Iran's Raisi pokes Washington's eye from Latin America

Analysis: The Iranian president's tour of Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua is designed to show that Tehran has strategic ties in the US's 'backyard' and that its influence is not limited to the Middle East.

Analysis
Giorgio Cafiero
13 June, 2023

On 11 June, President Ebrahim Raisi kicked off his first Latin America tour since coming to office. His three stops will be in Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. The left-wing governments of these countries share Iran’s desire to challenge US hegemony in the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East.

In many ways, this tour is highly symbolic. One of the aims of Raisi and the Islamic Republic is to send a strong message to the US: Iran has friends in its ‘backyard’, and they are willing to defy Washington.

“Raisi wants to show that his administration has strategic ties in the US’s southern hemisphere and that Tehran’s axis of resistance is not limited to the Middle East,” explained Dr Sanam Vakil, deputy director of the Middle East North Africa program at Chatham House, in an interview with The New Arab.

“For Raisi personally the trip gives him a few more stamps in his little-used passport and offers him an opportunity to show some foreign policy influence inside the ever competitive and divided Iranian system.”

Iran’s relationships with anti-hegemonic actors in Latin America should be analysed within the context of South-South solidarity. As Iran and certain Latin American countries share a history of struggling with US sanctions and Washington’s interference in their internal affairs, they have much common cause in terms of pushing for a more multipolar and less West-centric world order.


"Raisi wants to show that his administration has strategic ties in the US's southern hemisphere and that Tehran's axis of resistance is not limited to the Middle East"

Tehran’s ties with Caracas, Managua, and Havana are not new. During Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency (2005-13), the Islamic Republic put energy into its ties with Latin America’s left-wing governments. Ahmadinejad held meetings with Bolivia’s Evo Morales, Brazil’s Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Cuba’s Fidel and Raul Castro, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa, Nicaragua’s Daniel Ortega, and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez.

Iran became much less focused on Latin America when Hassan Rouhani was in office (2013-21). But now Raisi’s administration is taking steps to put energy back into Tehran’s Latin America foreign policy.

“This is a continuation of a policy begun under the Ahmadinejad administration to show the US that if it insists on keeping a large military presence in the Persian Gulf, Iran can also play in the US backyard,” said Barbara Slavin, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center in Washington and a lecturer in international affairs at George Washington University, in an interview with TNA.

“We have seen a pattern in Iranian foreign policy in which hardline elements seek to prove that Iran can prosper without relations with the United States, by investing in political and economic relations with states in the Global South,” Dr Trita Parsi, the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told TNA.

“The Ahmadinejad government invested heavily in Latin America, while the Rouhani government focused primarily on the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)], the US, and Europe. Iran under Raisi [is] shifting back to a strategy centred on non-Western countries.”
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Scoring rhetorical points and poking the US in its eyes in the company of countries in the Western Hemisphere is one of the key motivations behind Raisi’s Latin America tour.

“Such performances are also a way for the Islamic Republic to try to promote the narrative, at home and abroad, that it is not isolated, and that its resistance policies have support all over the world,” Dr Thomas Juneau, an associate professor at the University of Ottawa’s Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, said in a TNA interview.

Venezuela

Caracas is likely the most important leg of Raisi’s tour. Of these three Latin American nations, Iran’s ties to Venezuela are the most substantive. Iranian-Venezuelan cooperation is across multiple domains, including energy, agriculture, education, health, science, technology, mining, petrochemicals, tourism, shipping, and culture.

While in Caracas on 12 June, the Iranian president said that his visit to Caracas is aimed at boosting bilateral trade from $3 billion to $20 billion. During his visit, Iran and Venezuela announced 25 new deals between the two countries. Raisi told the press that the Islamic Republic and Venezuela share “common interests, common visions, and common enemies” while declaring that “the relationship between Iran and Venezuela is not a normal diplomatic relationship, but a strategic relationship”.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro asserted that “Iran is playing a starring role as one of the most important emerging powers in the new world” and that the two nations together will be “invincible”.

Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi attend the Venezuela - Iran Joint Commission in Caracas, Venezuela on 12 June 2023. [Getty]

When looking at the history of warm relations between Tehran and Caracas, a good starting point is 1960. That year Iran and Venezuela became two of OPEC’s five Founding Fathers. Fast forward to the 21st century and during the years in which Ahmadinejad and Chavez were in office, there was a lot of solidarity in the bilateral relationship.

When Ahmadinejad made his fourth visit to the South American country in June 2009, Chavez hailed him as a “gladiator of anti-imperialist struggles” and condemned Israel as “the murderous arm of the Yankee empire”.

The relationship has gone beyond warm words and strong rhetoric. During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, institutions such as Venezuela Banco Internacional de Desarrollo and the Banco Binacional Irani-Venezolano enabled the Iranians to make investments in Venezuela, which gave Iran a foothold in the Southern American country’s banking system.

Tehran and Venezuela have entered energy deals with the Iranians repairing refineries and other energy facilities in Venezuela. The two countries have done oil swaps. There have also been direct flights between Caracas and Tehran. Last year, Maduro met with Iran’s supreme leader in Tehran and the two countries signed a 20-year cooperation plan.

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A 2010 Pentagon report claimed that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) was deepening its influence in Venezuela, though Chavez denied the validity of that report. Also, last year, the Israeli Defence Minister accused Iran of sending armed drones to the South American country.

Regarding the true nature of military ties between Tehran and Caracas, what constitutes fact versus fiction is not always clear. Most of the hype about Venezuela’s ties to Iran’s military and Hezbollah comes from anti-Iran neo-conservative hawks in the US and right-wing Venezuelans who lobby Washington to take a tougher stance against Caracas.

Both groups frequently exaggerate the security threat to the US posed by the Iran-Venezuela relationship. As Slavin explained, “[Iranian-Venezuelan] military cooperation is mostly token”.

Nicaragua

Iran’s relationship with Nicaragua’s left-wing government strengthened significantly in the 2000s. During that decade, Iran and Nicaragua reopened their embassies following the withdrawal of their ambassadors in 1990. Ahmadinejad came to Nicaragua in January 2007 and toured the country’s shantytowns with Ortega. “We have to give each other a hand,” said the Iranian president when addressing Tehran-Managua relations. “We have common interests, common enemies and common goals.”

Two months later, Iran and Venezuela promised Nicaragua a $350 million investment in a deepwater seaport near Monkey Point on the country’s Atlantic coast along with highways, rails, and pipelines. Although the Iranians did not end up delivering, the plans showcased the extent to which Tehran sought more publicised ties with Managua.

"Iran under Raisi [is] shifting back to a strategy centred on non-Western countries"

“In our Iranian brothers we have a people, a government, a president willing to join with the Nicaraguan people in the great battle against poverty,” said Ortega during Ahmadinejad’s January 2007 visit to Nicaragua.

In September of that year, Nicaragua’s chief diplomat went to Iran and met with his Iranian, Cuban, and Syrian counterparts. That trip came three months after Ortega paid his first visit to Iran, from where he called for the establishment of a new global order to replace capitalism and imperialism.

