Saturday, January 15, 2022

 

Police Brutality Against Voters? The 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum

This content was originally written for an undergraduate or Master's program. It is published as part of our mission to showcase peer-leading papers written by students during their studies. This work can be used for background reading and research, but should not be cited as an expert source or used in place of scholarly articles/books.

On the 1st of October 2017, the Spanish constitutional crisis in Catalonia came to a showdown between the independence movement and the central government. The confrontation had been in the making since 2010 and aimed at liberation from Madrid. On that day, the Catalan government conducted a ‘legal and binding [independence] referendum’ (Deutsche Welle, 2016b), which had been prohibited by the Tribunal Constitucional (TC), the Constitutional Court of Spain. Despite this, the vote proceeded and was disrupted by 10,000 Policía Nacional (National Police Force) and Guardia Civil (Civil Guard) officers on the orders of the Spanish government (BBC, 2017e; March, 2018, pp. 72-86). During the referendum the policemen used force which was immediately branded as police brutality by pro-independence organisations (Òmnium Cultural, 2017), NGOs (Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de España, 2017), members of the Catalan government and supporters (The Guardian, 2017), the international press (BBC, 2017a; BBC, 2017b; La Vanguardia, 2017c), and international politicians (Deutsche Welle, 2017b). Throughout the next month human rights activist groups, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, claimed to have collected evidence of the mistreatment of citizens and concluded that the state forces had used excessive force (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Amnesty International, 2017b; Amnesty International, 2017c; Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de España, 2017).

As a result of the referendum the political situation spiralled, Carles Puigdemont[1] and the Catalan government declared independence, which in turn prompted the Spanish government to invoke article 155 of the constitution, thereby removing the autonomous privileges of the region (Birke and Kellner, 2017; Ubasart-González, 2021, pp. 48-49). In addition, the Spanish judiciary prosecuted the Catalan independence leaders that had not fled the country (ibid.; Garcia Valdivia, 2019). Since then, the issue has continued to dominate regional politics and regularly flares up nationally, for example in 2019 when the Catalan politicians were sentenced, and in early 2021 when the rapper Pablo Hasél[2] was sent to prison for recidivism (Burgen and Jones, 2019; Congostrina, Bono and Carranco, 2021). Thus, independence remains a contemporary and highly contentious issue.

The intention of this article, however, is not to analyse the independence issue itself, as so many others have done before, but instead to focus on the events of the 1st of October 2017. The central aim is to investigate whether or not the federal government employed police violence or brutality in order to suppress the vote/the voters. Perplexingly enough, the academic community has thus far not conducted extensive investigations into the accusation of police brutality. Instead, the conclusion drawn by the Human Rights organisations and the most prominent media has prevailed. The consensus is, in fact, so dominant, that academic articles casually refer to “police brutality” in their research as if it was an elemental and proven fact. To name a few examples: Cornelis Martin Renes (2019, p. 43): ‘the violent repression of the Catalan referendum’ (my emphasis), Antonio Reyes (2020, p. 486): ‘police brutality in dispersing unarmed citizens who aimed to express their opinions through voting’ (my emphasis), and Ignasi Bernat and David Whyte (2020, p. 762): ‘a number of visible instances of state violence’ (my emphasis). The only available academic research on the topic has been carried out by Núria Pujol-Moix (2019), a professor emeritus of the Autonomous University of Barcelona for medicine. However, the analysis was published on a non-academic, pro-independence website, which casts at least a certain amount of doubt on the impartiality of the investigation. Thus, there is no pre-existing academic literature on the use of force by the state during the Catalan independence referendum 2017 as of October 2021. This article aims to rectify the situation by providing scholarly analysis and understanding the gap between public perception and the existing data.

Summarily, this article aims to scrutinise the alleged police brutality during the Catalan independence referendum 2017 (abbreviated as 1-O) by contextualising, analysing, and evaluating the available data. Accordingly, the primary research question is:

Were the accusations of police violence and brutality during the Catalan independence referendum 2017 justified, or did the state utilize legitimate force during an illegal public assembly? What are the wider implications?

This study, however, is not trying to defend any form of police violence or brutality – protesters should never be mistreated by state forces – instead, this work aims to examine the specific occurrences on the 1st of October 2017 and offer an alternative interpretation.

Limitations

There are several limitations to this investigation. Firstly, and as previously mentioned, little secondary research has been done on the topic, and if at all, then focussed on separate but related issues. And while these academic works provide context, they do not offer examinations on state interference. Thus, this research relies largely on primary sources such as official statements, newspaper articles, NGO reports, and testimonials. Secondly, the most critically important primary source for this work is in Catalan, not Spanish – however, it consists mainly of data sets and tables, which allows for the translation with a dictionary. Nonetheless, this is a potential source of error, which I have tried to counteract with transparency. I have included my translations of the publicly available data in the appendix for perusal. Thirdly and finally, all other sources are either in German, English, or Spanish. Wherever possible I have attempted to rely on English sources (for accessibility), however, the Spanish resources often offer more detailed accounts which is why they feature heavily.

The definition of police brutality

To avoid any miscommunication or misconceptions, and to preserve this research’s unequivocalness, precise definitions are determined for the terms: police force, violence, and brutality. A differentiation between the terms force and brutality can be found in Lawrence’s “The Politics of Force Media and the Construction of Police Brutality”(2000). She suggests that the term force is used for legal and necessary violence, while unnecessary force describes a situation where excessive violence is used unintentionally and without malice (e.g. officers with insufficient training or lack of rational assessment). Police brutalityon the other hand, is disproportionately used force with malevolent intent (Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993, pp. 19-20; Lawrence, 2000, pp. 18-32). Another term used frequently in this context is unnecessary or excessive violence, which will be equated with unnecessary force. These definitions direct the use of the terms in this research – the referenced sources, however, might differ from this accord.

Apart from the theoretical problem of defining the terms, the practical application of force by law enforcement officers presents a much graver issue. Recognising, and regulating applied force heavily relies on the circumstances and the individual judgment of the officer – in some situations a verbal prompt might be enough to prevent illegal or dangerous conduct, however, more often than not the officer has to revert to physical force to restrain a person or even fire his gun in self-defence (Alpert and Dunham, 2004, pp. 1-16; Goff et al., 2016, pp. 5-8). This makes it supremely difficult to offer extensive guidance to officers, or states when composing legislation, as can be observed in the official United Nations “Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials”:

‘5. Whenever the lawful use of force and firearms is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall:

(a) Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate objective to be achieved;

(b) Minimize damage and injury, and respect and preserve human life;

[…]

8. Exceptional circumstances such as internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked to justify any departure from these basic principles.

[…]

13. In the dispersal of assemblies that are unlawful but non-violent, law enforcement officials shall avoid the use of force or, where that is not practicable, shall restrict such force to the minimum extent necessary.’ (United Nations, 27/08-07/09/1990)

The guidance offers the most common substructure for national legislation concerning law enforcement, however, phrases like ‘act in proportion to the seriousness of the offence’ (ibid.) and ‘minimum extent’ (ibid.) are highly subjective and open to interpretation (Goff et al., 2016, pp. 7-8). Thus, offering very limited support and guidance, which is mirrored by the instruction offered by NGOs (Amnesty International, 2015), the European Union (Council of the European Union, 2012; Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, 2001), and national governments. Spanish guidelines that were active during the 1-O include the “Código Normativo de Fuerzas y Cuerpos de Seguridad del Estado”, a regulatory code for state security forces and bodies (Ministerio del Interior, 2009), the “Código de la Policía Nacional” (Gobierno de España, 2021a) and the “Código de la Guardia Civil” (Gobierno de España, 2021b). However, as already mentioned, there is little guidance on the handling of the use of force that exceeds the UN Principles.

Consequently, this work will not rely on subjective assessments, but instead, on the publicly available datasets of injured protesters and law enforcement officers. Accordingly, this article will consider both sides of the conflict, and allow for a data-driven assessment in an effort to fact-check the hysteria produced by the media, NGOs, and regional as well as national governments. Once again, this is not meant to portray or assess individual incidents.

