Poland Still Isn't Interested In Transferring Its MiG-29s To Ukraine

The U.S. is actively pushing for the transfer but Poland still says it won't give its MiG-29s to Ukraine.

BY STETSON PAYNE AND TYLER ROGOWAY 

MARCH 6, 2022
THE WAR ZONE

JAKUB HALUN/WIKICOMMONS

Days after a European Union-announced plan to supply Ukraine with fighter jets fell through upon statements from Polish, Slovakian and Bulgarian defense officials, it appears the U.S. government is still encouraging a transfer of jets to Ukraine despite Russian warnings.

Speaking on CBS’s Face the Nation, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken said a potential transfer of Polish Air Force MiG-29s to Ukraine would get a “green light” from the U.S. government to proceed. Blinken added there are ongoing negotiations with the Polish government, with particular attention to how Poland would replace those donated jets, potentially with American fighters.



“We are looking actively now at the question of airplanes that Poland may provide to Ukraine and looking at how we might be able to backfill should Poland decide to supply those planes,” Blinken told reporters separately on Sunday during his visit to Moldova. “I can’t speak to a timeline but I can just say we’re looking at it very, very actively.”

Our previous analysis of the rumored plan involving multiple nations donating aircraft to bolster the Ukrainian Air Force noted its looming logistical and political hurdles, to the point of it being totally unrealistic. Politico reported Saturday that negotiations are now focused on Warsaw only and revolve around the U.S. providing U.S.-built fighters to replace its MiG-29s.

Despite Secretary Blinken’s endorsement on Sunday morning, the Polish government is swiftly labeling any claims that Poland has or will provide its MiGs to Ukraine as “fake news.” The Chancellery of the Polish Prime Minister’s Twitter account has habitually replied to claims with a quote tweet from the Polish Armed Force emphasizing Polish MiG-29s are not in Ukraine and stating explicitly:

Poland won't send its fighter jets to #Ukraine as well as allow to use its airports. We significantly help in many other areas.

Apart from the need to backfill Poland's fighter inventory if their roughly 28 MiG-29s go to Ukraine, there’s the incredibly real problem of Russia considering such a move as active participation in the war by a NATO country.



NATO Article 5 being what it is, the threat of escalation beyond Ukraine is real. If the Russian government made good on its declaration and attacked Poland in some manner, even via a cyberattack, things could quickly turn into a larger war between Russia and NATO. That likely played no small part in the original rejection of the E.U. fighter transfer plan by the relevant NATO members last week.

Still, Secretary Blinken’s statements on the Sunday morning news circuit could indicate a split between how badly the U.S. government wants to reinforce Ukraine’s air combat capabilities and how much NATO’s ‘eastern flank’ countries are willing to risk doing it. These countries certainly have aircraft suitable for transfer, but independent of incurring a Russian response in the short term, they could also be wary of giving away a large chunk of their air power when they might need them to deter Russia or even for a potential conflict with Russia. In fact, so outrageous were the claims by major media outlets and some Ukrainian officials early in the week in regards to how many aircraft would be donated that some air arms would have been left with no fighters at all for their own defense. We pointed out how unrealistic this was at the time.

Renewed discussion about the MiGs came the day after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky made an impassioned plea for more support, including fighters, during a Zoom call with more than 280 members of Congress.

Given the Russian declaration that would seemingly rule out flying new jets into Ukraine directly, it appears the overt transfer of fighter aircraft could become a ‘red line’ red line for Russia in terms of potential escalation.

We’ve already seen massive overt shipments of ammunition and weapons by road convoys over the Polish border. Polish Defense Minister Mariusz Blaszczak tweeted a picture purportedly showing a convoy of ammunition sent to Ukraine in the war’s first days, though there have been few direct public acknowledgments of this vector for resupply as Russian rhetoric against them has grown. Combined with an ongoing surge of cargo flights into Rzeszow, Poland, not far from the Ukrainian border, it would appear that for now, Russia is begrudgingly stomaching NATO reinforcement by land. DOD has said on more than one occasion in the past few days that they've seen no attempts by Russia to intervene with these shipments

Regardless, it is widely understood that this is how most NATO-supplied weapons are entering the country.



But how does one get potentially several dozen MiGs over the border without being detected or even flying them at all, and do so covertly enough that it does not invite a widening of the conflict? Partially disassembling them and trucking them in is a possibility, but, then again, the sudden appearance of new MiG fighters in Ukraine and the disappearance of them from Poland certainly wouldn’t go unrecognized by Russia.

