Study: Most Marine Parks Are Not Protecting Wildlife

Reef at Ningaloo Marine Park (John Turnbull / CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

PUBLISHED JUN 30, 2024 4:38 PM BY THE CONVERSATION

 

 

[By Peter J.S. Jones and Rick Stafford]

The radio crackles into life on a small boat off an idyllic beach in Ningaloo Marine Park, Western Australia. Two recreational fishers are trying to catch prized spangled emperors in a sanctuary zone, where all fishing is supposed to be banned, to help protect this fish from overfishing.

A recreational fisher further down the coast is using his radio to alert others of the imminent arrival of marine park wardens in a patrol boat. The two fishers calmly stash their rods, power up the large outboard engine, and motor away from the sanctuary zone. By the time the wardens arrive, all appears calm and well. This scenario illustrates how challenging it can be protect marine wildlife from the sometimes damaging effects of human activities, such as fishing.

Almost every country in the world is trying to achieve an internationally agreed legal target to protect 30% of their land and sea area by 2030. Setting up marine protected areas, such as marine parks, is an important way of achieving this target. But they have to be effective in actually reducing the negative effects of human activities, as well as fair to local people in avoiding excessive restrictions. There are concerns that the race to create more marine protected areas or underwater nature reserves could be distracting governments from the challenges of ensuring that conservation measures are as effective as possible in fairly reducing harm from human activities that threaten marine wildlife, such as fishing and tourism.

To explore different ways of addressing such challenges, our research assessed the effectiveness of 50 marine protected areas in 24 countries, from Ecuador to Madagascar and Vietnam. We compared the strengths and weaknesses of different conservation measures for protecting marine wildlife by using a set of 36 “governance incentives” – these include providing financial compensation, requiring legal accountability and establishing local groups that encourage community participation in discussions, decisions and related research.

Working with 70 researchers from various countries, we interviewed around 20 people involved in each of the 50 marine protected areas, from fishermen to tourism operators and recreational sea users. We also analyzed marine conservation measures to see how effective they were and observed day-to-day activities on the coast.

Our aim was to understand how people perceive the effectiveness of some of these marine conservation measures and explore their views about which activities, such as fishing, could be better managed.

The 50 MPAs scored a low average of 2/5 for effectiveness – a lot of protective conservation measures were in place on paper but they were not effective in reducing the harmful effects of certain human activities to protect marine wildlife. This reveals the need for these marine protected areas to make a more tangible difference, rather than just being what many term “paper parks”, that exist in legal texts but not in practical reality.

Our research confirms that there’s no one key to success – different combinations of conservation measures work best to improve effectiveness in different locations. One clear overall trend was that a more diverse mix of management approaches resulted in greater reduction of the effects of fishing, tourism and other human activities.

Tackling illegal fishing

In Western Australia, Ningaloo and Shark Bay marine parks demonstrate how this can be done relatively well to reduce negative effects and better conserve marine wildlife. Here, fisheries officers enforce legal restrictions on recreational fishing, which has led to the recovery of some previously overfished populations, such as pink snapper, and increases in recreational fishing catches. But it can be challenging to prevent illegal fishing in remote no-take sanctuaries, as the scenario above illustrates. Recreational fishers who are caught breaking the rules are fined, but these fixed penalties are often not enough to discourage further illegal fishing.

Marine wildlife watching, particularly for whale sharks and bottlenose dolphins, is managed through a restricted number of licenses for tour boats to operate. Legal conditions to prevent disturbance to whale sharks and dolphins are attached to these licenses, enforced by vessels competitively watching each other's operations, in the hope that they can acquire additional wildlife watching licenses. Satellite surveillance and patrols by wardens helps to monitor wildlife watching vessels.

Ningaloo and Shark Bay marine parks also promote fairness to local people. The traditional ways of life of aboriginal Australians are respected and their understanding of ecosystems generated over many generations is learnt from. They are employed as wardens and research officers for the parks. Each of these two parks has a committee that provides for participation in discussions and decisions by local people representing different interests, including aboriginal Australians.

Ecosystems are more resilient to the impact of human activities if they support a wider diversity of species. Marine protected areas represent complex social and ecological systems, each interacting in different ways with local people in coastal communities. Our research shows that there’s no one-size-fits-all solution. There are examples of good practice, such as Ningaloo and Shark Bay marine parks, but even they aren’t perfect, as the challenge with illegal fishing illustrates. And what works in one situation may not work in another.

Our research also shows that to successfully protect 30% of their land and sea by 2030, governments and local people should use diverse management approaches in combination, rather than unrealistically seeking one best solution. The key to resilience is diversity, both of species in ecosystems and conservation measures in protected area management systems.

