Tuesday, June 11, 2024

PAKISTAN



THE RISE AND FALL OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

Karachi’s labour uprising serves as a testament to the power of organised labour, in stark contrast to Pakistan’s trade union landscape today. What fed this movement and what led to its downfall?

LONG READ
Published June 9, 2024 

The Bab-e-Mazdoor Shaheed Qabristan monument stands at the entrance of Frontier Colony, a predominantly Pashtun, lower-income neighbourhood within Karachi’s largest industrial area, SITE. Erected by the Pakistan Institute of Labour Education and Research (PILER) and the Shaheed Mazdoor Yadgari Committee, the monument pays solemn tribute to the workers killed during the June 1972 labour movement.

On June 7, 1972, police opened fire on unarmed workers protesting overdue wages against the management of a textile mill. The next day, during the funeral procession of one of the slain workers, the crowd’s attempt to reach the Governor’s House escalated into a protest, resulting in further violence and fatalities at Banaras Chowk. Several more workers lost their lives. This brutal two-day confrontation sent shockwaves throughout Karachi, the industrial heart of Pakistan, leading to a citywide strike that halted economic production for 13 days.

The uprising occurred amid the political turbulence following East Pakistan’s secession to become Bangladesh just a year earlier. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s newly formed government, with the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) advocating socialist ideals, was suddenly at odds with the working class it claimed to champion.

In a national address on February 10, 1972, Bhutto, then both president and martial law administrator, promised new benefits for workers but also issued a stern warning against the tactics of “gherao [encirclement]” and “jalao [arson]” used to pressure industrial management. “The strength of the street will be met by the strength of the state,” Bhutto declared. By June, his government had acted on this warning.

Karachi’s industrial sector was famously brought to a standstill in June 1972 following clashes between the police and disgruntled labourers. This triggered the emergence of Karachi’s labour uprising, which serves as a testament to the power of organised labour, in stark contrast to Pakistan’s trade union landscape today. What fed this movement and what led to its downfall?

The 1972 labour movement that disrupted Karachi’s industrial sector is a significant chapter in Pakistan’s political and labour history. This piece draws on interviews with Bawar Khan, a prominent militant figure in the movement, and others, along with a review of existing literature, to reconstruct the events of those critical days. It explores the rise of the movement, its successes and struggles, and its lasting impact on the fight for workers’ rights in Pakistan.

A NETWORK OF LABOUR SOLIDARITY

Like thousands of others from various parts of the then-North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), teenaged Bawar arrived in Karachi from Swat in the mid-1960s, seeking opportunities in the city’s booming textile industry.

“School wasn’t for me,” he admits with a smile. “So, I ran away from Swat to Karachi, twice actually. Finally, my father convinced me to stay and find work here.”

His first job was at Hafiz Textile in the SITE area. Back then, mill owners personally interviewed potential employees. When the mill owner saw Bawar, he remarked, “You seem quite young.” Bawar’s quick reply — “Young, but I eat too!” — earned him a smile and a chance. Those nine months at Hafiz Textile were Bawar’s introduction to the world of textile mill work and labour activism. He honed his skills and eventually moved on to other mills, finally landing at Zebtan Textile Mills around 1966.


Dawn’s front page headline on June 8, 1972 | Dawn Archives

At that time, the country was simmering with anti-Ayub Khan sentiment, and the labour movement was gaining momentum. Bawar recalls that the workers, including him, participated in strikes against Ayub’s dictatorship.

“Usman Baloch was our leader and mentor,” Bawar recalls with respect. “He taught us how to fight for our rights.” Baloch was a towering figure in labour activism during the 1960s and 1970s, organising workers across various industries and the informal sector — from construction workers at Lea Market to textile mill workers in SITE and government institutions.

Bawar also mentions Kaneez Fatima, Shah Raza Khan and leftist student leaders, such as Karamat Ali (now PILER’s executive director), who helped mobilise workers by spending much of their time with the workers at their deras [male-only shared houses] in labour chalis [settlements] in SITE.

Bawar’s dedication resonated with his fellow workers, leading to his election as president of the Zebtan Textile workers union.

When Yahya Khan took power in 1969, Bawar was arrested at the mill gate and sent to Landhi Children’s Jail — due to his young age — for a period of time. Around this time, a powerful labour alliance, the Muttahida Mazdoor Federation (MMF), was formed by figures such as Nabi Ahmed, SP Lodhi and Usman Baloch. Eventually, Bawar rose through the ranks, becoming the MMF’s vice president and a key leader of the workers’ action committee, which united thousands of workers from over 75 industrial units across Karachi.

Bawar explains, “Back then, if there was an issue at one mill, all workers from all mills would gather there to pressure the owner.” This period also saw the worker occupation of Valika Textile Mills in SITE in March 1971.

Laurent Gayer, a senior research fellow at the Centre de Recherches Internationales (CERI)-Sciences Po in Paris, observes that the meteoric rise of Bawar and Baloch signalled a profound change in the profile of trade union leaders in Karachi. “They rose from the shop floor and contrasted with the more educated, more polished professional trade unionists, who were often Urdu-speaking and rarely had any experience of industrial work themselves,” says Gayer, author of the forthcoming book Gunpoint Capitalism: Enforcing Industrial Order in Karachi.

Thus, the movement against forced removals, exploitative mill owners, and unfavourable government policies continued through June 1972.

THE EVENTS OF JUNE 1972

“It all begins with Feroz Sultan Mills,” Bawar says as he recalls what unfolded on June 7, 1972, and the firestorm that ensued. It was a typical day, with Bawar addressing workers at the gate of Zebtan Textile Mills during a shift change, a regular practice for labour leaders to mobilise support.

“News came in,” Bawar remembers, “that police had brutally baton-charged workers at Feroz Sultan Mills who were protesting for their overdue wages.” Bawar, along with hundreds of Zebtan workers who had just finished their shift, marched towards Feroz Sultan Mills to show solidarity.

As they approached the mill, chanting slogans against the management, the situation escalated. Police stationed at the gate opened fire indiscriminately, according to Bawar. The scene turned chaotic.

“Two of our colleagues,” Bawar says, “Painda Muhammad and Muhammad Shoaib, both from Zebtan Textiles, were killed in the firing, while many others were injured.” Police took Painda’s body inside the mill and continued firing from above, while enraged workers retaliated with stones, carrying Shoaib’s body away from the violence.

Workers brought Shoaib’s body to the Eidgah Ground in Pathan Colony. Labour leaders and workers from across the city gathered, delivering speeches until late at night. The workers unanimously decided to hold a massive funeral procession for Shoaib, culminating in prayers at the Governor’s House.

On the morning of June 8, thousands of workers converged at Pathan Colony. As the procession reached Banaras Chowk, a heavy police contingent, led by the then Deputy Commissioner (DC) Kunwar Idrees, awaited them. Tear gas failed to deter the crowd. Suddenly, police opened fire, killing several workers, all from Swat and Mardan districts, and injuring dozens more.

News of the killing spread like wildfire. Bawar, along with other labour leaders on the action committee, sprang into action. In defiance of the killings, workers across Karachi shut down factories in a citywide strike. Bawar recounts, “All major textile mills and other industries were brought to a standstill by protesting workers.”

Karamat Ali, PILER’s executive director, in his book Raahguzar Tau Dekho [Assess The Way], notes that while the labour leadership scrambled to strategise the next steps, the rank-and-file workers took matters into their own hands. He notes, “The entire industrial areas of SITE and Landhi, as well as Korangi and Kotri Hyderabad, were brought to a halt by the spontaneous worker-led shutdown.”

Production across the city plummeted. Karachi, the industrial heart of Pakistan, was effectively paralysed.


