DACA recipients will now be eligible for federal health care coverage under new Biden rule

Over 100,000 young immigrants without health insurance will now be able to buy affordable health care through the plan, the administration estimates.

Demonstrators in Los Angeles rally in support of DACA recipients on the day the Supreme Court heard arguments in the DACA case in 2019.Mario Tama / Getty Images file

May 3, 2024, 
By Nicole Acevedo


More than 100,000 young immigrants protected by the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program will soon become eligible to receive federal health care coverage for the first time since DACA was implemented over a decade ago.

The Biden administration will announce a new federal rule Friday allowing DACA recipients to enroll in a qualified health plan through the Affordable Care Act insurance marketplace or become eligible for coverage through a basic health program.

An estimated 580,000 young adults who lack legal immigration status and have lived in the U.S. since they were children are currently working or studying without fear of deportation under DACA. An overwhelming majority of DACA recipients were born in Mexico and other Latin American countries.

Even though the program has helped them access better-paying jobs and educational opportunities since it was first implemented in 2012, DACA beneficiaries had been barred from accessing federally funded health insurance despite contributing billions in federal taxes, pouring funds into the nation’s federal health insurance system for years.

While many DACA recipients get health insurance through their jobs, more than a quarter are estimated to currently be uninsured.

By implementing a federal rule expanding the definition of “lawful presence” to include DACA recipients, they are “no longer excluded from receiving coverage from a quality health plan and financial assistance as well,” Health and Human Services Secretary Xavier Becerra told reporters in a press call Thursday.

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that over 100,000 young immigrants who lack health insurance will now have a shot at accessing affordable health care.

“DACA recipients are currently three times more likely to be uninsured than the general U.S. population, and individuals without health insurance are less likely to receive preventative or routine health screenings. They delay necessary medical care, and they incur higher costs and debts when they do finally see care,” Becerra said, adding the new expansion “will improve their health and will strengthen the health and well-being of our nation.”

The new federal rule does not make DACA recipients eligible for the Medicaid program, according to senior administration officials, but gives them coverage through the Affordable Care Act and its marketplaces and financial assistance programs.

The announced rule is expected to go into effect Nov. 1, which coincides with the Affordable Care Act’s open enrollment period for 2025 health insurance plans, allowing newly eligible DACA recipients to have access to federal health care as early as December, according to HHS.

Friday’s announcement comes about a year after President Joe Biden first announced his administration’s plan to expand health care coverage to DACA recipients. The administration’s original plan aimed to implement the federal rule by November 2023.

Senior administration officials declined to comment this week on why the implementation of the rule was delayed.

However, White House domestic policy adviser Neera Tanden stressed that “the president will continue to fight” for DACA recipients, adding that “only Congress can provide them permanent status and a pathway to citizenship.”

While the program has been around for a decade, it faced legal challenges during the Trump administration and from Republican-led states. DACA has been closed to new registrants since July 2021 as lawsuits challenging the program continue making their way through the courts.

For more from NBC Latino, sign up for our weekly newsletter.

Nicole Acevedo is a reporter for NBC News Digital. She reports, writes and produces stories for NBC Latino and NBCNews.com.

 

As US Federal Menthol Ban Languishes, Black Smokers Are Left To Mercy Of Marketers

 May 3, 2024  

By Eurasia Review

After decades of deception, Black adults who smoke menthol cigarettes are often unaware of the deceitful ways tobacco companies market their products to them, according to a Rutgers study.

“Evidence shows that the tobacco industry engages in predatory marketing tactics and that companies push certain products on specific groups,” said Kymberle L. Sterling, an associate professor at the Rutgers School of Public Health and lead author of the study published in Nicotine and Tobacco Research. “The tobacco industry uses these predatory methods to target Black communities with menthol cigarettes, and many consumers are simply unaware.”

The findings come as a federal pledge to ban menthol cigarettes languishes. In April 2022, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration disclosed plans to enact a menthol ban by August 2023, but the measure remains stalled. This month, a coalition of medical and civil rights groups sued the FDA for inaction.

Since the end of World War II, tobacco companies in the United States have pushed menthol products on Black communities. Today, an estimated 81 percent of Black cigarette-smokers smoke menthols, compared with 34 percent of whites and 51 percent of Hispanics.

To gauge perceptions of how tobacco companies engage with and market menthol cigarettes to Black communities, and to help inform public health solutions, Sterling and colleagues at the Rutgers Institute for Nicotine and Tobacco Studies surveyed more than 2,300 adults age 18-45. The survey, part of the Rutgers Omnibus Study, a multiyear survey to assess tobacco behaviors and patterns, was designed to measure Americans’ smoking habits and beliefs.

Respondents were asked a series of questions related to their awareness of tobacco company engagement strategies. Topics included knowledge of companies’ lobbying and marketing and funding for Black community organizations.

Each issue has been well documented in the national media: Tobacco companies have enlisted prominent Black leaders to lobby against a federal menthol ban; denied the harmfulness of menthol cigarettes and flavored cigars; and used cultural icons to promote their products.

Prominent Black cultural institutions, such as the National Museum of African American History and Culture, have received funding from companies such as Altria, one of the world’s largest producers and marketers of tobacco, cigarettes and related products.

Yet results from Sterling’s study suggest industry marketing efforts are working. A third (37 percent) of respondents said tobacco companies deny the harms of menthol cigarettes; 20 percent said companies pay Black lobbyists to oppose health policies; and 12 percent said that companies fund Black community organizations.

While many respondents recognized that tobacco companies target their marketing of menthol cigarettes and flavored cigars to Black communities, “there was high uncertainty among [Black] respondents and menthol cigarette smokers about tobacco company activities beyond marketing,” the researchers wrote.

“To borrow a saying from my grandmother, tobacco companies are throwing rocks and hiding their hands,” Sterling said.

Sterling said as the tobacco industry wages a war of public perception and the federal government refuses to act, it’s up to state and local leaders to respond.