Peter JS Jones is an Emeritus Professor of Environmental Governance at UCL.

Rick Stafford is a Professor of Marine Biology and Conservation at Bournemouth University.

Top image: Reef at Ningaloo Marine Park (John Turnbull / CC BY-NC-SA 2.0)

This article appears courtesy of The Conversation and may be found in its original form here. 

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

 

India’s Shipyards Attract European Orders as They Seek Global Role

India's Garden Research Shipbuilders received a large European contract (GRS)

PUBLISHED JUN 28, 2024 3:42 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

As demand for global shipyard capacity rises, the Indian shipbuilding industry is seeking to attract more work from European shipowners. With the support of the Indian government, the industry is positioning for an expanded role in the global shipbuilding market. 

Last week, the state-owned Garden Reach Shipbuilders (GRSE), under the Ministry of Defense, entered into an agreement with the German firm Carsten Rehder for the construction of four multi-purpose vessels each 7,500 dwt. The contract also includes an option for building another four ships. This order represents an important pivot for GRSE which is historically known for the construction of warships. 

The vessels will be 394 feet (120 meters) long and 56 feet (17 meters) wide with a maximum draft of approximately 22 feet (6.75 meters). Each will have a capacity to carry 7,500 metric tons of cargo. Further, the vessels will have a single cargo hold each to accommodate bulk and general cargoes, with the capacity to carry containers on the hatch covers. The order is worth $54 million and is scheduled to be completed in a competitive 33 months.

The Indian government has identified domestic shipbuilding as critical in promoting the country’s industrialization ambition. Since 2016, the government has been implementing the Shipbuilding Financial Assistance Policy, which is designed to offer domestic shipyards subsidies of up to 20 percent for contracts signed in 2016 but scaled back to 11 percent by 2026. The policy has been recently amended to include financial assistance for the construction of green vessels, with rates as high as 30 percent for vessels running on alternative fuels such as methanol and ammonia. 

To further raise the incentives, the government this year is reportedly planning to roll out an extra $600 million for the shipbuilding financial assistance scheme. The funding will be part of a new viability gap funding (VGR) scheme to incentivize the construction of inland vessels, with a future option of extending it to the building of sea-going vessels.

These initiatives are facilitating most government-owned shipyards to take up more orders of commercial vessels. Early this month, the Goa shipyard, under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defense, received an order for a next-generation trailing suction hopper dredger from the Belgium company Jan De Nul. The vessel is a plug-in hybrid specifically designed to operate in small harbors.

While this contract is for one vessel, with a delivery period of 24 months, there is an option to construct a second vessel. In commenting about the contract, Goa Shipyard Chairman and Managing Director B.K Upadhyay said that this deal with a European client marked a significant step towards diversifying into the global commercial shipbuilding market. Goa shipyard is currently known for its exports of defense platforms from India.

Meanwhile, Udupi Cochin Shipyard, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the state-controlled Cochin Shipyard, on Friday announced it received an order from Norway’s shortsea liner shipping company Wilson ASA. The deal includes the design and construction of four 6,300-ton dry cargo vessels. The company also added that an agreement is in place for an additional four vessels of the same type, which will be formally contracted by September 19, 2024. The total order is estimated at $131 million.

Currently, India has less than one percent share of the global shipbuilding market, which is largely dominated by China, South Korea, and Japan. Replacement of aging fleets is a top concern for most shipowners, specifically in Europe which is implementing some of the toughest maritime environmental regulations. The growing orders from European shipowners are however helping India as it vies for a top position in the industry. According to local media reports, European shipowners have so far placed orders worth $750 million at Indian shipyards. 

 

A Vessel That Australia Banned Catches Fire and Sinks Off Java

Rescued crewmembers from the Noah Satu (Indonesian Directorate of Shipping)

PUBLISHED JUN 27, 2024 3:11 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

An Indonesian freighter with a past history of port state bans has caught fire and sunk in the Java Sea, according to Indonesia's sea transport directorate. 

At about 1400 hours local time, the freighter Noah Satu (IMO 9313620) reported an engine room fire as it transited off the coast of Tuban, East Java. The vessel was under way with a cargo of corn, headed westbound for the port of Ciwandan, on the other end of the island. 

The nearby coast guard station in Tanjung Perak launched a response, dispatching a patrol ship to meet up with the Noah Satu. The local port authority also sent a response team aboard a commercial tug, the Mitra Anugerah 27. 

Over the course of an eight-hour response, the coast guard response boat rescued the captain and chief engineer, and the tug brought 12 crewmembers aboard for evacuation. One oiler sustained minor burns in the fire and was taken to Tuban for medical treatment. 

