Saturday, February 03, 2024

To Be Or Not To Be Marxist?

By Michael Albert
January 23, 2024
Z Article
Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

Image by Velvet, Creative Commons 4.0

LONG READ



A recent Jacobin article about how Karl Marx first got radicalized included these two sentences: “Today, many young people are marching leftward in [Marx’s] footsteps from a passion for freedom to a critique of capitalism. But unlike Marx, they have the whole tradition of Marxism to guide them.”

Will taking the “whole tradition of Marxism” as their guide reveal to “young people marching leftward” the critical, essential elements of their circumstances they will need to navigate to best win a better society? Police violence. Abortion denial. Accelerating inequality. Climate collapse. War. Fascism. And more. To react effectively, should we immerse ourselves in Marxist texts?

Weeks, months, years, and decades come and go. Left “scholars” periodically proclaim “Marx said it. Marx knew it. Marx taught it. To win a better world, we should channel Marx’s Collected Works. We should be guided by the whole Marxist tradition.” But is it true that if we don’t seriously study Marx to learn his old answers to our current questions—and if we don’t seriously study Lenin and Trotsky too to learn their answers as well—then our knowledge, preparation, and thinking will not successfully advance our needs and desires?

The bearded big man, the optimistic oracle, the grandest grand teacher, the most famous flag bearer himself wrote “The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.”

Non-Marxologists might think Marx must have been referring to the effect of the tradition of dead generations on reactionaries who wish to return to the past. It turns out, however, that reading further we find that reactionaries weren’t Marx’s target: “And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new scene in world history in time honored disguise and borrowed language.”

So it was revolutionaries, not reactionaries, that Marx was eloquently castigating for borrowing “names, battle slogans, and costumes” from the past in order to present the present in “honored disguise and borrowed language” until we find that over and over, today is costumed as if it was yesterday, and this is done, ironically, by those claiming to seek tomorrow.

Some will say I exaggerate the problem. Perhaps, but then did Marx exaggerate it too? Suppose you think you operate in the tradition of some dead thinker. Should you proclaim it? Should you footnote it? Should you urge your preferred old texts on others? What is a committed comrade to do?

When asked that question, my first observation is that there is no need to display your lineage, much less to trumpet it even if your claimed lineage is brilliant. What matters instead is to make clear what you yourself believe and to show why you believe it using your own words of today. Can’t we agree that here is rarely need to quote dead men’s words and most especially that there is never reason to treat dead men’s words like scripture, as if simply quoting such words provides an argument or evidence. Instead, to convey our own passion on behalf of our own aims while we also attend to the expectations, fears, and experiences of those we address, why not present relevant experiences and logical connections in our own contemporary words as evidenced in our own contemporary times?

Consider a person, probably a guy, who repeatedly quotes Marx and advises reading Marx (or some other long gone icon) to make some point about contemporary relations much less about contemporary means or aims. Imagine hearing or watching him. Doesn’t he too often seem more concerned to get his audience to genuflect to Marx or more concerned to demonstrate his own allegiance to Marx than he is concerned to help larger, undecided audiences consider for themselves current observations based on current evidence and reasoning? In short, doesn’t to quote from the past often mask contemporary communicative poverty? Doesn’t it sometimes appeal to some dead author’s authority, which in turn risks a slip-slide toward sectarian conformity?

Why not instead take Marx’s own advice and let “dead generations” rest in peace? Why not avoid “nightmarish” mimicry? Why not stop “borrowing” and instead create?

Please note, so far I haven’t offered a word of critique of Marxism itself. Not a word. Instead the above observations are about how to communicate substance, not about the merits of the substance to be communicated. But to now assess Marxism’s substance, consider the harsh claim that the goal of struggle in every Marxist text that offers a serious economic or societal vision is an economy that elevates about twenty percent of its population to ruling class status and that also retains patriarchy, racism, and political authoritarianism, not to mention continuing to excessively spew pollution. Is that claim true? Consider that when Marxist movements have actually guided revolutions, those revolutions have delivered societies with just those horribly flawed features. Does this aspect of Marxist tradition matter? Do these outcomes exist consistently with and not despite Marxism’s concepts?

Many Marxists reply that such implications are nonsense. They say every genuine Marxist’s goal is mass working-class participation, democracy, and freedom. And I agree that that is what Marx and most Marxists desire. But then I add that despite those undeniable personal desires, in practice most Marxists don’t pursue institutions consistent with mass working-class participation, democracy, and freedom or with ending patriarchy, racism, and authoritarianism. Again, is that claim about institutional aims false, or is it true?

To decide, suppose we could put every Marxist text about economics and/or society in a pile. To the very limited extent that anything in that pile provides serious institutional vision, won’t it most often be only economic and include authoritative decision making, a corporate division of labor, remuneration for output or bargaining power, and markets or central planning, each of which institutions elevate the earlier-mentioned twenty percent. And then if we look at actual Marxist-inspired revolutions, putting them in a pile, so to speak, don’t we see just those institutional aims achieved?

Perhaps the cause of Marxism not delivering what most of its advocates have wanted hasn’t been bad leaders. Yes, of course Stalin was a bad leader, to put it mildly. But perhaps the real, deeper, and lasting problem has been Marxist movement dynamics that have elevated a thug like Stalin and, going still one step further, perhaps the problem has been the concepts that have elevated or at any rate that did not prevent those Stalin-elevating movement dynamics.

The problem wasn’t that everybody in Marxist Leninist parties explicitly wanted to trample workers on the road to ruling them. That is overwhelmingly false. That is nonsense. The problem was that however well meaning their members may have been, some of the core concepts of Marxist parties have inexorably led those parties, when they succeeded, to trample workers. Behind and pushing the leaders, structures. Behind and elevating the structures, concepts.

Become a Marxist revolutionary. Even with the very best motives—the very very best motives—the odds are that you aren’t going to make a revolution in our modern world because you won’t have sufficiently broad focus and especially, ironically, because you will lack sufficient working class support. But if you do transcend those problems and you do help make a revolution, the odds are your achievement will elevate what I call the coordinator class to economic rule over the working class, and will leave patriarchy, racism, and authoritarianism modified but intact or even intensified.

Some Marxists find this claim personally insulting. I don’t think it should be. It isn’t about particular people or motives. It isn’t about people’s personalities much less people’s genetics. It is instead about concepts, methods, and institutional allegiances which, even in the hands of wonderful people foster results that those people never wanted. The target of my comments is nightmarish tradition that weighs down good people. Or, as my bard, who is still living, sang, “I mean no harm nor put fault on anyone who lives in a vault, it’s alright ma, if I can’t please him.”

So let’s focus on two substantive issues. Consider first that Marxism’s core concepts and associated practices overemphasize economics and underemphasize gender/kinship, community/culture, polity, and ecology.

This claim doesn’t imply that all (or even any) Marxists ignore everything other than economics. Nor does it imply that all (or even any) Marxists don’t care greatly about other matters. It implies, instead, that when yesterday’s Marxists addressed the sex life of teenagers, marriage, the nuclear family, religion, racial identity, cultural commitments, sexual preferences, political organization, police behavior, war, and ecology, they tended to highlight dynamics arising from their understanding of class struggle or that demonstrated implications for class struggle and tended to miss concerns rooted in the specific features of race, gender, power, and nature. They most often even claimed that this limited accounting was a virtue.

This criticism doesn’t say yesterday’s Marxism has said nothing useful about race, gender, sex, and power or at least about the economics of each. But this criticism does say that yesterday’s Marxist concepts did not sufficiently counter tendencies imposed by then current society, or by then current struggle, or by then current tactical choices that generated racist, sexist, and authoritarian outcomes even against the best moral and social inclinations of most Marxists. Yesterday’s Marxism left out too much that matters greatly for it to guide us to tomorrow.

In other words, these claims about Marxism’s overemphasis on economy and insufficient emphasis on other sides of life do not predict mono-mania about economics or even a universal and inviolable pattern of over attention to economics and under attention to everything else. No, instead they predict a harmful pattern of narrowness in how attention is given to extra economic phenomena. Doesn’t Marxism instruct us to study such phenomena and to correct ills associated with such phenomena, but to do so with our eyes primarily on what Marxism says are the paramount change-relevant causes and effects, which Marxism says are the economic ones? Doesn’t Marxism provide valuable and even essential insights about the economic dimensions of other than economic sides of life, but not so much about their less economic dimensions? By analogy imagine a feminist, anti-racist, or anarchist who says we should pay attention to economic phenomena and seek to correct ills associated with them, but we should do so always with our eyes primarily on what feminism, anti-racism, or anarchism would call the paramount change-relevant causes and effects, which they would say are the intrinsically gender, racial, or political ones. Wouldn’t Marxists rightly reply that those other approaches need economic enhancement? But isn’t it just as valid for those other approaches to say that the Marxist approach needs gender, racial, and political enhancement?