“The high proportion of uncertainty and lack of awareness identified in this study presents a tremendous opportunity for communication efforts to educate the public on tobacco companies’ disinformation activities,” the researchers wrote. “Community-engaged, culturally tailored communication efforts are needed to better educate the public about tobacco industry activities that impact Black/African American communities.”

New video shows Israeli soldiers in Gaza using Palestinian civilian as human shield

Man receives orders from soldiers to inspect school in Gaza City, according to footage

Anadolu staff |03.05.2024 - 


ANKARA

A newly surfaced videotape depicted on Friday a civilian man being directed by Israeli soldiers to inspect a school in Gaza City.

The footage by Al Jazeera media network obtained from a downed Israeli drone, captured what appeared to be Israeli soldiers using a detained Palestinian man as a human shield to inspect an abandoned school in Shujaiya neighborhood.

The footage dates back to December 2023.

There was no immediate comment from Israeli authorities on the video.

Israel has waged an unrelenting offensive on the Palestinian enclave since a cross-border attack by Hamas on Oct. 7, 2023 which killed some 1,200 people.

Nearly 34,600 Palestinians have since been killed, mostly women and children, and over 77,800 others injured.

More than six months into the Israeli war, vast swathes of Gaza lay in ruins, pushing 85% of the enclave’s population into internal displacement amid a crippling blockade of food, clean water and medicine.

Israel stands accused of genocide at the International Court of Justice, which in January ordered Tel Aviv to prevent genocidal acts and take measures to guarantee that humanitarian assistance is provided to civilians in Gaza.

* Writing by Ikram Kouachi

NOT SO FRIENDLY FIRE

U.S. airstrike targeting al-Qaida leader in Syria killed a farmer, American military says

U.S. Central Command said the investigation into the strike was completed last November — but it wasn’t released publicly until Thursday.

Mohammed Hassan Masto sits next to the grave of his brother Lutfi on May 7, 2023, in the village of Qorqanya, a rural area in northern Syria. 

Omar Albam / AP file


May 3, 2024, 

By The Associated Press

A U.S. airstrike in Syria in May 2023 that was targeting an al-Qaida leader killed an innocent civilian instead, U.S. Central Command said Thursday, confirming early reports from residents and family members shortly after the attack.

U.S. Central Command said an investigation into the May 3 strike concluded that U.S. forces misidentified the intended al-Qaida target “and that a civilian, Mr. Lufti Hasan Masto, was struck and killed.”

Shortly after the drone strike, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, an opposition war monitor, said it had hit a chicken farm near the town of Harem, killing one person. And just days later, relatives and neighbors told The Associated Press that the person killed was a farmer who raised sheep, chickens and cattle and had no involvement with armed groups.

Masto’s brother, Mohamed Masto, said reports that his brother, 60, was involved with al-Qaida were “absolute lies” and his killing was “an injustice and an aggression.” Instead, Masto was simply tending his sheep when the strike hit.

Central Command said the investigation into the strike was completed last November — but it wasn’t released publicly until Thursday.

In a statement, Central Command said much of the investigation and findings are classified but acknowledged it revealed “several issues that could be improved.”

“What we can share is the investigation concluded the strike was conducted in compliance with the law of armed conflict as well as Department of Defense and CENTCOM policies,” the statement said. “We are committed to learning from this incident and improving our targeting processes to mitigate potential civilian harm.”

The Defense Department has come under fire over the course of the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria for killing civilians in airstrikes. It set up a detailed investigation and review process for strikes when there are allegations of innocent people being killed.

The U.S. also continues to target al-Qaida and Islamic State leaders in Syria, including the 2017 airstrike that killed Abu al-Kheir al-Masri, a former aide to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida’s second in command in Syria.

World's most powerful diesel-engine icebreaker makes maiden voyage in Arctic ice

May 2, 2024 The Independent Barents Observer

 1

The 147 meter long vessel that is designed for Arctic operations has made its first voyage into far northern Yenisey Bay, Russian state ship operator Rosatomflot informs.

The powerful ship escorted cargo carrier Ioann Makhmastal to the icy bay where it encountered nuclear icebreaker Ural. The Ural subsequently escorted the cargo ship into the Yenisey river and to the terminal of Tanalau.

The 25 MW Viktor Chernomyrdin is the most powerful conventional icebreaker in the world. It was expected to be extensively employed in remote northern waters, but since its commissioning in November 2020, it has first of all broken ice in the Gulf of Finland.

In 2023, it for the first time sailed into Arctic waters for testing.

According to ship owner Rosmorport, the Viktor Chernomyrdin can provide not only icebreaker escorts, but also take part in Arctic research expeditions, transport containers and cargo, and operate as fire extinguishing ship.

The powerful diesel-engined machinery enables the ship crew to stay autonomously at sea for up to 60 days.

It took the Baltic Yard in St.Petersburg more than eight years to complete construction, double the time of the original schedule. And the construction price quickly increased from the original estimate of 7.95 billion rubles to more than 12 billion rubles.

The Viktor Chernomyrdin is named after Russia’s late prime minister.

Back to the Future of the Arctic

The Enduring Relevance of Arms Control

SWP Comment 2024/C 18,

Michael Paul

02.05.2024, 

7 Pages
doi:10.18449/2024C18

Research Areas

Security and defence policy
PDF | 318 KB
EPUB | 1.2 MB
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Russia’s war against Ukraine seems to have no immediate end in sight, the strategic competition between China and the US continues, and the expanding military cooperation between China and Russia increases the challenges facing the international com­munity. In this context, the Arctic seems to be a relic of the past, no longer the “zone of peace” that Mikhail Gorbachev described in 1987. Indeed, this Arctic exceptionalism ended long before Russia’s war of aggression began. In order to restore at least a minimum level of cooperation, informal talks are needed that could help to provide perspective after the end of the war. Two former relatively uncontroversial projects could serve as starting points: the recovery of radioactive remnants of the Cold War and an agreement to prevent unintentional escalation, namely, another Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA). A return to old approaches to arms control could pave the way to renewed cooperation in the Arctic in the future.

