Friday, April 17, 2020

Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital
http://geopolitica.iiec.unam.mx/sites/default/files/2019-08/Moore-CapitalismInTheWebOfLife.pdf

Jason W. Moore


Verso Books, Sep. 15, 2015 - Political Science - 336 pages


Finance. Climate. Food. Work. How are the crises of the twenty-first century connected? In Capitalism in the Web of Life, Jason W. Moore argues that the sources of today’s global turbulence have a common cause: capitalism as a way of organizing nature, including human nature. Drawing on environmentalist, feminist, and Marxist thought, Moore offers a groundbreaking new synthesis: capitalism as a “world-ecology” of wealth, power, and nature. Capitalism’s greatest strength—and the source of its problems—is its capacity to create Cheap Natures: labor, food, energy, and raw materials. That capacity is now in question. Rethinking capitalism through the pulsing and renewing dialectic of humanity-in-nature, Moore takes readers on a journey from the rise of capitalism to the modern mosaic of crisis. Capitalism in the Web of Life shows how the critique of capitalism-in-nature—rather than capitalism and nature—is key to understanding our predicament, and to pursuing the politics of liberation in the century ahead.



Capitalism in the Web of Life: an Interview with Jason W. Moore

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Partway through Capitalism in the Web of Life, Jason W. Moore provides the imperative for a complete theoretical reworking and synthesis of Marxist, environmental, and feminist thought by asserting: “I think many of us understand intuitively – even if our analytical frames lag behind – that capitalism is more than an “economic” system, and even more than a social system. Capitalism is a way of organizing nature.”
Kamil Ahsan spoke with Moore about his book Capitalism in the Web of Life (Verso), released last month, to grapple with his new challenges to old assumptions.
Kamil Ahsan: What was the impetus for Capitalism in the Web of Life?
Jason W. Moore: I wanted to come up with a framework that would allow us to understand the history of the last five centuries in a way that was adequate to the crisis we face today. For the past four decades, we’ve had a “Green Arithmetic” approach to crisis. When we’ve had an economic or social crisis or any other kind of crisis, they all go into one box. Then we have an ecological crises – water or energy or the climate – that go into another box.
So for roughly the past four decades, environmentalists and other radicals have been raising the alarm about these crises but never really figured out how to put them together. Environmental thinkers have been saying one thing and then doing another – they claimed that humans are a part of nature and that everything in the modern world is about our relationship with the biosphere, but then when they got around to organizing or analyzing, it came down to “Society plus Nature,” as if the relationship was not as intimate and direct and immediate as it is.
KA: The premise of this book is that we need to break down the “Nature/Society” dualism that has prevailed in so much of Red and Green thought. Where did this idea come from, and why is it so thoroughly artificial?
JWM: The idea that humans are outside of nature has a long history. It’s a creation of the modern world. Many civilizations before capitalism had a sense that humans were distinct. But in the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, this very powerful idea emerged – that is embedded in imperialist violence and dispossession of peasants and a whole series of recompositions of what it meant to be a human, particularly divisions around race and gender—that there was something, in Adam Smith’s words, called “civilized society,” which included some humans.
But most humans were still put into this category of “Nature,” which was regarded as something to be controlled and dominated and put to work – and civilized. It sounds very abstract, but the modern world was really based on this idea that some group of humans were called “Society” but most humans go into this other box called “Nature” with a capital N. That’s very powerful. That didn’t come about just because there were scientists, cartographers or colonial rulers who decided it was a good idea, but because of a far-flung process that put together markets and industry, empire and new ways of seeing the world that go along with a broad conception of the Scientific Revolution.
This idea of Nature and Society is very deeply rooted in other dualisms of the modern world: the capitalist and the worker, the West and the rest, men and women, white and black, civilization and barbarism. All of these other dualisms really find their taproots in the Nature/Society dualism.
KA: What is the importance of breaking this dualism, especially in terms of how you reconceptualize capitalism as being “co-produced,” as you say, by human and extra-human natures?
JWM: It is important to understand that capitalism is co-produced by humans and the rest of nature, especially in order to understand the unfolding crisis today. The usual way of thinking about the problems of our world today is to put social, economic and cultural crises into the rubric of “social crises” – and then we have ecological crises and that’s climate and everything else. Today, we’re increasingly realizing that we can’t talk about one without the other, but that’s actually been the reality all along.
We need to overcome this dualism so we can build our knowledge of the present crisis, a singular crisis with many expressions. Some, like financialization, look to be purely social, and others, like the potential sixth extinction of life on this planet, appear to be purely ecological. But in fact those two moments are very closely linked in all sorts of interesting ways.
Once we understand that those relations are central, we begin to see how Wall Street is a way of organizing nature. We see the unfolding of problems today – like the recent turbulence in Chinese and American stock markets – as wrapped up with bigger problems of climate and life on this planet in a way that even radical economists are not willing to acknowledge. This has an impact on our politics. We are seeing today movements – such as food justice movements – that say we need to understand this transformation and it has to do with a right to food in an ecological sense, but also a cultural and democratic sense, and these cannot be separated out.
The problem with the “Green Arithmetic” of “Society + Nature” is this weird separation of environmental justice from social justice, environmental sustainability from social sustainability, ecological imperialism from regular imperialism – even though anyone who knows the history of imperialism knows that it is always about “who are we going to value” and “what groups of society are we going to value?” Once we stop this adjectival promiscuity, we see that imperialism was always about how humans and the rest of nature were wrapped up with each other.
I think then we can practically start to make new alliances with different parts of the world’s social movements that are disconnected – between peasant movements and workers’ movements, between women’s movements and the movement for racial justice. There is a common root. The reason why putting together what I call a “singular metabolism” of humans in the web of life is so crucial – it allows us to start making connections between social moments and ecological moments.
KA: In direct opposition to the Nature/Society binary, you pose a new synthesis, the “oikos.” What is that and how does that take us to a deeper analysis of capitalism?
JWM: At the core of radical thought is something that violates our emphasis on history and relations between humans and the web of life. What happened is this core idea of Nature as outside of human relations as pristine, as nature without a history. That leads to this sense of Nature is there and we need to protect it because if we don’t, the apocalypse is coming. It gets part of what’s going on correct, but it does what radicals have otherwise always been good at: naming the system wrong.
Radicals talk about the interaction between humans and the rest of the nature, but don’t name the relation of life-making that produces both environment and species. Humanity evolves through a series of environment-making activities that transforms not only landscapes but also human biology. For instance, the harnessing of fire allowed human ancestors to develop smaller digestive systems and treat fire as a sort of external stomach.
One of the big ideas in this book is that Nature in general has many patterns that are relatively constant—the Earth rotating in an orbital pattern around the Sun—but Nature is also historical.
With the oikos, we are talking about a relation of life-making, and we are naming this relation that gives rise to multiple ecosystems that include humans. Humans are always making their environments and in the process, making their relationships with each other and their own biology. The structures of power and production, and crucially of reproduction, are part of that story of how we go about making landscapes and environments, and how those environments are making us. However, our vocabulary and concepts are hard-wired in this dualism. We need to crack this dualism and offer some new concepts.
KA: Very early on in the book, you cite Marx’s observation that industrialization was turning “blood into capital.” You go on to talk about this terrifying transformation of the work of all forms of nature into value. What forms of Nature has capitalism historically appropriated and what is capitalism’s trend with previously unexploited natures?
JWM: Capitalism is a weird system, because it’s not really anthropocentric in the way that Greens usually talk about. It’s anthropocentric in a narrow way which is that humans work within the commodity system, which is based on exploitation: the worker works four hours to cover his or her own wages and then another 4-10 hours for the capitalist. That’s one dimension that Marx focused on. But he was aware of a wider set of dimensions.
Capitalism treats one part of humanity as social – the part of humanity that is within the cash nexus and is reproduced within the cash nexus. But –  and this is the counter-intuitive part – capitalism is also an island of commodity production and exchange within much larger oceans of appropriations of unpaid work/energy. Every work process of say, a worker in Shenzhen, China, or in Detroit 70 years ago in an auto plant, depends on appropriating the unpaid work/energy of the rest of nature. Capitalism is, above all, a magnificent and destructive system of  “the appropriation of women, nature and colonies,” to use Maria Mies’ great phrase.
The problem of capitalism today is that the opportunities of appropriating work for free – from forests, oceans, climate, soils and human beings – are dramatically contracting. Meanwhile, the mass of capital floating around the world looking for something to invest in is getting bigger and bigger. The view of capitalism in this book speaks to something that is dynamic about the present situation and will feed into an increasingly unstable situation in the next decade or two. We have this huge mass of capital looking to be invested and a massive contraction of opportunities to get work for free. This means that capitalism has to start paying its own costs of doing business, which means that opportunities for investing capital are shrinking. There’s all this money that nobody has any idea what to do with.
What happened in the radical critique is two parallel lines. One, the world is coming to an end, which is the planetary apocalypse view of John Bellamy Foster. Then there’s the other view of capitalism, that it has an underconsumption or an inequality problem. But each of these two arguments is incomplete without the other, and they need to be put together. And when you bring together the ecological into the theory of economic crisis or the analysis of social inequality, the terms of understanding economic boom and bust and inequality begin to change, and vice versa. Part of that is that the core issues of social inequality, along class, race, and gender lines, have everything to do with how capitalism works in the web of life.