If so, then doesn’t it follow that the fix for Marxism’s “economism” would be for Marxists to agree that feminism, anarchism, and anti racism have their own core insights and that just as advocates of each of those perspectives need to take account of class-focused understanding, so too people seeking classlessness should take account of those other source’s insights about those other focussed areas of needed change? Won’t prioritizing only a one-way causation, whether economics to the rest or some other favored focus to the rest, miss phenomena of crucial importance, especially given the racial, gender, authority, ecology, and class biases and habits that are imbued so prevalently in current societies? But doesn’t that make clear that we therefore need concepts that counter and certainly not concepts that accentuate such biases?

The good news is that I think the majority of today’s Marxists agree with the need to transcend economism. The bad news is that I think the majority of today’s Marxists haven’t yet adopted new concepts that equally prioritize those other areas of needed change. Instead the concepts and words of the dead generations that inhabit Marxism’s tradition tend to crowd out or sometimes even stamp out such broader insights as soon as momentum for fundamental change builds. So while the majority of today’s Marxists see the need to escape economism and while they sincerely seek to do so (often by embracing another perspective so we get socialist feminism, marxist anti racism, anarcho-marxism, and eco-marxism), nonetheless, isn’t a lingering obstacle to their success that in times of crisis their allegiance to their whole tradition’s core intellectual framework tends to overcome their good intentions? As movement urgency rises, that is, don’t desires for enlarged breadth of focus tend to get washed away? That is what we might call Marxism’s economism problem.

A second area of concern less noticed and less confronted than its economism, is ironically that regarding Marxism’s primarily focused side of life, the economy, Marxism’s concepts fall profoundly short. Most Marxist might say, “come on. Whatever limitations or even failings Marxism may have, surely its economics is powerful.” Well, yes, Marxism rightly argues the intense importance of class conflict and that is excellent. But then Marxism near universally fails to highlight a class that exists between labor and capital. Yesterday’s and also today’s Marxists tend to apriori deny the roots of a third class in how the economy defines and apportions work. Yesterday’s and also today’s Marxist’s teach, instead, that classes owe their existence only to ownership relations. But isn’t it blindingly evident that this is why Marxism fails to see that the economies that Marxists have either positively called “socialist” or critically called “state capitalist” have elevated neither capitalists nor workers to ruling economic status? Instead, in this system, aren’t capitalists gone but workers still subordinate? Indeed, hasn’t what the Marxist tradition has sought and won beyond capitalism in every case elevated to ruling economic status not workers but instead a coordinator class of planners, managers, and other empowered employees? Hasn’t it been out with the capitalist boss, in with the coordinator boss?

But why does that happen? Is it a revolution hijacked? Or is it that victorious Marxism has most often sought and won public or state ownership of assets, top down decision making, corporate divisions of labor, remuneration for output or power, and markets or central planning for allocation. And hasn’t this all happened, remarkably, even while Marxists simultaneously urged the need for workers control. Yet when Marxists have implemented the former institutions they have not attained the latter goals. Isn’t that because some key Marxist conceptual and institutional commitments have not only permitted but propelled coordinator rule even while they have denied that the coordinator class exists? Perhaps the reason why Marxism isn’t all that popular among working class audiences isn’t solely that those audiences have been misled.

But, please note, this doesn’t say that most (or arguably even any) individual Marxists self-consciously try to advance the interests of managers, lawyers, accountants, engineers, planers, and other empowered actors over and above workers. It says, instead, that certain concepts within Marxism do little to prevent this elevation of a coordinator class and indeed even propel it. It says that in Marxist practice, coordinator economic dominance tends to emerge even despite and against the sentiments of Marxism’s rank and file.

This may seem peculiar. After all, how could a movement most of whose members want one thing repeatedly wind up implementing something damningly and even diametrically opposite? But actually, this is not uncommon. Social outcomes often diverge from rank and file desires.

For example, sincere and eloquent advocates of workers control who favor privately-owned corporations, whether they do so for personal gain or due to a sincere belief that private ownership is essential for a well functioning economy, do not usher in workers control. Their institutional choice to retain private ownership trumps their worthy ethical desire for workers control. All Marxists understand that outcome because Marxism’s concepts highlight how private ownership precludes workers control.

Similarly, sincere and eloquent advocates of workers self management who favor markets or central planning and who favor the corporate division of labor, whether they do so for personal gain or due to a sincere belief that those choices are essential for a well functioning economy, will not usher in self management. Their institutional choices will trump their worthy ethical desires for self management. Marxists often fail to understand that. Their concepts don’t highlight and even obscure the dynamics at work.

Is it nasty to point out that Marxists ought to easily understand this possibility not least because Marx himself smartly advised that when judging some intellectual framework one should discount what it says about itself (“workers above all”) and instead notice what its concepts obscure (“coordinatorism above workers”)? Is it nasty to urge, like Marx, that an intellectual framework that becomes a tool of an aspiring ruling class will obscure that class’s behavior, hide that class’s roots in social relations, and even deny that class’s existence, all while furthering that class’s rise to dominance?

Look at the theory and ideology of mainstream capitalist economics to see exactly that dynamic. But don’t we also discover something quite similar if we apply the same evaluative method to assessing Marxism’s relation to the class between labor and capital? That is, when we look to see what the Marxist tradition highlights, obscures, and seeks, don’t we see that Marxism’s focus on property relations as the only basis for class conflict obscures the importance of the distribution of empowering tasks among economic actors for class conflict? Don’t we see that that’s why Marxism misses that with owners gone, coordinators can rise to rule workers? Don’t we see that Marxism removes from view the rule exerted by about twenty percent of the population (the coordinator class that monopolizes empowering work), over the remaining eighty percent of the population (the working class that does mainly disempowering work) in so-called “twentieth century socialism,” which system we really ought to call coordinatorism?

Don’t we see, in other words, that despite the sincere and oft-stated aims of so many of its adherents, in practice Marxism’s concepts overwhelmingly and predictably elevate the coordinator class to rule over workers even as Marxism’s concepts have hidden coordinator’s role and even their very existence?

Would Marx call today’s Marxism and especially today’s Marxism Leninism the ideology of the coordinator class, not the working class? Whether Marx would do so or not, isn’t it clear that to argue that we should do so doesn’t imply that we think that somehow all Marxists are enemies of classlessness? Isn’t it clear that it instead urges that even when Marxists overwhelmingly desire classlessness, their conceptual and institutional allegiances trample those desires?

A question arises. How might today’s Marxists seek a better Marxism for tomorrow? How might new Marxists augment, alter, or otherwise transcend faulty current concepts to avoid the two problems we and so many feminists, anti racists, anarchists, councilists, and others have highlighted?

Regarding “economism,” isn’t the problem that we need to transcend a conceptual framework that starts from economics and then even while revealing important economic dynamics, primarily examines other realms with the intention of seeing their economic implications but not their intrinsic extra-economic dynamics?

And if we recognize the problem, shouldn’t we instead ground our overall perspective on concepts that highlight economics, but also equally highlight polity, kinship, culture, and ecology? Shouldn’t we prioritize understanding each of these life sphere’s own intrinsic logic and dynamics, and simultaneously prioritize seeing how in actual societies each of these life spheres influences and even limits and defines the others without presupposing that they line up according to some particular hierarchy of importance? For example, as a possible correction to today’s economism, tomorrow’s Marxist might say,

“I am Marxist but I am also feminist, inter communalist, anarchist, and green. I recognize that dynamics arising from spheres of life other than the economy are critically important and can even define economic possibilities, just as the reverse can occur. Of course, I still think class struggle is important, but I realize gender, race, religious, ethnic, sexual, and anti-authoritarian struggle are each also important. I realize that just as we need to understand non-class struggle in its relation to class struggle, we also have to understand class struggle in its relation to gender, race, political, and ecological struggle.”

So, okay, suppose tomorrow’s Marxist does renounce the idea of an economic base which affects an extra-economic superstructure which is in turn only affected. Suppose tomorrow’s Marxist denies that societies rise and transform only due to modes of production and instead sees how modes of kinship, culture, and polity are also crucial to how societies rise and transform? Suppose tomorrow’s Marxist still argues the importance of class struggle but no longer sees class struggle as the alone dominant conceptual touchstone for identifying strategic issues. Could the label “Marxist” come to connote what this new “Marxist” believes? I am not sure. Maybe it could, though the Marxist tradition would no doubt resist. Indeed, I think this battle is and has been under way for decades.

In contrast to the above possibility for overcoming Marxism’s economism problem, the class-definition problem of yesterday’s and also most often of today’s Marxism seems to more strongly resist correction. Capitalists are capitalist, Marxists rightly urge, and this is so by virtue of their private ownership of the means of production. To no longer have capitalists above workers requires, Marxists also rightly urge, that we therefore eliminate private ownership of means of production. So far, so good. So essential.

