Mining fractures land and community in Mongolia

11 February 2022

Author: Ariell Ahearn, University of Oxford

With over 1000 licenses issued across the country, a diverse range of mineral extraction operations are transforming Mongolia’s rural cultural landscape. The Gobi region is crowded with both mega mines and smaller-scale operations. The Gobi also has excellent conditions for renewable energy and is poised to be a site for significant investment in this industry. Solar and wind farms are already starting to pop up in Omnogobi and Dornogovi provinces reflecting Mongolia’s commitment to reduce its reliance on coal power under the State Policy on Energy 2015-2030.

Yet in the face of these major investments and developments, discussions of traditional mobile pastoralist land tenure rights have been muted. While the Mongolian government has some legal provisions to protect the environment, such as the 2012 Law on Environmental Impact Assessment, it lacks robust policy on resettlement and social safeguarding and adequate protections against forced eviction.

To address this regulatory gap, the ESRC-GCRF funded (2018-2021) Gobi Framework project drafted national guidelines for the Social Impact Assessment as part of a Government of Mongolia Working Group initiative. The Working Group was established in 2020 to study and develop proposals on the impact of mining, including existing practices of resettlement and compensation.

Since the mid-1990s, the crisis of land tenure rights for mobile pastoralists has been quietly unfolding across the country. Rural pastureland is state property and industrial licensing processes — for both mineral extraction and renewable energy projects like wind and solar — override herders’ traditional rights to mobile land use. The territory of Dalanjargalan county in Dornogovi province is a case in point, with two-thirds of the territory taken for mining.

Climate change impacts the Mongolian drylands in complex ways. But herder vulnerabilities also stem from political and economic policies, which include a lack of government capacity, informalisation of the economy, legal complexity and a focus on urban-based service provision and free market policies, catering to settled and urbanised livelihoods.

The rapid scaling up of open-pit mining has fractured and physically destroyed pasturelands. Mining overburden, heavy truck traffic, dust, waste and herder concerns on the availability of safe potable water make rural areas increasingly risky for the well-being of livestock.

The transformative effects of open pit mining intersect with climate change impacts, putting pressure on the delicate and variable steppe and Gobi ecosystems. The industry is only loosely regulated, and enforcement is challenging. The vast majority of mines are limited only by national laws and regulations. They are not required to abide by international standards such as the International Finance Corporation Performance Standards, as their financing is from private sources.

While mining laws in Mongolia require an Environmental Impact Assessment process, they lack attention to social impacts and international standards for resettlement of traditional mobile pastoralist herders. As herders are not considered to be Indigenous by the Mongolian government, processes of free, prior and informed consent are not a legal requirement. A regular review of human rights in Mongolia by a UN Special Rapporteur in 2019 and by the UN Human Rights Council in 2020 identified concerns regarding the negative impacts from mining projects on the rights of herders.

International resettlement and livelihood restoration standards do not feature in the Mongolian Minerals Law. Article 41 of the law makes licence holders liable to compensate for damage they cause. But companies tend to define project-affected peoples as those who have a formally registered winter camp within a fixed distance from a piece of infrastructure or license area. In some cases, registered spring camps are also included. This excludes many herders who do not have formally registered winter camps but are still legitimate occupiers based on customary land use practices and commonly held beliefs.

This overly simplified mapping practice misrepresents the dynamic mobile livelihoods of herders as fixed points occupying a small plot of land. It also leaves out many herders who may use a designated license area seasonally. By not formally accounting for loss of pastureland or other natural resources, herder livelihoods are put at risk.

Our research in the Gobi Framework project revealed that the failure to acknowledge herders outside of the narrow lens of registered winter camp households is sowing the seeds of community conflict. Conflict is frequent between displaced and non-displaced herders, with displaced herders being shunned as ‘sell-outs’ and chased away by new host communities. In many cases, the households formally designated by companies as ‘project-affected people’ were rejected and ostracised by herders from the same district. Their ability to negotiate for pasture access in other areas is limited due to this social rejection.

