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CEO Greg Becker led the Silicon Valley Bank for the last 12 years (Picture: Patrick T. Fallon/AFP)

Jeremy Hunt has pledged the government will do ‘everything to protect’ British technology companies caught up in the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank.

The chancellor warned its failure posed a ‘serious risk to our technology and life sciences sectors’ – although he said there was no risk to the UK’s ­financial system as a whole.

Urgent talks to ‘come up with a solution’ were held over the weekend between Mr Hunt, prime minister Rishi Sunak and Bank of England governor Andrew Bailey.

Regulators closed the bank – led for the last 12 years by CEO Greg Becker – on ­Friday amid struggles in the tech sector as higher interest rates squeezed out investors. Its UK arm was put into insolvency yesterday.

Mr Hunt said: ‘We want to find a way that minimises or, if we possibly can, avoids all losses to those incredibly promising companies.

‘What we will do is bring forward very quickly a plan to make sure that they can meet their operational cash flow requirements.’ But he did not say whether the government will guarantee deposits companies had with the lender or step in with taxpayers’ money.

Labour said the start-up industry must not ‘pay the price’ for the bank’s failure.

OakNorth Bank – founded by a former Conservative donor and advised by the former chancellor Lord Hammond – is in talks to buy the stricken bank’s UK operation, Sky News reported last night.

Labour’s shadow chancellor Rachel Reeves said: ‘I would urge the government to do more than offer warm words, but come forward with specific plans.’


Who Broke The Silicon Valley Bank And What Now – OpEd

By 

By Alex Gloy*


On Friday, March 10, California-based Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), was forced to close. SVB was among the top 20 US banks by assets. Its collapse was the second-largest bank failure in US history. Who could have caused SVB’s collapse?

Let us examine the potential culprits one by one.

The Federal Reserve

In an interview with YouTube channel Blockworks Macro, Chris Whalen, an investment banker and author, puts the blame for SVB’s failure at the footsteps of the Federal Reserve, the US central bank. He argues that long periods of near-zero interest rates forced management to venture into longer-dated securities to find acceptable yields without compromising the quality of assets. The speed of subsequent increases in rates, the fastest of the past six cycles, led to steep losses on longer-duration bonds. 

While this is certainly true, it is doubtful a central bank should take individual positioning into consideration when deciding on its monetary policy. Unfortunately, rising interest rates usually create casualties, especially after long periods of low rates. Should the fight against inflation, which affects every individual, trump the wish to protect certain institutions against financial harm?

Whalen predicted that the Federal Reserve would cut interest rates in an emergency meeting before financial markets open on Monday morning or face the risk of contagion. Whether that happens or not, it seems Whalen is not entirely right in blaming the Fed for SVB’s collapse.

The Management

Over the past ten years, client funds at SVB grew almost tenfold from $38 billion in 2012 to $375 billion in 2022. Inflows in 2021 alone amounted to $137 billion. From a bank’s perspective, client money inflows represent an increase in liabilities. The bank has to do a corresponding transaction on the asset side of its balance sheet, preferably earning an interest rate higher than the one owed to its clients.

During the period of largest inflows, yields in securities considered risk-free, such as 3-months Treasury Bills, ranged between 0.02% and 0.16%. Management could have chosen to relax standards for loan approvals in order to increase lending to customers. This would have been a recipe for increased credit losses in the future. Low interest rates forced management to venture into bonds with longer maturities in order to achieve acceptable yields on their assets.

Despite such pressures, management does not seem to be able to escape entirely scot-free.Moody’s has severely downgraded SVB, citing “significant interest rate and asset liability management risks and weak governance.” In hindsight, purchasing hedges against a rise in interest rates would have been beneficial. However, those hedges would have eaten further into margins. Management could be forgiven for dismissing the necessity of hedging after experiencing a decade of interest rates below 2.5%. Yet it is worth investigating shortcomings in governance.

The Customers

Social media are rife with comments demanding “no taxpayer bailout for rich clients” or blaming customers for not being aware of the $250,000 limit of Federal Deposit Insurance Fund (FDIC) insurance per account. Many of SVB’s clients were start-ups in the technology and healthcare sectors. Their deposits at SVB often consisted of capital raised from venture capital firms—money intended to carry them through the first loss-making years. These funds are needed for payroll, rent and other current expenses. Losing them would most likely result in the start-up closing down and laying off all employees.

