Putin’s not a fascist, totalitarian or revolutionary – he’s a reactionary tyrant

THE CONVERSATION
Published: March 17, 2022 

Talk of a “new cold war” in this century began in the time between the war in Iraq and the global recession of 2008. It roughly coincided with the attention focused on the murder of Alexander Litvinenko by polonium-210 poisoning at the hands of Russians in London.

Such talk was quietly forgotten while the consequences of global recession played out. Europe and the United States were distracted by dealing with their own – self-imposed – problems: Trump, Brexit and a general upturn in support for anti-system political movements. But with the invasion of Ukraine, the topic has returned glaringly.

What language is helpful for shaping the crucial judgements now necessary? Much damage has been done to common political vocabulary in recent years. “Enemies of the people” is a Stalinist phrase, but was used to push through Britain’s extrication from the European Union. The frequently relied-on “populism” is a vague, all-too-muted descriptor. “Imperialism” has been stretched thin by over-censure of humanitarian liberals.

Today we see similar harm being done. A Guardian editorial recently described a “slide into totalitarianism” in Russia. Likewise, The Daily Telegraph published a comment piece: “Russia’s war on journalism is another step towards the totalitarian”. But Vladimir Putin’s Russia is not totalitarian. Neither accurate political understanding, nor suitably directed moral criticism, is best served by this framing.

Ideologically, totalitarianism has three markers: utopia, exaggerated trust in science, and revolutionary violence. What Putin retains from the Soviet era is not its utopianism but its late-period security obsession, via his personal background in the KGB.

He does not carry his belief in science into dogma. He is not – like Marx and Lenin were – interested in science as a grand legitimiser of historical vision: he is only interested in technologies of communication for the purposes of control. And his belief in violence is utilitarian and calculating (even if miscalculated in practice), rather than revolutionary and geared towards social renewal.

Totalitarianism today in Russia would need to be a “post-totalitarian totalitarianism”. The legacy of the original totalitarianism – thanks to inherited trauma of the Soviet era – is a population not enthused into grand, confident collectivism but far more cowed into suspicion, “self-isolation” and “state paternalism”. Repression, which has increased, is not actually a very specific marker of totalitarianism.

Read more: Putin's Russia: how the ex-KGB strongman has gradually turned the clock back to Soviet repression

Using clear terminology to represent the experience of people living under toxic regimes is important for thinking about the possibilities of dissent balanced by the pressures to conformism. But this must be done accurately.
Not fascism

Neither is Putin’s regime “fascist” by ideology. The appearance since the start of the invasion of the swastika-looking “Z” symbol on posters and people’s clothing (but to begin with on Russian tanks) has been widely reported. Historians have noted the revival of previously overlooked Russian-born fascist thinkers, such as Ivan Ilyin, whose remains Putin repatriated and reburied in 2008.

Putin’s people: a souvenir ship in Moscow displays the ‘Z’ symbol so popular among supporters of the invasion, alongside its architect, Vladimir Putin. EPA-EFE/Maxim Shipenkov

The reason the issue is on the table is Putin’s own claim to freeing Ukraine by “denazification”. This is laughable in itself, but richly relevant to this question of what kind of past political language will prosper in the present. Putin meets only one of the three criteria for ideological fascism: strong, ethnic nationalism, which is the basis for the solidarity of self-styled white nationalists abroad when they promote the “Z”.

Two other criteria for fascism are absent entirely. Putin’s policies do not glorify the state over the individual. And, as opposed to compelling public participation, Putin cautions people to stay out of public life – even, as a rule, the oligarchs his rule has indulged. Neither do his policies express “transcendence” (or going beyond present limits) – whereas recognisably fascist movements aim at creating “new men”. Re-embracing Russian Orthodox Christianity is one ideological sign to the contrary, since it look forwards not back.
Putin’s reactionary regime

Putin is really a “reactionary tyrant”. This reflects the structure of rule he has evolved, and also the main lines of his legitimising discourse. This discourse may not have taken root deeply, but is nonetheless present in the regime’s rhetoric. Like totalitarianism, like fascism, reactionism has three main ideological themes.

The first is decrying decadence – evident in Putin’s explicit anti-westernism. So Ukraine’s west-oriented leadership are portrayed as “drug addicts”, or the west is described as weak because it is effeminate.

The second feature is inventing conspiracy theories. Among others targets, Putin fulminates at a homosexual lobby, which is accused – by conflation with paedophiles – of conspiring to steal children. This has been brilliantly highlighted by the journalist and activist Masha Gessen.

Such stances explain why Putin has been appealing, not just for extreme “manosphere” white supremacists, but also for more “mainstream” western reactionaries attracted by an unapologetic social conservatism. Hence, in France, the praise for Putin from two hard-right presidential contenders, Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour, each of whom now has hastily tried to retract previous positions.

Fellow travellers? Putin with French far-right politician Marine Le Pen. 

EPA/Michael Klimentyev/Sputkin/Kremlin pool

The third feature is the hardest to spot. This feature is the indignation of a population group: its righteous anger, hitherto suppressed, but now liberated – and politically tapped. In western countries, indignation has had a common, anti-immigrant wellspring. And politicians have prospered by alleging the unacceptability of expressing white working-class anger in a “politically correct” time.

Putin also understands that he can win a significant number of people’s loyalty by recognising and stressing shared humiliations. His message is that – unlike citizens of other countries – his fellow Russian nationals have been denied access to an acceptable historical memory. Thanks to Stalinism, cold war defeat and Soviet Russia’s chequered record of anti-fascism (the minimising of Jewish suffering in preference for a broader tale of Soviet sacrifice), many Russians are unable to look back in pride.

Anti-fascism is a record Putin’s leadership continues to blot, even against the background of this complaint about burdensome memories. Witness the destruction of the Holocaust monument at Babyn Yar in Ukraine.

Putin is a reactionary tyrant. The tyranny language is important. Inside Russia, the vocalisation of conscience against him has been brave and points to the noblest traditions of resisting tyrants. Any meaningful ideas lack root. So, like Caesar to the gladiators entering the arena, Putin is what people on both sides of the war are being asked to die for.

Author

Richard Shorten
Senior Lecturer in Political Theory, University of Birmingham

Big new California reservoir on track for $2.2B federal loan

By ADAM BEAM

March 17, 2022

 A barbed wire fence runs along a ranch in Sites, Calif., on Friday, July 23, 2021. The Environmental Protection Agency, on Thursday, March 17, 2022, signaled its intent to loan nearly $2.2 billion to the Sites Project Authority to cover about half the cost of construction of the reservoir that would be used to store water during wet years for use during droughts. (AP Photo/Adam Beam, File )


SACRAMENTO, Calif. (AP) — A long-delayed plan to build a giant reservoir in Northern California to help withstand the U.S. West’s notorious droughts got a huge financial boost on Thursday when the federal government signaled its intent to loan the project nearly $2.2 billion — about half of the cost to design, plan and build it.

