Wednesday, March 09, 2022

Otto Rühle
The Struggle Against Fascism
Begins with the Struggle Against Bolshevism (1939)


This article by Otto Rühle appeared in the American councilist journal Living Marxism (Vol. 4, No. 8, 1939)

In 1981 it was reprinted as a pamphlet in the UK by Bratach Dubh editions.

It seems to be based on a much longer text, part of which was published in French as “Fascisme Brun, Fascisme Rouge” by Spartacus in 1975 (Série B—No 63). This is part of a still longer text in German called “Weltkrieg—Weltfaschismus—Weltrevolution”.

I.

Russia must be placed first among the new totalitarian states. It was the first to adopt the new state principle. It went furthest in its application. It was the first to establish a constitutional dictatorship, together with the political and administrative terror system which goes with it. Adopting all the features of the total state, it thus became the model for those other countries which were forced to do away with the democratic state system and to change to dictatorial rule. Russia was the example for fascism.

No accident is here involved, nor a bad joke of history. The duplication of systems here is not apparent but real. Everything points to the fact that we have to deal here with expressions and consequences of identical principles applied to different levels of historical and political development. Whether party “communists” like it or not, the fact remains that the state order and rule in Russia are indistinguishable from those in Italy and Germany. Essentially they are alike. One may speak of a red, black, or brown “soviet state”, as well as of red, black or brown fascism. Though certain ideological differences exist between these countries, ideology is never of primary importance. Ideologies, furthermore, are changeable and such changes do not necessarily reflect the character and the functions of the state apparatus. Furthermore, the fact that private property still exists in Germany and Italy is only a modification of secondary importance. The abolition of private property alone does not guarantee socialism. Private property within capitalism also can be abolished. What actually determines a socialist society is, besides the doing away with private property in the means of production, the control of the workers over the products of their labour and the end of the wage system. Both of these achievements are unfulfilled in Russia, as well as in Italy and Germany. Though some may assume that Russia is one step nearer to socialism than the other countries, it does not follow that its “soviet state” has helped the international proletariat come in any way nearer to its class struggle goals. On the contrary, because Russia calls itself a socialist state, it misleads and deludes the workers of the world. The thinking worker knows what fascism is and fights it, but as regards Russia, he is only too often inclined to accept the myth of its socialistic nature. This delusion hinders a complete and determined break with fascism, because it hinders the principle struggle against the reasons, preconditions, and circumstances which in Russia, as in Germany and Italy, have led to an identical state and governmental system. Thus the Russian myth turns into an ideological weapon of counter-revolution.

It is not possible for men to serve two masters. Neither can a totalitarian state do such a thing. If fascism serves capitalistic and imperialistic interests, it cannot serve the needs of the workers. If, in spite of this, two apparently opposing classes favour the same state system, it is obvious that something must be wrong. One or the other class must be in error. No one should say here that the problem is one merely of form and therefore of no real significance, that, though the political forms are identical, their content may vary widely. This would be self-delusion. For the Marxist such things do not occur; for him form and content fit to each other and they cannot be divorced. Now, if the Soviet State serves as a model for fascism, it must contain structural and functional elements which are also common to fascism. To determine what they are we must go back to the “soviet system” as established by Leninism, which is the application of the principles of bolshevism to the Russian conditions. And if an identity between bolshevism and fascism can be established, then the proletariat cannot at the same time fight fascism and defend the Russian “soviet system”. Instead, the struggle against fascism must begin with the struggle against bolshevism.

II.

From the beginning bolshevism was for Lenin a purely Russian phenomenon. During the many years of his political activity, he never attempted to elevate the bolshevik system to forms of struggles in other countries. He was a social democrat who saw in Bebel and Kautsky the genial leaders of the working class, and he ignored the left-wing of the German socialist movement struggling against these heroes of Lenin and against all the other opportunists. Ignoring them, he remained in consistent isolation surrounded by a small group of Russian emigrants, and he continued to stand under Kautsky’s sway even when the German “left”, under the leadership of Rosa Luxemburg, was already engaged in open struggle against Kautskyism.

Lenin was concerned only with Russia. His goal was the end of the Czarist feudal system and the conquest of the greatest amount of political influence for his social democratic party within the bourgeois society. However, it realized that it could stay in power and drive on the process of socialization only if it could unleash the world revolution of the workers. But its own activity in this respect was quite an unhappy one. By helping to drive the German workers back into the parties, trade unions, and parliament, and by the simultaneous destruction of the German council (soviet) movement, the Bolsheviks lent a hand, to the defeat of the awakening European revolution.

The Bolshevik Party, consisting of professional revolutionists on the one hand and large backward masses on the other, remained isolated. It could not develop a real soviet system within the years of civil war, intervention, economic decline, failing socialization experiments, and the improvised Red Army. Though the soviets, which were developed by the Mensheviks, did not fit into the bolshevistik scheme, it was with their help that the Bolsheviks came to power. With the stabilisation of power and the economic reconstruction process, the Bolshevik Party did not know how to co-ordinate the strange soviet system to their own decisions and activities. Nevertheless, socialism was also the desire of the Bolsheviks, and it needed the world proletariat for its realization.

Lenin thought it essential to win the workers of the world over to the bolshevik methods. It was disturbing that the workers of other countries, despite the great triumph of Bolshevism, showed little inclination to accept for themselves the bolshevik theory and practice, but tended rather in the direction of the council movement, that arose in a number of countries, and especially in Germany.

This council movement Lenin could use no longer in Russia. In other European countries it showed strong tendencies to oppose the bolshevik type of uprisings. Despite Moscow’s tremendous propaganda in all countries, the so-called “ultra-lefts”, as Lenin himself pointed out, agitated more successfully for revolution on the basis of the council movement, than did all the propagandists sent by the Bolshevik Party. The Communist Party, following Bolshevism, remained a small, hysterical, and noisy group consisting largely of the proletarianized shreds of the bourgeoisie, whereas the council movement gained in real proletarian strength and attracted the best elements of the working class. To cope with this situation, bolshevik propaganda had to be increased; the “ultra-left” had to be attacked; its influence had to be destroyed in favour of Bolshevism.