KA: Let’s turn to the labor process, the cornerstone of capitalist exploitation in classical Marxist thought. You argue that Marx felt that it’s not just wage labor but the unpaid work and energies of both humans, especially women, and extra-human natures that has been central to capitalism. And you also note that we live in a world where increasingly, we seem to pit wages and jobs against the climate, which is a false dichotomy. How do we begin to move away from this binary you’re trying to break?
JWM: I went to the core of Marxist thinking to tease out a new interpretation that is consistent with how Marx thought about it. Value is one of the most boring things that any Marxist can talk about – to utter the words “the law of value” certainly makes my eyes glaze over. But all civilizations have a way of valuing life. That’s not unique to capitalism. What capitalism does is say that well, labor productivity within the cash nexus is what counts and then we’ll devalue the work of women, nature, and colonies. This turns inside-out the usual Marxist argument. There is a kind of law of value in capitalism that is a law of “cheap nature” or a law of devaluing the work of humans along with the rest of nature in order.
I grew up in the Pacific Northwest while this kind of politics was unfolding. On one side you had conservationists who, rightly so, wanted to protect old-growth forests. And on the other side, you had the bourgeoisie but also labor unions which said, well, we need jobs.
This is changing. It’s becoming clear, even for many big businesses, that climate change is going to fundamentally alter the conditions of making a profit. We can see this around food. The modern world is built on cheap food, which you can get if you have a very regular climate, lots of soil, cheap labor – then you can grow calories for relatively cheap. But we see the food sovereignty movement emerging which says there aren’t any jobs anyway, and there’s no way to get nature to work for free any more than it already is, because now we’re seeing all the bills coming due of treating the global atmosphere as a dumping ground for pollution.
We also see the situation in California, for instance, where the drought has become so severe—the worst in 1200 years, we’re told—that the center of North American cash crop agriculture might just disappear over the next few decades. So in a lot of ways, the acceleration of historical change is making that “jobs vs. environment” discourse obsolete.
KA: You talk a great deal about capitalism’s modus operandi being the appropriation of socially necessary unpaid work, and Green and Red thought has generally tended to ignore that. What are some examples?
JWM: The first thing we need to be aware of is that the most powerful organizing myth of Green thought and environmental activism over the past four decades has been the Industrial Revolution—this is the argument of the “Anthropocene” today, which says that everything bad about environmental change goes back to England around 1800 with the steam engine and coal. That’s not really true, but that idea is ingrained in how we learn about the modern world and especially how we think about environmental crisis.
In fact, the rise of capitalism can be seen most clearly in the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries in the ways that landscapes and humans on those landscapes were transformed. There was a revolution in environment-making that was unprecedented in scale, speed, and scope between 1450 and 1750.
The most dramatic expression of this was the conquest of the Americas, which was far more than merely military conquest and genocide, although that was a big part of it. The New World became a proving ground for industrial capitalism in every sense. The origins can be seen in sugar plantations. A close second was silver mining in Potosi, in Bolivia today, in Spain, Mexico today. There were very large production operations, lots of machinery, money flowing in, workers who were regimented by time and by task – and it was all premised on appropriating the work of nature for free or very low cost and turning it into something that could be bought and sold.
That destroyed soils and the mountainous zones of the Andes, for instance, which were completely denuded of trees, causing terrible soil erosion. But it was also devastating for the humans involved. In the viceroyalty of Peru in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Castilians, the Spaniards, for example, had a special word for indigenous people which was “naturales.” These workers and indigenous people were considered part of nature.
The same sort of dialogue went on around African slavery. The African slave trade was a conjoined reality with the sugar plantations, which tells us something important – not only were New World soils appropriated and exhausted and forests cleared, but also African slaves were treated not as humans or part of society, but as part of nature. The work of Africans was appropriated, and the work of soils and forests was appropriated. It was on this basis that a new relationship with nature started to emerge, and it had to do with the economy.
Every time new empires went out, the Portuguese to the New World and the Indian Ocean, the Dutch, the Spaniards, the first thing they did was start to collect all the natures they could find, including the humans, and to code them and rationalize them. Finally there were extraordinary processes of mobilizing unpaid work in service of commodity production and exchange. The first thing any capitalist wanted, or any colonial power wanted, was to put down a little bit of money, and get a lot of useful energy back, in the form of silver, sugar, and then later tobacco and then cotton with the advent of the Industrial Revolution. It was the same process that every act of technological breakthrough – the steam engine or before that, innovations in ship-building – was premised on: getting new ways of nature to work for free or a low cost on a mass scale. It’s the same thing in the past century with oil.
KA: What is your critique of the Anthropocene and how do you feel it glosses over real historical analysis of capitalism?
JWM: We need to distinguish between two uses of the term. One is the Anthropocene as a cultural conversation, the kind of conversation with friends over dinner or at the watercooler. In this sense the Anthropocene has the virtue of posing an important question: how do humans fit within the web of life? But the Anthropocene cannot answer that question, because the very terms of the concept are dualistic, as in the famous article “The Anthropocene: Are Humans Now Overwhelming the Great Forces of Nature?” That isn’t a great question if you believe humans are a part of nature.
The Anthropocene argument in its dominant form, on the other hand, is an absurd historical model. It says more or less that everything starts in England in 1800 with steam engines and coal. There are all sorts of historical problems with that, which we talked about. Long before the steam engine, there was an order of magnitude increase in capitalism’s ability to transform the environment, in terms of scale, speed and scope.
I’m very concerned that the Anthropocene plays this old bourgeois trick which says the problems created by capitalists are the responsibility of all of humanity. That is a deeply racist, Eurocentric, and patriarchal view that presents a series of very real problems as the responsibility of humanity as a whole. On a deep philosophical level, we are all the same in the eyes of the Anthropocene. In a historical sense, that is some of the worst conceptual violence you can impose. It would be like saying race doesn’t matter in America today – anybody who said that would be laughed off the stage. But part of getting away with the Anthropocene idea is the Nature/Society dualism.
KA: Is capitalism today, in the final analysis, in developmental crisis? What prognostication does this new historical analysis give us?
JWM: Everything depends on how you think of capitalism. If you have a standard definition of capitalism committed to endless economic growth and maximizing profitability, you can say a lot of things about capitalism’s ability to survive. But if you say capitalism is dependent upon appropriating the unpaid work of humans and the rest of nature… then you start to have a different view of limits.
The core question of political economy is: how do great booms of capitalist investment and accumulation occur in the modern world, and what are the limits to them?
Even if climate change weren’t happening, these limits would be profound. Capitalists have always found their way out of crisis, something radicals and conservatives agree on. Both say the same thing because they are both nature-blind. Capitalism is above all a system of cheap nature, consisting of the four cheaps: labor power, energy, food, raw materials. Capitalism restores the cheapness of those natures by finding new parts of nature that have not been commodified or brought into the cash nexus. In the 19th century, that was South Asia and East Asia. Over the past 30 years, neoliberalism brought in China, India, the Soviet Union, and Brazil.
Then we have climate change. That feeds back in a way that slows whatever “cheap natures” are left. Climate change is the largest single vector of rising costs of business as usual. It will undermine the basis of capitalism’s whole relationship with nature by radically undermining the cheap nature strategy that it was based on.
KA: You mention that environmental and social movements are slowly coming to the realization that the Nature/Society binary is false, possibly because of the real threats on both Nature and Society and capitalism, particularly with large-scale extractive drilling projects that are encroaching on a Nature of which humans are a part.
JWM: I think some movements are seeing Nature and Society as inextricably linked. I think the next step is to move into the heartland of questions of race, gender, and inequality to point out that these issues are intimately about how Nature and Society get imagined in the modern world. If you ask a simple question, like why do some human lives matter more than other – so we think about Black Lives Matter – or why do some genocides matter more than others, you start to see that there are very powerful presumptions of Nature and Society that go in there.
I think movements around the tar sands or the Keystone XL pipeline present the kind of social movement organizing that fits very well with the arguments of this book. Movements for justice cannot be placated anymore through a new distribution of reward, in part because capitalism doesn’t have the surplus that it used to have. You see these conversations especially around energy, fracking, oil, and extractive projects in Latin America. And of course, in Latin America, many indigenous groups never believed in this dualism to begin with. They were always ahead.
But there are still too many on the Left, especially in North America, who view Nature as out there, as a variable, or a context, which will be a complete political dead end. We need to bring Nature into capitalism, and understand capitalism in Nature.

 is assistant professor of sociology at Binghamton University, and coordinator of the World-Ecology Research Network. He writes frequently on the history of capitalism in Europe, Latin America, and the United States, from the long sixteenth century to the neoliberal era. Presently, he is completing Ecology and the rise of capitalism, an environmental history of the rise of capitalism, for the University of California Press.

 is a freelance writer and a PhD candidate in developmental biology at the University of Chicago.


BOOK REVIEW

‘Capitalism in the Web of Life’ – A Critique




Kamran Nayeri argues that Jason W. Moore’s theories involve major departures from Marxism, and do not themselves provide a coherent alternative approach to understanding capitalism’s impact on the natural world.

For previous discussions of the issues discussed here, see:
As always, C&C welcomes constructive and thoughtful discussion. Please read our Comments Policy before posting.