The history of Catalan independence and the 1-O

Separatism up to 2017

Catalonia has been a part of Spain with a lot of regional identity (and push for self-governance) since the 15th century, but after the democratisation of the country post-fascism in the 1970s, it officially acquired a degree of regional autonomy (Tortella, 2017, pp. 29-48). Since then, secession had been a minority sentiment, but with the remodelling of the Statute of Autonomy in 2006 and the subsequent appeal against it the situation changed dramatically (Beltrán de Felipe, 2019, pp. 1-37; Cetrà, 2019, pp. 87-123). The proposed changes to the Statute included aspects such as the elevation of Catalan (the language) above Spanish, the obligation to teach Catalan in schools, and crucial reforms in fiscal and administrative matters which generated displeasure among the PP, the Partido Popular, one of the national parties (Beltrán de Felipe, 2019, pp. 8-12; Cetrà, 2019, pp. 87-123). Eventually, Mariano Rajoy, the head of the PP and later Prime Minister of Spain, and other members filed an appeal against the Statute with the Audiencia Nacional de España, the Spanish National Court. The legal proceedings lasted until 2010 when the court decided that 14 articles of the Statute were unconstitutional, and 27 needed further legal review (Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2010). Primarily, the illegitimate parts were centred around the minor judicial and financial aspects, but more prominently around the preferential treatment of Catalan over Spanish. And while this decision affirmed the claims of the PP, it also led to widespread protests all over Catalonia with an estimated attendance of more than a million people in Barcelona alone (Friend, 2012, pp. 73-107; BBC, 2010; CNN, 2010). Thus, secessionist sentiment grew steadily.

In the following years, independence from Madrid grew to be the central issue in Catalonia, in fact, it developed so much that a coalition between independence parties called Junts pel Sí (JxSí), “Together for Yes”, was formed for the 2015 regional elections (Heller, 2015). The vote was considered an indicator of popular opinion and awarded the separatist movement a 48% majority – not an absolute majority – but still a success for the pro-independence faction (BBC, 2015). They formed a coalition, took over the regional government, and proclaimed the ‘”inicio del proceso” hacia la independencia’ (‘“beginning of the process” towards independence’) (Julve, 2015; Noguer, 2015). The central government reacted to the initiation by threatening legal, political, and military action (Field, 2015, pp. 116-136; García, 2016, pp. 229-252; Martí and Cetrà, 2016, pp. 107-119). Thus, the situation in 2016 was fraught with conflict when Carles Puigdemont, the newly elected president of the Generalitat, announced a referendum for the following year (Berwick and Cobos, 2016; March, 2018, pp. 13-18).

October 1st, 2017: the independence referendum

In late 2015 the Spanish national elections failed to produce a government, thereby causing another election in June 2016 (Alberola, 2016) with the ultimate outcome of a minority government under Mariano Rajoy (Jones, 2016; Eldridge, 2021). Meanwhile, the secessionist movement had gained momentum and the president of the Catalan Generalitat Carles Puigdemont announced a legally binding referendum for October 2017 (Deutsche Welle, 2016a; Deutsche Welle, 2016b). Rajoy and the Spanish government rejected those assertions and claimed it would do everything in its power to prevent the secession of any form (Berwick and Cobos, 2016). During the next seven months, there were two meetings with representatives of both sides, however, neither resulted in a compromise (March, 2018, p. 17). The situation worsened when the date for the referendum was announced on the 9th of June and the Catalan parliament started passing legislation to facilitate it (ibid., pp. 19, 45-46; Jones, 2017a).

In the months before October, Catalonia passed political and legal proceedings to accommodate the vote strategically. For example, the bill for the referendum was logged with parliament on the 31st of July, the last day before the summer recess, leaving no time for discussion (March, 2018, p. 55). Moreover, on the 6th of September, it was then suddenly introduced in the plenum, and under legal modifications, itwas ratified (Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017a; Puente, 2017b). The law established the legal framework for the referendum but was suspended ‘on a precautionary basis’ (Tribunal Constitucional, 2017) via the appeal of the Spanish government to the TC on the next day (ibid.; Pérez, 2017; Cortizo, 2017a).

In addition to the legal prohibition, the central government made every effort to block the vote. Thus, the original plan of using public funds – provided by the central government – for the referendum, was thwarted by the Public Prosecutors Office when they asked the Generalitat to pay bail of more than 6 million euros to prevent misuse (Parera, 2017; 20 Minutos Editora, 2017; Marraco, 2017). Madrid and the Public Prosecutors Office also ordered the seizure of voting materials such as ballot boxes, voting papers, voting station manuals, etc. (Navarro, 2017; Europa Press, 2017b) and the closure of all governmentally run webpages advertising or offering instructions for the vote (El Diario, 2017a). Overall, the seizure of the materials concluded in an unsatisfactory manner, since the vote went ahead with enough materials (El Mundo, 2017; El Nacional, 2017; El Confidencial, 2017; Marín, 2017; Público, 2017; Zuloaga, 2017). The repression of online communication about the referendum was equally unsuccessful since the pro-independence leaders and organisations were supported by Russian hackers (Alandete, Dolz, and Busquets, 2017; El Diario, 2017a). Apart from these efforts, traditional media and regional politicians were dissuaded from aiding the vote which resulted in several municipalities cancelling pro-independence events and rallies (Bandera, 2017; La Vanguardia, 2017b). The suppression of information about the referendum was then topped by the operations Anubis and Copernicus, the first one facilitating the arrest of political actors that were actively organising the referendum (Arroyo, 2017; El Diario, 2017b) and the second one deployed 10,000 National Police and Civil Guard officers to Catalonia prior to the referendum (BBC, 2017e; March, 2018, pp. 72-86). Thus, the Spanish government had exhausted every legal and political avenue to obstruct the vote and prepared to use force, which was massively criticised (Altimira, 2017; Cortizo, 2017b; Letamendia, 2018).

The organisation of the referendum itself relied on volunteers who hid and transported polling materials, as well as manned the voting stations. Since everything was carried out secretly, a lot of the materials arrived just in time on the day before the referendum. The polling stations were set up in the early morning surrounded by cheering crowds and only occasionally hindered by the Mossos d’Esquadra, the regional police force (which largely abstained from interfering during the voting) (Berwick and Dowsett, 2017), the National Police, and the Civil Guard (Sallés, 2017). Polling stations were prepared from 8 a.m. onwards, opened at 9 a.m., and closed at 8 p. m. (Diari Oficial de la Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017b, p. 4; Congostrina, 2017). Over the course of the day, the Policía Nacional closed 46 polling stations, and the Guardia Civil another 46 with a total of twelve injured state officers reported by the Ministry of Interior on the night of the 1st of October (Ministerio del Interior, 2017). However, the number dramatically increased over the next 24 hours, first to 39 and on Monday to 431 – the Ministry of Interior explained that police officers with any form of injury (bruises, scratches, etc.) were now counted too (La Vanguardia, 2017d). The sudden rise in injuries was attributed to the statistics released by the Catalan Health Department, which initially reported 844 injured people, but later corrected the number to 1,066 (Iglesias, 2017; Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017b; Generalitat de Catalunya, 2018). Spanish media accused both sides, but especially the Catalan officials, of inflating the numbers, for example, with anxiety attacks of people who had not even been present during the voting (Congostrina, 2017; El País, 2017b). A manager of the hospital system in Catalonia, who remains anonymous in Iglesias’ article, expressed that ‘los números se han inflado’ (‘the numbers were inflated’) (2017).

Madrid, on the other hand, was heavily criticised for using excessive force, some news outlets and politicians even denounced it as police brutality (BBC, 2017a; BBC, 2017b; The Guardian, 2017; Deutsche Welle, 2017a). The images on social media provoked outrage among the Spanish and international audience, which called for the suspension of the action (Congostrina, 2017). Politicians and international organisations around Europe demanded the end of the police violence on the day and condemned it in the following days (Council of Europe, 2017; Deutsche Welle, 2017b; El Diario, 2017c; Minder and Barry, 2017). In fact, Greg Russell claims that the German chancellor Angela Merkel interfered on the behalf of the Catalans (2018) to end the action early, and while there is no official source to corroborate the allegation, some other media outlets and organisations confirm a premature end of the police intervention (Greenfield, Russell, and Slawson, 2017; López-Fonseca, 2017a). According to these articles, the state forces retreated between 1-2 p. m., hours before the end of voting.