"We are committed to ensuring shipping safety and security and handling this incident quickly and effectively. We also appreciate the efforts and coordination of various parties in dealing with this incident," said Jon Kenedi, Director of the Maritime and Coast Guard Unit (KPLP).

No pollution was reported, but the Noah Satu sank with her cargo. 

The 20-year-old vessel had a checkered maintenance history, including a long list of past inspection deficiencies. Australian officials identified a heightened safety risk aboard Noah Satu and banned the ship in 2016. After the vessel failed two port state control inspections in the span of a year, the Australian Maritime Safety Authority prohibited Noah Satu for returning for at least 12 months. The vessel was never inspected by a foreign port state control team again, and AIS data shows that it has only traded within Indonesia since at least 2020. 

SKULLDUGGERY💀

Master of Iranian Shadow Tanker Disappears Days Before Indonesian Trial

Arman 114 (left) was discovered conducting an illegal oil transfer to another shadow tanker in June 2023 (Bakamla)

PUBLISHED JUL 1, 2024 12:48 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

A court in Batam, Indonesia has delayed the trial and reading of the verdict in a case of a tanker that was caught conducting an illegal ship-to-ship oil transfer and charged with causing pollution after the master of the vessel disappeared five days before the court was scheduled to convene. It is the latest turn in a case that started over a year ago and even still the ownership of the tanker remains unclear.

The master of the tanker Arman 114 (300,579 dwt), Mahmoud Abdelaziz Mohamed Hatiba (age 43 and believed to be an Egyptian citizen) was facing the possibility of seven years in prison and a fine of more than $305,000. If he failed to pay the fine, a further six months in jail would have been added to his sentence. Prosecutors are also asking the court to seize the crude oil tanker and auction it off along with the cargo aboard. Initial reports in 2023 said there were more than 272,000 metric tons of crude oil aboard although later reports say it is just under 167,000 metric tons of light crude oil.

Several entities presented themselves to the court claiming to be the order of the tanker while the Iranian Embassy in Jakarta has denied ownership and said the vessel is owned by an Iranian citizen. The Arman 114, built in 1997, has repeatedly appeared on watch lists from various organizations accused of being used to smuggle Iranian oil. The ship is believed to be registered in Iran but it has not undergone inspections according to the databases in years and its management and insurance are unknown.

In June 2023, the Indonesian Coast Guard discovered the vessel at anchor with a second tanker displaying the name S Tinos and reporting to be registered in Cameroon. However, the ship was using the identity of a tanker that had been scrapped five years earlier. Neither ship was displaying a flag or transmitting accurate AIS data. The Arman 114 was displaying a position in the Red Sea at the time.

When the ships were discovered, reports suggest they attempted to flee and the Malaysians assisted the Indonesian authorities in stopping the Arman 114. The ship was detained with a total of 29 people aboard, including the wife and child of the security officer. The crew was reported to be from Iran and Egypt. They were also being detained in Batam with reports that they had come ashore without proper paperwork.

Three months after the vessels were discovered, Indonesian prosecutors in October 2023 added charges of dumping waste. Reports said they tested oil found in the water and determined it came from the Arman 114. Some reports are saying the captain had ordered the crew to dump oily water overboard.

Shortly before the hearing scheduled for last week, the Attorney General’s Office confirmed it had a visit from the Iranian Embassy requesting the ship and its cargo be released. Iranian officials denied ownership of the tanker or the cargo aboard.

The court went into recess after the master failed to report for the hearing and is now due to reconvene on July 4. The court has ordered if the master can be located that he should be detained while prosecutors are pressing for the court to proceed with the seizure of the vessel and its cargo. It is unclear if any of the other crewmembers might face charges for the transfer, pollution, and attempts to display a false identity and flee from authorities.

 

Sweden Bans Scrubber Discharges in its Waters

Scrubber retrofit in process on a ro-pax ferry (file image)

PUBLISHED JUN 30, 2024 10:44 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

 

Sweden has joined the list of countries seeking to ban scrubber water discharges in their waters. In a proposal issued last week, the Swedish government wants to start prohibiting discharges from open loop scrubbers beginning July 1, 2025. This will be followed by a ban on discharges from all other scrubbers from January 1, 2029. The ban will be applicable in Swedish territorial waters.

While the IMO’s global cap on sulfur content in fuel oil was lauded as the right step towards clean shipping, it inadventently led to widespread use of exhaust gas cleaning systems, popularly known as scrubbers. In addition to washed-out sulphur, other contaminants such as heavy metals and oil residues have been found in the discharge wastewater.

In commenting on the scrubber discharge ban, Sweden’s Infrastructure Minister Andreas Carlson said that most Swedish shipowners are already using low sulphur fuel oil (LSFO). For this reason, it became imperative to extend to all ships in Swedish maritime territory.