Marxists then say non-capitalists own only their ability to do work which they sell for a wage. Also good. But then Marxists say that all these wage earning employees, by virtue of having the same ownership situation as one another, also have the same class interests. They are all in one class, the working class. This is not good.

The point is, Marxists almost universally fail to recognize that the parts of wage earning employees can have crucially different class interests from other parts due to having different jobs in the corporate division of labor. Suppose in response to this criticism we hypothesize that perhaps there is a class between labor and capital. Is this hypothetical third class real? Is anyone actually in this hypothetical third class? Once we admit that it might exist and we thus admit that something other than ownership relations might generate class difference, if we then look can’t we easily see that some employees—managers, lawyers, accountants, engineers, and more are highly empowered by their economic position and in particular by corporate divisions of labor which allot to them a virtual monopoly on empowering tasks as well as on the levers and requisites of daily decision-making, while in contrast allotting to other employees disempowering tasks that leave them subordinate—so that the former coordinators decide and the latter workers obey?

Doesn’t it follow that to no longer have empowered coordinators above disempowered workers, and therefore to attain classlessness, we must replace the offending institutions—markets, central planning, and especially the corporate division of labor? But if so, then why do most Marxist and all Marxist Leninist visions explicitly advocate having a corporate division of labor?

More, doesn’t this advocacy explain why Marxists typically do not see that even when private ownership is eliminated, markets, central planning, and corporate divisions of labor will nonetheless elevate a ruling class of structurally empowered coordinators above a subordinate class of structurally disempowered workers?

Marxists often movingly and sincerely describe the justice, equity, and dignity that “socialism” should usher in. But, if we look at texts by Marxists for their proposed vision, don’t we find vague rhetoric that lacks institutional substance, or, when there is some institutional substance, don’t we find institutions that deny the justice, equity, and dignity that Marxists personally favor?

Similarly, when we look at Marxist practice, which is most often Marxist Leninist practice, don’t we find these same coordinatorist structures nearly universally implemented? Could a Marxist today transcend this problem by adopting a three class view that sees beyond only property relations as able to cause class rule, and yet reasonably continue to call him or herself a Marxist?

If a Marxist did follow that path, which indeed some Marxists have at times tried to do, (including myself when I co-authored a book with Robin Hahnel forty six years ago called Unorthodox Marxism) I think signs that it had occurred would be obvious. For example, wouldn’t such “new Marxists” critique what has been self-labeled “socialism” by its advocates in various countries around the world, and then not call it capitalism or state capitalism, or even deformed socialism, but instead call it a new mode of production that enshrines a coordinator class above workers?

And wouldn’t such new Marxists then offer a vision that would dispense with markets, central planning, and corporate divisions of labor, as well as dispense with modes of remuneration that reward property, power, or output, and of course dispense with private ownership of means of production?

And wouldn’t such new Marxists also propose new defining economic institutions to seek in place of those rejected options? The new institutions that I think might gain support from such new Marxists might be, for example, worker and consumer collectively self-managing councils, remuneration for duration, intensity, and onerousness of socially valued labor, a new division of labor that has jobs balanced for empowerment effects, and participatory planning in place of markets and central planning?

Then, in accord with their altered economic vision, wouldn’t such new Marxists also advocate movement organization, methods, and programs that embody, propel, and actually arrive at their positive aims? Wouldn’t they understand that strategies for social change that embody organizational choices and methods such as employing centrist parties, top down decision-making, and corporate divisions of labor will not eliminate coordinator class rule but entrench it? Wouldn’t they understand that today’s Marxism’s flaws lead to coordinator class rule regardless of the sincere desires of many or even nearly all Marxists to end up someplace much nicer than coordinatorism?

What would be the relation of such “new Marxists” to the Marxist tradition that they previously celebrated? Well, I doubt such new Marxists would call themselves Leninist or Trotskyist, but even if they did, they would certainly disavow huge swaths of associated thought and action.

Instead of persistently quoting Lenin and Trotsky positively, for example, they would aggressively reject Lenin saying: “It is absolutely essential that all authority in the factories should be concentrated in the hands of management.”

And they would reject Lenin saying: “Any direct intervention by the trade unions in the management of enterprises must be regarded as positively harmful and impermissible.”

And they would reject Lenin saying: “Large scale machine industry which is the central productive source and foundation of socialism calls for absolute and strict unity of will… How can strict unity of will be ensured? By thousands subordinating their will to the will of one.”

And they would reject Lenin saying: “A producer’s congress! What precisely does that mean? It is difficult to find words to describe this folly. I keep asking myself can they be joking? Can one really take these people seriously? While production is always necessary, democracy is not. Democracy of production engenders a series of radically false ideas.”

And then they would reject Trotsky saying (about left communists): “They turn democratic principles into a fetish. They put the right of the workers to elect their own representatives above the Party, thus challenging the Party’s right to affirm its own dictatorship, even when this dictatorship comes into conflict with the evanescent mood of the worker’s democracy.”

And they would reject Trotsky saying, “We must bear in mind the historical mission of our Party. The Party is forced to maintain its dictatorship, without stopping for these vacillations, nor even the momentary falterings of the working class. This realization is the mortar which cements our unity. The dictatorship of the proletariat does not always have to conform to formal principles of democracy.”

And they would reject Trotsky saying: “It is a general rule that man will try to get out of work. Man is a lazy animal.”

And they would reject Trotsky saying (with pride): “I consider that if the Civil War had not plundered our economic organs of all that was strongest, most independent, most endowed with initiative, we should undoubtedly have entered the path of one-man management much sooner and much less painfully.”

More, wouldn’t such new Marxists not waste time blaming Lenin or Trotsky’s personal dispositions for the origins of such undeniably horrible utterances and outcomes, but instead look for underlying inadequate concepts they can now transcend?

But, honestly, isn’t all of the above in some sense the fare of “dead generations”? More important than arguing about the past, wouldn’t tomorrow’s “new Marxists” note that utilizing hierarchical structures in economic and/or political or social institutions risks ushering in coordinator rule as well as creating an environment uncongenial to widespread worker involvement, or kinship, racial, political, or ecological advances?

If tomorrow’s Marxists wanted to argue that in some difficult contexts such structures may have to be employed, wouldn’t they urge seeing the structures as temporarily imposed expedients and in all other respects try to pave the way for classless self-managing social relations, now and in the future?

Finally, despite some crucial flaws, is there also great wisdom in Marx and in many subsequent Marxist writers and activists that “tomorrow’s Marxists” would rightly retain? Of course there is. But wouldn’t new Marxists who rightly reject not only capitalist property relations but also markets, central planning, and a coordinatorist division of labor as well as patriarchy, racism, and authoritarianism also want to avoid fulfilling Marx’s own commentary that: “The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living.”

That seems like a good back-to-the-beginning place for us to sign off, no?

Well, at the risk of belaboring, I don’t think so. To reject things we have been taught, things we have quoted, things we have taken our identities and battle slogans from, things that we have believed in, and that we have advocated all so that we can get beyond traditions of dead generations is no simple path to navigate, especially when many highly learned, compelling committed, courageous, and accomplished folks repeatedly tell us that to do that would leave us ignorantly ill-suited to winning change. So at the risk of running on, I want to give the issue just a little more attention.

The point of activists becoming familiar and facile with such long-lived frameworks as Marxism or Marxism Leninism (or any other long-lived framework) as they move leftward should of course be to find in such frameworks’ insights and methods that can usefully aid current and future practice.

To decide if to immerse oneself in Marxist (or any other) long-lived tradition is a wise choice, shouldn’t we ask, will that tradition’s proposed concepts and practices not hinder but instead help us to comprehend all main conditions we will encounter when we combat injustice? Shouldn’t they help us try to conceive and attain a desirable new world? If so, we should of course learn from that collection of proposed concepts, albeit using our own words. But if not, shouldn’t we develop better concepts and embark on better practice?

To that end, here are some additional very summary judgements about Marxist tradition to discuss, debate, explore, and hopefully get beyond:

1. Marxist “dialectics” is a substantively empty drain on creativity and range of perception. If you doubt it, okay, ask even a well read Marxist what dialectics means. And especially ask what dialectics helps activists understand which, if they hadn’t learned dialectics, they wouldn’t understand. Ask what makes dialectics other than useless and pointless rhetoric that only elevates its owners above those who fail to successfully borrow those same habits and slogans from dead generations.

2. “Historical Materialism’s” claims have some validity, but when real existing people utilize the concepts of historical materialism they typically tend to arrive at an economistic and mechanical view of society that systematically under-values and mis-understands social relations of gender, political, cultural, and ecological origin and impact.