The proposal would flood what’s left of the town of Sites, a tiny community with just a handful of residents nestled in a valley of the coastal range mountains in rural Colusa County. The idea has been around since the 1950s, but there has never been enough money or political will to move it forward.

But now a megadrought caused by climate change that researchers say is the worst in 1,200 years has renewed interest in the project, and efforts to move the project forward are happening quickly. It is also in line to get about $875 million from a voter-approved bond, plus another $450 million loan from the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

And the massive loan announced Thursday by the Environmental Protection Agency essentially preapproved the project and making it close to fully funding the project for the first time. Final approval of the $2.2 billion will take up to two years as federal government and project officials to negotiate the terms and sign documents.

“We’ve definitely turned the corner and we have a nice tailwind at our back,” said Jerry Brown, executive director of the Sites Project Authority overseeing and promoting the project. He is not related to the former California governor with the same name.

The project still must clear some regulatory processes before construction, including an environmental review in which the project is facing fierce resistance. Unlike most reservoirs, the Sites project won’t be connected to a river or stream for water to naturally flow into the lake. Instead, operators will have to pump water from the nearby Sacramento River.

Environmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense Council, have said the project will take too much water from the river, harming endangered salmon. Plus, they say the water from the Sites project will be more expensive for customers because of high pumping costs.

“It’s disappointing that the EPA seems to be prioritizing taxpayer subsidies for this environmentally destructive dam instead of projects for to ensure safe drinking water and wastewaters services,” said Doug Obegi, a senior attorney for Natural Resources Defense Council.

It takes a lot of water to run California, which has nearly 40 million residents. The state has a robust agricultural industry that supplies the bulk of the nation’s fruits, nuts and vegetables and a diverse — but fragile — ecosystem that is home to endangered salmon species.

It hardly ever rains in the state, with nearly all precipitation coming during the winter months and early spring. California has a vast system of reservoirs that capture and store water from rain and melted snow in the Sierra Nevada mountains. The reservoirs then release water throughout the year for drinking, agriculture and environmental purposes while also offering recreation for local residents and tourists.

But the drought has drained those reservoirs to alarmingly low levels, forcing state and federal officials to release a lot less water. That’s been bad for the environment and forced farmers to fallow thousands of acres of crops.

When it does rain in California, it rains a lot. So-called “atmospheric rivers” that suck moisture from the Pacific Ocean can dump tremendous amounts of rain on the state in short periods. The Sites Reservoir, project officials say, would capture that extra water when it’s available.

The reservoir would hold enough water to supply about 3 million households for one year — although much of the water would be for agricultural purposes. It would be nearly twice the size of the most recent reservoir built in California, but still much smaller than some of the state’s better known lakes like Shasta and Oroville.

Project officials say a lot of the water from the reservoir would be released for environmental purposes, including increasing flows in the state’s major rivers and streams.

But Obegi, with the Natural Resources Defense Council, says the water would likely be too warm to benefit fish. Plus, he said the project would take water from the Sacramento River during both wet and dry seasons.

“It is the classic example of a project that where the political science supports the project but the biological science does not,” Obegi said.

Brown, the Sites Reservoir’s executive director, said the project would be a “smarter tool” to “provide better management of our water.”

He acknowledged the reservoir would remove river water but said the reservoir would put it back. Plus, he said the loan from the EPA could reduce the cost of the water by about 10% for customers.

“It’s just a, kind of, different way of thinking about it,” he said. “There’s a lot of fear and distrust and we have to operate in a way that we, you know, secure trust and address the fears.”

Flood Risk Threatens to Delay Wheat Sowing in Dakotas, Minnesota

Brian K. Sullivan, Allison Nicole Smith and Michael Hirtzer, Bloomberg News

A beaver swims along the Red River in Winnipeg, Manitoba, in May 2021. , Bloomberg

(Bloomberg) -- The risk of major flooding in the fertile Red River Valley and continued snow cover across Minnesota and North Dakota threaten to delay planting across the region for weeks, U.S. government forecasters said in a call with reporters. 

Heavy snow and saturated soils mean The Red River of the North, which serves as the border between the two states and flows on into Manitoba, including through downtown Winnipeg, will likely see the worst flooding in the U.S. this spring, the meteorologists said in a seasonal forecast Thursday.

“In short, expect planting delays,” said Brad Rippey, a meteorologist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture and an author with the U.S. Drought Monitor. “There will be a few weeks of planting delays as we get into April.” 

The specter of floods in the Red River Valley, considered one of the most fertile areas of the world, is threatening to delay spring sowing just as planting in major producer Ukraine is in doubt because of the Russian invasion. 

The prospect of crimped wheat output raises the chance that prices will continue to skyrocket and exacerbate worldwide food inflation. Wheat prices soared to a record in early March, and a report from the United Nations says food prices have already hit record highs and could surge higher amid fears of supply shortfalls in the wake of the war in Ukraine.

Production from farmers in the Red River Valley will be important after drought last year parched wheat fields in key growing areas of the U.S., visibly stunting crops and severely curtailing output. Growers in states such as North Dakota were expected to boost plantings of spring wheat in the coming weeks, according to a survey this week from Allendale Inc.

There’s also the potential for rivers to rise across Indiana and along the Mississippi and its tributaries. Given the flat topography in the Dakotas and western Minnesota, melting snows can leave fields covered with ponds or deep with mud, which hinders farmers from being able to get crops such as wheat, corn and soybeans planted. The Red River also rolls through parts of eastern South Dakota. 

Flooding along the river has caused planting problems in the past, as well as damaging homes and businesses throughout the region, including Fargo and Winnipeg. 

©2022 Bloomberg L.P.

On the Fence: Why India Won’t Condemn Russia

Published By : Conrad Von Moltke
Posted On : March 17, 2022 

Amongst an unprecedented wave of global backlash levied against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, one prominent nation has remained reserved in its criticism of Putin. India has refused to directly condemn Russian aggression, calling instead for the cessation of hostilities and continued diplomacy. The 1.4 billion-strong democracy – the world’s largest – considers Russia and the U.S. crucial allies, and has adopted a neutral stance it hopes will allow it to maintain relations with both Moscow and the West.

This was showcased on the February 25th United Nations Security Council Resolution vote denouncing the invasion, from which India (along with China and the UAE) abstained. In two successive UN votes, on March 2nd and 4th, India again abstained, sidestepping the censure of Russian aggression on the international stage.

Indo-Russian relations

At the heart of India’s neutrality is a dilemma familiar to any world leader and one that Putin, in his gamble, has sought to exploit in the West: balancing practicality with principles. Indo-Russian relations are deep-rooted, reaching back to the Cold War. At that time, Moscow was one of India’s main arms suppliers and backed them diplomatically over issues like the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. Today, their “special and privileged strategic partnership” remains strong, with 70% of India’s defensive arsenal and half of its arms imports between 2016 and 2020 coming from Russia. Moscow’s continued support for Indian territorial claims (particularly over the Kashmir region) and their willingness to assist New Delhi in areas the West will not – like with nuclear submarine construction – has cemented Russia as a valuable Indian ally.

