Saturday, June 08, 2024

 Hamilton·CBC Investigates

Prisoners in Hamilton put in segregation at far greater rate than any other Ontario jail, data shows

City's segregation rate 4 times higher than province, meets UN conditions for torture

A segregation cell.
A segregation cell in the now-closed Kingston Penitentiary is shown in this file photo. A CBC Hamilton analysis of data shows segregation in Ontario jails has been ramping up across the province. (Frank Gunn/Canadian Press)

After spending nearly a solid month alone in a jail cell in Hamilton, Cedar Hopperton remembers how the deafening quiet and isolation impacted her. 

"The main thing that strikes you is the silence … it definitely aggravated feelings of anxiety and fear, like listening to every little sound in this totally silent environment, just being really worried and stressed," she said. 

While at the Hamilton-Wentworth Detention Centre (HWDC) in 2018, Hopperton was put in what the province calls segregation — or what prisoners often call "the hole," she said.

"You're literally in a little cream-coloured box with nothing … usually all your possessions are taken away from you and you have to bargain for them back," said Hopperton, who is now an advocate for incarcerated people.

A person standing in front of a jail.
Cedar Hopperton, who was in the Hamilton-Wentworth Detention Centre (HWDC) in 2018, says her longest stay in segregation was a month. (Bobby Hristova/CBC)

Segregation, also known as solitary confinement, is when prisoners are physically and socially isolated in a cell for 22 hours or more.

A CBC Hamilton analysis of data shows segregation in Ontario jails has been ramping up since 2019, despite the Ontario Human Rights Commission urging the province to phase out segregation in its jails since 2016.

In Hamilton, it has been happening at a far greater rate than the rest of Ontario and has met the United Nations' threshold for torture, with some segregation periods lasting as long as 21 days. 

Under its Mandela Rules, the UN considers segregation of over 15 consecutive days a form of torture, calling it "cruel" and "inhuman." The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has been calling for an end to segregation globally since 2011. Ontario's ombudsman also says, in a 2017 report, that segregation should only be used as a last resort, noting research shows the health and suicide risks associated with extended segregation.

'The numbers are so high, it's hard to believe'

The CBC analysis of provincial data shows the Hamilton jail accounted for roughly one out of every five segregation placements reported in Ontario's 25 correctional facilities between April 2022 and March 2023.

During that period, more than 1,408 prisoners were placed in segregation 11,494 times at HWDC. That's the equivalent of an estimated 31 placements per prisoner in a year. 

When factoring in jail population data, obtained through a freedom-of-information request, Hamilton's segregation rate was four times the provincial rate of seven placements per prisoner.

"The numbers are so high, it's hard to believe … we've got a problem, 100 per cent," said Peter Boushy, a longtime local criminal defence lawyer who was shown CBC's figures and has many clients who have been imprisoned at HWDC.


The province lists six reasons for putting people in segregation:

  1. They pose security risks.
  2. They pose security risks for medical concerns.
  3. They need protection.
  4. They need protection for medical concerns.
  5. For misconduct.
  6. For refusing to be searched.

The Ministry of the Solicitor General declined an interview and didn't address detailed questions about CBC's findings in its emailed statement. 

Despite the jump in segregation use across Ontario, ministry spokesperson Andrew Morrison said the province "continues to make progress in keeping inmates out of segregation conditions" and highlighted a 2020 announcement of $500 million over five years to hire staff and "modernize" facilities.

'If I was in charge … I'd be asking a lot of questions'

The province's website describes HWDC as one of its eight regional facilities meant to serve a larger area and be a "point of entry into the institutional system." 

In other words, many of the people in HWDC and other provincial jails haven't been convicted for the charges that landed them behind bars. Data from provincial courthouses also shows 54 per cent of cases that were before Ontario courts in 2022 ended up being withdrawn or stayed before trial.

Howard Sapers was previously Canada's correctional investigator and was an independent adviser to Ontario on corrections matters. The federal government describes Sapers as a "prominent expert on effective and humane corrections management."

He saw CBC's data and said it is "alarming" and shows "people who haven't even been convicted are being thrown into … the worst, most oppressive forms of custody."

"If I was in charge … I'd be asking a lot of questions," Sapers said.

A man speaking.
Howard Sapers, previously Canada's correctional investigator, says the amount of segregation taking place in Hamilton is a 'symptom of much bigger problems.' (Sean Kilpatrick/The Canadian Press)

After HWDC, the next highest segregation rates for 2022-23 were at the Vanier Centre for Women in Milton, the North Bay Jail and the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre in London.

HWDC had 368 imprisoned people in 2022-23, making it the seventh most populous jail in Ontario. The Toronto South Detention Centre had the highest population with roughly 1,200 prisoners. 

That means Toronto South has roughly triple HWDC's population and yet HWDC's segregation rate is roughly 10 times higher.

The segregation data, which only accounts for reported segregation placements between fiscal years 2019-20 and 2022-23, was compiled using the population of each jail and annual statistics publicly released by the Ministry of the Solicitor General.