Generalised mistrust has supplanted the trust that once anchored the Arctic Council, and it is difficult to see at what level and by what means the forum can be brought back to constructive engagement. Under Presi­dent Vladimir Putin, Russia has now either violated or terminated all remaining arms control agreements and fora. Trusting co­operation with Putin is no longer possible, and his aggressive, neo-imperialist policy will have a lasting impact. Yet, Russia still laments the loss of trust – as cynical as this may sound in view of the ongoing brutality of Russian warfare and violations of inter­national law.

Reinstatement of the Arctic as an area of cooperation and stability is the long-term goal of all member states of the Arctic Coun­cil. Indigenous peoples and observer states, including Germany, are also likely to agree on this. Even Moscow seems to be interested in some kind of stability, par­ticularly to enable the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) to function as its national resource base funded by foreign investments and thus to reduce its growing dependence on China. However, Russia cur­rently remains on a collision course with the West. The hostilities in Ukraine will not end in 2024, which will be a decisive year in many respects; a historic NATO summit will take place in Washington and several elections will occur, including the US presi­dential elections in November.

In order to make future cooperation pos­sible, it is advisable to reflect critically on certain measures that appear suitable to restore trust in the intentions and goals of Arctic actors. To this end, the original objec­tives and instruments of arms control should be reconsidered, and thought should be given to how they can be applied within the new Arctic security environment. This applies across the entire spectrum, from con­fidence-building measures to arms con­trol of weapons systems.

The Arctic: a hotspot of climate change and an area of political opportunity

The Arctic is a good starting point for un­official talks and an eventual resumption of positive diplomatic exchange, not least because of its geographic location far from current geopolitical hotspots in the Sino-American rivalry and its increasing impor­tance for both China and the United States. According to Canadian political scientist Rob Huebert, the US, China, and Russia form “a new Arctic strategic triangle” which essentially determines the potential for con­flict in the Arctic.

The effects of climate change in combination with strategic competition form a toxic mix when it comes to cooperation among the Arctic players. Due to continued warming, an ice-free Arctic Ocean will likely become a reality in the near future. In this case, the Arctic Ocean is expected to be covered by less than 15 percent sea ice in the summer months. Such a scenario is now foreseen to occur by the mid-2030s, whereas some time ago this was not ex­pected until the middle or end of the cen­tury. Due to this development, sea routes and resources in the Arctic will be more accessible soon. Civilian and military activ­ities are already growing and competition for access and influence in the Arctic is intensifying. This has created a need for rules governing states’ behaviour, while also taking into account transnational and indigenous relationships.

The increase of military activity requires arms control in the original and comprehensive sense. This means that potential adversaries should engage in all forms of military cooperation in the interest of re­ducing the probability, scale, and violence of a potential military conflict, as well as the political and economic costs of pre­paring for one. In this context, it is now a question of what can be used in the medium term to overcome the ongoing tensions and to shape mutually beneficial cooperation in the Arctic in the future. A certain degree of cooperation with Russia is necessary in order to avoid misunderstand­ings, miscalculations, and mutually unde­sirable events which could occur in the con­text of military activities. In the long term, stability is a prerequisite to the sustainable use of Arctic sea routes and resources. The Arctic states will need to involve new play­ers such as China if a “peaceful, stable, prosperous and cooperative Arctic” is to be possible in line with the US Arctic strategy.

Such a constructive approach currently has little chance of success within Russia, as with many NATO states. The Kremlin sees the collective West as an opponent and perceives willingness to negotiate as a weak­ness. Within NATO, the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has strength­ened internal cohesion, but the alliance is not united on the question of how security should be guaranteed against Russia in the future. The opinion in many NATO states is that Russia can only be countered from a position of strength, which thus requires comprehensive rearmament. Others, on the other hand, also consider risk reduction measures to be reasonable, which would require a minimum level of cooperation. A clear decision on NATO’s political direction is not expected before this year’s summit in Washington and the US presidential election.

First and foremost, it is necessary to reach a common understanding of how future relations with Russia should be shaped after the end of the war against Ukraine. The Arctic is of central importance to Russia not only as a national resource base and sea route, but also as a zone of security that guarantees Russia’s maritime nuclear second-strike capability. For their part, the north­ern European states, as well as the US and Canada, are facing new types of military threats that require novel concepts and costly investment in capacities. Former con­cepts such as crisis stability are being chal­lenged by the emergence of hypersonic weapons systems, and this puts political decision-making processes under even more pressure.

The security dilemma in the Arctic should be defused, the build-up of military capabilities contained, and crisis and con­flict prevention measures should be intro­duced. Ideally, these goals can serve as building blocks for a future security archi­tecture. Otherwise, the increasing activities in the Arctic – from civilian shipping to large-scale military exercises – exacerbate the risk of unintentional escalation as a result of misunderstanding or misperception. Thus, a dialogue on military security issues in the Arctic must be established.

At which level could the Arctic states resume dialogue?

Despite tensions with Russia, communication between the Arctic states continues, both at an official level, such as within the framework of the United Nations, and bilaterally insofar as it is enshrined in agree­ments that regulate border traffic, protect fishing activities, and maintain search and rescue commitments. Multilateral formats are also still active, for example among parties to the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (CAOFA).

However, a security dialogue that includes Moscow and focuses explicitly on the Arctic no longer exists. Since its annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia is no longer in­volved in dialogue among the Arctic states’ military commanders (the Arctic Chiefs of Defence [ACHOD]) or in the annual meet­ings of the Arctic Security Forces Round­table (ASFR). Germany, France, the UK, and the Netherlands are also represented at the ASFR. Other formats of which Russia is a member such as the Arctic Council and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) do not address military security, nor does the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, from which Russia withdrew in September 2023. Even before the war, experts widely agreed that Russia needed to be reincluded in dialogue, but opinions differ among politicians and experts as to how this should be done.