Nabi Ahmed (pictured above addressing the crowd) and Usman Baloch (standing next to Ahmed with his arms folded) at a gathering at Frontier Colony on June 8, 1972: in defiance of the killings, workers across Karachi shut down factories in a citywide strike | Raahguzar Tau Dekho


AN UNEASY TRUCE

With mills shut down for days, financial hardship gripped the workers, most of them daily wage earners. “The leadership felt the pressure and decided to negotiate with the government,” Bawar says.

Labour leaders presented a 14-point demand charter, which included an inquiry into the firing, action against responsible officers, the release of all workers arrested after the incident and the withdrawal of the cases against them. Other demands addressed civic issues, such as access to water, gas and electricity, faced by workers in the SITE area settlements, such as Frontier Colony and Pathan Colony. Regularisation of these settlements was also stipulated.

“They built makeshift dwellings because they had no other option,” Bawar explains. “But the Karachi Municipal Corporation would demolish them or demand bribes, claiming the land was unauthorised.” The workers toiled for eight hours in the mills, only to face another eight-hour struggle, just to find water in these neglected areas.

Kamran Asdar Ali, an academic who teaches anthropology at the University of Texas, Austin, in his paper The Strength of the Street Meets the Strength of the State: The 1972 Labour Struggle in Karachi, writes that the government seemed reluctant to address the action committee’s core demand — the suspension of implicated officials: “Some leaders complained about the state representatives dragging their feet: they would meet the provincial labour minister, Abdus Sattar Gabol, on one day; the governor of Sindh, Mir Rasool Baksh Talpur, on the second; and the chief minister, Mumtaz Bhutto, on the third. In turn, all three government officials relayed their discussions to Bhutto, who was on a foreign trip.”

However, the labour movement faced an unexpected complication. The National Awami Party’s (NAP) Wali faction’s local leaders not only opposed the movement in the localities but also actively undermined it, according to Bawar. They did this by taunting the workers with slogans such as, “Khoon baicha pani liya [sold blood, took water]”, creating division and mistrust.

To counter this and secure a public commitment, the labour leaders decided that the agreement with the government would be announced at Nishtar Park, inviting labour leaders and workers from across the city.

“At the rally,” Bawar reveals, “the government announced its agreement to meet our demands if the strike ended.” But the announcement sparked outrage among charged workers. They chanted “Khoon ka badla khoon [blood for blood],” demanding the arrest of police officer DSP Noor Khan, who had ordered the firing. Nabi Ahmed tried to calm them, but to no avail.

Seeing the growing tension, Baloch called Bawar to the stage. “I addressed the workers,” Bawar says. “I told them that we had accepted the agreement because further financial hardship would only weaken us. We can’t fight shopkeepers, who are not lending rations to us or our families. We’re securing what we can and are preparing for future battles. Our destiny lies in a ’mazdoor kisan raj [workers-peasants rule].”

Bawar’s words resonated with the workers. They hoisted him on their shoulders in agreement. “I told them to take one more day off,” he says, “and the factories would pay them for it.” Finally, after a gruelling 14 days, the factories reopened.


Bawar Khan (pictured above), now in his 70s, is living a quiet retirement in his village in Swat | Courtesy of the author



THE CRACKDOWN

Following initial negotiations with labour leaders, the Bhutto government took a sharp turn towards repression. While Bhutto’s labour reforms offered unprecedented benefits, such as inflation allowances, social security and increased worker participation in management, these progressive measures were coupled with a severe crackdown on dissent, particularly against labour leaders.

The government invoked the Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR), a tool previously used to silence political opposition, to target dissenters, including vocal labour leaders. This crackdown heavily relied on the Federal Security Force (FSF), a paramilitary force created by Bhutto to quell dissent after a police strike in March 1972. Media reports from that time documented the detention of 58 labour leaders, including Bawar and Baloch, from Karachi, Gharo, Hyderabad, Kotri and Kashmore, within a year of the June 1972 unrest.

“From June 1972 onwards,” Bawar recounts, “the government kept arresting and releasing me, a cycle that went on for several years. They fabricated charges, including cattle theft, to justify these arrests.” He estimated spending a total of three years in various provincial jails under Bhutto’s rule.

When Gen Ziaul Haq took power in July 1977, he ended the DPR cases against political, labour and student leaders, including Bawar.

FACING OPPOSITION, FORGING UNITY

The 1972 Karachi labour movement drew its strength from a confluence of social, political and economic factors. Scholars and labour leaders offer various perspectives on its success, highlighting the city’s unique context and evolving worker organisation strategies.

Asdar Ali emphasises Karachi’s explosive growth — fuelled by industrialisation between 1947 and 1972, with a population increase of 217 per cent — as a factor in the labour movement. More than half of Karachi’s growth since the early 1950s is attributed to migration from India and from rural and other urban areas of the country, he writes. He further explains how the practice of “jobbers” — recruitment of workers from specific districts in the NWFP and Southern Punjab through economic and social coercion, often based on ethnicity — created a divided workforce with limited bargaining power.

However, by the late 1960s, a radicalised left-wing movement had emerged, challenging these “pocket unions” controlled by management, Asdar Ali writes. This movement aimed to organise workers into independent trade unions and address the complex ethnic and social hierarchies within workplaces and worker colonies. Gayer says that Bhutto’s coming to power had galvanised workers and many believed that this would mark the beginning of the “mazdoor kisan raj.”

In his August 1972 article ‘From Pathan Colony to a Workers’ State’ in the Pakistan Forum journal, academic Iqbal Khan noted that the June 1972 state violence against workers was not surprising. He highlighted that the period leading up to the incident, particularly following the announcement of the Bhutto government’s labour policy, saw a significant surge in working-class activism, which he described as “an explosion in working-class militancy.”

He writes, “Strikes and gheraos have become common, everyday occurrences in hundreds of mills throughout Pakistan; in many industrial units, there has been an almost perpetual state of war between management and workers, often involving bloody clashes.” To underscore the scale of this unrest, he cited official statistics. In Punjab alone, from January to May 1972, there were 63 strikes and 55 gheraos. The situation in Sindh was even more volatile, with 176 factories gheraoed — 150 in Karachi and 26 in Hyderabad.

Despite its strength, the 1972 Karachi labour movement faced significant challenges. Bawar highlighted widespread opposition, not just from established parties such as Bhutto’s PPP and NAP (Wali group), but also from some communist leaders because of their pro-China and pro-Soviet divisions. Even the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) opposed the movement on religious grounds. Bawar reveals, “The Jamaat deemed the demand for profit-linked bonuses, separate from regular wages, as ‘haram’ in Islam.”

However, the movement achieved a remarkable feat — overcoming ethnic divisions within the workforce. According to Asdar Ali, the Mohajir-dominated trade union leadership, which played a crucial role in advocating for labour rights in Karachi, also managed to “contain, much to its advantage, the cultural and linguistic tensions between the more highly skilled local workers (Mohajirs) and the less skilled up-country migrants (Pashtun/Southern Punjabis) through a rhetoric of class solidarity and proletarian politics.”

As Bawar observes, “At that time, all ethnicities, Pashtuns, Urdu-speakers, Punjabis, Baloch, etc, were working together in the mills and participated in labour politics.” However, this unity proved fragile. Bawar laments that the rise of ethnic politics during Zia’s dictatorship, particularly the emergence of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), fractured this working-class solidarity. “It caused a huge loss to the working class, particularly the poor labourers,” he says.


The family of a labourer, Nekzada, mourns his death after he was fired upon by the police during protests on June 8, 1972: police opened fire on protestors who had converged at Pathan Colony, killing several workers and injuring dozens more | Dawn Archives

BHUTTO’S CRACKDOWN: BALANCING ACT OR BETRAYAL?

Academics and labour leaders offer various explanations for Bhutto’s use of force.

One key factor highlighted by some academics is the precarious economic situation Bhutto inherited. Academic Iqbal Khan, writing for the Pakistan Forum, emphasises the near-collapsed state of the economy and dwindling foreign currency reserves and views allowing worker actions to intimidate capitalists as economic suicide.