“Hopefully, these national bans will fuel discussions on regional bans in the Baltic, the Northeast Atlantic and the entire EU. The IMO need to move forward on this topic as well, although I think a global ban is quite a few steps away. There are intermediate steps to make nevertheless,” said Mattias Rust, Deputy Director, Ministry of Rural Affairs and Infrastructure, Sweden.

Recent research by the Swedish Chalmers University of Technology estimated that there are more than 200 million cubic meters of environmentally hazardous scrubber water discharged into the Baltic Sea annually. Other countries in the Baltic region, such as Denmark and Finland, have also imposed limits on scrubber water discharge in their waters.   

WWIII

China Coast Guard Obstructs Rescue of Two Filipino Fishermen

A China Coast Guard cutter stands by next to a stricken Philippine fishing vessel at Scarborough Shoal, June 29, 2024 (PCG)

PUBLISHED JUN 30, 2024 11:15 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

 

The China Coast Guard actively obstructed a rescue operation to save two Philippine fishermen after their vessel suffered an engine explosion, according to Philippine Coast Guard spokesman Jay Tarriela. 

On Saturday, the Philippine Coast Guard vessel BRP Sindangan responded to a request for assistance from a fishing boat at Scarborough Shoal, a contested reef controlled by Chinese forces within the Philippine exclusive economic zone. According to Tarriela, the CCG deployed two rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIBs) and attempted to "obstruct and hinder" the efforts of the rescuers. In a video from the scene, two large China Coast Guard cutters can be seen approaching the stricken fishing boat while the PCG cutter holds station alongside. 

The Philippine Coast Guard boat crew managed to evade the CCG patrol boats and transfer two injured fishermen on board for first aid. The two victims had second degree burns, and the BRP Sindangan got under way for Luzon - with the fishing boat in tow - to deliver them safely to higher medical care. The cutter arrived in Subic Bay in the early hours of Monday morning and transferred the two fishermen to an ambulance service. 

Via state media, the China Coast Guard released its own video of the encounter and claimed that it had helped rescue the injured fishermen. The video showed China Coast Guard personnel throwing life preservers onto the stricken vessel. 

The Philippine Coast Guard routinely encounters obstruction from the China Coast Guard at Scarborough Shoal and at Second Thomas Shoal, the two major flashpoints in the Spratly Islands. Several recent incidents have turned violent, and multiple Philippine servicemembers have been injured by ramming and water-cannoning. In the last run-in at Second Thomas Shoal, one Philippine soldier lost his thumb when a China Coast Guard launch rammed his boat. 

Transitioning Away From Carrier Strike Groups to Win Command of the Seas

Warships from Destroyer Squadron 23 transit the Pacific Ocean, 2020 (USN file image)

PUBLISHED JUN 30, 2024 7:50 PM BY CIMSEC

[By CDR Anthony LaVopa, USN]

The United States Navy and its allies have enjoyed uncontested control of the world’s oceans for over thirty years. But the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been ambitiously pursuing the development of its military to compete with the U.S., specifically in the maritime domain. The PRC has invested in a large Navy, a land-based mobile rocket force fielding long-range anti-ship weapons, and a modernized air force. These investments in military buildup and modernization demonstrate the PRC’s urgency to be ready for a conflict sooner rather than later. President Xi has told the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to be ready for an invasion of Taiwan by 2027.1 However, the U.S. military, specifically the Navy, does not demonstrate that same sense of urgency. Decades spent fighting insurgents have diverted the Navy’s attention away from its original purpose – establishing and maintaining command of the seas through fleet warfare.

Since World War II, the Navy’s principal means of seizing command of the seas has been the carrier group. However, the service’s warfighting concept of Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is fundamentally predicated on a different set of capabilities and force packages. The Tri-Service Maritime strategy – Advantage at Sea – defines DMO as “an operations concept that leverages the principles of distribution, integration, and maneuver to mass overwhelming combat power and effects at the time and place of our choosing.”2 To effectively win a war against a peer competitor, the Navy should transition to the decentralization and distribution inherent in DMO by empowering the surface fleet to take the lead in prosecuting sea control.

The Challenge to Decentralize and Distribute

The decentralization of combat power is required to conduct effective DMO. Following the logic of the memorable Captain Wayne Hughes, DMO aims to secure the operational advantage of firing effectively first.3 It can enable a good offense and subsequently reduce the requirement for a good defense. However, generations of naval officers have matured through their careers using the carrier-centric Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) construct. This construct is inherent to using the CSG as the primary element of naval power projection, but it is in tension with the broader fleet-level principles of DMO.