The most obvious solution seems to be the least realistic, namely extending the mandate of the Arctic Council to include military affairs. Indeed, the Arctic Council has a high degree of institutionalisation and has been successfully active for over two decades. The extension of its mandate would therefore appear to be easier than creating an entirely new format as it also already brings together all of the main regional players. In spite of this, member states would need to agree on broadening the Council’s mandate to include military security issues, and this has already been rejected by some members. While Iceland’s Prime Minister Katrín Jakobsdóttir and Fin­land’s Prime Minister Antti Rinne spoke out in favour of such a solution in the past, others voiced concerns that this could hinder cooperation. Former Norwegian Arctic en­voy Bård Ivar Svendsen, for example, noted at a time of extensive cooperation that the dialogue with Russia in the Council only remained active precisely because security policy was not being discussed. Moreover, in 2021, Alaska’s Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) President Jimmy Stotts refused to address defence issues, stating, “[w]e don’t wish to see our world overrun with other peoples’ problems”. Consensus on this front therefore remains unlikely.

Another approach would be to resort to already established formats. For instance, in the beginning of Russia’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council (2021-23), Foreign Minis­ter Sergei Lavrov sought to reactivate dia­logue between the general staffs of the Arc­tic states. With this in mind, Russia’s Arctic ambassador Nicolay Korchunov declared his intention to resume informal exchanges between military experts from the Arctic states. The war against Ukraine has put an end to these ideas, and the accession of Fin­land and Sweden to NATO shows the need for an alternative interim approach aside from formats such as the ACHOD and ASFR that exclude Russia.

Even if scepticism is warranted, dialogue with Russia at an informal, expert level (Track 2) seems reasonable. This would make it possible to test potential approaches to confidence-building measures and, building on this, to initiate official talks at a formal level (Track 1) in due course. Informal talks are an instrument that stimulates reflective dialogue between actors in conflict, espe­cially when discussions at official levels are difficult or even impossible. In today’s new mistrustful and competitive reality, it is important to restore a minimum level of stability. Dialogue between military experts from all eight Arctic states could constitute a new interim format and initiate a process in which confidence-building measures are developed.

To this end, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) has had experience organising Track 2 (infor­mal) and Track 1.5 (with officials) meetings with Russian representatives before the in­vasion of Ukraine. Russia has a very limited pool of experts who have little or no ex­change with or influence over Russian policy- and decision-making. Since the beginning of the war, the Russian expert community has split into several groups: The first group has fled the country in exile; the second group is still in Russia, but is isolated and trying to fly under the radar; the third group is making a career for them­selves by adopting or echoing the Kremlin’s rhetoric. Even if exchange with the second group could be constructive, these (former) experts would be putting themselves at extreme risk by engaging. Interrogations at the borders are commonplace and these experts can easily be declared foreign agents. Track 2 activities are also known to have been infiltrated by Russian intelligence services; and even in cases in which Mos­cow has authorised such talks (such as the 1993–2013 Armed Forces Dialogue seminars with Russia, organised by SWP in cooperation with the German Federal Minis­try of Defence), no significant break­throughs have truly been witnessed.

With this in mind, informal talks on arms control and transparency measures represent another possible realm of engage­ment that does not necessarily require mu­tual trust in order to be successful. Rather, such measures are a means of en­abling predictable behaviour among parties who distrust one another and of creating trust in the long-term.

What kind of measures can restore trust?

Trust always involves a degree of uncertainty and the possibility of disappointment. Nevertheless, it also opens up more possi­bilities for action because, as the sociologist Niklas Luhmann puts it, “trust provides a more effective form of reducing complexity”. Those who act with confidence are opti­mistic about the future, which always con­tains a multitude of certain and uncertain events. If calculated rationally, risks cannot be eliminated, but they can be reduced. Ac­cording to Luhmann, such points of refer­ence can thus serve as a “stepping stone for jumping into a limited and structured uncertainty”.

According to its National Security Strategy, the German government “supports strategic risk reduction and the fostering of predict­ability, as well as the maintenance of reli­able political and military channels of com­munication in relations between NATO and Russia. [It] remain[s] open to reciprocal transparency measures where the prerequisites for them exist”. This includes the devel­opment of new approaches based on behav­ioural arms control that can help reduce tensions.

In 2023, Russia’s Arctic ambassador Nico­lay Korchunov once again expressed the desire for comprehensive cooperation that included military issues, stating that “[i]t can all be sorted out by dialogue, which would strengthen trust”. Despite this senti­ment, it will be difficult to start a dialogue in view of the consequences of the war in Ukraine. Russia’s current policy gives little hope for constructive talks, as deliberately playing with unpredictability is one of Rus­sia’s manipulation tactics to destabilise Western societies and institutions. This, however, should not prevent preparations and considerations with respect to how secu­rity and stability can be enhanced in the future.

Confidence-building measures (CBMs) should define acceptable and legitimate behaviour. They should help to promote transparency and reduce the risk of mis­judgements, and hence, unwanted esca­lation. In this way, a certain degree of crisis stability and trust in the intentions of the other side can be fostered. This could miti­gate the current security dilemma.

CBMs could, for example, focus on creat­ing transparency with regard to military activities, and they could incorporate recommendations from the former NATO-Russia expert dialogue. For instance, Arctic military bases could be subject to mutual visits. A regular regiment on visitation could be established and plans for military exercises could be disclosed. Advance notice of Russian exercises could help to avoid mis­interpretation. In turn, NATO allies could inform Russia about unscheduled activities.

Confidence- and security-building meas­ures (CSBMs) are rooted in the Vienna Docu­ment on CSBMs. In the 1990s, the Organi­zation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) created the world’s most advanced set of rules for arms control, veri­fication, and CBMs. Now many of the agree­ments under this arrangement have either been suspended or weakened as partners withdraw. According to OSCE Secretary General Helga Maria Schmid, however, this does not mean that CSBMs will not play an important role again in the future, as the instruments are still available.

New dialogue requires constructive sub­stance in the form of suitable projects that foster cooperation. In the long term, it is important to develop a new set of (multi­lateral) rules that serve both sides’ interests. According to a team of authors from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, two basic conditions must be met to facilitate an effective multilateral agreement: The rules must be designed so that they are appropriate for solving the problems and these rules must be adhered to by the in­volved states. Accordingly, the crucial ques­tion is to what extent these rules will re­strict state action, including military action.