The outcome of the referendum was announced during the night and, as predicted, showed an overwhelming majority in favour of independence. 2,262,424 people voted – roughly 42% of the electorate (5.3 million) – however, allegedly about 770,000 votes went missing due to the state interruptions according to officials (Greenfield, Russell, and Slawson, 2017). In total, the yes-ballots amounted to 90%, hence giving Catalonia the right to secede under the stipulations of the suspended Referendum Law (El Plural, 2017; Minder and Barry, 2017). Five days later, on Friday the 6th of October, the result of the vote was officially presented to the Catalan parliament, which counted additional 23,793 ballots, and confirmed the turnout of 43%, with 90% pro-independence and 8% against (Puente, 2017a; Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017a).

The results of the referendum were subsequently contested[3], and unsurprisingly not accepted by the Madrid government (Gobierno de España, 2017). In the aftermath, Carles Puigdemont declared independence but suspended the declaration immediately in order to open up the dialogue with Rajoy (BBC, 2017d; La Vanguardia, 2017e). The subsequent confusion over the declaration led the Prime Minister of Spain to declare an ultimatum on whether or not Catalonia had declared independence (Minder, 2017b; Jones, 2017b), but when it expired without a clear answer from Barcelona, he asked the Senate to approve the application of article 155 of the constitution in order to suspend the regional autonomy (Díez and Mateo, 2017; Gobierno de España, 2016). In reaction to that, the Catalan government issued a declaration of independence on the 27th of October, the same day that Mariano Rajoy’s request for the implementation of article 155 was approved. Thereupon the Catalan parliament was dissolved, regional elections were called, and several politicians fled the country (Parlament de Catalunya, 2017; Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2017a; Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2017b; Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2017c; Castro and Ponce de Léon, 2017). The rest of the regional government was summoned to court, trialled, and then sentenced on the grounds of sedition and misuse of public funds (Garcia Valdivia, 2019). The ruling caused protests, especially in the streets of Barcelona, but overall, it was the final nail in the coffin for the 2017 referendum, albeit not for the independence movement (Burgen and Jones, 2019).

The allegations of police violence and brutality during the referendum spread across the world in a matter of hours. However, in the aftermath, contradictory evidence emerged. Allegedly, several of the images, videos, and stories that sparked international outrage were either exaggerated or from other incidents (ABC Cataluña, 2017; Confilegal, 2017; Libertad Digital, 2017; Preston, 2017). In addition, the accusation of inflation of the statistics of the injured people, officers, and protesters alike, surfaced (BBC, 2017c; Iglesias, 2017).

Despite these contradictions, two highly influential human rights organisations, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, published reports on the referendum supporting the allegations of the excessive police force (Amnesty International, 2017b; Amnesty International, 2017c; Human Rights Watch, 2017). Amnesty International reported on polling stations in Barcelona (Amnesty International, 2017c), while Human Rights Watch investigated in Girona, Aigneviva, and Fonollosa (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Both concluded that excessive use of force by the police occurred. In addition to the accusations of police violence, intimidation of journalists has also been pointed out by Reporters Without Borders and newspapers (Amnesty International, 2017a; Gálvez, 2017; La Vanguardia, 2017a; Reporters Without Borders, 2017a; Reporters Without Borders, 2017b). The allegations led to judicial proceedings, but the difficulties of identification of perpetrators and insufficient evidence often resulted in dismissal (Confilegal, 2017; Libertad Digital, 2017). Overall, Libertad Digital argues that the state forces got away lightly and that in reality, the number of injured civilians was at about 130 – a far cry from the initial 844 (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017b) and the later reported 1,066 injured people (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017c; Generalitat de Catalunya, 2018).

Statistical analysis of the state interference

As described above was the situation before, during, and after the referendum – a lot of allegations from all sides. For a rational, factual, and critical assessment of the state-used force, the official statistics (published by the Catalan Generalitat and the Spanish government) must be evaluated and put into context on a numerical level. Antecedently, two basic disclaimers have to be elaborated. Firstly, this is foremost a statistical assessment, it is not an appraisal of individual incidents. The outcome, therefore, reflects the average occurrences (or non-occurrences). Secondly, at best, the available data is non-transparent and obscure, due to changing figures, allegations of manipulation, and exaggeration, in addition to the unverifiability of the evidence. Therefore, this analysis will focus on the common trend that manifests despite these limitations.

Proportion of population/electorate/injured people

Catalonia accounts for 16% of Spain’s population and was quantified at approximately 7.5 million in 2017 (Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya, 2020). From that population about 5.3 million people were eligible to vote in the referendum of which 2.3 million submitted a valid ballot (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017a) – additionally, officials claimed that circa 770,000 ballots went unaccounted for due to the police intervention (Greenfield, Russell, and Slawson, 2017). This discrepancy of a fourth of the ballots would impact the statistical considerations heavily, however, the most verifiable and only official number records 2.3 million votes[4]. It is therefore used as the baseline for all following statistical considerations.

As can be seen in Figures 1 and 2 the relative number of injured people to the electorate is minuscule. Disregarding the whole electorate, the total of injured people to voters still comprises a tiny minority (Figure 3). The following table (Figure 4) shows this with additional clarity, less than 0.05% of the citizens that voted reported injuries. Unquestionably, every injury to a peaceful protester is an individual injustice, however, these statistics imply that either the alleged police violence and brutality must have occurred in confined incidents since far less than 1% sought medical help, or it did not occur in the breadth commonly assumed. The accusations of widespread police brutality are in fact diametrically opposed to the here provided evidence.

The reported severity of the injuries

On the matter of injury severity, a report called “Primer d’Octubre” was published by the Catalan Generalitat on the 1st of October 2018, which listed the injury types and gravities. Figure 5 summarises these injuries in a table in English, while Figure 6 compiles the degrees of severity in the reported injuries from the same source. The table in Figure 5 shows that the majority of the injuries fall in the categories of bruises, in fact, they make up 83.3% of them. This high percentage implies that “little” force was used against the voters and protesters, thereby undermining the claims of police brutality. Figure 6 reports on the gravity in three categories: mild, moderate, and grave – with few people being moderately or gravely injured (less than 17%). On the account of these numbers, it becomes clear that most people suffered no or mild injuries. Comparatively, less than 1% of all injured people endured severe harm and the data offers no specification on how people obtained their injuries and whether they were caused by the police directly, indirectly, or not at all.

Overall, this report by the Generalitat highlights the low number of major injuries, thereby contradicting the claims of widespread police brutality further. Police violence on the other hand is less severe and cannot be challenged as much with the offered data, but the overarching implication of little applied force against civilians prevails. Furthermore, it should also be noted that the Generalitat only published the comprehensive statistics a year after the incidents occurred, thereby limiting or even obstructing the verifiability of the report. Thus, the validity can be questioned and the numbers in relation to the wider picture present a different story than the media or the Catalan government at the time.

Comparison of police presence during 1-O and El Clásico in 2019

In addition to the reported numbers of injured people, an assessment of the ratio between civilians and police officers can be made. Multiple sources confirmed that circa 10,000 National Police and Civil Guard officers were sent to Catalonia in anticipation of the referendum (BBC, 2017e; March, 2018, pp. 72-86). The Mossos d’Esquadra, which has about 17,000 officers (Mossos d’Esquadra, 2021), announced prior to the voting day that they would only stop public unrest (López-Fonseca, 2017b; Minder, 2017a). They refused to shut down polling stations, abstained from interfering, and ultimately only observed the voting (Berwick and Dowsett, 2017).

Ergo, at the time of voting, there were 10,000 police officers ready to interfere. To estimate whether the police presence was proportionate to the event, it will be compared to the security presence during the football game: El Clásico. Usually, the game between Barcelona FC and Real Madrid draws big crowds, but in 2019 it was moved due to massive protests after the sentencing of the Catalan independence leaders. When the match took place months later, additional police forces were sent to oversee it. Barcelona’s stadium accommodates roughly 100,000 people and in 2019 1,000 police officers plus an additional 2,000 stadium stewards were employed for safety (Lowe, 2019). Official police sources say that in addition to the stadium audience about 5,000 people protested in the streets (Keely, 2019), which adjusts the ratio for El Clásico to 105:1 protesters/officers (only counting the official police officers) in Figure 7. In comparison, the ratio was 230:1 on the day of the referendum. Despite the amendment for El Clásico, the discrepancy between the police presence at both events is extremely significant, with more than a doubled ratio of officers for the football game. In addition, this comparison only considers the valid votes that were reported, but the number of people on the street on the 1st of October 2017 could have been significantly higher. On the contrary, it could be argued that many of the voters cast their ballot and then left due to the police presence – the actual number of average present people could therefore vary dramatically, which is why the ballot number is assumed as the most rational and plausible number. Despite these considerations, the ratio between police officers and voters remains in disfavour for the police forces and indicates that they were severely outnumbered, at least at the height of the confrontation at the 1-O.