The data does not include unscheduled lockdowns, where prisoners are stuck in their cells sometimes for extended periods of time because of security incidents, searches or other reasons. CBC only used data between 2019 and 2023 due to inconsistencies in how the province tracked segregation in prior years.

a picture of Hamilton Wentworth Detention Centre - Barton Jail
The HWDC had 368 imprisoned people in the 2022-23 fiscal year. (Dan Taekema/CBC)

Jane Sprott, a Toronto Metropolitan University criminology professor who was shown CBC's figures, said having a high segregation rate isn't good, but a low rate doesn't make one jail better than another, noting it could just mean there were fewer segregations per prisoner but for longer periods of time. 

Sprott and Anthony Doob, professor emeritus of criminology at the University of Toronto, led research in 2020 into segregation in federally run prisons — called solitary confinement — and the rate at which it amounts to torture.

They did the research while being members of an advisory panel the federal government formed when it was replacing segregation in federal prisons with a new system in 2019. Sapers was chair of the panel.

Under the new system, prisoners must be granted at least four hours a day outside their cells, including two hours of "meaningful human contact." But the new system is still being used more often — and for longer periods of time — than intended.

Hamilton's segregation rate has jumped since 2019

Sapers said the amount of segregation taking place in Hamilton is a "symptom of much bigger problems," which could include issues related to staffing, morale, training, policy awareness and compliance, infrastructure or institutional violence.

In the 2019 fiscal year, the segregation rate was three times per prisoner. Three years later, it was happening 10 times as often, with the rate ballooning to 31 segregation placements per prisoner.

Sapers noted the COVID-19 pandemic prompted jails to be more restrictive and some have continued pandemic practices like isolating new inmates, among other actions, even though the worst of the pandemic is over.

The short timeframe of the data analysis can't determine whether the pandemic had a long-term impact on segregation rates.


Chad Oldfield is chair of the Ontario Public Service Employees Union's (OPSEU) Corrections Ministry employee relations committee. 

Oldfield said the province's jails "are in crisis after years of understaffing and under-resourcing." 

"The union agrees that the use of segregation-like conditions are detrimental to the mental health and well-being of the inmates in our care, however, our correctional system lacks any kind of practical alternative," he wrote in an email.

"For years, front-line correctional workers and their union have been sounding the alarm on these ongoing systemic issues and advocating for better working conditions, which in turn are better living conditions for those in custody."

He said the COVID-19 pandemic hit jails hard — many staff got sick and many prisoners entered isolation for health reasons. He said mental health and addictions issues in jails have also "skyrocketed," and both prisoners and staff face an "ongoing threat of violence."

Oldfield said the province needs more full-time correctional officers, better infrastructure, and more training and resources for staff.

Segregation in Hamilton met UN conditions for torture

CBC Hamilton used another freedom-of-information request to obtain more detailed data about who entered segregation in HWDC for 2022-23, how long they stayed and why they were put in.

Those figures show 312 people entered segregation between six and 10 times. A smaller group, 32 prisoners, entered segregation between 41 and 155 times.

The average length of segregation was a day and a half, but the longest at HWDC was 21 days — which is the longest segregation stay in the province for a man that year and exceeds 15 days, the threshold the UN considers to be torture.

Ontario's Court of Appeal also set a hard 15-day cap on segregation in 2019. The province did not respond to CBC on how or why the cap was allowed to be exceeded in Hamilton. It did say it was "important to note that an inmate can request a placement in segregation conditions."

Of the people who entered segregation, 504 had a mental health alert on their file, which means they've disclosed a mental illness, demonstrate behaviour that suggests mental illness or have shown signs of or have said they're thinking about suicide.

The 504 prisoners represent roughly a third of people segregated in HWDC in 2022-23.

A person peering through the door of a segregation cell.
An inmate can be seen inside a segregation cell at the federally run Collins Bay Institution in Kingston. (The Canadian Press/Lars Hagberg)

There were also 112 people in segregation who had "severe mental illness" and 223 people on suicide watch, which is when the imprisoned person needs "increased supervision" due to a "high risk of suicide or self-harm."

Ontario's ombudsman has said, by law, prisoners with "a serious diagnosed mental illness" cannot be held in segregation, but some may have safety or security concerns that prevent them from being housed with others.

In those cases, the ombudsman said his office speaks with local jail staff and follows up with the province to ensure the prisoners continue to have access to programming and mental health support.

In a 2013 settlement, the province committed to not placing people with mental health issues in segregation unless alternatives to segregation were considered and rejected because they would cause "undue hardship."

Morrison, the ministry's spokesperson, said that in some cases it is necessary to separate people from other prisoners for "health, safety and/or security reasons."

He also said there have been "substantial reductions in the length of time that inmates are spending in segregation conditions" and "regulatory amendments are now in force" to address legal limits on the length of segregation placements, prohibit segregation for people with mental health issues and do independent reviews of those in segregation.

The 'exceptionally debilitating' effects of segregation

Boushy said many of his clients have mental health issues. "Segregation has, for the most part, an exceptionally debilitating effect on the psychological and emotional well-being of our clients."

The HWDC figures don't offer much information about why segregations occur. They also appear to be categorized differently than the publicly available data.

A room with doors.
The segregation unit at the North Bay jail. (Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services)

While the province has six categories for why people get put into segregation, the HWDC data lumps people into just three: 

  1. Refusing to be searched.
  2. Protecting the security of the institution or others (including for medical or other reasons).
  3. Because an imprisoned person needed protection (also including for medical or other reasons).

In four cases, HWDC reported someone entered segregation for refusing a search.