Potential cooperation projects

The oldest CSBM to prevent unintentional escalation is the Incidents at Sea Agreement (INCSEA), concluded between the US and the Soviet Union in 1972. Individual NATO states such as Norway have continued simi­lar agreements with Russia, taking into account new technological developments. All contain similar provisions that can be qualified as CSBMs. While bilateral INCSEA agreements between states with naval forces operating worldwide make sense, a multi­lateral Arctic INCSEA agreement or a NATO-Russia INCSEA agreement that would apply to all naval ships in the Arctic Ocean would be more purposeful. In practice, it would be easier for navy officers to work with a single set of signals than with many differ­ent ones, as noted by a RAND study. This would also mirror considerations for a simi­lar agreement between the US and China in the Western Pacific.

Further rules of conduct, such as a Arctic Military Code of Conduct, have long been discussed. One possible model is the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, which provides a format for negotiations between the Arctic’s coastal states, four countries engaging in fishing activities in the Arctic, and the EU. In addition to the Arctic states, a military code of conduct could also in­clude countries that are capable of military operations in the Arctic. The purpose of this code would be to promote cooperation and keep tensions low.

A resumption of cooperation in the nu­clear realm would surely address spectres of the Cold War – whether submarine wreckage, nuclear weapons systems, reac­tors, or fuel rod disposal systems – which threaten to contaminate the fish-rich Barents Sea and adjacent areas – as far south as Norway – with radioactive material in the long term. This is one reason why Oslo has taken the lead in cleaning up Russian wreckage and waste in the High North in the past. A proposal put forward during the beginning of Russia’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council envisaged the recovery of two nuclear submarines (K‑27 in the Kara Sea and K‑159 in the Barents Sea) with financial support from the EU. The sub­marines would otherwise continue to cor­rode and eventually release radioactive waste. Beyond this, respective Russian and American researchers have submitted pro­posals on how to regulate the handling of civilian nuclear energy in the Arctic; both are follow-ons from the Arctic Military En­vironmental Cooperation that was founded in 1996. This cooperative efforts was aimed at mitigating the dangers posed by radio­active vestiges of Russia’s Northern Fleet, and it indirectly contributed to the establish­ment of what is today the Arctic Council.


Map


Source: Charles Digges, “War Puts Cleanup of Russia’s Radioactive Wrecks on Ice”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 28 November 2022 (map created by Thomas Gaulkin), https://thebulletin.org/2022/11/war-puts-cleanup-of-russias-radioactive-wrecks-on-ice/.


Seeing that discarded radioactive material is a cross-border, transnational problem, there should be just as much interest in its clean-up in Moscow as there is in Oslo and other northern European capitals. Seeing that the prevention and clean-up of oil spills and search and rescue operations rep­resent issues whose importance is undis­puted among Arctic states and which has formed an essential basis for successful cooperation in the Arctic, the proper dis­posal and clean-up of radioactive material could come to constitute a similar realm of cooperation.

Berlin in the High North

The Arctic is a challenge for Berlin because security must be ensured on NATO’s north­ern flank, and even more acutely in the future. New arms control ideas require first and foremost the restoration of deterrence and defence capabilities. Deterrence only works if backed by substantial defence capabilities in the event that deterrence fails. The military potentials of both China and Russia, which have been growing for decades, must be taken into account in terms of their significance for the Arctic and North Atlantic region when it comes to determining adequate contributions to alliance defence. Only on the basis of such a shared perspective within NATO can prom­ising arms control activities be deter­mined. Similar to the NATO Dual-Track Decision initiated by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1977, armament and arms con­trol must both be considered as equally important, and a comprehensive rearmament process must be planned, financed and, implemented.

Even if Russia’s interest in stability in the Arctic grows, its war in Ukraine and on­going confrontation with other Arctic states still serve to stabilise Putin’s regime. It there­fore remains to be seen whether the Kremlin is prepared to take concrete actions to stabi­lise the situation in the spirit of arms con­trol and thus to relativise the image of adversity that is useful to Putin, or whether it intends to expand the war given its already mobilised war economy.

For NATO’s navies, comprehensive mari­time situational awareness is required in order to better detect and track Russian activities over, on, and under the water. It should be noted that cooperation between China’s Coast Guard and Russia’s Border Guard will increase as codified in the Mur­mansk Agreement of April 2023. The UK foresees an increase in the number of NATO’s P-8 maritime patrol aircraft along­side a proposal to extend cooperation between the US, UK, and Norway which should also involve countries such as Den­mark and Germany.

Furthermore, the German Navy’s 2035+ objectives must be implemented as soon as possible. New F‑126 frigates should not only be suitable for operations in the sea ice of the Baltic Sea, but F-127 frigates should also be capable of operating in Arctic waters like the U212 CD German-Norwegian submarines. Long-range airborne surveillance and recon­naissance drones should also be equipped to operate in this arena, as should unmanned long-range underwater vehicles that monitor critical maritime infrastructure on the seabed.

Germany indeed needs to take a “new look” at the Arctic, and new guidelines for Germany’s Arctic policy will need to take shifting security considerations into ac­count. It is rightly accepted that Russian aggression against Baltic states or in the Barents Sea would trigger a war with NATO. None­theless, because of Putin’s erratic behaviour, an escalation in the Arctic cannot be ruled out.

The restoration of trust is nowhere on the horizon, but in the meantime, a certain degree of cooperation on critical issues must continue where necessary during Russia’s war against Ukraine and where possible after the war, especially in the Arctic. As in climate policy, what happens in the Arctic doesn’t stay in the Arctic. However, how Russia’s war of aggression ends will have a profound effect on whether and how co­operation with Russia may occur in the future.


Dr Michael Paul is a Senior Fellow in the International Security Research Division at SWP.

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2024

All rights reserved

This Comment reflects the author’s views.

SWP Comments are subject to internal peer review, fact-checking and copy-editing. For further information on our quality control pro­cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/about-swp/ quality-management-for-swp-publications/

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ISSN (Print) 1861-1761

ISSN (Online) 2747-5107

DOI: 10.18449/2024C18

(Updated and expanded English version of
SWP-Aktuell 3/2024)

Unanswered concerns on the EU AI Act: a dead end?