For project-affected people, some mining companies provide monetary compensation while others provide in-kind goods for herders who lose their winter campsites located in license areas. Amounts of compensation vary widely and arrangements are often protected by nondisclosure agreements. In other cases, herders report being threatened with forced eviction by companies.

The land dispossession facing Mongolia’s traditional mobile pastoralists and the contribution of mining-induced displacement on processes of urbanisation should be given urgent attention in this era of climate change and its consequential risks to rural livelihoods.

Ariell Ahearn is a lecturer in human geography at the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/

India’s free pass on civil rights

14 February 2022

Author: Arun R Swamy, University of Guam

For India, 2021 was a year of trauma and portent. Alongside the continuing COVID-19 crisis — despite an ostensibly successful vaccination drive — the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) anti-democratic tendencies intensified. A year-long protest by farmers eventually resulted in the government withdrawing a landmark bill to liberalise agricultural trade. State elections heralded the strength of regional parties. Yet despite domestic setbacks, India raised its profile regionally and globally.

India’s COVID-19 surge between March and June 2021 was exceptionally high and sharp. By the end of the year, the country had recorded nearly 40 million positive tests, totalling 3 per cent of the population and 500,000 deaths. Both numbers are likely gross underestimates given the lack of reporting and testing in rural areas. By mid-year, the economy was reeling and the crisis took a toll on Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s popularity. This led the government to lash out at critics — including ordering Twitter to shut down criticism of the government’s handling of COVID-19.

The attempt to censor criticism on Twitter illustrated the government’s most notable anti-democratic practice of pressuring social media companies to police criticism of the government. It asked Twitter to shut down hundreds of accounts critical of the government — including news organisations and supporters of the farmers’ protests — and investigated Twitter for labelling a BJP spokesman’s tweet misleading. Facebook dithered over-policing hate speech in India for fear of alienating the government and initially blocked a hashtag calling for Modi to resign, while WhatsApp took legal action to prevent the Indian government from tracing accounts.

The attacks on social media are an extension of years of effort by the Modi government to control information on the internet, resulting in a low and declining Freedom on the Net ranking. The attempts to intimidate and muzzle journalists also produced a low rank of 142 in the World Press Freedom Index. While elections remain free and fair, the decline of civil liberties and increasingly open attacks on religious minorities are eroding India’s democracy, with watchdog group Freedom House dropping India’s democracy status to ‘partially free’ for the first time.

These crackdowns are notable for their brazen disregard for international opinion, even at a time when India is becoming more assertive internationally. In Asia, the term Indo-Pacific is replacing the old ‘Asia Pacific’ as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue — composed of the United States, Japan, Australia and India — more actively seeks common ground. And nothing in India’s recent democratic setbacks got in the way of Modi being given a prime speaking slot at US President Joe Biden’s Summit for Democracy.

Globally, Modi won plaudits at the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow for committing to a distant deadline for capping greenhouse emissions. At the same time, India’s decades-old security cooperation with Russia, most notably on weapons systems, received a major boost during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s high-profile visit despite US disapproval. This partnership has resulted in the first major sale, to the Philippines, of a jointly developed Indian–Russian missile system.

It seems that Modi, in his eighth year in office, has learned that democracy activists and editorialists count for little in the halls of diplomacy, and is making the most of India’s strategic location and flexibility.

In domestic politics, the jury is still out on the BJP. Elections in various states in May 2021 showed it is yet to penetrate much beyond its core regions in the north and west, but also demonstrated the continued weakness of the main opposition Indian National Congress. Many BJP-ruled states are scheduled to hold elections in early 2022, including the largest state in the country, Uttar Pradesh.

While opinion polls show the BJP ahead in Uttar Pradesh, other states show a tight contest — often between two or three opposition parties. There are also signs that the BJP’s position is eroding in Uttar Pradesh and a defeat there would provide a catalyst for opposition parties to come together for the national elections in 2024.