With all this in mind, it still seems unlikely that Poland will hand over its full MiG-29 fleet to Kyiv, at least at this time and at the scale currently being discussed. Additionally, even if it decided to do it today, there could be major timeline and logistics obstacles. NATO equipment would likely have to get removed from the aircraft for one. Then the aforementioned issue of just getting them into the country is becoming more tumultuous a proposition with each passing day. This, along with the fact that western allies claim that Ukraine’s air defense capabilities remain remarkably intact, and the reality that the Russian air threat has not dictated the course of the war, makes providing a couple of dozen old MiGs to Ukraine less of a strategic imperative than other initiatives aimed at supporting the country’s ability to whether Kremlin’s military onslaught.


ANDRE WADMAN Polish MIG-29 taxiing.

Then again, if the U.S. can make the deal sweet enough, maybe Poland would take the risk. Such an arrangement could include U.S. fighter aircraft being temporarily forward-deployed to Poland to make up for the gap left by the MiG-29 force. While U.S. fighter capabilities in the region are already overstretched in some regards, this would help alleviate any air defense shortcomings Poland would experience from such a deal.

In their place, the decades-old MiG-29s could be offset by surplus F-16s provided by the United States. They could come from U.S. stocks, which would not be as straightforward in the near term as some would think, or from an ally that has surplus F-16 aircraft for sale. Much of the latter have been snapped up by other NATO members as of late who are transitioning from old Soviet-era gear and by the U.S. private adversary air support marketplace.


New order Block 70 F-16s are now in very high demand with a multi-year waiting period. Even if some orders could be diverted to Poland, which is highly unlikely as countries who are waiting for their F-16s have their own pressing military challenges to deal with, they would not start showing up for quite some time.

No matter where they would come from, it will take some time to get them delivered and get Polish crews trained to fly and support them. Poland flies the much more modern Block 52+ F-16C/D. While the type has much in common with earlier block Vipers, they are far from totally the same and would require specific training and logistical support to reach full operational capability in Polish hands. The U.S. also has Block 52 aircraft, but they are some of the youngest in the USAF's inventory and have been upgraded to U.S. standards. These aircraft serve in critical operational roles, as well as flying with the USAF Thunderbirds. Aside from the Thunderbirds, forking over these aircraft would disrupt USAF air combat capabilities until they could be replaced by F-35 or F-15EX fighters, and they still are not identical to the F-16s Poland flies today.

USAF Polish F-16C Block 52+.

The other possibility is that the U.S. offers to speed up Poland’s F-35 procurement of 32 aircraft and even offers those additional aircraft at a discount in exchange for the MiG-29s. This would be tricky, but it could be enticing enough to Poland to invite more risk in the short term for extra high-end combat capability in the long term.

It’s also possible that MiG-29s could be acquired from a different source and then transferred through Poland. What country would want to get involved at all by forking over its MiG-29s for this conflict is a big question. And nothing like this would be able to occur in the very near term.

Finally, as we have stated previously, this entire conversation becomes more realistic when smaller numbers of aircraft are discussed. For instance, the idea that Poland could send say a half dozen MiG-29s to Ukraine instead of liquidating its entire fleet is far more palatable and wouldn't have the massive operational impacts we are discussing here. Offsetting that smaller loss in combat capability is simply far easier to contend with.

Regardless, according to Poland’s own statement at the highest level, the country has no intention of sending its MiG-29s to Ukraine. Until that sentiment changes totally, this entire exercise, now in its second round, remains hypothetical.

Contact the editor: Tyler@thedrive.com

The End of the End of History: What have we Learned So Dar?

By Branko Milanovic - 07 March 2022
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE


Branko Milanovic argues that, once again, the idea that one type of system will eventually be embraced by all is being violently shown to be a delusion.

Wars are the most horrible events. They should never happen. The entire human effort should be directed toward making wars impossible. Not just illegal, but impossible, in the sense that no-one would be either able or have incentive to start them.

But we are, unfortunately, not there yet. The humankind has not evolved that far. We are now in the midst of a war that may become a very murderous war.

Wars are also an opportunity (however cold-hearted this might seem) to reassess our priors. Things are suddenly thrown into a much sharper focus. Our beliefs are transformed into illusions. The nostrums become meaningless. We have to deal with the world as it is, not with the world we imagined until a day before.

So, what have we learned after one week of the Ukraine-Russia war? I will try not to speculate about the outcome. Nobody knows it. It can end with the occupation and subjugation of Ukraine, or it can end with the break-up of Russia. And everything in between. Neither I, nor the reader, nor Putin, nor Biden know it. So I will not speculate on it.
But what do we seem to have learned so far?

1. Power of oligarchy. The power of oligarchy when it encounters le raison d’état is limited. We tended to believe that Russia, being an oligarchic capitalist economy, is also one where the rich decisively influence policy. Perhaps that in many everyday decisions that is the case. (I do not have in mind here the oligarchs who live in London and New York, but those who live in Moscow and St Petersburg and who may be also heads or large shareholders of powerful private and semi-state-owned companies.) But when the matters of state are serious, for the organized power, that is, the state, oligarchy is no match. The threat of sanctions, so visibly displayed and trumpeted by the US weeks before the war started, might have influenced Russian oligarchs to move their yachts as far as possible from US jurisdiction, or to engage in fire-sales of their property, but it made no difference to Vladimir Putin’s decision to go to war.