Reviewed by Kamran Nayeri
(Kamran Nayeri blogs at Our Place in the World: A Journal of Ecosocialism, where this review first appeared. It is reposted with his permission. Comments on this article can be posted below, or on his blog, or both.)
Jason W. Moore’s Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital (2015) offers a new perspective on capitalism and its current systemic crisis by developing an ecologically centered theory of capital accumulation. This essay first presents a concise account of Moore’s theory.[1] Then, I turn my attention to Moore’s methodology which he believes is “revitalizing” and “reworking” Marx’s and Engels’ historical materialism. In section 2 and 3, I examine this claim and find it wanting. In fact as I will show Moore methodology and theory are entirely different from those of Marx and Engels. The fact that Moore’s methodology and theory are different from Marx does not mean that they are “wrong” or lack explanatory power. In section 4, I examine the inner logic of Moore’s methodology and theory and find them incoherent on their own basis. In Section 5, I outline a way forward that shares Moore’s concern with situating humanity in nature and shares with Ecological Marxism of Foster and others their focus on the concepts of metabolic rift and alienation from nature.
1. Moore’s theory of capitalism and present-day crisis
The organizing principle of Moore’s book is a critique of what Moore calls Green Arithmetic or Green Thought, which he says divides the world into two separate categories, Society and Nature. He calls this Cartesian dualism to denote its origin in the work of René Descartes. The aim of the book is to replace such dualism with a theory that views humanity, hence human social organization, as an organic part of nature, and then develop an ecologically centered theory of capitalism and its dynamics.
The book has four parts. Part I is an overarching statement of Moore’s critique and his positive contribution. Parts II-IV deal with specific aspects of Part I in greater detail. They are: Part II: Historical Capitalism, Historical Nature; Part III: Historical Nature and the Origins of Capital; and Part IV: The Rise and Demise of Cheap Nature. While all deserve critical attention, for brevity’s sake I will focus on Part I. As we will see, Moore’s methodology, theory and analysis are heavily influenced by world systems theory as developed by Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi: “Capitalism is … best understood as world-ecology of capital, power, and re-production in the web of life.” (p. 14. hereafter all emphases are Moore’s own unless noted otherwise)
Moore argues that it is necessary to develop “a language, a method, and a narrative strategy that put the oikeios at the center”; that is, “the creative, generative, and multi-layered relation of species and environment. The oikeios names the relations through which humans act—and are acted upon by the whole nature.” (p. 4)
By “web of life,” Moore means “nature as us, as inside us, as around us.” (p. 3) Moore’s alternative to Green Thought “begins neither with ‘humans’ nor with ‘nature’ but with the relations that co-produce manifold configurations of humanity-in-nature, organisms and environments, life and land, water and air.” (p. 5) To tackle these infinitely complex sets or “bundles” of relations, Moore uses a number of hyphenated terms to denote abstraction; in his view, “’History’ … is the history of a ‘double internality’: humanity-in-nature/nature-in-humanity.” (ibid.)
“Humanity-in-nature” is “[h]uman engagement with the rest of nature.” It is ecology from the standpoint of human agency. “Capitalism-in-nature” is rather different, since Moore develops a more expansive definition of capitalism, “not an economic system … not a social system; it is a way of organizing nature”:
“Capitalism’s governing conceit is that it may do with Nature as it pleases, that Nature is external and may be coded, quantified, and rationalized to serve economic growth, social development, or some other higher good. … [But meanwhile] the web of life is busy shuffling about the biological and geological conditions of capitalism’s process. The ‘web of life’ is nature as a whole: nature with an emphatically lowercase n.” (pp. 2-3)
Moore further defines “world-ecology” as “the process through which civilizations, themselves forces of nature, are caught up in the co-production of life.” (p. 3) World-ecology draws attention to the “rich mosaic of relational thinking about capitalism, nature, power and history.” (ibid.) It also “says the relationality of nature implies a new method that grasps humanity-in-nature as a world historical process.” (ibid.)
Thus, the current crisis is “singular and manifold. It is not a crisis of capitalism and nature but of modernity-in-nature. That modernity is a capitalist world-ecology.” (p. 4)
Moore argues that this oikeios-centered theory inverts the key questions of Green Thought that seek answers to how humanity was separated from nature and causes ecological damage. Instead, he argues, the key questions become “how is humanity unified with the rest of nature within the web of life,” and “how is human history a co-produced history, through which humans have put nature to work—including other humans—in accumulating wealth and power?” (p. 9) “[T]he oikeios presumes that “humanity has always been unified with the rest of nature in a flow of flows. What changes are the ways in which specific aspects of humanity, such as civilizations, ‘fit’ within nature.” (p. 12.)
Further:
“In this book, nature assumes three major forms: human organization; extra-human flows, relations, and substances; and the web of life. These are not independent; rather, they are interdependent, and their boundaries and configurations shift in successive historical-geographical eras. This last is pivotal: nature is not ‘just there.’ It is historical. This way of seeing leads us to a second inversion. Instead of asking what capitalism does to nature, we may begin to ask how nature works for capitalism? If the former question implies separation, the latter implicates unification.” (pp. 12-13)
But while laws of nature obey those that govern matter and energy, capitalism operates on the basis of capital accumulation as self-expanding value which obeys the “law of value.” Moore is aware of this incongruence in his theorizing. Thus he writes: “The concept of work/energy looms large in this argument. … Work/energy helps us to rethink capitalism as a set of relations through which the ‘capacity to do work’—by human and extra-human natures—is transformed into value, understood as socially necessary labor-time (abstract social labor).” (p. 14) [2]
However, this way of overcoming theoretical/analytical incongruency forces Moore to suggest that not only humans or other animals, but rivers, waterfalls, or forests also “work.”
In addition, although Moore acknowledges the essential role of exploitation – the production of surplus-value in the labor process – he makes a key part of his argument the centrality to capitalism of appropriation, defined as
“those extra-economic processes that identify, secure, and channel unpaid work outside the commodity system into the circuit of capital. … So important is the appropriation of unpaid work that the rising rate of exploitation depends upon the fruits of appropriation derived from Cheap Natures, understood primarily as the ‘Four Cheaps’ of labor power, food, energy, and raw materials.” (p. 17, emphasis added).
Thus he reinterprets the law of value as “a ‘law’ of Cheap Nature” that is operative from the inception of capitalism in the long sixteenth century (1450-1650). “At the core of this law is the ongoing, rapidly expansive, and relentlessly innovative quest to turn the work/energy of the biosphere into capital (value-in-motion).” (pp. 13-14) In Moore’s reconceptualization,
“Capital must not only ceaselessly accumulate and revolutionize commodity production; it must ceaselessly search for, and find ways to produce, Cheap Natures; a rising stream of low-cost food, labor-power, energy, and raw materials…. These are the Four Cheaps… The law of value in capitalism is a law of Cheap Nature.” (p. 53, emphasis added).
“Cheap Nature” operates “by reducing the value composition—but increasing the technical composition—of capital as a whole; by opening new opportunities for investment; and, in its qualitative dimension, by allowing technologies and new kinds of nature to transform extant structures of capital accumulation and world power. In all this, commodity frontiers—frontiers of appropriation—are central.” (ibid., emphasis added)
Moore gives this process of appropriation on a world scale a name, “world-ecological surplus,” and suggests a tendency for it to fall over the course of historical time. “The ecological surplus is the ratio of the system-wide mass of capital to the system-wide appropriation of unpaid work/energy.” (p. 95) He borrows the idea from the EROI ratio (energy returned on energy invested), a measure for energy efficiency. Moore amends this notion to EROCI – “energy returned on capital invested.” He acknowledges that, like EROI, EROCI cannot be quantified because it is impossible to calculate unpaid work/energy (ibid., 16n)
From this follows Moore’s view of the current systemic crisis:
“The crises of capitalism-in-nature are crises of what nature does for capitalism, rather more than what capitalism does to nature. This point of entry offers not only a fresh perspective—one that includes, centrally, the work of human natures—but also provides an opportunity for synthesizing two great streams of radical thought since the 1970s: the theory of accumulation crisis and the study of environmental crisis.” (p. 17)
2. Moore’s revision of historical materialism
Moore posits that Paul Burkett (1999) and John Bellamy Foster (2000) offer the potential for “a revitalized and reworked historical materialism in line with Marx’s system of thought” and a “renewal of value-relational thinking—the law of value as co-produced by humans and the rest of nature.” He clearly views his own work as at least a significant step in such revitalization and renewal. Let’s first outline what Moore believes are the key contributions of Foster and Burkett that enable him to rework historical materialism and develop his own theory of capitalism and crisis.
Foster has argued that Marx’s central concern with human emancipation included overcoming bourgeois estrangement from nature, as seen in capitalist production and the growing division between town and country that has adversely affected the metabolic interaction between humanity and the rest of nature. Following Marx’s own use of the concept (Foster, 2000, chapter 5), he and his colleagues have used the concept of “metabolic rift” for their own theoretical development of the relationship between capitalism and nature.
Moore argues that “Foster’s original formulation of metabolic rift opens the possibility for thinking through a singular metabolism of power, nature, and capital.”[3] He enumerates three “registers” in Foster’s formulation of the “rift.” First, there is a “rift between human production and its natural conditions.” Second, there is a “material estrangement [alienation] of human beings in capitalist society from conditions of their existence.” Finally, the rift finds geographical expression in a new town-country antagonism.
“Foster took the rift in metabolic rift to signify the rechanneling of food and resources produced in agrarian zones into urban-industrial spaces. Although metabolic rift today is almost universally understood as a metaphor of separation, the original argument suggested something different: rift as reconfiguration and shift.” (p. 83).
Thus, the idea of “rift as reconfiguration and shift” which he credits to Foster became Moore’s own point of departure. (ibid.) [4]
Moore’s interpretation of and preference for “rift” as “shift” – as opposed to Foster’s use “irreparable rift” (Foster, 2000, p. 141) – becomes a defining characteristic of his methodology and the basis of his assertion that environmentalist and Marxists methodologies often suffer from “Cartesian dualism.”
“Metabolism, liberated from dualisms, acts a solvent. For if metabolism as a whole is a flow of flows in which life and matter enter into specific, historical-geographical arrangements, we are called to construct a much more supple and historically sensitive family of concepts, unified by a dialectical method that transcends all manner of dualisms—not least, not only, Nature/Society.” (ibid.)
Thus, Moore’s focus turns to Cheap Nature as the key source of capitalist accumulation: “Foster’s insight was to posit capitalism as an open-flow metabolism, one that requires more and more Cheap Nature just to stay in place…” (ibid.) Cheap Nature as appropriated from human and extra-human nature becomes central to Moore’s theory, a concept that he asserts is from Burkett’s discussion of Marx’s historical materialism and the law of value and nature. [5]
Thus, modern history is characterized as “the voracious consumption of, and relentless quest for, Cheap Natures – ‘cheap’ in relation to the accumulation of capital and its curious privileging of wage-work as the only thing worth valuing.” (p. 85) Thus, Moore’s emphasis on non-wage worker sources for capitalist accumulation, in particular on the unpaid work/energy of human and extra-human nature.
A key problem that Moore overlooks is this: if Burkett’s and Foster’s contributions that Moore takes as his own point of departure are salient features of Marx’s historical materialism and its specific application to the capitalist mode of production, that is, Marx’s labor theory of value, then why didn’t Marx himself develop a theory of capitalism and crisis along the lines that Moore now proposes? Put another way, why is Moore’s theory of capitalism and crisis differ so radically from that of Marx?
3. Contrasting Marx and Moore
Let’s recall Marx’s own theoretical development and the methodological reasons for it. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels argued that
“…[W]e must begin by stating the first premise of all human existence and, therefore, all history, the premise, namely, that men must be in a position to live in order to be able to ‘make history.’ But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, housing, clothing and various other things. The first historical act is thus the production of material life itself.” (Marx and Engels, 1845, p. 43-44, emphasis added).
All living organisms “appropriate” from their environment their means of subsistence in order to live and to reproduce. For 190,000 years or 95% of our existence, modern humans lived as hunter-gatherers who – like other animals – appropriated their livelihood. When a combination of factors forced some hunter-gatherer bands to take up farming about 12,000 years ago, production for subsistence began. First farmers “begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization…” (ibid., p. 31, emphasis in original) [6]. (In thinking through Marx’s concept of metabolic rift this is an insightful passage to which I will return in Section 5 below).
Because of the world-historic significance of production, Marx and Engels viewed “mode of production” not simply as“the reproduction of physical existence of individuals” but also as “a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part….What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produced and with how they produce it.” (ibid. pp. 31-32, emphases in original)
It is important to note what Marx and Engels quite explicitly set aside: “Of course, we cannot here go either into the actual physical nature of man, or into the natural conditions in which man finds himself—geographical, oro-hydrographical, climate and so on.” (ibid. p. 31) The point is that they were fully aware that “human nature,” and our natural context, environment and what is now called ecological niche matter and can be woven into their analysis. But they still insisted that a focus on “mode of production” is the proper methodological focus for historical studies.
Thus, it is not surprising that Marx devoted decades of his life to developing his critique of political economy and of the capitalist mode of production. Nor it is surprising that he critically appraised and appropriated as much as possible of classical political economists’ labor theories of value, in particular those developed by Ricardo and Smith. These clearly follow from his historical materialism.
It is equally clear that Marx and Engels were always aware of the role of appropriation in human history and prehistory (See, Burkett, 1999; chapter 2). For Marx, the capitalist mode of production originated in primitive accumulation, a historical process of appropriation (Marx, 1867, chapter 26; Nayeri, 1991, Appendix 1). This process was necessary to develop the four pillars of the capitalist mode of production: 1) the existence of a class of wage workers that is “free” of their means of subsistence and of bondage to land, that is, a labor market; 2) the concentration of means of social production in the hands of a class of industrial capitalists, that is, a capital market; 3) a commodities market; and 4) production for profit. For Marx, in England this process coincided with the “manufacturing stage,” roughly 1550-1750 (Marx, 1867, p. 455).
The contrast with Moore is considerable. Following Wallerstein who identified capitalism with “production for sale in a market which the objective is to realize a profit” (Wallerstein, 1974, p. 398), Moore holds that capitalism came into existence in the long sixteenth century (1460-1650).[7] For Marx capitalism in England took at least a century more to emerge. Moore does not distinguish between “capitalism” and “capitalist mode of production.” For Marx, the former is a social formation and the latter a historical mode of production. A nation-state typically is a social formation including a number of modes of production. A nation-state is called capitalist when the capitalist mode of production is dominant. This requires the formation of the general (average ) rate of profit. (Marx, 1894, Part Two; also see, Shaikh, 2016, Pat II, especially, 7. IV) To my knowledge neither Wallerstein nor Moore have argued that this was the case in the long sixteenth century.
Moore’s revisions to Marx’s and Engels’ historical materialism are extensive.
First, he insists that capitalism is “not an economic system … not a social system; it is a way of organizing nature.” A charitable interpretation of this assertion is that for Moore capitalism is first and foremost “a way of organizing nature.” But in doing so, Moore is focusing attention on what is shared with all other modes of production, the exact opposite of Marx’s method that focused attention on what is unique to capitalist production.
Second, in his theory of accumulation, Moore de-emphasizes capitalist production, hence wage-labor, and emphasizes appropriation of “unpaid human and extra-human nature.” That is, Moore privileges “appropriation” instead of “production.”