Raisi’s visit to Nicaragua this week, which will be the first by an Iranian president since Ahmadinejad came to the country in 2007, will build on a visit paid to the impoverished Central American country by a high-level delegation led by Iran’s minister of petroleum, Javad Owji, in May 2022, and another by Iran’s foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian earlier this year.

Last year, Owji’s delegation signed a host of agreements with the Nicaraguan government across many domains from agriculture to oil, technology transfers to trade, and livestock to construction. One of the agreements entails the Iranians providing Nicaragua with technical support for the expansion of a refinery in the country. The two sides signed three memoranda of understanding and their discussions addressed ways to make their bilateral circumvent US sanctions.

The Ahmadinejad government invested heavily in Latin America. [Getty]

During that visit, Ortega expressed gratitude to the Islamic Republic for being in solidarity with “a country like Nicaragua, a small people in its territory, which has been invaded since the Spanish colonizers to the Yankee expansionists”.

When Tehran’s top diplomat was in Nicaragua in February 2023, just before going off to Venezuela, he met with Ortega, blasted Washington’s sanctions on Tehran, and paid a visit to a Nicaraguan oil refinery.

Notwithstanding political tensions between Washington and Managua, Nicaragua’s economy remains dependent on US markets for its exports. What remains to be seen is how much Iran and the Central American country can bolster their trade links.

Cuba

The Islamic Republic’s relationship with Cuba goes back to 1979 when Castro’s government embraced the Islamic revolution. Although Havana and Baghdad’s close ties required Castro to calibrate his island nation’s relationship with Tehran amid the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), the end of that conflict enabled Cuba and Iran to grow closer.

Both belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, Iran and Cuba have shared anti-imperialist attitudes, which have created much warmth in their bilateral relationship with the two countries frequently standing up for the other in international fora.

During Mohammad Khatami’s presidency, Tehran provided the island nation with an annual credit line of €20 million, which increased to €200 million under Ahmadinejad.

"Over the years, there has been consistent exaggeration in some circles in the US, especially those holding more hawkish views, about Iran's presence and influence in Latin America"

In 2001, Castro paid his first visit to Iran. While in Tehran, the Cuban leader received an honorary degree from Tarbiat Modares University. “As you have witnessed, the Islamic Revolution has always sided with Cuba in its conflict with the United States, since we believe that your struggle is a just one,” said Ayatollah Ali Khamenei during Castro’s visit.

“The secret of the resistance of our revolution against the pressure exerted on us by the global arrogance [the US] is the strong belief of our people, who adhere to Islam, and its principles and values.”

Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the Finlay Institute of Vaccines in Havana and the Pasteur Institute of Iran jointly developed the Soberana-2 vaccine (known in Iran as the Pasteurcovac), which was reportedly 91.2 percent effective. Iranian authorities gave the jab emergency-use approval and, according to Cuban state-run media, Iran quickly became the first country aside from Cuba to produce the Soberana-2 vaccine on a serious scale.

Last month, a Cuban delegation came to Iran, resulting in the two countries signing 13 agreements in the domains of agriculture, banking, biotechnology, healthcare, sports, and trade.

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Beyond the rhetoric and symbolism

Iran clearly shares many geopolitical interests with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. There is much ideational synergy between these four countries. Yet, the reality is that Iran remains a heavily sanctioned country facing major economic problems at home. Therefore, some experts doubt that Iran’s economic ties with these three Latin American countries will expand much as an outcome of Raisi’s tour.

“Even during [Ahmadinejad’s] presidency, when there was a lot of emphasis on expanding relations with Latin American countries and many economic agreements were concluded, some of them were not implemented,” Dr Javad Heiran-Nia, the director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, told TNA.

“It seems that increasing economic and military cooperation is on the agenda during this tour. Whether all of them will be implemented is doubtful.”

Other experts have similar assessments. When asked what to expect from Raisi’s visits to these Latin American countries, Slavin responded, “A bunch of announcements about economic and other cooperation that will not amount to much in the future”.

Dr Juneau answered the same question by saying, “Promises of cooperation among anti-American actors, flashy rhetoric criticising American policies in Latin American and beyond, but in practice very few concrete deliverables”.

Kenneth Katzman, a Senior Fellow at the Soufan Center, told TNA, “You might see some announcements of Iran building some factories here and there. But, even if that’s accomplished, these are going to be very small facilities [which are] reasonably symbolic. It’s not going to develop the economies of any of these places”.

Some experts doubt that Iran's economic ties with these three Latin American countries will expand much as an outcome of Raisi's tour. [Getty]

The view from Washington

Even though Raisi’s Latin America tour will probably prove to be more about messaging, expressions of solidarity, and anti-US rhetoric, there are voices in Washington who have spent years raising alarm over Tehran’s clout in the Western Hemisphere.

Yet, in contrast to the last two Republican administrations - Bush 43 (2001-2009) and Trump (2017-21) - the Biden White House is not keen on making a huge fuss over Iranian inroads into Latin America.

“Over the years, there has been consistent exaggeration in some circles in the US, especially those holding more hawkish views, about Iran’s presence and influence in Latin America,” Dr Juneau told TNA. “In general, the Biden administration has not engaged in threat inflation about Iran as much as some of its predecessors. Ideally, its response to Raisi’s Latin American tour should be to mostly ignore it.”

Dr Parsi explained that “the Biden administration does not appear to buy into the hysteria among some Republicans who wildly inflate Iran's influence in Latin America and portray Tehran as a threat to US influence in the Western Hemisphere”.

Ultimately, it is important to avoid reading too much into Raisi’s Latin American tour. Although Iran does have influence in Latin America and Tehran’s relationships with a handful of anti-hegemonic actors in the region are brotherly, it would be inaccurate to interpret these visits and meetings as threatening the security of Western countries.

“You might see more announcements of Iranian investment,” Katzman told TNA. “You might see some oil swapping arrangements [with Venezuela and] possible announcements of upcoming ports visits by Iranian ships. Some of these may happen, but they’re not a threat to the US in any way. They are just purely symbolic acts of defiance.”

Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics.
Follow him on Twitter: @GiorgioCafiero

Israel's blockade of Gaza: Indefinitely caging Palestinians in a state of non-life

Analysis: Sixteen years of Israel's blockade of Gaza have shown that the policy has little to do with security and more to do with economic warfare, collective punishment, separation, and bargaining.

Analysis
Muhammad Shehada
14 June, 2023

In 1995, the New York Times eagerly interviewed Palestinians in Gaza to highlight the freedoms the Oslo peace accords had brought them.

Instead of an optimistic feeling of joy and progress, "prison" was a common word Palestinians used to describe their confinement in the small densely populated enclave and inability to move to - or even visit - the occupied West Bank.

Israel’s closure of Gaza has been incrementally developed since at least the early 1990s. While Israel was making peace with the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) with one hand, in 1993 it was building a separation barrier around Gaza with the other.

Even when the White House had pressured Israel to open a safe passage between Gaza and the West Bank and a Palestinian airport in Gaza in 1998-1999, the Israeli government closed both down about a year later at the earliest possibility.

Years of fluctuating restrictions and closures led a prominent Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling to conclude in 2003 that Israel has turned Gaza into “the world’s largest concentration camp ever”.