Considering the agitation and conflict that surrounds the subject and prior incidents would allow for the reasonable assumption that the Spanish government should have been aware of the potential, but still sent insufficient numbers of officers. So why did they? The National Police has about 70,000 officers, while the Guardia Civil has roughly 80,000 employees (López-Fonseca, 2020), which, if all officers had been sent, would have reduced the ratio to 15:1 – a lack of police force was therefore not the reason. Sending all of them, however, would not have been practical, but even an increased number would have provided relief and possibly prevented the referendum, but they did not. Thus, the decision to only send 10,000 officers has two possible explanations: either they anticipated less trouble, or it was a deliberate decision. Perhaps it is possible that the police force was not sent to prevent the referendum, but to present a feasible objection to it, so that the central government could oppose the outcome on additional grounds, but at the same time could not be accused of military suppression of public opinion.

Contrasting police intervention and non-intervention

To further the previous point, another aspect must be examined: the restraint of the police intervention. Overall, Catalonia had 2,315 polling stations on the day of the referendum and according to the official statement of the Ministry of Interior, only 92 of them experienced police intervention (Güell, 2017; March, 2018, p. 88; Ministerio del Interior, 2017). An additional 400 reportedly were shut down beforehand and hence recorded no ballots (El Plural, 2017). Figure 8 summarises the interferences before and during the referendum – the 400 polling stations that were closed prior to the referendum are displayed, but since they weren’t closed on the day of the referendum, there is no link to the police brutality allegations on 1-O. Overall, the table shows that there was little police interference, since less than 4% of the polling stations were either closed or the ballots seized.

These statistics combined with the findings from the comparison of police presence during El Clásico and the referendum suggest a very limited extent of police presence and interferences. Further support for this assessment comes from the accounts of the early dissipation of the police action on the 1st of October – some sources claim as early as 2 P.M. (Greenfield, Russell, and Slawson, 2017; López-Fonseca, 2017a). The accuracy of these claims is contested since they are not mentioned in the official announcement (Ministerio del Interior, 2017) and Human Rights Watch dates one police intervention in Aiguaviva at around 4 P.M. (Human Rights Watch, 2017). But the overarching implication remains: few police officers took little action.

Evaluating the evidence presented by human rights organisations

Despite these quantitative discrepancies between the media portrayal and the confirmed numbers, two highly influential human rights organisations, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International, published reports on the referendum supporting the allegations of excessive police violence (Amnesty International, 2017b; Amnesty International, 2017c; Human Rights Watch, 2017). Five observers of Amnesty International reported on polling stations in Barcelona (Amnesty International, 2017c), while Human Rights Watch investigated during and after the referendum in the local towns of Girona, Aigneviva, and Fonollosa (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Both organisations claim to have witnessed evidence of the incidents in the reports, but the proof is not made publicly available (video material, medical records, etc.) and inquiries for evidence (calls, emails) have gone unanswered. Having acknowledged these struggles of verifiability and assessment, both groups are commonly considered to be credible, and they have published congruent judgments of the situations. They were also issued nine days apart and covered the mentioned different locations, thereby making an emulation unlikely.

If we assume all data presented by the NGOs to be accurate, the NGOs reported 14 detailed cases, and an additional 20. In total 34 cases are offered, which means summarily both NGOs have accounted for 3.2% of the officially reported cases, or alternatively found 34 additional cases[5], which would heighten the total number of injured people to 1,100. However, HRW abstains from describing 20 cases, and the detailed incidents that are presented cover little more than 1%, diminishing its statistical relevance. Apart from that, Amnesty International and HRW selected the cases, thus ensuring that the most severe are reported (unsurprising, since the purpose of a human rights organisation is to collect the breaches of human rights, not the adherence). They also neglect to elaborate on the incidents they observed where police violence and brutality were absent. With the assumption of accuracy, this confirms that disproportionate violence was used by police officers in a few cases, but it equally affirms the fact that it was taciturn for the most part.

Additional considerations

To conclude all statistical considerations, two additional points need to be made: firstly, on the government statistics and secondly, on the trials after the 1-O.

The statistical evidence presented and explained rests upon official Catalan government numbers from the 1st of October 2018 (Generalitat de Catalunya, 2018). Notably, they were published a full year after the event and included anxiety attacks as well as people with single bruises – are those conditions, or injuries that can be classed as police violence or even brutality? Both categories together make up for 47% of the injuries listed (Figure 5) and have been subjected to allegations of inflation (Iglesias, 2017). However, these allegations are not only levelled at one side (ibid.; BBC, 2017c; The Premium Times, 2017) since the police injury count also jumped from 39 to 431 overnight[6]. But in contrast to the statistics published by the Catalan Health Department, the national government explained that the increase stems from the officers that obtained bruises, scratches, and bites (El País, 2017c).

The second remark concerns the judicial proceedings against police forces accused of police brutality. Most of them were dismissed, either due to lack of identification of the individual officer or because sufficient evidence was missing (The Local, 2019; García, 2019). Overall, eight policemen were formally investigated by a Spanish court, a microscopic figure in proportion to the police presence (The Local, 2019). Principally, however, the low number of investigations is not indicative of a lack of police brutality, but it underlines the argument of this work.

Conclusion: Police Brutality Against Voters?

After the consideration of the presented evidence, we return to the initial research question:

Were the accusations of police violence and brutality during the Catalan independence referendum 2017 justified, or did the state utilise legitimate force during an illegal public assembly? What are the wider implications?

Through the statistical considerations of officially reported numbers, I have tried to demonstrate the discrepancy between the representation of the state action during the 1-O (medial and academic) and the official reports. This inconsistency derives from differences between the allegations of police violence and brutality and the low numbers of deployed police officers, the low interference rate at polling stations (less than 4%), the small number of injured people compared to voters, and the relatively low injury severity. In addition, the reports of the early withdrawal – albeit not officially verified – support the line of argument. The evaluation of the NGO reports, that present counter-evidence to my assessment, lacks statistical relevance (reported on 1-3.2% of cases) for an assessment of widespread police brutality. Moreover, the absence of verifiable evidence, the imprecision of the descriptions, the reporting of only excessive police force incidents, and the missing total number of investigated incidents obscure the picture further.

In conclusion, there were incidents of police violence and brutality, but the majority of the collisions between the state’s police forces and protesters resulted in none or few and predominantly minor injuries. What was published on social media, in traditional media, and the reports of the NGOs, therefore, shows the experiences of a rather limited number of people during 1-O, but has dominated public perception to an unwarranted degree. This portrayal has led to a judgment of the proportionality of the police action that is contradictory to the official facts and needs rectification. This result, however, does not justify police violence or brutality against peaceful demonstrators, which is and remains reprehensible as well as not worthy of a constitutional state, but shows that from a purely quantitative point of view there was hardly any police violence or brutality.

Additionally, and in the broader context of the Catalan-Spanish relations, these findings run counter to the general narrative. Typically, the Catalan minority presents itself or is depicted as the oppressed (Òmnium Cultural, 2017; La Opinión a Coruña, 2017; Renes, 2019; Guinjoan and Rodon, 2017; Rico, 2017; Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya, 2017; Síndic de Greuges de Catalunya, 2018). The media coverage that followed the referendum in 2017 proves this, with Òmnium Cultural (2017), politicians like Carles Puigdemont (Masó, 2020), and news outlets (La Opinión a Coruña, 2017; Guinjoan and Rodon, 2017; Rico, 2017) painting Catalans as subjugated. In this story, the Spanish state is often labelled as a ‘francoesque tyrant’ (BBC, 2019) or the oppressor (Miley and Garvía, 2019). The publicly circulated happenings of the referendum affirmed the depiction, but the here presented analysis contradicts the traditional picture.