Third, he sets aside Marx’s labor theory of value, his historical materialism applied to the analysis of the capitalist mode of production, in favor of a “law of value” that combines “work/energy” from appropriation and surplus value from capitalist production to explain the history of the capitalist system and its crisis.
Historical materialism has been both a methodology used by some of the best historians and theorists of capitalism and contested by others including some Marxist theorists who have tried to refine or extend it. However, fruitful revision of any methodology or theory requires specific criticism of its deficiencies and ensuring that the proposed improvements would not debase it entirely. Unfortunately, Moore’s “revitalization” and “reworking” of historical materialism does not explicitly discuss any of its deficiencies. Instead, he simply declares an alternative methodology and a theory of capitalism and crisis that is at odds with Marx’s own methodology and theory (which Moore claims to adhere to and wishes to extend).
Moore’s sharp break with Marx aside, we must now ask: How well do Moore’s methodology and theory hold up on their own basis?
4. Tensions in Moore’s methodology and theory
Moore’s methodology and theory have serious internal tensions. Moore himself acknowledges some of them. For instance, he admits that his proposed EROCI ratio (energy returned on capital invested) to measure “world ecological surplus” cannot be operationalized: “This is an imperfect formulation, precisely because the condition for quantification within the commodity system (units of labor-time) is a world of unpaid work that cannot be quantified.” (P. 96, 16n) However, Moore does not seem to recognize that this same lack of congruency and incoherence runs through his entire theory of capitalist accumulation which centrally depends on appropriation of “unpaid work by human and extra-human nature.” If Moore cannot quantify unpaid work, then how can we assess how central its contribution is to capitalist accumulation?
However, Moore seems impervious to such considerations. Thus, He uses EROCI ratio to introduce yet another concept: “Peak appropriation.”
“EROCI puts the relative contributions of paid and unpaid work/energy at the center. The peak in question is not, then, a peak in output—of energy, or some other primary commodity. It is, rather, the work/energy embodied in the commodity: dollars per bushel, or ton, or barrel, or horse, or hours of labor-power.” (p. 106)
But he immediately adds:
“Even here the language is imprecise. Quantification can illuminate but not adequately capture these specifics. Energy and material flows can be measured; but within capitalism, they cannot be counted—for the secret of capital’s dynamism is that it counts only what it values (labor productivity).” (ibid.)
It seems to this me that this not really a problem of language but of murkiness of Moore’s own concepts. If Moore cannot establish a way to verify conceptual categories that are derived from his methodology and are the stuff of his theory, then how can he believe they are valid?
Moore’s concept of work/energy is similarly incoherent. What does it mean to say, as he does, that rivers, oceans and forests “work”? When a beaver puts up a dam on a river does the river “work” for her? If Moore answers in the affirmative, then he is speaking the language of physics: Work is done when a force that is applied to an object moves that object. But if Moore denies that the river works for the beaver, then why, when humans put up a dam on the same river, does Moore argue that the river is providing unpaid work to humans (be they hunter-gatherers or capitalists)?
The same methodological problem crops up in Moore’s notion that capitalism is “co-produced by human and extra-human nature” (e.g., see, p. 14). If appropriated unpaid work is centrally important to capitalist accumulation and by appropriation we understand the dictionary definition (“The action of taking something for one’s own use, typically without the owner’s permission”) then how can we view those who have been subjected to appropriation as “co-producers?” In 2011, more than 58 billion chickens, nearly 3 billion ducks, and some 1.38 billion pigs were slaughtered worldwide to be sold as food. Other farm animals slaughtered for food numbered in the hundreds of millions (turkeys, geese and guinea fowl, sheep, goats and cattle). (Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2014, p. 15; for a discussion of this, see, Nayeri, 2014) It is clear that the meat industry quite consciously “worked through” nature by enslaving, torturing and mass murdering these billions of non-human animals. Should we call their victims “co-producers” of the capitalist meat industry? To what end?
The notion of “co-production” is problematic because the relation between social production and the rest of nature in not symmetrical. In Marx’s view, in class societies external nature (extra-human nature) is mediated through forces of production, knowledge/science and technology. These create a partial separation from external nature. Interpreting Darwin’s work as showing “the formation of the organs of plants and animals, which serve as the instruments of production for sustaining their life,” Marx asks rhetorically: “Does not the history of the productive organs of man, of organs that are the material basis of every particular organization of society, deserve equal attention?” In his view human history differs from natural history in that humans have made the former, but not that the latter. “Technology reveals the active relation of man to nature, the direct process of the production of his life, and thereby it also lays bare the process of production of his life.” (Marx, 1867, p. 493, footnote 4).
In the Grundrisse, in the “Chapter on Capital,” Book VII, Marx writes:
“Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc. These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it.” (Marx, 1973, p. 706; emphases in original)
Hence, the need for a theory of society that requires its own methodology apart from methodology of natural science. Thus, Moore’s methodology and theory that aim at combining social and natural categories by privileging contributions to capitalist accumulation from “unpaid work of human and extra-human nature” is incoherent. There is no way to reconcile the labor theory of value (or indeed any “theory of value”) and appropriated flows of work/energy because the former is about the laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production and the latter obey the laws of physics. An analogous error can be found in E.O. Wilson’s attempt to apply evolutionary biology to problems in the domains of humanities and social sciences, for which he has been aptly criticized by dialectical biologist Richard Levins (e.g., see, Levins, 2012) (for my own view, see, Nayeri, 2015).
The problem here is not dualism but the recognition that to understand humanity we must understand humans not simply as biological beings but also as social beings who have unique powers to manipulate nature, including human nature, and to try to understand why in class societies, in particular industrial capitalism, these powers have come to debase life as we know it.  In the short history of capitalism, these powers have produced conditions that threaten not only humanity but the Earth system itself.
5. An alternative road forward
In Chapter 7, “Anthropocene or Capitalocene?: On the Nature and Origins of Our Ecological Crisis,” Moore dismisses a number of competing views of the causes and timing for the Anthropocene to argue for his own notion of the Capitalocene. Included in his criticism are their supposed treatment of humanity as a homogenous whole and their dualism. Unsurprisingly, the Capitalocene began with “[t]he rise of capitalism after 1450” which “was made possible by an epochal shift in the scale, speed, and scope of landscape transformation in the Atlantic world and beyond.” (p. 182)
The literature on the Anthropocene (Epoch of Man) was born out of the recognition of the intensifying planetary crisis that poses an existential threat to humanity and the search for its causes and policy response to it. The aquatic biologist Eugene F. Stoermer coined the term in the 1980s and atmospheric chemist Paul Crutzen who popularized it in 2000 have suggested that the Anthropocene could have begun with the introduction of the steam engine in the English Industrial Revolution. This idea resonated with the Green movement, which holds industrialization as the cause for the ecological crisis and with the (eco)socialist movement that holds capitalism responsible. There are very good reasons to believe that the fossil fuel-powered industrial capitalist world economy is responsible for the planetary crisis—just take a look at the list of the nine “planetary boundaries” (thresholds for safe human societies) presented by the Stockholm Resilience Center (Rockström, et.al., 2009) that Moore himself cites on the first page of his book. They are as follows:
  • climate change
  • stratospheric ozone
  • land use change
  • freshwater use
  • biological diversity
  • ocean acidity
  • nitrogen and phosphorus inputs to the biosphere and oceans
  • aerosol loading
  • chemical pollution
Even if we accept the world-systems view that capitalism emerged in the long sixteenth century with significant negative impact on the landscape and labor, it is hard to deny that capitalist industrialization has had a world-historic disastrous impact on the biosphere creating existential threats to humanity and much of life on Earth.
Between 1804 and 2012 the world human population increased exponentially seven-folds from 1 billion to 7 billion and it is expected to reach 9.7 billion by 2050. “The human species is now using about 12,000 times as much energy per day as was the case when farming started; 90 per cent of this is a result of industrialization, 10 per cent to our huge growth in numbers.” (Vitousek, et al, 1986) The ratio of real GDP in 1995 to 1950 was 3.1 in the “more developed areas” with 20% of the world population and 2.9 in the “less developed areas” with 80% of the world population. (Easterlin, 2000, Table 3) Taking Moore’s own interest in appropriation of work/energy, in the 1980s about 40% of the net primary production in terrestrial ecosystems was being coopted by human beings each year. [9] People and the associated organisms used this organic material largely, but not entirely, at human direction, and the vast majority of other species had to subsist on the remainder. “An equivalent concentration of resources into one species and its satellites has probably not occurred since land plants first diversified.” (Vitousek, et al, 1986). They also note that humans affected much of the remaining 60% of terrestrial NNP. This study used conservative estimates and we are now 25 years further down the path of expansion of production and population. Just one statistics makes the point: in 2011-2013 China used more concrete than the United States did in the entire 20th century. (Beiser, 2016)
Further, Moore’s double criticism of proponents of the notion of the Anthropocene certainly does not apply to at least some ecological socialists. To simply paint the entire literature on the Anthropocene as indifferent to social stratification and as dualist is to dismiss a key thesis in understanding of what has gone wrong and how to intervene in history to address the existential crisis we face today.
Even so, the literature on the Anthropocene and its competing hypotheses such as the Capitalocene ignore a central question: How and when humanity or at least a decisive part of it set off to forge a malignant relation with nature?
The origin of alienation from nature
Ecological Marxists like Foster identify alienation, in particular alienation from nature, as the root cause of the ecological crisis. In this, they follow Marx’s labor theory of alienation, closely tied to the rise and dominance of the capitalist mode of production. However, we know of many pre-capitalist civilizations that collapsed in part because of ecological crisis. Clearly, the problem of alienation from nature precedes capitalism.
To locate the origins of alienation from nature and appreciate its world-historic significance for human emancipation, it is helpful to recall key elements of Marx’s and Engels’ historical materialism that I cited in Section 3 above. Marx and Engels argued that as they engaged in organized production for the first time in history early farmers began to distinguish themselves from other animals. What they produced and how they produced it also contributed to who the early farmers became. Modern anthropology and archeology confirm this view expressed over a century and a half earlier.
Taking this cue from Marx and Engels, I have drawn upon the most recent “stylized facts” of archeology and anthropology to outline a theory of the origin of human alienation and how it served as the basis for social alienation: stratification, oppression and exploitation (Nayeri, 2013). I urge the reader to review my argument which I cannot repeat in detail here. But for our present purpose it instructive to outline what hunter-gatherers’ worldview might have looked like, based on anthropologists’ accounts of the worldviews of forager societies still surviving in tiny pockets around:
“…[M]ost foragers are characterized by ‘animistic’ or (less commonly) ‘totemic’ belief systems. In the former, non-human animals are not just like humans, they are persons. Their environment is a treasure house of ‘personage’, each with language, reason, intellect, moral conscience, and knowledge, regardless of whether the outer shape is human, animal, reptile, or plant. Thus the Jivaro people of eastern Ecuador and Peru consider humans, animals, and plant as ‘persons’ (agents), linked by blood ties and common ancestry (Descola, 1996). Foragers with animistic belief systems commonly do not have words for distinguishing between people, animals, and plants as separate categories, using instead classification systems based on terms of equality rather than the hierarchies of our own Linnaean taxonomies (Howell, 1996). The totemic systems of Australian Aborigines are ceremonies and rituals that stress an abstract linear continuity between the human and non-human communities. Animals are the most common totems, signifying a person’s or group’s identity or distinctiveness, but though they may be good to eat or food for thought, they are not considered social partners as in the animistic belief systems.
“The forager world is animated with moral, mystical, and mythical significance (Carmichael et al., 1994). It is constructed and reconstructed through the telling of myths, which commonly include all kinds of animals as humans, changing shape between one and the other. In addition to the present world inhabited by humans and non-human-beings, there is a supernatural world. In many forager societies, shamans mediate between the lived and supernatural worlds, entering and conceptualizing the latter, commonly through ecstatic experiences… As the whole world is self, killing a plant or animal is not murder but transformation. Finding food is taken for granted, reinforced by myths telling the hunter to be the animal before presuming to kill and eat it. ‘They are being heard by a sentient conscious universe–a gallery of intelligent beings who, if offended by injudicious words (ridicule, bragging, undue familiarity, profanity, etc.) can take reprisal, usually by a steadfast refusal to be taken as food or by inflicting disease or doing other violence’ (C.L. Martin, 1993, p. 14).” (Barker, 2006, p. 59).
I call foragers worldviews ecocentric because their frame of reference is their natural setting. It should be easy to agree that our ecocentric hunter-gatherer ancestors had no dualist view of the natural world in the sense Moore is concerned with. However, as Marx and Engels suggested to us and modern anthropology and archeology document it the perception of humanity rising above the natural world , which we may call anthropocentrism, originated with the Agricultural Revolution some 10,000 years ago. Anthropocentrism (human-centered worldview), also known as homo-centrism, human supremacism, and speciesism, is the view that holds human beings as the central or most significant species on Earth in the sense that they are considered to have a moral standing above other beings. Current consensus is that anthropocentrism perhaps contributed to the transition to farming. But there is little doubt that it emerged and consolidated with the Agricultural Revolution and institutionalized by the class societies that followed.
Let recall that farming presupposes domestication of some plants and animals. While early domestications were coincidental (how some wolves began to track humans for leftovers from hunting and in return provided the hunter-gather bands with advance warning and some protection), when farming finally consolidated it has been characterized throughout history with systematic attempts to dominate and control nature including by breeding “desirable” plants and animals and control or elimination of “undesirable” species and more recently by attempts to control against natural cycles. These contributed to the development of science and technology and it was served in turn by them.
Once the early subsistence farmers began to produce an economic surplus, social stratification emerged giving rise to social alienation, paving the way for the institutionalization of subordination, oppression and exploitation. Thus, alienation from nature and social alienation are inter-related and the former was necessary for the latter.
If my overall argument is correct in broad outlines, then we have a unified (non-dualist) theory of society and nature and their systemic crisis throughout history has brought down a number of civilizations. The systemic crisis we face today is different only because of its global reach and scale, speed and intensity of forces unleashed by industrial capitalist civilization that threatens humanity and much beside. The metabolic rift did not originate with the rise of capitalism but, to use Richard Levins’ terminology, with the rise of Homo productivore (Levins, 2012). Anthropocentric class societies that have been all about “ways of organizing nature” for the benefit of the ruling elites and have presupposed domination and control over nature, including human nature.
An advantage of this theory of metabolic rift and dualism is that it includes an environmental ethics not integral to Moore’s theory or those of Ecological Marxists. This environmental ethic squarely is based on Darwin’s theory of evolution and science of ecology that are both ecocentric (even though Darwin himself like others of his time was anthropocentric). The solution to the anthropocentric industrial capitalist crisis is an ecocentric ecological socialist revolution in which we retreat from more than 10,000 years of trying to dominate and control nature only to create more devastating social and natural crises. The challenge of our time is to make such a revolution before the systemic crisis undermine life-support systems of the biosphere.