A bank customer should not be required to study the bank’s balance sheet or be familiar with implications of monetary policy decisions on duration risk. During the 2008-09 financial crisis, the FDIC managed to protect all depositors of almost 500 failed banks without using a single tax-payer dollar. The same is expected at SVB, especially given the losses incurred seem manageable in relation to its assets.

The Rating Agencies and the Regulators

A news article by Reuters titled “Silicon Valley Bank’s demise began with downgrade threat” describes how an imminent downgrade in credit ratings by Moody’s derailed a plan by SVB to raise $1.75 billion in fresh capital. For legal reasons, investors need to be made aware of significant developments when purchasing newly issued securities. While the news of a looming downgrade certainly scared off any potential investors, it would be unfair to blame rating agencies for the demise of the bank.

Following the 2008-09 crisis, banking supervision has become stricter. Bankers regularlycomplain how stringent regulation hampers their operations. “Where Were The Regulators When SVB Crashed” asks the The Wall Street Journal. The article raises valid questions yet it is important to note that regulations require banks to hold a certain percentage of assets in so-called “High Quality Liquid Assets.” These can be quickly turned into cash if depositors want to withdraw funds, which is exactly what SVB did. Its losses did not stem from bad credits or investments in low quality assets, but from unrealized losses on high-quality bonds.

Regulations cannot foresee every business decision any bank might take. Banking is already one of the most regulated industries and more regulations do not seem to be the answer.

The Crypto Bros and the Short Sellers

Bitcoin advocates were quick to celebrate the demise of SVB as a sign the current fiat money system was about to collapse. Meanwhile, Circle Internet Financial, the issuer of stablecoin USDC, confirmed having $3.3 billion out of $40 billion dollars of its reserves stuck at SVB. This revelation led to turmoil in the market of stablecoins, with USDC breaking its $1 peg. It is not without irony that crypto still depends on traditional banking—the system it seeks to liberate its followers from—only to get caught with funds in said system, leading to a bank run on its stablecoin.

Stablecoin reserves are hard to manage since withdrawal could be required in a short period of time. Many banks refuse deposits from stable coin operators for exactly this reason apart from legal considerations.

As usual, short sellers are blamed for driving down the stock price of a failed company. However, short sellers analyze companies in depth and are well informed. Rising short interest (number of shares sold short) is often an indication of trouble brewing. According to an online service, as of February 15, around 6% of SVB shares outstanding were sold short. This is only a slightly elevated figure. If short sellers had any impact on SVB’s share price, it would have been relatively minor.

SVB was Unique

The business model of banking is to borrow short (at low rates) and to lend long (at higher rates). Otherwise, there is no way to accept deposits and make a profit. Net interest margins are slim. It would not make sense to run a bank without leverage. The business model has inherent risks, but those risks are not to be borne by depositors. The depositors themselves are a risk, should they decide to withdraw funds all at once. This is discouraged via the FDIC’s deposit insurance, which has worked very well in the past.

The combination of rapid deposit growth during a low-yield period, lack of lending opportunities, high share of non-insured deposits, and rapidly rising interest rates led to an unfortunate shortfall in risk-bearing capital. Calls on start-ups to withdraw their funds were individually rational, but they led, in aggregate, to a bank run and the irrational outcome of the bank being closed.

Containing contagion is important: the stock prices of other regional banks have suffered. Investors are now concerned about unrealized losses on long-duration bonds at other institutions too. In order to prevent increasing mistrust becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, the Federal Reserve might be forced to stop the fire from spreading by lowering rates or lending against collateral. The fight against inflation might have to take a backseat.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

*About the author: Alexander Gloy is an independent investment professional with over 35 years of experience in financial markets. He worked in Equity Research and Sales, both in Investment and Private Banking for Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Sal. Oppenheim and Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch. He focuses on macroeconomic research, analyzing the impact of global debt and derivatives on the stability of our monetary system. His interest in crypto-currencies from the perspective of monetary theory led him to become a member of the Central Bank Digital Currency Think Tank. He has taught classes at colleges and universities.