Nor did all the buying of influence by the rich Russians among the Tories in the UK or both political parties in the US matter. Neither did the “sanctity of private property” on which the United States was created (and which so much attracted the oligarchs to move their stolen wealth there in the first place). The US proceeded to probably the largest inter-state transfer of wealth in history. It is the equivalent of Henry VIII’s seizure of church lands. While we have seen such gigantic confiscations within countries (the French and Russian revolutions) we have never seen it, in one fell swoop, in 24 hours, between the countries.

2. Financial fragmentation. The corollary of this point is that extremely rich people are no longer safe from political forces—even if they change citizenship, contribute to political campaigns, or dedicate a wing of a museum. They can fall victim to geopolitics they do not control and which are much beyond their remit—and at times beyond their understanding. To remain excessively rich would require more than ever political nous. Whether the globally rich will interpret this confiscation to mean that they must more seriously than ever capture the machinery of the state, or they interpret it to mean that they should find other new havens for their investments is impossible to tell. Most likely it will lead to the fragmentation of financial globalization and to the creation of new and alternative financial centers, probably in Asia. Where will they be? I think the strong candidates are the democratic countries with a degree of judicial independence, but also enjoying sufficient international political clout and margin of maneuver not to yield to the pressure of the US, Europe or China. Bombay, Djakarta come to mind.

3. The end of the end of history. We—or at least some people--tended to believe that the “end of history” meant not only that the ultimate political and economic system was discovered in one night in November of 1989, but that the old-fashioned tools of international struggles will not reappear. The latter was shown wrong several times already, from Iraq and Afghanistan to Libya. A more brutal demonstration is in the process of being executed right now where borders are being redrawn using the instruments that the world has practiced for 5,000 years of recorded history but that were thought obsolete.

The current war displays to us that the complexity of the world, its cultural and historical “baggage”, is great and that the idea that one type of system will eventually be embraced by all is a delusion. It is a delusion whose consequences are bloody. To have peace, we need to learn to live while accepting differences. These differences are not trivial differences that go under the current title of being open to variety, in way we dress, in our sexual preferences or the food we eat. The differences we need to accept, and to live with, are much more fundamental and they relate to the way societies function, what they believe in, and what they think is the source of legitimacy of their governments.

That of course can change in the course of time for any one given society, as it did many times in the past. But at a given point, it will differ from country to country, from region to region, from religion to religion. To assume that everyone who is not “like us” is somehow deficient, or not aware that they would be better off being “like us” will –if we maintain this flawed belief—remain the source of endless wars.


This first appeared on Branko's blog.

Photo by Andrea Piacquadio from Pexels

Russia limiting communications at nuclear facility, watchdog says

MARCH 6, 2022 / 8:03 PM / CBS NEWS

Ukrainian staff continue to operate the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, however, it is now under Russian control and they have shut down some external communication to the plant, the International Atomic Energy Agency said Sunday. The power plant, which is the largest nuclear power plant in Europe, was taken over Friday by Russian forces after shelling led to a fire at one of the training facilities.

According to the IAEA, Russian forces at the site "have switched off some mobile networks and the internet so that reliable information from the site cannot be obtained through the normal channels of communication." Ukraine also reports that all Ukrainian activity at the plant, "including measures related to the technical operation of the six reactor units," must now be approved by the Russian commander at the plant.

Russian forces have also taken control of a second nuclear power plant and are closing in on a third, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told the U.S. Congress on Saturday.

Ukraine ambassador to the U.S. Oksana Markarova told "Face the Nation" on Sunday that the international community should step in and help Ukraine regain control of the nuclear sites from Russia. Markarova noted that the first nuclear plant the Russians seized was the infamous Chernobyl plant, which is "not operational," but still poses a risk because "there is a lot of waste there and everything else."

Surveillance camera footage shows the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant following shelling, amid the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in Enerhodar, Zaporizhia Oblast, Ukraine March 4, 2022, in this screengrab from a video obtained from social media. 

ZAPORIZHZHYA NPP VIA YOUTUBE VIA REUTERS

"The second one's operation is the largest one in Europe. So actually, that put the world on the brink of the nuclear disaster," she added. "And even though, again, our firefighters were able to put down the fire, nobody is safe. Ukraine is not safe. Europe is not safe. Because these stations are not supposed to be run by war criminals."

The fire at the power plant was extinguished and no damage was done to any of the reactors. No elevated levels of radiation were detected following the attack. Russia has denied deliberately shelling the nuclear plant.