Since the Gulf War, the CSG employment model has evolved into a managed defense of an aircraft carrier (High-Value Unit – HVU) to ultimately preserve the capabilities of the carrier air wing. The platforms and weapons in today’s surface fleet are those that have been optimized to support the CWC construct as part of a CSG. They are relatively short-range weapons that rely on exquisite platforms to deliver them in large quantities. Aside from the air wing, the rest of the platforms in the CSG are having their armaments, dispositions, and roles mostly driven by defensive imperatives.

Captain Bill Shafley argued that “as the DMO concept suggests, disaggregation of the CSG is driven now by lethality and survivability.”4 The essence of DMO should be to distribute and decentralize combat power based on the long-range fires capability carried by surface combatants. The vast majority of the Navy’s cruise missile firepower and vertical launch cell capacity is fielded by the surface fleet, which operates significant numbers of platforms compared to the handful of capital ships in the fleet. But the surface fleet currently lacks the long-range weapons required to mass anti-ship firepower in coordinated offensive strikes as envisioned by DMO.

The distribution of ships still assigned to a CSG is not DMO in the fullest sense, but rather just a CSG spread out over larger distances, while still using a centralized model of command and control in the form of CWC. The viability of the CSG in a high-end threat environment depends upon an initial campaign of DMO, which sets the conditions and creates a more permissive operating environment for high-value units. Forces that operate under DMO must be able to penetrate into an adversary’s weapons engagement zone and take on risks that high-value units cannot. Tethering the surface fleet to capital ship defense therefore hamstrings the broader operational potential of the fleet and diminishes the extent of physical distribution that is possible.

To realize the full potential of DMO, the Navy must pivot its focus away from platforms and focus on the underlying weapons and effects that deliver the critical enabling capabilities. As Dmitry Filipoff notes, “The ability to combine fires against warships heavily depends upon the traits of the weapons themselves. These traits offer a valuable framework for defining the aggregation potential of individual weapons and the broader force’s ability to mass fires.”5 The transition to a distributed surface force with widely-fielded anti-ship weapons could tip the operational advantage toward the U.S. Navy and set the stage for new fleet-level force packages that are less centered on capital ships the Navy can ill afford to lose.

Effective DMO Requires Long-Range Fires

The ability to deny an adversary navy the opportunity for a decisive opening salvo depends upon a fleet having a superior first strike capability. However, U.S. naval forces lack meaningful, long-range anti-ship weapons that they can employ in a distributed nature because the fleet has relied principally on the concentrated firepower of the air wing. This critical dependency on carrier aviation’s short-range anti-ship fires significantly limits the degree to which the Navy can effectively execute DMO. In his article “DMO – A Salvo Equation Analysis,” Captain Anthony Cowden (ret.) noted that:

“the single point of failure for a distributed force is the ability to coordinate a strike on another force. This coordination becomes even more complex with greater distribution of one’s force, and even more so when the enemy’s force is distributed. If the distributed force cannot coordinate their fires, they lose in every scenario.”6

This points to how the Navy must ensure it has the requisite long-range anti-ship weapons and the networks to guide them so it has a variety of resilient options for maritime strike. Without the right long-range weapons, the viability of DMO is heavily degraded because forces will struggle to effectively distribute from one another and maintain the ability to concentrate firepower. This is the situation the U.S. Navy is in today with its CSG-centric paradigm that features only a small amount of anti-ship firepower that is almost entirely concentrated in the carrier. As Filipoff notes in his article describing the current state of U.S. anti-ship firepower shortfalls and the challenges of using the air wing to sink warships, “…it would mean coming to terms with how the vast majority of the U.S. Navy’s force structure and missile arsenal is hardly able to threaten modern naval formations with anti-ship firepower.”7 This lack of weapons from a range and quantity perspective severely handicaps the proper implementation of DMO.

The Navy has made some modest strides in increasing the lethality of its surface ships, particularly with SM-6 having the capability of operating in an anti-surface mode. However, the most common variant of SM-6, with a range of about 150 miles, is still well out-sticked by the Chinese surface fleet’s YJ-18 with a range of 330 miles.8 Although newer variants of SM-6 and Tomahawk are expected to provide much longer-range anti-ship capability, it is doubtful whether ships would have the capacity to carry a meaningful amount of these weapons for these roles, since the need for heavily biasing VLS loadouts toward defense is driven by the capital ship-centric design of current U.S. naval operations and force packaging.

The PLA Navy Type-055 guided-missile destroyer Wuxi steams to a designated sea area during a maritime training exercise. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Wang Zezhou)

The transition to surface ships loaded with long-range, offensive weapons substantially changes the overall importance of each individual combatant. No longer will surface ships simply be a defensive adjunct to the carrier and its air wing. Soon surface ships will possess the firepower to execute sea control operations, and in ways that could be more aggressive than what is prudent for capital ships. The transition to fleets centered on numerous distributed surface ships executing core offensive missions, while operating at significant distances from the nearest U.S. capital ship, is the true essence of DMO.