Meanwhile, people went to "the hole" 8,338 times to protect the security of the institution or safety of others. Segregation was used another 2,671 times because a person needed protection.

"If your only way of keeping people safe is by isolating them, you're not operating a very safe correctional institution," Sapers said.

Boushy said HWDC staff may be using segregation to create space due to overcrowding in the facility.

He said there are three inmates in many cells, which means one person sleeps on the floor while two sleep in bunk beds.

Last year, HWDC prisoners who went on a hunger strike described overcrowding and staffing shortages at the jail and sounded an alarm about weekly lockdowns, among other things.

Former prisoners have also raised issues with what they call a "broken" complaint system.

Province has long faced calls to end segregation

Hopperton, who spent time in segregation for what she said were administrative reasons and not misconduct, said she believes the true segregation rate is higher.

She said that when she was in jail, staff would lock her in the shower for three to four hours so she was out of her cell long enough to no longer be considered in segregation. The province did not respond to comment on such a tactic.

A man.
Paul Dubé, Ontario's ombudsman, is seen in a file photo. His 2017 report says segregation should only be used as a last resort. (Nathan Denette/Canadian Press)

Sapers said he isn't surprised to hear what Hopperton said about the tactic, pointing to the 2017 report by Ontario's ombudsman.

The ombudsman investigated segregation after seeing a steady rise in complaints, a lack of response to previous recommendations and hearing about Adam Capay, who spent more than four years in solitary confinement in Thunder Bay while awaiting trial for murder. The charges were stayed in 2019.

The report showed jails didn't track segregation properly and oversight was "severely lacking," leaving vulnerable inmates in isolation for prolonged periods of time without the required reviews.

The ombudsman made 32 recommendations to the province, all of which were accepted.

Some of those included implementing a more specific definition of segregation, more training to staff and regularly auditing segregation data.

As of October 2023, the province has implemented 29 recommendations, according to the ombudsman.

The ombudsman noted it is waiting on the province to create an independent panel to review segregation placements and waiting on Ontario to better integrate paper and digital systems.

Saper said segregation should be scrapped.

"The purpose of corrections is to prepare people to live safely in the community. Just about everyone in a detention centre is going to be released one way or another," he said.

"Don't you want the person being released to be better able to cope safely in society … you can't achieve that if you've confined someone in a segregation cell."

METHODOLOGY: How CBC analyzed segregation placements in Ontario jails

The data included in this story was compiled by the Ontario Ministry of the Solicitor General and publicly disclosed every fiscal year. To compare segregation placements between correctional facilities, CBC divided the total number of segregation placements by every jail's corresponding average daily custodial counts for every fiscal year (2019/20 to 2022/23), as obtained through a freedom-of-information request. Two subject matter experts consulted by CBC News have seen this analysis and said that given the data available, calculating a segregation placement rate is the best way to represent change over time and to compare jails.

CBC only used data from 2019/20 to 2022/23 because prior years didn't collect data for the whole fiscal year and didn't release data for all jails. The limited time frame isn't long enough to determine a trend. Toronto Intermittent Centre, Elgin-Middlesex Regional Intermittent Centre and the Ontario Correctional Institute are not included in the analysis due to incomplete data.

Additional statistics on segregation placements for the Hamilton-Wentworth Detention Centre were obtained by CBC News using a freedom-of-information request. 

Research and data analysis: Bobby Hristova (February – May 2024).

Data verification & analysis: Naël Shiab (February 2024) and Valérie Ouellet (April — May 2024).


Sea urchin pandemic spreads beyond Red Sea, endangering coral reefs


A dead black sea urchin is displayed at a laboratory in Tel Aviv University's Steinhardt Museum of Natural History in Tel Aviv, Israel May 23, 2023.

PUBLISHED JUNE 07, 2024 

TEL AVIV — A sea-borne pandemic that wiped out sea urchin populations in the Red Sea has spread and is taking out the species in parts of the Indian Ocean and could go global, scientists in Israel say.

The particular species of sea urchin impacted is a well-known protector of coral reefs and the deaths put the already fragile reef ecosystem in even more peril.

The pandemic was first noticed in the Gulf of Aqaba a year ago and researchers say they have since identified the pathogen behind it through molecular analysis. They are linking it to mass deaths across the Red Sea, the Arabian peninsula, and as far as Reunion Island off Madagascar.

The pathogen kills fast and violently — in just two days colonies can be lost — making it hard to assess how many are dying, said Omri Bronstein, a zoologist from Tel Aviv University and the Steinhardt Museum of Natural History.

It seems to be heading east towards the tropical waters of the Coral Triangle that extends off southeast Asia and Australia's Great Barrier Reef.

"I fear that at the current situation this is the trajectory, so this is where it's going," he said.

Their findings were published in the journal Current Biology.

'Lawn mowers'

Bronstein described the affected sea urchin species as the "lawn mowers" of coral reefs, since they remove algae that otherwise blocks sunlight, allowing the coral to thrive.

In the Gulf of Aqaba, no other creature has taken over that role and Bronstein's team is already seeing extensive growth in algae cover.

"When mortalities started in the Red Sea, they were so strong and so abrupt and so violent that the first thoughts were this must be some kind of pollution, or something very severe but very local," he said.

Then the phenomenon was seen at a wharf farther south in Sinai where a ferry from Aqaba docks. Two weeks later it spread another 70 kms. They described thousands of skeletons of the once dominant species rolling on the sea bottom.