"Israel's closure of Gaza has been incrementally developed since at least the early 1990s. While Israel was making peace with the PLO with one hand, it was building a separation barrier around Gaza with the other"

Apartheid in action: A blockade before Hamas

When former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s unilateral “disengagement plan” came up in 2004, its stated goal was all about demography rather than security.

Sharon’s Deputy, Ehud Olmert, bluntly explained that a solution to the conflict and occupation is unlikely, which means Palestinians might eventually move towards “a struggle for one-man-one-vote,” and that would be “a much cleaner struggle, a much more popular struggle – and ultimately a much more powerful one”.

Hence, Olmert emphasised the need for addressing “the demographic issue with the utmost seriousness and resolve” by unilaterally cutting Gaza off from the equation.

Furthermore, Sharon’s top aide asserted that the Gaza disengagement primarily aimed to “freeze the peace process” and prevent “the establishment of a Palestinian state”. This made it necessary for Israel to isolate about half the occupied Palestinian population to prevent a one-state solution where Jews become a minority, and locking Gazans up in a cage became the solution.

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In fact, the policy’s original name was the ‘Separation Plan’, but Sharon had to change the name because “separation sounded bad, particularly in English, because it evoked apartheid”. Olmert also made clear that the disengagement would allow Israel to strike Gaza’s population even harder.

Indeed, Israel retained full control over Gaza’s air, water, and ground spaces as well as telecommunications, electricity and the entry and exit of indispensable goods after the ‘withdrawal’.

Instead of opening Gaza to the world and making it into ‘Singapore’, Israel’s disengagement plan deliberately and openly sought to isolate the enclave, including cutting Gaza’s labour force from Israel and denying Gazans access to the West Bank.

This exacerbated an economic recession from Israel’s previous years-long restrictions that the World Bank called “among the worst in modern history”.

Israel has launched at least four large-scale military attacks on the Gaza Strip since 2009. [Getty]


The blockade: Putting Gaza on a diet, indefinitely

Israel’s blockade on Gaza is remembered to be a result of Hamas seizing power from the Palestinian Authority (PA) in June 2007. However, the ongoing closure of Gaza started more than a year before and the siege was officially announced three months after Hamas' takeover. The naval blockade wasn’t declared until 2009.

Israel’s preceding decade-long isolation and restrictions on Gaza, culminating with a destructive ‘disengagement’, dramatically rendered the PA dysfunctional and created a dire humanitarian situation.

This in turn helped Hamas significantly in the 2006 parliamentary elections, an outcome Israel immediately used to further besiege Gaza. “There is no question that the disengagement from Gaza strengthened the Hamas and weakened [the PA]” admitted the IDF former Chief of Staff, Moshe Ya’alon, in 2006.

"Palestinians are stuck in a permanent state of non-life, or as Gazans call it 'slow death'"

Following Hamas’ win, then PM Olmert closed Gaza’s commercial crossing, Karni, and imposed a series of sanctions on the PA including withholding its tax revenues, calling the PA “a terrorist authority”.

His top aide, Dov Weisglass, then explained “the idea is to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not to make them die of hunger”.

Upon Hamas’ takeover in June, Israel sealed all of Gaza’s border crossings and reduced the fishing space from 20 to 6 nautical miles, but it wasn’t until September that the Israeli government declared Gaza a besieged “hostile entity” after the Islamic Jihad group fired projectiles on Israel.

It was never about Hamas

The blockade’s stated goal was “economic warfare” to collectively punish the population in order to turn them against Hamas and end the group’s rule. Israel even devised a calorie count of the bare minimum amount of imports needed to prevent Gazans from dying from hunger.

However, in 2008, it became clear Israel was starving, isolating, and immiserating Gazans with one hand while preventing Hamas’ collapse with the other. That year, PM Olmert admitted to transferring hundreds of millions of shekels every month to the Hamas government, mostly through currency exchanges for smuggled money.

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In 2009, Olmert refrained from dealing a “knockout blow” to Hamas during Operation Cast Lead because Israel didn’t want to reoccupy Gaza or hand it back to the PA; a strategy PM Netanyahu later made explicit in 2019, saying “I won't give [Gaza] to [PA president] Abu Mazen”.

Over the years, Israel developed a solid transactional relationship with Hamas by which the latter polices the blockade and prevents attacks on Israel during times of ceasefire and in return Israel eases some of its restrictions on Gaza.

In 2012, this relationship prompted Haaretz’s editor-in-chief to write “Israel Killed Its Subcontractor in Gaza” in reference to the Qassam Brigades leader whose troops were ensuring calm for Israel.

The majority of Gaza's children have never known a life without Israel's blockade. [Getty]


All about separation and isolation

In 2009, Hamas’ control and Gaza’s blockade allowed Israel to make official one of its most controversial policies that violate the Oslo Accords into virtual obsolescence. By military order 1650, Israel declared any Gazan in the West Bank an “illegal alien” and an “infiltrator” subject to arrest, deportation, or imprisonment for up to seven years.

Since 2010, Israeli authorities began to openly use the term ‘Separation Policy’ as a legal justification for restrictions on Gazans’ freedom of movement.

In 2019, Israel even started to allow Qatari cash to enter Gaza, which was intended to help needy families and provide aid, fuel, and government salaries.

Israel said it sought to stabilise Gaza, conditioned on maintaining calm, but the move had another dimension; to fuel the division and separation between Gaza and West Bank.

As PM Benjamin Netanyahu bragged “whoever is against a Palestinian state should be for” transferring the funds to Gaza to “keep Palestinians divided”.

This made clear that Hamas has been more of a pretext to justify Israel’s escalating collective punishment and isolation of Gaza rather than the actual reason for these extreme measures.

"Israel's siege has no clear endgame. There is no certain military objective or condition that, if achieved, would lead Israel to lift the blockade"

A permanent state of non-life

Israel’s transactional relationship with Hamas is limited to preventing Gaza’s total collapse, without allowing it to ever live or prosper.

Netanyahu’s then Defence Minister Avigdor Lieberman put it simply in 2018: “We allow them to keep their heads above water, but not beyond that”. His successor Benny Gantz boasted “We will not allow real and long-term development in the Gaza Strip”.

This means an average highly educated Gazan by the age of 35 has almost never been able to find a job, afford to fall in love and start a family, or put food on the table. In other words, Palestinians are stuck in a permanent state of non-life, or as Gazans call it “slow death”.

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Israel deliberately exploits the misery it created in Gaza to push its people to emigrate and leave the territory. In 2019, Netanyahu admitted to even working actively to find countries to absorb Gazan immigrants.

What makes this more troubling is that Israel’s siege has no clear endgame. There is no certain military objective or condition that, if achieved, would lead Israel to lift the blockade. It is, rather, an indefinite instrument to maintain the status quo of inequality and oppression in the occupied Palestinian territories.

Muhammad Shehada is a Palestinian writer and analyst from Gaza and the EU Affairs Manager at Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor.
Follow him on Twitter: @muhammadshehad2

Revealed: The unknown fate of the wild African elephants at UAE's Al-Ain Zoo

A year after wild elephants were captured and sent to the UAE to simulate a safari experience, little is known about their location or wellbeing, elevating concerns around an already-controversial wildlife export.