Since the soviet system had failed in Russia, how could the radical “competition” dare to attempt to prove to the world that what could not be accomplished by Bolshevism in Russia might very well be realized independently of Bolshevism in other places? Against this competition Lenin wrote his pamphlet “Radicalism, an Infantile Disease of Communism”, dictated by fear of losing power and by indignation over the success of the heretics. At first this pamphlet appeared with the subheading, “Attempt at a popular exposition of the Marxian strategy and tactic”, but later this too ambitious and silly declaration was removed. It was a little too much. This aggressive, crude, and hateful papal bull was real material for any counter revolutionary. Of all programmatic declarations of Bolshevism it was the most revealing of its real character. It is Bolshevism unmasked. When in 1933 Hitler suppressed all socialist and communist literature in Germany, Lenin’s pamphlet was allowed publication and distribution.

As regards the content of the pamphlet, we are not here concerned with what it says in relation to the Russian Revolution, the history of Bolshevism, the polemic between Bolshevism and other streams of the labour movement, or the circumstances allowing for the Bolshevik victory, but solely with the main points by which at the time of the discussion between Lenin and “ultra-leftism”, were illustrated the decisive differences between the two opponents.

III.

The Bolshevik Party, originally the Russian social democratic section of the Second International, was built not in Russia but during the emigration. After the London split in 1903, the Bolshevik wing of the Russian social democracy was no more than a small sect. The “masses” behind it existed only in the brain of its leader. However, this small advance guard was a strictly disciplined organization, always ready for militant struggles and continually purged to maintain its integrity. The party was considered the war academy of professional revolutionists. Its outstanding pedagogical requirements were unconditional leader authority, rigid centralism, iron discipline, conformity, militancy, and sacrifice of personality for party interests. What Lenin actually developed was an elite of intellectuals, a centre which, when thrown into the revolution would capture leadership and assume power. There is no use to try to determine logically and abstractly if this kind of preparation for revolution is right or wrong. The problem has to be solved dialectically. Other questions also must be raised: What kind of a revolution was in preparation? What was the goal of the revolution?

Lenin’s party worked within the belated bourgeois revolution in Russia to overthrow the feudal regime of Czarism. The more centralized the will of the leading party in such a revolution and the more single-minded, the more success would accompany the process of the formation of the bourgeois state and the more promising would be the position of the proletarian class within the framework of the new state. What, however, may be regarded as a happy solution of revolutionary problems in a bourgeois revolution cannot at the same time be pronounced as a solution for the proletarian revolution. The decisive structural difference between the bourgeois and the new socialist society excludes such an attitude.

According to Lenin’s revolutionary method, the leaders appear as the head of the masses. Possessing the proper revolutionary schooling, they are able to understand situations and direct and command the fighting forces. They are professional revolutionists, the generals of the great civilian army. This distinction between head and body, intellectuals and masses, officers, and privates corresponds to the duality of class society, to the bourgeois social order. One class is educated to rule; the other to be ruled. Out of this old class formula resulted Lenin’s party concept. His organisation is only a replica of bourgeois reality. His revolution is objectively determined by the forces that create a social order incorporating these class relations, regardless of the subjective goals accompanying this process.

Whoever wants to have a bourgeois order will find in the divorce of leader and masses, the advance guard and working class, the right strategical preparation for revolution. The more intelligent, schooled, and superior is the leadership and the more disciplined and obedient are the masses, the more chances such a revolution will have to succeed. In aspiring to the bourgeois revolution in Russia, Lenin’s party was most appropriate to his goal.

When, however, the Russian revolution changed its character, when its proletarian features came more to the fore, Lenin’s tactical and strategical methods ceased to be of value. If he succeeded anyway it was not because of his advance guard, but because of the soviet movement which had not at all been incorporated in his revolutionary plans. And when Lenin, after the successful revolution which was made by the soviets, dispensed again with this movement, all that had been proletarian in the Russian Revolution was also dispensed with. The bourgeois character of the Revolution came to the fore again, finding its natural completion in Stalinism.

Despite his great concern with Marxian dialectics, Lenin was not able to see the social historical processes in a dialectical manner. His thinking remained mechanistic, following rigid rules. For him there was only one revolutionary party -- his own; only one revolution -- the Russian; only one method -- the bolshevik. And what had worked in Russia would work also in Germany, France, America, China and Australia. What was correct for the bourgeois revolution in Russia would be correct also for the proletarian world revolution. The monotonous application of a once discovered formula moved in an ego-centric circle undisturbed by time and circumstances, developmental degrees, cultural standards, ideas and men. In Lenin came to light with great clarity the rule of the machine age in politics; he was the “technician”, the “inventor”, of the revolution, the representative of the all-powerful will of the leader. All fundamental characteristics of fascism were in his doctrine, his strategy, his social “planning”, and his art with dealing with men. He could not see the deep revolutionary meaning of the rejection of traditional party policies by the left. He could not understand the real importance of the soviet movement for the socialist orientation of society. He never learned to know the prerequisites for the freeing of the workers. Authority, leadership, force, exerted on one side, and organization, cadres, subordination on the other side, -- such was his line of reasoning. Discipline and dictatorship are the words which are most frequent in his writings. It is understandable, then, why he could not comprehend nor appreciate the ideas and actions of the “ultra-left”, which would not accept his strategy and which demanded what was most obvious and most necessary for the revolutionary struggle for socialism, namely that the workers once and for all take their fate in their own hands.

IV.