I would therefore argue that the public perception is flawed and has fallen prey to Catalan propaganda. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the central government has not contributed to the attitude of earlier and much more violent reactions to civil unrest. Furthermore, one could argue that the dispatching of the National Police and Civil Guard can be understood as an attempt at oppression, and even if the interference was largely moderate it was still authority enforcement through violence. Apart from that, the refusal to negotiate after the referendum seemingly validated the tyrant label, even if the non-agreement was based on a reasonable principle, and therefore exacerbated the political deadlock.

As is evident from the history of Spanish-Catalan relations, regional independence has been an issue for the past ten years and the 1-O was only the most recent pinnacle. There is no solution in sight, and most of the blame for the political impasse can be placed on the Spanish government – they have ignored the demands for change since 2010. If the Spanish government wants to keep Catalonia and the other regions with similar aspirations as a part of Spain, they will have to consider fundamental change, and enter negotiations. Otherwise, as has been seen in history time and time again, the issue has serious potential to turn insurmountable. Ireland, for example, descended into a war of independence when the British Empire refused to implement Home Rule – resulting in a continued conflict on the island (Regan, 2007, pp. 197-223).

On the positive side, I believe the situation between Madrid and Barcelona has not yet reached irreversibility, especially since the recent COVID-19 pandemic disrupted the drive of the movement. Regional secessionism has lost its momentum for now, which offers a window of opportunity. But in order to produce a solution, the Spanish government needs to accept that ignoring the political demands of Catalonia will yield no resolution. A compromise has to be reached and thus far, Catalonia has demonstrated the greater willingness, while Madrid continues to bury its head in the sand. The flames of the Catalan independence movement can flare up again at any time, as seen after the incarceration of Pablo Hasél. The accusations of police brutality were thus only one attempt in Catalonia’s history of incitement for independence support.

Notes

[1] At the time the President of the Catalan Generalitat (regional parliament) who led the parties that organised the referendum.

[2] For more information on Pablo Hasél please read Congostrina, Bono and Carranco (2021).

[3] The referendum was considered invalid on several different grounds by international observer missions. For further information please see: El Plural, 2017; International Limited Observation Mission, 2017; Colomé, 2017; Europa Press, 2017a; De Rabassa, 2017 and El País, 2017a.

[4] As mentioned earlier (Footnote 3) due to the non-compliance of the administration with international voting guidelines electoral fraud was possible, thereby further diminishing the reliability of the number.

[5] Or anything in between since it remains unclear if the NGO-recorded injuries are part of the official statistics.

[6] The injured police officers will not be considered at this point because it would go beyond the scope of this work.

FOR CHARTS, SOURCES AND APPENDIX CLICK HERE Police Brutality Against Voters? The 2017 Catalan Independence Referendum (e-ir.info)


Tackling Loss and Damage: Who Is Most Vulnerable to Disaster Displacement?

These tools mark a step change in our ability to assess displacement risk, especially at global level.


January 13, 2022 by International Institute for Environment and Development 


Drawing on recent research, Simon Addison and Sam Barrett explain why disaster displacement risk assessments must integrate better quality data on the specific vulnerabilities of different people to escalating climate risks.

At COP26, vulnerable developing countries highlighted the urgent need to address loss and damage caused by climate-related disasters, and for their international donor partners to step up and provide significant financial support for them to do so.

The COP also drove home how population displacement caused by extreme weather events is now one of the most pressing forms of loss and damage and needs immediate attention.

The number of people affected by climate- and weather-related disasters has more than tripled since the 1970s, and the number of people forced from their homes due to destructive climate events has also escalated dramatically.

Worldwide, over 283 million people were displaced by weather-related disasters between 2008 and 2020, and over 30 million in 2020 alone – mainly in poor regions of Africa, Asia and Central America.

The frequency and intensity of climate shocks will worsen as global heating increases, and will be most devastating for the poorest people most vulnerable to climate change. In the least developed countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) entire communities and even nations may be forced to migrate.

To address disaster displacement effectively, governments, civil society organisations (CSOs) and their international partners – including donor governments, multilateral development banks and UN agencies – must build a good understanding of:
How populations at risk are likely to be impacted as extreme weather events intensify
Who is likely to be displaced as those events escalate and compound over time, and
The challenges facing populations, once displaced.

In recent years, our understanding of disaster displacement risks has evolved rapidly, and so too have the approaches and tools we can use to understand them better. A variety of tools are now available, some of which – like probabilistic models – can even predict how many people might be displaced to particular locations due to hazards such as floods, storms and sea-level rise.

These tools mark a step change in our ability to assess displacement risk, especially at global level.

But IIED’s latest research, to be published this month, has found the tools are limited in providing detailed data on the specific vulnerabilities of different people to different climate hazards; this data could help decision-makers to design and deliver projects that better meet the needs of displaced people.

No two people experience the same level of displacement risk. Vulnerability to climate shocks varies dramatically depending on a range of social, economic and cultural factors, such as gender, age, physical ability, ethnicity, income level, asset ownership, food security, and access to essential services and social protection.

To be effective, assessments of disaster displacement risk must consider the diverse ways that different individuals, households, communities and social groups might be affected by climate shocks.

Unless risk assessment methodologies integrate the different factors that expose different people to different types and levels of displacement risk, the results they generate will not provide the full picture on who is at risk from particular hazards, or how they may be impacted differently.

Mind the data gap


Our research found that most displacement risk assessment methodologies only predict the number of people likely to be displaced due to a particular type of extreme weather event. None of the approaches we reviewed either integrate or generate robust data on the ways different types of people may be more or less vulnerable, or resilient, to climate shocks.

As a result, they cannot provide detailed insights into the extent to which different groups might be at risk of disaster displacement, or how they might be impacted if displaced.

This creates a serious gap, not only in our understanding of disaster displacement risks and how people most vulnerable to these risks are affected, but also in the data available to inform the design and delivery of interventions to save lives, protect livelihoods and reduce disaster displacement risks in the face of escalating climate shocks.

We also found significant demand, among planners and programme managers responsible for delivering disaster response and risk reduction programmes, for more robust assessments of disaster displacement risks that include detailed data on vulnerability, as well as on resilience and adaptive capacity at community and household levels.

Better data can sharpen tools to assess displacement risk


Luckily, developers of disaster displacement assessment tools do not need to start from scratch to integrate such data into their models.

Over the past 20 years, researchers and practitioners in the climate adaptation and climate risk management communities have done a huge amount of research and developed many practical tools that can be used to assess vulnerability, resilience and adaptive capacity at the micro-level.

This learning offers disaster displacement specialists a wealth of options for integrating more robust, granular data into the tools they currently use.

But further research is required to understand how different forms of quantitative and qualitative data, generated at different scales and with different levels of detail, can be interwoven to produce more accurate, vulnerability-informed displacement risk assessments that can be used easily by operational decision-makers at sub-national and local levels.



This post was previously published on iied.org under a Creative Commons License .
10 years later, Costa Concordia disaster vivid for survivors

BY TRISHA THOMAS AND NICOLE WINFIELD• ASSOCIATED PRESS • JANUARY 12, 2022

The luxury cruise ship Costa Concordia lays on its starboard side after it ran aground off the coast of the Isola del Giglio island, Italy on Jan. 13, 2012. (Giuseppe Modesti/AP)

GIGLIO, Italy — Ten years may have passed since the Costa Concordia cruise ship slammed into a reef and capsized off this Tuscan island. But for the passengers on board and the residents who welcomed them ashore, the memories of that harrowing, freezing night remain minute-to-minute vivid.

The dinner plates that flew off the tables when the hull first slammed into the rocks. The blackout after the ship’s engine room flooded and generators failed. The final mad scramble to evacuate the listing liner and then the extraordinary generosity of Giglio islanders who offered shoes, sweatshirts and shelter until the sun rose and passengers were ferried to the mainland.

Italy on Thursday is marking the 10th anniversary of the Concordia disaster with a daylong commemoration that will end with a candlelit vigil near the moment the ship hit the reef: 9:45 p.m. on Jan. 13, 2012. The events will honor the 32 people who died that night, the 4,200 survivors, but also the residents of Giglio who took in passengers and crew and then lived with the Concordia carcass for another two years until it was righted and hauled away for scrap.

“For us islanders, when we remember some event, we always refer to whether it was before or after the Concordia,” said Matteo Coppa, who was 23 and out fishing on the jetty when the darkened Concordia listed toward shore and then collapsed onto its side.