There is no known way to stop the disease, Bronstein said. But there is still a chance to create an isolated population, or broodstock, of the sea urchins remaining elsewhere that could hopefully be reintroduced later on.

The Israeli team is now cooperating with scientists across the region to map the pandemic and gather more details. This includes collecting continuous samples of environmental DNA from the different bodies of water that show how sea life interacts with the surroundings.

"You must have people on site to provide you with data, because within 48 hours you have no evidence of the mortalities even taking place," Bronstein said. "This coordination and this collaboration is one of the keys of being able to be on top of this rapidly evolving situation."

REWRITING ASIAN AMERICAN HISTORY: THE ANTI-IMPERIAL STRUGGLES OF TAIWANESE AND HONG KONG DIASPORAS

Written by Alex Yong Kang Chow. 

Image credit: The 70’s Biweekly and People’s Theatre by Mr. Mok Chiu-yu Augustine, Dr. Jessica Wai Yee Yeung and Hong Kong Baptist University Library / License: CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 DEED.

Wendy Cheng’s book, Island X: Taiwanese Student Migrants, Campus Spies, and Cold War Activism, highlights the intricate and often fraught connections between the exiled diaspora, Asian Americans, Leftist politics, and the geopolitical forces shaping the lives of individuals in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China. This work prompts an exploration of how Taiwanese Americans and the Hong Kong diaspora navigate and struggle with the cognitive and ideological complexities faced by Asian Americans and anti-imperial activists, who often conflate imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism within the contexts of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC), and the United States. 

During the Cold War, Hong Kongers in the US intersected with Taiwanese students who opposed the Kuomintang (KMT) regime, albeit for different political reasons. While the pro-independence Taiwanese students criticised the KMT regime for white terror, political censorship, and a one-party dictatorship, the nationalistic Hong Kong students also criticised the KMT for its hypocrisy in framing itself as a promoter of democracy against the authoritarian Chinese Communist regime. 

Since the late 1980s, Hong Kongers and Taiwanese have embarked on parallel paths in their quests for democratisation and decolonisation. When Taiwan transitioned into an independent nation-state, Hong Kong moved from a British colony to a special administrative region under the PRC regime. The youth of the two regions came together during significant historical events such as the 2014 Occupy movements in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 

Since 2019, the Taiwanese have undertaken new efforts to reaffirm their sovereignty, defend their territory against the People’s Liberation Army, and secure their critical economic role in semiconductor production. Concurrently, many Hong Kongers have faced exile, finding themselves in unfamiliar environments that resonate with the diaspora experiences depicted in Cheng’s book. This shared history underscores these communities’ ongoing struggles and solidarity as they confront the overlapping and often confusing narratives of imperialism, colonialism, and nationalism. 

Activism and Left-leaning Politics  

As Cheng outlined in the introduction, the objective of Island X is to expose historical processes and reveal alternative possibilities. “By exposing the process—history in motion—by revealing what might have been, and by centring those who dreamed otherwise, who were erased, ignored, or relegated to the margins and footnotes of history, we restore more capacious genealogies and broader horizons of aspiration and struggle” (9). 

In chapter two, Cheng uncovered three figures who struggled to address left-leaning politics and aimed to bridge the left-right divide within the movement. For example, Lin Shiaw-shin, a Baodiao activist from a bensheng family, maintained and acted on “broadly left, non-identitarian alliances” (66) to support Taiwan’s democratic movement. Despite many of these alliances falling short of their more radical or revolutionary goals, Lin’s efforts were significant.  

Kao Cheng-yan, who later became a computer science professor at National Taiwan University, took a left-leaning, pro-Taiwan independence stance that eventually led to the founding of the Green Party. This party identifies as internationalist, supports Taiwan’s independence, and focuses on environmental politics (67-72). 

Dissatisfied with the goals and operations of World United Formosans for Independence, Cary Hung co-founded the Taiwan Revolution Party, which advocated for a mass-based, working-class revolution (73-76). 

Similarly, in the 1970s, a distinct faction of anti-imperial anarchists emerged in Hong Kong, navigating a complex political landscape influenced by global and local dynamics. This group, often in tension with other political factions, sought to challenge the British colonial and PRC regimes. 

For example, Augustine Mok, a young activist and founder of the 70s Biweekly, an influential magazine among left-leaning circles in Hong Kong during the 1970s, criticised the PRC regime and proposed an internationalist path that exemplified his anarchist beliefs.  

When the anti-imperial Baodiao movement emerged in the U.S., Mok participated in rallies in Hong Kong, advocating for an anti-imperial stance that the island belonged to no one—neither the PRC, ROC, nor Japan. This position contrasted with many other nationalist Baodiao activists or students in Hong Kong.  

Similar to the ideological split between pro-PRC and pro-ROC factions before the fall of the Gang of Four in 1976, anti-colonial activists in Hong Kong also divided into pro-PRC and anti-PRC clusters. Youth on both sides criticised the British colonial regime, but they debated whether the PRC regime was a liberator or another form of authoritarianism under Mao’s leadership. 

Despite the political crackdown against the 1967 riot instigated by Chinese Communist activists under the influence of the Chinese Cultural Revolution, young activists in Hong Kong found room for resistance. They navigated a highly censored environment yet managed to create spaces for political expression and activism. 