Ongoing border tensions with China and India’s long-time rival, Pakistan, means New Delhi will not endanger a steady supply of weapons from their main arms dealer over a conflict they feel is geographically and politically removed from them. Furthermore, Indian decision-makers can’t afford to push Russia deeper into Beijing’s orbit, when Western sanctions are already accelerating that phenomenon. Pulled by the democratic responsibility to uphold territorial sovereignty on one side, and their security demands on the other, India has chosen the latter.

As the West Shouts, India Shrugs

Although Indian officials maintain that their abstention is not tacit approval for Putin’s actions, the U.S. and Europe have expressed frustration over Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s equivocation. U.S. Department of State official Donald Lu voiced the possibility of punishing India for its reliance on Russian defensive equipment, intending to indirectly target Putin by pressuring New Delhi to distance itself from Moscow. Meanwhile, a leaked American diplomatic cable from earlier this month stated that India’s stance places it “in Russia’s camp, the aggressor in this conflict.” New Delhi has countered by claiming American hypocrisy, given Washington’s half-hearted disapproval of Chinese aggression at their border with India and the U.S.’s refusal to sell the country the latest version of its missile defense system – which could reduce its reliance on Russian arms.

Ultimately, Modi can afford to dismiss concerns over Western reprisals because of the pivotal role India plays as a bulwark against Beijing’s growing influence. The shared interest in containing Chinese expansionism has incentivized deeper ties between India and the West, most evident in the QUAD security alliance composed of Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.

New Delhi recognizes that Washington will likely not risk endangering this vital relationship by coaxing a more assertive Indian response.

Moreover, unlike the tremendous display of popular support for Ukraine in the West, there is comparably little domestic pressure in India to renege on the entrenched Russo-Indian relationship. In fact, Putin’s popularity among Indian nationalists – Modi’s main voter base – saw the Twitter hashtag #IstandwithPutin trend on Indian social media in the days following the invasion.

This may yet change, as calls mount for Modi’s government to accelerate the evacuation of thousands of Indian students trapped in Ukraine, following the death of an Indian student during Russia’s shelling of Kharkiv.

The cost of neutrality

Although New Delhi has been spared substantive Western action over their stance towards Russia, they will almost certainly feel the economic blowback from Russian exports sanctioned by the West, especially energy. While Russian oil makes up only three percent of India’s imported crude, India’s domestic oil industry will likely raise prices to meet climbing international benchmarks and recover their losses. New Delhi has also recently expressed interest in purchasing cheap Russian oil, despite Western efforts to isolate Moscow.

The real cost to India, however, is a moral one. Regardless of how much damage the invasion brings Moscow, Putin will sooner double-down than withdraw from his war with Ukraine. As the conflict escalates, possibly to the use of biological or chemical weapons, civilian casualty counts will grow and Modi will find abstention increasingly hard to justify.

Strategic neutrality, a central feature of Indian foreign policy since the cold war, is now being tested by “the most violent act of unprovoked aggression in Europe since 1939.” As Modi finds himself in the unenviable position of trying to negotiate security needs with moral imperatives, he must come to terms with the reality that sitting on the fence too long will hurt the credibility of a democracy already shaken by the domestic growth of illiberalism.

Edited by Theo Malhotra.

The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and they do not reflect the position of the McGill Journal of Political Studies or the Political Science Students’ Association.

Photo by Mohit Singh and obtained via Flickr under a CC BY-SA 2.0 license.

As sanctions over Ukraine war mount, Russia turns to India to buy oil and arms

By Gerry Shih
March 17, 2022 

NEW DELHI — When Russia faced international condemnation and sanctions after President Vladimir Putin launched his Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, India stayed on the diplomatic sidelines.

Now, as those economic sanctions begin to bite, Moscow is again turning to India.

India, the world’s biggest oil importer behind China and the United States, has agreed to purchase 3 million barrels of Russian oil at a heavy discount, an Indian official said Thursday. The purchase, which was first reported by the Wall Street Journal, is relatively small given Russia’s production and Indian demand. But the volume could increase in the coming months and reinforce a growing perception that India is determined to preserve its extensive trade and military ties with Moscow, even as the United States and its allies urge governments around the world to isolate Russia.

India avoids condemning Russian invasion of Ukraine and stays aloof on Western coalition

Aside from the oil deal, the Indian government is also exploring ways to maintain trade with Russia by reviving a Cold War-era arrangement called the rupee-ruble trade, according to two other Indian officials with knowledge of the matter. The mechanism, which would be akin to a ledger of trade between the two countries, would let Indian and Russian firms do business while bypassing the need to use U.S. dollars — the predominant currency of international trade — and lowering the risk of potential U.S. sanctions

The three Indian officials spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter. “Eighty-five percent of India’s oil comes from imports, so we always look for good options,” one of the officials said. “If that includes a good package coming from the Russian side, and there’s no bar on buying from Russia, then let’s accept that.”

The Indian officials characterized the ruble-rupee ledgers, which will probably be set up at Russian and Indian banks that are not exposed to the U.S. financial system, as a solution to help the Indian economy and its exporters rather than a way to evade potential U.S. sanctions. India trades with Iran, another country under U.S. sanctions, using a similar rial-rupee trade arrangement.

In recent weeks, India has drawn condemnation from some U.S. lawmakers after it repeatedly abstained from criticizing Russia at the United Nations. But Biden administration officials have often stopped short of criticizing an Asian giant that is seen as a crucial part of its strategy to counter China.

On Tuesday, White House press secretary Jen Psaki told reporters she did not believe that Indian purchases of Russian oil would violate existing U.S. sanctions.

“But also think about where you want to stand when history books are written about this moment,” Psaki added, without explicitly naming India. “Support for the Russian leadership is support for an invasion that obviously is having a devastating impact.”

India’s special relationship with Russia was highlighted this month when the Russian military gave India “special input” about when and to where its stranded citizens should flee the besieged Ukrainian city of Kharkiv, while Russian military officers offered to fly Indians, specifically, out of the war zone.

As Russia’s military onslaught in Ukraine sends refugees scattering, Moscow extends a helping hand to one group: Indians

India is not the only country maintaining trade relations with Russia. Many European countries, including U.S. allies in NATO, continue to purchase Russian energy even though the United States and Britain have announced domestic bans. And India’s oil purchases probably would not amount to a game-changer for Putin’s war effort. Russia’s most important customers are Europe and China; India accounted for about 3 percent of Russia’s exports in 2021 and sources most of its oil from the Persian Gulf, according to S&P Global Commodity Insights.

But the two countries’ cooperation in the energy sector has deepened in recent years. In 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Putin oversaw a $13 billion deal between Rosneft and a refinery in Modi’s home state of Gujarat that represented India’s largest-ever injection of foreign investment and Russia’s largest-ever outbound deal. Indian energy companies, meanwhile, have invested $16 billion in Siberian oil fields.

As talk about the oil purchase ramped up last weekend, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak called Indian Oil Minister Hardeep Singh Puri to express Russian interest in “further attracting Indian investment to the Russian oil and gas sector and expanding Russian companies’ sales networks in India,” according to a statement issued by the Kremlin.

