Narrative X-ray: Does Russia want peace?

31.12.2023

Russia claims it wants peace and is not to blame for starting wars, but the facts show that the narrative systematically repeated by key Kremlin figures is false. In the same way, Russia’s calls for peace with Ukraine are hollow because fulfilling the conditions set as their basis would mean suicide for Ukraine. The Kremlin unequivocally wants to usurp Ukraine and other neighbours and has essentially declared a covert war on the entire West.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has issued a new demand for the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, suggesting this as a precondition for initiating peace negotiations. According to a report from the state news agency Tass, Putin made these remarks during a meeting with the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Putin stated that if Ukraine begins a “real withdrawal of troops from these regions” and formally abandons its plans to join NATO, Russia will immediately issue an order to cease fire and commence negotiations. “As soon as this happens, we will ensure the unhindered and safe withdrawal of Ukrainian forces,” he said, emphasizing Moscow’s commitment to facilitating a peaceful resolution.

The Russian president also warned that if Kyiv rejects this peace proposal, Russia’s future demands will differ, though he did not specify what those might entail.

Putin’s demands for starting peace talks include more land from Ukraine. Source: screenshot.

On December 29, 2023, US President Joe Biden stated the recent Russian airstrike on Ukrainian cities and civilian targets, the largest to date, saying, “This is a stark reminder to the world that after nearly two years of destructive war, Putin’s goals remain the same. He wants to wipe out Ukraine and subjugate the people of Ukraine. He must be stopped.”

Both now and in his speech to Congress in early December, Biden said that if Putin takes away Ukraine, he won’t stop there, he will go further, and the Baltic countries, Moldova and Poland, will be next. If Russia attacks NATO allies, the United States will intervene directly, Biden confirmed, and then the United States will have to fight a war on another continent. Therefore, it makes more sense for the US to support Ukraine and stop Putin now. This sums up the position of the Western countries: Russia has started a war, and the aggressor must be stopped in the bud.

Russia’s dove of peace narrative and threats

Russia’s talking points regarding the war in Ukraine have been the same all along: Russia did not start the war, but acted in self-defense; the war is not an aggression against Ukraine, but a “special military operation” against the threat to Russia, which is said to be the “Nazi regime” of Ukraine, which committed “genocide” against Russians in Eastern Ukraine and is driving the country towards NATO, which, in turn, means that the “hostile” bloc’s border with Russia is expanding. Therefore, it is necessary to “denazify” the country. These noble goals justify a war with a fraternal nation, which is not a war at all.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said after Biden’s speech in Congress that the US President’s suggestion that Russia wants to attack NATO countries after annexing Ukraine is “complete nonsense.” “Russia has no reason or interest—neither geopolitical, economic, nor military—to go to war with NATO countries,” Putin said in an interview with the Russian TV channel Rossija1 in the TV program “Moscow. The Kremlin. Putin”. “We have no territorial demands on them and do not wish to spoil relations with them.”

According to Putin, the Kremlin’s wishes are the opposite: Russia wants to develop good relations with NATO countries.

In the same interview, Putin made veiled threats towards Finland, which had just been accepted into NATO, including that the country “has problems”, and promised to concentrate military units on the Russian-Finnish border. The possibility of Finland attacking Russia defies common sense.

On July 21, 2023, after Poland sent military units to secure the Polish-Belarusian border in response to Wagner’s redeployment of troops to Belarus, Putin threatened Poland in a televised appearance, saying that Russia would respond with “all possible means at our disposal.” Poland is known to be a NATO country and has not expressed any desire to attack Ukraine or Belarus. “Poland wants to form some kind of coalition under the umbrella of NATO and intervene directly in the conflict in Ukraine, to get a fatter piece for itself, to get back its so-called historical territories,” Putin said.

In a speech in October 2023, Putin said that Western leaders had “lost their sense of reality and crossed all boundaries. “We did not start the so-called war in Ukraine. On the contrary, we are trying to end it,” Putin spoke as a dove of peace at the meeting of the international Valdai discussion club.

Already in 2016, at a meeting of the same club, he said that Russia was not going to attack anyone: “It is simply unthinkable, stupid and completely unrealistic.”

On the contrary, according to Putin, the USA is trying to incite military action in Ukraine to maintain its global supremacy.

Russia’s dove-of-peace narrative is also cringing when you look at where the Russian Federation has intervened militarily during its short existence: 1991-1993 in Georgia and South Ossetia, 1992-93 in Abkhazia, 1992 in Transnistria and North Ossetia, 1992-97 in Tajikistan, 1994-96 and 1999-2009 in Chechnya, in 1999 in Dagestan, and 2008 in Georgia for the secession of South Ossetia. So far, Russia has been involved in one way or another: since 2015 in support of the al-Assad regime in Syria, since 2018 in the civil war in the Central African Republic, and since 2018 in the war in Mali. Not to mention that Russia started to take pieces from Ukraine already in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the shadow war in Donbas.

The real danger: Russia does not stick to the agreements

Many analysts see Putin’s peace dove talk as a narrative aimed at blurring reality and dividing the West because Putin has violated almost every relevant agreement and consistently lied as if he lived in a parallel universe.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, an international agreement was concluded in Budapest in 1994, based on which Ukraine surrendered its existing arsenal of nuclear weapons to Russia. In return, Russia recognized Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political independence under the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. Russia has violated this agreement.