Conclusion

The intent of DMO should not be to render the CSG irrelevant, but rather to ensure that the CSG is not relied upon as the sole vanguard of sea control in the initial stages of a high-end conflict against a peer competitor. DMO must delay and degrade the decision-making of adversaries while denying them the opportunity to engage first. It is about establishing and maintaining temporary sea control for operational needs and sea denial all other times. The transition away from using the air wing to prosecute sea control means fully embracing the true manifestation of DMO – lethal, distributed surface ships that can combine long-range fires across broad geographic spaces.

However, given the state of weapons development and procurement, the Navy’s lack of progress in implementing the DMO concept is concerning. Against a peer competitor, the appropriate type of long-range weapons, fielded in sufficient numbers to support effective DMO, will increase the survivability of fleet and ensure its ability to maintain the initiative by firing effectively first. This transition away from the longstanding muscle memory of fighting under the CWC construct and toward a concept of using large numbers of coordinated but distributed surface units to launch fires will be essential to winning modern fleet warfare.

Commander Anthony LaVopa commanded the USS Hurricane (PC 3) and also served as a DDG-1000 requirements officer at the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He recently graduated with a Masters in National Security and Strategic Studies from the U.S. Naval War College as a Halsey Group Fellow and is currently the Prospective Executive Officer (PXO) of USS Bulkeley (DDG 84). 

This article appears courtesy of CIMSEC and may be found in its original form here. a

References

1. https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2024/05/07/how-dc-became-obsessed-with-a-potential-2027-chinese-invasion-of-taiwan/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CPresident%20Xi%20has%20instructed%20the,TV%20interview%20in%20February%202023.

2. “The US Tri-Service Maritime Strategy,” Strategic Comments 27, no. 5 (2020): p. iv-vi, https://doi.org/10.1080/13567888.2021.1960095.

3. Wayne P. Hughes and Robert Girrier, Fleet Tactics and Naval Operations (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2018).

4. Shafley, “A NEW DESRON STAFF – BEYOND THE COMPOSITE WARFARE COMMANDER CONCEPT”

5. Dmitry Filipoff, “FIGHTING DMO, PT. 2: ANTI-SHIP FIREPOWER AND THE MAJOR LIMITS OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL ARSENAL,” Center for International Maritime Security, February 27, 2023, https://cimsec.org/fighting-dmo-pt-2-anti-ship-firepower-and-the-major-limits-of-the-american-naval-arsenal/.

6. Anthony Cowden, “DISTRIBUTED MARITIME OPERATIONS – A SALVO EQUATION ANALYSIS,” Center for International Maritime Security, March 23, 2023, https://cimsec.org/distributed-maritime-operations-a-salvo-equation-analysis/.

7. Filipoff, “FIGHTING DMO, PT. 2: ANTI-SHIP FIREPOWER AND THE MAJOR LIMITS OF THE AMERICAN NAVAL ARSENAL”

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

 

Efforts Proceed for Morocco’s New Transshipment Nador West Deepwater Port

Nador West Med will provide a large new port for container transshipments near Gibraltar (EBRD photo)

PUBLISHED JUN 27, 2024 5:50 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

 

After more than a decade of planning, progress is being made in the development of Morocco’s new Mediterranean port called Nador West Med. The first phase of the port is expected to be commissioned in 2027 increasing Morocco’s role in the growing transship container trade as well as providing additional capacity for wet and dry bulk.

The state-owned Nador West Med company awarded the first port concession focusing on container operations. They selected a domestic company, Marsa Maroc, which currently operates 24 terminals in 10 ports including the third terminal at Tangier Med, another leading transshipment port. The company received a 25-year concession and is committing €200 million toward the development of Nador West Med.

North Africa’s transshipment ports are taking on a new critical role in 2024. The closing of the Red Sea meant that containerships were diverting not following normal routes that went to ports ranging from Greece to Italy and others along the Mediterranean. Many carriers have chosen to transship containers from ports such as Tangier Med into the eastern Mediterranean and as a result, Tangier Med and others are experiencing backlogs and congestion due to the high volumes. In addition, the new EU carbon fees were also anticipated to drive more volumes into the transshipment ports as carriers worked to manage under the Fit for 55 emissions regulations and fees.

Marsa Maroc highlights that in just over three years it has grown the container transshipment business in Tangier Med where it is in partnership with Hapag-Lloyd, Eurogate International, and Contship Italia. They report a volume of 1.5 million TEU after just three years.