3. Marxist “class theory” has obscured the importance of a class between labor and capital, has under-appreciated that class’s antagonisms in capitalist economies with the working class below and with capital above, has long obstructed class analysis of Soviet, Eastern European, and Third World post capitalist economies, and has especially obstructed understanding the failings of tactics and strategies that have consistently attained other than what most activists have wanted to attain.

4. The “Marxist Labor Theory of Value” misunderstands its own subject the determination of wages, prices, and profits in capitalist economies and more broadly turns activists’ thoughts away from a needed social-relations bargaining-power view of capitalist exchange. It also directs its advocates away from seeing that the dynamics of workplaces are largely functions of the differential empowerment effects of work, of bargaining power, and of forms of social control and not solely functions of ownership relations. It suggests all workers will wind up earning the minimum wage they need to reproduce themselves. But then one ought to wonder what the point of seeking higher wages is, and for that matter why wages for different wage earners differ so markedly.

5. Marxist “crisis theory,” in all its variants, often distorts understanding of capitalist economies and anti-capitalist prospects by seeing intrinsic cataclysmic collapse as inevitable and even imminent where no such prospect exists, and by in that way orienting activists away from the importance of their own sustained vision-guided organizing as a far more promising basis for desirable change.

6. Regarding visions of desirable societies, the Marxist tradition has been particularly obstructive. First there has been Marxism’s general taboo against “utopian” speculation which taboo literally rejects trying to conceive a vision we wish to attain. Second, Marxist causal economism has presumed that if economic relations are made desirable then other social relations will fall into place, making vision for other than economy redundant. Third, Marxism is permanently confused about what constitutes an equitable distribution of income. “From each according to ability and to each according to need” is not a viable economic guide since for each of us to provide society according to our ability would mean we should each work as much as our ability allows which is typically way more than it makes sense for us to work. Likewise, for each of us to receive according to our need would either let us all have anything we say we need or, if not, it would require that someone or something else decides our needs for us. In neither case would it respect or reveal information that indicates how much people want or need any particular thing and not just that they do want/need that particular thing, and that would in turn prevent determining costs and benefits of different possible choices by workplaces. More, the norm that Marxists sometimes propose instead, “from each according to personal choice and to each according to contribution to the social product” is not even a morally worthy maxim since it rewards productivity, including genetic endowment, and not just effort and sacrifice. And fourth, Marxism approves hierarchical relations of production, a corporate division of labor for workplace organization, and approves command planning or even markets as a means of allocation because while Marxism recognizes the need to eliminate the causes of capitalist economic rule it does not even recognize the existence of much less seek to eliminate the causes of coordinator economic rule.

7. Taken cumulatively Marxism’s injunctions regarding economic goals amount to advocating what we call a coordinator mode of production that elevates administrators, planners, and all structurally empowered workers, called coordinators, to ruling class status. This Marxist economic goal then uses the label “socialist” to appeal to all other employees, workers, but it does not structurally implement socialist ideals (just as the political goal of bourgeois movements uses the label “democratic” to rally support from diverse sectors, but does not structurally implement full democratic ideals).

8. Finally, Leninism and Trotskyism are natural outgrowths of Marxism as it is employed by people in capitalist societies, and Marxism Leninism, far from being “theory and strategy for the working class,” is, instead, by its focus, concepts, values, methods, and goals, and despite most of its advocates’ desires, “theory and strategy for the coordinator class.”

So, to get personal about all this, and to add a crucial caveat, since I believe the above claims, albeit my reasons are only summarized here, I hoped the demise of the patriarchal, nationalist, authoritarian, ecologically suicidal Soviet model, would end allegiance to Marxism and Marxism Leninism taken as whole traditions, since those whole traditions aimed in their principles, concepts, thought, and vision (though not in the deepest aspirations of many of their advocates), at that Soviet model.

So, what’s the problem? Out with that model, out with the concepts and strategies that led to it. That makes sense, doesn’t it? Yes, but—and here comes the caveat—only to a point. When theories fail to sufficiently explain reality or to successfully guide sought practice, they certainly do need to be refined and corrected or sometimes even jettisoned and replaced. And, in the case of Marxism and Marxism Leninism, the faults briefly discussed here and often also critiqued by feminists, anti-racists, anarchists, councilists and even many Marxists are demonstrably intrinsic to certain Marxist core concepts so that correcting those concepts is not just modestly tinkering with the still intact intellectual framework.

That is, supposing we seriously refine or even dispense with major elements of dialectical materialism, historical materialism, the labor theory of value, Marxism’s constricted understanding of class, Leninist strategy, a coordinator elevating economic vision, and Marxism’s still insufficient attention to and aspirations for kin, gender, sex, race, ethnic, political, and ecological vision, won’t whatever emerges reject enough from the Marxist tradition to also have to find a new name? Maybe, maybe not. But I would suggest that it is time—actually that it is well past time—to get on with something new.

My caveat, however, is that it is also true that when theories fail to sufficiently explain reality or to guide practice, it does not follow that we must jettison every claim they made, every concept they offered, and every analysis they undertook. Quite the contrary, it is more likely that much will be still valid and should be retained (though perhaps recast) in any new and better intellectual framework.

So, in 2024, as crisis looms and momentum for change grows, learning from past traditions can certainly help us, but we should recognize that immersing ourselves in past traditions can also crowd out our need to explore and adopt essential new insights in place of flawed ones we have heretofore borrowed from traditions of dead generations.

This article is an edited and shortened transcript of the 265th episode of the podcast RevolutionZ titled, Marxism Revisited: Beacon Or Burden?

The author hopes to hear from those who agree and from those who disagree with the many controversial sentiments of this essay via the ZNet discord channel set up for the purpose.



Michael Albert s radicalization occurred during the 1960s. His political involvements, starting then and continuing to the present, have ranged from local, regional, and national organizing projects and campaigns to co-founding South End Press, Z Magazine, the Z Media Institute, and ZNet, and to working on all these projects, writing for various publications and publishers, giving public talks, etc. His personal interests, outside the political realm, focus on general science reading (with an emphasis on physics, math, and matters of evolution and cognitive science), computers, mystery and thriller/adventure novels, sea kayaking, and the more sedentary but no less challenging game of GO. Albert is the author of 21 books which include: No Bosses: A New Economy for a Better World; Fanfare for the Future; Remembering Tomorrow; Realizing Hope; and Parecon: Life After Capitalism. Michael is currently host of the podcast Revolution Z and is a Friend of ZNetwork.

Union Democracy Is a Value, Not a Strategy

By Dave Kamper
February 1, 2024
Source: Jacobin


Democracy is a central value of every trade union worth the name. But we shouldn’t assume that a more democratic union means a more militant union.

Chris Bohner’s recent essay in these pages, “Direct Elections for Labor Leaders Make for More Militant Unions,” lays out an argument that at one level is so uncontroversial that it should be a platitude — unions should be democratic. No one who believes in organized labor in the United States (or anywhere in the world) can disagree with the sentiment. Nevertheless, Bohner is right to say it, because even seemingly obvious truths bear repeating.

However, Bohner goes much further and commits an error common to union reformers — conflating the morally good with the inherently strategic. A “more democratic union,” Bohner contends, “is a more militant union.” The path to a stronger, better union is through democracy.

Would that it were so. Building more effective unions requires commitment, patience, planning, and considerable skill, and cannot be achieved by changing a constitution. We are doing a disservice to those who want to build a better labor movement if we reduce the scope and scale of our challenges to the question of how leaders are chosen.
Democracy and Militancy

Let me back up, though, and begin by questioning one of Bohner’s underlying assumptions, that “‘one member, one vote’ is a right denied to most union members.” This simply isn’t true.

It is true that if by one member, one vote, you only mean direct election of an international union’s top leaders, most unions are not structured that way. But that’s the only way that Bohner’s assertion is true.

For example, Bohner criticizes the delegates of the convention of the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) for not backing what he calls “commonsense resolutions” to make it easier for the union to strike, increase strike pay, and direct resources to organizing. He asserts that if “the general membership of the UFCW had direct elections, these resolutions would have likely received widespread support.” This is because, as he puts it, union conventions that elect leaders by the delegate system “entrench incumbents who can deploy the union’s vast legal, financial, political, and organizational resources to maintain power and stifle reform challenges.”

But the general membership of the UFCW does have direct elections. The delegates of that convention were all directly elected by members in secret-ballot elections. The UFCW constitution lays out the process in excruciating detail, one that guarantees members the right to vote.

Why is a convention delegate elected by one-member-one-vote a shill for incumbents, but an international union president elected by one-member-one-vote a liberatory figure who will change the union in fundamental ways?