Already at the beginning of the war or before it, the Russian president rejected a preliminary agreement between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators, according to which Ukraine would have agreed not to join NATO, and Russian forces would have ended the military campaign against Ukraine. According to Mykhailo Podoljak, adviser to the President of Ukraine, Russia used pre-invasion negotiations as a smokescreen to prepare for an advance on Ukraine.

Putin’s current claims about not wanting to attack NATO countries are similar to the Kremlin’s messages in late 2021 and early 2022, even the night before hostilities began on February 24, 2022, when Putin and other senior Russian officials lied in unison: Russia is not going to attack Ukraine. At the same time, Russia concentrated more than 100,000 troops on the Ukrainian border.

Therefore, according to the ISW analysis of the US Independent Institute for the Study of War (17.12.2023), Putin’s claims that Russia has no desire to attack NATO countries are hollow.

In August 2023, the head of the Russian Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, said that Russia has the right to act against NATO countries based on the principles of jus ad bellum (legitimate reasons for starting a war).

In November, Medvedev threatened Poland, saying the country could lose its independence. On December 2, he said on state television that the Baltic states could be Russia’s next targets.

Medvedev, Vladimir Solovyov, and other Russian propagandists have repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons against NATO countries. ISW experts say propagandists’ threats are not credible in themselves, but they are important in connection with Putin’s recent “peacemaking attempt,” the real goal of which is to weaken the unity of the West and force NATO to revise its principles in the direction that Russia wants.

According to ISW experts, Putin’s recent statements that it is not Russia, but the US that needs to find a common ground, are thinly veiled threats towards the US and NATO.

A peace agreement is unlikely at this stage

There have been constant attempts at peace or a truce, but none of them have succeeded.

At the November 2023 video meeting of the G20 countries under the presidency of India, Putin said that Russia has never refused peace talks with Ukraine, but it is Ukraine that has withdrawn from the talks. It was the first time Putin had to directly endure accusations of aggression from heads of state, and the first time he called the war a “war” (rather than a special operation) and a “tragedy.” “Of course, we should think about how to end this tragedy. By the way, Russia has never refused peace talks with Ukraine,” said Putin.

In July 2023, Putin confirmed at a meeting of representatives of African countries and Russia in St. Petersburg that the proposals of African leaders for peace talks could be the basis for ending the war, but that Kyiv’s attacks on Russia make it “almost impossible”.

Before, China presented a 12-point peace plan, in which the first point is to respect the sovereignty and borders of countries under the principles of the United Nations. It has not affected Putin’s aggression in Ukraine in the desired direction.

Together with Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014, the Kremlin currently controls about 17.5% of Ukraine’s territory. As a condition of the peace talks, the Kremlin wants the ceasefire border to be fixed on the current front line and that part of Ukraine to remain under Russian control. According to analysts, such an outcome may suit Putin because it can be presented as a victory and “fulfilment of objectives,”  which is Putin’s main condition for ending hostilities.

However, this does not suit Ukraine in any way, because Kiev’s prerequisite is the withdrawal of Russian troops from the pre-war borders. Therefore, Putin’s “dove of peace” narrative is empty.

The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelelsnkyi, presented a 10-point peace plan for Ukraine already at the end of 2022, and its main conditions are the cessation of hostilities, the restoration of Ukrainian territory to the borders fixed in 1994, the withdrawal of Russian troops from there, and the prosecution of war criminals. “There is no alternative to this peace plan: only Ukraine, the country fighting this aggression, can determine what a just and lasting peace looks like. Therefore, all proposals for peaceful reconciliation can only be based on the Ukrainian peace formula,” reads the explanation of the Ukrainian peace formula.

Analysts reasonably believe that even if Putin is forced to start peace talks, nothing will happen until a new president is elected in the US, preferably Trump, with whom he would have better opportunities to achieve his goals.

At the same time, ideas in the Western media are emerging that the war could also be ended by Ukraine giving up parts of the territories occupied by Russia, or at least a ceasefire should be concluded. Unfortunately, it is obvious that under the conditions of a ceasefire, where the war border is frozen, Putin would simply take advantage to consolidate his positions and/or prepare a new offensive.

Also, dangerous rhetoric has started to sound in the Western media, as if Zelenskyy, and not Putin, should try to make peace – even though the latter is the aggressor. However, Zelenskyi has already formulated the principles for achieving peace.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said at the end of December that influential Western powers had just met under cover of secrecy to discuss the peace formula presented by Zelenskyy. According to Lavrov, the next meeting has been arranged for January 2024, as well as the start of peace talks in February. However, the Reuters news agency was unable to confirm these claims.

Putin has repeatedly stated that Russia is always ready for peace talks, but only on Russia’s terms.

If you read the interview of Maria Zakharova, spokeswoman for the Russian Foreign Ministry, published on December 6, 2023, for AFP, unfortunately, all hopes for peace are extinguished. Zakharova, speaking on behalf of Lavrov, who is in turn hosted by Putin, formulated the preconditions for peace talks as follows: the West must stop supplying Ukraine with weapons, Kyiv must accept the new territorial reality, Ukraine must become a neutral state, and the rights of Russians must be protected. “We cannot tolerate the existence of an aggressive Nazi state on our border, from whose territory the threat to Russia and its neighbors emanates,” Zakharova repeated the Kremlin’s long-known talking points, which make effective peace talks impossible. Or why should Ukraine voluntarily commit suicide, as some analysts rhetorically asks.