The BJP’s prospects of becoming the first party in over 50 years to win a third consecutive term will depend on the performance of the economy, which is still suffering from the effects of the pandemic. To this end, the government has undertaken a massive stimulus that has taken the fiscal deficit to 9.5 per cent of GDP but eschewed any direct relief for the poor. Various liberalisation measures should also be seen in this light, from the privatisation of Air India to the attempted agricultural liberalisation bills.

India’s stock market boomed over the last year with tech start-ups taking off led by mobile payment apps, but US automaker Ford exited the market, India’s 5G rollout was ‘bumpy’ and agricultural reforms were withdrawn. The poor are suffering the most in the COVID-19 recession.

Above all, 2021 was a year in which Modi and the BJP implemented their authoritarian vision of a resurgent Hindu India. Despite a setback at the hands of the farmers’ movements, domestic opposition is divided and international attention is focussed on India’s usefulness in emerging geopolitical alignments. There is little reason to think that the trajectory of Indian politics or foreign policy will change in 2022.

Arun R Swamy is Professor of Political Science at the University of Guam.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2021 in review and the year ahead.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/

Peeling back the onion on India’s farm

protests

24 February 2022

Author: Arun R Swamy, University of Guam

Late last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the repeal of three laws intended to liberalise agricultural trade within the country. The announcement attracted worldwide attention, giving some indication of how enormous a political headache the laws had become.

For over a year, mass protests by farmers camped in and around New Delhi had been an international talking point. Concerns were often borne out by the government’s heavy-handed responses and accusations that the protestors were unpatriotic. That the protestors’ victory was framed as a win for democracy against an autocratic regime is not surprising.

But at its core, the protests were not about democracy. It was about the economic interests of some farmers in maintaining a set of policies dating back to the food shortages of the 1960s when the government promoted hybrid high-yield varieties of rice and wheat with a wide range of subsidies. Over time, the subsidies came to cover agricultural inputs — seeds, fertilisers, power and water — as well as the prices paid to farmers and by consumers. The policy led to a dramatic increase in food production, the so-called Green Revolution, but also brought problems in its wake.

Subsidies to farmers and consumers were closely linked. The purchase of grain by the Food Corporation of India for the Public Distribution System was redistributed to consumers at subsidised prices. While private traders were allowed to purchase grain, trade across state boundaries in grains and other ’essential commodities’ was restricted to prevent profiteering at the expense of food deficit states.

Prices paid to farmers by the government increased until they were well above market prices in many states and constituted a Minimum Support Price (MSP). Farmers preferred to sell their grain to the government and huge grain surpluses rapidly outstripped warehouse capacity.

By the 1980s, the combined cost of food and agricultural subsidies was a significant fiscal burden. Some questioned whether farmers were actually subsidised once trade policies were taken into account. Import restrictions on fertiliser and export restrictions on grain may have represented hidden taxes on farmers that ate up much of the value of the subsidies. But, economists on both left and right decried the size of the subsidies.

The regional, class and caste biases of the subsidies also attracted criticism. The coverage of the Public Distribution System was uneven. Some states expanded it to the countryside, while in others it remained a predominantly urban intervention benefiting the middle class. Farmers who benefited from agricultural subsidies tended to be concentrated in a few regions deemed suitable for high-yield variety seeds. They often came from owner-cultivator castes who formed the middle stratum in the countryside in many parts of the country.

Farming communities were both agents and beneficiaries of agricultural modernisation. Caste solidarity facilitated their political mobilisation. Subsistence farmers, farmers in drier areas growing other crops like onions and agricultural workers from lower castes benefited little from the policies, apart from the increase in food output.