Bohner here falls prey to another common error made by union reformers — treating union decisions they don’t agree with as self-evident proof of some kind of corruption.

Unions are political entities. Reasonable people can disagree on what the best path forward is for a union. To stick with UFCW: it’s entirely possible that UFCW convention delegates might have sad memories of the 2003–04 California grocery strike, where some seventy thousand UFCW members were out for 140 days, the union’s assets were cut in half, and the final deal was a bitter pill that few believe justified the walkout. Remembering that experience might well make a delegate reluctant to increase strike pay because of the risk that a long strike would drain the union’s coffers.

I’m not saying those convention delegates were right; I’m not saying they were wrong. I’m saying that their decision can be explained without resorting to allegations of corruption.

And, yes, it is likely true that, if the current leadership of UFCW opposed the reformers’ suggested changes, they might have tried to persuade convention delegates. That’s called politics, not corruption. Leaders get to try to persuade people to support their policies. That’s what leaders are supposed to do.

While Bohner reluctantly acknowledges that union democracy goes beyond direct election of international officers, that’s clearly the part he considers the most important. If so, he seems to me to be doing a disservice to, say, the National Education Association’s (NEA) annual Representative Assembly (RA), arguably the world’s largest parliamentary gathering, which some years can see close to ten thousand delegates, directly elected by members across the country. Democracy can and does have a different look in different unions.

However, even if we grant Bohner’s contention that union democracy equals one member, one vote, for the top leadership of the union, we shouldn’t assume that such a reform will automatically lead to a more militant, more organizing-minded, or more successful union.

Bohner (rightly) praises the Teamsters’ successful UPS contract campaign, a militant, strategic, well-executed plan that won a lot of good things for the members. But Bohner can’t (and doesn’t try to) explain why Teamsters presidents directly elected by the members since 1991 didn’t produce what he considers a revitalized and militant union, but the direct election of 2021 did.

Bohner has produced very provocative work on union finances, arguing that unions are hoarding assets at the expense of organizing and militancy. His argument is that more union democracy would change that trajectory. I can understand why people might want to believe it, but saying it doesn’t make it so.

The only systematic effort to study the relationship between union democracy and union organizing doesn’t support that point of view. In the mid-2000s, Andrew W. Martin looked closely at union financial data and came to the conclusion that the greater the influence union staff have on a union’s actions, and the less control local unions have over the operations of their locals, the more likely that union will engage in new organizing. Martin’s data is based on LM-2 reports to the Department of Labor, which is not an ideal source, but it is the same source that Bohner uses for his work on union finances.

As to the other half of Bohner’s argument, that directly elected union leaders will also be more militant, there isn’t any robust evidence to back it up. If you squint at the year 2023, it does kind of look like unions with directly elected leaders were more militant, but there are any number of years in recent memory where the most militant union was (say) the Communications Workers of America (CWA), or the NEA, or Service Employees International Union (SEIU), none of which directly elect their top leaders.
The Hard Work of Reform

What does seem to be true is that unions that become more focused on organizing and become more militant have gone through some kind of internal shift in power. But that shift in power isn’t always tied to changes in constitutional arrangements. If you’d asked folks before the recent United Auto Workers (UAW) strike what the most inspiring recent story of union reform and militancy was, many would have said the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU). In 2010, a CTU reform caucus won power and took the union in a much more aggressive direction, launching a series of powerful strikes and even getting a former CTU staffer elected mayor. The CTU reform story is inspiring and powerful; it does not feature notable constitutional changes.

The 2018 Red for Ed strike in West Virginia and elsewhere had a different path, but also one without a union-democracy-equals-union-militancy storyline. In West Virginia in particular, member-organizers bypassed official union structures and put together a statewide strike with little reference to the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) or NEA leadership in the state.

You see this again and again if you look at how unions reinvent themselves. That conflict is rarely centered on the union’s formal structures. What it always requires, though, is considerable amounts of hard work.

If you want to reform your union, reform your union. Have one-on-one conversations to identify organizing issues and figure out what it will take to move members in the direction you want to go. Find and support better leaders, at every level of the organization. Develop strategies to win based on the circumstances of your union and the employers against whom you struggle. Build energy for those strategies through even more one-on-one conversations, leadership identification, and action. Execute your strategies, and win.

If you want unions that do more organizing, that are more militant, you’re going to have to build it, carefully and consciously. No silver bullets. Just organizing.
The Decline Of The Humanities Studies Around The World Is An Enormous Risk For Humankind

By Anne Farrell
February 2, 2024
Source: Pressenza


According to Statistics Canada, student enrolment in the humanities has been declining since 2008. For all postsecondary students, humanities enrolments have dropped by 50 percent over the past 30 years. However, this phenomenon is not isolated to Canada. According to various OECD data, the lack of interest in the humanities is a phenomenon spread across 24 countries in the world.

(…) Between 2015 and 2018, the share of bachelor, master, and doctoral degrees awarded in humanities fields fell 5%, 11%, and 9% respectively on average with drops of varying proportions detected in 24 of the 36 OECD countries. In the US, the proportion of undergraduate students studying the humanities tumbled approximately 30% between 2005 and 2020, while the United Kingdom government recently announced in 2021 its intention to reduce funding for arts, social sciences, and humanities degrees it now deems “low value. (Source: OECD statistics data)

According to Rob Townsend, director of the humanities, arts, and culture program at the AAA&S (American Academy of Arts and Sciences) in the US

“We’re reaching a kind of existential tipping point for a lot of departments that could lead to their elimination.” (Globe and Mail, Why business needs the humanities: Focusing on STEM degrees and economic cost).

Even as overall postsecondary enrolments have dramatically grown, the humanities have continued to shrink. Meanwhile, the enrolment of students around the world in business, administration, science and technology, and computer science studies is increasing.

This situation is not surprising since the government prioritized specialized training in STEM and trade (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) over the last few decades over general knowledge and humanities. The dominant ideology has neglected history, literature, art, and “ideas” given that these human activities generate low-value income according to shareholders that are investing in higher educational programs.

Why should the humanities be prioritized?

In his book Sensemaking: The Power of the Humanities in the Age of the Algorithm, Christian Madsbjerg identifies various competencies and skills cultivated in humanities such as communication, collaboration among pairs, intercultural awareness, learning to communicate point of view, and acquiring mental flexibility.


He argues that “our fixation with data often masks stunning deficiencies and sensibilities, and is an enormous risk for humankind. The educational system has become subservient to algorithms”

Today more and more programs are based on algorithms and ways of thinking and learning, step by step. Humanities cultivated other skills that are essential to maintain democratic systems and societies based on human rights and diversity.

Humanities develop a special sensitivity and through understanding various ways visual, material, and – in the contemporary immaterial and digital world – they explore the expressions that are creating meaning in the world, and how those meanings contribute to our social, political, and spiritual life. Moreover in many humanities programs student experience is decisive and provides a learning process that is fundamental for critical thinking and self-knowledge.

By neglecting the Humanities, a few decades ago, most Western countries participated in the suppression of various lines of thinking and the suppression of various important points of view on human activities. This tendency coupled with the increasingly rapid dissemination of destructured information and polarization of point of view may generate greater difficulties in the comprehension of complex social and cultural issues. Since processes that take place in the individual consciousness also happen in large human groups, it’s possible that in future societies a massive number of individuals will be ignorant of history, philosophy, literature, and ethnicity.

This situation may generate difficulties as a whole, as a society, to advance and reflect on various processes and complex issues that demand human skills and a special sensibility. The future generations may be less able to apply ethical frameworks to advances in machine learning, biotechnology and nanomedicine. They will be less able to communicate without the assistance of machines, which will eventually think of them.

Possible solutions

Leaders must understand that educational programs are a fundamental element in the development of people and societies. Today’s leaders and government must prioritize Humanities. The future generation must be able to obtain the tools to understand the world in which they live and be able to act and change the world according to their aspirations.

For Aguilar and Bize, education is the noblest of human activities because “it” is at the forefront of the evolutionary direction of the human being. Mario Aguilar and Rebeca Bize are the authors of the book Pedagogy of Intentionality Educating for Active Consciousness. Bize is a researcher and professor at the University of Santiago de Chile while Aguilar was a teacher and the spokesperson for a large teachers’ union in Chile.

An education that focuses mainly on specialization can be interesting from the point of view of the job market, but in the long term, it serves mainly the interests of companies and corporations and may disrupt societies as a whole.