Some view it as a delicate balancing act. Bhutto’s nationalisation programme itself could have been seen as a concession to labour demands, diverting attention from further worker activism. Perhaps Bhutto saw stabilising the economy and consolidating power after a turbulent period as more important.

The academic Tausif Ahmed Khan explains, “Industrialists, already displeased with Bhutto’s nationalisation policies, had been further alienated by a labour movement. By cracking down, Bhutto aimed to appease them and maintain economic stability.” He also suggests Bhutto might have aimed to project a moderate image to the United States, distancing himself from socialist ideals associated with strong labour movements.

Karamat Ali says Bhutto’s dictatorial and feudal mindset ultimately hindered constructive dialogue with the labour movement. According to him, “Bhutto touted his pro-worker actions, such as nationalising industries, appointing labour representatives to directorships and increasing worker profit-sharing, and therefore became resentful of labour criticism and viewed their activism as a threat to his authority.”

The labour movement also exposed tensions within the PPP. Radical elements, such as Mairaj Mohammad Khan, accused the government of betraying its pro-worker stance by appeasing industrialists. This internal conflict highlighted a growing divide between the party’s leftist wing and more conservative elements that feared prolonged strikes could destabilise the government.

Tausif Ahmed Khan argues that the weakened labour movement created a vacuum that Islamist parties like JI readily exploited. “This, combined with the rise of the Pakistan National Alliance [PNA] movement, swayed many Mohajir and Pashtun voters in Karachi towards the right-wing,” he says.

He also asserts that a vibrant labour movement could have bolstered Karachi’s historically liberal character, shaped by student and worker activism: “Its decline might have paved the way for right-wing parties to gain traction. This, coupled with the PPP’s struggles to establish a strong presence in Karachi, could explain the party’s ongoing challenges in the city.”

Many leaders and workers, primarily Pashtuns, later joined mainstream parties, particularly the National Democratic Party (NDP), according to the Veteran labour lawyer Manan Baacha. This party, formed after Bhutto banned the NAP for alleged subversive activities, became a new political home for these figures. Baloch, for instance, joined the Mir Ghous Bux Bizenjo-led Pakistan National Party.

“The PPP’s handling of the labour movement through an ethnic lens,” Baacha notes, “deterred them from joining that party.” He cites the 1977 national assembly elections, where Sherbaz Mazari, the NDP leader, defeated the PPP candidate in Baldia Town and SITE industrial areas, under the banner of the PNA — a testament to the shift in worker allegiance.

WEAKENING OF THE MOVEMENT

Karamat Ali, in his book, details how mill owners and the labour department collaborated to suppress worker activism by circulating photographs of identified labour leaders, creating a climate of fear. This repression coincided with a period of economic hardship. “The textile crisis,” he explains, “which heavily impacted the sectors with high worker mobilisation, was followed by the oil crisis, leading to widespread industrial closures

“With local industries crippled,” Karamat Ali adds, “many active trade unionists, primarily from the Swat Valley, were forced to return to their hometowns or seek work abroad in the Gulf countries until early 1975. This mass exodus significantly weakened the Karachi labour force, depriving the movement of its vital core.”

Baacha characterises the movement as “haadsaati” or ‘accidental’ and argues that this unplanned nature, while successful initially, ultimately hindered its long-term impact. The movement lacked the crucial element of political backing, causing it to lose momentum.

Mill owners, emboldened by Zia’s dictatorship, implemented a contract system and mass layoffs, which further weakened the labour movement, according to Baacha. He says, “Trade union leaders at the industry level became part of ‘pocket unions’ and began playing the role of ‘contractors’.”

Bawar’s story exemplifies the impact on individual workers. “After the imprisonments, I was blacklisted,” Bawar recounts. “No one was hiring me as a worker.” After months of unemployment, workers collected donations to send Bawar’s family back to Swat and helped him join the shipping industry as a seaman, where he worked for 12 years. Later, he worked as a labourer in the United States, until recently, when he returned to Pakistan permanently.

THE REMAINS OF THE DAY

The 1972 Karachi strike remains a significant event, a testament to the power of organised labour even when it falls short of its initial goals. Today, however, Pakistan’s trade union landscape presents a stark contrast. Weakened by fragmentation, economic shifts and government policies, their ability to effectively advocate for workers’ rights remains a significant challenge.

Bawar, now in his 70s, is living a quiet retirement in Dherai village in Swat. In early 2022, he visited Karachi to reconnect with old friends, where labour groups hosted programmes in his honour. “Unfortunately,” he says, “the situation for workers today, particularly in Karachi, is worse than in 1972. But there is no labour movement or trade union because of the divisions among workers on various grounds.”

“Our movement was not just about pay,” he reflects, “it was about respect, about being seen. Karachi belonged to the workers in 1972. It was a different kind of power, a solidarity that forced the government to listen.”

“Karachi needs that again,” Bawar says.

The writer is a journalist and researcher whose work appears in The New York Times, Dawn, and other publications, as well as for various policy institutes. He can reached at zeea.rehman@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, EOS, June 9th, 2024

Header image: On June 10, 1972, a labourers’ procession is taken out from Frontier Colony in Karachi. It passes through Narimabad and Golimar, and ends at Quaid-i-Azam’s mausoleum: after the events of June 7-8, 1972, factories across Karachi remained shut for 14 days as labourers continued their protests | Dawn Archives


The writer is a journalist and researcher, who writes for The New York Times and Nikkei Asia, among other publications. He also assesses democratic and conflict development in Pakistan for various policy institutes. He tweets @zalmayzia

DOCUMENTARY: A MOMENT IN TIME

Adam Behr 
THE CONVERSATION

The last time The Beatles ever played together, on the roof of the Apple Records building in London in January 1969 | Trinity Mirror/Alamy


In one sense, Let It Be — director Michael Lindsay-Hogg’s 1970 film documenting The Beatles’ recording sessions of January 1969, and their famous concert on the rooftop of the Apple building — could be viewed as something of a coda to the main event.

At the time, both the film and the accompanying album of the same name reached the public a month after the band’s break-up was announced. In the present day, its re-release follows Peter Jackson’s epic Get Back docu-series, which drew on the 60 hours of raw footage of the same sessions to provide a more complete account of the recordings.

So, why the fuss? Re-releases and re-masters are a standard feature of both the film and music industries, and The Beatles’ media and commercial juggernaut has arguably led the way in this for a long time. First, there’s the sheer length of time, since the film was last generally available more than 50 years ago.

The answer also partly lies in the distinctive way in which, beyond their huge financial success, the narrative of The Beatles as a band has been woven into popular music and wider history.

The re-release of the 1970 Beatles film Let It Be reveals how the history of popular music is written

Peter Jackson’s 2020 series, in many respects, superseded Hogg’s film, providing a fuller picture of the sessions, which also fed into the Abbey Road album, the band’s last recording (even though Let It Be was released afterwards).

Same events, different perspectives

A highlight of both the film and series was the concluding rooftop concert, but Jackson’s programme was widely acknowledged for adding context to the band’s closing chapter. The hours of jamming and studio high-jinks revealed moments of camaraderie and a less rancorous atmosphere than had previously been thought.

So, beyond the events themselves, there’s an element of historiography at play here — a concern with how history is written and constructed. Since Let It Be’s original release, The Beatles have become an increasingly important aspect of popular music, and wider social history. Beyond the mystique acquired by inaccessibility for so long, the film gains interest as a document of how the band’s last days as an active unit were framed, and experienced, at the time.

In purely functional terms, it’s obviously easier to give a more complete account of the recording sessions in the nearly eight hours afforded by Peter Jackson’s Get Back than the one-and-a-half hours available to Lindsay-Hogg on Let It Be.

Moments of discord appear in both, notably the famous encounter between a taciturn George Harrison — who walked out during the sessions — telling a cajoling Paul McCartney, about a guitar part: “I’ll play, you know, whatever you want me to play. Or I won’t play at all, if you don’t want me to play.”