Puri said in the Indian Parliament this week that the Modi administration was working hard to keep gas prices low and that he was in talks with “all levels” of the Russian government about a deal. The Indian Oil Ministry has otherwise not publicly commented about the matter.

Many Indian industry executives and observers say it would be unfair for the West to pressure India to quit Russian oil. The European Union said this month it would wean itself off Russian energy “as soon as possible,” but large countries that depend on Russia, such as Germany, have not immediately cut imports.

“Has Europe or any other significant taker of Russian oil and gas reduced its consumption yet?” said Subhash Kumar, the former chairman of the Indian state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, the country’s largest crude-oil company. If India, which is not involved in the Ukraine conflict, did not buy discounted Russian oil, there would be other takers on the market, he said.

Other prominent commentators have cautioned against proceeding with the purchases, mostly due to its optics. “From a moral standpoint, the decision to buy Russian oil and gas at a discounted rate because of the crisis in Ukraine could be questionable,” Vikram Singh Mehta, the former chief executive of Shell India and former chairman of the Brookings Institution’s India arm, told local media outlets this week.

In the coming months, India’s trade with Russia is likely to continue in another crucial realm besides oil: defense. Largely as a legacy of the Cold War — when the Soviet Union gave India everything from help setting up steel plants to blueprints for MiG fighter jets — around 85 percent of Indian weapons today came from the Soviet Union or Russia, according to a 2021 analysis by the Stimson Center, a nonpartisan think tank in Washington.

Amit Cowshish, a retired Indian defense ministry official who previously oversaw India’s military acquisitions, said the armed forces would be badly crippled within a year if India could not trade with Russia.

“There’s ammunition, subassemblies, critical licenses, all of which would run out, and it wouldn’t be in the U.S. interest to see an Indo-Pacific partner be crippled or alienated by sanctions,” he said.

So far, Biden administration officials have avoided criticizing India’s continued relationship with Russia. During a House Armed Services Committee hearing last week, lawmakers asked Ely Ratner, the assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs who has argued for a tougher U.S. posture against Beijing, why India was not siding with the West on the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

“We recognize that India has a complicated history and relationship with Russia,” Ratner responded.

India is trying to diversify away from Russia, but it will take time, Ratner added. “From the U.S. perspective,” he said, “India is an absolutely essential partner as we think about our strategy in the Indo-Pacific.”

Niha Masih and Anant Gupta contributed to this report.

Babyn Yar was his backyard. Now this 95-year-old Holocaust survivor has escaped Ukraine after a harrowing ordeal.

BY DINAH SPRITZER MARCH 17, 2022 

Evgeny Pavlovskiy and his son, Mykhailo Pavlovskiy, reunited in Warsaw

 after he struggled to leave Ukraine. (Courtesy From the Depths Foundation)

(JTA) — Before this month, the last time Evgeny Pavlovskiy left the Kyiv area was during World War II, when his Jewish family hid from the Nazis in Russia’s Ural Mountains.

At 95 and suffering from several serious ailments, he was content living alone just two houses away from the entrance to Babyn Yar, where the Nazis killed and buried more than 33,000 Jews on two days in 1941. When his son moved to Israel earlier this year, he decided to stay in his native land.

And when rumors of war began to swirl earlier this year, he was unmoved, like so many other Ukrainians who could not believe that Russian President Vladimir Putin would attack their country.

“My father did not want to leave Ukraine no matter how hard I pressed,” said Mykhailo Pavlovskiy, who also goes by Moshe. “By the time I finally persuaded him, no one was around to help.”

Evgeny Pavlovskiy ultimately made three solo attempts to flee the Russian shelling and artillery. His journey to Poland, a drive that would have normally taken eight hours, lasted three days.

Pavlovskiy’s great escape represents the wartime resilience of both Jews and Ukrainians, two groups he identifies with full-heartedly. It also makes him likely to be the oldest refugee to have fled the war in Ukraine on his own, rather than alongside younger family or friends.

“I would like my story to help people and to inspire them,” Pavlovskiy said. “And I have another message, I want Russians to stop killing Ukrainians.” he pleaded. “They started World World III without realizing it, and now they are destroying the homes and lives of peaceful people. They should stop!”

RELATED: All of our ongoing Jewish Ukraine coverage

After war erupted in February, Mykhailo persuaded his dad that Russian saboteurs might invade his home and murder him.

Pavlovskiy loved his life in Ukraine despite his family’s history of trauma in the country. (Courtesy From the Depths Foundation)

So Pavlovskiy made an 11-hour journey by train from Kiev to Lviv, a trip that normally takes roughly six and a half hours.

Evacuation train cars from Kiev intended for six people are typically packed with twice as many passengers, who wait for hours and sometimes days with the hopes of boarding. They only have the clothes on their backs and personal items they can stuff in a small backpack or purse.

“The most difficult and heroic thing, for which I thank him every day, is that my father got on that evacuation train,“ said Mykhailo. “Before the trip, my father tried not to drink or eat anything, because there was no toilet. He sat for 11 hours without moving.”

Then things got worse. Upon trying to leave Lviv for Poland, Pavlovskiy had to stand in a line for seven hours in the hopes of finding safe transport.

“He had a serious mental breakdown, ” said Mykhailo. “He felt that everyone had abandoned him; he was crying.”

The younger Pavlovskiy stayed in constant contact with his father as he tried to leave the country. “Really his only support was my voice on the cell phone,” Mykhailo said. “He didn’t meet anyone he knew during his entire journey.”

Mykhailo wanted to rescue his dad himself but could not easily leave Israel because he only recently immigrated there

“I am now going through the process of repatriation [or making aliyah]. This is only the second month for me, so I didn’t have a passport with which I could travel,” Mykhailo explained. “By the time I received permission to leave Israel, 15 days had passed since the start of the war. As soon as I had a passport, I immediately bought a ticket and flew to Poland to meet my dad.”

Meanwhile, strangers in Kyiv took pity on the ancient refugee and found him a hostel. He tried again to leave from Lviv to Poland via bus, but logistical obstacles and concerns about Russian shelling thwarted his journey.

Mykhailo was then able to reach friends who helped his father get on a bus to Poland that was operated by Caritas, a Catholic charity. When he crossed the border, he became one of nearly 3 million Ukrainians to leave their country since Feb. 24.

It took Pavlovskiy six hours to make it to Tomaszow Lubelski, a Polish border town. He stayed there for a day and was sent to Lublin, and then on to Warsaw to reunite with his son.

The father and son are among thousands of Jewish Ukrainian refugees in that city, where they are receiving support from multiple Jewish charities, including the From the Depths Foundation, a group focused on memorializing the Holocaust that says it has spent $25,000 on food, clothing and other supplies for refugees in Poland. Staying in hotel rooms paid for by Israel’s Jewish Agency, the Pavlovskiys plan to travel to Israel together in the next few days.