Only States can address the current enormous educational inequities across gender, race/ethnicity/origin, social class, disability, and many other forms of exclusion. Moreover, the conception of “quality” in education must extend beyond workforce creation and attaining narrow learning metrics. Education technology must not displace teachers and depersonalize learning, nor supplant free, quality, public education provided in school settings. Instead, quality education must address broader human rights objectives, including the full development of the human personality, and foster skills for learners to meet today’s global challenges as informed, critical, and active citizens. (Pressenza)

* American Academy of Arts and Sciences is one of the oldest learned societies in the United States. It was founded in 1780 during the American Revolution by John Adams, John Hancock, James Bowdoin, Andrew Oliver, and other United States Founding Fathers.
Hyundai Workers Roll the Union On in Alabama
February 2, 2024
Source: Labor Notes

Montgomery, Alabama, Hyundai workers (left to right) Robert Kennedy, Dewayne Naylor, and Conbralius Thomas pose just before the group announced that they collected union authorization cards from 30 percent of the plant’s workers.
(Photo: UAW)

Auto workers at Hyundai in Montgomery, Alabama, have signed up more than 30 percent of their nearly 4,000 co-workers in an ambitious drive to unionize.

The Auto Workers (UAW) announced the organizing breakthrough with a new video, “Montgomery Can’t Wait,” where workers link the labor and civil rights movements: “Montgomery, the city where Rosa Parks sat down, and where thousands of Hyundai workers are ready to Stand Up.”

“There’s something about our fight to unionize being homegrown that makes it just that much sweeter,” said Quichelle Liggins, a 12-year quality inspector at Hyundai.

“All I can tell my people to do is be bold and intentional. Just like the leaders of the civil rights movement, we’re linking together one by one. One person had to say, ‘Hey, it’s time for us to make a difference!’ And then several other people had to agree, and now we have a group of workers that feel the same way.”

Workers in this plant assemble the Santa Fe and Tucson SUVs, the Santa Cruz pickup truck, the Genesis GV70 luxury SUV, and the Electrified GV70.

They’re the third plant to reach the 30 percent milestone in the UAW’s new organizing push, just weeks after workers at a Mercedes-Benz plant near Tuscaloosa, Alabama, and on the heels of those at Tennessee’s Chattanooga Volkswagen plant in December.

The UAW announced Monday that more than 10,000 workers across 13 non-union plants have signed union cards since last November, when the union announced an ambitious goal to organize 150,000 autoworkers. That’s roughly the same number as are covered now under the Big Three contracts.

Once workers reach the threshold of 30 percent on signed union authorization cards, under the UAW’s rubric, they take their organizing public. At the 50 percent mark, they rally with their co-workers, families, neighbors, and community and union leaders, including UAW President Shawn Fain.

As soon as 70 percent of workers at a given plant sign cards, and their organizing committee has grown to include workers from every shift and job classification, they will demand voluntary recognition of their union. If the company refuses, the workers file for an election with the National Labor Relations Board.

TRIED BEFORE

Hyundai workers had tried mounting a union campaign in 2016, but it never garnered much support, plus management intimidation caught workers unprepared. They didn’t even file unfair labor practice charges after being targeted for organizing. Talk of the union resumed in 2020 at the height of the pandemic after management kept managers on the payroll but forced hourly workers onto the unemployment rolls.

Liggins compared the long lines to sign up for unemployment to a Michael Jackson concert, with people lining up for hours on end, bringing along folding chairs to sit on. Workers also said that Hyundai management penalized people for being sick. They started chatting on Facebook, initially a small group of no more than three. Liggins had signed a union card in 2016, but she wasn’t involved in that campaign.

But once the UAW’s Stand-Up Strike began grabbing headlines last fall, she and her co-workers started talking in earnest about a union at Hyundai, especially after the union notched a historic victory. “Then the company actually threw money at us,” Liggins said. Hyundai promised to raise wages by 25 percent over four years. “So, all we’re doing is talking about the union. And we got this little money and began wondering what we could get if we actually tried to form a union. And so here we are today.”

OVERWORKED AND DEMORALIZED

The biggest issues motivating Hyundai workers to unionize are retirement security, favoritism, high rates of injury, and punishing schedules that leave little time for family or even time away from the line to recuperate from an illness or care for a sick child. Workers complain that Hyundai’s six-day workweeks and last-minute schedule changes break up their weekends, leaving them overworked and demoralized. Managers routinely flip their schedules with little notice between days and nights or over holiday breaks.

Gilbert Brooks usually takes vacation days ahead of Martin Luther King Day, which is a company-paid holiday. On Tuesday, he reported to work at his scheduled time, but because of the holiday, he didn’t check the app and see that managers had called an early start. He didn’t need to check—if a worker is on vacation, the early-startup notification isn’t supposed to apply. Hyundai manager’s dinged him for being late anyway, moving him to phase two of the disciplinary process.

“That kept me from getting a maintenance job after they had already offered me the job, and I had signed the paperwork,” said Brooks, with feeling in his voice. “They took it away from me.”

At Hyundai, workers are required to maintain 99 percent attendance. If a worker dips below that percentage because they are late or absent, they are given a verbal warning, or what the company calls a “discussion planner,” and the worker is put on probation for a year. At the phase two mark, the worker is given a written warning and two years of probation, and has to write a letter to team relations (HR) showing contrition and vowing to do better in the future. At phase three, the worker is automatically terminated without any appeal process.

Hyundai has no sick days. With only three personal days, regardless of years at the company, workers are bound to end up in a disciplinary process.

“If you have kids and they are around the same age, if one gets sick, everyone in the house gets sick,” said Liggins. “So with three personal days for a family with small kids, there’s no way around it—you’re probably going to be in a phase by the time you get back to work.”

CONCRETE WEARS YOU OUT


Most workers put in grueling 10-hour shifts on hard concrete floors and lift their arms over their heads. As the years on the factory floor pile up, the result is damaged knees, torn rotator cuffs, and numb hands from carpal tunnel.

When 19-year employee Timothy Cripple first arrived at Hyundai, he described it as winning the lottery–the pay was good, plus he was a hard worker. He makes over $30 an hour after the company raised wages following the UAW stand-up strike. But as an engine shop machine operator, his job has taken a toll on his body, especially on a permanent third shift schedule from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.

Having put in the time to build Hyundai into a successful company, Cripple applied for a different position to get off his swollen feet after all these years of toil. He was hoping to move to an engine lab. But the company didn’t even post the jobs. Instead, the manager hired the nephew of a group leader off the street, bypassing Cripple’s seniority.

“I knew it would be better for me to be in there in the lab instead of walking on concrete all night, because that wears you out,” said Cripple. And there’s no rest—not even on holidays.

“If a holiday is on a Monday, they’ll give you a Sunday off,” he said. “You still have to come in on Monday night. So you don’t really get to see any holidays.”

Workers also worry about their retirement security. The Hyundai plant takes such a toll on their bodies that many won’t be able to keep working all the way up until they’re eligible for Medicare at 65; they will need health insurance after they leave the job.

SOARING PROFITS


When measured by the speed a car is produced, Hyundai’s Montgomery plant is the second-most-productive plant in the world. Over the past three years, Hyundai’s profits have soared 75 percent, while its vehicle prices rose 32 percent.

Brooks connects the company’s prosperity to its $300 million expansion plans at its Montgomery assembly plant, and the buildout of a $400 million battery plant by Hyundai Mobis, South Korea’s largest auto parts supplier. It also has another facility in South End, Georgia, in the Kia complex.

“If the company wasn’t prospering, there would be no way that they could do that,” said Brooks. He’d like to see some of the profits he and his co-workers have generated for the company reinvested in the workers.

He referenced the recent nonsense the company has been putting out in union-busting meetings about a family-oriented company culture. “If we’re family-oriented, they will try and do their best to take care of us—meaning profit-sharing, meaning a pension after we retire,” he said. “We have nothing after we retire. We’re not retiring. We actually just basically quit the company, because we get nothing.”

For Liggins too, the talk about family is bull. She got written up for “job abandonment” four years ago when she scheduled a half-day of vacation to attend her youngest son’s basketball playoff game. No one came to relieve her, but she left, since she had scheduled it and it was approved. When they had her sit down with HR, she was grilled about whether her family or her job was more important.

“I always bragged about my kids’ games,” she said. “I’m a basketball and football mom. That’s my life.” Monday mornings she’d update her co-workers about her kids’ sports games. When she was told by management to choose work over family, she was stoic on the outside, but inside she was furious. “I didn’t want to go off and get out of character. I just paused, and I was speechless, like, ‘You actually had the gall to tell me that.’”

REPUBLICANS DECLARE WAR ON WORKERS

Over four decades, automakers have relocated to the South to flee unions. And Hyundai plant management is hellbent on keeping it that way.

“They want to indoctrinate us with their anti-union commercials, but they don’t want us to have any UAW material in the plant,” said Cripple. While he was handing out UAW flyers in the breakroom, a team leader took them and threw them in the trash. Another worker, Beverly McCall, was told to stop passing out leaflets in the company parking lot. But she carried on, telling management, “We have every right to get the word out, and they can’t stop us,” according to a UAW press release from December when the union filed unfair labor charges against Hyundai, as well as Volkswagen and Honda.