These are diluted in the long stretch of Get Back, but become part of the central narrative of Let It Be. Filmmakers’ editorial decisions shape their stories, but are informed by their own contexts. Lindsay-Hogg was editing the film at a time when the band had just split, and trying to salvage a viable product from a somewhat chaotic process, since he’d originally been taken on to produce a television documentary and concert broadcast.

Re-tooling it as a film was a response to the band dropping the idea of a major event, the now legendary rooftop performance only emerging as a process of back-and-forth compromise.

Conversely, one of the iconic elements of Jackson’s Get Back series shows Paul McCartney coming up with the bare bones of the song of the same name more or less impromptu, and the pleasure in seeing how it develops.

But that relies on the more leisurely pacing of the long form allowed by primary release on a streaming platform, as opposed to the editorial constraints of a cinema (or even television) release.

The streaming format was, of course, a long way off in the future when Lindsay-Hogg was working with the band. Jackson’s series also works more profoundly because of the classic status Get Back (the song) has accrued over half a century.

For Lindsay-Hogg filming in 1969, it was just another jam — albeit by the world’s most famous band. In 2020, much of the audience was witnessing the genesis of a song they’d known their whole lives.

Framing popular music history

Get Back reviews the longitudinal process of a band at work, and one whose working processes had influenced many of the acts that followed in their wake. The Beatles’ success helped to shape the very idea of a band combining multiple songwriters and friends into a social, creative and business unit.

Their split was big news, and mattered in a way that the re-combinations of musicians into new working units had not done previously. Let It Be was tied into that historical moment, and the presence in the room of Lindsay-Hogg’s cameras helped to define it.

Viewed at the arrival of the 1970s, as the preeminent band of the 1960s announced their demise, Let It Be told the story of an ending, enhanced by the technical fact that it was blown up from a 16mm print, for TV, to 35mm for the cinema, adding a dark, grainy patina to the proceedings, now alleviated in the remastering process.

Now in 2024, it’s a document in a wider archive of Beatles lore and helps to inform the process of how the history of popular music is written.

The writer is a Senior Lecturer in Popular & Contemporary music at Newcastle University in the UK

Republished from The Conversation
Published in Dawn, ICON, June 2nd, 2024
PAKISTAN

Federal funding for universities
Stopping federal annual grants to provincially chartered universities is an ill-advised move.


Dr Muhammad Ali Shaikh 



UNIVERSITIES in Pakistan are again in the news — once again for the wrong reasons. The issue this time is that the federal government has decided to stop giving annual recurring grants to provincially chartered universities, ending a practice that had been in vogue since independence.

Accordingly, the federal government asked the Higher Education Commission (HEC) on May 24, 2024, to resubmit the budget proposal, reducing the demand to less than one-fifth of the original amount asked — from Rs126 billion to Rs25bn — catering for only the federally chartered universities.

The cited logic behind the federal government’s decision is that, as education has been devolved to the provinces under the 18th Amendment, it is now the responsibility of the provincial governments to foot the bill of universities established and chartered by them.

This decision sent shockwaves across the country, particularly among students and academia of some 160 affected universities. On their part, the Federation of All Pakistan Universities Academic Staff Associations sprang into action and held their executive council’s meeting in which they rejected the government’s decision and decided to launch a national protest movement and observe May 30 as a ‘black day’.

Stopping federal annual grants to provincially chartered universities is an ill-advised move.

It is an irony that 85 years ago on that day, on May 30, 1939, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah wrote his final will, in which he bequeathed his entire personal wealth to educational institutions, showcasing his commitment to the cause of education. But with him were gone his ideals and aspirations.

Coming back to the present, let’s examine the issue and suggest a way out. First of all, the most striking aspect of the government’s decision is its abruptness. The practice of federal funding to all chartered universities, both federal and provincial, has been going on for a very long time. Even the 18th Amendment was passed 14 years ago.

If the federal government had been serious about the matter, it could have gradually eased itself out in a phased manner, after the passage of the 18th Amendment. Now, expecting universities, which are fully dependent on federal grants, to create alternative financial resources on such short notice — just a month before the start of the next financial year in July — is not understandable.

Another aspect is the federal government’s legal competence to take unilateral decisions in such matters. Constitutionally speaking, the forum for resolving issues that involve the interests of the federation and the provinces is the Council of Common Interests. Before taking any action, the federal government would be well advised to raise this issue in the CCI and have it resolved there.

It is also very important to involve the other stakeholders in the decision-making process. In the present case, these stakeholders are students, their parents, universities, representative faculty bodies and staff associations as well as the general public.

Here, it is pertinent to see what is happening across our borders, particularly in India and Bangladesh, because the three of us share the same roots in connection with our higher education systems.

In the case of India, its union (federal) government allocated an amount equal to $5.6bn for the higher education sector in fiscal year 2023-24, in addition to the state governments’ grants to their respective universities. Following this example, Pakistan, about one-fifth of India in terms of population, should have allocated at least $1bn in federal grants for its higher education sector.

Meanwhile, Bangladesh, which has a population of about 171 million, allocated over $1bn for its 53 public universities during the same year.

In contrast, Pakistan has frozen its federal outlay for higher education to Rs65bn since 2018. In dollar terms, this amount in June 2018 was equal to $537m (at the exchange rate of 121 rupees to a dollar), which has now shrunk in its dollar value to $232m (at the exchange rate of 280 rupees a dollar).

Despite repeated demands from academia and students, the government did not increase allocations for higher education during the last six years. This year, it is altogether ending it, except for an amount of $89m for federally chartered universities.

This move has already given rise to various conspiracy theories and interpretations. One such exposition states that the move is intended to benefit the already rich universities run and operated by the armed forces as almost all of them are federally chartered institutes, at the expense of poor public universities spread across the four provinces. This impression is not good for national coherence and harmony.

In these circumstances, the best course of action for the federal government would be to not only continue with federal grants to all universities until the matter is discussed and decided by the CCI, but to also consider enhancing the allocation to a level that matches at least the figures for Bangladesh — the rupee equivalent of $1bn.

On their part, the provinces should also shoulder their responsibilities towards higher education and contribute their bit, following the pattern in India. In the current context, Sindh is the only province that has provided grants amounting to Rs26bn to its universities, an action that needs to be followed by the rest of the provinces.

The universities should also find ways to boost their own resources, on the pattern of countries like China, Turkey, Malaysia, etc. One good way to do this is to rationalise their fee structures on the basis of the real incurred cost on various programmes, and then subsidise it for poor students only.

Last but not least, there is an urgent need to bring extreme prudence and transparency to university spending processes and enforce a mechanism of accountability to eradicate funds misuse and corruption. That is how we shall be able to develop our universities and help them play their due role in national development and prosperity.

The writer is a development professional and a former vice chancellor.
drshaikhma@gmail.com

Published in Dawn, June 3rd, 2024




Tyranny of learning


Nasira Habib 
Published June 4, 2024






SCHOOL education in Pakistan plays no constructive role in cultivating a civic sense in students. It fails to prepare responsible citizens. The social studies school curriculum claims a paradigm shift to an inquiry-based approach, focusing on ‘student constructed’ learning, instead of teacher-transmitted information. It also recognises that learning experiences must be relevant to students’ daily lives.

The prerequisites of such an approach are relevant cultural context, understanding of students’ prior knowledge, immersive teaching, active participation, and recognising the critical importance of their voices. However, these essential elements are missing in textbooks.

There has been no effort to locate the teaching of citizenship in students’ sociocultural realities in primary school textbooks. On the contrary, the text is context-neutral and abstract. The language is dull, monotonous and difficult. Not only linguistically but conceptually as well, it is age-inappropriate. The content is uninteresting and the vocabulary and concepts far more advanced than their comprehension level. A chapter on general knowledge uses six sentences to educate six-year-old Grade 2 children on rights and duties, including the right to religious freedom. Without explaining human rights, a table gives four types of rights and five kinds of responsibilities.