The number of pro-peace activists in Russia has increased

The fact that the Kremlin does not want peace does not mean that the people of Russia want the war to continue. According to the latest survey by the private Russian research company Russian Field, 39% of the respondents are in favor of continuing the “special military operation,” and 48% are in favor of moving to peace talks. This shows a significant shift: in a poll in early February, 45% were in favor of war and 44% were in favor of peace talks. A year earlier, there were even more supporters of the war. For the first time, there are now more opponents of war than supporters of its continuation. Moreover, when asked directly whether they would support Putin’s decision to sign the peace treaty, 74% said yes and only 18% said no. In addition, 61% of Russians have a negative view of a possible second wave of mobilization.

This direction is also supported by the polls of the largest independent research company, Levada. According to the data from the last two polls, the share of doves for peace has increased in October, compared to September, from 51% to 56%, and the share of supporters of war has fallen from 39% to 37%.

However, one cannot overlook the fact that the majority of respondents to the Levada survey “strongly support” (45%) or “rather support” (31%) the activities of the Russian armed forces in Ukraine—a total of 76%. According to Russian Field, the corresponding numbers are 47% and 33%, for a total of 80%.

However, based on what is known, war is more useful to the Putin regime than peace, at least as long as it can serve as its achievement. It is also clear that the survival of Putin’s regime depends on how the war ends, but for now, it is more profitable for him to continue the war than to end it. Only when war becomes a threat to his power Putin will have a real desire to end it.

The ISW Institute for the Study of War has aptly summarized Russia’s aggression: “Putin did not attack Ukraine because he was afraid of NATO. He attacked because he thought NATO was weak and his attempts to regain control of Ukraine by other means had failed, and installing a Russia-friendly government in Kyiv was supposed to be safe and easy. His goal was not to protect Russia from some non-existent threat but to expand Russia’s power, destroy the state of Ukraine, and destroy NATO. Those are the goals he’s still trying to achieve.”

Source: Russian Field (https://russianfield.com/13volna)

The infographic was created by Propastop’s editors.

 

Runes in Modern Warfare: Ideological and Propaganda Weapon

13.06.2024

During the Russian aggression against Ukraine, runes, nearly two thousand years old symbols, were used to emphasize their identity and justify their actions. The Azov Regiment, one of the most well-known units of the Ukrainian National Guard, was accused by Russian propaganda of using the Wolfsangel rune in its symbolism. At the same time, Russian paramilitary groups, such as the Wagner Group, have used various runic symbols to denote their military identity and historical continuity. In the Kharkiv region, Russia has used a specific rune to emphasize its claims of the region’s “historical belonging” to Russia.

What are the runes?

Runes are characters used by the ancient Germanic peoples, dating back to around the 2nd century. These symbols were originally used in the Futhark alphabet, which consisted of 24 runes. Each rune symbolized a specific sound and held deep mythological and magical significance. Runes were used for writing, but also in mystical and religious rituals where they were intended to bring protection, healing, or luck.

The meanings of runes were diverse, and they were often used as talismans to bring strength and protection to the bearer. For example, the rune “Algiz” symbolized protection, while “Fehu” represented wealth. In warfare, runes were used on warriors’ equipment and weapons to ensure victory in battle and to protect against enemy attacks.

Thor’s Hammer, known as Mjölnir

In modern war symbolism, the use of runes has resurfaced, primarily among extremist and paramilitary groups seeking inspiration from the past and the power of symbols. For instance, neo-Nazi groups have used runes and other ancient Germanic symbols to express their ideologies. These symbols, such as the hammer of Thor, the thunder god and son of the chief god Odin, and the swastika, carry messages of strength, purity, and historical justification.

Runes as a propaganda tool

The Wolfsangel rune, historically associated with both National Socialists and ancient Germanic tribes, symbolizes strength and protection but is also a controversial symbol due to its historical context. The Azov Regiment members were accused have worn symbols that reference National Socialism, including the Wolfsangel rune, also known as the “wolf hook,” which is linked to historical Nazi Germany symbolism.

The Azov Regiment is surrounded by numerous myths created by Russian propaganda to justify Russia’s brutal destruction of Mariupol. Russian and pro-Russian media have accused the Azov Regiment of being a neo-Nazi unit, using the unit’s symbol similarity to a rune as evidence to support these claims.

The Wolfsangel rune, historically associated with both National Socialists and ancient Germanic tribes, symbolizes strength and protection but is controversial due to its historical context. Members of the Azov Regiment have been accused by Russian propaganda of wearing symbols that reference National Socialism, including the Wolfsangel rune, also known as the “wolf hook,” which is linked to historical Nazi Germany symbolism. Those statements were debunked by numerous Ukrainian and Western sources (https://www.azovcontrafake.com/, Euromaidan Press article)

The Azov Regiment is surrounded by many myths, unit’s symbol to be a neo-nazi rune is one of them. Source: screenshot https://www.azovcontrafake.com/

On June 11, 2024, the U.S. confirmed that “the 12th Operational Purpose Brigade of the National Guard of Ukraine” (the official name of the 12th Special Forces Brigade Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine) has passed the vetting required by U.S. law and is eligible to receive security assistance from the United States.