Management has hauled workers into captive-audience meetings to show anti-union videos and passed out anti-union T-shirts. In one commercial, Brooks said, a team leader shows pictures of a shack where workers had lived before working at Hyundai and shows another picture afterwards of a revamped home.

State officials have argued that the state’s growing auto sector will be threatened if workers unionize.

Alabama is tied in with Tennessee as the fifth-highest car-producing state in the country. Mercedes-Benz, Toyota, Honda, Hyundai, and suppliers employ a combined 50,000 workers in Alabama.

Nationwide, the share of union workers in manufacturing declined by 21 percent from 1983 to 2022. The UAW’s industrial base in auto, which at its peak stood at 1.5 million members, has substantially eroded.

Key to the UAW’s strategy is to empower workers inside the plants to build their unions publicly, rather than organizers who don’t work there running an underground campaign. In previous organizing efforts at Nissan and Tennessee, Republican governors and anti-union groups painted the union as out-of-state interlopers.

Soon after the Mercedes-Benz workers went public with their organizing in January, Alabama Governor Kay Ivey wrote an op-ed vowing to bust the union.

“It was a shock to hear the governor say she’s for the employer,” said Cripple, who found the insinuation that he and his co-workers were an outside entity disrespectful. “Why wouldn’t you want your constituents to better themselves financially and improve their working conditions?”

NEVER PICKED UP A TOOL


“There are actually thousands of us who get on the floor and run those lines day in, day out,” said Liggins. “The governor has never stepped foot in Hyundai. Our CEO has never stepped foot on the line. He’s never picked up a tool, doesn’t know what it’s like to work overnight on Saturday—a total of 10 hours—and drive home early Sunday morning. So what surprises me is them telling me what I need and don’t want and how I should react, if they can’t walk a mile in my shoes.”

Alabama Commerce Secretary Ellen McNair claimed that the workers’ union drive would “place our state’s main economic driver in the crosshairs.” McNair insinuated that workers would lose their jobs: “The days of Alabama being a premier destination for industry investment may be coming to an end.”

The Business Council of Alabama announced a website, Alabama Strong, meant to wallop the union drives. This anti-union front group brings together the business interests of Honda, Hyundai, and Mercedes to “provide Alabamians with a full and thorough picture of the economic dangers that unionization presents,” wrote the Business Council’s CEO Helena Duncan in an op-ed titled “The United Auto Workers labor union must not do to Alabama what it did to Detroit.”

“They’ve declared war on us now,” said Mercedes-Benz auto worker Jeremy Kimbrell, who works near Tuscaloosa. “Game on!”

The union-busting playbook may be dog-eared, but it’s still in use because it works. But workers are hip to its contents this time and know what to expect. Last time, Liggins said, the company would throw terms at workers—”right to work,” “just cause”—and they’d get intimidated because people didn’t fully understand what they meant.

“Nobody ever tried to challenge it,” Liggins said. “This time around, we knew that we needed to file unfair labor practice charges.” When workers got hauled into HR for flyering and talking about organizing in break areas, they were ready.

“They took them to the office, but once we filed charges, nothing happened,” she said. “And so that was kind of like, okay, that works. And we’ll try something else.”
Germany's new leftist party gains support, far-right loses in polling

2024/02/02
Members of the German Bundestag Amira Mohamed Ali (L) and Sahra Wagenknecht take part in a plenary session to discuss the 2024 federal budget. 
Britta Pedersen/dpa

The newest party in the German political landscape, the populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), is gaining support, with a 6% approval rating nationwide, according to the latest opinion poll on Friday.

That is an increase of 2% for the party that was established by Sarah Wagenknecht, a former leader of Die Linke (The Left), who split from her party to form the BSW.

The BSW combines left–wing social policy with an anti-immigrant stance and criticism of the European Union.

The results mean that if Germany held elections on Sunday, the party that was founded in January would beat the 5% hurdle needed to enter parliament, according to the poll, conducted for German public broadcaster ZDF.

The centre-right opposition bloc of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the regional Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU) came in at 31%, meaning it would remain the strongest force.

The far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) had the second-highest level of support with 19%, losing 3 points compared to the channel's previous survey carried out in mid-January.

The anti-immigrant AfD had been steadily rising in polls for months, propelled at least in part by right-wing anger at Chancellor Olaf Scholz's stumbling three-party coalition government.

Scholz's governing Social Democrats (SPD) had a support level of 15%, an increase of 25. The Green Party, the SPD's main coalition partner, had a 13% approval rating, losing 1%.

Support for the junior coalition partner, the pro-business FDP, remained unchanged at 4%, meaning it would fail to pass the 5% hurdle for the Bundestag.

Former German intelligence head slams left-wing rival as 'communist'

2024/01/28

Former President of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) Hans-Georg Maassen waits to testify as a witness before the investigative committee of the North Rhine-Westphalian state parliament.
 Federico Gambarini/dpa

A former head of the German domestic intelligence service, who is carving out a career in right-wing politics, on Sunday dismissed a new party on the left as "communist" in response to a suggestion that they shared common ground.

Hans-Georg Maaßen, who was eased out of his position with the intelligence agency in 2018 after comments about violence directed at migrants, announced this week that he was leaving Germany's main centre-right party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), to set up a new party, the Werteunion (Values Union).

He was dismissive of Sarah Wagenknecht, a former leader of Die Linke (The Left), who split from her party to form the Sarah Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW).

"Common ground consists in the fact that Ms Wagenknecht addresses the problems that I see as well, but on the other hand her solutions come from the socialist toolbox," Maaßen told dpa. He stressed that he was open to cooperation with Wagenknecht but doubted whether this would be reciprocated.

Maaßen said he respected Wagenknecht as a gifted politician. "What I don't like is that she is simply a communist," he said, referring to her former membership of a communist grouping within Die Linke.

He noted that concern on migration was a theme common to both his group and the BSW, but that finding common solutions would be difficult. "A socialist worldview and a liberal worldview do not fit together well," Maaßen said.

The Werteunion would be a "liberal party and we say we want less state," he said.

The Werteunion plans to contest elections in three states in autumn in the east of the country in which the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) is riding high in the polls in an increasingly fragmented German political landscape.

Mass Protests Against the Far Right AfD in Germany
February 2, 2024
Source: Originally published by Z. Feel free to share widely.

Source: screenshot of Germany’s main public TV station’s news, 27th January 2024

It’s early February in 2024 and on the last 3 weekends in January hundreds of thousands of Germans took to the streets and rallied against the far-right AfD. Many politicians, intellectuals and ordinary voters are convinced that the AfD, Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany), is a true Neo-Nazi party.

In popular parlance the party is also referred to as:AfD = Alternative für Dumkopfe (Alternative for Dummies)
AfD = Abyss for Deutschland
AfD = Aus für Demokratie (The end of democracy)
AfD = Alliance for Demagogues
AfD – Alle faschisten Deportieren (Deport all fascists)

Since the recent Wannsee 2.0 scandal came to light, the AfD is even more widely regarded as a Neo-Nazi party. In 2018 CDU-boss and arch-conservative Friedrich Merz declared, “the AfD are Nazis.”

More recently, the regional CDU leader of Germany’s largest state of North-Rhine-Westphalia and state premier Hendrik Wüst said, “this is a Nazi party.”

A court decided that it was justifiable to call the AfD’s most powerful Führer, Björn Höcke, a Nazi. The AfD’s party deputy, who has no real power but is the pretty face of neofascism, Swiss resident Alice Weidel, has been called a Nazi-Schlampe or Nazi bitch and a court decision allowed that moniker to stand.

Last month, Weidel was forced to fire one of her advisors who had taken part in that secret Wannsee 2.0 meeting where plans were aired to force the elimination or deportation of anyone with a non-Aryan heritage.

It all began in 2013 with a handful of staunchly neoliberal and anti-EU professors of economics who founded the AfD. But today, the AfD is more right-wing than ever before.

To get to where they are today, in 2022 the AfD replicated Hitler’s Night of the Long Knives. Even though nobody was killed, apart from a few character assassinations, the party purged anyone who could possibly move toward the center or be open for compromise with other parties.

This purge eliminated the party’s last moderates. The ideological cleansing of the party took place in the East-German city of Riesa at the AfD’s 2022 party congress. The neofascist core group eradicated the original non-fascist neoliberals and severely weakened the party’s conservative-reactionary wing.

Riesa 2022 strengthened the völkische (read: Neo-Nazis) forces within the party. By 2023, the traditional internal AfD fights between neoliberals, conservatives, and right-wing extremists had ended.

After that, inner-party disputes largely centered around inconsequential issues like which party candidates should be put on a list so they could be elected.