The move is one that many Ukrainian Jews have made in recent decades, but one that Pavlovskiy never considered despite the trauma he endured at home, first during the Holocaust and then during the Soviet era, when Jews were the target of state-sponsored discrimination that limited his educational and work opportunities.

While Pavlovskiy’s immediate family survived the Holocaust by fleeing to the Urals — “They didn’t know what a Jew was there,” he said — relatives and friends left behind were murdered.

“My aunt was betrayed by her husband, he personally drove her — she was disabled and could not walk — and handed over to the German authorities,” he said. “They killed her.”

Those traumas were in the past for Pavlovskiy before the outbreak of the war, before Russia dropped bombs across his country, including adjacent to Babyn Yar March 1 in a shelling that has come to be a symbol of Russian aggression.

“My father received a decent pension and help from the Hesed,” Mykhailo explained, referring to a Jewish charity. “A woman came to my father’s house four times a week to cook and clean. He loved his life in Ukraine and already misses it a lot.”

As for Mikhailo, a licensed psychotherapist, he is happy to be in Israel with his wife and children, and hopes he can help refugees process the trauma they are going through. But he also wishes to defend his native country. “I want to go back and fight,” he said. “But my family won’t let me.”

Alona Cei contributed reporting.

Belarus future depends on fate of Ukraine: opposition


By AFP
Nina LARSON

The Belarusian people oppose Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, being facilitated by the Minsk regime, and see their country’s fate tied to the outcome of the war, Belarus’s exiled opposition leader said Thursday.

Svetlana Tikhanovskaya insisted on the need to distinguish between the position of Belarus’s autocratic leader Alexander Lukashenko and the people he rules with an iron fist.

“These are two different issues,” she told AFP in an interview in Geneva.

Belarusians, she said, were now not only forced to fight against their own regime, “but also for Ukrainians, because we understand that the fate of Belarus depends on the fate of Ukraine”.

Lukashenko is supporting Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, allowing him to launch attacks from Belarusian territory.

But Tikhanovskaya, who the West believes was the true winner of August 2020 presidential elections that kept Lukashenko in power for a sixth term, insisted that “the Belarusian people don’t support this war”.

– ‘Treated like aggressors’ –

“Lukashenko dragged our country into this invasion of Ukraine because he’s paying back the Kremlin for the support he got in 2020,” she said.

But “all our people are now fighting on the side of Ukraine”, the exiled 39-year-old rights activist said, pointing to how exiled independent Belarusian media were reporting on the war and how volunteers were helping Ukrainian refugees and sending medical equipment into the war-torn country.

Earlier, during a news conference organised by the association of UN correspondents in Geneva, ACANU, she stressed that Belarusians “are afraid of possible war on the territory of Belarus”.

As it is, she said, they are paying a heavy price for Lukashenko’s position, as international sanctions bite.

“We are being treated like aggressors,” she said, even as they “fight against dictatorship.”

She insisted that rather than denying regular Belarusians visas, the sanctions should target more state enterprises and banks that fund the regime.

Minsk cracked down hard on the mass protests that erupted over the 2020 election, with at least 37,000 people detained in a matter of months, with many alleging they were mistreated and tortured in detention.

United Nations rights chief Michelle Bachelet said Thursday that 1,085 people are currently in detention on politically-motivated charges.

According to Bachelet’s report to the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva, more than 900 people were arrested last month during protests over the constitutional change to Belarus’s non-nuclear status, pushed through by Lukashenko, making it possible for Russia to station nuclear weapons in the country.

– ‘Tortured’ –

“The conditions of political prisoners in our country are much worse than the conditions of usual criminals,” said Tikhanovskaya, whose husband, leading opposition figure Sergei Tikhanovsky, is among those languishing in detention.

“People are constantly humiliated, physically and morally,” she told AFP. “They are deprived of medicines, of medical care, deprived of hygienic supplies. They are tortured.”

Tikhanovskaya hailed Bachelet’s report, pointing to the data collected which could later be used as “evidence of atrocities”.

She stressed that the world must “not let human rights abuses in our country to be overlooked in this (terrible) situation of war in Ukraine.”

She warned that people living in Putin’s Russia were now facing a similar situation to that faced by Belarusians for the past year and a half.

“We faced huge repressions after fraudulent elections in 2020,” she said, adding that Lukashenko “used all the possible violence against people”.

“Now the situation in Russia looks like the same.”

‘It’s a nightmare’: Hong Kong runs low on coffins as Omicron exacts deadly toll

Empty coffins are delivered to funeral businesses in the Kowloon district of Hong Kong on Thursday.
(Isaac Lawrence / AFP/Getty Images)

LONG READ

BY DAVID PIERSON,
STEPHANIE YANG

MARCH 17, 2022 
SINGAPORE —

The repurposed AsiaWorld-Expo center in Hong Kong echoes with the moans of elderly COVID-19 patients. Kept in 8-foot cubicles, many go weeks without fresh air, sunlight or a bath. Some take their last breaths under the harsh glow of the convention hall lights. On a good day, an ambulance will arrive in an hour to carry their bodies away.

“It’s a nightmare,” said Lily, a 22-year-old nurse at the isolation facility. “Sometimes we call for an ambulance because a patient needs to go to a hospital, and we’re told it will take one to two days to arrive. It’s really shocking.”

The nurse, exhausted by having to care for more than 150 patients with one other co-worker, declined to give her last name because staffers were ordered not to speak to the press about the conditions at the site, which have come to exemplify the runaway COVID-19 crisis in Hong Kong.

In just a matter of weeks, the city of more than 7 million has transformed from one of the safest places during the pandemic to having what’s believed to be the highest rate of COVID-19 deaths in the world. On Feb. 18, Hong Kong had a total of 259 COVID deaths since the pandemic began. A month later, the number had soared to nearly 4,600 — on par with the reported total in China, a country of 1.4 billion.

With an alarmingly low vaccination rate among its seniors, about 90% of Hong Kong’s deaths in the latest wave have been of patients 60 or older. Morgues and hospitals have run out of room to store bodies. The city is awaiting a fresh batch of coffins arriving by sea.

Concerns are now spilling into mainland China, which is facing its worst outbreak since the disease was first reported in Wuhan in early 2020. Fueled by the easily transmissible Omicron variant, the number of cases on the mainland has surged in the last week, with authorities reacting by locking down neighborhoods in major cities such as Shanghai, Shenzhen and the entire province of Jilin, affecting tens of millions of people.

“We are at a key stage,” said Jing Junhai, Jilin’s Communist Party chief, according to state media.

Combined with Omicron-fueled outbreaks in South Korea and Vietnam, the pandemic is proving stubbornly resilient in parts of Asia at a time when the United States and Europe have decided — rightly or wrongly — to move on from the coronavirus, lifting mask mandates and allowing large gatherings.

That social freedom comes after the loss of more than 2 million American and European lives. By comparison, the death toll in China, Hong Kong, South Korea and Vietnam officially numbers in the tens of thousands, in no small part because of strict adherence to policies such as zero tolerance for COVID.