Nadine Talaat
27 February, 2023

The African Safari experience at Al-Ain Zoo in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, describes itself as “ground-breaking”. It is home to 300 animals from 17 different species native to the African continent, including giraffes, zebras, wildebeest, onyx, Springbok gazelle, antelopes, ostriches, and even lions and white rhinos.

The safari, which opened its doors in 2016, spans 54.5 hectares and is entirely man-made, and claims to be the largest artificially constructed safari in the world.

For 1050 dirhams, or USD 286, visitors can take a private SUV guided tour through the safari, stopping to feed giraffes and getting up close to the animals.

After a 45-minute tour, the SUV drives past a large open area in the distance, one that currently remains completely empty, and it becomes clear to visitors that there is one staple of the African landscape that is missing from Al-Ain’s safari experience: the majestic African elephant.

"Very little is known about where the African elephants of Al-Ain Zoo are, how they are doing, or when they will be present in the attractions"

On its website and at the zoo itself, Al-Ain Zoo boasts not one but two African elephant attractions. The main one, the Elephant Safari, allows viewers to get “up close” with the large animals and even feed them, according to the zoo’s website.

The Elephant Safari is a large area, spanning 23.77 hectares to be exact, that is part of the Elephant Village, a dedicated part of the zoo where visitors can learn about the pachyderms while marvelling at them from a cafe, or climb a watchtower disguised as a baobab tree to get a birds-eye view. This area has been built and promoted online since at least September 2021.

In addition, the zoo also has an Elephant Exhibit, a much smaller enclosure that, according to the official website, is “home to a pair of African elephants”.

What is not made clear online, however, is that there are in fact no elephants to be seen in Al-Ain Zoo at all. In fact, very little is known about where the African elephants of Al-Ain Zoo are, how they are doing, or when they will be present in the attractions.

As part of the Al-Ain Safari experience, visitors are given carrots to feed to giraffes. [TNA]

A sketchy wildlife deal

The elephants that will eventually be on display at Al-Ain Zoo and Safari are part of a larger group of around 22 wild elephants from Namibia that arrived in the UAE in March 2022. The number of tuskers that landed in the Emirates is still disputed because of conflicting reports on infant births and deaths along the journey.

At least one calf was recently born in the Sharjah Safari Park, meaning that the group captured in Namibia included at least one pregnant female. Boarding heavily sedated pregnant cows on a plane could breach the transport rules of the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the only major international treaty on wildlife trade to which Namibia and the UAE are both signatories.

Of the elephants originally captured, 13 were destined for Sharjah Safari Park and around nine for Al-Ain Zoo. Both facilities are part of the UAE’s larger wildlife conservation efforts.

An investigation by The New Arab (TNA) revealed, however, that the sale was commercially driven under a cover of conservation, violating international guidelines that discourage the removal of wildlife from their natural habitat.

CITES explicitly bars the export of elephants from Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa to any country where the elephants are not naturally occurring unless there is a proven conservation benefit.

Despite this, the UAE and Namibia exploited a controversial legal loophole to export the elephants into captivity in the UAE, where plans had been made for years to acquire wild African elephants.

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What happened to the elephants?

After landing in the UAE, it is typical that the wild elephants would have had to endure a quarantine period before being trained to adapt to their new environment to ensure the safety of visitors during the safari experience, known as the ‘socialisation’ period. But this process shouldn’t take longer than a few months.

While their counterparts in Sharjah Safari Park have been on display to the public since May 2022, just two months after arriving in the UAE, the Al-Ain batch of elephants remain hidden away. Nearly a year after they arrived, very few people know the details of their location and wellbeing.

“They wouldn't keep them away for a year. I think it's pretty certain something's wrong,” Adam Cruise, a South African investigative environmental journalist and expert on African elephants, told The New Arab.

"Zoo guides, staff, and keepers seem to have limited knowledge about their supposedly major attraction, indicating a deliberate attempt to keep any information about the status of the elephants limited to a small circle"

When The New Arab visited the zoo and took the safari tour in January, a tour guide confirmed that there would be eight or nine elephants and that they were indeed from Namibia, but refused to say where they were or confirm their arrival at the zoo, instead saying that they were “on their way”.

The guide also could not confirm when the elephants would be on display, simply saying it would be “soon”. Another guide said that it would be in March, a full year after they had arrived.

It is unclear exactly what happened to the elephants after they had left Namibia, or the condition that they are in after being taken from the wild and enduring a difficult journey involving heavy sedation.

Zoo guides, staff, and keepers seem to have limited knowledge about their supposedly major attraction, indicating a deliberate attempt to keep any information about the status of the elephants limited to a small circle.

The Elephant Village at Al-Ain Zoo includes a watchtower from where visitors will be able to view the animals. [Al-Ain Zoo official website/fair use]

It is not unprecedented for a group of wild elephants to go ‘missing’ after being sold and exported internationally. In similar deals of wild African elephants from Zimbabwe sold to China, several of the giant animals simply disappeared. Records show that some died in transport and others showed signs of abuse, but conservationists were unable to account for or find out what happened to the rest.

According to wildlife experts, there are several possible scenarios that could explain the absence of the Al-Ain elephants. The first is that the enclosure that makes up the Elephant Safari is not yet ready for the animals.

On a previous visit to the zoo, The New Arab spoke with one keeper who admitted that there was an issue with the enclosure, possibly with the electrical fencing surrounding it. It’s unlikely that issues with the enclosure would account for the entire delay in exhibiting the elephants to the public, though.

The second scenario is much more grim. Cruise believes that there is a significant possibility that all or some of the Al-Ain elephants are severely ill or have died.

"Their environment is severely restricted, likely to their hangar and a small outdoor area, a far cry away from the vast and open landscapes of Namibia"

“So the worst case scenario is the elephants are dead. They died, which is quite often the case in translocations like this one, especially if they are family groups. It’s a lot of stress, especially with the younger ones, they'll probably die, while the older ones might get sick. They might be too ill to even put on display,” Cruise speculated.

He explained that the process of transferring elephants involves very heavy sedation, which can have a debilitating role on their bodies, particularly for young calves, causing severe stress and dehydration. Transfer also involves separating calves from their mothers, a very risky move because, once the bond is broken, it is possible that mothers will kill or shun them.

The final scenario is that Al-Ain zookeepers and staff have been unable to adequately socialise the elephants to the point where they can be put on display and it is safe to bring visitors to interact with them, a likely scenario given the difficulties of taming wild elephants.

Cruise recalls thinking it would be tricky to capture wild elephant herds when he first heard about the Namibian government’s plan. “This is a wild herd and it's very, very difficult to control. So to put them out might just mean that they're gonna go crazy. They might be stuck in pens at the moment and restricted from movement.”

If there is difficulty socialising wild elephants, the animals are given heavy sedatives to stop them from acting aggressively and to make them ‘socialise-able’, Cruise explained. Then, they may use electric shocks to train them into behaving in a way that will allow for visitors.

Satellite imagery taken at 11am local time on 23 October 2022 shows the hangar where the elephants are likely being kept, but no elephants are visible. [Skywatch for TNA]

The New Arab has learned of reports of a video that shows the elephants as they roam in a mud hole located near a hangar, but has not been able to independently verify this.