Russian Paramilitary Groups: On the Russian side, several paramilitary groups have used runes and other symbols to emphasize their military identity and historical continuity. For example, the Wagner Group, a well-known Russian private military company linked to numerous war crimes and human rights violations in various conflict zones, has used runic symbolism on their uniforms and in their propaganda. This references their connections to Vikings and ancient warrior cultures, symbolizing military power and fearlessness in battle.

Wagner Group vehicle. Image: Reddit

Kharkiv Oblast rune: a specific rune called the “Gungnir rune” – Odin’s spear, associated with power, protection, and strength – was adopted. Russian occupation authorities in Kharkiv Oblast have used symbols and runes to emphasize their claims of the region’s “historical belonging” to Russian territory. The use of these symbols is part of a broader strategy aimed at reinforcing Russia’s claims to justify its control and potentially annex the region in the future. For example, Russia has used symbols in Kharkiv Oblast that refer to the region’s historical ties to Russian culture and history.

Russians use symbols associated with Vikings to emphasize a long history. The ancient Rus’ state was founded by Swedish (Rus) Vikings. According to myths, Odin himself came to the Nordic countries from the Scythian steppes, the Black Sea region, as recorded in the Ynglinga saga. There is a belief that Odin’s symbols and ritual items could only be worn by warriors chosen or blessed by Odin himself, which in the current context refers to Russian forces.

The Impact and Meaning of Symbols

The use of ancient symbols, such as runes, in a modern context has become a powerful tool in ideological and propaganda warfare. Amid Russian aggression against Ukraine and the occupation of territories, symbols historically associated with Vikings and ancient Germanic tribes are being revitalized, emphasizing claims of historical continuity and cultural roots.

On one hand, Russian occupation authorities and paramilitary groups, such as the Wagner Group, use these symbols to strengthen their identity and create the image of fearless warriors. On the other hand, Russian propaganda tries to discredit Ukrainian forces by accusing them of using Nazi symbols, which has been refuted by numerous Ukrainian and Western sources.

The example of Kharkiv Oblast shows how historical symbols can be used to justify occupation and create the myth of “historical belonging.” This underscores the importance of a critical approach and fact-checking in the context of information warfare.

Ultimately, the revival and interpretation of these symbols in a modern context serve not only for propaganda and justifying political ambitions but also for creating a new layer of historical memory that will influence future generations.

Canadian extreme temperatures table omits recent records

• Published on July 8, 2024 at 14:35
•  6 min read 
• By Gwen ROLEY, AFP Canada

Copyright © AFP 2017-2024. Any commercial use of this content requires a subscription. Click here to find out more.

Social media posts containing a list of supposed Canadian temperature records from the early 20th century were used to claim recent reports of extreme heat are exaggerated. This is misleading; data from Environment and Climate Change Canada show records not mentioned in the posts, including Canada's highest-ever temperature recorded in British Columbia in 2021.

"Stop falling for all the BS that 'We have never had temps like this!'" the text inside a June 17, 2024 Facebook photo says. The image, shared more than 10,000 times, includes a table that purportedly lists "the most extreme temperatures ever recorded" for various Canadian jurisdictions ranging between 36 and 45 Celsius (96.8 and 113 Fahrenheit) all appearing to be measured between 1919 and 1937.

The graphic spread across Facebook and jumped to X, where some users shared the table to claim public overreaction to a June 2024 heatwave over portions of North America which set several daily temperature records.

Image

Screenshot of an X post taken July 8, 2024Screenshot of a Facebook post taken July 8, 2024

One of the categories of the table is titled "Province or Territory," but four Canadian jurisdictions are missing from the social media posts: Nunavut, Yukon, the Northwest Territories and British Columbia.

Simon Donner, a professor and climate scientist at the University of British Columbia (archived here), said these omissions are significant because they ignore all the provincial and territorial temperature records measured in the 21st century, including the all-time Canadian extreme of 49.6C (121.2F) set in Lytton, British Columbia on June 29, 2021. 

"It's just cherry picking of data that is not actually the most extreme temperatures recorded in Canada," Donner said on July 3, 2024.

2021 heat dome

In June 2021, North America experienced a stagnating bubble of hot air which set temperature records across the western US and Canada. Donner said the omission of British Columbia not only excluded the national record set in Lytton but also ignored the other instances of extreme heat in the province that summer.

"It leaves out the heatwave in 2021 that killed hundreds of Canadians," he said.

Local reporting said health authorities estimate around 600 people died in Canada as a result of the extreme temperatures that June. The day after the national heat record was set in Lytton, the British Columbia village was almost entirely destroyed by a nearby wildfire.

While the misleading social media posts claimed warnings about recent extremes are overreactions, researchers are predicting that heat domes such as the one experienced in 2021 will become more intense because of human-caused climate change (archived here).

There is a near-universal consensus that the burning of fossil fuels is causing global average temperatures to rise (archived here). Donner said that historically cooler regions are warming faster than other parts of the world and the lack of contrast between temperatures slows the movement of weather patterns, allowing heat domes to settle and intensify over a longer period (archived here).

Image

Graphic explaining the formation of a "heat dome" 

(AFP / Mélodie LONTJENS, Sabrina BLANCHARD)

"We are seeing more of these blocking events and more sluggish movement of air in the upper atmosphere," Donner said. "And that follows from what you would expect due to adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere."