Acknowledgement: I am grateful to Fred Murphy for his expert copy-editing of this essay and his critical comments that helped me improve the text, and to Robin Chang for his generous help with the literature search. Neither bears any responsibility for the views expressed here or any remaining errors and shortcomings.

Dedication: The writing of this essay was delayed for months when my beloved companion Lulu (the cat) was battling serious and eventually terminal illness. He died at 5 in the morning of February 13, 2016. The Humane Society in Sonoma County, California, offers incentives to people who adopt black cats because of the superstition that black cats bring bad luck. My experience has been the exact opposite. I have been fortunate to have had two companion black cats both of them by far sweeter than any human friend I have ever had. This essay is dedicated to the loving memory Lulu.

Endnotes:
[1] The American Sociological Association has granted Capitalism in the Web of Life the Section on the Political Economy of the World-System Book Award. Still, I found reading “Capitalism in the Web of Life” challenging. It is poorly edited and rife with repetitions. Moore liberally uses a language whose terminology is not properly explained (for example, “bundles” is first defined on page 46 but used earlier a number of times). The editorial group of Capitalism Nature Socialism in Britain similarly found it hard to summarize and understand Capitalism in the Web of Life (Watson, et. al., 2016).
[2] Moore borrows this idea from George Caffenztis (In Letters of Blood and Fire, 2013): ”My use of work/energy extends it to capitalism’s unified logic of appropriation of human and extra-human ‘work’ that is transformed into value.” (p. 14, footnote 24).
[3] Of course, the idea of metabolic rift originated with Marx; Foster should be credited for reintroducing it and expanding on it with others in the current surge of interest in ecological socialism.
[4] Due to concern for brevity I have set aside a number of important methodological issues, including the meaning and uses of “dialectics.” “Rift” is a break from an existing pattern of relations setting up a new relationship. Once established, the new pattern of relations changes over time making for another rift, setting up new relationships. Thus, a rift happens as quantitative changes resulting in a qualitative change, or thesis and anti-thesis making for a new synthesis. This is the sense I understand Moore’s emphasis on “rift” as “shift” and Foster’s use of “rift irreparable.” Moore emphasizes continuity while Foster emphasizes change.
[5] In Marx, labor power is itself “a natural object, a thing, although a living conscious thing” and through the labor process the worker “appropriates Nature’s productions in a form adapted to his own wants.” (Burkett, 1999, p. 26, emphases in original)
[6] Clearly, in retrospect Marx and Engels must have said, instead of “distinguish themselves from animals,” “distinguished themselves from other animals.” I will get back to this distinction in Section 5.
[7] Brenner (1977) deftly criticizes this notion. Also, see, Denemark and Thomas (1988) and Ashton and Philpin (1985). There is a renewed interest in the problem of origins of capitalism and the debate on transition from feudalism to capitalism. Writing in the same vein as Brenner, Wood (1999) criticizes the literature for its logical circularity. While Brenner’s thesis is largely accepted among economic historians and others interested in the question of origins of capitalism, in recent years a number of writers have contributed views that are different from or critical of Brenner’s, including Anievas and Nisancioglu (2015), Banaji (2014), Blaut (1994), Harootunian (2015) and Heller (2011). Others, such as Post who writes in the Brenner tradition (Post, 2012), have argued in his defense (2014). As Post observes there is nothing less than the status of Marx’s and Engels’ historical materialism that is at stake.
[8] What distinguishes Moore’s method and theory is the emphasis on appropriation of “unpaid work of human and extra-human nature.” “So important is the appropriation of unpaid work that the rising rate of exploitation depends upon the fruits of appropriation derived from Cheap Natures, understood primarily as the ‘Four Cheaps’ of labor power, food, energy, and raw materials.” (p. 17)
[9] Ultimately, all species live off energy that arrives on Earth via sunshine. Through photosynthesis green plants (primary producers) convert solar energy into sugars. They consume about half of it for their own livelihood. What remains is called Net Primary Productivity (NPP). The NPP is the basis for all animal life. Herbivores eat plants to gain energy for their livelihood (primary consumers). Finally, some carnivores live off herbivores (secondary consumers). Some omnivores eat secondary consumers (tertiary consumers). The final link in the food chain is the decomposers that live off the organic matter of plants, herbivores and carnivores. In each step in the food chain about 90% of the energy is lost. 