The rights include the freedom to choose an occupation, the right to shelter homes for destitute people, and the right to electricity, gas, clean drinking water, a safe environment, housing, education, protection, and healthcare. Furthermore, the textbooks want children to ‘define’ a government and its roles and responsibilities.


Are we producing responsible citizens?

The chapter on the role of the government and citizens for Grade 3 is no less pathetic. The curriculum expects seven-year-old children to link water shortages in some areas of Pakistan to the increase in population, a lower water table, absence of water storage facilities, poor water supply management and irrational water use. The textbook also asks them to give suggestions on how a government and citizens can collaborate to meet the needs of a community.

At the end of the lesson, they must know the qualities of good citizens, for example, being law-abiding, responsible, trustworthy, gender-just, tolerant, and respectful of others’ rights. The relevant chapters for Grade 4 take children farther away from their reality and achieve new heights of abstraction. The chapter on citizenship describes at least 33 complex concepts in 26 sentences. Almost every sentence presents a new idea.

Students are required to memorise the definitions of an ‘ordinary’, ‘digital’ and ‘global’ citizen. They have to endlessly repeat and commit to memory complex concepts like the caste system, international affairs, conflict resolution through dialogue, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, protection of language and culture, religious freedom, right of movement, speech and expression, payment of taxes, and changes in rights and responsibilities over time. In addition, 26 bullet points present an array of rights and duties for the three categories of citizens.

There is an absence of sensitivity in the textbooks pertaining to children’s lived experiences, the extent of their exposure, location, access to technology, etc. The textbooks also appear to overlook teachers’ ability to deal with such intellectually challenging concepts. The borrowed format of the presentation and layout of the text makes a mockery of the thought behind the format.

Such imposed and undemocratic education is a tyranny for learners. It leads them to using hollow words, having no de­­mocratic values and convictions, and la­­cking the courage to stand up for civic ideals. Poor governance, slackness in law enforcement, and rampant corruption reinforce their ignorance and disbelief in democratic values. People without a value system, logical thinking, and decision-making tools become conformists and follow the crowd.

We must teach democratic behaviour and form habits from the first day of school. Instead of talking about J.S. Mill and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, education must be structured around everyday happenings involving children, inviting them to express their views, listening to them, and giving them ownership in decision-making, such as developing classroom rules.

School life presents many situations in the classroom, in the lab, in the library, in the garden and on the playground, which themselves relate to issues of rights and duties, justice and fair play, gender equity and responsibility, and need resolution. Such immersion would help children think and act democratically. Textbooks must facilitate these processes. Otherwise, they are counterproductive.

The writer is an educationist, environmentalist and ecological gardener.
nasira@khoj.edu.pk

Published in Dawn, June 4th, 2024
PAKISTAN

Price of peace

Muhammad Amir Rana 
Published June 9, 2024 
DAWN




PAKISTAN is not alone in confronting armed opposition. Many nations grapple with persistent violence, often resorting to force over peace negotiations. This hesitation stems from the fear of concessions, neglecting the heavy price paid for prolonged conflict.

Colombia offers a compelling example. In 2016, it opted for peace, establishing a ceasefire with major rebel groups — primarily factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which has been active since 1964. Despite initial setbacks, Colombia recently enacted a Total Peace Bill to forge agreements with remaining armed groups.

Colombia’s peace process has been arduous, with the government determined to achieve an end to the conflict, even if it necessitates meeting some of the armed groups’ demands. This dilemma resonates with states facing insurgencies, who fear internationalising their conflicts. While Colombia’s UN involvement, prompted by resistance demands, ultimately aided negotiations, core issues like land reform, victim justice, and political participation remain unresolved.

The success stories of other peace processes offer valuable lessons. Notably, many successful agreements involved compromises across the ta­­b­le. In some cases, these have caused major amendments in social contracts of the states, the autonomy of a region, the separation of a territory, or agreement on resource distribution. The Good Friday Agreement in 1998 in Northern Ireland helped end the violent conflict known as ‘The Troubles’, leading to power-sharing in the North­ern Ireland Assembly and disarmament of paramilitary groups.

Colombians took 50 years to assess the strength of the resistance movement.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 ended the Second Sudanese Civil War, granted southern Sudan autonomy, and led to a referendum in 2011, after which South Sudan gained independence.

The Peace Accords (1996) in Guatemala ended 36 years of civil war, leading to the demobilisation and integration of guerrilla fighters into society, and significant political reforms. The Mindanao Peace Process (2014) in the Philippines and the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro established the Bangsamoro Autono­mous Region, granting greater autonomy and addressing the grievances of the Moro people.

Finally, the Final Agreement (2016) between the Colombian government and the FARC was signed. The agreement ended over 50 years of armed conflict. These peace processes typically involved lengthy negotiations, international mediation, and the establishment of frameworks for disarmament, political integration, and socioeconomic development to address the root causes of the conflicts.

A multifaceted armed resistance stretched out for 50 years in Colombia because it had roots in socioeconomic factors, took time to pick momentum, and once it picked momentum, it became more lethal compared with movements triggered by religion and ideologies. A mix of socioecono­mic, political, and ideological factors can nurture a separatist solid resistance against the states. The FARC emerged as a response to deep-rooted social and economic inequalities in rural Colombia. Vast land ownership disparities and peasant communities’ marginalisation provided fertile ground for the group’s initial support and recruitment.

Colombians took 50 years just to assess the strength of the resistance movement, which resu­l­ted in thousands of deaths, political instability, a poor economy, and a constant state of fear. Un­­governed and poorly governed spaces have always provided fertile ground for resistance movements, and Colombia was no different in this respect.

A similar situation was witnessed in the Fed­e­rally Administrative Tribal Areas — now the New­ly Merged Tribal Districts — where the state is still facing armed and unarmed resistance aga­inst its approach to governing these areas. The banned TTP wants to revoke the status of these areas to regain the strength it enjoyed before the military operations and under tribal arrangements.

Balochistan is facing the worst governance crisis; a hybrid governance system has failed to stop the power elites’ misuse of the province’s resources. It cannot deliver services to the people and needs help to conceive a development plan. The securitisation of the province fuels anger among the people, including those who have experienced urban life in other parts of the country.

A comparison between the Baloch and FARC armed resistance can be drawn as both movements are deeply rooted in socioeconomic disparities. An­­oth­er common feature that creates a conducive environment for the armed resistance movement lies in the structure of the parallel economies in the areas, which include illicit trade, smuggling, drug trafficking, etc. Both state and non-state actors become the beneficiaries of this parallel ec­­o­­nomy. The resolution of the problem can hurt their economic benefits, and they resist any attempt at this.

In Colombia, the FARC survived so long because of parallel economic structures, which significantly funded its operations through the cultivation, production, and trafficking of cocaine. Kidnapping for ransom and extortion of local businesses and individuals were also significant sources of income for the FARC, further sustaining the resistance.

Two factors that the state emphasises are regional dynamics and external support for the armed resistance. These are essential factors, but to deal with armed resistance, it must concentrate on other aspects too. For instance, the state underestimates the armed group’s ability to adapt its tactics and strategy to changing circumstances, as well as the local support network it has built up over time.

There is nothing new about the dynamics of armed resistance — a vast amount of literature is available on the subject. However, the peace process is challenging. First, realising that the chain of violence cannot be broken without a dialogue takes time, as the state evaluates strength in terms of resources, and not in terms of the local support that is available to resistance movements. The ceasefire between the Colombian government and FARC dissidents has been mixed, with both positive outcomes and significant challenges. However, spoilers continue to provoke both the state and non-state actors, which causes violations of agreements and inconsistencies in the implementation of peace agreements, often extending the peace process.

While a good takeaway from the Colombian peace process is that it has not caused the country’s disintegration, it is also true that had the peace process been started 40 years ago, the results would not have been very different. The state took 50 years just to prove it is strong, but real strength comes through dialogue.

