The China–Russia condominium in Kazakhstan
Author: Loro Horta, Dili
In early January 2022, Kazakhstan experienced its worst riots in recent history. Many observers argued that the riots could undermine Chinese interests in this resource-rich country. But the situation is far more complex.
Over the past decade, China has emerged as an important economic player in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. By 2016, China’s largest state-owned oil company, Sinopec, along with a few other companies, had invested over US$20 billion in the Kazakh oil and gas fields. In 2019, Chinese investment in Kazakhstan totalled US$27.6 billion.
Two-way trade between China and Kazakhstan surpassed US$15.4 billion in 2020, with China importing primarily oil and gas and Kazakhstan importing textiles, machinery and metals. In 2020, China accounted for over 18 per cent of Kazakhstan’s foreign trade and there were more than 700 joint companies.
Traditionally, the Kazakh elite was educated in the former Soviet Union. While some have pursued studies in the United States and Europe, the number of scholarships provided by China is far greater than those provided by any other country. Several Kazakh ministers and senior security officials have studied in China. President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is fluent in Chinese and served in China as a diplomat. Beijing has invested significant resources in cultivating the Kazakh elite and this investment has paid off.
China’s main interest in Kazakhstan is access to the country’s vast energy supplies. Oil and gas imports from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, such as Turkmenistan, reduce China’s dependence on the Middle East. Central Asian energy routes also allow China to bypass the Malacca Strait in case of conflict with the United States. Trade and investment have gained China powerful friends among the Kazakh elite and ensured the protection of its interests. But among the Kazakh population, Chinese soft power remains weak. There have been several anti-Chinese riots in Kazakhstan in the past decade. Chinese policies in Xinjiang also contribute to negative views of China. Ethnic Uighurs in Kazakhstan account for 1.5 per cent of the population.
In contrast to China’s economic success, Russia’s economic presence has seen a significant decline, but Russian soft power remains somewhat high. Strong ties between Kazakhstan and Russia date back to the Tsarist monarchy and the Soviet period. Over 20 per cent of Kazakhstan’s population is of Slavic ancestry. According to UNESCO, an estimated 60,000 Kazakhs were studying in Russia in 2019, while 15,000 were studying in China. Russian language and cultural influence remains high. Russian TV stations are far more popular than local stations.
Yet there are anti-Russian sentiments among the Kazakh population. Some fear that Russia may annex territories in Northern Kazakhstan, where the majority of the population is of Slavic origin.
Knowing the limits of its influence in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, Beijing has focused on the economic front and energy resources, deferring to Moscow on security and political matters. Beijing has been careful not to upset Russia as an important ally. Moscow has in turn allowed China to claim a greater share of Kazakh energy resources.
Central Asian leaders believe that Russia would only intervene militarily to defend their regimes in case of internal turmoil. Russian troops deployed to Tajikistan in the 1990s during Tajikistan’s civil war and in 2010 Kyrgyzstan requested Russian military assistance to deal with internal instability. China, on the other hand, has limited itself to providing diplomatic and financial support.
Following the January 2022 riots in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh government requested Russian assistance to quell the disturbance. But, by the time Russian troops were deployed, the Kazakh government already had the situation largely under control. The presence of Russian troops served more as a powerful deterrence to internal opponents, rather than an operational necessity. Over 2000 troops were deployed under the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russia-led military alliance. The troop deployment demonstrated to internal opponents that the government has powerful allies around its borders.
Kazakhstan’s increasing dependence on China and Russia may further erode US influence in the country and impact its billion-dollar investments in the energy sector. But Kazakhstan will continue to court US, European and Japanese investment as a way to mitigate its excessive dependence on China and Russia. Kazakh leaders have often tolerated Western criticism over human rights to preserve lucrative economic ties. Kazakhstan is likely to continue this policy but with much less room to manoeuvre.
Some Western observers believe that the January riots may undermine Chinese influence in Kazakhstan. But it may have the opposite effect. The rapid deployment of Russian troops further demonstrated to Kazakh leaders that Russia is the ultimate guarantor of their security. During the crisis, China limited itself to statements of solidarity and offers of economic assistance. Central Asian leaders know that they need the assistance of both powers. Under the China–Russia condominium, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and other Central Asian leaders seem to be secure in power.
Loro Horta is a public servant based in Dili and is a former Timor-Leste ambassador to Cuba.