Satellite imagery of the safari area shows a building that appears to be the hangar near the unopened Elephant Safari and Village, which is likely where the elephants are being housed. However, in high resolution satellite images used by The New Arab to verify the location of the elephants, they could not be seen.

In any scenario, it is likely that the elephants at Al-Ain Zoo are spending a lot of time in this hangar, whether they are waiting for the enclosure to be ready, are ill, or are being socialised. This would mean that their environment is severely restricted, likely to their hangar and a small outdoor area, a far cry away from the vast and open landscapes of Namibia.

It’s unclear how much time they have spent in the confines of this small building over the course of the past 11 months, or how often they are let out.

A site map at the Al-Ain Zoo shows plans for the Elephant Safari, as well as an additional Elephant Exhibit, both 'coming soon'. [TNA]

A new elephant exhibit

Located in the zoo area of the Al-Ain Park, the Elephant Exhibit is a new addition to the facility’s attractions, evidenced by the fact that it has not yet been added to the official map and no opening date has been set. Very little can be seen by visitors of the zoo, but large poster fences indicate where it will be.

The exhibit will be home to a pair of African elephants, according to the zoo website. It is much smaller than the safari, less than the size of a football pitch, a very tight space for two of the world’s largest land animals, particularly if they are coming from the wild. It is unclear whether this pair will be taken from the Namibian group or whether plans have been made to bring more elephants to the zoo.

The second scenario would raise questions as to where the zoo would acquire the African elephants from. Al Ain Zoo was, until recently, a member of the European Association of Zoos and Aquaria (EAZA), which is supposed to help zoos to acquire animals in a legal and sustainable way.

Partially as a result of The New Arab investigation into the illegality of the export of the 22 elephants, Al-Ain Zoo was stripped of its accreditation in September 2022. Arne Lawrenz, EAZA ex-situ programme coordinator for elephants, told The New Arab that Al-Ain Zoo’s termination was an “ongoing process” and that it had the right to “lodge an appeal against the decision”.

An official handout guide from the Al-Ain Zoo, printed in January 2023, continues to display the EAZA logo among its 'Memberships' in the bottom right corner. [TNA]

The official website and zoo guides printed in January 2023, continue to boast Al-Ain Zoo’s membership with EAZA.

In addition, the 19th CITES Conference of Parties held in Panama in November 2022 directly addressed the controversial sale and placed a moratorium on all exports of wild African elephants outside their natural range.

The more likely scenario is that the Elephant Exhibit will display two elephants from the Namibian group. This would violate the original terms of the Namibian tender, which specified the need to capture and keep family groups together.

“With small enclosures… If they are pulled from the wild, they always come as babies. So if that's the case, they'll be separating the youngest of that [Namibian] herd, because they are the easiest to manage, and they are the easiest to adapt to a small environment,” said Cruise.

One possible scenario is that the exhibit is a response to socialisation issues within the Namibian elephant group. A conservation expert with knowledge of the elephant deal suggested to The New Arab that the exhibit could be used to house two male members of the herd, who might need to be kept separate to prevent aggression towards other members.

"The Elephant Exhibit opens a floodgate of additional questions and concerns about animal welfare, conservation benefits of the original deal, and violations of international guidelines on wildlife trade in an already controversial export"

“To keep them in a life of solitary confinement or tiny captivity like that is cruel beyond cruelty,” said Cruise.

The Elephant Exhibit opens a floodgate of additional questions and concerns about animal welfare, conservation benefits of the original deal, and violations of international guidelines on wildlife trade in an already controversial export.

Al-Ain Zoo and the UAE Ministry for Climate Change and Environment did not respond to The New Arab’s requests for comments on the status of the elephants and the plans for the Elephant Exhibit.

In the worst case scenario that the elephants cannot be put on display, Cruise believes it is likely that they will be euthanised. While it would be possible to send them back to their natural habitat in Namibia - in fact, wild elephants reintegrate quite smoothly - it would require a massive financial and logistical effort, not to mention media attention, that UAE officials would likely rather avoid.

Nadine Talaat is a London-based journalist writing about Middle East politics, borders and migration, environment and media representation. She is a Deputy Editor with The New Arab's editorial team.

New York, New York: The first Arabic-speaking community in the United States


Linda K. Jacobs
21 April, 2023

At the turn of the 20th century, New York welcomed a new community to its shores. Comprising of what are now known as Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians, the burgeoning community struggled to survive but would overcome adversity and come to thrive.

One of the best-kept secrets of Arab, Arab American, and New York history is the existence of the first Arabic-speaking community in the United States in Lower Manhattan at the end of the nineteenth century.

Until the publication of my book in 2015 (Strangers in the West: The Syrian Colony of New York City, 1880-1900), nothing had been written and almost nothing was known about the community that was founded in 1880 and finally obliterated by the construction of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel in the 1940s.

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In 1900, about 1,200 “Syrians” (a term that was used in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to refer to immigrants from present-day Syria, present-day Lebanon, and historic Palestine) resided on Washington Street, a north-south thoroughfare originating at The Battery at the southern tip of Manhattan, where new immigrants disembarked.


"Syrians not only survived but thrived. When they first arrived in New York, many — both men and women — took up peddling, selling door to door in wealthy parts of the city or travelling from town to town for weeks at a time"

When they stepped onto American soil, these immigrants would have immediately been greeted by reminders of home.

Along four blocks of Washington Street, known as the “Syrian quarter,” the “Syrian colony,” or “Little Syria,” the immigrant saw signs and menus in Arabic, heard Arabic on the street, and might easily have encountered someone from their home village, all of which would have been a welcome sight.

Beneath that cheerful surface, however, the living conditions in the Syrian quarter were deplorable. The elegant single-family homes that had graced Washington Street in the early part of the century had been cut up into small cubicles to accommodate the flood of new immigrants, among whom were the Syrians.

As in other poor neighbourhoods, too many people were crowded into too-small spaces with no windows, no electricity and no indoor plumbing. The rooms were dark, both day and night —“dark as a wolf’s mouth” as one reporter had it — freezing in winter, stifling in summer.

Toilets and cold-water faucets were located in the rear yards, several pitch-dark flights of stairs away. The tidal movements of the Hudson River, one block west, regularly flooded the cellars, where many Syrians had their homes.

25-27 Washington Street, an all-Syrian tenement. From Moss, Frank: The American Metropolis: From Knickerbocker Days to the Present Time, v. 3. New York: Peter Fenelon Collier, 1897.

Tuberculosis was rampant and infant mortality rates were high. Although the community was well-served by doctors who had either trained at Syrian Protestant College (today’s American University of Beirut) or in American medical schools, as well as by three midwives, nothing could counteract the lethal effects of poverty.

The behemoth Babbitt’s Soap Works rendered hundreds of pounds of lard every day, spewing black smoke and noxious fumes into the air.

Youth gangs roamed the streets, and saloons, brothels, and insalubrious boarding houses catered to the dockworkers and sailors on the Hudson River piers, lowering the tone of the neighbourhood still further.

The only relief from these miseries came from the breezes that blew in from the ocean to dissipate the miasma of the slum, the free and open spaces of The Battery, and the determination of the Syrians to better their lives.