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Vitousek, P., Ehrlich, A., and Matson, P. “Human Appropriation of the Products of Photosynthesis,” BioScience, vol. 277, pp. 494-499, 1986.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. 1974.
Watson, Judith, Ted Benton, Kathryn Dean, Pat Devine, Jane Hindley, Richard Kuper, Gordon Peters, Graham Sharp & Peter Dickens (2016) “Disentangling Capital’s Web,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, 27:2, 103-121, DOI: 10.1080/10455752.2016.1178952.
Wood, Ellen Meiksins. The Origin of Capitalism: A Longer View. 1999.
Journal of Political Ecology                                     Vol.24, 2017     
                                                               
Jason W. Moore. 2015. Capitalism in the web of life: ecology and the accumulation of capital. London: Verso Press, 336p. ISBN: 9781781689028. US $29.95 (paperback)       

Reviewed by Eric H. Thomas. Email:  ehthomas "at" live.unc.edu 

Jason W. Moore's  book, Capitalism in the web of life: ecology and the accumulation of capital presents an ambitious and expansive argument designed to transform how we think about capitalism in the world. There has been a resurgence of Marxist ecology in the last several decades and scholars debating Marx's position on the relationship between nature and capitalism will  find ample material for further discussion in Moore's book. Moore opens his text by describing the double movement of capitalism through nature and nature through capitalism, which he terms a ''double internality."  "The capacity to make history", he writes, "turns on specific configurations of human and extra-human actors" (p. 37). For Moore, these configurations reveal the Cartesian dualism that separates "nature" from "society" to be nothing more than a convenient fiction obscuring how contemporary capitalism actually works.  As an alternative, Moore asserts that capitalism depends on the continuous production of what he terms the "four cheaps": cheap food, energy, labor, and raw materials. Thus, he contends,  the exploitation of labor and the appropriation of uncommodified natures necessarily go hand in hand (p. 68), an argument that will be familiar to those who have read Saskia Sassen (2014) and David Harvey (2003). Yet the author's assertion that the appropriation of "cheap natures" diffuses distinct surpluses across the entire system connects nicely with recent work on coal and oil by Timothy Mitchell (2009)—after all, these are two "cheap natures" with extremely expensive social consequences.  Moore's treatment of frontiers may be of particular interest for scholars working in remote and rural spaces.  These, he argues may be external or internal to circuits of capital. External frontiers, he argues, represent the resource-rich boundaries of capitalist production where uncommodified natures yield short-term profits (p. 157). Internal frontiers, on the other hand, are sites where greater profits may be extracted from existing circuits by eliminating "inefficiencies" and restructuring production to further exploit unpaid labor. Moore warns that the exhaustion of both kinds of frontiers is already on the horizon, representing what he terms an "epochal crisis" for capitalism—and for the planet. Moore provides "a modest catalogue of early capitalism's transformations of land and labor" (p. 182) giving brief accounts of land reclamation projects in the Netherlands, the colonization of Madeira, the establishment of sugar plantations in the British West Indies, and the extraction of silver from Spanish Peru, among countless others. All of these examples provide the basis for what the author terms "a new law of value" in which nature was conceptualized as external and new configurations of exploitation and appropriation emerged, all in the service of capital (p. 191). Late in the book, Moore poses a provocative question that goes to the heart of recent debates among scientists and educators concerned with the arrival of the so-called Anthropocene:  "does the urgency to communicate the realities of biospheric change override the need for an adequate historical interpretation of the problem?" (p. 169). This far into Capitalism and the web of life the reader will surely recognize that Moore  believes it does not, and that he sets out to provide just such a historical interpretation.  Yet this highlights a problem with the book's structure. It reads like a series of essays that make connecting, and at times overlapping arguments using a dizzying number of terms, some of which seem to refer to the same concepts. In this regard, readers may be forgiven for wondering if they have already read certain passages in earlier chapters as they progress through the book.  Despite his use of what he calls his "world-ecology" approach, Moore's provocative take overlooks some recent work by ecological anthropologists, political geographers, and feminist scholars—work that reveals the degree to which capitalist development, particularly in rural areas, is patchy, halting, and diverse (Li 2011; Tsing 2015). Perhaps with the term "world-ecology" Moore is connecting his work to scholarship on "world-systems", another important body of literature that often overlooks the diversity and complexity of contemporary forms of capitalism in service of a grand, unifying theory. Greater attention to contemporary sites where capitalism and nature are co-produced might help with this problem. While Moore seems to have an infinite number of historical examples that highlight how capitalism shapes and is shaped by the availability of cheap nature, he poses comparatively few questions about how 21st Century flows of people 

and commodities promote or limit capitalist expansion. This comes as a surprise, given Moore's earlier work, and readers may be disappointed by his failure to adequately acknowledge the diversity of practices associated with contemporary capitalism as well as the ways that challenges to capital's unending search for the "four cheaps" result in its being redirected and altered,  even as it expands.  Recent studies in anthropology, geography, and environmental science have shown how different responses to environmental and socioeconomic change are crucial factors impacting the resilience or transformation of social-ecological systems. As has been well documented, in many cases, individuals act strategically, using paid labor and migration (both topics ostensibly of interest to Moore) as means to gain influence within their communities. Furthermore, the author's focus on the exhaustion of frontiers after uncommodified natures are drawn into capitalist circuits overlooks the fact that these are dynamic spaces where local non-capitalist practices often play a significant role in the maintenance of endemic species. Though Moore's construction of a sweeping historical narrative in service of a grand theory may put some readers off, political ecologists and others currently conducting more  ethnographic  or localised fieldwork are in a unique position to put such theories to the test. Furthermore, the author's descriptions of what he views as critical historical moments that illustrate the inseparability of nature and capitalism provide his readers with countless jumping-off points for further exploration and debate. Few books published today have such a broad scope or are as forceful in their claims, and Capitalism in the web of life is certain to spark productive conversations in upper-level political ecology and critical  development seminars, as well as among faculty working in a range of disciplines.  

References 

Harvey, D. 2003. Accumulation by dispossession. In Harvey, D. The new imperialism.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 137-182. 

Li, T.M. 2011.  Land's end: capitalist relations on an indigenous frontier. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 

Mitchell, T. 2009. Carbon democracy. Economy and Society 38(3): 399-432. Sassen, S. 2014. Expulsions: brutality and complexity in the global economy. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 

Tsing, A. 2015. The mushroom at the end of the world: on the possibility of life in capitalist ruins. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 

 ***  Eric H. Thomas is a doctoral candidate in Anthropology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA.   
 Lenin's Imperialism nearly 100 years on: an outdated paradigm? 

Marshall, A. (2014)
Critique: A Journal of Socialist Theory, 42 (3). pp. 317-333.
ISSN 0301-7605
Copyright © 2014 Taylor and Francis
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/42356878.pdf

Lenin’s Imperialism nearly 100 years on: an outdated paradigm?

Abstract: Lenin’s Imperialism. The Highest Stage of Capitalism formed part of the canon of
mainstream Marxist writing for much of the twentieth century, and also represented a critical
reference point for Marxist attempts to interpret international relations for much of the same period.
At one and the same time both a stinging condemnation of the betrayal of the European working class by their political leaders in 1914, and a synthesis, with some original elements, of existing contemporary Marxist theory on imperialism, Lenin’s ‘popular outline’ subsequently (from around the time of the ‘New Left’ onwards) came under increasing fire for being both incoherent, irrelevant, and overrated. This article revisits both the contemporary genesis of the text, and the question of its longer term pertinence and relevance in the light of capitalism’s current crisis.
Marx’s Concept of Socialism
Peter Hudis

The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx
Edited by Matt Vidal, Tony Smith, Tomás Rotta, and Paul Prew

Print Publication Date: Jun 2019
Subject: Sociology, Social Theory
Online Publication Date: Sep 2018
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190695545.013.50

In This Article
1. The Vision of a Post-Capitalist Society in the Young Marx
2. The Impact of Marx’s Critique of Political Economy on his Concept of Socialism
3. The Vision of a New Society in Marx’s Capital
4. The 1875 Critique of the Gotha Program
5. Conclusion
References

View PDF

Abstract and Keywords

One of the most important theoretical challenges facing us is developing a viable alternative to capitalism. Achieving this requires rethinking basic premises of social theory and practice, given the difficulties of freeing humanity from such problems as alienation, class domination, and the capitalist law of value. Taking off from Marx’s Concept of the Alternative to Capitalism, this article explores how Marx’s critique of capital, value production, and abstract universal labor time is grounded in an emancipatory vision of a post-capitalist society—a vision that has been largely overlooked. While Marx never wrote “blueprints of the future,” the full breadth of his work as revealed in the Marx-Engels Gesaumtausgabe indicates that his vision of a post-capitalist society went further than specifying the need to abolish private property and “anarchic” exchange relations. This chapter seeks to show how Marx’s writings on this issue provide important theoretical ground for envisioning a non-capitalist future in the twenty-first century.