The class bias critique can be exaggerated. While critics often refer to ’rich farmers’, even prosperous Indian farmers are small farmers by global standards and poor by Western ones. The economic challenges faced by farmers, especially in the states characterised by more commercial crops, are significant and farm indebtedness has been blamed for persistent suicides by farmers.

The caste and regional biases are central to understanding the politics of Indian farm prices. Farmers’ organisations have been active politically in many states since the 1970s. But, the proximity of wheat-growing Green Revolution areas to New Delhi and the supporting infrastructure provided by caste organisations gave them special clout in these regions. The Bharatiya Kisan Union, for example, mounts force in the capital whenever policies that threaten the subsidy regime are proposed.

In the 1990s, as India pursued economic liberalisation, dealing with agricultural subsidies became one of the residual issues that successive Indian governments failed to deal with. While food subsidies were reduced, the MSP for key agricultural commodities was expanded.

It was against this backdrop that Modi’s government passed three reform laws in September 2020. The laws allowed farmers to sell their grain anywhere, allowed long-term contracts between farmers and trading companies and removed many agricultural products from the essential commodities list. Farmers’ concerns have focused on the potential impact of these measures on farm prices. Farmers fear that the increased role of private contracts would lead to a gradual erosion of the MSP paid by the government.

While it is tempting to view the farmers’ protest as a blow for democracy against an authoritarian government, the economic pressures to reform the agrarian sector and the political obstacles to do so have been around for decades. The context of farm politics is essential to understand why the protest ensued, why it lasted so long and why farmers won.

Modi’s decision to withdraw the laws was undoubtedly motivated by political concerns, as was the decision of all opposition parties to oppose it. The need for change will not go away, but the Modi government’s characteristic preference for a frontal assault may yield to more incremental steps less likely to provoke another mass demonstration.

Arun R Swamy is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Guam.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/

 

Australia’s Anglo-focussed COVID-19 news coverage

26 February 2022

Author: Ross Tapsell, ANU

Australian news coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic has been largely focussed on the United States and United Kingdom, not Asia and the Pacific.

Between 1 December 2020 and 28 February 2021, 53 per cent of COVID-19 foreign news coverage across selected Australian media outlets studied were of the United States and the United Kingdom. Australian mainstream media coverage of its neighbours in South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific is low in comparison. Only 5 per cent mentioned Southeast Asia and 1.5 per cent mentioned South Asia.

The declining and reduced coverage of the Asia Pacific region is not recent, nor is it a direct consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Australian mainstream media has for the past decade reduced the number of its reporters in the Asia Pacific and has steadily dismantled programs and positions that allowed for reasonable coverage of the region.

The decline in coverage of Australia’s region by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) is of growing concern.

In 2014, the Australian government cut the Australian Network’s AU$223 million (US$160 million) funding over ten years. Sky News was given funds to broadcast the Australia Channel internationally, a 24 hour business channel which would showcase Australian industry and Australia as an investment destination. Graeme Dobell estimates that in 2010, the ABC spent AU$36 million (US$26 million) on international broadcast services. By 2018, the figure dropped to around AU$11 million (US$8 million). The subsequent restructuring of its international division made many journalists with years of experience covering the region redundant. In late 2019, ABC Chair Ita Buttrose called for more funding to ‘increase [the] ABC’s role in the Asia Pacific’.

The ABC’s Asia Pacific Focus program, which was broadcast nationally in Australia and the region, was axed in 2014. Amid ongoing cuts to its budget from the federal government, the ABC’s long-running program Foreign Correspondent has seen original episodes reduced, even though its stories would very often make the nightly news.

The ABC scaled back its foreign bureaus in 2014, including selling off its Southeast Asia office in Bangkok. As COVID-19 cases in India surged to record levels in 2021, the Australian mainstream media’s on-the-ground coverage of the devastation relied heavily on Delhi-based ABC correspondent James Oaten, who was ‘working around the clock’.