“I imagine it like a nail stuck to the wall that marks that date, as a before and after,” he said, recounting how he joined the rescue effort that night helping pull ashore the dazed, injured and freezing passengers from lifeboats.

The anniversary comes as the cruise industry, shut down in much of the world for months because of the coronavirus pandemic, is once again in the spotlight because of COVID-19 outbreaks threatening passenger safety. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control last month warned people across-the-board not to go on cruises, regardless of their vaccination status, because of the risk of infection.

For Concordia survivor Georgia Ananias, the COVID-19 infections are just the latest evidence that passenger safety still isn’t a top priority for the industry. Passengers aboard the Concordia were largely left on their own to find life jackets and a functioning lifeboat after the captain steered the ship close too shore in a stunt. He then delayed an evacuation order until it was too late, with lifeboats unable to lower because the ship was listing too much.

“I always said this will not define me, but you have no choice,” Ananias said in an interview from her home in Los Angeles, Calif. “We all suffer from PTSD. We had a lot of guilt that we survived and 32 other people died.”

Prosecutors blamed the delayed evacuation order and conflicting instructions given by crew for the chaos that ensued as passengers scrambled to get off the ship. The captain, Francesco Schettino, is serving a 16-year prison sentence for manslaughter, causing a shipwreck and abandoning a ship before all the passengers and crew had evacuated.

Ananias and her family declined Costa’s initial $14,500 compensation offered to each passenger and sued Costa, a unit of U.S.-based Carnival Corp., to try to cover the cost of their medical bills and therapy for the post-traumatic stress they have suffered. But after eight years in the U.S. and then Italian court system, they lost their case.

“I think people need to be aware that when you go on a cruise, that if there is a problem, you will not have the justice that you may be used to in the country in which you are living,” said Ananias, who went onto become a top official in the International Cruise Victims association, an advocacy group that lobbies to improve safety aboard ships and increase transparency and accountability in the industry.

Costa didn’t respond to emails seeking comment on the anniversary. Cruise Lines International Association, the world’s largest cruise industry trade association, stressed in a statement to The Associated Press that passenger and crew safety was the industry’s top priority, and that cruising remains one of the safest vacation experiences available.

“Our thoughts continue to be with the victims of the Concordia tragedy and their families on this sad anniversary,” CLIA said. It said it has worked over the past 10 years with the International Maritime Organization and the maritime industry to “drive a safety culture that is based on continuous improvement.”

For Giglio Mayor Sergio Ortelli, the memories of that night run the gamut: the horror of seeing the capsized ship, the scramble to coordinate rescue services on shore, the recovery of the first bodies and then the pride that islanders rose to the occasion to tend to the survivors.

Ortelli was then on hand when, in September 2013, the 115,000-ton, 300-meter (1,000-foot) long liner was righted vertical off its seabed graveyard in an extraordinary feat of engineering. But the night of the disaster, a Friday the 13th, remains seared in his memory.

“It was a night that, in addition to being a tragedy, had a beautiful side because the response of the people was a spontaneous gesture that was appreciated around the world,” Ortelli said. It seemed the natural thing to do at the time.

“But then we realized that on that night, in just a few hours, we did something incredible.”
Ukraine Hit By Cyber Attack. Is Russia’s Next Move Invasion?

By Steve Balestrieri
Russian T-90 Tank. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

“Massive Cyberattack”, Briefly Cripples Ukraine Government Websites: Ukraine was hit by a massive cyberattack on several government websites on late Thursday and into early Friday. This comes just one day after talks between Russia and the United States trying to find a peaceful way out of a possible conflict in Ukraine broke down.

Meanwhile, the Russians, who already have massed more than 100,000 troops on Ukraine’s borders, released an ominous video of even more troops massing there, supposedly for another drill.

This Means Cyber War


The cyberattack, which targeted the foreign ministry, the cabinet of ministers, the ministries of energy, sports, agriculture, veterans’ affairs, and ecology, as well as many other government websites, posted a warning on the foreign ministry website in Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish warning Ukrainians that their personal data had been compromised.

“Ukrainians! All your personal data was uploaded to the internet,” the message read. “All data on the computer is being destroyed. All information about you has become public, be afraid and expect the worst,” it read.


It then listed historical grievances between Ukraine and Poland. Many cyber analysts believe that the listing of the three languages and the grievances posted were a ploy to deflect where the attack came from.

A Foreign Ministry spokesman told the AFP that due to the “massive cyberattack, the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a number of other government agencies are temporarily down.”

The Ukrainian government later released a message that it had restored nearly all of the sites that were affected by the cyberattack and that no personal data was taken, despite the message posted by the hackers. They added that other sites were temporarily suspended due to the threat.

Is Russia To Blame?


The Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security, which was established by Ukraine to counter Russian disinformation operations, and irregular warfare aims, issued a statement more directly blaming Russia for the hack than the foreign ministry had earlier in the day.

“We have not seen such a significant attack on government organizations in some time,” it said. “We suggest the current attack is tied to the recent failure of Russian negotiations on Ukraine’s future in NATO.”

NATO-Russia Talks Not Going Well

These latest developments came after meetings between Russia and the West, ended with neither side willing to compromise which raises the fear that Moscow could once again invade Ukraine. Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and supported an uprising of pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas.

Russian and American negotiators voiced frustration over the talks in Vienna at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), where Russia dug in its heels over insisting on a guarantee that Ukraine will never be permitted to join NATO and that the alliance cease its expansion in Eastern Europe. The U.S. and EU have both stated that those suggestions are off the table. Russia has suggested that they could turn to military options.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov, according to Russian state media TASS, stated that the meetings had reached “a dead-end or a difference in approaches” citing the West’s refusal to guarantee that Ukraine will never join NATO and hinted to the news agency that further talks were worthless.

War Imminent?


The U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Michael Carpenter sounded an ominous warning to the media following Thursday’s meeting stating that the “drumbeat of war is sounding loud and the rhetoric has gotten rather shrill”

“We have to take this very seriously,” Carpenter added. “We have to prepare for the eventuality that there could be an escalation.”

The U.S. and other NATO members are now concerned about which way that Russia will turn. And they’re unaware if Russia will continue to negotiate for peace or prepare for renewed conflict in Ukraine.

Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with MSNBC on Thursday and said, “The jury’s out on which path Vladimir Putin is going to choose,” he admitted.

“Is he going to choose the path of diplomacy and dialogue to resolve some of these problems or is he going to pursue confrontation and aggression?”

Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman minced few words in her assessment of the negotiations and what she felt if the Russians decide to cease talks.

“If Russia walks away, however, it will be quite apparent they were never serious about pursuing diplomacy at all,” she said. “That is why collectively we are preparing for every eventuality.”

Last week, NATO secretary-general, Jens Stoltenberg, warned that “the risk of conflict is real” involving another Russian invasion of Ukraine, but that NATO and the West wished for a peaceful solution to the dilemma, but would be prepared for any eventuality.

If the talks fail, he said, NATO is prepared to continue the support of the integrity and independence of Ukraine both “politically and practically” while creating “significant consequences” that “carry a heavy price for Russia.”

Steve Balestrieri is a 1945 National Security Columnist. He has served as a US Special Forces NCO and Warrant Officer before injuries forced his early separation. In addition to writing for 1945, he covers the NFL for PatsFans.com and his work was regularly featured in the Millbury-Sutton Chronicle and Grafton News newspapers in Massachusetts.
“Putin Is Not Stupid”: This Expert Spent 182 Days On The Russia-Ukraine Battlefields

ByPhillip Karber
13/01/2021
Russian TOS Unit. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

American Who Spent 182 Days on the Battlefield Speaks Out on Ukraine and Russia: One US civilian has been to Ukraine and seen the border skirmish between Moscow and Kyiv up close and personal. Policy institute president and defense and national security expert Dr. Phillip Karber has visited Ukraine 36 times in the last eight years and has spent a total of 182 days at the front lines of various battlefields observing combat.

1945 caught up with Karber, who heads the Potomac Foundation, for a wide-ranging, detailed, and insightful interview about the situation in Ukraine and Russia. 1945 Defense Editor Brent Eastwood conducted the interview.



You have traveled to Ukraine many times over the years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Can you tell us the overall state of readiness when it comes to Ukraine’s military?