During a June 2024 heat dome seen over the east coast of North America, AFP debunked separate claims that forecasts about extreme temperatures were being exaggerated.

What's in the data?

Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) maintains climate measurements going back to the 19th century in the country and shared its highest provincial and territorial temperature records with AFP on July 2.

According to ECCC data, two more records were set in the 21st century which the social media graphic leaves out: 36.5C (97.7F) in Yukon in 2004 and 39.9C (103.82F) in the Northwest Territories, also during the June 2021 heat dome (archived here and here). The ECCC said its highest recorded temperature for Nunavut was 34.9 C (94.82 F) in 1989, before the region separated from the Northwest Territories (archived here and here).

Beyond the province and territories left out of the graphic on social media, ECCC data measured higher and later records than those claimed in the posts for Alberta, Ontario and Quebec (archived here, here and here).

Image

Table showing Canadian temperature records shared by Environment 

and Climate Change Canada on July 2, 2024, reformatted by AFP

For Newfoundland and Labrador, ECCC provided a tied record at 37.8C (100.4F), measured twice in 1944 and 1953 (archived here and here). While a reading in that province at 38.3 C (100.9 F) on July 6, 1921 as seen in the social media posts does exist in the government agency's historical data (archived here), ECCC spokeswoman Hannah Boonstra said it was not included in its list of provincial and territorial records because the measurement needed to be validated.

"It is possible the value will be deemed valid; however, it was excluded from the provided table until its validity can be confirmed at a future date," Boonstra said.

The ECCC says online that some historical readings can be erroneous and Boonstra explained daily maximum temperature values are compared with hourly temperatures and measurements from surrounding stations to assess whether a value is suspect (archived here).

Canada warming up faster

A 2019 study from the Government of Canada reported the country is warming at twice the rate as the rest of the world (archived here). Travis Moore, a researcher in climate and atmospheric science and extreme weather at Concordia University (archived here), also said that Canada's highest annual average temperatures were recorded during the last two decades (archived here). 

Moore said that as temperatures rise, cooler regions will feel the effects more quickly, and that the social media posts' omissions of far-north Canadian territories was striking to him. 

"The North has some very, very impressive records, too," he said.

The Arctic regions of Canada are warming even faster than the rest of the country. A 2022 Finnish study (archived here) found that melting sea ice is providing less surface area to reflect solar radiation and northern regions are absorbing more heat, creating a positive warming feedback loop.

Moore underlined that even as Canada and the North are warming more quickly, all of these rates are being calculated from global averages -- with 2023 being the hottest year on record.  

Read more of AFP's reporting on misinformation around climate change and the environment here.

Abandoned legacy: The left of Iran and Palestinians

First published at Verso.

Omid Montazeri
27 June, 2024

The genocide in Gaza has created new fault lines within the global Left. Friendships, families, relationships and solidarities have been cut through. For the Iranian Left, these fault lines have followed a binary logic. Some understand the different factions of resistance in Palestine as emancipatory movements for self-determination and others flatten them with their own experience of the Islamic Republic of Iran: backward and reactionary. This was not always the case. Palestine was once the beating heart of a united front, a “national liberation movement”, shared by many factions of the left in Iran. Returning to their shared history may open the path for reclaiming the abandoned legacy of the left.
*

In 1969, a faction of fighters from Al-Fatah, the main organisation within the Palestinian national Liberation Movement (PLO), attacked and successfully seized control of the Abinia kibbutz located along the border of Jordan with Israel. One of the commanders of this operation was a member of an Iranian communist nucleus later known as the Iranian People’s Fadai Guerrillas (OIPFG). His Palestinian Fadaiyan identity card bore the name Abu al-Abbas; while his Iranian birth certificate identified him as AliAkbar Safaie-Farahani. What prompted an Iranian Fadai to fight alongside Palestinians at this time?

About a year prior to the operation, Safaie-Farahani, along with his comrade Ali Safari-Ashtiani, were the surviving members of a small communist nucleus suppressed by Shah. While still in Iran, in 1967, the group had published a pamphlet titled Concerns of the Anti-Colonial Movement and the Duties of Communists where they decried the 1953 coup and its aftermath as the era of the "failure of the anti-colonial movement in Iran." In their view, the Shah's foreign policy showed an "Imperialist strategy against progressive liberation movements.” According to their analysis, ideological unity among Iran's communist, socialist, nationalist, and religious groups against the Shah had never materialised and the only possibility for "unity in action" hinged on armed struggle and engagement with Palestine.

With the pamphlet's publication, the Iranian Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAK) identified and detained most members of the group. Safaie-Farahani and Safari-Ashtiani fled the country, but rather than heading to Moscow, they travelled via Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and ultimately to Palestine. For them, the Palestinian cause served as a crucial link between Marxism and anti-colonialism, and an essential tool for reassembling their intersection. The first three years of the journey transformed Safaie-Farahani into a seasoned guerrilla fighter, participating in various armed operations in the region. He also wrote What a Guerrilla Fighter Should Know.

In February 1971, returning to Iran from Palestine, Safaie-Farahani led an armed group from the Iranian People's Fadai Guerrillas to attack the Siahkal police station. Safari-Ashtiani, who had been responsible for an Al-Fatah military warehouse, took charge of the armaments for this operation - a role that he later came to play for all guerrilla activities of the group.