Markarova said Sunday that Ukraine is "ready for any option" to take back the power plants, even suggesting that a no-fly zone be established — something Zelensky has asked for on several occasions.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has warned that Russia would consider any nation that imposes a no-fly zone to be a participant in the war. NATO had previously said that creating a no-fly zone could lead to a larger war in Europe, and Senator Marco Rubio told ABC's "This Week" on Sunday that, "basically a no-fly zone, if people understand what it means, it means World War III."

Despite the ongoing Russian assault, a senior U.S. defense official said Sunday that the Pentagon believes Ukrainians in most parts of the country still have internet access and most means of communication are still available. The official said that Russia has now committed roughly 95% of the forces it had gathered along the border inside Ukraine.

Still, there were few changes on the ground in the last 24 hours, the official said. A Russian military convoy seen in Maxar satellite imagery continues to be stalled and "leading elements" are still outside the major city centers, although exact distances were not given.

The official added that, while both sides have "taken losses to both aircraft and missile defense inventories," Ukraine and Russia still have the "majority of their air defense systems and capabilities."

Margaret Brennan and Eleanor Watson contributed to this report.

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Belarus Deputy Defense Minister Reportedly Quits Over Invasion of Ukraine

By Brian Freeman    |   Sunday, 06 March 2022 05:19 PM

Belarus Deputy Defense Minister and chief of general staff Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich has reportedly quit due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Washington Examiner reported over the weekend.

His resignation was revealed in a letter he wrote and posted online by former Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Nosov.

In it, Gulevich said he is unable to mobilize his soldiers to take part in the Russian attack on Ukraine because they do not want to participate, writing that he thus asks Defense Minister Viktor Khrenin "for your decision regarding the acceptance of my resignation," according to the Washington Examiner.

However, the Belarus government raised doubts about the authenticity of the letter and said that its military forces are "100 percent" ready to be deployed wherever they are ordered to go.

Gulevich has been personally sanctioned by the West, with the British Foreign Ministry announcing last week that this action was taken because "he has directed joint military exercises with Russia, and consented to the deployment of Russian troops along the border of Belarus with Ukraine, which has directly contributed to Russia’s ability to attack Ukraine, including from positions in Belarus," the Daily Mail reported.

Oleksiy Arestovych, the advisor to the head of the Ukrainian president's office, said that he is checking the accuracy of the reports, but denied that the Belarus army is being used in the attack on Ukraine.

However, Arestovych did acknowledge that the territory of Belarus is being utilized in the attack, with the entire system of military airfields being used to bombard Ukraine, as well as anti-tactical missiles being  launched from its territory.

Read more: Belarus Deputy Defense Minister Reportedly Quits Over Invasion of Ukraine | Newsmax.com

Europe's nuclear dilemma

March 07, 2022   

Wajahat S. Khan

 Gabriella Turrisi

Last Friday’s attack by Russian forces on Europe’s largest nuclear power plant triggered outcry over the potential for a Chernobyl-like disaster. The US called it a “war crime,” and the issue was debated in an emergency session of the UN Security Council, where Russia received a global dressing down.

The blaze resulting from artillery use at Zaporizhzhia’s nuclear facility was eventually controlled. But Ukraine’s nuclear regulator told the IAEA on Sunday that it is having problems communicating with staff at the plant, and that a Russian general now controls the facility.

Putin’s next target, according Shaun Burnie, a senior nuclear specialist with Greenpeace, could be the three reactors at the Yuzhnoukrainsk power plant, which generates 10% of Ukraine’s electricity and is a major energy supplier throughout southern Ukraine. “Loss of cooling function to the reactor cores and spent fuel pools could lead to a disaster far worse even than the [2011] Fukushima Daiichi [disaster],” Burnie warns.

While the war is threatening Ukraine’s nuclear power operations — not to mention impacting world energy supplies and prices — it’s also raising questions about the safe use of nuclear energy. The continent has been accelerating its nuclear power usage — now officially, and controversially, labeled “green” by the European Commission, despite the threat of accidents and radioactive waste.

But the fast-changing security landscape poses a dilemma for European policymakers. How can they fight global warming while balancing their energy needs with this new security threat posed by Vladimir Putin?

“Europe is finally reckoning with the reality that its importing of Russian natural gas helped finance the Putin regime and puts it in grave danger,” says Josh Freed, senior vice president of Third Way, a pro-nuclear energy think tank in Washington, DC.

Nuclear energy has been a highly divisive issue in Europe for decades. Austria voted in the late 1970s not to build nuclear power plants, and after the Chernobyl disaster of 1986, Germany and Italy halted production of new NPPs while Switzerland imposed a 10-year moratorium.

After the 2011 tsunami-triggered disaster at Japan’s Fukushima plant, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced plans to phase out Germany’s use of nuclear energy altogether. Her successor, Olaf Scholz, seemed to have the same idea when he assumed office. But now, with its dependency on Russian gas exposed, Germany is considering a halt to its phase-out plan, even as it scrambles for other options.