Midwife Mannie Shahdan, who delivered most of the Maronite babies in the Syrian community, ca. 1890. [Courtesy, Matt Williams]

Syrians not only survived but thrived. When they first arrived in New York, many — both men and women — took up peddling, selling door to door in wealthy parts of the city or travelling from town to town for weeks at a time.

Peddling was arduous and dangerous; the satchels or boxes they carried as they tramped the countryside could weigh as much as eighty pounds; they were regularly harassed by police or abused by the local populace; robberies were frequent. But a peddler was his or her own boss and the profit depended mainly on skill.

Peddling was much more lucrative than factory work; if a nineteenth-century factory worker earned between four and seven dollars a week, a peddler could earn fifty dollars in the same period.

Even if half went back to the supplier, the difference was significant. Peddlers were divided by their fellow Syrians into two types: keshahi who sold notions or dry goods and jezdan harir peddlers, who sold fancy goods or “Turkish” or “Holy Land” goods.

Notions were small items like shoelaces, safety pins, celluloid collars, or sewing supplies or larger dry goods like bolts of cloth or towels.

“Turkish” and “Holy Land” goods included damasks, embroideries, rosaries and olive-wood boxes. It was the Turkish and Holy Land goods that distinguished Syrian peddlers from those of other nationalities.

"Every Syrian store was both a warehouse, where peddlers would congregate in the morning to pick up their stock, and a retail shop that sold to the occasional American customer"

When they had saved enough money, often about three years after arriving, men stopped peddling to set up their own businesses, while women settled down to raise a family and/or work in a family-run business.

Syrian-run grocery stores, boarding houses, barbershops, and restaurants popped up on the street. More ambitious men became peddlers’ suppliers, buying notions or dry goods wholesale from New York merchants and distributing them to “their” peddlers, or importing and selling Turkish or Holy Land goods.

Every Syrian store was both a warehouse, where peddlers would congregate in the morning to pick up their stock and a retail shop that sold to the occasional American customer.

A nineteenth-century newspaperman was astonished at the vast array of goods held by one of these suppliers: “pins by the hundred gross rest against shoe-blacking by the case, and scapulars and rosaries, beads and prayer books…silk and satins, lacework, embroideries…and a long, curved sword of Damascus steel….”

Syrian children in front of 77 Washington. New York Times 20 August 1899

Some men opened small workshops or factories to produce soft goods in cotton (kimonos, shirtwaists, petticoats, lace collars and cuffs), or harder goods like cigarettes, suspenders or mirrors.

Space was at a premium on Washington Street, so these factories were small, having no more than a dozen employees. As these enterprises expanded, they sought larger spaces on nearby streets and in the 1920s, as skyscrapers encroached on the neighbourhood, they began to move them uptown.

A little-known career path for dozens of Syrians was as “Oriental” entertainers: exploiting their own “exotic” origins for gain. These included men and women who delivered lectures on the Holy Land, often in so-called “native dress,” and charged admission or sold Turkish goods after the lecture; Arab acrobats; “Oriental” dancers; and presenters of “scenes of Bedouin life.” Syrian impresarios produced huge “Oriental” carnivals they showed all over the United States.

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Farah Abdessamad

Syrians were not just concerned with earning a living and making their way up the economic ladder, however; they were intellectually, artistically, and spiritually ambitious as well. The first Arabic newspaper, Kawkab America, was published in New York in 1892.

Two brothers, Abraham and Nageeb Arbeely, members of the putative first Syrian family to settle in the United States, were its founders and editors. A half-dozen more newspapers were published before the turn of the century, and many more appeared after.

Several associations were founded in the nineteenth century: some were benevolent organisations to help their compatriots in need; others were religious, raising money for the church; others set out to explore and debate ideas; and some facilitated assimilation in the new land.

The Syrian Society, founded in 1892 by Ameen F. Haddad, opened a school at 95 Washington Street to teach children American history and adults English.




The majority of the early Syrian immigrants were Christians, and each of the four congregations — Maronite, Melkite, Orthodox, and Presbyterian — requested and was sent an Arabic-speaking priest, who, in addition to ministering to his congregants in New York, was tasked with travelling around the country to perform the liturgy and baptize, marry and bury believers in other Arabic-speaking communities.

Each of the congregations raised enough money to pay the priest’s salary and fit out a chapel on Washington Street. Although not recognised externally, there must have been Druse and Muslims in the community.

A Muslim “prayer room” was supposedly established on Greenwich Street, one block east of Washington Street, in 1912, pointing to the presence of Muslims nearby. Two Syrian Jews who arrived in New York in 1892 established a close relationship to the Lower West Side Syrian community but did not live there.

Tannous Shishim’s restaurant and boardinghouse, 91 Washington Street. Moss 1897

Most important, perhaps, is the literary blossoming that occurred in the first two decades of the twentieth century in New York, a blossoming that had its roots in the nineteenth-century Syrian community.

The early newspapers regularly published poetry and extemporaneous speeches of members of the community, and their presses published their books.

The first published books were primarily utilitarian: Arabic-English language primers, essays on great men translated into Arabic, or tips for the new immigrant.

The first two decades of the twentieth century, however, saw an extraordinary outpouring of literature, including Afifa Karam’s three novels in Arabic, Ameen Rihani’s novel The Book of Khalid in English, and Nasib Arida’s arts magazine al Funun, which published poetry, essays and art by, among others, the men who would found Al Rabitah al Qalamiyah (the Pen Bond) first in 1916 and then again in 1920.

Members of the Pen Bond, such as Kahlil Gibran, Ilya Abu Madi, Ameen Rihani, and Mikhail Naimy produced some of their most important work in Arabic and English in those years: Gibran’s The Prophet was published in New York in 1923.

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Brooke Anderson

By the turn of the century, a quarter of the Syrians had already moved across the East River to Brooklyn, and hundreds followed over the next decade.

They established a new community around Atlantic Avenue, where they found better living conditions: more space for less money; clean, open streets and parks; and good schools.

They built churches and bought homes. Even then, they kept their businesses on Washington Street and the Syrian quarter was constantly being renewed by newly-arrived immigrants, many of whom found employment with these Brooklyn-based businessmen.

But skyscrapers, the first of which had been built on the street in 1904, finally took over much of Lower Manhattan, replacing the tenements and forcing Syrians to move their businesses uptown.

In the mid-1940s, the construction of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel wiped out the last vestiges of the first Arabic-speaking community in the United States.


Linda K. Jacobs is a New York-based scholar and author. She holds a Ph.D. in Near Eastern Archaeology/Anthropology and spent many years working on archaeological excavations and economic development projects in the Middle East. She is the author of Digging In: An American Archaeologist Uncovers the Real Iran (2012) and Strangers in the West: The Syrian Colony of New York City, 1880-1900 (2015) as well as a series of articles about the nineteenth-century Syrian colony in New York.

Dr. Jacobs is committed to promoting Middle Eastern culture and knowledge in the United States, founding KalimahPress in 2011, establishing the Violet Jabara Charitable Trust, and sitting on the boards of the Near East Foundation, the Washington Street Historical Society, and the Moise Khayrallah Center for Lebanese Diaspora Studies. She has also served on the board of the American University of Beirut.