In the print media, the Sydney Morning Herald and The Age previously employed a specialist Southeast Asia correspondent as well as an Indonesia correspondent, before the roles were merged in 2018. Both now employ a ‘Southeast Asia’ and a ‘Northeast Asia’ correspondent, both based in Singapore. The Australian’s Jakarta correspondent is expected to cover all of Southeast Asia and South Asia. The Australian Financial Review relies on grant funding to maintain a Southeast Asia correspondent, having previously closed down the bureau in Jakarta.

The decline in the number of Australian journalists in Asia could be filled by a growing number of highly competent and English proficient Asian journalists, commentators and columnists. But research shows that Australian newspapers are rarely even using Reuters or Agence France-Presse stories from these countries, let alone allowing for more Asian writers in their news coverage. Conversely, it is more common to see interviews with US politicians and analysts on the ABC, as well as stories by US and UK writers in Australian newspapers. This suggests that the narrow coverage is more than just a resourcing issue.

For the Australian mainstream media and the COVID-19 pandemic, the United Kingdom and the United States are most likely considered ‘newsworthy’ because it captures an Anglo-Saxon audience or readership. The United Kingdom and the United States are part of the developed world and these countries being unable to handle a pandemic is seen as shocking and makes headlines.

The ABC 7.30 Report introduced a COVID-19 story in the United Kingdom in January 2021 as ‘ripping through the country on a scale difficult to comprehend’. Yet COVID-19 was ‘ripping through’ many other countries, notably Indonesia, South Africa, the Philippines and India. It was only ‘difficult to comprehend’ perhaps because the Western, developed world was expected to be able to handle a global pandemic better than countries in the developing world, including Southeast Asia. This skewed worldview may lead to editorial justification for more reports on the United Kingdom and the United States.

Seen through the prism of how media reports emphasise Australia’s place in the world, the findings show a largely Anglo Saxon-centric coverage. Consequently, lives in the developing world — even those on Australia’s ‘doorstep’ — are underrepresented.

The Australian mainstream media’s COVID-19 coverage reflects a broader issue in Australian society that continues to emphasise the stories of nations with Australia’s ‘colonial ties’ and the plight of white, English-speaking Australians in them.

The declining trend in media expertise on Asia and funding for Asian bureaus is indicative of a wider trend in Australian society in the 21st century previously noted by scholars of Asia–Australia relations. Australia does not systematically prioritise engagement with, or knowledge of, Asia and continues to see itself as overwhelmingly tied to the events, policies and fortunes of those in the United States and the United Kingdom.

Ross Tapsell is a Senior Lecturer at the College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/

 

Combatting Japan’s agricultural worker shortage

3 March 2022

Author: Yusaku Yoshikawa, JIN Corporation

One of the biggest challenges for agriculture in Japan has been its chronic worker shortage. The industry’s jobs-to-applicants ratio is higher than other sectors and during the COVID-19 pandemic it has been a struggle to secure enough workers.

In the latest 2020 Basic Plan for Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas, Japan’s Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) expressed concern about the country’s weakening agricultural production base due to a rapid decrease in farmland and the number of self-employed farmers.

Still, questions remain around how Japan’s agricultural labour shortage is playing out on the ground and what policy solutions might be pursued.

The number of Japanese farmers has been decreasing sharply. The 2020 Census of Agriculture and Forestry in Japan reported that Japan had 1.52 million agricultural workers. In 2015, the number of agricultural workers was 1.97 million, representing a 20 per cent decline in five years. In 2020, agricultural workers consisted of 1.36 million self-employed farmers, and 160,000 employed farmers — defined as those who work for other farmers for more than seven months of the year. This number is less than one third of what it was in 1980 and continues to decline by 50,000 people per year.

The number of farming households has fallen 20 per cent in 10 years, from 2.2 million in 2010 to 1.7 million in 2020. Yet moves to upsize farms has been slow and some farmlands of over 400,000 hectares are being abandoned. Among these 1.7 million farming households, 40 per cent, or about 700,000 of them are relatively small-scale farmers. They possess less than 3000 square metres of operating, cultivated land and often produce below 0.5 million yen (US$44,000) in agricultural product sales.