Another group of guerrilla fighters emerged shortly after the Siahkal operation—the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK)—identifying as a left Islamic group. They too had connected with Palestinian fighters a few years earlier to prepare and train for armed resistance. Together these events marked the beginning of an era where the Iranian left identified itself as an armed struggle and national liberation movement.

Within months of the Siahkal operation, Safaei-Farahani was captured by security forces, subjected to torture, and killed. Al-Fatah's weekly magazine published a eulogy for him in an essay titled From Jordan’s Aghwar to Iran and Vice-Versa. Safaei-Farahani's death was commemorated as the "martyrdom" of Abu al-Abbas, a commander of the Palestinian Fadaiyan and the Iranian People's Fadai Guerrillas.
*

For the Iranian Marxist movements that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, Palestine played a pivotal role in shaping their identity. Following the Six-Day War, Al-Fatah, under PLO, garnered substantial trust and reputation in the region. To the extent that their "Fadai" membership cards facilitated seamless movement across the national borders. Iranian resistance groups were closely affiliated with the PLO, assigning Arabic aliases to their members, providing Fadai membership cards and subsequently, Palestinian identity documents.

The initial wave of Iranian Fadai and Mojahedin reached the Palestinian camps in Jordan before the civil war in 1970. The Jordanian civil war, also known as Black September, saw violent clashes between the PLO and the Jordanian army. As a result, Palestinians were compelled to retreat to Syria and then to Lebanon, with their Iranian counterparts following suit.

The support extended by the PLO to Iranian armed groups was multifaceted. In strategic terms for example, they allocated an office space to the Mojahedin on the second floor of a prominent four-story building at the entrance to the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila. Supervision and training were provided by Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) and Salah Khalaf Abu Iyad, who were overseeing military and security affairs in Al-Fatah at that time.

Their support had a theoretical dimension too. George Habash, a prominent leader of the Palestinian left, and the founder of PFLP, penned an introduction for the work of a martyred Fadai leader, Amir-Parviz Pouyan in 1974. Pouyan’s article originally published in the spring of 1970 was titled The Necessity of Armed Struggle and the Refutation of Survival. Habash recognised the importance of the essay for its conceptualization of armed struggle in national liberation movements. He emphasised the crucial role played by the guerrilla fighters in fostering solidarity between the Iranian people and the Arab people in general, and the Palestinian people in particular.

Through their association with Palestinians, the Iranian left established connections with other liberation movements in the region, particularly in Lebanon, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Oman. Low frequency radio channels transmitted updates on the revolutionary movements. Some Iranian fighters were stationed in the camps to coordinate with regional revolutionaries, while others, in groups of 10 to 15, were dispatched to the military training centres of Palestinian forces.

Palestinian camps provided the Iranian left with crucial insights into the region and a fresh understanding of its geopolitics. This enabled them to become contemporary with their time and align with other national liberation movements in the global south. This network of alignments facilitated the opening of new frontlines against the Shah, particularly during the Dhofar War in Oman, where Iran’s state army supported Sultan Qaboos and the Iranian leftist fighter engaged in battle alongside Omani liberation forces.

It may be true that the Iranian left sought to connect with Palestine to learn the tactics of urban warfare. But history shows that they ended up living alongside Palestinians, forging emotional bonds, sharing meals, falling in love and ultimately fighting side by side. In the words of Torab Haghshenas, one of the first Mojahedin members stationed between Jordan and Lebanon: "We all developed an emotional bond with the people in the places we were stationed in. we became one with that place. We clapped at the celebrations and cried in the sorrows. We quickly learned the language there and mingled with the people."

The left was not there at the start. Within two weeks after Nakba, on 15 May 1948, Iran’s recently formed Etehadie-Moslemin (Muslim Union), issued a call for volunteers to join the struggle in Palestine. Registration places were set up across the city of Tehran, attracting prominent Muslim intellectuals and clerics in support of the cause. Records indicate that around five thousand fighters registered to join their Palestinian brethren. Despite the significant interest, the Shah of Iran, refused to grant the necessary permits for the dispatch, leading to the cancellation of the initiative.

From their failure in the aftermath of Nakba until the early days of the 1979 revolution, the politically critical clerics, dissatisfied with the Shah’s stance, focused their efforts on cultural and literary activities.

An examination of the literature on Palestine published in Farsi during these three decades reveals the role played by these clerics in shaping the "Palestinian question" in the Iranian context.

Consider for instance, the 1964 Farsi edition of The Fate of Palestine and the History of Colonial Oppression by the Joradian diplomat Akram Zuaiter. The work stood out as one of the most influential literary pieces on Palestine and anti-colonial armed resistance in Iran. The edition was the work of translation by a young political cleric, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, who had self-published the work without a permit or funding. Despite being banned by the Intelligence service SAVAK, the translation circulated widely. Mohammad Mossadegh, the former Prime Minister who was exiled after the 1953 Anglo-American coup, praised the translation and contributed funds for its wider distribution.

Up to this point, the prevailing writings within the established circles of the seminaries in Qom and Tehran were largely characterised by anti-Semitic sentiments. A notable example was a letter to the Pope in 1948 by a leading Shiite authority in Iran, Ayatollah Behbahani. In this letter, Behbahani voiced objections to the killing of Palestinian Muslims but the essence of his correspondence was what he described as a religious conflict between Jews, Muslims, and Christians, with a language that was distinctly anti-Jewish.