Keywords: socialism, value production, abstract labor, Communism, state

When Karl Marx broke from bourgeois society and became a revolutionary in the early 1840s, he joined an already-existing socialist movement that long predated his entrance upon the political and ideological scene. Neither he nor any other radical intellectual of the time invented the idea of socialism and Communism. A general notion of an alternative to capitalism, even if vague and misdirected, was already in circulation. It consisted of replacing an anarchic, market-driven competitive society with a planned, organized one controlled by the working class. It may seem that Marx had little to add to this notion, since he refrained from speculating about the future and sharply criticized the utopian socialists who spent their time doing so. Moreover, since Marx’s theoretical contribution consisted of an extended critique of the existing capitalist mode of production and he wrote relatively little about post-capitalist society, it may appear that his work has little to offer those seeking to develop a viable alternative to capitalism in the twenty-first century. However, as with so much in life, the appearance is deceptive
Stages of Capitalism and Social Structures of Accumulation: A Long View
Terrence McDonough

The Oxford Handbook of Karl Marx
Edited by Matt Vidal, Tony Smith, Tomás Rotta, and Paul Prew
Print Publication Date: Jun 2019Subject: Sociology, Social Theory, Economic Sociology
Online Publication Date: Nov 2018DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190695545.013.33
Abstract and Keywords
The Marxian theory of stages of capitalism emerged in two waves. The first wave, at the turn of the twentieth century, was rooted in the Marxist response to the recovery of capitalism from its late nineteenth-century crisis. Conversely, the second wave in the 1970s grew out of the faltering of the relatively unproblematic accumulation associated with the post–World War II capitalist order. One wave was concerned with the beginning of a period of long-run accumulation. The second wave was concerned with the advent of a downturn in capitalist accumulation and a period of crisis. These turning points marked the inauguration of a period of relatively unproblematic reproduction of capitalist social relations and, symmetrically, the beginning of a period of stagnation and crisis. This chapter examines the Marxist concept of a stage of capitalism and concludes with an application to the contemporary crisis at a global, regional and national level.

FREE PDF OF THIS CHAPTER
Zombie Capitalism: Global Crisis and the Relevance of Marx

Chris Harman


Haymarket Books, 2010 - Business & Economics - 424 pages

We've been told for years that the capitalist free market is a self-correcting perpetual growth machine in which sellers always find buyers, precluding any major crisis in the system. Then the credit crunch of August 2007 turned into the great crash of September-October 2008, leading one apologist for the system, Willem Buiter, to write of "the end of capitalism as we knew it."

As the crisis unfolded, the world witnessed the way in which the runaway speculation of the "shadow" banking system wreaked havoc on world markets, leaving real human devastation in its wake. Faced with the financial crisis, some economic commentators began to talk of "zombie banks"-financial institutions that were in an "undead state" and incapable of fulfilling any positive function but a threat to everything else. What they do not realize is that twenty-first century capitalism as a whole is a zombie system, seemingly dead when it comes to achieving human goals.


PDF  https://archive.org/details/pdfy-kvzhB4k4AcAT-7iA/page/n1/mode/2up

Contents

Understanding the System Marx and Beyond
19
Marx and His Critics
41
The Dynamics of the System
55
Monopoly War and the State
87
State Spending and the System
121
Capitalism in the 20th Century
141
The Long Boom
161
The End of the Golden
191
The Runaway System
305
The Runaway System and the Future for Humanity
325
Notes
353
Glossary
394
Index
403
143
410
325
420
Copyright

The New Age of Global Instability
227



Global Politics, Capitalism, Socio-Ecological Crisis, and Resistance:
Exploring the Linkages and the Challenges

Mark Tilzey




Abstract
This paper engages critically with a set of broadly Marxian-based approaches to the relationship
between global politics and processes of capital accumulation. This is then used to inform analysis of
the dynamics underlying the multiple but inter-linked crises of food, environment
(energy/climate/biodiversity), and finance. The first section assesses the work of Callinicos in his
focus on renewed inter-imperialist rivalry, in which the USA is seen as wanting to secure access to,
and control over, key resources to secure capital accumulation in intensifying competition with China
and other capitalist powers. This approach is compared to the work of Panitch, Gindin, and Kiely in
which they revive Kautsky’s notion of ultra-imperialism – here US hegemonic power is assumed to
lead other capitalist states in the re-organisation of the global economy. It is argued that, ultimately,
both approaches examine only the external relations between the separate but linked logics of capital
and global politics. They also neglect the crucial role of the biophysical domain in defining key
parameters surrounding capital accumulation.

In the second section, the paper develops an alternative approach to understanding capitalist
expansion, its relation to global politics and current crises. By drawing from Rosa Luxembourg’s
spatial account of the accumulation of capital and expansion into non-capitalist spaces 
through ongoing processes of primitive accumulation, the structuring conditions of capitalist 
expansion are conceptualised. 

Through a critical engagement with William Robinson’s work on the emergence of the
transnational state, and that of Jason Moore on ‘world ecology’, the paper develops a
conceptualisation of the agency of different class fractions within the inter-state system and their
relationship to the crises of food, environment, and finance. In the third section, the paper addresses
resistances to these crises. 

The hegemony of trans-nationalised fractions of capital, often, although not
always, led by the USA through ‘ultra-imperialism’, is challenged by sub-hegemonic national capital
fractions of some BRICS, notably China and Brazil. But this merely perpetuates the crises of
capitalism through policies of neo-developmentalism and neo-extractivism. These are challenged in
turn by counter-hegemonic forces seeking food/land/territorial sovereignty. The dynamics of this
relationship between hegemonic, sub-hegemonic and counter-hegemonic forces – between global
politics, the state, and social movements – are examined, particularly in relation to Latin America. 

State, Capital and World Economy: Bukharin's Marxism and the “Dependency/Class” Controversy in Canadian Political Economy*
Paul Kellogg 

Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique
Volume 22, Issue 2
June 1989 , pp. 337-362

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423900001335
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 November 2009

Abstract


In the late 1960s and early 1970s, “left-nationalist” dependency theories dominated Canadian political economy. However, Canada defied the predictions of dependency theory and developed all the class relations appropriate to advanced capitalist societies. The origins of Canadian industrial capitalism were not such that the country was locked into a staple-trap, notwithstanding the very real reliance of the economy on staple-export. In recent years, a number of political economists have offered an “orthodox” Marxist critique of dependency to account for these and other weaknesses in its overall framework. This article first summarizes the dependency arguments, then the arguments of its Marxist critics, and finally introduces a summary look at the ideas of Nikolai Bukharin, a little-examined but nonetheless important theorist whose insights on the relationship between the state as a capitalist and the growing internationalization of economic life are key to a Marxist re-theorization of Canadian political economy.



Vers la fin des années soixante et le début des années soixante-dix, les théories de la dépendance « nationalistes de gauche » dominaient l'économie politique du Canada. Le Canada a pourtant défié les prévisions de ces théories et développé tous les rapports entre les classes qui caractérisent les sociétés capitalistes avancées. Les débuts du capitalisme industriel au Canada n'étaient pas au point de nous rendre totalement dépendants des produits de base, même s'il ne faut pas ignorer l'importance de l'exportation de ces produits. Dans les dernières annees, un certain nombre de spécialistes en économie politique ont présenté une critique marxiste de type orthodoxes des théories de la dépendance afin d'expliquer certaines faiblesses de son cadre générale d'analyse. Cet article résume d'abord les arguments portant sur les théories de la dépendance, puis ceux des critiques marxistes et présente enfin un bref aperçu des idées de Nikolai Bukharin, un théoricien important mais relativement peu connu. Ses théories du rapport entre l'État vu comme capitaliste et l'internationalisation croissante de la vie économique sont présentées comme étant la clé d'une re-théorisation marxiste de l'économie politique du Canada.

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COPYRIGHT: © Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique) and/et la Société québécoise de science politique 1989


References Hide All


1 Cited in Clement, Wallace and Drache, Daniel, A Practical Guide to Canadian Political Economy (Toronto: Lorimer, 1978), 43.Google Scholar


2 Carroll, William, “Dependency, Imperialism and the Capitalist Class in Canada,” in Brym, Robert J. (ed.), The Structure of the Canadian Capitalist Class (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1985), 42.Google Scholar


3 Porter, John, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 273.CrossRef | Google Scholar


4 See Lumsden, Ian (ed.), Close the 49th Parallel Etc. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977)Google Scholar; Teeple, Gary (ed.), Capitalism and the National Question in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973)Google Scholar; and Laxer, Robert (ed.), (Canada) Ltd. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973).Google Scholar


5 Resnick, Philip, “The Maturing of Canadian Capitalism,” Our Generation 15, (1982), 11–24.Google Scholar


6 Carroll, “Dependency, Imperialism and the Capitalist Class in Canada.”


7 Moore, Steve and Wells, Debi, Imperialism and the National Question in Canada (Toronto: S. Moore, 1975), 113.Google Scholar


8 Panitch, Leo, “Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy,” Studies in Political Economy: A Socialist Review 6 (autumn 1981), 7–33CrossRef | Google Scholar; David McNally, “Staple Theory as Commodity Fetishism,” Ibid., 35–63; and Ray Schmidt, “Canadian Political Economy: A Critique,” Ibid., 65–92.


9 This will not involve a complete survey of all Marxist political economy. In particular, I shall not refer to the numerous and important contributions of Niosi, Jorge including The Economy of Canada: A Study of Ownership and Control (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1979)Google Scholar; Canadian Capitalism (Toronto: Lorimer, 1981); and Canadian Multinationals (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1985). While it does not deal directly with Canada, Niosi's work co-authored with Bellon, Bertram, The Decline of the American Economy (Montreal: Black Rose, 1988)Google Scholar, is also relevant. I have restricted my horizons to those Marxists who have directly taken up the dialogue with the dependency theorists.


10 Marx, Karl, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970), 20.Google Scholar


11 Levitt, Kari, Silent Surrender (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1970).Google Scholar


12 In saying this, I do not wish to imply that the dependency theorists were by and large elite theorists. However, in developing a society-centred framework to understand the Canadian economy, many dependency theorists did use elite theory (whose classic Canadian formulation is found in John Porter's The Vertical Mosaic) as a starting point and developed their analysis through a critique of this approach. The attitude of the dependency theorists to elite theory was fraternal (agreeing that society was in fact based on manifest inequalities) but critical. Dependency theorists disagreed with the purely descriptive bias of this type of sociology and with its acceptance of the inevitability of inequality. They posited an explanation of the inequalities inside Canadian society that implicitly or explicitly contained a prescription—independence and socialism.