To take their destiny in their own hands -- this key-word to all questions of socialism -- was the real issue in all polemics between the ultra-lefts and the Bolsheviks. The disagreement on the party question was paralleled by the disagreement on trade unionism. The ultra-left was of the opinion that there was no longer a place for revolutionists in trade unions; that it was rather necessary for them to develop their own organizational forms within the factories, the common working places. However, thanks to their unearned authority, the Bolsheviks had been able even in the first weeks of the German revolution to drive the workers back into the capitalistic reactionary trade unions. To fight the ultra-lefts, to denounce them as stupid and as counter-revolutionary, Lenin in his pamphlet once more makes use of his mechanistic formulas. In his arguments against the position of the left he does not refer to German trade unions but to the trade union experiences of the Bolsheviks in Russia. That in their early beginnings trade unions were of great importance for the proletarian class struggle is a generally accepted fact. The trade unions in Russia were young and they justified Lenin’s enthusiasm. However, the situation was different in other parts of the world. Useful and progressive in their beginnings, the trade unions in the older capitalistic countries had turned into obstacles in the way of the liberation of the workers. They had turned into instruments of counter revolution, and the German left drew its conclusions from this changed situation.

Lenin himself could not help declaring that in the course of time there had developed a layer of a “strictly trade-unionist, imperialistic orientated, arrogant, vain, sterile, egotistical, petty-bourgeois, bribed, and demoralised aristocracy of labour”. This guild of corruption, this gangster leadership, today rules the world trade union movement and lives on the back of the workers. It was of this trade union movement that the ultra-left was speaking when it demanded that the workers should desert it. Lenin, however, demagogically answered by pointing to the young trade union movement in Russia which did not as yet share the character of the long established unions in other countries. Employing a specific experience at a given period and under particular circumstance, he thought it possible to draw from it conclusions of world-wide application. The revolutionist, he argued, must always be where the masses are. But in reality where are the masses? In trade union offices? At membership meetings? At the secret meetings of the leadership with the capitalistic representatives? No, the masses are in the factories, in their working places; and there it is necessary to effect their co-operation and strengthen their solidarity. The factory organization, the council system, is the real organisation of the revolution, which must replace all parties and trade unions.

In factory organizations there is no room for professional leadership, no divorce of leaders from followers, no caste distinction between intellectuals and the rank and file, no ground for egotism, competition, demoralization, corruption, sterility and philistinism. Here the workers must take their lot in their own hands.

But Lenin thought otherwise. He wanted to preserve the unions; to change them from within; to remove the social democratic officials and replace them with bolshevik officials; to replace a bad with a good bureaucracy. The bad one grows in a social democracy; the good one in Bolshevism.

Twenty years of experience meanwhile have demonstrated the idiocy of such a concept. Following Lenin’s advice, the Communists have tried all and sundry methods to reform trade unions. The result was nil. The attempt to form their own trade unions was likewise nil. The competition between social democratic and bolshevik trade union work was a competition in corruption. The revolutionary energies of the workers were exhausted in this very process. Instead of concentrating upon the struggle against fascism, the workers were engaged in a senseless and resultless experimentation in the interest of diverse bureaucracies. The masses lost confidence in themselves and in “their” organizations. They felt themselves cheated and betrayed. The methods of fascism, to dictate each step of the workers, to hinder the awakening of self-initiative, to sabotage all beginnings of class-consciousness, to demoralise the masses through innumerable defeats and to make them impotent-all these methods had already been developed in the twenty years of work in the trade unions in accordance with bolshevik principles. The victory of fascism was such an easy one because the labour leaders in trade unions and parties had prepared for them the human material capable of being fitted into the fascistic scheme of things.

V.

On the question of parliamentarianism, too, Lenin appears in the role of the defender of a decayed political institution which had become a hindrance for further political development and a danger to the proletarian emancipation. The ultra-lefts fought parliamentarianism in all its forms. They refused to participate in elections and did not respect parliamentary decisions. Lenin, however, put much effort into parliamentary activities and attached much importance to them. The ultra-left declared parliamentarianism historically passé even as a tribune for agitation, and saw in it no more than a continuous source of political corruption for both parliamentarian and workers. It dulled the revolutionary awareness and consistency of the masses by creating illusions of legalistic reforms, and on critical occasions the parliament turned into a weapon of counter revolution. It had to be destroyed, or, where nothing else was possible, sabotaged. The parliamentary tradition, still playing a part in proletarian consciousness, was to be fought.

To achieve the opposite effect, Lenin operated with the trick of making a distinction between the historically and politically passé institutions. Certainly, he argued, parliamentarianism was historically obsolete, but this was not the case politically, and one would have to reckon with it. One would have to participate because it still played a part politically.

What an argument! Capitalism, too, is only historically and not politically obsolete. According to Lenin’s logic, it is then not possible to fight capitalism in a revolutionary manner. Rather a compromise would have to be found. Opportunism, bargaining, political horse-trading, -- that would be the consequence of Lenin’s tactic. The monarchy, too, is only historically but not politically surpassed. According to Lenin, the workers would have no right to do away with it but would be obliged to find a compromise solution. The same story would be true as regards the church, also only historically but not politically antedated. Furthermore, the people belong in great masses to the church. As a revolutionist, Lenin pointed out, that one had to be where the masses are. Consistency would force him to say “Enter the Church; it is your revolutionary duty!” Finally, there is fascism. One day, too, fascism will be historically antedated but politically still in existence. What is then to be done? To accept the fact and to make a compromise with fascism. According to Lenin’s reasoning, a pact between Stalin and Hitler would only illustrate that Stalin actually is the best disciple of Lenin. And it will not at all be surprising if in the near future the bolshevist agents will hail the pact between Moscow and Berlin as the only real revolutionary tactic.