The writer is a security analyst.


Published in Dawn, June 9th, 2024

Chinese advice

Muhammad Amir Rana 





PAKISTAN’S law-enforcement agencies have completed the investigation of the Dasu terrorist attack carried out against Chinese nationals in March, in record time.

This is, indeed, a remarkable achievement, but it does not seem to have impressed the Chinese authorities very much, as there have been reports that Beijing wants a large-scale anti-terrorism operation, like Zarb-i-Azb, against the militants.

On March 26, a convoy of Chinese nationals travelling from Islamabad to the Dasu Hydropower Project site in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Kohistan district was attacked by Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists. The government announced compensation of $2.5 million for the families of the five Chinese nationals who lost their lives in the attack. A joint investigation team comprising police and intelligence agencies’ personnel was immediately formed to address Chinese concerns regarding the capability of Pakistani law enforcers to probe a high-profile terrorist attack.

The reports of China’s demand for a massive counterterrorism operation are reflective of Beijing’s concerns over the escalating threats to Chinese nationals working on CPEC-related and other projects in this country. Pakistan has a history of launching such counterterrorism operations at the request of China. The Lal Masjid operation in Islamabad in 2007 was launched after Chinese President Hu Jintao called Gen Musharraf. Prior to the operation, women students of the Jamia Hafsa madressah had kidnapped Chinese health workers who they believed were commercial sex workers.

One can take precautionary steps against terrorist groups, but what about intolerance?

International pressure, including from the Chinese, also worked in 2014 when the Pakistan military launched Operation Zarb-i-Azb in North Waziristan. China fully supported the Financial Action Task Force’s recommendation that Pakistan comply with its counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering commitments. The maximum favour the Chinese officials extended to Pakistan in this case was to support the country’s need for more time to fulfil the financial watchdog’s requirements.

However, China’s latest demand regarding a large-scale operation does not seem feasible, as the TTP and its affiliates are hiding in Afghanistan, and cross-border operations would trigger a major conflict in the region. Moreover, there is also the Baloch insurgency, which is a complex issue that needs to be handled delicately. There is already an ongoing encounter between the insurgents and security forces in Balochistan. Any misadventure is likely to incur heavy political and security costs.

Pakistan’s economy is in the throes of a deep crisis, and a massive military operation would entail its own costs. At the same time, it seems that the Pakistani leadership is underestimating the demands of its friends for a fully secure environment for their investment. This is not only about China, a major investor in Pakistan, but also other friends of the country, such as Saudi Arabia, which have concerns similar to Beijing’s when it comes to putting their money here. These states are taking security concerns very seriously.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently approved a cooperation agreement between the Presidency of State Security in the kingdom and the military intelligence in Pakistan to combat terrorism and its financing. The Pakistani leadership appears overly confident in its assessment that the security challenges at home can be mitigated as before; it wants the states that are looking at investment prospects in the country to trust its capabilities. However, terrorist incidents such as the Dasu attack will only shake the confidence of foreign investors.

No doubt, the Taliban’s Afghanistan has emerged as a major security challenge for the country, but terrorism and extremism have a long history of state institutions using them as tools for political and strategic purposes. One can be aware of the dynamics of terrorist groups and take precautions, but what about intolerance, which can erupt suddenly and result in the lynching of innocent people?

The state has fanned the flames of intolerance in society, and this has eroded the social fabric and made conditions insecure for the minorities and for those who think differently from the state. Intolerance has become a huge hurdle in the way of economic progress, including foreign investment. How will the Chinese forget the incident last year when one of their nationals barely escaped lynching by a mob at the Dasu Hydropower Project site? The Chinese official was simply asking employees to complete their work before going for prayers.

Security firms dealing in risk assessment most often cite the killing of Priyantha Kumara Diyawadana, a Sri Lankan national lynched by a mob on Dec 3, 2021, in Sialkot, to show who controls the environment for investment.

If you were to ask a Pakistani official or leader, they would claim that Pakistanis are moderate in their views and the most tolerant society among Muslim nations. Such a claim was recently made in Beijing. Lynching incidents are dismissed as the actions of a few misguided and emotional youths.

However, defending the indefensible causes more damage and shakes even friendly countries’ confidence in one’s ability to maintain security. The truth is that Pakistan’s social indicators are amongst the poorest anywhere. A major reason for this is substandard education and an extensive network of religious institutions that nurture extremism and intolerance in the country. The establishment has not stopped considering the political utility of religious institutions either.

Extremism and intolerance are thriving with state support, as the power elites are not willing to review their connection with the clergy. Making policies to counter extremism and terrorism satisfies their conscience, and they believe that by simply placing policy drafts in the cupboards of the relevant ministries, they will automatically solve the issue. The maximum effort by the state to solve the problem has been to create institutions to counter extremism. Eventually, these institutions are used to appease the clergy.

China goes by its own model to forcefully ‘harmonise’ its ethnic and religious communities. However, for Pakistan, the first and foremost priority must be to abandon its approach of pacifying the sentiments of the hardliners, and instead, stand with the weak and the victims, regardless of their religion or community.

The writer is a security analyst.

Published in Dawn, June 2nd, 2024

 

New film depicting ‘hero’s journey’ of Swami Vivekananda comes to PBS

'America's First Guru' is a 90-minute look at how Swami Vivekananda introduced yoga and Hinduism to the Western world.

Poster for

(RNS) — A new film by Raja Choudhury, titled “America’s First Guru,” will be released to worldwide audiences on almost 200 PBS stations Friday (May 31). The documentary-style film tells the story of Swami Vivekananda, the young monk who brought Vedanta Hinduism to the Western world.

“When I first came to the U.S. in 1998, I realized that nobody here in America knew the story of how yoga and Vedanta Hinduism really came into the popular conversation,” Raja Choudhury told RNS. “I had this idea that this was a tipping point story we needed to tell about the birth of that conversation — of Hinduism and yoga in America and the interfaith movement.”

Originally released to PBS streaming, the film takes a 90-minute look at Swami Vivekananda’s journey to the U.S., from his famous speech to the 1893 Parliament of the World’s Religions to the legacy of his impact more than a century later on contemporary religious pluralism, interfaith understanding and the recognition of an inherent divinity in all beings.


“In a way, it was a kind of Joseph Campbell hero’s journey,” said Choudhury. “This young man discovers an Obi-Wan Kenobi type teacher who gives him the wisdom. Then he looks around India and sees that we are a struggling nation. Then he takes this trip to America and the adventure begins. And he becomes a superstar at this conference. And next thing you know, he’s changing the world.”

Narendranath Datta, born in 1863 in Kolkata, was a curious young man when he came across his guru Sri Ramakrishna in 1881. He went on to take a monk’s vow and became Swami Vivekananda. At age 30, the charismatic monk was invited as a spokesperson of Hindu philosophy to speak at the Parliament, where he famously began his speech with the words, “Sisters and brothers of America.”

“He saw that Americans were extremely practical people and needed practical tools for enlightenment and for wisdom to come into their lives,” said Choudhury.

At the time, the New York Herald called him “undoubtedly the greatest figure in the Parliament of Religions,” going on to say that, “after hearing him, we feel foolish to send missionaries to this learned nation.” For six years, Vivekananda traversed the United States, lecturing to religious and laymen alike on Raja, Jnana, Karma and Bhakti Yoga. Vivekananda is credited with altering the West’s perception of Indian wisdom and with bringing Hinduism to the status of a major world religion.



Samrat Chakrabarti plays the role of Swami Vivekananda in the film, which intersperses historical photos and videos with Vivekananda’s own speeches and letters, as well as interviews with several experts. 

Following his footsteps in America, the film depicts the orange-robed Swami traveling in modern-day New York City in scenes that Choudhury says were his favorite to film: especially when some New Yorkers would ask Chakrabarti for blessings.