By the end of 2023, in virtually all of Germany’s recent elections as well as in public polling, the AfD was at a historic high, sitting at 20% to 24%, as reflected on German TV’s famous Sunday question that asks Germans: “Which party would you vote for if election day was next Sunday?”

Germany’s normally apathetic political landscape might well have accepted the AfD as a new (neo-fascist) normal for Germany. But then the wave of street protests began. Dramatically, the protests have had their first victory against the party, causing their defeat in an election in Thuringia.

For years, the AfD has been under intense scrutiny by the security services as well by Germans who remember the atrocities carried out by the Nazi regime.

Meanwhile, rafts of analytical acuity have also been applied to the AfD ever since its foundation. Early in its history, the AfD planned the destruction of the CDU, since 1945 Germany’s traditional conservative party. They failed.

Most recently there have also been passionate debates about the possibility of banning the AfD. This has arisen because the AfD has increasingly failed to camouflage its Neo-Nazi ideology.

However, at the moment there is a rather paradoxical development: the simultaneous radicalization and normalization of the AfD. Today it is no longer unthinkable to imagine a political scenario in which the AfD becomes the leading force on the right of Germany’s political spectrum.

Particularly in the former East-Germany, where the AfD is a very serious contender. In the eastern states it might even replace the conservative CDU.

In 2023, the party celebrated its 10th anniversary. In those 10 years the AfD moved even more to the right of the conservative CDU and neoliberal FDP. AfD founder Alexander Gauland was eliminated, and at the same time the simple-minded Beatrix von Storch, great-grandaughter of Hitler’s Finance Minster, has mostly been sidelined – but not for her statement advocating for the shooting of refugees at Germany’s borders!

With Gauland gone and Storch weakened, the Völkisch, i.e. Neo-Nazi, wing of the AfD runs the show. The AfD’s Neo-Nazi wing was only in its nascent stage after the foundation of the AfD. Initially, it played no visible role in the party.

The AfD’s Führer is the cunning hardcore Neo-Nazi Björn Höcke who spread his Nazi ideology under the self-assumed and camouflaging name of Landolf Ladig.

At the beginning of the AfD his Neo-Nazi wing was extremely marginal in terms of quantity and quality. But over time he was able to shape and develop them into a very strong contingent. Today they are “the” absolutely dominating force inside the party.

Since the Riesa congress in the summer of 2022, there is no doubt that the Völkische-Neo-Nazi wing has taken over the AfD’s leadership. The other two currents (reactionary and neoliberal) continue to exist, but their remnants must subordinate themselves to the Neo-Nazis.

Under the Neo-Nazis, anyone making public statements is obliged to use Neo-Nazi buzzwords such as Umvolkung or population exchange, as well as to promote the neo-fascist ideology of racial identity.

Through the use of these framing techniques, it has become obvious that the AfD’s right-wing radicalization has not harmed the party. Rather, the opposite is the case.

Absurdly, the AfD is more right-wing than ever and is also stronger than ever. In the East-German state of Saxony, for example, the AfD is currently at 35% of voter popularity.

Characterized by a strengthening of its Neo-Nazi self-confidence, AfD members themselves have noticed this rather astutely, further boosting their adherence to Neo-Nazi doctrine.

Not surprisingly, mini-Führer Björn Höcke has recently praised what he calls “the party’s ideological consolidation”. Appropriately, the AfD’s top candidate for the upcoming EU election in June 2024, Maximilian Krah, calls his party the “post-Riesa AfD”. Both of them acknowledge and support the far right radicalization of the AfD.

The leap into Neo-Nazism as “the” ideological strategy is working out well for the AfD – rather brilliantly actually. At the same time, their success cannot be seen without the current unpopularity of Germany’s progressive-environmental-neoliberal (SPD-GREEN-FDP) government.

The government’s downward trend in popularity has been strongly supported by Germany’s conservative mass media. The combined force of German conservatism (CDU) and corporate mass-media (Springer) has hit the present government hard and has inspired the AfD.

It has also generated mass support for the AfD as it successfully pretends to be the only true opposition to the government.

This occurred at the same time as the – seemingly – unstoppable normalization of the AfD. The AfD has been able to benefit from the current widespread displeasure about Germany’s so-called traffic light coalition. This has been shown in recent elections in the states of Hessen and Bavaria. In other words, there are currently a few trends that are favorable for the AfD.

The AfD was indeed starting to be perceived as a normal party until its Wannsee 2.0 scandal and its plans for the forced deportation of millions. According to recent public polling, about 27% of voters consider the AfD to be a “normal party”.

In 2016, when the AfD was much more moderate, it was only 17%. In other words, as it becomes more and more Neo-Nazi it is somehow increasingly regarded as a normal political party.

One of the reasons for the public support of the AfD can be found in the fact that the party appears much more disciplined than other parties to the outside world. The AfD’s very own replication of Hitler’s Night of the Long Knives in 2022 has worked in favor of the party. Those who used to challenge the AfD’s Neo-Nazis internally are gone. There is no longer any opposition to the monolithic ideology promulgated by the leadership.

The few internal conflicts that remain no longer penetrate the Putin-inspired iron wall of fear to the outside world. The AfD also offers what on the surface seem to be unifying issues. For example, it takes a different position on the the war in Ukraine than almost all of Germany’s democratic parties.

What works for the Putin-loving AfD is the fact that an increasing number of Germans think that Germany’s federal government is undertaking way too few diplomatic efforts to end a war that Putin wants to extend in order to recover all of Russia’s “lost” territory.

Like the All-Russian Political Party “United Russia”, the AfD remains nationalistic. And it also benefits from the fact that voices critical of Germany’s current government have found an audience inside the AfD.

Recently, the AfD has also received support from Germany’s conservative CDU. What Germany’s conservatives don’t realize is that they are not helping themselves by taking up AfD-related issues and topics. The result is that the conservative CDU/CSU are stagnating in public polls.

Largely by taking up the AfD’s issue of migration, the CDU’s indirect support has moved Germany’s Overton Window of politics to the right. In other words, the AfD is harvesting the seeds of what the CDU/CSU is planting.

The AfD also pretends to offer a stand against billionaire predatory capitalism. This is nothing new as regards political “hall of mirrors” techniques. Historically, Germany’s Nazi party of the 1930s, called itself “socialist” as in “National Socialist German Workers’ Party” (NSDAP).

The illusion created by the names “socialist” and “workers” had its desired effect and attracted those disaffected by the inability of the leftist parties of the day to unite against the fascist right.

Once the NSDAP came to power, thousands of real socialist workers were beaten, tortured, and killed while Germany’s capitalist oligarchs and business elite thrived.

As in the 1930s, so in the 21st Century: the AfD is married to a strict neoliberal ideology. For example, the AfD is against any tax increase for the wealthy. On the whole however, the AfD remains a so-called single issue party. The issue that is their bread and butter is migration.

This plays well into the fear of Germany’s petit bourgeois middle class. For those with right-wing tendencies, the question is not so much whether and how social and economic policies will impact them. The easy answer to every question is: migration.

As a consequence, the AfD exploits the insecure very successfully in their fear of losing out by shouting the Big Lie that mirrors their tortured thoughts: “Migrants will replace me, take my job, take my house, take my car… .”

Self-negativity contains a belief of not being able to win something – not even something small. Unlike in the 1920s, this has nothing to do with class consciousness. Instead, it has a lot to do with xenophobia and – as so often in Germany – with race consciousness.

Meanwhile, it is not even clear whether more people in Germany’s population are actually moving toward the far right or not, compared to, let’s say, a few years ago. Germany’s all-important and most recent Mitte Studies supports this conclusion. At the same time, other surveys contradict the Mitte’s findings.

The problem for the democracy-loving parties is that the recent electoral success of the AfD is showing that there is growing support for Germany’s far right.

This is true almost everywhere, particularly in the eastern portion of Germany. Furthermore, the AfD remains particularly strong among the middle-aged and increasingly also among young voters. On the other side of the coin, Germany’s pensioners are reluctant to support the AfD.

One might even say that if the 60-to-70 year olds currently getting monthly payments from the federal government would support the AfD, an absolute majority for the AfD would already be within reach in some East German states.

At some point in the near future the recent mass rallies against the AfD will show whether or not the seemingly unstoppable growth of the AfD has finally been halted. The next three elections – for the EU’s parliament in June and in the three East-German states of Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia later in the year – will also be important indicators for the increasing (un)popularity of the AfD.


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Thomas Klikauer has over 800 publications (including 12 books) and writes regularly for BraveNewEurope (Western Europe), the Barricades (Eastern Europe), Buzzflash (USA), Counterpunch (USA), Countercurrents (India), Tikkun (USA), and ZNet (USA). One of his books is on Managerialism (2013).