Japan’s low rate of food self-sufficiency (37 per cent on a caloric basis and 66 per cent on a production value basis in 2021) is often presented as a case in point to justify the need for more farmers. The MAFF basic plan, which aims to ‘improve the nation’s capacity for food self-sufficiency and establish its food security’, typifies this argument. To fulfil these objectives, it aims for a food self-sufficiency rate of 45 per cent on a caloric basis and 75 per cent on a production value basis by 2030.

To achieve this goal, MAFF promised to commit to several measures, including smart agriculture. For example, the use of technologies like drones, robots and a public platform for agricultural data collection have been promoted to save labour and cut production costs.

Some also argue that Japan needs more young self-employed farmers to secure the agriculture industry’s long-term sustainability. Japan’s food production is extremely dependent on elderly workers. The average age of the country’s self-employed farmers is over 65. While approximately 53,700 self-employed farmers joined the industry in 2020, only one third of them (18,400) were below 49 years old. A high turnover rate for young newcomers in the industry is a common phenomenon. As a result, the proportion of young farmers has been decreasing.

To promote the active participation of young people in the industry the Japanese government should create a supportive environment for prospective farmers. Becoming a self-employed farmer requires big investments, especially in terms of funds, farmland and skills. In 2017, Japan’s National Chamber of Agriculture reported in a survey that it took at least two years for almost half of new farmers to start their own farm. The average start-up cost for farming was 5.7 million yen (US$50,000), which is similar to the country’s average annual income for males.

Japan’s agricultural labour shortage also hits farmers hard during the labour-intensive harvest season, when part-time workers are often difficult to find. Because of this, many Japanese farmers are trying to secure foreign workers. COVID-19 made this problem worse by preventing foreign workers from entering the country.

Many foreign agricultural workers in Japan are recruited under the government’s Technical Intern Training Program (TITP). TITP trainees — who tend to come from countries such as Vietnam, the Philippines and China — numbered approximately 350,000 in 2021. Still, the TITP has been criticised as merely a means for farmers to access cheap labour despite the program’s initial aim to foster capacity development among trainees. To attract more foreign workers, improving their treatment, particularly their salary and working conditions, should be of the utmost priority.

Japan’s agricultural worker shortage stems from a number of problems in the Japanese labour market and demographic situation, each of which require different solutions. Given this situation, there is no one simple fix. Instead, the government must take a comprehensive approach towards the issue through smart agriculture, measures to support for young self-employed farmers, the upsizing of farms and measures to improve conditions for foreign agricultural workers.

Yusaku Yoshikawa is an aid consultant at JIN Corporation.

https://www.eastasiaforum.org/

The China–Russia condominium in Kazakhstan

4 March 2022

Author: Loro Horta, Dili

In early January 2022, Kazakhstan experienced its worst riots in recent history. Many observers argued that the riots could undermine Chinese interests in this resource-rich country. But the situation is far more complex.

Over the past decade, China has emerged as an important economic player in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. By 2016, China’s largest state-owned oil company, Sinopec, along with a few other companies, had invested over US$20 billion in the Kazakh oil and gas fields. In 2019, Chinese investment in Kazakhstan totalled US$27.6 billion.

Two-way trade between China and Kazakhstan surpassed US$15.4 billion in 2020, with China importing primarily oil and gas and Kazakhstan importing textiles, machinery and metals. In 2020, China accounted for over 18 per cent of Kazakhstan’s foreign trade and there were more than 700 joint companies.

Traditionally, the Kazakh elite was educated in the former Soviet Union. While some have pursued studies in the United States and Europe, the number of scholarships provided by China is far greater than those provided by any other country. Several Kazakh ministers and senior security officials have studied in China. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is fluent in Chinese and served in China as a diplomat. Beijing has invested significant resources in cultivating the Kazakh elite and this investment has paid off.