The young Hashemi distanced himself from the anti-Semitic narratives. Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleghani, co-founder of a Muslim and nationalist group named Nehzat-e Azadi (Freedom Movement of Iran) was another example of such political clerics. He visited Jerusalem in 1961 to witness the resistance of Palestinians and reported on his observations upon returning to Tehran at the Hedayat Mosque.

In subsequent years, the newly formed Mojahedin-e Khalq, supported the political clerics in Palestine related projects. For example, Torab Haghshenas acknowledged the pioneering role of Nehzat-e Azadi in addressing the Palestinian cause in Iran in his memoir. In 1968, his group translated a declaration on boycotting the state of Israel by the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini's and disseminated it across the country.

Apart from the clerics, other Muslim intellectuals were also contributing to the discourse on colonialism during this period. With the Six Day War in 1967 for example, Ali Shariati, drew parallels between the Zionism in Arab countries and the British Oil Company in Iran. Renowned Muslim writers such as Jalal Al-e Ahmad and Simin Daneshvar travelled to Palestine to learn from the struggle first hand. Gradually, the Palestinian resistance gained a broader resonance in Iran's civil and political movements.

In the decade between the Six Day War in 1967 and the 1979 revolution, Marxists, anti-colonial nationalists and Muslim opposition groups collaborated to form a unified front in the name of Palestine and in opposition to Imperialism. This unified front haunted the Shah of Iran so much so that he described it as the resurgence of the "red and black"- a spectre that brought together the Marxist and religious anti-colonial movements in the region.

In the winter of 1979, following the revolution in Iran, the first international guests invited to Tehran to celebrate the victory were Palestinians. This included Yasser Arafat, chairman of PLO, and several leaders of the Al-Fatah movement. They arrived at Tehran airport on 17 February 1979, only six days after the revolution, and were greeted by members of the newly-formed Council of the Revolution who then accompanied them to the house of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Conspicuously absent from the pictures of their gatherings and celebrations, were figures from the Iranian leftist groups, namely the Organisation of Iranian People's Fadai and Mojahedin-e Khalq. Such absences signalled a rupture between a revolution and its revolutionaries.

Up until this moment, the Palestinian struggle had been a touchstone for many factions of Iranian Muslim, Marxist and anti-colonial resistance groups, inspiring and uniting the national liberation movement against the Pahlavi monarchy and imperialism. This united front shattered with the 1979 revolution. Nehzat-e Azadi came to power, their members joined the Council of the Revolution, established the temporary post-revolutionary government and laid the foundations of an Islamic Republic. Hashemi became a significant figure in Iranian politics, evolving into a game changer and kingmaker. They followed by a widespread suppression of the leftist groups that led to violent and bloody confrontations across the ensuing years.

From honour to melancholy, from victory to failure, from progress to retreat—remembering the path that connected the Leftist movements to Palestine is remembering an intense history, an image that is present but is not expressed, an abandoned legacy. Indeed, is this not the very definition of trauma?.
*

Four decades after the Revolution, only a handful of organised leftist and Marxist Iranian voices echo from within the region, with little more resonating across the Middle East. Throughout this time, the Iranian left grew distant from Palestine and movements such as Hamas for its fear of the position of Islam in the region’s national liberation movements.

Both the State of Iran and its leftist and Marxist opposition ignore the history they once shared with the Palestinian movement. In the aftermath of October 7th for example, both condemned Israel but from different rhetorical positions. The former supported Operation Al Aqsa Flood and the latter condemned Hamas. The former spoke in defence of Islamism, as the latter denounced the dangers of religious fundamentalism. For both fronts, the concern was not Hamas itself, but with the role of Islam within the conflict.

Following Russian Marxism, the Iranian Left recognised national liberation movements as forms of resistance against imperialism and the dependency of States to the west with useful contributions to progressive and bourgeois national-democratic revolutions towards socialism. Kamran Matin reintroduces the national liberation problem into the radical left debate in Iran.

Arab Marxism on the other hand, appreciated national liberation movements as foundations for the building of a united front amongst the Arab resistance groups in the region, including both Muslim and non-muslim factions. For the Lebanese theorist Mahdi Amel, Islam was determined in the field of “conflicting class-based political practices”. Amel’s book was published posthumously based on an unfinished manuscript that he had begun writing a year after the 1979 revolution in Iran. For him the question was not “whether islam is political (temporal) or not (and thus spiritual)”, but rather “how to define Islam’s political position”.

Despite the political milieu of the 1970s, the Iranian Marxist groups did not engage with the discourse of Arab Marxism, perhaps because their writings were hardly translated into Persian. As such, their theoretical framework lacked the insights that were critical for organising in a society fragmented by class, religion and national minorities. Indeed, the dialogue was cut short.

Take for example George Habash’s note on the work of the Iranian Fadai leader, Amir-Parviz Pouyan. He had reaffirmed the “historical necessity” for the figure of the vanguard fighter, but insisted on the need to address, with the same attention, the issue of evolution from the vanguard to the revolutionary party. In his view breaking the frontiers of dictatorship did not pave the way for the masses to join revolutionary organisations. Since Pouyan was killed by the time of his writing, he concluded "this legacy rests upon the shoulders of future generations." Habash’s warning was not heard. The Marxist vanguards of Iran failed in organising the masses, and the revolution of 1979 came to miss-align with its revolutionaries.