“Vivekananda was a very modern man, said Choudhury. “Even in the 1890s, he was speaking a language about pluralism and acceptance and diversity and tolerance. And it’s just as relevant today, you know, where most young people consider themselves to be spiritual, but not religious and not aligned to any particular dogma or creed or teaching. This is the language we need to speak. And that’s why it resonates so well today.”

For Choudhury, who previously won the National Film Award in India for his film “The Quantum Indians,” this 10-year-long project was also a tribute to his father’s heritage and his own faith. Choudhury, a global citizen who has lived in England, Nigeria and India and calls himself a “spiritual being having a great adventure on this earth,” follows the wisdom of Sri Ramakrishna and Vivekananda, whom his Bengali father revered, even going to the same college in Kolkata as Vivekananda once did.

Raja Choudhury. (Courtesy photo)

Raja Choudhury. (Courtesy photo)

“It’s kind of spiritual for me because this was my sadhana (spiritual practice),” he said. “My own spiritual journey was through both Shakti and Vedanta, to this kind of work with Ramakrishna and Vivekananda and other teachers. And then, you know, as a filmmaker, it’s the story I always wanted to tell, so the universe aligned for me in a way.”

For Swami Medhananda, a professor of Vedanta philosophy and a monk in the Ramakrishna Order in Hollywood, California, he similarly considers his academic work as his own spiritual practice. Medhananda, who is interviewed in the film, said he was glad to be a part of a project that centers the teacher who led him on a spiritual path after being raised in a “culturally Hindu” family in Massachusetts.

“It’s detailed, it’s visually impactful, but there’s also music and duration, and there’s somebody acting as Swamiji,” said Medhananda. “And it’s very dramatic, vivid. It really leaves an impression, more so than other media could have done. And I think Raja has done a good job of making the Swami’s life and teaching appealing and plausible to Westerners, which I think is a genuine achievement.”

Medhananda, who serves as the Hindu chaplain at UCLA and USC, agrees with Choudhury that Vivekananda’s words remain just as potent today as they were a century ago for young people who are increasingly “looking for evidence” when it comes to religious beliefs. “The secret of life is not enjoyment, but education through experience,” he tells his students, quoting Vivekananda.


“Vivekananda says religion is being and becoming: the idea that the goal of religion is direct experiential realization, that you have to verify the claims of religion for yourself. And so I always consider realization to be the goal of all my spiritual practice and my monastic life.”

For both Choudhury and Medhananda, questions of yoga’s cultural appropriation, from meditation retreats to mindfulness fads, are not of immediate concern. According to them, Swami Vivekananda himself would have appreciated the widespread adoption of Indian wisdom for people of all backgrounds. 

“If a few people make a few million dollars selling yoga gear, good luck for them,” said Choudhury. “But he would have said that a woman doing Hatha Yoga in Idaho is the beginning of a journey into the Vedantic idea. Why should we sit there and hold our heads and complain that they’re stealing all our culture? When really speaking, we should be learning how to be strong and celebrate our culture, and enjoy it.”

 

Women get a voice in Israel’s vote for chief rabbi. It may not save a deeply unpopular institution.

In the wake of Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel, the elections for chief rabbi are receiving more scrutiny than in past years, with many advocating that religious leaders hew more to the views of at least most Orthodox Israelis.

Jews pray at the Western Wall, beside the Temple Mount, known to Muslims as the Noble Sanctuary, or the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, in the Old City of Jerusalem, Oct. 16, 2023. (AP Photo/Jon Gambrell)

(RNS) — Israel’s minister of religious affairs, Michael Malchieli, announced last week that he would commit to appointing 10 women to seats in the 150-member assembly responsible for electing Israel’s two chief rabbis, ahead of the next election this summer. 

The rabbinate, headed by a duo of chief rabbis, has sweeping power over the many state functions that intersect with Jewish law in Israel, from setting kosher standards to overseeing marriage and divorce. Its budget accounts for half a percent of the national budget. 

The assembly reserves 70 seats for public representatives, including members of Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, and heads of local regional councils. The other 80 seats are filled by rabbis, chosen by the rabbinate itself.


The 70 seats for public officials have always been open to women, but women have seldom been equally represented even on that side of the council, giving them nearly no voice in who runs religious affairs.



The decision comes after Israel’s Supreme Court ruled in January that religiously educated women should be eligible for the 80 rabbinic seats, even though the staunchly Orthodox rabbinate does not acknowledge that women can be rabbis.

Michael Malchieli. (Photo by Yakov Cohen/Wikipedia/Creative Commons)

Michael Malchieli. (Photo by Yakov Cohen/Wikipedia/Creative Commons)

The court, while ruling women are eligible, did not compel the rabbinate to appoint any. But Malchieli, a Knesset member representing the Sephardic ultra-Orthodox Shas party, conceded to pressure from groups such as Emunah, a social services agency affiliated with the Religious Zionist movement and focused on women’s issues, which said in a May 29 public letter to Malchieli:

Despite the fact that the Chief Rabbinate provides services for both genders in a variety of fields, some of which are even designated only for the female public, the Law of the Chief Rabbinate of Israel does not include a provision guaranteeing adequate representation for women in the Electoral Assembly.

In 2013, Emunah lobbied the rabbinate to allow women to serve as kosher supervisors, a job that is monopolized by the rabbinate in Israel. 

“I am hopeful that this will be the beginning of a binding tradition and another step to deepen the representation and involvement of women in the assembly that elects the Chief Rabbinate,” Emunah’s chair, Yifat Sela, told The Jerusalem Post.

Despite the women’s appointment, not all are hopeful that it will make much of a difference in Israel’s religious policies. Malchieli’s appointments, which include several more seats than just the 10 women, are all expected to vote in line with the wishes of his religiously conservative Shas party. 


The rabbinate’s control over marriage and divorce has been a major point of conflict in Israel. While the country acknowledges the validity of marriages performed outside its borders, Israeli Jews who want to vary from the rabbinate’s standards, whether same-sex or interfaith couples or simply in a ceremony performed by anyone other than an Orthodox rabbi, are forced to travel abroad to do so. 

There has been growing discontent with the rabbinate, which is controlled by the Haredi minority, due to its outsized power in Israel. Its political parties often serve as kingmakers in Knesset elections, while Haredi men in full-time yeshiva study are exempt from the national military service. Haredim are a group that has bloomed in recent years to 13% of the population.

Israel’s Jews largely see Judaism in Orthodox terms, but fall on a spectrum of how much they engage with that. 

On one end are the fully secular or “Hiloni” Israelis who engage little with traditional Jewish practice. On the other are the “ultra-Orthodox” or Haredim, whose lives revolve around the strict observance of Jewish law and who hold the study of Torah to be the highest pursuit, eschewing both gainful employment and national service. Many Haredim live in isolated communities, speak Yiddish rather than Hebrew, and reject the state’s claims to a Jewish character. 

In between is a large range who are known simply as traditional, meaning those who may not be fully observent, but when they do observe, do so in a traditional way. 

Another group in the middle are the Religious Zionists. While they live strictly observant lives, they avoid neither the workforce nor the army but view the building of the state of Israel as part of their religious duty. 


The movement was deeply influenced by disciples of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, who was the Ashkenazi chief rabbi in the years before Israel became a state.

In the wake of Hamas’ Oct. 7 attack on Israel, the elections for chief rabbi are receiving more scrutiny than in past years, with many advocating that religious leaders hew more to the views of at least most Orthodox Israelis, who do not see a conflict between their religious identity and their responsibilities to national service as Israeli citizens. 

The fight over the exemptions led Israel to an unprecedented period of political instability, with five elections in just four years before Oct. 7, and nearly caused the current government to collapse in March when the Supreme Court ruled that yeshivas would lose their state funding if their students did not submit themselves to the draft. 