China’s main interest in Kazakhstan is access to the country’s vast energy supplies. Oil and gas imports from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, such as Turkmenistan, reduce China’s dependence on the Middle East. Central Asian energy routes also allow China to bypass the Malacca Strait in case of conflict with the United States. Trade and investment have gained China powerful friends among the Kazakh elite and ensured the protection of its interests. But among the Kazakh population, Chinese soft power remains weak. There have been several anti-Chinese riots in Kazakhstan in the past decade. Chinese policies in Xinjiang also contribute to negative views of China. Ethnic Uighurs in Kazakhstan account for 1.5 per cent of the population.

In contrast to China’s economic success, Russia’s economic presence has seen a significant decline, but Russian soft power remains somewhat high. Strong ties between Kazakhstan and Russia date back to the Tsarist monarchy and the Soviet period. Over 20 per cent of Kazakhstan’s population is of Slavic ancestry. According to UNESCO, an estimated 60,000 Kazakhs were studying in Russia in 2019, while 15,000 were studying in China. Russian language and cultural influence remains high. Russian TV stations are far more popular than local stations.

Yet there are anti-Russian sentiments among the Kazakh population. Some fear that Russia may annex territories in Northern Kazakhstan, where the majority of the population is of Slavic origin.

Knowing the limits of its influence in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, Beijing has focused on the economic front and energy resources, deferring to Moscow on security and political matters. Beijing has been careful not to upset Russia as an important ally. Moscow has in turn allowed China to claim a greater share of Kazakh energy resources.

Central Asian leaders believe that Russia would only intervene militarily to defend their regimes in case of internal turmoil. Russian troops deployed to Tajikistan in the 1990s during Tajikistan’s civil war and in 2010 Kyrgyzstan requested Russian military assistance to deal with internal instability. China, on the other hand, has limited itself to providing diplomatic and financial support.

Following the January 2022 riots in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh government requested Russian assistance to quell the disturbance. But, by the time Russian troops were deployed, the Kazakh government already had the situation largely under control. The presence of Russian troops served more as a powerful deterrence to internal opponents, rather than an operational necessity. Over 2000 troops were deployed under the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russia-led military alliance. The troop deployment demonstrated to internal opponents that the government has powerful allies around its borders.

Kazakhstan’s increasing dependence on China and Russia may further erode US influence in the country and impact its billion-dollar investments in the energy sector. But Kazakhstan will continue to court US, European and Japanese investment as a way to mitigate its excessive dependence on China and Russia. Kazakh leaders have often tolerated Western criticism over human rights to preserve lucrative economic ties. Kazakhstan is likely to continue this policy but with much less room to manoeuvre.

Some Western observers believe that the January riots may undermine Chinese influence in Kazakhstan. But it may have the opposite effect. The rapid deployment of Russian troops further demonstrated to Kazakh leaders that Russia is the ultimate guarantor of their security. During the crisis, China limited itself to statements of solidarity and offers of economic assistance. Central Asian leaders know that they need the assistance of both powers. Under the China–Russia condominium, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and other Central Asian leaders seem to be secure in power.

Loro Horta is a public servant based in Dili and is a former Timor-Leste ambassador to Cuba.

Tokayev wins the battle but the war is not over in Kazakhstan

26 February 2022

Author: Gennady Rudkevich, Georgia College

The main result of the January 2022 Kazakhstan protests was to solidify the transfer of power from Nursultan Nazarbayev to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev that began with the latter’s assumption of the Kazakh presidency in 2019. While there are still many unknowns relating to the protests, which led to at least 225 deaths, President Tokayev responded by initiating a crackdown against top Nazarbayev supporters and promising to enact major economic reforms. 

Tokayev’s ability to forestall another protest wave will depend on his ability to distance himself from the corruption associated with the Nazarbayev regime and to create a modern welfare state. 