The history of the national liberation movement in the region is written as a non-secular, non-democratic and homogenising kind. Behind the narrative and historiography of Iranian scholar Peyman Vahabzadeh on this topic for example, is a dark underground labyrinth where the monster of political Islam lay dormant. The different and differing leftist and Muslim groups who collaborated and formed the united front of a 'national liberation movement', did so while maintaining their singularities. Unseeing their multiplicity and flattening their singularities is to trap oneself within the epistemology of states and their international relations. Eskandar Sadeghi Broujerdi’s recent work on the position of the Islamic Republic and its approach to the Israeli state provides an example. As Naghmeh Sohrabi urges, it is time to disentangle the revolutionary process from the revolutionary outcome.

During the golden era of armed struggle in the 1970s, the national liberation movement provided a theoretical framework for cooperation between Muslim and leftist anti-colonial resistance groups in the Middle East. But today this framework has faded from contemporary debates among the left. During a recent exchange between Andreas Malm and Matan Kaminer, the discussion inevitably shifted to the question of united fronts and transnational movements. Malm pointed to the false dichotomy of Muslim and secular democratic resistance and called for re-centering the disputes and theoretical controversies within the left around a shared front. He rightly stressed that “the left in the global North has followed events since October 7 by paying little if any attention to the left that is there.” This is why we need to return to the experience of national liberation movements in the global south.

To bring sense and reason to this history, we must rewind to the very origin of Marxism in the region. Over a century ago, as early as the birth of socialism in Iran and the Constitutional Revolution in 1905, the problem of Islam was formulated in a letter to Lenin by the founder of the Iranian Soviet Socialist Republic, Mirza Kuchak Khan: In a Muslim society with many national and religious minorities, what response does the Left have to the problem of the front and its relationship with the masses?

For the Iranian Left, remembering Palestine, is remembering the relationship that once tied them to a united front at the scale of the region. It is remembering their abandoned legacy.

*** I'm thankful to Samaneh Moafi, assistant director of research at Forensic Architecture, for her collaboration in designing a precise methodology to recall a forgotten solidarity with Palestine.

Omid Montazeri is an essayist, journalist, and former political prisoner. He is a founding member of the Materialist Research Group, a farsi speaking leftist research group. Between 2020-23 he worked with the “Off-site project” as a researcher on State-building and violence in Post-revolutionary Iran. His main field of research is the intellectual and political legacy of communism and the radical left in Iran, since the 1960s and especially in the context of the 1979 revolution.

Why was the general election in Scotland a disaster for the SNP?

Independence still remains popular even if the SNP isn't

Labour has many more MPs, but that won’t mean change

By Bob Fotheringham
Sunday 07 July 2024

SOCIALIST WORKER

Issue 2912

The general election result in Scotland was a disaster for the Scottish National Party (SNP). Its seat count was reduced from 37 to just nine. Labour took 37 sears, the Lib Dens six and the Tories five.

This is a far cry from the heady days of 2015. Then, in the wake of the 2014 independence referendum, the SNP swept all before them taking 56 seats in Scotland. Labour, the Tories and Liberal Democrats only managed to pick up one seat each.

So why has this happened in Scotland?

Firstly, it is important to acknowledge that despite their success in picking up seats, Labour is still not particularly popular. Its share of the vote was around 36 percent, only slightly bigger than the 34 percent it received nationally.

Support for independence in Scotland remains just shy of 50 percent. Many thousands of independence supporters voted Labour. They did so to get rid of the Tories.

An important feature of the voting in Scotland was that the central belt, which contains most working class constituencies, almost universally returned Labour MPs. The SNP hung on only narrowly in Dundee which is a working-class constituency with a long history of support for the SNP.

The ongoing crisis in the SNP and its failure in government have led to a withering of its support. The party which is formally committed to making Scotland an independent country has no idea how to achieve this end.

The current leader of the SNP, John Swinney, is a cautious business-friendly politician. Meanwhile, there are ongoing issues in Scotland with poverty, drug deaths and underfunding of the NHS. The SNP has been far from radical in challenging and confronting the outgoing Tory government.

Worryingly, the Reform Party is starting to pick up support in Scotland. It won a 7 percent share of the vote. One poll suggests it might return nine MSPs at the Scottish Elections in 2026. While the debate in Scotland around immigration and refugees has been generally far less toxic than in England, this shows that Scotland is not immune from the racism of right wing and mainstream politicians.

Like many across Britain, most people in Scotland will be happy to see the back of the Tories. However, like the rest of Britain, the real fight for change will take place on the streets and in the workplaces. This will mean confronting both the SNP government in Scotland and the Labour government around support for the Palestinians, tackling climate change, supporting immigrants and refugees and supporting those workers fighting back.

Independence remains popular in Scotland. For the moment, however, with the decline of the street movement, it is difficult to see how this can move forward in any effective way. As disappointment with a Labour government in Westminster sets in, as it certainly will, there is potential for the independence movement to reignite.

If it is to succeed, then a major lesson for the movement is not to put your trust in the ultra-cautious and timid SNP.