The strategy, which relies on tightly controlled borders, mass testing, quarantining and isolation to eliminate all instances of the virus, was already under strain for weakening economic growth and fraying the nerves of millions of people desperate to travel, attend school and do business like before.

Now it faces its biggest test, with Omicron predicted to infect more than half of Hong Kong’s population in the coming weeks while threatening to spread across mainland China, where there’s virtually no natural immunity and millions of unvaccinated seniors.

“In the earlier phases of the pandemic, the goal of keeping cases as close to zero as possible was reasonable,” said Keiji Fukuda, a leading epidemiologist and the former director of Hong Kong’s top public health school at the University of Hong Kong. “But over time, COVID-19 showed its ability to persist and evolve. … [It] shows no signs of disappearing. Since the most likely scenario is that the world will be living with COVID-19 indefinitely, the value of a zero-case policy diminishes.”

Hong Kong, a former British colony that still maintains some autonomy from China, proved zero tolerance could work when caseloads were low. But when Omicron lifted the number of daily infections in the city by more than 800% starting in mid-February, it exposed many of the city’s shortcomings — none more devastating than the failure to inoculate enough of Hong Kong’s elderly.

Less than 45% of Hong Kong residents ages 70 and up were vaccinated when the outbreak started. The rate was even lower for seniors in assisted-living homes — less than 20%. That’s well below Hong Kong’s overall vaccination rate of 72%.

Overnight, the Asian financial center was inundated with scenes of sickly older patients flooding hospital wards. Space became so limited that many had to be wheeled outdoors and kept on roadsides without shelter.

Experts say a number of factors have led to low rates of vaccination among Hong Kong’s seniors. Political unrest starting in 2019 bred distrust of the government, weakening calls to heed public health advice. Other seniors were influenced by misinformation online and in local media about threats vaccines allegedly posed to the elderly and frail. Many reasoned it wasn’t worth risking a shot when the city had so few cases. Moreover, studies have shown China’s domestic vaccines made by Sinovac and Sinopharm are less effective at preventing disease than their mRNA counterparts such as Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna.

“This tragedy was entirely predictable, and it was entirely preventable,” said Gabriel Leung, dean of medicine at the University of Hong Kong. “We’ve had early, sustained, uninterrupted, privileged access to vaccines. And yet we are probably the only population in the global north that has such poor coverage of our most vulnerable.”

Hong Kong Chief Executive Carrie Lam acknowledged recently that “not enough” had been done to vaccinate seniors.

The city is now upping its efforts. Its health department did not respond to a request for comment on conditions at the AsiaWorld-Expo center.

Lam’s government has been widely criticized for its handling of the crisis. Its failure to clearly rule out a lockdown led to panic buying and the emptying of supermarket shelves earlier this month. The forced isolation of COVID-19 patients resulted in parents being separated from their infants. And a plan to test all residents for the virus appears to have collapsed because the city’s labs lack capacity.

The missteps have reinforced perceptions of Hong Kong’s decline as a global city. The outbreak has exacerbated the exodus of residents, which reached levels last year unseen in more than half a century. Meanwhile, the city’s stock market dipped to its lowest level in eight years this week.

“The government could have handled this much better,” said Bruno Ko, a fourth-year biomedical engineering student who recently recovered from COVID-19. “They allowed rumors to spread and created panic.”

Ko said he was probably infected by his parents, with whom he shares a 1,000-square-foot apartment. When his father called a hotline to seek an isolation center, he couldn’t get through because the line was inundated. The family eventually stopped trying and recovered at home.

“Everyone is exhausted,” said Ko, whose voice remains scratchy from his illness. “We’re going crazy staying home with no social life and no food. You can’t even get KFC delivered at night. They can’t continue with zero-COVID because this is going to last for years.”



Officials in mainland China have started to contemplate what a more accommodating COVID-19 policy might look like. But in briefings and interviews with Chinese state media, experts and epidemiologists said current prevention measures will need to be upheld in order to minimize serious illness among the unvaccinated and the strain on the country’s medical resources.

Zhang Wenhong, a well-known epidemiologist in Shanghai, said on China’s Twitter-like platform Weibo this week that the situation in Hong Kong has shown the importance of vaccinations, particularly among the elderly.

According to a November report from state-run Xinhua News Agency, about 81% of China’s 264 million people over age 60 have received at least one dose of vaccine, leaving about 50 million unvaccinated.

As a rise in confirmed cases kicks off a countrywide scramble to contain outbreaks, many residents are more concerned about getting ensnared in the country’s COVID prevention measures than actual infection.

Cindy, a 26-year-old Shanghai resident who declined to give her last name, said the breadth and uncertainty of the latest COVID-19 restrictions have been frustrating. Despite living less than a mile away from an outbreak site, she’s preoccupied with what will happen to her dog if she gets stuck away from home.

“What scares most of my friends around me is to be locked down in the wrong place for 14 days,” she said. “The government wants so badly to have zero cases.”

Others say they can no longer tell the difference between a lockdown and the COVID controls that have permeated everyday life in China.

In Shenzhen, photographer Leo Lee doesn’t feel much impact from staying at home, since he often works remotely and orders groceries online for delivery. Two of his co-workers, in anticipation of the partial lockdown, opted to live at the office for access to the photo studios. With public transportation halted, one took a cab and the other rode a bike, he said.

“People here are optimistic and completely cooperate,” Lee said. “I don’t think we will need a long time to reach zero cases.”

There are signs that China is attempting more flexibility in its latest COVID-19 control measures. Rather than shutting down the entire city of Shanghai, apartment complexes and communities have been cordoned off in shifts while residents undergo mass testing. China’s National Health Commission adjusted its policy to allow patients with mild symptoms to isolate in centralized quarantine facilities rather than at hospitals, and lowered the bar for patients to be discharged.

Zhang, sometimes referred to as China’s Dr. Anthony Fauci, struck an optimistic tone in his public post despite the outbreak. He said that containing the virus will provide a window of opportunity to vaccinate more elderly residents and improve testing and treatment, and it doesn’t mean that the strategy moving forward would always be lockdowns and large-scale testing. Any long-term measures would have to be gentle and sustainable, he said.

“In two years of fighting the pandemic, is the most difficult period the long winter night or the cold snap in spring?” Zhang wrote. “When we clearly see the road ahead and the spring that must come, what is there to be afraid of?”

Pierson reported from Singapore and Yang from Taipei, Taiwan. Special correspondents Chi-Hui Lin in Taipei and Antonia Tang in Hong Kong contributed to this report.

Opinion – ‘Resilient Ukraine’ and the Future of War in Europe

Julian Reid
Download PDF
Mar 17 2022 

Photographer RM/Shutterstock


In an interview given to the BBC, Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State, praised the ‘extraordinary resilience’ of ordinary Ukrainians fighting Russian military forces (BBC News 2022). Indeed, the media is awash with descriptions of Ukrainians as ‘resilient’ in the face of Russia’s invasion. Meanwhile, images circulate of Ukrainian civilians resisting Russian military forces, throwing molotov cocktails at Russian tanks, and urinating on Russian military vehicles. All of which contributes to the construction of a ‘Resilient Ukraine’. The role of resilience in the Ukrainian struggle, however, is not just that of a handy soundbite for statesmen like Blinken, or a patronizing cliche for western journalists.