By Kamilia Amdouni - 03 May 2024



Kamilia Amdouni unpacks some of the major concerns raised by civil society groups on the new European law, and shares insights on potential future development.

Last March, the European Union (EU) made headlines with the endorsement of the groundbreaking EU Artificial Intelligence Act, marking a pivotal moment in the regulation of AI within its borders. However, the journey to this milestone was anything from easy, marked by intense debates and twists and turns. Crafting legislation that effectively governs AI technologies proved to be a daunting task, fraught with complexities ranging from defining AI to the rapid advancements in Generative AI, particularly ChatGPT from OpenAI.

While some heralded the EU AI Act as a crucial step forward, others, in particular civil society groups voiced concerns over its perceived shortcomings in providing adequate safeguards and have demanded stronger protections and monitoring. What are those unresolved concerns raised by associations and non-governmental organisations and what comes next?

It is clear that the EU will not backpedal as the legislation is now set for implementation by 2026. Instead, by engaging in multilateral and multistakeholder processes like the United Nations AI Advisory Body and the Global Digital Compact, civil society groups are playing a pivotal role in shaping global policy on AI. These processes are very ambitious and will set concrete and actionable mechanisms that address some of these concerns. This could influence regional policies on AI and maybe a future iterations of the EU AI Act
High risk AI systems

The EU AI Act takes a risk-based approach and has classified AI systems depending on the threats they represent to people's health and safety or fundamental rights. Biometric identification, access to public services, and border controls are among the eight high-risk categories.

Civil society groups asked to completely ban AI systems that enable biometric mass monitoring and predictive policing systems. While these AI systems are widely recognized as highly dangerous, the EU regulators did not concede to ban their use because of national security. Instead, they have emphasized that these systems will undergo a thorough compliance evaluation. This assessment will depend on the statements made by AI providers regarding the risks they have evaluated and addressed to market their products. This evaluation should be supported and documented by a compulsory Fundamental Rights Impact Assessment (FRIA). Yet, the precise extent of those responsible for carrying out the FRIA remains somewhat unclear. Conducting FRIA can also present quite a challenge, as not all those who deploy high-risk AI systems have the necessary expertise to thoroughly evaluate the risks associated with their deployment. There is also a question about whether the evaluation of fundamental rights should encompass all of them or if organizations can focus on a select group of fundamental rights that is more likely to be impacted. No methodologies have been developed yet that effectively translate technical descriptions of high-risk AI systems into concrete analyses of abstract concepts like fundamental rights.

The legal gaps brought about by some AI systems' exemptions is a further key worry. These exemptions allow developers of AI systems to forego assessment if their systems are designed for specific tasks, enhancing human activities, or carrying out preparatory tasks for specific use cases. Civil society fears that a lack of reliable metrics could lead to AI providers downplaying risks, and human rights be considered in balance with the interests of corporations or other entities. In order to assess risk and potential impact, it is important to involve various stakeholders. This approach would help to consider different perspectives and avoid oversimplification, taking into account the unique circumstances, contexts and vulnerabilities of groups and communities affected. In addition, it is important to support the documentation and explanation of risks with concrete evidence from previous incidents. This would help establish a solid foundation for risk assessment.
Human oversight

The EU AI Act imposes stringent requirements for high-risk AI systems such as the integrity of data, traceability, transparency, accuracy, and resilience to mitigate potential threats to fundamental rights and safety. In fostering the ethical and responsible deployment of AI systems, it also recognizes the imperative to integrate human oversight across all stages of their lifecycle, spanning from design to usage.

However, a notable caveat emerges within the Act's provisions regarding human oversight, stipulating its implementation "when technically feasible”. This language introduces a layer of ambiguity that has left certain stakeholders unsettled, apprehensive about potential trade-offs and risks. AI providers could perceive the addition of human oversight to the product development cycle as burdensome. This could lead to neglecting human oversight because of technical limitations.

Calls for a more robust human-centred approach have echoed throughout discussions on AI governance, advocating for the integration of meaningful oversight and human judgement across the AI lifecycle. This entails broadening the scope of input from diverse stakeholders to ensure a comprehensive consideration of various perspectives. Furthermore, human judgment should assume a central role in determining specific metrics related to AI trustworthiness, including reliability, safety, security, accountability, transparency, explainability, interpretability, privacy protection, and fairness. Establishing precise threshold values for these metrics could offer clear compliance guidelines. There is a growing consensus on the necessity of regular public reporting of these audits to promote transparency and accountability.
AI liability and redress for victims

The European Commission has proposed the 'AI liability directive' since September 2022, intending to modernize the EU liability framework by establishing regulations specifically addressing damages caused by AI systems. Its goal is to afford individuals harmed by AI the same level of protection as those affected by other technologies.

The major concern of the proposed approach is that victims bear the burden of providing evidence of non-compliance with the AI Act. Victims should demonstrate negligent conduct and establish how the damages were caused by the AI system. Placing such responsibility on victims could present significant challenges, particularly considering the opacity and technical complexity of AI systems, making it difficult to substantiate claims for compensation. In addition, the way AI systems are decentralized and have minimal physical presence in different jurisdictions will make it even more challenging for victims to be compensated after an incident.

EU lawmakers will also face challenges considering certain factors, such as determining the extent of harm, which includes intangible and indirect damages, and providing clarity on how liability is assigned throughout the AI value chain. It is worth mentioning that there is an increasing push for the implementation of a strict liability system for general-purpose AI systems. This is mainly due to the concerns surrounding cybersecurity threats posed by generative AI technologies, enabling intrusion attacks, malware creation, and the spread of AI-powered disinformation. Civil society has emphasized the importance of establishing clear liability frameworks and tackling the complexities involved in order to provide sufficient protection for individuals who may suffer harm due to AI-related incidents.
The path forward

The EU AI Act establishes a framework for accountability, outlining the obligations of those involved in the development, provision, and deployment of AI systems throughout key stages of quality management.