Meanwhile, France has been emboldened by the EU’s goals for achieving carbon neutrality by 2050 based on a shift away from fossil fuels and toward cleaner energy, including nuclear. As Europe’s nuclear energy powerhouse (with 56 reactors), France plans to build even more nuclear plants. Energy price hikes and concerns about Europe's dependence on Russian gas have further driven the French and their colleagues in Brussels for more energy sovereignty.

“That shift will only accelerate Europe’s acceptance of using nuclear, and every other clean energy technology, to help countries become more energy sovereign and address climate change,” says Freed. “It's also an acknowledgement that no energy source is entirely without risk.”

And just how risky is nuclear power with a war raging in Europe? According to the World Nuclear Association, there are now 58 reactors under construction around the globe, with two in Ukraine. Meanwhile, 421 are planned and proposed worldwide. Most of the upcoming projects are in China and India — both hostile to each other — but 89 are earmarked for Europe, with the majority in Russia and Eastern Europe.

“The recent attacks on nuclear facilities in Ukraine raise troubling issues about the safety and security of both the operating nuclear fleet around the world and proposals to build new ones, especially in countries located in or close to politically unstable regions,” says Edwin Lyman, director of nuclear power safety at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Washington, DC.

Nuclear plants are designed to withstand certain accidents and external events, but not sustained military assult. For Lyman, Russia’s recent move means “there is a new category of threat that reactor operators and designers need to take more seriously, and that may require additional protective measures to mitigate.”

Many new reactor designs — especially so-called small modular reactors, or SMRs — have even less protection than operating plants, according to Lyman. With smaller, weaker containment mechanisms and fewer backup safety systems to rely on in an emergency, safety systems that these reactors typically have are no match for a military attack.

But politics, not science, is the main concern when it comes to nuclear energy, insists Freed.

“If Putin wants to kill countless people by blowing up a dam, attacking a chemical plant, or launching missiles at a nuclear plant, he could do it. But the fact is, and despite some cable news hysteria, nuclear plants are incredibly safe.”

Unlike in Chernobyl, Freed says the reactors at Zaporizhzhia have three-foot steel and concrete containment domes. The ones that would be built in Europe are designed to withstand a direct impact by a large aircraft or a terrorist attack. And the new reactors under development now, including SMRs, “will be even safer.”

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The Arctic Geopolitics In Disarray: 

Fallout Of The Ukraine War – Analysis

 March 7, 2022 

By K.M. Seethi

When environmental scientist Jessica Moerman said, “What happens in the Arctic doesn’t stay in the Arctic,” she was only referring to the sensitive polar region’s role as the “frontline for climate change.” Moerman reminded: “It may seem like it’s far away, but the impacts come knocking on our front door.” 

Moerman’s forewarning has significant geopolitical dimensions today with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the consequent twists and turns in the Arctic political and strategic landscape. Amid fears and anxieties, a major question is whether the Arctic will become another theatre of great power rivalry in the emerging conflict between the West and Russia.  

Currently, the Arctic Council, headed by Russia has five NATO members (Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and the United States), and two of the western allies (Finland and Sweden) are also members of the eight-member inter-governmental body. There are eight other European countries in the Council with observer status. Besides India and China, there are three other (Asian) observer countries in the Council. The composition of the Council itself is an indication of the shape of things to come. 

In the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, seven of the eight Arctic states declared that they would be halting the work of the Arctic Council. It was only last year (May 2021) that Russia assumed the chairmanship of the Council. These Arctic states also condemned Russia’s “unprovoked invasion” of Ukraine and emphasised “the grave impediments to international cooperation, including in the Arctic,” in a joint statement. It was also reported that all working group meetings would be halted indefinitely and no officials from these Arctic Council members would visit Russia for any consultation or deliberation in view of Moscow’s “flagrant violation” of territorial sovereignty and international law. The Director of the Center of Arctic Security and Resilience called this action “the Arctic seven speaking with one voice.”

However, even as Russia’s role as the chairperson is now under challenge, the other seven Arctic Council members—Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States—and the council’s working groups are reported to have considered alternative ways to continue critical work in the region. But, according to Sherri Goodman, former U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense and a senior fellow at the Wilson Center’s Polar Institute, “there’s no forum for dialogue and discussion with Russia, the largest Arctic country, on matters that affect the people, the ecology, the geography of the Arctic.” Goodman also warned that the consequence of Russia’s invasion might “increase the risk of miscommunication and miscalculation in the North, at a time where Arctic activities are increasing.”