The new port which is designed to strengthen Morocco’s maritime and port role is located less than 250 miles from the Strait of Gibraltar on Betoya Bay. The government’s plans call for 1,520 meters (approximately 5,000 feet) of quay at a depth of nearly 60 feet. This would provide a capacity to handle 3.4 million TEU annually and they could add 4,000 feet to increase capacity by an additional 2 million TEU.

Marsa Maroc highlights that the terminals in the two ports will provide nearly 5 million TEU capacity for transshipment and a total handling capacity of 6.5 million TEU.

Plans for Nador West Med also include an oil terminal that would be able to handle 25 million tonnes annually. The coal terminal will have a capacity of 7 million tonnes and they also anticipate up to 3 million tonnes of general cargo.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) committed in 2015 to provide a €200 million loan for the development of the port. In December 2022, they provided the second tranche under the agreement providing €100 million to Nador West Med for the construction of the port. EBRD also provided technical cooperation with €1 million to assess the port’s role in the oil shipping market.

 

Port Of Los Angeles Calls for Proposals for New Cruise Terminal

Los Angeles is looking to develop a new cruise terminal to expand its homeport operations (Port of Los Angeles)

PUBLISHED JUN 28, 2024 8:02 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

The Port of Los Angeles issued a Request for Proposals for the construction and operation of a new Outer Harbor Cruise Terminal, along with the redevelopment and operation of the existing World Cruise Center. It is a critical part of the future plans for the port and will play an important part in helping Los Angeles expand its cruise business. Proposals are due by November 12.

“We have seen increased demand for cruises out of the LA Waterfront over the last several years, with a record 1.3 million cruise passengers in 2023,” said Port Executive Director Gene Seroka. “With more growth forecast, these projects will allow us to greatly expand our cruise business capacity while providing the best possible experience and convenience for cruise travelers.”

Los Angeles first released details on its plans to expand the cruise terminals in January 2023. Unlike other major cruise homeports, including Miami and Galveston, Los Angeles elected to develop the terminals without specific cruise partners. Some of the major cruise corporations are rumored to be reviewing the RFP and might submit proposals. They all have been anxious for enhanced facilities in the Port of Los Angeles.

They highlight that over the last two years, more than 200 cruise ships called in Los Angeles with each cruise ship calling at the port generating more than $1 million in local economic activity. Over the next five years, additional growth in cruise passengers and local economic impact is expected with larger ships of 4,000+ passenger capacity continually calling at the port. The growth, however, requires more modern and large terminals to handle the increased passenger volumes.

 “Over the past 20 years, our Port has invested over $1 billion in enhancing, operating, and programming LA Waterfront infrastructure,” said Mike Galvin, the Port’s Director of Waterfront and Commercial Real Estate Development. “These two proposed cruise terminal projects represent the next stage of that investment, and the continued transformation of the waterfront into a dynamic and multi-use visitor destination.”

The proposed new Outer Harbor Cruise Terminal will be located in San Pedro and includes Berths 46 to 50. The site consists of 13 acres of backland, two existing wharves, and 20 acres of associated potential off-site parking with an estimated 2,300 spaces. For this new proposed terminal, the port is seeking a flexible design to accommodate a variety of additional non-cruise revenue-producing uses in the off-season, such as filming, conferences, and events.

The existing World Cruise Center is to be redeveloped. The terminal site consists of 22 acres, including parking, two cruise berths (Berths 90-93), two terminal buildings, and a baggage handling structure. The adjacent battleship Iowa however is not part of the project and will remain in its current location.

 

Arctic HFO Ban Starts as Activists Say There Are Too Many Loopholes

First steps in IMO ban on HFO in the Arctic went into effect today (NOAA)

PUBLISHED JUL 1, 2024 2:18 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

 

Three years after the International Maritime Organization (IMO) adopted the regulation, the international ban on transporting or using heavy fuel oil (HFO) in the Arctic went into effect today, July 1, 2024. Shipping authorities are hailing it as a step toward better protection of the Arctic from the dangers of the fuel while environmentalists continue to emphasize it does not go far enough and contains far too many loopholes.

The ban was adopted at the 76th meeting of the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee in June 2021. In the first phase, it targets older ships without double hulls or protected fuel tanks which are now banned from carrying HFO in the regions of the Arctic, but even there it remains up to the individual countries bordering the Arctic. The IMO provision distinguishes ships built after 2010 with protected tanks, but Danish authorities have said they will extend the exemption to older ships that also have protection on their fuel oil tanks.

The full force of the IMO’s regulations does not happen for another five years. Ships qualifying for the exemptions can continue to sail in the Arctic till 2029 according to the IMO’s regulation. The rule was modeled on a similar restriction for HFO in the Antarctic which went into effect in 2011. 