Lenin’s position on the question of parliamentarianism is only an additional illustration of his incapacity to understand the essential needs and characteristics of the proletarian revolution. His revolution is entirely bourgeois; it is a struggle for the majority, for governmental positions, for a hold upon the law machine. He actually thought it of importance to gain as many votes as possible at election campaigns, to have a strong bolshevik fraction in the parliaments, to help determine form and content of legislation, to take part in political rule. He did not notice at all that today parliamentarianism is a mere bluff, an empty make-believe, and that the real power of bourgeois society rests in entirely different places; that despite all possible parliamentary defeats the bourgeoisie would still have at hand sufficient means to assert its will and interest in non-parliamentary fields. Lenin did not see the demoralising effects parliamentarism had upon the masses, he did not notice the poisoning of public morals through parliamentary corruption. Bribed, bought, and cowed, parliamentary politicians were fearful for their income. There was a time in prefascist Germany when the reactionists in parliament were able to pass any desired law merely by threatening to bring about the dissolution of parliament. There was nothing more terrible to the parliamentary politicians than such a threat which implied the end of their easy incomes. To avoid such an end, they would say yes to anything. And how is it today in Germany, in Russia, in Italy? The parliamentary helots are without opinions, without will, and are nothing more than willing servants of their fascist masters.

There can be no question that parliamentarianism is entirely degenerated and corrupt. But, why didn’t the proletariat stop this deterioration of a political instrument which had once been used for their purposes? To end parliamentarism by one heroic revolutionary act would have been far more useful and educational for the proletarian consciousness than the miserable theatre in which parliamentarism has ended in the fascistic society. But such an attitude was entirely foreign to Lenin, as it is foreign to day to Stalin. Lenin was not concerned with the freedom of the workers from their mental and physical slavery; he was not bothered by the false consciousness of the masses and their human self-alienation. The whole problem to him was nothing more nor less than a problem of power. Like a bourgeois, he thought in terms of gains and losses, more or less, credit and debit; and all his business-like computations deal only with external things: membership figures, number of votes, seats in parliaments, control positions. His materialism is a bourgeois materialism, dealing with mechanisms, not with human beings. He is not really able to think in socio-historical terms. Parliament to him is parliament; an abstract concept in a vacuum, holding equal meaning in all nations, at all times. Certainly he acknowledges that parliament passes through different stages, and he points this out in his discussions, but he does not use his own knowledge in his theory and practice. In his pro-parliamentarian polemics he hides behind the early capitalist parliaments in the ascending stage of capitalism, in order not to run out of arguments. And if he attacks the old parliaments, it is from the vantage point of the young and long outmoded. In short, he decides that politics is the art of the possible. However, politics for the workers is the art of revolution.

VI.

It remains to deal with Lenin’s position on the question of compromises. During the World War the German Social Democracy sold out to the bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, much against its will, it inherited the German revolution. This was made possible to a large extent by the help of Russia, which did its share in killing off the German council movement. The power which had fallen into the lap of Social Democracy was used for nothing. The Social Democracy simply renewed its old class collaboration policy, satisfied with sharing power over the workers with the bourgeoisie in the reconstruction period of capitalism. The German radical workers countered this betrayal with this slogan, “No compromise with the counter revolution”. Here was a concrete case, a specific situation, demanding a clear decision. Lenin, unable to recognize the real issues at stake, made from this concrete specific question a general problem. With the air of a general and the infallibility of a cardinal, he tried to persuade the ultra-lefts that compromises with political opponents under all conditions are a revolutionary duty. If today one reads those passages in Lenin’s pamphlet dealing with compromises, one is inclined to compare Lenin’s remarks in 1920 with Stalin’s present policy of compromises. There is not one deadly sin of bolshevik theory which did not become bolshevistic reality under Lenin.

According to Lenin, the ultra-lefts should have been willing to sign the Treaty of Versailles. However, the Communist Party, still in accordance with Lenin, made a compromise and protested against the Versailles Treaty in collaboration with the Hitlerites. The “National Bolshevism” propagandized in 1919 in Germany by the left-winger Laufenberg was in Lenin’s opinion “an absurdity crying to heaven”. But Radek and the Communist Party—again in accordance with Lenin’s principle—concluded a compromise with German Nationalism, and protested against the occupation of the Ruhr basin and celebrated the national hero Schlageter. The League of Nations was, in Lenin’s own words, “a band of capitalist robbers and bandits”, whom the workers could only fight to the bitter end. However, Stalin—in accordance with Lenin’s tactics—made a compromise with these very same bandits, and the USSR entered the League. The concept “folk” or “People” is in Lenin’s opinion a criminal concession to the counter-revolutionary ideology of the petty bourgeoisie. This did not hinder the Leninists, Stalin and Dimitrov, from making a compromise with the petty bourgeoisie in order to launch the freakish “Peoples Front” movement. For Lenin, imperialism was the greatest enemy of the world proletariat, and against it all forces had to be mobilized. But Stalin, again in true Leninistic fashion, is quite busy with cooking up an alliance with Hitler’s imperialism. Is it necessary to offer more examples? Historical experience teaches that all compromises between revolution and counter-revolution can serve only the latter. They lead only to the bankruptcy of the revolutionary movement. All policy of compromise is a policy of bankruptcy. What began as a mere compromise with the German Social Democracy found its end in Hitler. What Lenin justified as a necessary compromise found its end in Stalin. In diagnosing revolutionary non-compromise as “An Infantile Disease of Communism”, Lenin was suffering from the old age disease of opportunism, of pseudo-communism.


VII.

If one looks with critical eyes at the picture of bolshevism provided by Lenin’s pamphlet, the following main points may be recognized as characteristics of bolshevism:

1. Bolshevism is a nationalistic doctrine. Originally and essentially conceived to solve a national problem, it was later elevated to a theory and practice of international scope and to a general doctrine. Its nationalistic character comes to light also in its position on the struggle for national independence of suppressed nations.