Source: This article was published by Fair Observer


Fair Observer is an independent, nonprofit media organization that engages in citizen journalism and civic education. Fair Observer's digital media platform has 2,500 contributors from 90 countries, cutting across borders, backgrounds and beliefs. With fact-checking and a rigorous editorial process, Fair Observer provides diversity and quality in an era of echo chambers and fake news. Fair Observer's education arm runs training programs on subjects such as digital media, writing and more. In particular, Fair Observer inspires young people around the world to be more engaged citizens and to participate in a global discourse.

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Yes, The Latest Bank Bailout Is Really A Bailout: And You Are Paying For It – OpEd

By 

Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) failed on Friday and was shut down by regulators. It was the second-largest failure in US history and the first since the global financial crisis. Almost immediately, the calls for bailouts started to come in. (Since Friday, First Republic Bank has failed, and many other banks are facing stress.)

In fact, on March 9, even before SVB failed, billionaire investor Bill Ackman took to Twitter to insist a federal “bailout should be considered” if the private sector could not save the bank. Hours after SVB officially failed, Ackman was still at it, and in a 646-word panicky screed, he demanded that the federal government “guarantee SVB deposits” and essentially backstop the entire banking industry to keep failing, inefficient, and poorly managed banks afloat.

Now, many readers might be saying to themselves, “I thought bank deposits were insured!” That, of course, is correct, but deposits are only legislatively insured up to $250,000 by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Given that most normal people keep less than this in their bank accounts, that means the majority of bank users are not going to lose any of their money should their banks fail. Moreover, it is extremely easy to acquire deposit insurance on much more than $250,000 by simply keeping money at more than one bank. That $250,000 limit applies to the deposits at each bank where a depositor keeps funds. For customers with high liquidity needs, the financial sector offers tools for dealing with the risk of exceeding FDIC limits.

In an illustration of the laziness and arrogance that so characterizes our modern financial class, however, many of the wealthiest depositors at Silicon Valley Bank couldn’t be bothered with managing their deposits, and they essentially ignored the deposit-insurance rules that even a ten-year-old understands when opening his first bank account.

As a result, many venture capitalists and other wealthy SVB customers stand to a lot of money. At least, theystood to lose a lot of money before Sunday evening, when the Federal Reserve announced its new “Bank Term Funding Program” (BTFP), which promises to flood the banking system with new money and shore up the personal finances of wealthy depositors. 

This is part of a two-pronged effort to both make banks appear more financially sound, and to greatly expand FDIC payouts to depositors who have their funds in these banks. 

The official propaganda coming out of the administration, and from the usual Fed fanboys, is that none of this is a bailout. That’s a lie. The new steps being taken by the Fed and by the Treasury Department’s FDIC are indeed ultimately bailouts for billionaires and other wealthy depositors. Moreover, this new program will require at least a partial return of quantitative easing. There’s no way to guarantee such huge sums of money without having to fall back on inflationary monetary policy yet again. This also means price inflation won’t be going away. Here is why.

Propping Up Asset Prices with New Money

The first indication that this is a bailout comes from the text of the press release on the creation of the BTFP. It states that the new program will be

offering loans of up to one year in length to banks, savings associations, credit unions, and other eligible depository institutions pledging U.S. Treasuries, agency debt and mortgage-backed securities [MBS], and other qualifying assets as collateral. These assets will be valued at par. The BTFP will be an additional source of liquidity against high-quality securities, eliminating an institution’s need to quickly sell those securities in times of stress.

The key phrase is “These assets will be valued at par.” That’s important because these banks are facing huge unrealized losses on assets whose market prices plummeted as interest rates rose. In other words, the Fed has decided to live in an imaginary world in which banks have assets far more valuable than is the case in real life, and it will now allow banks to use worthless and near-worthless assets as collateral. According to the FDIC, these losses are huge:

Moreover, the terms of these loans reiterate how these are loans designed to hand money to banks for little in return. According to the Fed, “there are no fees associated with the Programs” and there is no penalty for prepayment. Foreign banks are also eligible, by the way. And, of course, “the Department of the Treasury . . . [will] provide $25 billion as credit protection.” If history is any guide, we can expect that Treasury backstop to get a lot bigger. If and when some of these banks default on the loans, the collateral won’t come close to covering the value of the loans. The banks are essentially getting free money.