However, the student activists at the time were also aware that their phones installed in the student union on campus were wiretapped by the political branch of the British colonial police. This situation underscored the constant surveillance and repression they faced, similar to their Taiwanese counterparts, as they sought to push boundaries and advocate for change. 

The legacy of these anti-imperial anarchists, particularly those like Augustine Mok, underscores the complexity and diversity of political activism in Hong Kong. Their efforts to foster critical discourse and challenge dominant narratives continue to resonate in contemporary discussions on democracy, sovereignty, and resistance in the region. 

Cold War Geopolitics and Positioning Diaspora Identity: Historical Context and Challenges 

One of the challenges facing Taiwanese Americans is positioning the group within Asian American studies, which often focus on left-leaning, working-class subjects, and resistance narratives: “Within Asian American studies in particular, a scholarly field born of leftist social movements that has tended to privilege working-class subjects and narratives of resistance, these characteristics may render diasporic Taiwanese communities difficult, unappealing, or uninteresting as objects of inquiry” (14). 

In the 1960s and 70s, the romanticisation of PRC socialism within US leftist circles was not uncommon, leading to assumptions about pro-Taiwan political stances as “conservative or retrograde” (15). Furthermore, as racialised non-US nationals campaigning against their government—a US ally—”Taiwanese student migrants were neither fully legible to nor protected by dominant rights-based moral and political” (8). 

Because of the impact of Cold War geopolitics on global comprehension of Taiwan’s existence, the fact that the United States served as both geopolitical “benefactor and protector” of Taiwan may confuse, if not irk, many pro-PRC factions in the US. Additionally, the left-leaning, anti-imperial US activists who criticised the US regime as imperialist over Latin America, Vietnam, and the Middle East may also find this situation confusing or frustrating. 

How could an independent-seeking country that sought US support be progressive, anti-capitalist, and anti-imperial enough? How could an authoritarian regime governed by the KMT be a faithful, democratic ally for those left-leaning US activists? 

Similarly, since 2019, the Hong Kong diaspora has found the assumptions underlying some Western leftists’ ideological simplifications funny, if not ridiculous. How can a capitalist-driven city and secessionist movement not be seen as an imperial puppet against a Chinese socialist regime? How can diaspora Hong Kongers, who mostly lobby Western governments against the PRC regime, counteract an imperial US regime? 

Rather than exaggerating or dismissing these questions emerging from a Western-leftist perspective, countering the inward-looking leftist knowledge production that fails to grapple with the Chinese questions may be productive. This can be done by disseminating the thoughts, theories, and praxis of pro-Taiwan-independence Taiwanese Americans or pro-Hong Kong-independence Hong Kong leftists, as Cheng’s book has done. 

Urging or educating the dogmatic Western left to adopt an anti-PRC stance is an uphill battle. Many Western leftists sympathetic to the PRC do not read Chinese, lack access to nuanced anti-PRC Chinese thoughts in English translation, or have limited lived experience in Hong Kong and Taiwan. This challenge extends even to second or third-generation Asian Americans who might share heritage with the diaspora. 

Colonisation, colonialism, and internal settler colonisers do not just describe the imperial process of European-American expansion but are also applicable and have an Asian origin, demonstrated by the PRC and KMT regimes born out of the 20th-century revolutionary period. Recent studies have attempted to reconstruct Chinese intellectuals’ struggles to navigate a third path beyond KMT and CCP domination. 

Tracing the creation of myths, misconceptions, and knowledge production about Chinese politics in the US requires more collective effort. This effort must bridge the revolutionary continuity and discontinuity before and after the 1949 KMT-CCP civil war that shattered the fate of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and mainland China. 

One invisible historical connection is that Hong Kong was removed from the United Nations’ non-self-governing territories list upon the PRC’s entrance into the UN. The PRC replaced the ROC to serve on the permanent seat of the UN Security Council. As a result, Hong Kongers’ international rights of self-determination within the UN mechanism were deprived because the US administration decided to side with Maoist China over Chiang’s ROC due to Cold War calculations against the Soviet Union. 

The Unique Contribution of Cheng’s Book: Rewriting Asian American History 

The most substantial contribution of Cheng’s book is to enrich the diversity and complexity of Asian Americans in scholarly knowledge production. It aims to 1) rethink and rewrite the diverse history of Asian Americans; 2) delink Asian Americans from the PRC regime; 3) respect the similarities and differences among and between Asian Americans and Asians that may stand at odds with each other; and finally, 4) reconnect Taiwanese Americans to Asian American history. 

Cheng’s book, likely one of its kind, explores the possible reconcilability and irreconcilability of intersectional politics among Asians, Asian Americans, Leftist politics, geopolitics, and democratic aspirations at the Cold War historical juncture. 

Rewriting the history of Asian Americans by tracing and reconstructing the sociological and intellectual development of anti-PRC and anti-KMT Taiwanese Americans provides an excellent example for other scholarly, literary, and intellectual endeavours. This approach extends the mapping to other broadly speaking Sinophone populations, such as Hong Kongers, Tibetans, Uyghurs, and exiled mainland Chinese. This broader framework fosters a more nuanced understanding of the complex and multifaceted identities within the Asian American community and will hopefully encourage more productive work that enriches our definition of Asia American history. 