The protests began in the western city of Zhanaozen after the government lifted a cap on liquefied petroleum gas prices, aggravated by pandemic-related labour unrest and long-term grievances relating to inequality. The protests quickly spread across the country, with the most violent clashes occurring in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city. The speed with which the protests spread and the degree of violence unleashed by both pro- and anti-government forces caught many off-guard, including President Tokayev. 

The survival of Tokayev’s regime was far from guaranteed until it counter-attacked with significant force and (primarily Russian) Collective Security Treaty Organisation peacekeepers were rapidly deployed. It wasn’t long before Kazakh officials began talking about a foiled coup. Despite limited evidence linking the violence in Almaty to Nazarbayev supporters, some of his loyalists were arrested. 

While Nazarbayev’s personal involvement is still unclear, his former prime minister and security chief, Karim Massimov, was charged with treason. Removing Massimov, whose background and ties with China made him a potential rival for the presidency, allows Tokayev to reshape Kazakh society without facing elite dissent. 

The protests in Kazakhstan were based on local grievances, which were aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. While popular discontent has been brewing in Kazakhstan for years, the economic consequences of the pandemic might have pushed many otherwise politically apathetic citizens onto the streets. 

When the effects of the pandemic wane, the government will be better positioned to use its substantial energy resources to pacify much of the discontent. Whether those resources will be used to deal with Kazakhstan’s inequality is less certain. Strengthening the rule of law without giving a greater role to civil society and a more independent press has rarely worked in similar countries.

If it is true that Nazarbayev’s loyalists played a major role in unleashing the violence, then the crackdown against those loyalists and Russia’s open support for the Tokayev regime can be used to distance Tokayev from the corruption associated with Nazarbayev and his inner circle. There seems to be genuine popular support behind ‘de-Nazarbayevification’. Cracking down on corruption carried out by Nazarbayev’s supporters should buy Tokayev enough good will to make people overlook his regime’s own shortcomings in that area.

The Kazakh public’s perception of the crackdown is harder to gauge. Those closest to the protesters are aware of the violence used by the authorities, including against those protesting peacefully. This is likely to create tensions in Almaty for the foreseeable future. The popular desire for stability and the government’s control over information should limit the damage to Tokayev’s legitimacy as long as he is able to return a sense of normalcy. If the crackdown expands beyond Nazarbayev’s inner circle, the Kazakh government will have traded short-term stability for long-term resentment. 

Russia’s role in ending the protests will remain a source of anger in nationalist circles. Russian politicians talking about Kazakhstan in terms previously reserved for Ukraine will not be well received. But the mostly symbolic use of Russian peacekeepers and their quick withdrawal should minimise the degree of anti-Russian enmity. 

As Russia wields its newfound influence behind closed doors, most Kazakh citizens will focus on more immediate concerns. Given the substantial ethnic Russian minority in northern Kazakhstan and Russia’s role as the guarantor of the Tokayev regime, Kazakh elites will be careful not to add fuel to the anti-Russian sentiment. 

Several of the causes of the Kazakh protests — the economic consequences of the pandemic and the corruption linked to Nazarbayev — won’t have the same effect in the future if Tokayev continues his current path. The crackdown against the main Nazarbayev allies should prove to be popular and the Kazakh government is unlikely to cut back on social protections for the foreseeable future. 

The large-scale violence against Almaty protesters will create lasting local problems, but the broader fallout should be limited. Russia’s role in the protests will harm Tokayev’s legitimacy with the nationalist segment of the population, but that damage should decrease over time. Removing the proximate causes of the protests doesn’t address the systemic problems of inequality and corruption, neither of which are likely to be resolved in the context of Kazakhstan’s current political model. Another wave of protests based on a future misstep by the government cannot be ruled out. Protests have already resumed in Zhanaozen, this time over a lack of jobs.

Gennady Rudkevich is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia College.