Since the beginning of Russia’s most recent aggressions towards Ukraine in 2014, NATO has been developing a strategic approach of resilience to equip member states and strategic partners like Ukraine for future conflicts. To understand the resilience of Ukrainians to Russia’s invasion, we have to consider it in context of the demands for resilience made upon Ukraine by NATO over these last eight years. NATO summits in Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016) were important forums for the development of NATO approaches to resilience. Ukraine is not a member of NATO, but it has been an important partner to NATO since the 1990s, and the development of its strategic thinking and practice has been influenced by NATO. Indeed the increasing influence of NATO over Ukraine has been an important factor in the escalation of its conflict with Russia.

Resilience, in the military-strategic context, refers, at its simplest, to the ability of ordinary people to fight their own wars of defence against aggressors. A resilient people does not rely on a state’s military to defend it, it gets on with doing that by itself. ‘Society must defend itself’ is the governing imperative of resilience in military-strategic terms. In this sense it is similar to every other way in which resilience is already deployed in other fields of policy, such as economy, development and health. In these areas people have already been taught the necessity to protect themselves rather than expect the state to save them. Resilience describes the abilities of peoples to help themselves in times of crisis, and not expect the intervention of some greater power to save them.

NATO is commonly understood as a military alliance formed to provide collective defence to its member states. Its principle of collective defence is supposedly enshrined in Article 5 of its founding treaty. This is the article said to be the defining principle of NATO membership; the idea that an attack on one is an attack on all, and that any member state attacked can expect support from other members in the alliance.

This would be fine if it were so simple. However, the myth of collective defence is unravelled by the increasing centrality of resilience to NATO. ’Resilience’ falls under Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 3 is where NATO stresses the requirements for every NATO member ‘to be resilient to resist and recover from a major shock such as a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack’ (NATO 2021). In other words, members of NATO are expected to be able to cope with major disasters, including armed attacks and invasions by themselves, and not depend on NATO to get them out of trouble. It is a fact, of course, that it took 52 years for Article 5 to ever be invoked, and even then, it was on behalf of its strongest member, the United States, after 9/11, on the 12th of September 2001. Still today, it remains the only occasion when Article 5 was actually invoked.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine we have seen a huge swing of public support towards NATO membership in the non-aligned states of Finland and Sweden. This swing is motored by a public perception of NATO as a source of collective security should Finland or Sweden be attacked by Russia. Finns and Swedes talk positively of how they could enjoy the protection of Article 5, as well as how being out of NATO means losing any potential for assistance in an emergency.

This begs the question of whether Finns and Swedes understand exactly what they would be signing up for were they to join NATO. Media debates in these countries suggest a consensus that it is dangerous to try to go it alone in today’s world, and joining NATO means getting that protection which Article 5 automatically offers. Awareness of the implications of the shift in NATO doctrine towards resilience, and the subsequent degradation of Article 5, has been absent in these debates.

However, the war in Ukraine is illustrative of the kind of war which NATO would expect a relatively small state, such as Finland, to conduct for itself, were it to be invaded by Russia. The reality is that NATO has been tutoring Ukraine to fight precisely this style of war since the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

The effects of NATO’s focus on resilience since 2014 are already evident in the strategic development of the Baltic states; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. All of whom are NATO members and each of which has increased its focus since 2014 on involving its own society in preparations for defence of the state. Developing resilience has come to be seen as crucial for the ability of these states to withstand future aggressions from Russia. The building of resilience for these states has meant, principally, focusing on increasing the will of their societies to engage directly in defence (Andzans et.al. 2021).

Resilience, in military-strategic terms, is not just about preparing society for when an attack occurs in order for it to fend off that attack after the event. It is also about deterring the possibility of attack as much as possible by projecting an image of resilience to potential aggressors. Which leads to the problem of what has gone wrong in Ukraine, such that Russia perceived sufficient weakness to launch the scale of attack which it has. Is this a failure of Ukrainian resilience, of NATO, or of Russian perception and calculation?

Of course for experts writing in the media, the answer is clear. Ukrainians are incredibly resilience and Putin has made an extraordinary miscalculation of judgement. Putin assumed Russia could win by targeting Ukrainian military infrastructure, and wait for its government and people to concede defeat. When this did not happen, Russia began to target civilians and their infrastructure, as witnessed with the bombing of residential areas and hospitals in several cities.

We can already speculate coherently on how such early errors of calculation will affect Russian strategy in the future. Quite conceivably, Russia will learn and start next time by attacking civilians and the infrastructure on which they rely, in order to shatter the resilience of the target state and its population, which they so badly underestimated in Ukraine.

As such two minimal conclusions can be drawn concerning future scenarios. Firstly, any state and people facing Russian attack has to anticipate the likelihood of a strategy which starts by targeting civilians and their infrastructure. This is the rational way to undermine an adversary which has invested heavily in its society as a source of strategic defence. Secondly, any democratic people concerned by its (in)security in the light of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and now turning to NATO as a source for defence in the future, has to understand that joining NATO means having to accept the further development of resilience as a strategy for its security.

Acceding to the imperative of resilience, as NATO disciplines its members and partners to do already, means accepting the idea that not only is society itself a player in national defence, but also a prime target in any conflict with Russia. The more NATO invests in resilience as the way forward, the more we can expect Russia to adapt to that trend, and the more central will European civilians find themselves to be in the bloody business of warfare between Russia and the West.

Ukraine is proving to be a laboratory for the testing of resilience as a strategy of national defence. On the evidence of the war so far, proponents of resilience in NATO will be encouraged. However, looking at this war from a social perspective, it is essential to be cautious about these developments. Resilience may increase the strategic efficacy of a state, but it will by definition, also make society itself into a more direct agent of war, and therefore, also a target in war. Whatever states may gain from adopting a strategy of resilience, their societies will lose in terms of security. Resilience, it must be understood, is not a synonym for security. It is the polar opposite of security. It is social insecurity by state design.

References

Andzans, M., et.al. (Eds.). (2021). Willingness to Defend One’s Own Country in the Baltic States: Implications for National Security and NATO’s Collective Defence. Riga: Riga Stradins University.

BBC News. (2022 March 5.). Ukraine War: ’Ukraine can absolutely win against Russia’. bbc.com. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60626921.

NATO. (2021). Resilience and Article 3. nato.int. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/ natohq/topics_132722.htm.

 

[ANALYSIS] 2 TSK aircraft stranded in Ukraine show failure of Turkey’s military intelligence

By

 Turkish Minute

 -

 March 17, 2022 

Fatih Yurtsever*

Turkey dispatched two A400M military transport aircraft to Ukraine on Feb. 24 to evacuate Turkish nationals. The two aircraft have remained at Boryspil Airport near Kyiv since that date due to the closure of Ukrainian airspace. “We are in contact with both Russia and Ukraine on this matter to ensure the safety of our aircraft,” Defense Minister Hulusi Akar told Habertürk TV.