Plausibly, after the military take over of Crimea in 2014, Russia was not allowed to take part in any Arctic meetings on security (this included the Arctic Forces Security Roundtable) even as the Arctic Council was not mandated to handle security issues. Experts, however, fear that President Vladimir Putin may continue to remain unpredictable and his order to put nuclear forces “on high alert” has obviously intensified the threat scenario in the Arctic also. In response to the seven-members’ resolution to halt the Council’s work, Moscow’s Arctic senior officials warned that any temporary freeze would “inevitably lead to the accumulation of the risks and challenges to soft security in the region.”

Sanction Forays in the Arctic 

While the Western sanctions continued to shake the various sectors of the Russian economy, many major oil investors and firms also came out with statements that they would be pulling out of Russian resource development or may not continue with new projects with Russia, including in the Arctic. The first such announcement came from BP when it said that the company would exit its 19.75 per cent shareholding in Russia’s Rosneft and ordered its directors “to resign from the Rosneft board with immediate effect.” BP Chair Helge Lund said: “Russia’s attack on Ukraine is an act of aggression which is having tragic consequences across the region. BP has operated in Russia for over 30 years, working with brilliant Russian colleagues. However, this military action represents a fundamental change. It has led the bp board to conclude, after a thorough process, that our involvement with Rosneft, a state-owned enterprise, simply cannot continue.”  

BP’s decision is expected to have a major impact on Russia’s huge Vostok oil project in the Arctic. BP is known for its expertise in offshore development and, more importantly, its financing has been critical to Rosneft’s Arctic extraction project. Similarly, Equinor, Norway’s international energy firm, which has its projects in as many as 30 countries worldwide, including several of the world’s most important oil and gas provinces, such as in Russia, declared that it will stop new investments in Russia and will exit joint ventures. Anders Opedal, President and CEO of Equinor, said: “We are all deeply troubled by the invasion of Ukraine, which represents a terrible setback for the world, and we are thinking of all those who are suffering because of the military action.” The Norwegian energy firm has been in Russia for over three decades and had entered into a cooperation agreement with Rosneft in 2012. 

Like BP and Equinor, Shell also announced its “intention to exit its joint ventures with Gazprom and related entities, including its 27.5 per cent stake in the Sakhalin-II liquefied natural gas facility, its 50 per cent stake in the Salym Petroleum Development and the Gydan energy venture.” It also sought “to end its involvement in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project.”  Shell’s chief executive officer, Ben van Beurden, said that “We are shocked by the loss of life in Ukraine, which we deplore, resulting from a senseless act of military aggression which threatens European security.”

ExxonMobil, one of the world’s largest publicly traded energy providers and chemical manufacturers, which operates the Sakhalin-1 project on behalf of an international consortium of Japanese, Indian, and Russian companies, said that they were “beginning the process to discontinue operations and developing steps to exit the Sakhalin-1 venture.” The company also announced that under “the current situation, ExxonMobil will not invest in new developments in Russia.”

India’s state-run Oil India Ltd (OIL) also said “it has no immediate plan to invest in Russia, indicating uncertainty on investment in the massive Vostok project of Russia’s PJSC Rosneft Oil Co., which it was eyeing through a consortium,” according to the Mint report. A consortium of ONGC Videsh Ltd (OVL), Indian Oil Corp. Ltd (IOC), and OIL was planning to invest jointly in the massive Vostok project of Rosneft. India was also exploring to invest in Novatek’s Arctic LNG-2 project as part of its energy profile expansion. Though India is soft on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, its foreign ventures in Russia are subject to the pulls and pressures of the West and its international sanction. 

The Wall Streat Journal reported that Norges Bank Investment Management, the world’s largest sovereign-wealth fund is “divesting its Russian holdings.” Norges, the arm of the Norwegian central bank that operates the $1.3 trillion fund, announced that it would be “freezing investments in Russia.” The Norwegian government also announced a range of actions being taken to support Ukraine, including allocating funds for humanitarian aid, joining European Union sanctions and withdrawing the oil fund from Russian investments. Norway being a member of NATO is also committed to providing military equipment to Ukraine.

Singapore-based Trafigura, one of the world’s leading independent commodity trading and logistics houses, said that it “immediately froze its investments in Russia. The firm also announced that it was “now reviewing the options in respect of our passive shareholding in Vostok Oil.” 

TotalEnergies, a major multi-energy firm that produces and markets energies on a global scale, which also has a major stake in Russia, condemned Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, which it said would have “tragic consequences for the population and threatens Europe.” The firm announced: “TotalEnergies supports the scope and strength of the sanctions put in place by Europe and will implement them regardless of the consequences (currently being assessed) on its activities in Russia. TotalEnergies will no longer provide capital for new projects in Russia.” The war in Ukraine also led Italy to put on hold its share of financing for the $21 billion Arctic LNG 2 project led by privately-owned Russian gas producer Novatek,   

Given the tempo of withdrawals, freezing and halting resorted to by the Western firms in the Arctic energy sector, Russia might explore alternative channels for investment and exploration. China could be a possible investor, but it is not yet clear, in spite of its political support to Moscow, whether Beijing would come up with major investments in the energy sector in Russia to offset the sanctions. 