2. Bolshevism is an authoritarian system. The peak of the social pyramid is the most important and determining point. Authority is realized in the all-powerful person. In the leader myth the bourgeois personality ideal celebrates its highest triumphs.

3. Organizationally, Bolshevism is highly centralistic. The central committee has responsibility for all initiative, leadership, instruction, commands. As in the bourgeois state, the leading members of the organization play the role of the bourgeoisie; the sole role of the workers is to obey orders.

4. Bolshevism represents a militant power policy. Exclusively interested in political power, it is no different from the forms of rule in the traditional bourgeois sense. Even in the organization proper there is no self-determination by the members. The army serves the party as the great example of organization.

5. Bolshevism is dictatorship. Working with brute force and terroristic measures, it directs all its functions toward the suppression of all non-bolshevik institutions and opinions. Its “dictatorship of the proletariat” is the dictatorship of a bureaucracy or a single person.

6. Bolshevism is a mechanistic method. It aspires to the automatic co-ordination, the technically secured conformity, and the most efficient totalitarianism as a goal of social order. The centralistically “planned” economy consciously confuses technical-organizational problems with socio-economic questions.

7. The social structure of Bolshevism is of a bourgeois nature. It does not abolish the wage system and refuses proletarian self-determination over the products of labour. It remains therewith fundamentally within the class frame of the bourgeois social order. Capitalism is perpetuated.

8. Bolshevism is a revolutionary element only in the frame of the bourgeois revolution. Unable to realize the soviet system, it is thereby unable to transform essentially the structure of bourgeois society and its economy. It establishes not socialism but state capitalism.

9. Bolshevism is not a bridge leading eventually into the socialist society. Without the soviet system, without the total radical revolution of men and things, it cannot fulfil the most essential of all socialistic demands, which is to end the capitalist human-self-alienation. It represents the last stage of bourgeois society and not the first step towards a new society.

These nine points represent an unbridgeable opposition between bolshevism and socialism. They demonstrate with all necessary clarity the bourgeois character of the bolshevist movement and its close relationship to fascism. Nationalism, authoritarianism, centralism, leader dictatorship, power policies, terror-rule, mechanistic dynamics, inability to socialize-all these essential characteristics of fascism were and are existing in bolshevism. Fascism is merely a copy of bolshevism. For this reason the struggle against the one must begin with the struggle against the other.



Otto Rühle


Otto Rühle was a German Marxist active in opposition to both the First and Second World Wars, and a founder along with Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Franz Mehring and others of the group and magazine Internationale, which posed a revolutionary internationalism against a world of warring states, and also the Spartacist League in 1916. The Spartacist League took an oppositional stance to Leninism, and was attacked by the Bolsheviks for inconsistency. Though Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were murdered in 1919 for their involvement in the German Revolution, Rühle lived on to participate in the left opposition of the German labour movement, developing both an early communist critique of Bolshevism, and an early opposition to fascism. Rühle saw the Soviet Union as a form of state capitalism with much in common with the state-centred capitalism of the West, as well as Fascism: "It has served as the model for other capitalistic dictatorships. Ideological divergences do not really differentiate socioeconomic systems." He also saw the Leninist Party as an appropriate form for the overthrow of Tsarism, but ultimately an inappropriate form for a proletarian revolution.







EAST GERMAN STALINISTS SUPPORT AfD
Germany's far-right AfD can be put under surveillance

The far-right populist Alternative for Germany has lost a legal battle against the countryˈs domestic intelligence service. Judges ruled that the party can be categorized as "suspicious entity."




The AfD can be labeled as a suspicious entity, granting investigators more power to keep tabs on it

Germanyˈs domestic intelligence agency has the right to surveil the populist far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) as part of its remit to monitor extremism, a court in Cologne ruled on Tuesday.

The AfD is the countryˈs most right-wing party represented in parliament and had been categorized as a "suspicious entity" by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) over concerns of increasing radicalization, especially within its youth organization.

The AfD had taken the matter to court to stop what it called the "politically motivated" investigation, arguing that the categorization would amount to a ban. They also claimed that the controversial extreme-right "Flügel" (wing) of the party had already been disbanded two years ago.

Björn Höcke, AfD leader in Thuringia, is one of the party's most influential figures on the extreme right

But the Administrative Court of Cologne found that there was more than sufficient evidence that the AfD was advocating an anti-constitutional ethnic concept, which the agency considers incompatible with human dignity as guaranteed in the German Basic Law. The judges found that even if the "Flügel" had been officially dissolved, its members were still active and influential within the party, as well as the "Junge Alternative" (JA) youth organization adhere to xenophobic concepts similar to those of Nazi Germany decades ago.

AfD chairman Tino Chrupalla said the party was "surprised" by the verdict, but vowed to explore all legal avenues to appeal it.
A first in post-war history

Although there are still a few legal hurdles to clear before the BfV is allowed to use informants or surveillance measures such as wiretaps, the decision marks the first time in post-war Germany that such a large party — the AfD is represented in the European Parliament, the Bundestag, as well as all state legislatures — will be surveilled by intelligence agents.

After the verdict, BfV President Thomas Haldenwang spoke of a "good day for democracy".

"The party stands for racism, the party stands for exclusion of minorities, the party stands for contempt of the social system," Haldenwang told public broadcaster ZDF. "That is why it is important that the Office for the Protection of the Constitution can talk about this party again after a year of silence."

In the past, the BfV has investigated members of the Left Party suspecting them of intending to replace the existing economic, political and social order with a socialist or communist system, but those investigations came to naught. It also infiltrated the neo-Nazi NPD with so many informants that a case to ban the party outright was thrown out over concerns that there were more spies in the party than dedicated members.