Where will the money to provide these loans come from? It will be printed, of course. The Fed is already bankrupt and has no extra money lying around. The Fed can’t just start selling off its $8.5 trillion hoard of Treasurys and MBS to get cash. That would drive down the prices of those assets even further, and this would make balance sheets at banks—who also own Treasurys and MBS—even worse. So, new loans and guarantees will have to come from new money. Another phrase for that is “monetary inflation.”

The FDIC Will Need a Bailout

The second prong of the bailout is the FDIC’s promise to cover all depositors at troubled banks, rather than just those with deposits up to the usual limit. The not-a-bailout narrative claims that the new promised expansion of insurance will all be funded by FDIC fees and imposes no costs on taxpayers. “The banks will pay for it,” we are told.

That’s not how it will actually work. In this three-minute video, Peter St. Onge explains the real problem:

St. Onge notes that the FDIC fund available for backstopping deposits is less than $130 billion. Yet deposits in US banks total approximately $22 trillion. The FDIC fund is equal to about 0.6 percent of all the deposits. And it appears that even at the banks with the highest proportion of FDIC-covered accounts, only 42 percent of deposits are covered by insurance. So, clearly, extending FDIC coverage to all deposits means the FDIC will have nowhere near the funds it needs to cover potential depositor losses. The FDIC was never intended to insure rich people with deposits well in excess of FDIC insurance maximums. Yet that is exactly what is now happening.

When the FDIC runs out of money, what happens? The FDIC runs to the US Treasury to get a bailout. Where does the money to bail out the FDIC come from? It comes either from current tax revenues or from borrowed money. Either way, the taxpayers are on the hook. Moreover, if the Fed intervenes to buy up some of that new government debt—to keep federal interest obligations low, of course—then taxpayers will also pay via the inflation tax.

When we consider all this, we can see how the grift works: the Fed or the Treasury Department creates a “fund” and claims that it will be financed by fees and other nontax revenue sources. Thus, when the FDIC or the Fed rush to bail out banks, the politicians can claim the taxpayers will pay nothing. That is only true if the programs themselves receive no backstopping from the Treasury or from monetary inflation. But if we’ve learned anything since 2008, it’s that these programs all enjoy implicit guarantees of taxpayer backing, and that any “caps” on these amounts can be increased at any time.

Expect More Price Inflation

In any case, the ordinary taxpayer will certainly feel the pain in terms of ongoing price inflation. Current bailout efforts are inflationary and are thoroughly opposed to the Federal Reserve’s recent attempts at “quantitative tightening.” The whole point of the bailouts, after all, is to loosen financial conditions for banks. So the Fed will almost certainly be backing off whatever it had planned in terms of raising the target interest rate and reducing its portfolio at the next Federal Open Market Committee meeting. Now the Fed will be looking at whatever strategy it can find to increase the flow of dollars to banks, and that will mean more money creation, even if the Fed’s official position remains ostensibly hawkish. Put another way, get ready for more entrenched price inflation. But don’t forget that the primary focus of all of this is to bail out wealthy depositors and bankers. On top of it all, there’s no guarantee that it will even work. There’s a reason the financial technocrats are in panic mode. They don’t know what will happen next.

About the author: Ryan McMaken (@ryanmcmaken) is a senior editor at the Mises Institute. Send him your article submissions for the Mises Wire and Power and Market, but read article guidelines first. Ryan has a bachelor’s degree in economics and a master’s degree in public policy and international relations from the University of Colorado. He was a housing economist for the State of Colorado. He is the author of Breaking Away: The Case of Secession, Radical Decentralization, and Smaller Polities and Commie Cowboys: The Bourgeoisie and the Nation-State in the Western Genre.


Source: This article was published by the MISES Institute

MISES
The Mises Institute, founded in 1982, teaches the scholarship of Austrian economics, freedom, and peace. The liberal intellectual tradition of Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) and Murray N. Rothbard (1926-1995) guides us. Accordingly, the Mises Institute seeks a profound and radical shift in the intellectual climate: away from statism and toward a private property order. The Mises Institute encourages critical historical research, and stands against political correctness.

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