However, trends in China-Russia trade may provide some indication that there could be some possibilities. According to a report, bilateral trade between the two countries exceeded the $100-billion mark for three successive years, and China continued to be Russia’s top trading partner. The report says that energy and agricultural trade witnessed a steady growth, with Russia emerging a top energy supplier for China and agricultural exports reaching a record high of $5.55 billion. Yet, in terms of investment, Russia ranked only No.13 among foreign destinations for Chinese investment at $12.8 billion (two years back), according to the Chinese official data. But experts suggested that the figure could be raised to a “much higher level, given the massive opportunities in a wide range of areas, including energy, agriculture, manufacturing and technology.” 

Meanwhile, Chinese experts continued to put the full blame of the Ukrainian crisis on the West. For instance, an analyst writes in Global Times: 

Russia didn’t initiate the current war in Ukraine. Russia is ending the 8-year war triggered by the pro-Western Ukrainian regime in 2014 when Donbass broke up refusing to accept the violation of the Ukrainian Constitution that is the coup-d’etat sponsored by Brussels and Washington. 

The aim of the West is as clear as a day — to encircle Russia with unfriendly regimes alongside its borders, strangle it with that military loop and force to stick in the geopolitical quagmire for decades. Being involved in continual counteractions with such regimes, Moscow would have less political, diplomatic, military and economic resources for acting on other directions, for example, in post-Soviet part of Eurasia, Arctic, the Middle East.

The analysist continues: Washington’s strategy is to oust Russia from the access to warm seas such as the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and the Baltic Sea and impede the political and economic communication between Russia and the world. Ousting Russia from the seas would mean that for the time being the Anglo-Saxons continue to be the only power able to control the world’s oceans. They will preserve this position as long as they can deter Russia and China away from the main ocean routes accessible from the seas like the South China Sea. 

The author, who is said to be a Ukrainian expert located in Russia, further writes: “Trade diversions against China is another of Washington’s dreams. Western experts continually put forth different kinds of tactics on how to split up the unity of Russia and China.” 

However, it remains to be seen if this ‘unity’ is sustainable in the context of the huge energy sector in Russia getting affected. According to Goodman, “there may be long-term consequences from these moves to disinvest, especially in an increasing shift to renewable energy.” She said that as “the Russian Arctic oil and gas reserves increasingly become stranded assets with the EU and U.S. accelerating their green transition, Russia’s both economic power and leverage power will eventually decrease.” 

Nord Stream 2 Episode 

A major setback for Russia, in the wake of its intervention Ukraine, came when Germany stopped the Nord Stream 2 Baltic Sea gas pipeline project, constructed to augment the flow of Arctic Russian gas direct to Germany. The $12 billion project was completed last year pending certification by Germany and the European Union. This project was announced way back in 2015 amid threats of sanctions by Western countries following Russia’s annexation of Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine and its support to the rebels in the Donbass. Even as Germany continued to argue that Nord Stream 2 was a commercial venture, Ukraine tended to see it as an “existential threat because it eases Moscow’s reliance on Ukraine to ship gas to lucrative European markets.” Ukraine argued that it would lose billions of dollars in transit revenue. 

Washington also believed that the project would reinforce Russia’s sway over Europe. It knew that Russia was already providing 40 per cent of the EU’s total gas supply and that the new pipeline would increase that amount by as much as “55 billion cubic meters per annum.” Hence it continued to oppose the construction and did everything possible to sink the Nord Stream 2 project. As Joe Biden assumed office, efforts were underway to revive the strained relations with Germany. Yet, Germany was resisting Washington’s pressure saying that the U.S. cannot be a substitute for Russia given its geopolitical proximity and reduced transaction costs. However, the situation began to change for the worse with Putin’s action in eastern Ukraine. It was at this time that U.S. had warned that it would suspend the project amid reports of Russian invasion.  On 23 February, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken applauded “Germany’s decision to take administrative steps to halt the certification process for Nord Stream 2, which will prevent the pipeline from becoming operational.” He said: “This action is in line with the United States’ longstanding opposition to Nord Stream 2 as a Russian geopolitical project and the President’s commitment that Nord Stream 2 would not move forward following the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.”  

Following this, the German subsidiary of the Nord Stream 2 operator—Gas for Europe GmbH—announced “its possible liquidation due to current events around the project.” However, amid all developments in Ukraine, Russia continued to argue that Nord Stream 2 was only “a commercial project and is being implemented jointly with European partners.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told in an interview that the “situation around the Nord Stream 2 showed that Europe holds an absolutely subordinate and dependent place at the global stage.” But Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine has not helped her realise its dream of dominating the European energy market. 