GERMANY: AFD PARTY LEADERS — LURCHING FURTHER TO THE FAR RIGHT
Bernd Lucke (2013 - 2015)
In 2013 the economist co-founded the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as a euroskeptic party that he went on to represent in the European Parliament in 2014. He left the AfD in 2015 after losing a power struggle against its more xenophobic wing.
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The fall-out for AfD members

The verdict may have immediate consequences for AfD members in the civil service, says DW political correspondent Hans Pfeifer.

"There are members of the party who are civil servants; police officers, district attorneys, teachers, judges," Pfeifer said, now their employers could argue that they have failed to uphold their oath to protect the constitution and fire them.

The court decision could also have an impact on AfD lawmakers in the Bundestag. Government and opposition MPs were quick to point out that members of a party that is suspected of breaching the constitution, would face a conflict of interest if they sat on committees overseeing the country's intelligence services.

The chairman of the Parliamentary Control Body in the Bundestag, Roderich Kiesewetter of the main opposition party, the center-right Christian Democrat (CDU) told ZDF: "If this ruling is confirmed, it will not be possible for a party that is classified as a suspicious case to be a member of the Parliamentary Control Board which controls the intelligence services of the federal government."

The former president of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, Charlotte Knobloch, described Tuesday's verdict as "a victory for the defensible constitutional state and a clear sign that democracy must not stand idly by and watch the machinations of its opponents." She told the FAZ daily that it was a sign "that all people can live safely and without fear in Germany. If a party borrows from National Socialism and openly associates itself with enemies of democracy at home and abroad, then the institutions of the rule of law must be able to keep a close eye on it."

Knobloch said she hoped this would also help sway voters: "I hope that the voters of the AfD will now finally also become aware of who they have sent to the parliaments."

But DW's Hans Pfeifer is less optimistic. While the verdict may make it more difficult for AfD supporters to claim that they are a mainstream conservative party, the verdict could be used to the partyˈs advantage, playing into their narrative that "this is just another way the government is trying to repress the opposition."

"They can turn this around, like the alt-right does in the US," Pfeifer said, "theyˈve already begun using it as a tool to de-legitimize the BfV and other government institutions, by insinuating that the mainstream political establishment has it out for them."

This article has been updated and expanded since its publication.

Darko Janjevic and Mark Hallam contributed to the report.

Edited by: Rina Goldenberg


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How war videos on social media can trigger secondary trauma

During a war, trauma is no longer limited to the battlefield. Violent and distressing content on social media can leave a lasting impression. Here's how users can be prepared.


A Ukrainian immigrant in California shows a photo of her aunt hunkering down

 in a basement in Kyiv, Ukraine, amid Russia's invasion

A huge explosion — first a massive orange-yellow flash, then plumes of smoke rising. The location is an administrative building on the edge of Svobody Square in the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv. 

This scene could be watched unfiltered all over the world shortly after it happened. The video of the explosion, caused by a missile strike, as it later emerged, was shared widely on social networks. Four days later, it had been viewed several million times.

The war in Ukraine is also a digital war. The movements and reporting of journalists on the ground are limited, and access to most areas is restricted or impossible. Hence, a lot of the information coming out of Ukraine is so-called user-generated content, or eyewitness media. It is mostly raw footage posted; editorial standards do not apply. 

The result is that a lot of harrowing material makes it to the screens of social media users the world over. What does this mean for people who consume content from the war in Ukraine online? How can potential psychological injury be avoided, or at least limited? How can users stay informed on the one hand, while they protect their mental health on the other hand? 

Secondary trauma 

Secondary trauma refers to distress or negative emotional effects that result from second-hand exposure. In other words: secondary trauma can occur when an individual hears about the first-hand trauma experiences of another person, or is exposed to gruesome or distressing material via images or videos.

In particular, repeated exposure to disturbing content carries the risk of negative consequences regarding mental well-being. If at all possible, this should be avoided.

Studying the psychological effects of exposure to distressing digital content on social media is a relatively new field of research. The same applies to the study of effective countermeasures. 

"Always be prepared, avoid surprises, and be ready to view distressing material any time when moving online," said Sam Dubberley, managing director of the Digital Investigations Lab at Human Rights Watch, and co-author of a report on eyewitness media and vicarious trauma

While Dubberley’s research has focused on secondary or vicarious trauma in the journalistic and human rights context, some of his findings can also serve as advice to ordinary social media users viewing content from the war in Ukraine. 

Dubberly stresses: "Be honest to yourself. If you see something distressing that affects you, acknowledge it. Don’t brush it under the carpet or pretend it doesn’t affect you if it does." 

Everyone is different

It is important to stress that everyone is different and reactions vary to the same or similar occurrences or exposures. Furthermore, much depends on the frame of mind prevailing at the time of exposure. 

Someone who expects to counter potentially disturbing material can put up their guard beforehand in order to prepare accordingly for what may come up on screen. 

Furthermore, each individual has different triggers. For some, it is viewing explicit physical injuries, while for others it is the sad or desperate look of a child. 

Taking one's personal situation into account is also important. Having a personal connection to an event plays a role, too. There is no particular universal technique or guideline that works for everyone in every type of setting. Nevertheless, a number of measures and activities can help limit negative consequences.


Ukrainian refugees fleeing toward Poland have shared images of their experiences

 

Limiting negative impact on mental well-being 

Being prepared to potentially encounter disturbing or distressing material when scrolling through a news feed is an important strategy. During a heavily-documented war, a horrific photo or video could be displayed on screen at any moment. 

The power of sounds should not be underestimated, and social media users are advised to turn off the audio on their news feeds.

Research has shown that the sound of, say, a person being seriously injured or harmed, "sticks" far more to the psyche than visual material. There are many highly disturbing videos circulating online, showing people who are victims of attacks and assaults — and hearing their pain and suffering can burn itself into one's mind for a long time. 

If watching videos from the war, social media users should reduce the size of the video window and disable autoplay. Turning away from the screen is always an option too. 