Netanyahu says he's opposed to any interim US-Iran deal on nuclear program

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says he opposes any interim agreement reportedly being negotiated between the U.S. and Iran over its nuclear program

Via AP news wire
2 hours ago

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Sunday that he opposes any interim agreement reportedly being negotiated between the U.S. and Iran over its nuclear program.

Netanyahu spoke after reports in Israeli media said understandings are being reached between Washington and Tehran that would seek to hold back Iran's nuclear program somewhat, in exchange for some sanctions relief. The reports could not be independently confirmed and the U.S. has publicly denied any such deal.

Netanyahu said Israel had informed the U.S. that “the most limited understandings, what are termed ‘mini-agreements’, do not – in our view – serve the goal and we are opposed to them as well.”

The Israeli site Walla last week reported that under the emerging understandings Iran would limit its uranium enrichment to 60% in exchange for sanctions relief. The site also said the sides were discussing reciprocal prisoner releases.

State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said last week “there is no deal," adding that the reports were untrue.

In its report, Walla said Netanyahu had revealed details of the agreement at a recent parliamentary committee meeting. The U.S. and Israel share intelligence and a prime focus of the countries' interactions is Iran and its nuclear program.

Netanyahu vehemently opposed the 2015 deal between Iran and world powers brokered by the Obama administration that sought to rein in Iran's nuclear program. He was a major supporter of President Donald Trump's 2018 decision to withdraw from the deal, which left it in shambles.

Iran says its program is meant for civilian purposes. Israel considers a nuclear Iran as a major threat, citing its calls for Israel’s destruction and its support for anti-Israel militant groups across the region.

Israel says it does not rule out military action to prevent Iran from making a nuclear weapon.

We must raise popular consciousness on Palestinian resistance

The tendency to ignore or erase Palestinian resistance, and instead rely on victimising the people during Israel’s onslaughts, must be fought. The Palestinian diaspora in the West has a critical role in this, writes the Palestinian Youth Movement.

The Popular Cradle as both a historical and present reality, highlights a relationship between the resistance and the masses, writes The Palestine Youth Movement.

Perspectives



Palestinian Youth Movement
13 Jun, 2023

This year marks 75 years of Nakba; 75 years since the violent expulsion of up to 1 million Palestinians from their homeland by Zionist militias for the creation of the state of Israel: a by-product of a broader imperial project that attempts to oppose Arab Unity and to create an imperial outpost in the region. To date, the loss and defeat of the Nakba has framed and defined Palestinian history. However, historical and contemporary Palestinian resistance is part of a legacy of ongoing struggle that predates this.

Today’s resistance efforts receive mass support in Palestine through Al-Hadena Al-Sha’biya (The Popular Cradle). The Popular Cradle works as the organ of our struggle by conceptualising resistance as both a normal and necessary state of being and creating a resistance-enabling environment in which the popular masses financially, socially, and politically sustain the resistance and readily accepts the consequences of supporting armed struggle against Zionist settler colonialism.

This is by no means a new phenomenon: the Popular Cradle has mobilised the Palestinian people from as early as the 1920s, with Palestine's popular classes providing a base of mass support, resources, and protection for key revolutionary fighters like Abu Jilda. The Popular Cradle as both a historical and present reality, highlights a relationship between the resistance and the masses: that the Palestinian people rally around resistance to Zionism and imperialism, and that it is through this support that Palestinian resistance is sustained.

''For us, while Gaza has been victimised by the Zionist violence, it is the heart of Palestinian resistance: placed under siege precisely because its people choose to resist.''

Despite the historical and contemporary existence of a Popular Cradle in Palestine, conversations in the West continue to be dominated by liberal notions of victimhood, peace-building, humanitarian aid, and equal rights. These frameworks do not incorporate (and often contradict) the reality and the spirit of resistance on the ground in Palestine.

The Palestinian Youth Movement is a transnational, grassroots movements of Palestinian and Arab youth in exile dedicated to the liberation of our homeland and people. We believe that we have a critical role in the far diaspora (that is, the diaspora currently residing in the West) to historicise, politicise, and legitimise Palestinian resistance, and to oppose the narratives which rob us of our commitment to revolutionary optimism and struggle. We understand that our dispossession is a product of the colonial project and that we are therefore active agents in confronting Zionism in the service of struggle, wherever we may be.

This year, as Palestinians around the world were preparing to mark Nakba Day, the Zionist entity that is Israel, launched an assault on Gaza, killing at least 34 Palestinians. Social media platforms were understandably flooded with messages of heartbreak and outrage, but largely missing from this coverage is an analysis of the developments of resistance. Yet, amongst both the Zionist occupation forces and the wider Israeli population, there was an acknowledgment of significant reduction in the effectiveness of the Iron Dome, with some reports citing a 29% decrease in the success rate during the recent rounds of escalations.

The Palestinian Youth Movement. [PYM]

Images emerged of the destruction of infrastructure in Tel Aviv and its surrounds, indicating the strength of the Palestinian resistance in terms of the long-range and precision of resistance weaponry. The absence of these facts in mainstream discourse reflects an ongoing humanitarian narrative on Gaza that has prevailed since 2008: of the territory being defenceless and of Gazans only as victims.

For us, while Gaza has been victimised by the Zionist violence, it is the heart of Palestinian resistance: placed under siege precisely because its people choose to resist.

The news headlines on Palestine in 2008 and 2009 were dominated by the casualties of Israel’s attacks on Gaza in which 1383 Palestinians were killed and, later, the Goldstone report that documented Israeli war crimes and other human rights abuses. Absent from Western reporting was the fact that the Israel’s stated goal for the attack (that is, to destroy the military infrastructure of the resistance and rescue a Zionist soldier who had been captured by the Palestinian resistance) was changed during the course of the battle as the Zionist entity did not anticipate the military strength and precision of Palestinian resistance.

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Abu-Jildeh

In military science, victory is understood as a condition in which the enemy’s ability to enter battle, resist, or resume hostilities is destroyed. The 2008 and 2009 wars on Gaza saw massive loss of Palestinian life, but it also saw a weakening of the enemy by Palestinian resistance efforts. A large part of the success of the resistance then and now, can be attributed to the formation of the Joint Operations Room which houses all major Palestinian resistance factions.

The unity of Palestinian resistance, as made manifest in the Joint Operations Room, is also absent from Western reporting on Palestine.

Likewise when in 2012 Israel’s Zionist regime mounted a war on Gaza that began with the assassination of Ahmed Jabari, the chief of the Qassam Brigades, the strength with which the Palestinian resistance responded led to a new deterrence equation being developed during ceasefire negotiations. This was known as ‘quiet for quiet’ – the idea that the resistance would remain ‘quiet’ (i.e. not launch any rockets) if the occupation forces also remained ‘quiet’.

In May 2021, when protest chants from Jerusalem called on the Palestinian resistance to defend them against mounting violence by occupation forces, the Palestinian resistance responded, asserting that ‘quiet for quiet’ is not limited to Gaza, but is a deterrence equation that extends across Palestine.

The legacy of this, which became known as the ‘Unity of All Fronts’ or ‘Unity of the Fields’ approach lives on today. In fact, the unity of resistance is not limited to Palestine: May 2021 saw the formation of a new joint operations room that includes non-Palestinian and regional actors. Palestinian resistance factions have long been supported by regional actors, but the developments of the 2021 uprising signalled a formalisation and strengthening of this support.