Alex Yong Kang Chow is pursuing a PhD in Geography at UC Berkeley, studying decolonial praxis in Hong Kong, with a focus on capitalism, nationalism, and colonialism. He graduated with a BA from the University of Hong Kong and an MSc from the London School of Economics. Alex was the former Secretary-General of the Hong Kong Federation of Students during the 2014 Umbrella Movement and was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2018. He co-founded Flow magazine and is a board member of the Hong Kong Democracy Council, dedicated to advocating for human rights and democracy. 

This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Student Migrants, Campus Spies and Island X‘.


 

ISLAND X: AN INTERNATIONALIST EXAMINATION OF TAIWANESE AMERICAN HISTORY DURING THE COLD WAR

Written by Wen Liu.

Image credit: 07.02 副總統出席「陳文成博士紀念晚會」 – 50068877552.jpg by 總統府 / Flickr, license: CC BY 2.0 DEED.

Wendy Cheng’s Island X is a new classic study on Taiwanese American lives that bridges between Taiwan Studies and Asian American Studies. In this essay, I want to highlight three major contributions that the book has made, including 1) The importance of understanding Taiwan through the US-China-Taiwan as well as an internationalist stance, 2) the need for Asian American Studies to incorporate diasporic perspectives and geopolitical analysis, and 3) situating Taiwan as a critical epistemological site in Asian American Studies. 

An Internationalist Perspective 

Since the end of the martial law period, more and more archives have been open to the public. More books have discussed the Cold War period in Taiwan through the triangulated relations between the US, China, and Taiwan. For instance, Hsian-ting Lin’s Accidental State: Chiang Kai-shek, the United States, and the Making of Taiwan uses the US’s recently declassified archives to describe the dictator’s internal turmoil in making modern Taiwan in contested geopolitical time. Chen Tsui-lien’s Revisiting the Political History of Post-WarTaiwan: The Triangulated Tug-of-War between the United States, the Kuomintang Government, and Taiwanese Civil Society also took the comparative approach. All these books on Taiwanese history—along with Wendy’s Island X—disputed the myth that the possibility of a modern democratic Taiwan was neither made magically through one leader’s hand (e.g., the common depiction of Chiang Ching-kuo as “the Father of Democracy” rather than an authoritarian leader who executed many tangwai movement leaders) nor simply through the Cold War US imperialist influences that manipulated Taiwan as its subaltern proxy state (as often articulated by Anglophone or American Studies). Instead, it is a result of the triangulation of forces between the US, the Kuomintang (KMT), the tangwai movement in Taiwanese civil society, and the diasporic Taiwanese students’ movement, which is the central focus of this book. 

The death of Chen Wen-chen is particularly illuminating in the book. Professor Cheng argues that far from being neutral or benevolent, the instances of Taiwanese students spied on by other Taiwanese on US campuses illustrate the role of US educational institutions as critical sites of Cold War battles. We often understood his death as a critical event that drove the US to take seriously the issues of authoritarian surveillance since Chen was a US citizen, and the Taiwanese American communities took the chance to challenge the KMT surveillance on US campuses. This event not only pushes policy changes in the US but also adds additional pressure on the already heated democratization demands from the Taiwan side.  

Chen Wen-chen’s case—along with many other historical examples and live narratives in the book—complicates the political biography of Taiwanese student activism in the US at the time. Usually, the overseas Taiwanese movement is often portrayed as singularly pro-independence and, thus, conservative and anti-Communist. The book shows a much more complicated picture. For instance, as Wendy writes, while in Pittsburgh, Chen Wen-chen became particularly interested in the ideas of the left pro-independence group, Taiwan Era, which took a Marxist-Leninist line and elaborated more profoundly and in a more explicitly internationalist stance, along with an earlier diasporic left publication headquartered in Toronto, Taiwan Revolution. These diasporic groups are not without their internal intellectual and ideological debates, reflecting the US activist political spectrum in the 1970s and 1980s. 

An Asian Americanist Perspective 

This brings me to my second point; another significant intervention of the book is how it takes on an Asian Americanist approach that also centres on Taiwanese history and voice. One of the reasons that Taiwan and Taiwanese Americans are often erased from Asian American Studies or history is that the field of Asian American Studies emerged in the 1960s at the peak of internationalists’ left politics. Up to today, it continues to skew toward a specific working-class and left politics that is more concerned with US hegemony and the critiques of racial politics domestically. Yet under what Wendy calls the “infrastructure of surveillance,” Taiwanese immigrants were often framed as the “good” and “middle class” immigrants who are also ideologically seen as blinded pro-US. The lack of differentiation between the nation-state, the KMT party, the US influences, and the civil society in Taiwan results in the fact that Taiwan is merely understood as KMT’s “Republic of China” in the Cold War binary framework. It misses the opportunity to see how this group of Taiwanese immigrants calls the present nation-state, the ROC, in question and organizes creatively to achieve human rights and democratization.  

Moreover, the centrality of race in Asian American Studies is often eager to create racial politics against assimilation yet neglects how racial politics can also be produced globally, out of the US. In fact, both Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have been the hegemonic forces in East Asia to create different ideologies of racial superiority or racial victimhood to counter US influences. By focusing on the US empire and the US only, the field misses the opportunities to engage with the complexity of inter-Asia dynamics on how ethnonationalist forces are forged. And how the Taiwanese subject is, in fact, caught between white assimilationism, Chinese ethnonationalism, and Han settler-colonialism, where some of the key players in the book attempt to rearticulate a new kind of national imagination.  