Regular breaks away from phones and computers are advised to prevent users being exposed to a constant stream of war footage almost every waking hour.


People around the world, including in Krakow, Poland, have been protesting the war

If things turn really bad: seek help 

Those that do become affected, whether mentally or emotionally, are urged to look out for "unusual signs" (such as problems sleeping, frequent nightmares, excessive alcohol or drugs consumption, to name but a few) and to talk to others about their feelings. These can be family, friends or colleagues. 

If these issues continue for longer periods, professional help should be sought, if you haven't already.

Wars produce a huge amount of distress and trauma, not only for Ukrainians who are directly affected. While it is important to stay informed, social media users should stay aware of possible risks that may result from exposure to disturbing digital material, wherever it is encountered.

Edited by: Ruairi Casey

Young Russians to their parents: 'How is it possible to think differently about this war?'

How can young Russians change the minds of their parents, who get most of their news from state television and defend the war in Ukraine? We spoke to some who talked about heated family debates and deep divisions.


Since the war began, there have been numerous demonstrations against it across Russia

Before Twitter was blocked in Russia, the site saw frequent discussions about how people might be able to persuade their parents not to believe Kremlin propaganda — and, above all, not to support the war in Ukraine.

According to a survey by the state-led opinion research institute VCIOM, 68% of Russians support the war, which within the country can only officially be referred to as a "special military operation." There are hardly any critical or independent press outlets left, and older people in particular get most of their news from state television.

A few young Russians, whose names have been changed here, spoke to DW about their disagreements with their parents over Ukraine, which go back to President Vladimir Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the international sanctions that followed.

'My father has begun to be critical, but my mother remains a Putin supporter'

Yelena, 29-year-old IT developer for NGOs from Moscow

This is an all-out war and I am definitely against it. On the first day, I was totally shocked and cried when I read the news. I am ashamed and sad, and I feel responsible for the fact that the sickness of our land, in the form of our president, is affecting not only us, but also people in another country. I never voted for this government, and I have taken part in protests.

I am going to protests now, as well, and I have already signed everything there was to sign against the war. I talk with people about what they can do to have some kind of an impact on the situation. My friends and I have started going to a metro station in Moscow and handing out green bands as a symbol of peace. We have had all sorts of responses. An older man came up to us with tears in his eyes and asked for a second band for his wife. And then there was an older woman who yelled all the way down the street that we were fascists and needed to be killed.


Russian authorities have arrested hundreds of protesters taking part in anti-war rallies

My parents also live in Moscow. My father is 59 years old and works for a cash transportation company. My mother is 63 and retired. She used to work as a scriptwriter for children's shows. When all this started in Ukraine, we argued. My parents believed everything they saw on television. On the morning of February 26, I called my brother, who shares my opinion. I suggested to him that we all sit down together and talk. We were partly successful.

We got our father to realize that this is all terrible. Since then, he has started to think critically. Even before, he had begun to understand that not everything was as they said it was on TV. But these new realizations were a disaster for him. He had a seizure and couldn't breathe. His entire thinking about Russia and his people was completely shattered.

After my mother retired, all she did was watch TV, and it turned her into a fanatical Putin supporter. We tried to persuade her to read other sources, but she won't hear of it. As soon as you suggest to her that her ideology might be wrong, she gets angry and aggressive, like that old woman on the street who called us fascists. When it became known that Kadyrov [head of the Chechen Republic — Editor's note] was sending his troop of cold-blooded murderers to Ukraine, she was so happy she practically applauded. That hurts.


Most Russians, especially older people, get all their information from Russian TV,

 which is tightly controlled by the state

My mother and I are no longer in contact with each other. Maybe I'll talk with her about it one day, when she's experiencing all the consequences and her rose-tinted glasses begin to crack. But our father is on our side. He was always opposed to me going to protests, just because he was worried about me. But after all our conversations, to my amazement, he told me that if I went to protests again, he would come with me.

'My mother repeats propaganda slogans, but we both find Nemtsov good'

Anton, 24-year-old designer from the Moscow region

I grew up in Morozovsk in the Rostov region, about 200 kilometers (124 miles) from the Ukrainian city of Luhansk. I've known Ukrainians since I was a child; everything was always fine between us. On the morning of February 24, when the war began, I packed my rucksack in case we were mobilized, so I could go and hide in the forest. My mother immediately asked where I was going. She said she supported the war against Ukraine, that it should have been occupied completely in 2014, and that Putin was doing everything right. I was aghast.

My mother is 52 years old and believes in all sorts of strange things, like runes, tarot cards and conspiracies. When she talks about politics, she just repeats propaganda slogans. But I had not expected her to justify the murder of people in a neighboring country. It's important for me to convince her that murder cannot be justified by anything.

I believe that war is unacceptable. I have served in the army, and it was clear to me then that something was wrong in our country. We weren't allowed to take photos of broken equipment, and the officers stole petrol. When I came back from the army, I started going to protest rallies. The war is a product of this system, which is why I'm trying to convince my mother that what is happening in Russia is not normal.

On the second day of the war, February 25, we talked about everything without quarreling and getting angry. I set things out in logical sequence, presented her with arguments, suggested she read Orwell. We talked the next day, quite calmly. But I don't think I can convince her. Her thinking is all muddled, but I'll still keep trying. For example, we both agreed that we find Boris Nemtsov [Russian politician and Putin critic who was killed in 2015 in Moscow — Editor's note] really good.

'If people justify this slaughter, what else will they justify?'

Alena, 26-year-old economist from St. Petersburg

My mother is 47 years old and works in the administration of a hospital. My father is 56 and works for Russian Railways. They both live in Perm, and back in 2014 they were already supporting the Russian government and parroting what was being said on TV.

In the meantime, though, their views have changed. It started after the import bans in 2014, when we couldn't buy cheese every day because we could no longer afford it and it didn't taste good any more. I was in class 11 back then, and I remember it very clearly.