Considering the terrible shape the Ukrainian forces were in at the beginning of 2014 after two decades of utter neglect, their resurrection as a fighting force has been nothing short of miraculous

At the beginning of the conflict on paper, they had 15 ground force brigades with an authorized strength of 55 maneuver battalions. In reality only 16 of the latter were “ready” (defined as having at least two-thirds of required manpower and operable equipment). Moreover, only 25 percent of the ready battalions were deployed on the east side of the Dniepr River opposite Russia (and two of those were lost with the occupation of Crimea).

Neither Western analysts nor Russian planners expected the Ukrainian Army to be able to fight for more than several days. But they mobilized, redeployed their forces to the east, repaired and upgraded old weaponry, and have been fighting for eight years. They have lost some battles and won some battles, but in the process inflicted as many casualties as they have suffered.


Today, Ukraine fields the strongest active Army in Europe — it is larger, more ready with more combat experience than the armies of the last ten countries to join NATO — combined.

The active force equals 40 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs), backed up by 100,000 reservists with experience at the front, and units at every level led by a new generation of young aggressive officers who have fought the Russians, know their weakness and are not afraid to exploit them.

Ironically, in terms of stabilizing Eastern Europe, providing a bulwark to Russian revanchism, and significantly improving the defense of Romania, Poland, and the Baltics — NATO would gain more from having Ukraine on its side than Ukraine would get from being in NATO.


We do not appreciate their contribution now, but we will miss them when they are gone.

There is a common line of thinking in Washington that Kyiv would be beaten very quickly by Moscow. What is your take?

If the Washington, DC “desk-commandos” would get off their derrières and go to the front, they would get a more realistic perspective.

The Ukrainians can hold the current 500km line of engagement until the cows come home — in terms of the area covering the Donbas front against the 1st Donetsk and 2nd Luhansk proxy Corps and the causeways from Crimea against its 22nd Corps. And, in defending those prepared positions, they will stack Russian body bags like cordwood.


Map of Military Forces In and Around Ukraine. Image Courtesy of Dr. Karber.

The difficulty they face is not at the current line of contact but from a multi-directional threat on a six times larger perimeter and exacerbated by danger of multi-domain attack from the air and sea, as well as a large second-echelon backed up by chemical and tactical nuclear weapons. It is this wider and more intense threat that endangers Ukraine’s defensibility.

First, Putin has reinforced his front-line units with three additional Armies:

— the 8th Guards Army (8GA) at Rostov as a second-echelon behind the Donbas.

— the 20th Guards Army (20GA) at Voronezh opposite the city of Kharkiv.

— the 1st Guards Tank Army (1GTA) to the northeast of Kursk, aimed directly at Ukraine’s capital Kyiv.

These three armies — with reinforcements brought in last spring and this fall plus the existing front-line Donbas and Crimean Corps (plus available Airborne/Air Assault Divisions) — are equal to about 60 Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) and available to fight now.

While the aggressor would not have more than a 50 percent advantage in quantity of units, Russian weapons have a qualitative edge and the area north of Kharkiv favors the offense — it is classic tank country with few terrain obstacles and wide opportunity for rapid maneuver.

Moreover, in the current build-up, the second shoe has yet to drop. It appears that units from the Central and Southern Military Districts (2nd, 41st, 49th & 58th Armies) may be loading up for forward movement which could bring the Russian invasion force up to 100 BTGs giving them more than a two-to-one force ratio by the end of January.

Second, Ukraine’s small air force with Cold War-era aging fighters and helicopters is overshadowed by Russia’s larger and modernized air offensive potential. If preceded by a “shock and awe” strike with missiles (as done in Syria) followed up by bombers against key airbases and fixed air defenses, Russian fighters, and attack helicopters will own the skies and be able to not only add disproportionate attrition to the Ukrainian ground forces but seriously interdict their forward movement and counter-maneuver on the battlefield.

Third, to the north, Russia’s large exercise against NATO last September – Zapad 2021 – involved a Russian Army deployed forward into Belarus, which could drop down and cut Ukraine off in the West. Even without crossing the frontier, the prospect of an attack on the rear or flank draws off defenders that are badly needed in the East and South.

Fourth, to the south, Russia’s large fleet in the Black Sea along with amphibious ships brought into the Sea of Azov from the Caspian pose the threat of landings along the coast supported by Air Assault troops from Crimea, while Russian “peacekeeping” units in Transnistria could conduct sabotage and small unit raids. Another flanking danger tying down additional Ukrainian ground forces.

Lastly, and not to be ignored, Russia has already deployed along Ukraine’s border, the 400-500km range SS-26 Iskander-M missiles as well as heavy caliber long-range self-propelled guns (2S7 Pion and 2S7M Malka 203mm), and self-propelled mortars (2S4 Tyulpan 240mm) — all of which can deliver both tactical nuclear weapons and chemical warheads. Given the utility Russian chemical agents demonstrated in Syrian urban fighting their use cannot be ruled out if stiff resistance is met in Ukrainian cities.

Do You Think Russia Would Use Thermobaric Weapons Like the TOS-1?

We should not be surprised to see them use those fire-weapons because they favor an offensive breakthrough and are deadly even to entrenched infantry.

Russia has already fielded the TOS-1 in the 27th Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Regiment near the Ukraine border, and similar TOS systems are in NBC units to the north and east of that. Interestingly, south of Rostov the enhanced/longer-range TOS-2 has been introduced.


TOS-1 Rocket Launch. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

They also have deployed opposite Ukraine with several hundred multiple rocket launchers and the new versions are capable of firing both thermobaric warheads, as well as submunitions and scatterable mines. Combined with accurate targeting by UAVs, they produce a highly lethal battlefield.

Can Ukraine mount a successful insurgency if Moscow does invade and annex new territory?

Yes, and they will.

Today all over Ukraine, territorial units are being formed and civilians preparing to resist. However, insurgencies are by their nature an indecisive and attritional form of war. So realistically, while they may make an occupation miserable, their impact will not significantly impede an armored invasion. Given the civilian fear and loathing of Russia, what will be immediately pressing on NATO is five to ten million refugees streaming West across the border to escape into Europe.

What is Russia’s goal when it comes to Ukraine and this latest buildup of forces? Does Putin really intend to invade?

Clearly, Putin manufactured this crisis to achieve something, but it remains vague as to what it is. Surely he knows:

— That Ukraine will fight if he renews the aggression he started in 2014 and he is undoubtedly aware that the highest percentage of enlistments in the Ukrainian Army are soldiers from the east, who despite Russian ethnic and linguistic background, do not want to be forced to live in Putin’s kleptocracy.

— That the more massive the attack and heavier the damage caused, the greater the number killed, and deeper the territory conquered — the greater and longer-lasting enmity he will engender in the Ukrainian people and more costly the occupation to subdue them.

— That his demands on the US and NATO are outrageous and he is unlikely to get them all.

But, if one of his objectives was to convince Ukrainians that the West would not come to their aid with military support — he has already achieved that with the pre-emptive declarations of President Biden not to commit U.S. forces or even send military aid.


Russian T-90 Tank Firing. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

How impactful would tough financial sanctions like kicking Russia out of SWIFT be on Moscow?

Whatever else you say about him, Putin is not stupid.

If he thought that the diplomatic and economic costs of renewed aggression against Ukraine outweighed the gain of getting Ukraine back under control and demonstrating U.S. and NATO impotence to East Europeans and former Soviet Republics, he would already have been deterred from fielding a force he is not willing to employ. He knows that previous sanctions caused substantial pain to our European allies and that there is no stomach for the dislocation a SWIFT ban will cause the global financial sectors.

He also knows that his “strategic ally” China would like to fill in the gap by creating an alternative monetary system to the dollar. Likewise, threats to reduce energy purchases from Russia will literally leave Europe in the cold.

What sorts of help can the US and NATO provide Ukraine if Moscow does attempt an invasion? For example, would more Javelin missiles help?

The U.S. has sent Ukraine about 120 Javelin launchers, which should give them enough to help hold the current line of engagement. Clearly, evidence of Russia adding make-shift covers for their tank turrets demonstrates that Javelin has both a tactical and deterring impact disproportionate to the small numbers delivered.