13 Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, 557, 54 and 166.


14 John Hutcheson, “Class and Income Distribution in Canada,” in Laxer, (Canada) Ltd., 59.


15 Panitch, “Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy,” 7.


16 Drache, Daniel, “The Crisis of Canadian Political Economy,” Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 7 (1983), 25, 34–36.Google Scholar


17 See Baran, Paul, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957)Google Scholar; Emmanuel, Arghiri, Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Free Trade (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972)Google Scholar; and Frank, André Gunder, Dependent Accumulation and Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979).Google Scholar


18 Carroll, “Dependency, Imperialism and the Capitalist Class in Canada,” 21.


19 Ibid., 22–23.


20 See Moore and Wells, Imperialism and the National Question in Canada, 115.


21 Cited in Penner, Norman, The Canadian Left (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 86–87.Google Scholar


22 Ibid., 91, 100.


23 Ibid., 103.


24 Cited in Ibid., 104.


25 Resnick, Philip, The Land of Cain (Vancouver: New Star Books, 1977), 202–03, 70.Google Scholar


26 Ibid., 203.


27 Moore and Wells, Imperialism and the National Question in Canada, 112. Moore and Wells here do not mean to argue that this unity is a “good” thing. While there might be one central Canadian state, there is very definitely more than one nation. According to their analysis, the historic oppression of the Quebec nation is intensified precisely because the central state is independent and unified.


28 Panitch, “Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy,” 8.


29 Ibid., 9, 13.


30 Ibid., 14.


31 Levitt, Silent Surrender, 24.


32 McCallum, John, Unequal Beginnings (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).CrossRef | Google Scholar


33 Panitch, “Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy,” 15.


34 Ibid., 10. For a more extensive discussion of this approach to the early years of Canadian industrialization, see Paul Kellogg, “The Early Years of Capitalism in Canada: A Defence of the Home-market Approach,” unpublished paper, York University, 1987.


35 Panitch, “Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy,” 16.


36 Ibid., 17, 19.


37 Drache, “The Crisis of Canadian Political Economy,” 28.


38 McNally, “Staple Theory as Commodity Fetishism,” 44.


39 Drache, “The Crisis of Canadian Political Economy,” 25–43.


40 To be fair, Panitch has recently developed his analysis in a somewhat different direction, one which is more complex than simply a “branch-plant” approach that makes much of the location of head office. See Panitch, Leo, “Class and Power in Canada,” Monthly Review 36, 11 (1985), 1–13Google Scholar, which makes a coherent case for his rich dependency approach, developing an argument that incorporates dependency from an angle that does not rely on the “Frank school.” In “terms of the extent of foreign ownership and control over the economy and of Canada's international trade pattern… Canada looks more like belonging in the company of Venezuela or Nigeria” (Ibid., 1). He argues that “the material foundations for a centralized Canadian state simply do not exist.” In Canada, industrial and financial capital have not merged into a unified and concentrated national bourgeoisie to form “finance capital”; rather, “Canada's commercially oriented bourgeoisie… entered into a partnership with American industrial capital in Canada.” This has resulted in the “implantation within the social formation of a powerful fraction of foreign industrial capital on a scale unmatched anywhere in the developed capitalist world” (Ibid., 4–5). Canada has a “neo-colonial relationship” with the United States and “nothing approaching a national bourgeoisie with its own political, ideological and economic unity vis-à-vis other national capitals has emerged” (Ibid., 10–11). This allows Panitch to theorize a dependent relationship with the United States that does not rest on the assumptions of the underdevelopment school. The crux of the case is the weakness in Canada of a national bourgeosie. While this phenomenon has not led to the underdevelopment predicted by the Frank school, it has held important implications for the ability of the state to direct the economy. This is an interesting approach, one that merits detailed examination in a separate paper. It does not, however, detract from the thrust of the argument presented here. Dependency in the sense of the Frank school was intimately bound up with a notion of underdevelopment. This underdevelopment was rooted in several structures of the relationship between the centre and the periphery, all of which have been shown by Marxist critics of dependency to be empirically and theoretically weak.


41 Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, 266.


42 Ibid., 269.


43 Ibid., 269–70.


44 Ibid., 271–72.


45 Ibid., 273.


46 Resnick, “The Maturing of Canadian Capitalism,” 12.


47 Ibid., 17, 22.


48 For a compilation of the various official statistics which attempts to prove just that, see Kellogg, Paul, “Canada as a Principal Economy: A Comparative Critique of the ‘Counter-discourse’ of Political Economy,” paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, McMaster University, Hamilton, 1987.Google Scholar


49 Resnick, “The Maturing of Canadian Capitalism,” 15.


50 This framework is extensively developed in Carroll, William, Corporate Power and Canadian Capitalism (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1986).Google Scholar


51 Carroll, “Dependency, Imperialism and the Capitalist Class in Canada,” 31.


52 Ibid., 42–43.


53 Ibid., 25.


54 Ibid., 27, 28.


55 Ibid., 32.


56 Ibid., 35. This conclusion is directly opposite to the one drawn by Panitch (“Class and Power in Canada”). See footnote 40. Has finance capital developed in a more or less “classical” form in Canada, with the oddity of a high degree of head offices being located in the United States (as Carroll argues) or did Canadian banking interests fuse their interests with those of American industrial capital, leading to a “Canadian-exceptionalist” view (as Panitch argues) where indigenous Canadian industrial capital was left out in the cold? As the Marxist critique of Canadian political economy develops, this should prove to be one of the key areas of controversy.


57 Ibid., 35.


58 Friedman, Jonathan, “Crisis in Theory and Transformations of the World Economy,” Review 2 (1978), 143.Google Scholar


59 Warren, Bill, Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1980), 176.Google Scholar


60 Carroll, “Dependency, Imperialism, and the Capitalist Class in Canada,” 37.


61 Bukharin, Nikolai, Imperialism and World Economy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), 157.Google Scholar


62 Some recent scholarship has begun to reverse this trend. See, for example: Haynes, Mike, Nikolai Bukharin and the Transition from Capitalism to Socialism (Kent, UK: Croom Helm, 1985)Google Scholar; Coates, K., The Case of Nikolai Bukharin (Nottingham: Spokesman, 1978)Google Scholar; Cohen, Stephen F., Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1975)Google Scholar; and Lewin, M., Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debates (London: Pluto Press, 1974).Google Scholar


63 Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, 12.


64 Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, 17.


65 Cited in Trotsky, Leon, The Revolution Betrayed (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972), 291.Google Scholar


66 Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, 24–26.


67 Ibid., 126, 127.


68 See especially Cliff, Tony, State Capitalism in Russia (London: Pluto Press, 1974).Google Scholar Cliff argues on this basis that the Soviet Union is best understood as bureaucratic state capitalist. For a recent and iconoclastic examination of perestroika from this perspective see Harman, Chris and Zebrowski, Andy, “Glasnost—Before the Storm,” International Socialism 2 (1988), 3–54.Google Scholar International arms competition has another related impact on national economies which we will be unable to develop here. Briefly, three related concepts must be linked very closely—state-capitalism, world economy and the permanent arms economy. One of the principal thrusts behind the expansion of the state sector has been the competition between national-capitals which at a certain point becomes military competition. This military/state sector in turn becomes an economic factor in its own right, accelerating the very forces that brought it to birth—the concentration and centralization of capital. This argument is developed in the international context by Harman, Chris in Explaining the Crisis (London: Bookmarks, 1984).Google ScholarMcNally, David has developed its implications in the Canadian context in a provocative paper, “The Permanent Arms Economy and the Crisis of Canadian Capitalism,” paper prepared for the 1976 convention of the International Socialists, Toronto, 1976.Google Scholar


69 Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, 26.


70 Ibid., 61–62.


71 Ibid., 73.


72 This line of argument has been superbly developed by Harris, Nigel in Of Bread and Guns: The World Economy in Crisis (Markham: Penguin, 1973)Google Scholar which develops the general argument that the great levelling effect of the world market has overrun the ability of nation-states—communist or non-communist—to counter the pressures towards homogenization and, therefore, crisis; and The End of the Third World (Markham: Penguin, 1987) which develops the implications of this approach for dependency theories of the Third World and its development prospects.


* Ken McRoberts and Leo Panitch of the Department of Political Science, York University, and George Perlin and Grant Amyot of the Department of Political Studies, Queen's University, may not agree with everything in this article; but they were all invaluable over the years in helping these ideas come to fruition. The comments of the three anonymous reviewers for this Journal were extremely useful. The completion of this article was made possible by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
The enduring relevance of Rosa Luxemburg’s
The Accumulation of Capital
https://cbtansel.net/publication/2016-jird/2016-jird.pdf

Andreas Bieler, Sümercan Bozkurt, Max Crook, Peter S. Cruttenden,
Ertan Erol, Adam David Morton, Cemal Burak Tansel and
Elif Uzgören

School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham
NG7 2RD, UK.

First published in 1913, The Accumulation of Capital represents Rosa Luxemburg’s
quintessential contribution to Marxism and an exceptional, yet equally controversial, ‘modification’ of Marx’s original scheme of accumulation. Built on a cordial critique of Marx’s
model of expanded reproduction, Luxemburg’s intervention offers not only a new framework to study capitalist economic development, but also a historical and political compass
with which the expansion of capitalist social relations through colonialism and imperialism
can be expounded. To celebrate the centenary anniversary of the book in 2013, we assess the enduring relevance of key themes developed by Luxemburg in their conceptual implications, but also in their relevance to understanding dynamics within contemporary capitalism. 

The first part of the article engages with Luxemburg’s theoretical contribution to the analysis of capitalist expansion with reference to the transformation of peripheral spaces. The second part briefly discusses how the book can be utilised as a starting point to examine the characteristics of today’s crisis-ridden global capitalism. We conclude by highlighting a number of contentious points that challenge Luxemburg’s account, but ultimately claim that

The Accumulation of Capital is still an invaluable resource for those who are interested in
critically examining international political economy and geopolitics.

Journal of International Relations and Development (2016) 19, 420–447.
doi:10.1057/jird.2014.18; published online 19 September 2014

Keywords: capital accumulation; capitalism; geography; peripheral space; Rosa
Luxemburg; uneven developmen