Russia landed troops in Crimea in early 2014, seizing control and illegally

 annexing Ukraine's peninsula

At the same time, my father's Russian Railways salary was cut, because a lot of money was being spent on Crimea. I studied at the Faculty of Economics, and I made clear to my parents that we had suddenly started to live less well after the invasion of Crimea because that was what our money was being spent on. Was it worth it? A very good argument was always: "You worked really hard for me and my sister, and in the end, because the government, for which we didn't vote, seized part of another country, our quality of life has got much worse."

I admit that different generations can perhaps have different ways of looking at certain things, but not the things that are happening right now. I'm happy that my parents seem to share my opinion about the war; I don't know how anyone can think differently about it and still be a good person.

I always think: If people justify this slaughter, what else will they justify? You don't want parents like that. But we children can help them, for example, by providing orientation amid all this information.

This article was originally written in Russian

How the world has united in song via #StandWithUkraine

From national anthems to rock ballads by Sting, the Scorpions or John Lennon, musicians around the globe are showing their support for Ukraine via music.


Protests worldwide have been calling for peace

"Ukraine has not yet perished. Luck will still smile on us brother Ukrainians." These lyrics of the Ukrainian national anthem have been heard around the world since the beginning of Russia's war on Ukraine, on February 24, 2022.

Ukrainians around the world have been singing their anthem, proudly and defiantly — whether at the large Rose Monday demonstration in Cologne, Germany, or before an ice hockey game in Winnipeg, Canada.

It's not necessary to understand the lyrics of the anthem to understand its significance. It's enough to simply observe the faces of those singing to feel their profound expression of protest, love for their country's freedom and desire for peace.








In recent days, musicians around the world have used the hashtag #StandWithUkraine, to show their solidarity. In Germany, for example,  the NDR orchestra played the Ukrainian national anthem at Hamburg's Elbphilharmonie, with the concert hall illuminated in blue and yellow: the colors of the Ukrainian flag.

The anthem has been played by major orchestras around the world in recent days. At New York's Metropolitan Opera the in-house orchestra and chorus performed the anthem before a performance of the opera "Don Carlos." In Paris, it was played by the Orchestre de Paris.

Sting's Cold War ballad: 'Russians'

Big names in the music world are also taking part in the war protest via song. After nearly 40 years, Sting re-recorded his anti-Cold War ballad "Russians." In a video posted to Instagram, he is seen sitting in a studio with a cellist, performing the song which he wrote in 1985 for his debut solo album "The Dream of the Blue Turtles." In it, Sting appeals to common humanity. "There's no such thing as a winnable war," one line of the song goes.


"In light of one man's bloody and woefully misguided decision to invade a peaceful, non-threatening neighbor, the song is, once again, a plea for our common humanity" Sting says before he starts to play. "For the brave Ukrainians fighting against this brutal tyranny and also the many Russians who are protesting this outrage despite the threat of arrest and imprisonment — we, all of us, love our children. Stop the war."

The song is well-known in Russia as Sting has played it at concerts there in the past.

Peace songs have long been sung in Russia, as well. The glasnost and perestroika period at the end of the 1980s when the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev opened the Iron Curtain and turned towards the West, was an especially important time. Some songs came to represent the end of the Cold War, as well as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany. In a sense, peace anthems of the West became those of the East as the once long-separated worlds began to merge.


German rock band The Scorpions had massive success with 'Wind of Change'

The Scorpions: 'Wind of Change'

German rock band The Scorpions were among the first Western rock bands allowed to play in Russia. In 1988, The Scorpions played in Leningrad, and in 1989, they performed in front of almost 300,000 people with other top rockers like Ozzy Osbourne at the Moscow Music Peace Festival.

It was then tht Scorpions frontman Klaus Meine came up with the lyrics to "Wind of Change," while walking through the city's famous Gorky Park one evening. "The world is closing in, Did you ever think that we could be so close, like brothers" goes part of the lyrics.

"The song is my personal reappraisal of what happened in the world in recent years," he told Classic Rock magazine. The song accompanied not only the reunification of Germany, but also the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

John Lennon: 'Imagine

John Lennon created one of the greatest pop hits in history with his song for peace "Imagine." He dreams of a world in which there are no national borders, no religions, no God. "Maybe I'm a dreamer, but I'm not the only one. I hope someday you'll join us and the world will live as one." 

The song's message is timeless. Written in 1971 during the Vietnam War, the song is relevant to every conflict, including the war in Ukraine. At the French preliminary round of the Eurovision Song Contest, all twelve contestants took to the stage and sang the song together for Ukraine, while the audience waved blue and yellow flags.

John Lennon's equally famous peace anthem "Give Peace A Chance" was played simultaneously by 150 European radio stations at 8:45 on March 4.



'GIVE PEACE A CHANCE': SOLIDARITY WITH UKRAINE
Give peace a chance
On Friday morning, many radio stations across Europe played John Lennon and Yoko Ono's peace hymn "Give Peace a Chance" at the same time. Stations in Germany, France, Italy, Latvia, Iceland, Poland and Croatia all took part as a way to express solidarity with Ukraine and protest the Russian invasion. The Ukrainian station Radio Promin also played the song.
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The girl in the bunker

One of the most poignant songs in the last few days, however, is not an anti-war song, but rather "Let It Go," from the Disney movie "Frozen." A viral video shows a young girl singing it in an air raid shelter in Kyiv, where she and others have been holed up for days.

Initially, Amelia, who aims to be a pop star, sings against the clamor of voices of the others. But eventually everyone falls silent and listens. The video shot on a cell phone immediately became a hit on social media, touching the hearts of people all over the world. It even gained the attention of Broadway star Idina Menzel who sang in the original "Frozen." "We see you. We really, really see you," the star tweeted.

This article was originally written in German.