But, to cover a frontage six times larger, Ukraine will need a hell-of-a-lot more Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM) than they have now or what we have supplied. The U.S. Army is putting M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles in storage and the U.S. Marine Corps is replacing armored Humvees — both mounting TOW-2 anti-tank missiles which, while not Javelins, remain potent anti-armor weapons. Sending 500 Bradleys and TOW-2 Humvees along with another couple hundred Javelins would be a fast and cost-effective means of coping with the Russian threat of horizontal escalation.


A U.S. Marine with 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines, fires a shoulder-fired Javelin missile during exercise Bougainville II at Pohakuloa Training Area, Hawaii, April 18, 2021. Bougainville II is the second phase of pre-deployment training conducted by the battalion designed to increase combat readiness through complex and realistic live-fire training. 
(U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Jacob Wilson)

Likewise, the Russians learned to fear the Stinger man-portable air-defense system (MANPADs) in Afghanistan. Supplying several hundred Stingers as point-defenses for key positions (like airfields and bridges) as well as for mobile protection of Ukrainian maneuver forces would add a lot to offset Russia’s aerial dominance over the battlefield. While the U.S. has sent surveillance aircraft flying over Ukraine air space to monitor the daily Russian buildup, they have not been backed up by deploying F-15/F-22 fighters to Romania and Poland or F-18s with Harpoon anti-ship missiles to Bulgaria. In combination, that would help counter Russia’s aerial and naval multi-domain bullying along with sending a powerful message of U.S. commitment to East European peace and security.

In the Obama Administration, it was popular to say as an excuse for not sending lethal aid to Ukraine, that they were deterring a 19th Century threat with 21st Century methods that minimize the risk of military escalation. But that gambit did not stop the aggression, end the conflict, or inhibit the current crisis Putin has unleashed. Now, the same mantra is repeated once again extolling “Diplomacy” and “Sanctions.” Putin is a bully whose strategy is based on the 20th Century currency of deployable armed force and does not seem to be impressed with post-millennial epiphenomenalist rhetoric.

The people of Ukraine stood up to Russian domination in order to be part of the West. They have had the courage and endurance to hold the bully at bay for eight years of war. With the US and NATO now refusing to support them militarily in this crisis…how long can they hold on?

Tragically we have left them dangling in the wind with nowhere to go and their survival dependent on Putin’s whim.

Dr. Phillip A. Karber is President of the Potomac Foundation. Dr. Karber is an internationally recognized authority on defense and national security matters; an accomplished business executive; and a university professor. He has prepared studies and recommendations on defense strategy for the highest levels of the U.S. government; advised many NATO governments on defense issues; headed BDM Corporation’s International Division; served as JFK International Air Terminal’s Chairman of the Board; and teaches courses in national security and military affairs at Georgetown University.
“I Won’t Eat”: 36 Million US Families Are Missing A Certain Stimulus Check

By Ethen Kim Lieser
Could More Stimulus Checks Be Coming? Image Credit: Creative Commons.

Some Families Can’t Even Eat Without This Stimulus Check: For about thirty-six million US families, the enhanced child tax credit—considered in some circles to be an unofficial version of the fourth stimulus check—has indeed been a lifesaver, helping them pay for groceries, school supplies, and rent or the mortgage.


From this past July to December, the federal government, directed under President Joe Biden’s American Rescue Plan, provided eligible parents as much as $3,600 for a child under the age of six and up to $3,000 for children between ages six and seventeen. Broken down, this all means that a $250 or a $300 payment for each child was direct deposited to parents each month.

Stimulus Check: Poverty in Focus


However, with the entrance of the new year, these enhanced credits have come to a screeching halt, leaving millions of desperate parents to fend for themselves amid the Omicron coronavirus surge and red-hot inflationary environment.
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“The CTC went away, but grocery prices haven’t gone down,” Stormy Johnson, a single mother of three in Kingwood, West Virginia, told CBS News.

“Now that I don’t have that payment, the reality of life is that there will be times I won’t eat to make sure my kids can,” she continued.

Johnson noted that the $500 in credits she received for her two youngest children “was a huge help.” The other child, a twenty-one-year-old, is considered too old to be eligible for the credits.

“That payment they are taking away just put a lot hurting on a lot of folks,” she concluded.

Stimulus Check Case for BBB Act

There is, however, a way for the enhanced credits to roll out to American families once again—it needs the passage of the Build Back Better Act, which would tack on another year of the monthly payments. If the bill had been approved, families would be in line to receive another round of payment on January 14.

It is certainly possible that Congress could eventually approve the legislation or a standalone bill that would retroactively enhance the child tax credit for all of 2022. But to pass any bill, Democratic Senator Joe Manchin would have to be on board. That’s not considered an easy task as he has repeatedly stated that he will not support an extension of the enhanced credit if there is no work requirement for parents.

Without any movement on the Build Back Better bill, it is likely that the nation’s lowest-income children would suffer the most. According to a survey conducted by ParentsTogether Action, it revealed that due to the ending of the enhanced credits, 50 percent of respondents said that it will be more difficult for them to meet their family’s basic needs and 36 percent admitted that they will no longer be able to meet their family’s basic needs.

A separate analysis by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has sounded the alarm that nearly ten million children could potentially fall back into poverty without an extension of the credits. “The enhanced tax credit has enabled parents across the country to pay for food, clothing, housing, and other basic necessities and is expected to lower the number of children experiencing poverty by more than 40 percent as compared to child poverty levels in the absence of the expansion,” the organization says.

Ethen Kim Lieser is a Washington state-based Science and Tech Editor who has held posts at Google, The Korea Herald, Lincoln Journal Star, AsianWeek, and Arirang TV. Follow or contact him on LinkedIn.

The Stimulus Check Americans Want: 
How The Child Tax Credit Might Be Saved

By Stephen Silver

Image of US Currency. Image Credit: Creative Commons.

A New ‘Stimulus Check’? How the Child Tax Credit Could Come Back from the Dead: This month, American families will not receive a child tax credit payment, which they got each month between July and December of 2021.

 Those payments were the result of the American Rescue Plan Act, which was signed into law last March by President Joe Biden. However, that law only mandated the child tax credit payments for the year 2021.

Child Tax Credit State of Play: A Stimulus Check Reboot?


The White House had hoped to extend the payments into the future, at one point even proposing that they continue through 2025, while some in Congress pushed for the tax credit to become permanent. The version of the president’s Build Back Better that passed the House last year included a one-year extension of the credit, but Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV) announced in December that he opposed that version of the bill, and has been specifically skeptical about any legislation that extends the child tax credit without a work requirement.

That seemingly left the legislation, and the credit, in limbo as the calendar turned to 2022. And while Sen. Manchin indicated this week, per Axios, that he was willing to return to talks, the senator also has reportedly stated that he favors either eliminating the tax credit, or “dramatically [lowering] the income caps for eligible families.”

Tax Credit Not Dead? A Stimulus Check Compromise?


Meanwhile, this week Politico reported on what the Democrats might do to try to keep the 2021 version of the child tax credit alive.

The site suggested that Manchin and the other Democrats could pursue a compromise that still entails a work requirement, but lowers it from what Manchin would prefer. One potential idea would be to require recipients to “prove they’ve worked in the recent past.”

Another potential point of compromise, the story said, is to no longer allow wealthier families to receive the credit. However, doing so would risk violating the president’s pledge to not raise taxes on those with incomes lower than $400,000.

There is, the Politico story noted, still a child tax credit, it just has reverted to how it was prior to the passage of the American Rescue Plan, and no longer entails monthly direct payments.

Even if the credit did survive, lawmakers would likely have to subtract other things from the agenda to get its cost under a certain threshold where Manchin would be willing to vote for it, the story added.

Families Need this Stimulus Check


CBS News this week talked to some of the families who were counting on the child tax credit money arriving in January but will not receive it. Rising inflation, especially with grocery prices, has made things especially harder for such families. CBS also quoted a recent study from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), which found that “about 10 million children are at risk of slipping into poverty” without the payments.

Stephen Silver is a journalist, essayist and film critic, who is also a contributor to The Philadelphia Inquirer, Philly Voice, Philadelphia Weekly, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency, Living Life Fearless, Backstage magazine, Broad Street Review and Splice Today. The co-founder of the Philadelphia Film Critics Circle, Stephen lives in suburban Philadelphia with his wife and two sons. Follow him on Twitter at @StephenSilver.