Tokayev wins the battle but the war is not over in Kazakhstan
Author: Gennady Rudkevich, Georgia College
The main result of the January 2022 Kazakhstan protests was to solidify the transfer of power from Nursultan Nazarbayev to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev that began with the latter’s assumption of the Kazakh presidency in 2019. While there are still many unknowns relating to the protests, which led to at least 225 deaths, President Tokayev responded by initiating a crackdown against top Nazarbayev supporters and promising to enact major economic reforms.
Tokayev’s ability to forestall another protest wave will depend on his ability to distance himself from the corruption associated with the Nazarbayev regime and to create a modern welfare state.
The protests began in the western city of Zhanaozen after the government lifted a cap on liquefied petroleum gas prices, aggravated by pandemic-related labour unrest and long-term grievances relating to inequality. The protests quickly spread across the country, with the most violent clashes occurring in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city. The speed with which the protests spread and the degree of violence unleashed by both pro- and anti-government forces caught many off-guard, including President Tokayev.
The survival of Tokayev’s regime was far from guaranteed until it counter-attacked with significant force and (primarily Russian) Collective Security Treaty Organisation peacekeepers were rapidly deployed. It wasn’t long before Kazakh officials began talking about a foiled coup. Despite limited evidence linking the violence in Almaty to Nazarbayev supporters, some of his loyalists were arrested.
While Nazarbayev’s personal involvement is still unclear, his former prime minister and security chief, Karim Massimov, was charged with treason. Removing Massimov, whose background and ties with China made him a potential rival for the presidency, allows Tokayev to reshape Kazakh society without facing elite dissent.
The protests in Kazakhstan were based on local grievances, which were aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic. While popular discontent has been brewing in Kazakhstan for years, the economic consequences of the pandemic might have pushed many otherwise politically apathetic citizens onto the streets.
When the effects of the pandemic wane, the government will be better positioned to use its substantial energy resources to pacify much of the discontent. Whether those resources will be used to deal with Kazakhstan’s inequality is less certain. Strengthening the rule of law without giving a greater role to civil society and a more independent press has rarely worked in similar countries.
If it is true that Nazarbayev’s loyalists played a major role in unleashing the violence, then the crackdown against those loyalists and Russia’s open support for the Tokayev regime can be used to distance Tokayev from the corruption associated with Nazarbayev and his inner circle. There seems to be genuine popular support behind ‘de-Nazarbayevification’. Cracking down on corruption carried out by Nazarbayev’s supporters should buy Tokayev enough good will to make people overlook his regime’s own shortcomings in that area.
The Kazakh public’s perception of the crackdown is harder to gauge. Those closest to the protesters are aware of the violence used by the authorities, including against those protesting peacefully. This is likely to create tensions in Almaty for the foreseeable future. The popular desire for stability and the government’s control over information should limit the damage to Tokayev’s legitimacy as long as he is able to return a sense of normalcy. If the crackdown expands beyond Nazarbayev’s inner circle, the Kazakh government will have traded short-term stability for long-term resentment.
Russia’s role in ending the protests will remain a source of anger in nationalist circles. Russian politicians talking about Kazakhstan in terms previously reserved for Ukraine will not be well received. But the mostly symbolic use of Russian peacekeepers and their quick withdrawal should minimise the degree of anti-Russian enmity.
As Russia wields its newfound influence behind closed doors, most Kazakh citizens will focus on more immediate concerns. Given the substantial ethnic Russian minority in northern Kazakhstan and Russia’s role as the guarantor of the Tokayev regime, Kazakh elites will be careful not to add fuel to the anti-Russian sentiment.
Several of the causes of the Kazakh protests — the economic consequences of the pandemic and the corruption linked to Nazarbayev — won’t have the same effect in the future if Tokayev continues his current path. The crackdown against the main Nazarbayev allies should prove to be popular and the Kazakh government is unlikely to cut back on social protections for the foreseeable future.
The large-scale violence against Almaty protesters will create lasting local problems, but the broader fallout should be limited. Russia’s role in the protests will harm Tokayev’s legitimacy with the nationalist segment of the population, but that damage should decrease over time. Removing the proximate causes of the protests doesn’t address the systemic problems of inequality and corruption, neither of which are likely to be resolved in the context of Kazakhstan’s current political model. Another wave of protests based on a future misstep by the government cannot be ruled out. Protests have already resumed in Zhanaozen, this time over a lack of jobs.
Gennady Rudkevich is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Georgia College.
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