“By allowing ships with protected fuel tanks to continue using HFO until 2029, we ensure that shipping can adapt to the new rules in a practical and responsible manner while simultaneously protecting the fragile environment in the Arctic," said Nina Porst, Director of Climate, Environment, and Safety at Danish Shipping. The influential group highlights that it supports the ban and is calling on shipping companies to use the time for an orderly transition.

Some countries, including Norway, however, are not waiting for the IMO regulations. Norway began the ban on HFO in the region around Svalbard in 2022. It recently imposed the first fine on a ship for violating the rules. Other countries such as Finland and the United States are yet to act.

Canada announced that it was imposing its HFO ban effective today, July 1. However, they too provided exemptions including for supply ships to the Arctic communities which can continue to use HFO till 2026. Ships with double hulls are exempt to 2029.

Environmental groups contend that the IMO regulation has significant loopholes. They contend that the IMO left around three-quarters (74 percent) of Arctic shipping unaffected by the ban. The NGO Clean Arctic Alliance argues that the use of diesel fuel along with the installation of particulate filters or precipitators, would reduce emissions of black carbon by more than 90 percent quickly and be a solid first step on the route to decarbonization. They are saying waiting till the end of the decade means the Arctic and Indigenous communities remain exposed to the dangers of a spill.

“Governments and NGOs fought long and hard to achieve the ban on the use and carriage of HFO in the Arctic - yet see that it will be half-implemented is quite simply not good enough,” said Dr. Sian Prior, Lead Advisor to the Clean Arctic Alliance. ”IMO Member States, especially Arctic coastal countries, must go farther than the IMO ban by implementing it in ways that truly protect the Arctic from HFO spills and black carbon emissions - and that means refusing to offer loopholes to the shipping industry.”

Activists point out that carbon emissions from ships operating on HFO are just as dangerous and have a broader impact than the focus on banning the transportation of HFO. The Clear Arctic Alliance is calling for the IMO to make the ban and enforcement immediate without loopholes. They want the IMO to extend the area covered by the ban and to enact regulations to reduce black carbon emissions.

The groups highlight the dramatic growth in the number of ships operating in the Arctic. Russia, which is moving aggressively to expand Arctic shipping and start year-round transits, also has not accepted the ban or taken any steps to enact its provisions.

 

Disruptions Grow at German Ports as Labor Talks Drag On

Container operations in Wilhelmshaven were stopped for both shifts on Thursday in what the union called a warning strike (Eurogate file photo)

PUBLISHED JUN 28, 2024 11:10 AM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

 

Germany’s powerful union Ver.di is continuing to stage a series of “warning strikes” rolling across the main German commercial ports as the union says they are “still far apart” on contract negotiations. The latest effort came yesterday with both the day and night shifts stopping work at Wilhelmshaven.

Carriers are continuing to warn customers of potential impacts on their schedules as Ver.di says that there could be additional strikes before the next round of talks which is not scheduled for nearly two weeks. Maersk issued another update to customers saying that it was “reviewing vessel line ups and schedules, as well as potential impact of the strike action on vessel departures. We are looking into taking additional measures, such as diversions or move count restrictions in order to minimize the impact on onwards vessel schedules, and consequently, delays to our customers’ cargo.”

Yesterday’s action impacted Germany’s deep-water port and one of the primary ports for container operations. Wilhelmshaven’s container terminal is operated by Eurogate. The port has a nearly 60-foot depth permitting it to handle the largest containerships in the world.

Ver.di is seeking a new 12-month agreement for its 11,500 members working at Germany’s North Sea ports. It is calling for an increase in hourly wages of three euros as of June 1, 2024, as well as a corresponding increase in shift allowances, including a catch-up for the missing increase in shift allowances in the 2022 collective agreement. Media report said this would equate to between 10 and 14.5 percent increase depending on current wages. Ver.di cites its concessions in the 2022 negotiations and Germany’s current rate of inflation.

Two years ago, the negotiations stretched to ten rounds before an agreement. Ver.di also staged warning strikes to pressure the Central Association of German Seaport Operators with reports saying port operations were suspended for a total of 80 hours. It caused widespread disruptions and backlogs.

The two sides commenced talks at the beginning of June, with a second meeting on June 6 and a third round on June 17 and 18. The fourth round is not scheduled until July 11 and 12 in Bremen.

Warning strikes have ranged from Hamburg on June 7, to Bremen (June 11), Bremerhaven (June 12), and Emden (June 14). Coordinated to the third round, Ver.di called for the broadest strike which hit Hamburg, Bremen, Bremerhaven, Brake, and Emden along with a coordinated rally in Hamburg where they said 1,500 to 2,000 members were expected. The strike brought container movements to a standstill and caused backups of trucks on major roads around the Hamburg port.