Taiwan as a Critical Epistemological Site in Asian American Studies 

Lastly, the book argues how Taiwan can serve as a critical epistemological position in Asian American Studies. As Shu-mei Shih stated provocatively in the 2018 North American Taiwan Studies Association conference, “Taiwan Studies is American Studies,” the book shows how American Studies is also a part of Taiwan Studies. By examining Taiwanese American politics in relation to global politics, multiple state regimes, and Cold War conditions, we can see a fuller picture of how political changes occurred during this period. It is never just the influences of Western abstract liberalism of human rights of democracy, nor one great leader who gave authoritarian rule, but the complex debates and struggles over difficult material conditions across the transpacific that allowed movements to happen. As Wendy states in the concluding chapter, while Taiwanese Americans are often essentialized as the “model minorities,” the state-centric logics observe the historical conditions and hierarchies of power that “deny Taiwanese Americans our full historical subjectivity and complex subjecthood.” 

Island X is a timely book articulating how Taiwanese American identity is deeply historically grounded and influenced by multiple transnational forces. The book opens doors for scholars to pursue this understudied subject. In the so-called “Golden Era” for Taiwan Studies, we need an interdisciplinary approach that expands the usual horizons of researching Taiwan through the superpower struggles between the US and China but focuses on the untold lives and stories that complicate the existing narratives.    

Wen Liu is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. She is the author of Feeling Asian American: Racial Flexibility between Assimilation and Oppression (University of Illinois Press, 2024), which investigates Asian American identity formation via its flexible racial status and the psychic narrative of racial injury. 

This article was published as part of a special issue on ‘Student Migrants, Campus Spies and Island X‘.

CHINA’S INFRASTRUCTURE WARFARE AGAINST KINMEN

onstruction in the background. (Murphy, 2022) 

Image depicting anti-landing spikes to deter a Chinese amphibious invasion in the foreground and the Kinmen-Lieyu Bridge under construction in the background. (Murphy, 2022) 


Written by Ian Murphy.

Image credit: author.

Geopolitical adversaries have increasingly focused on targeting critical infrastructure like energy, transportation, and communication networks to weaken a nation’s military capabilities. This form of hybrid warfare, known as infrastructure warfare, has garnered significant attention in recent years. However, its application to the China-Taiwan conflict, particularly concerning Kinmen County, remains under-examined. China’s development of the China-Kinmen water pipeline and the proposed Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge project raise concerns about its use of infrastructure as a tool of political coercion. While often overshadowed by broader cross-Strait tensions, this approach poses a significant threat to Taiwan’s security and autonomy.  

Defining Infrastructure Warfare 

Traditionally, infrastructure warfare targets critical infrastructure to weaken a nation’s military capability, readiness, and force projection. However, China’s approach in Kinmen utilizes infrastructure not just for a military advantage but also as a tool for cognitive warfare, subtly manipulating perceptions and dependencies to achieve political goals. The challenge with applying this definition of infrastructure warfare to China’s hybrid warfare strategy against Taiwan is that it does not fully account for non-military gains or motives. Instead, we should think of infrastructure warfare as a part of China’s cognitive warfare strategy.  

Cognitive warfare is a distinct form of conflict that targets the minds of populations rather than physical infrastructure that aims to manipulate perceptions, disrupt decision-making, and erode social cohesion. It represents a shift from traditional kinetic warfare, focusing instead on psychological and informational operations to achieve strategic objectives. Disinformation campaigns, social media manipulation, and economic pressure are common tools of cognitive warfare, exploiting vulnerabilities in human cognition. This approach is often employed alongside traditional military force, which allows actors to achieve their goals without overt escalation or direct confrontation.  

The Chinese Communist Party’s cognitive warfare strategy is part of a larger hybrid warfare model that aims to achieve state objectives more ambiguously, with its approach in Kinmen exemplifying this strategic shift. While its infrastructure projects in the region offer tangible benefits like improved water supply, they also serve a deeper purpose – to subtly shape perceptions and foster a sense of dependence on the mainland. This gradual integration into China’s economic and social sphere aims to create a favourable environment for eventual reunification, push pro-unification narratives, and influence the population not to fight in a wartime scenario.  

In the case of Kinmen County, China is not using infrastructure warfare to undermine Taiwan’s military readiness or force projection in the Taiwan Strait. Instead, they are using infrastructure investment to bring Kinmen closer to China, push pro-unification narratives, and influence the population not to fight.  

Kinmen is Becoming Dependent on China for Social Services 

China’s carrot-and-stick approach to Kinmen is a strategy that combines incentives (carrots) with punitive measures or threats (sticks) to influence to island’s political and economic ties to mainland China. Punitive measures have included the maintenance of a significant military presence near Kinmen, while China leverages its economic influence by restricting trade and tourism from Kinmen and Matsu by leveraging customs, military exercises, the control of maritime and air transportation routes, and even by conducting sand dredging operations around the islands. 

After the lifting of martial law in Taiwan in the 1990s, Taiwan’s “Three Mini Links” (小三通) opened limited exchanges to create limited transportation, trade, and postal links between mainland China and Kinmen and Matsu. While these links were opened in 2001 with the aim of facilitating economic and cultural exchanges, the program opened Kinmen’s residents to an ever-intensifying Chinese cognitive warfare strategy and the promotion of China’s economic model as a competitor to Taiwan.  