FILE - Ultra-Orthodox Jewish men and boys block a road during a protest against the country's military draft in Jerusalem, on Feb. 26, 2024. Israel's High Court ruling Thursday, March 28, to curtail subsidies for ultra-Orthodox men has thrown Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's political future into grave jeopardy. Netanyahu now has until Monday to present the court with a plan to dismantle what the justices called a system that privileges the ultra-Orthodox at the expense of the country's majority. (AP Photo/Leo Correa, File)

Ultra-Orthodox Jewish men and boys block a road during a protest against the country’s military draft in Jerusalem, on Feb. 26, 2024. (AP Photo/Leo Correa, File)

This growing discontent has also fueled frustration with the fact that a large portion of seats in the rabbinical assembly are either internal appointments or reserved for unelected local leaders.

“Oct. 7 let the genie out of the bottle to an extent, in making clear to Religious Zionists that the Haredi position is not sustainable for the Zionist enterprise,” said Rabbi Seth Farber, the director of ITIM, a nongovernmental organization that advocates for transparency and inclusion in Israel’s religious institutions. “The disappointment with the chief rabbinate, with the rabbinate elections, are a symptom of that.”


The rabbinate’s popularity has not been helped by the nepotism that is rife in the institution. Both current chief rabbis, the Ashkenazi Rabbi David Lau and Sephardic Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, are sons of previous chief rabbis. The leading candidates for both of the spots in next month’s elections happen to be Lau’s and Yosef’s own brothers. Another major contender for the Sephardic chief rabbi is Rabbi Yehuda Deri, brother of Aryeh Deri, the leader of Malchieli’s Shas party. 

In addition to voting themselves, the chief rabbis personally appoint nearly 10% of the assembly that picks their successor. 

“The issues of nepotism have to be taken off the table,” Farber said. “In every normal democratic country that is considered beyond the pale.

“I think people would like to see this whole process depoliticized,” he added. “Instead of being a committee of insiders, it should be more representative of the communities themselves and the people who use its services.”

Farber said that non-Haredi Orthodox Jews believe that the rabbinate, a holdover from the Ottoman Empire, needs to be entirely revamped for the modern state. 

“In Israel, we haven’t had the luxury to write the full menu of what a Jewish and democratic state looks like,” he said. “Many people, myself included, in the Religious Zionist community believe there is a role for the state to play in the religious lives of its constituents, or citizens.”

RIP

The Rev. James Lawson Jr. has died at 95, civil rights leader’s family says

Lawson was a close adviser to the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., who called him 'the leading theorist and strategist of nonviolence in the world.'

FILE - The Rev. James Lawson Jr. speaks in Murfreesboro, Tenn., Sept. 17, 2015. Lawson, an apostle of nonviolent protest who schooled activists to withstand brutal reactions from white authorities as the civil rights movement gained traction, has died, his family said Monday, June 10, 2024. He was 95. (AP Photo/Mark Humphrey, File)

LOS ANGELES (AP) — The Rev. James Lawson Jr., an apostle of nonviolent protest who schooled activists to withstand brutal reactions from white authorities as the Civil Rights Movement gained traction, has died, his family said Monday. He was 95.

His family said Lawson died on Sunday after a short illness in Los Angeles, where he spent decades working as a pastor, labor movement organizer and university professor.

Lawson was a close adviser to the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., who called him “the leading theorist and strategist of nonviolence in the world.”

Lawson met King in 1957, after spending three years in India soaking up knowledge about Mohandas K. Gandhi’s independence movement. King would travel to India himself two years later, but at the time, he had only read about Gandhi in books.

The two Black pastors — both 28 years old — quickly bonded over their enthusiasm for the Indian leader’s ideas, and King urged Lawson to put them into action in the American South.

Lawson soon led workshops in church basements in Nashville, Tennessee, that prepared John Lewis, Diane Nash, Bernard Lafayette, Marion Barry, the Freedom Riders and many others to peacefully withstand vicious responses to their challenges of racist laws and policies.

Lawson’s lessons led Nashville to become the first major city in the South to desegregate its downtown, on May 10, 1960, after hundreds of well-organized students staged lunch-counter sit-ins and boycotts of discriminatory businesses.

Lawson’s particular contribution was to introduce Gandhian principles to people more familiar with biblical teachings, showing how direct action could expose the immorality and fragility of racist white power structures.



Gandhi said “that we persons have the power to resist the racism in our own lives and souls,” Lawson told the AP. “We have the power to make choices and to say no to that wrong. That’s also Jesus.”

Years later, in 1968, it was Lawson who organized the sanitation workers strike that fatefully drew King to Memphis. Lawson said he was at first paralyzed and forever saddened by King’s assassination.

“I thought I would not live beyond 40, myself,” Lawson said. “The imminence of death was a part of the discipline we lived with, but no one as much as King.”

Still, Lawson made it his life’s mission to preach the power of nonviolent direct action.

“I’m still anxious and frustrated,” Lawson said as he marked the 50th anniversary of King’s death with a march in Memphis. “The task is unfinished.”

Civil rights activist Diane Nash was a 21-year-old college student when she began attending Lawson’s Nashville workshops, which she called life-changing.

“His passing constitutes a very great loss,” Nash said. “He bears, I think, more responsibility than any other single person for the civil rights movement of Blacks being nonviolent in this country.”

James Morris Lawson Jr., was born on Sept. 22, 1928, the son and grandson of ministers, and grew up in Massillon, Ohio, where he became ordained himself as a high school senior.

He told The Tennessean that his commitment to nonviolence began in elementary school, when he told his mother that he had slapped a boy who had used a racial slur against him.

“What good did that do, Jimmy?” his mother asked.

That simple question forever changed his life, Lawson said. He became a pacifist, refusing to serve when drafted for the Korean War, and spent a year in prison as a conscientious objector. The Fellowship of Reconciliation, a pacifist group, sponsored his trip to India after he finished a sociology degree.

Gandhi had been assassinated by then, but Lawson met people who had worked with him and explained Gandhi’s concept of “satyagraha,” a relentless pursuit of Truth, which encouraged Indians to peacefully reject British rule. Lawson then saw how the Christian concept of turning the other cheek could be applied in collective actions to challenge morally indefensible laws.

Lawson was a divinity student at Oberlin College in Ohio when King spoke on campus about the Montgomery bus boycott. King told him, “You can’t wait, you need to come on South now,‘” Lawson recalled in an Associated Press interview.

Lawson soon enrolled in theology classes at Vanderbilt University, while leading younger activists through mock protests in which they practiced taking insults without reacting.

The technique swiftly proved its power at lunch counters and movie theaters in Nashville, where on May 10, 1960, businesses agreed to take down the “No Colored” signs that enforced white supremacy.

“It was the first major successful campaign to pull the signs down,” and it created a template for the sit-ins that began spreading across the South, Lawson said.



Lawson was called on to organize what became the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, which sought to organize the spontaneous efforts of tens of thousands of students who began challenging Jim Crow laws across the South.

Angry segregationists got Lawson expelled from Vanderbilt, but he said he never harbored hard feelings about the university, where he returned as a distinguished visiting professor in 2006, and eventually donated a significant portion of his papers.

Lawson earned that theology degree at Boston University and became a Methodist pastor in Memphis, where his wife Dorothy Wood Lawson worked as an NAACP organizer. They moved several years later to Los Angeles, where Lawson led the Holman United Methodist Church and taught at California State University, Northridge and the University of California. They raised three sons, John, Morris and Seth.

Lawson remained active into his 90s, urging younger generations to leverage their power. Eulogizing the late Rep. John Lewis last year, he recalled how the young man he trained in Nashville grew lonely marches into multitudes, paving the way for major civil rights legislation.

“If we would honor and celebrate John Lewis’ life, let us then re-commit our souls, our hearts, our minds, our bodies and our strength to the continuing journey to dismantle the wrong in our midst,” Lawson said.

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Loller reported from Nashville and Sainz from Memphis. Associated Press contributors include Michael Warren in Atlanta.