However, some civil society organizations have argued that this framework is insufficient and advocate for the creation of impartial oversight mechanisms that would track and document the negative effects of AI systems on people and society. Such a mechanism would ensure accountability, holding responsible parties liable for their actions and foster robust governance and mitigate potential harm linked to AI technologies. Notably, a similar proposition has garnered attention in the interim report of the United Nations High-Level Advisory Body on Artificial Intelligence. Emphasizing the crucial role of civil society, academia and independent scientists, the report underscores their involvement in providing evidence for policy formulation, assessing impacts, and ensuring accountability during implementation. It suggests the establishment of a global analytical observatory function to coordinate research efforts on harms of AI, in critical fields such as labor, education, public health, peace and security, and geopolitical stability.

The initial version of the Global Digital Compact (GDC), which aims to establish universal principles for an open, free, and secure digital landscape and provide a framework for governing artificial intelligence (AI) on a global scale, has been praised by civil society for its ambitious nature and strong basis. GDC has also crystallised several solutions that partly reflect what we described earlier. These include the development of a common and independent assessment of AI systems risks and impacts by a broader community of scientific professionals, the promotion and implementation of AI standards that prioritise human rights. In September 2024, UN Member States plan to ratify the GDC as an international agreement for governing emerging technologies like AI. It is tempting to wonder if we will witness in the next years a shift from the "Brussels effect," where EU regulations influence global policy, to a "Turtle Bay effect" where the UN influences regional policy on AI.

Kamilia Amdouni is an alumna of the University of London, Global Diplomacy. She is a public policy expert working at the intersection of technology, cybersecurity, peace and security and human rights.

Photo by Tara Winstead

Governing Artificial Intelligence



Author
Edited by Laura Mahrenbach

As ChatGPT noted, “AI has the potential to bring significant benefits to society, but it is crucial to manage its implementation and ensure that it is used in an ethical and responsible way”. Contributors to this e-book, edited by Laura Mahrenbach, discuss this tension, the technology and its governance, both here and in the future.

They illustrate the interaction of diverse issue areas (e.g., economy, environment, culture, etc.) and governance settings (e.g., national, regional, global). And show why exploring both the social implications and governance opportunities (domestic and international) afforded by AI is timely and necessary.

To download the free volume as a PDF click please click here or for e-book readers please click here.



CONTENTS

Introduction - Aligning Global Threats and Opportunities via AI Governance: A Commentary Series - Laura C. Mahrenbach

1. On the Normative Importance of the Distinction Between ‘Governance of AI’ and ‘Governance by AI’ - Eva Erman and Markus Furendal

2. Do more clubbing. How forming partnerships can help tech middle powers survive the escalating US-China tech war - Maximilian Mayer and Gedaliah Afterman

3. Contextualizing China's AI Governance - Jing Cheng

4. Re-imagining Africa’s sovereignty in a digitally interdependent world - Arthur Gwagwa and Beverley Townsend

5. Can Green FinTech Build Climate Justice? Laura Quinteros and Nick Bernards

6. Who is the AI Owner? Hacking the Illusive AI Inventorship Challenge - Giuseppina (Pina) D’Agostino

7. Global Governance of AI Songwriting - Patrycja Rozbicka, Simon Barber, Nicholas Gebhardt and Craig Hamilton

8. AI Governance in Practice: A View from the Non-Profit Sector - Laura C. Mahrenbach

9. AI Regulation in Practice: A View from the Private Sector - Laura C. Mahrenbach

Future Warfare and Critical Technologies: Evolving Tactics and Strategies


Author
Edited by Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Sameer Patil

Modern warfare has continuously evolved, with technological advancements shaping its conduct. Critical technologies like cyberspace and artificial intelligence (AI) are making new warfighting tools available, even as traditional ones like nuclear weapons are witnessing a resurgence. These changes have brought greater lethality and destruction in warfighting and blurred the lines of conflict, with direct warfare being replaced by new forms such as hybrid warfare or grey zone tactics (where the threat has diffused, and proxy actors have taken the lead).

Edited by Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan and Sameer Patil, the essays in this volume seek to unpack key critical technologies and explore their implications for the future of warfare. They tackle themes like cyberwarfare, challenges of attribution, swarming drones, autonomous weapons, AI, and their impact on land warfare, blockchain and nuclear weapons and space. Written by domain experts and renowned scholars, the essays answer four critical questions: Who/what are we fighting? Where are we fighting? How are we fighting? And when are we fighting?

To download the free volume as a PDF click please click here or for e-book readers please click here.



CONTENTS



Introduction

Strategic and Tactical Perspectives on Technologies

1 The Plague Beckons: On the Proliferation of Drone Swarms by Zachary Kallenborn

2 Virtual and Augmented Reality and Warfare: Fighting War as a Computer Game? by Akshat Upadhyay

3 The Future of Competition and Warfare in Cyberspace by Nishant Rajeev

4 Exploring the Utility of Blockchain in Military Operations by Meghna Bal and Mohit Chawdhry

5 Biotechnology and the Return of Biological Warfare by Shruti Sharma

6 Assessing the Military Applications of Generative AI by Amoha Basrur

7 Space and Counterspace Technologies in Future Warfare by Victoria Samson

General Strategic Perspectives

8 Should India Publicly Attribute International Cyber Incidents? by Arindrajit Basu

9 How the US Should Prepare for Space Warfare: Illustrated by Countering Rendezvous Spacecraft Threat by Brian G. Chow

10 Decoding China’s Nuclear Modernisation by Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

11 The Role of Nuclear Deterrence by Tanvi Kulkarni

12 No Domain an Island: Ground Forces Need AI in Other Domains to Succeed by Michael Depp

13 ‘It was an Accident’: Implications of AI on the Ability to Distinguish between ‘True’ Accidents and Violations of International Humanitarian Law by Laura Bruun

About Editors and Authors

High Anxiety
David Ignatius’ latest thriller is a tour de space force, spies and satellite warfare

HENRY R. SCHLESINGER
MAY 03, 2024
SpyTalk. 