The most successful case study of China’s infrastructure warfare strategy is the establishment of the China-Kinmen water pipeline in 2018, which now supplies over 70% of the island’s water usage. This infrastructure project addresses Kinmen’s historical water scarcity and also highlights the concerning trend of China’s potential to weaponize critical infrastructure against Taiwan. Prior to the pipeline’s establishment, Kinmen relied heavily on unsustainable groundwater extraction and limited rainfall, resulting in environmental degradation and inadequate water supply. The pipeline, while a practical policy solution, inadvertently created a strategic vulnerability.  

Chart depicting changes in Kinmen’s freshwater usage from 2012 (101) to 2022 (111). Since the completion of the China-Kinmen water pipeline in 2018, Kinmen’s reliance on water from China has increased to 70.9% (green), while its use of groundwater has dropped significantly to 16.7% (red).  

With Kinmen’s water supply now predominantly controlled by China, the potential for political manipulation and disruption is evident. China’s increasing assertiveness towards Taiwan, coupled with warnings from the Mainland Affairs Council, has raised alarms about the weaponization of newly built critical infrastructure. Taiwan has learned from this and is beginning to carefully assess future cross-Strait infrastructure projects, such as the proposed Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge, through a lens of strategic defence. For existing infrastructure like the water pipeline, Taiwan must now play defence by focusing on building resilience against potential disruptions. To prepare for disruptions, Taiwan will need to develop alternative water sources, enhance freshwater storage capacity, rehabilitation and reduction of salinification in existing reservoirs, and implement emergency response plans in Kinmen.  

Map published by Kinmen County Waterworks that depicts the China-Kinmen water pipeline that was built in 2018. 

China has also capitalized on the political fractures caused by the Kinmen-Lieyu bridge project by promoting its own bridge project to link Kinmen and neighbouring Xiamen City. The Kinmen-Lieyu bridge project was a Taiwanese infrastructure project that now links Kinmen’s main island with the smaller Lieyu Island. Lieyu Island was previously only connected to Kinmen through a ferry, which had limited capacity and availability. Taiwanese politicians promoted the bridge project to improve the lives of Lieyu residents by providing access to essential services, healthcare, economic opportunities, and boosting tourism. However, the bridge faced criticism for going over time, over budget, and for failing to bring access to needed social services due to limited social services within Kinmen County itself, with residents needing to go to Taiwan’s main island for adequate access to healthcare and job opportunities.  

The Chinese Communist Party has historically leveraged the development of cities like Shanghai and Xiamen as propaganda tools to showcase economic development and modernization, promote the Chinese Dream, and legitimize the CCP’s economic governance model that emphasizes the economic benefits of working with the CCP while discounting narratives of political control and national security concerns. So, when Taiwan’s bridge project failed to deliver the needed social services to Kinmen, Chinese media pushed narratives that preyed on Kinmen’s discontent with Taiwan’s governing model and investment in favour of a CCP economic and unification narrative.  

A chematic map of the planned route of the Ximen-Kinmen Bridge with a translation of the four scenarios provided by Chinese media (大公報, 2020) 

Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, responsible for evaluating proposals involving mainland China, has rejected the Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge Project as a legitimate development under the Three Mini Links program due to concerns over the bridge’s potential negative impact on Taiwan’s national security, noting that the policies of the Chinese Communist Party have shifted from mild to doctrine focused on maximizing intimidation and suppression of Kinmen and Matsu, with the Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge acting as a stepping stone towards integrating Kinmen into Fujian Province.  

Countering China’s Infrastructure Warfare 

The first challenge in countering China’s infrastructure warfare against Taiwan is understanding the strategy. By framing infrastructure warfare as part of a hybrid warfare model in service to cognitive warfare, we can see how infrastructure will be used against Taiwan in an invasion scenario. So far, the China-Kinmen water pipeline and the proposed Kinmen-Xiamen Bridge project have been used to offer economic incentives, promote CCP governance, and sow distrust in the Taiwan government. In wartime, this incentive structure will become punitive if Kinmen resist Chinese claims.  

China could potentially defeat Taiwan through a blockade by employing a combination of military and economic strategies aimed at isolating and weakening the island. Under such a blockade of Taiwan’s main island, Taiwan will be unable to continue flights and maritime transport to Kinmen. This strategy of anti-access area denial, combined with infrastructure integration, means that Kinmen’s only means of survival is found through an umbilical cord with China. With a new Taiwanese Presidential administration in power, the government will have to reexamine its current Kinmen defence strategy. Taiwan knows that it is unable to match China’s military and infrastructure modernization dollar-for-dollar, so it will need to find areas of comparative advantage to overcome its hybrid warfare strategy. 

Ian Murphy has a background in national security and international business. He earned an MA in National Security Studies at American Military University and received a Taiwan Scholarship to study at National Taiwan Normal University, where he completed an MBA with instruction in Chinese. Ian currently works as a China Subject Matter Expert at SecuriFense Inc., where he helps organizations understand developments in China’s economy and foreign policy.

His recently published article TAIDE: TAIWAN’S COMMITMENT TO INNOVATION, SECURITY, AND GLOBAL TECH LEADERSHIP can be read here.