Geopolitical Challenges 

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Arctic has become a new terrain of big power rivalry with the U.S., Russia and China contemplating to employ military and economic power to secure and sustain access to the region at the expense of the polar region’s ecosystem. The U.S. National Security Strategy sought to upgrade  the Arctic “as a corridor for expanded strategic great power competition between two regions – the Indo-Pacific and Europe.” 

It may be recalled that in March 2021, the U.S. Army brought out its new Arctic strategy under the heading, “Regaining Arctic Dominance.”  According to the document, the Army must “organize to win in the Arctic” and that the region represents “an arena of competition, a line of attack in conflict, a vital area holding many … natural resources, and a platform for global power projection.” An article in The Arctic Institute says that the US Army strategy adhered to other publications from the Government of Canada, the Norwegian military, the United States Navy, and other Arctic and non-Arctic state institutions “committed to increased military engagement in the circumpolar north.” According to Jen Evans, “these ambitious new Arctic security policies are more than just saber-rattling: NATO doubled Arctic military activities from 2015 to 2020 and Russia has assigned at least 81% of its nuclear weaponry to northern fleets, all in the name of (re)gaining Arctic dominance.” Evans also recalled, “the Arctic remained a pivotal military theater throughout the Cold War. During this period, the Arctic was characterized by high levels of militarization, which included the regional placement of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), long-range bombers, nuclear weapons, and a host of additional military resources.” 

Strategic thinktanks also noted Russia’s growing interest in the Arctic. SIPRI, for example, had brought out a background paper in 2016 which noted that the “rift between the West and Russia—due to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine from early 2014 and Russia’s more assertive or aggressive foreign policy—has made the other Arctic countries more concerned about the aims of Russia’s military modernization in the Arctic.” Some analysts had seen “this Russia–West confrontation as a new driver of militarization in the Arctic and as increasing the possibility of tensions between NATO and Russia spilling over to the Arctic.” As the SIPRI background paper noted, Russia’s Arctic policies are now available in two documents: The Foundations of the Russian Federation’s State Policy in the Arctic until 2020 and Beyond, adopted in September 2008; and The Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation and National Security Efforts for the Period up to 2020, adopted in 2013.  

These two documents underline the significance of the Arctic as a major storehouse of natural resources by 2020 and the security challenges emerging from the enhanced accessibility of the Arctic region. Basically, these documents focussed on non-military challenges and underline the importance of cooperation among all Arctic states in dealing with the region’s issues. However, the Arctic also appears more specifically in military and security documents, such as Russian Military Doctrine (December 2014), Maritime Doctrine (July 2015) which highlight “specific military maritime security concerns, with a strong focus on the security of the bases and units of the Northern Fleet in the Arctic.” 

A Report of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Political Committee, NATO and Security in the Arctic (October 2017) noted that Russian violations of the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova have raised concerns over territorial conflicts between Russia and the rest of the Arctic states.” The Report says that “Moscow, as the largest Arctic littoral state, recognises the geostrategic importance of the Arctic and vital Arctic energy resources, and has built up its military to protect what it perceives as Russian territorial interests in the region. Russian disregard for the territorial integrity of peaceful neighbours cannot be ignored in the High North.” It also pointed out that in “the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea, Russia’s Arctic build-up is viewed more sceptically by other littoral states. Moreover, as a result of Russia’s military build-up in the High North, its ability to limit or deny access and control various parts of the region has increased significantly.” The Report further noted that China was “interested in the exploitation of the sea lanes that will slowly open up as a result of global warming. Moreover, China is also interested in strengthening its ability as a non-Arctic state to access Arctic mineral resources and fishing waters. The PRC has taken steps over the past several years to protect its interests in the High North, pursuing a presence in Svalbard, Iceland, and Greenland.” It may be noted that China had come out with its Arctic policy in 2018 assuming itself as a ‘Near-Arctic state’ with a grand ambition of building a ‘Polar Silk Road.’ It is here that both China and Russia have a great interest in developing ‘Northern Sea Route’ (NSR) as a new geopolitical circuit connecting with Europe and beyond. 

In short, at the heart of the problem is the geopolitical contiguity of big powers linked by the Arctic region—compounded further by the quest for energy security and the resultant rivalry for control over the trade circuits. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has only deepened the security issues in the Arctic, and the consequences of this war will be more enduring than anything else in the preceding decades. 

The author, an ICSSR Senior Fellow, is Academic Advisor to the International Centre for Polar Studies (ICPS) and Director, Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension (IUCSSRE), Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala.  

K.M. Seethi is Director, Inter University Centre for Social Science Research and Extension (IUCSSRE), Mahatma Gandhi University, Kerala. He also served as Dean of Social Sciences and Professor of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University. He frequently writes for ‘Global South Colloquy.’ He can be contacted at kmseethimgu@gmail.com