Spoiler Alert: The new spy thriller by David Ignatius has arrived just in time for beach season, and that’s good. But Phantom Orbit is not a “rollicking rollercoaster of international mayhem,” as so many breathless blurbs once described spy thrillers. This is a sober and engaging tale of both human drama and emerging technological threats, fitting neatly in the category of what Graham Greene called an “entertainment.”

David Ignatius (Indiana State University media photo)

Ignatius is well placed to tell the story. A native Washingtonian, veteran foreign correspondent turned prize-winning columnist for the Washington Post, and a former adjunct lecturer at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, he has been covering the intelligence community for nearly four decades. This is his twelfth novel of international intrigue, with multiple previous efforts hitting The New York Times bestseller list. His 2007 bestselling novel, Body of Lies, was made into the 2009 Ridley Scott film of the same title starring Leonardo DeCaprio and Russell Crowe. And while the Middle East was his beat for years, more recently he has been turning his eye to Chinese intelligence operations, notably with his novella, The Tao of Deception, serialized in the Washington Post’s editorial pages in four parts last year, and the novel, The Quantum Spy (2018).

As the title of his latest effort would suggest, the focus of his story is satellite technology. Space, of course, is the domain of critical government, corporate, and consumer infrastructure and, as such, holds the potential for all manner of mischief, including hostilities generally associated with warfare. This is a point, as Ignatius makes abundantly clear, not only worth knowing but pondering to the point of fully understanding. To his credit, he manages to provide a painless primer on satellites, the myriad roles they play, and the hideous complexity of operating in space. By the end of the book the reader will know about Low Earth Orbits, ground stations, and other details of the space business.

Briefly stated, the book’s action focuses on the lives and careers of two unlikely, though engaging, protagonists: Ivan Volkov, a Russian scientist guided into working on satellite technology, and Edith Ryan, an intelligence officer recruited by the CIA while a student at Yale. That one of the protagonists is named Ryan while another, albeit ancillary, character is named Hunt may be a puckish nod to two popular American espionage icons.

The action begins in the mid-1990s and carries through to near present day, a span representing a critical time in geopolitics and technological advances that saw the ascendancy of China as a technological and economic force as well as the relative decline of the former Soviet Union on the world stage.

The protagonists, who are just starting their careers at the beginning of the book, will see their professional lives intertwine or pass close to one another, like orbiting satellites. This is a story of large-brained individuals working within their respective systems, sidetracked, bullied, suffering setbacks, and surviving the not always pleasant pragmatism of bureaucracies with their integrity more or less intact.

It’s definitely not James Bond. There is no gunplay, high-speed chases or any of the other flashy exotica associated with traditional espionage fiction. It’s not that kind of book, and that’s a good thing.

However, one wonders what the intellectual historian Jacques Barzun, who so thoroughly lambasted the work of Ian Fleming and John Le Carré in his landmark 1965 American Scholar essay, “Meditations on the Literature of Spying,” would think of Phantom Orbit and this newish breed of fictional espionage protagonist. Although a dedicated fan of murder mysteries, Barzun was, apparently, disdainful regarding the noirish lives and lifestyles of Cold War era fictional spies.

For the most part the characters presented by Ignatius live ordinary lives burdened by secrets and compelled to do what they believe to be the right thing. They labor in relatively obscure and little understood fields, well aware of larger consequences. An early book of this genre that comes to mind would be The Blonde Countess (1933) by the ceaselessly self-promoting cryptographer Herbert O. Yardley. It was later made into the 1935 film Rendezvous, starring William Powell as swashbuckling codecracker.

Although not buckling any swashes, it is Phantom Orbit’s Volkov who remains central to the plot. A brilliant scientist in the old school-true believer mold, his talents are recognized as high value to the advancement of satellite technology, first by China, then Russia, and America.



An earthbound prize in the new space race, Volkov is, somewhat quaintly, motivated by neither money nor political ideology betray his motherland. It is fair to say, that of his three suitors, China proves the most attentive throughout most of the book. Edith Ryan, who identified Volkov of possible value to U.S. intelligence, struggles within an agency often unkind to women, though perseveres long enough to see the beginning of changes taking place.

With decades of reporting on espionage to his credit, Ignatius clearly knows the spy business at the granular level. Thankfully, he doesn’t overburden readers with an alphabet soup of forgettable acronyms, bureaucratic jargon, or expository organizational charts. Perhaps this derives from confidence that he doesn’t require the swagger of the arcane to establish credibility, or he’s simply a kind soul that has taken pity on the reader.

By the same token, there is a ring of truth to every operation, motivation, and official decision, including those featuring sophisticated technological elements. When the “inside baseball” elements of espionage in general or a specific agency are offered up, they are treated somewhat casually within the story. On one character’s retirement from the CIA, he describes the significance of the Career Intelligence Medal. In another instance, he details the work of the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, which ranges from the “big tech” of satellites to small gadgetry of agent operations. As one might expect, the FSB, Russia’s internal security service, makes a recognizable and suitably disquieting appearance, and we see time has not significantly altered the Chekist mindset in the decades since the Cold War and KGB. However, perhaps even more importantly, this book provides an introduction to the operations of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), China’s principal civilian spy service. In this regard, China, “the world’s workshop,” has established a very formidable espionage enterprise.

It is fair to say that both Volkov and Ryan are drawn well enough to figure as solo central characters in their own books, though taken together the result is far richer and more impressive. There is a third character, however, and that is the crowded piece of real estate surrounding Earth with its thousands of satellites. In the hands of Ignatius, space is as much a part of the story as early Cold War Vienna in Graham Greene’s The Third Man or Rick’s cafe in World War Two Casablanca—and not lacking in intrigue or unsavory elements. To perhaps belabor the point, many governments, reminiscent of Claude Rains, profess to be shocked, shocked that spying is taking place in space.

Lastly, as with real spies, who will present a fiction to obtain a valuable truth, Ignatius’ work offers up a compelling fiction to deliver the broad strokes of a larger truth. And did I mention? It's a great beach read.

Phantom Orbit: A Thriller (W.W. Norton & Company) is available for purchase online in advance of its May 7 publication date. Washington, DC -area readers are encouraged to patronize Politics and Prose, an independent bookstore.