From the Turkish Air Force (TAF) point of view, the deployment of the aircraft to Ukraine hours before Russia invaded Ukraine and their getting stranded there can only be explained by the strategic blindness of military intelligence. So how could the TAF not receive information about an operation that would begin hours later in Ukraine, and not make a correct prediction about the course of Russia’s action against Ukraine? Turkish Navy reconnaissance and surveillance could not detect Russian warships positioned in the Black Sea to launch Kalibr cruise missiles? While the Turkish public tries to keep track of information about the Russian army’s progress in Ukraine on social media and Telegram, how can the British Ministry of Defence provide regular details from the theatre of operations in Ukraine every day?

The main reason the TAF was unable to detect the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is that it lacks signals intelligence capabilities and technologies, which are critical components of modern military intelligence.

The Signals Intelligence and General Staff Electronics System (GES) commands

Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is the gathering of information by intercepting signals, whether communications between people (communications intelligence, COMINT) or electronic signals not directly used in communications and radars (electronic intelligence, ELINT). SIGINT, which enables monitoring and locating enemy communications and radars, helps ensure the security of the forces by supporting tactical maneuvers in the theatre. Information derived from signal analysis is critical to the military in planning operations and national defense initiatives.

The General Staff established the GES Command in 1958 to provide signals intelligence from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) for NATO purposes during the Cold War with the help and technical support of the US Army. The GES command had the largest communications and electronic eavesdropping capacity in Turkey, with 13 stations spread throughout the country. The listening devices and antennas were used to collect signals from Balkan, Caucasian and Middle Eastern countries, track satellites, intercept communications and decode encrypted messages.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan intended to strengthen the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and reduce TAF’s role in intelligence collection and management by transferring all the intelligence collection facilities and capabilities of the GES Command to MIT. The government was suspicious of the TAF because it believed the GES Command not only wiretapped Turkey’s enemies but also kept a close eye on government ministers.

On Jan. 1, 2012 the GES Command, which had the highest signal intelligence capabilities in Turkey, was transferred to MIT. The name was later changed to the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SIB) with the task of conducting signals intelligence by analyzing all types of communication and radar signals.

SIB and its enhanced capabilities

With an amendment made to the law on the Presidency of the Defense Industry (SSB), it was ensured that MIT could benefit from the Defense Industry Support Fund for the procurement of its intelligence tools such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and intelligence ships and aircraft.

Working closely with SSB, MIT has procured many Turkish defense industry products, including TUSAŞ ANKA-I UAVs, the TCG Ufuk intelligence ship, Bayraktar TB 2 Assault UAVs, AKINCI Assault UAVs and the MULTI-INT Multi-Function Special Mission Aircraft. ANKA-I is an ANKA UAV configuration developed by TUSAŞ according to MIT requirements. The ANKA-I UAV is equipped with payloads capable of ELINT and COMINT reconnaissance through its electro-optical system, and ANKA-I can also perform image intelligence (IMINT).

The configuration of AKINCI drones procured from MIT is not known. AKINCI drones with high payload capacity can be used for both strike missions, the primary purpose of their development, and SIGINT activities. Based on SIB’s requirements, the MULTI-INT Multi-Function Special Mission Aircraft project will include the delivery of two Bombardier Challenger 600s equipped with payloads for SIGINT and IMINT missions.

Lessons learned by the TAF from the Ukraine crisis

The TAF was deprived of its strategic foresight capability, which contributes to shaping military strategy and security policy, by the Erdoğan government stripping it of its signals intelligence tools in favor of political ambitions. The TAF’s inability to determine when Russia would begin its invasion of Ukraine and its failure to track the operation’s progress shows that the TAF is strategically blind. The way to cure the TAF of this blindness is to establish a Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (JISR) center within the TAF. To this end, all listening stations and equipment belonging to the GES Command and transferred to MIT’s SIB should be returned to the TAF. The TCG Ufuk should be placed under the operational control of the Naval Forces Command and conduct SIGINT operations in accordance with TAF JISR priorities. JISR will be the center of data derived from SIGINT, IMINT (from the Göktürk-1 and Imece intelligence satellites) and Open Source Intelligence (OSİNT). Big Data applications and deep-learning algorithms will be used to transform the data collected from the various sources into information that will enable the TAF to forecast. In this way, the TAF will overcome its strategic blindness, and Turkey will once again be able to maintain adequate military intelligence, which is a critical component of regional power status.

* Fatih Yurtsever is a former naval officer in the Turkish Armed Forces. He is using a pseudonym out of security concerns.

Time Running Out to Address Afghanistan’s Hunger Crisis

Without a Functioning Central Bank, Aid Not Enough

Fereshta Abbasi
Researcher, Asia Division

A woman holds her baby as he undergoes treatment at the malnutrition ward of the Ataturk National Children's Hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan, December, 2, 2021. 

© 2021 AP Photo/Petros Giannakouris

“Children in the provinces – they are only skin on bones now – and I’m afraid this is only going to get worse,” the director of an international humanitarian organization in Afghanistan told me.

Since January 2022, roughly 13,000 newborns have died from malnutrition and hunger-related diseases, 95 percent of the population does not have enough to eat, and 3.5 million children need nutritional support. The United Nations has called the situation “a food insecurity and malnutrition crisis of unparalleled proportions.”

“Half of those we admit for critical care are also malnourished,” a doctor with Médecins Sans Frontières reported. Almost 800 children in one hospital in Helmand province are there because of acute malnutrition.

While many countries have pledged humanitarian aid, Afghanistan also urgently needs a functioning banking system to address the crisis. Most Afghan banks are barely operating now. In recent weeks, the United States and World Bank have unlocked billions of dollars in assistance, but restrictions on Afghanistan’s Central Bank are still making large transactions or withdrawals impossible.

Aid groups delivering humanitarian assistance say they are unable to move funds into Afghanistan because international banks remain wary of preexisting sanctions on the Taliban, and Afghan banks limit cash withdrawals due to currency shortages. Aid groups say that payments to Afghanistan are routinely blocked by banks wary of running afoul of sanctions.

Instead, most groups use the informal hawala system to transfer funds, even though the service charges can range from 4 to 8 percent in cities or as much as 13 percent in remote areas. Before the Taliban takeover in August 2021, rates were at about 2 percent.

Donors have been understandably worried that efforts to restore Afghanistan’s Central Bank would bolster the Taliban’s rule. Since taking power, Taliban authorities have arbitrarily arrested activists and journalists, executed former government officials, and engaged in widespread violations of women’s and girls’ rights.

But Afghans need all their rights protected, including the right to food. While humanitarian assistance programs can help mitigate the economic crisis, they are far from sufficient. The Taliban also need to address the crisis, including by letting women work, and donors should monitor bank transactions to ensure funds are being used for legitimate humanitarian and commercial purposes.

Without that, it will be impossible to ease the crisis and help Afghanistan’s most vulnerable children.