The incorporation of other regional actors into resistance coordination reflects the unity of the axis of resistance and the growing strength of anti-imperialist resistance in the region. Indeed, just this April Palestinian resistance forces in Lebanon and Syria launched rockets in defence of Jerusalem – a development which further highlight the unity of Palestinian resistance across the geographical confines of historic Palestine.

The popular support for Palestinian resistance that we see in Palestine has yet to be reflected in organising efforts and messaging in the wider diaspora. It is therefore our role, as Palestinian and Arab youth organising and mobilising the far diaspora, to raise popular consciousness on the contemporary role of resistance in our struggle and, in doing so, re-orient our organising efforts to mirror the\ politics of the Palestinian streets – it is only through this that we will be able to create the critical mass necessary for Palestinian liberation.

The Palestinian Youth Movement is a transnational, independent grassroots movement of young Palestinians and Arabs dedicated to the liberation of our homeland and people. We currently comprise of 14 chapters across North America and Europe.

Follow them on Twitter: @palyouthmvmt

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

Israeli forces detain 13-year-old Palestinian boy for 'filming raid' in West Bank

Israeli forces assaulted and detained 13-year-old Mohammad Shahin Al-Arda from the Palestinian town of Arraba, south of Jenin, for filming the Israeli forces during the incursion into the town, according to local reports.


The New Arab Staff
18 June, 2023

The forces assaulted and detained the boy in the town of Arraba [Getty]

Israeli forces arrested a 13-year-old Palestinian boy in the early hours of Sunday, for reportedly filming the forces during an incursion into the town of Arraba, the New Arab's Arabic language site Al-Araby Al-Jadeed reported.

The forces assaulted and detained the boy, identified as Mohammad Shahin Al-Arda, in the town of Arraba, south of Jenin, the report said.

Israeli forces also arrested former Palestinian prisoner Mohammad Areeda Mohammad from his home in Arraba.

In Jenin, clashes broke out between residents and occupation forces following a raid in the village of Faqqua east of the city.

In Nablus, clashes erupted between residents and Israeli forces in the town of Beita, following Israeli raids on residential and commercial areas and inspections of surveillance camera recording devices.

Israeli forces arrested former Palestinian prisoner Ibrahim Mustafa Abed while passing through a checkpoint in Hawara, south of Nablus.

In occupied Jerusalem, Israeli settlers entered the courtyards of al-Aqsa Mosque early on Sunday under the protection of Israeli forces. They carried out provocative tours, and performed rituals and prayers in the mosque's compound.

Spike in ocean heat stuns scientists: Have we breached a climate tipping point?

BY JEFF BERARDELLI - 06/18/23 

TAMPA, Fla. (WFLA) — Global oceans are so hot right now, scientists all around the world are struggling to explain the phenomenon. Sea surface temperatures in June are so far above record territory it is being deemed almost statistically impossible in a climate without global heating.

This is happening across the huge expanse of the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.

(WFLA)

In the North Atlantic Ocean — which was already way above record levels — temperatures have strikingly shot directly upward over the past two weeks.

A shocking visual shared on Twitter earlier this month is prompting many to ask whether this recent surge is evidence that human-caused heating has propelled the climate past a tipping point.

Luckily, climate scientists say the answer is likely no. Instead, it is much more probable to be a compounding coalescence of various factors – some natural and some human-caused. In other words, a coincidence of natural factors piled on top of the steady trend of human-caused global heating.

El Niño could mean the hottest year on record, meteorologists warn 

Regardless it’s a vivid illustration of the new extremes Earth can reach when conditions are ripe.

Ocean temperatures in any given region are the result of complex interactions between ocean currents, weather, climate oscillations and longer-term climate trends. In the case of this year, there are many factors, but the biggest factor is the change from La Niña to El Niño in the Tropical Pacific Ocean – a natural cycle that has global implications.

(WFLA)

For the past three years, Earth has been in a rare prolonged La Niña event. During that time, heat piled up in the tropical Western Pacific Ocean near Indonesia. But this spring, subsurface heat started propagating eastward across the Pacific Ocean and reached the surface. This marked the beginning of the warm phase called El Niño.

(NOAA)

With warm water now sitting on the surface of the entire Tropical Pacific Ocean – a particularly wide swath of the ocean basin – Pacific Ocean temperatures have been rising fast.

But the effects of El Niño are not confined to the Pacific Ocean. The ocean-air heat exchange results in changes in the atmospheric steering flow and pressure systems in the Atlantic as well. These changes in weather over the Atlantic Ocean, some related to El Niño, can have significant impacts on surface ocean temperatures.

At the same time, in the high latitudes of Canada and the far North Atlantic, a very blocked jet stream pattern has persisted for weeks. These persistent weather patterns have a significant impact on the underlying sea surface temperatures. Areas where it is sunny and calm tend to warm up and cloudy, windy areas tend to cool.

Canada has been trapped under a heat dome leading to record-setting wildfires and the US eastern seaboard/ western Atlantic has been stuck under the opposite — a cool dip in the jet stream. And over on the other side of the Atlantic, an ocean heat dome has been present near Europe.

The result of this stubborn configuration is a cooler-than-normal NW Atlantic and a much warmer-than-normal NE Atlantic.

(WFLA)

To the south across the Tropical Atlantic, this odd and persistent configuration of atmospheric steering and pressure systems has resulted in record-shattering heat. Sea surface temperatures are so hot across the “main development region” (seen in deep red between Africa and the Caribbean on this map) they have already reached levels expected during peak hurricane season in September.

To be more specific, this excess heat can be explained by some interrelated factors. Atmospheric high pressure over the Subtropical Atlantic is weaker than normal, likely due to a combination of the odd North Atlantic steering discussed above, and also El Niño’s influence, weakening the tropical winds called trade winds.

How will El Niño impact hurricane season? 

These trade winds blow across the deep tropical Atlantic from east (Africa) to west (Caribbean). When they are strong the waters cool due to increased upwelling of cooler water from below and also increased evaporation. This season, however, the weaker high pressure and lighter trade winds are helping increase sea surface temperatures.

Image WFLA

Weaker trade winds usually also correspond to less Saharan dust coming off of Africa. This year, dust is at a record low. Less dust means cleaner air, allowing more sun to reach and heat the ocean surface.

From the above, we can see the various ways persistent weather patterns can shape ocean temperatures around the globe. But there are a few more underlying reasons for the record warm departures in ocean surface temperature.

The most obvious is greenhouse warming. This did not cause the recent spike, but it is a big reason we are able to so easily achieve record territory nowadays.

Likelihood that Earth briefly hits key warming threshold grows bigger and closer, UN forecasts 

In general, the oceans have warmed around 2 degrees Fahrenheit since the early 1900s. This is the elevated baseline/ foundation which everything else is built upon.

If you compare June ocean temperatures in the 1982 El Niño — which eventually became one of the strongest ever — to June 2023 you can easily see the stark difference. This year is far and away much warmer across global oceans. That is mainly due to a trend in human-caused greenhouse warming.

But there’s more. Over the past few decades atmospheric pollution, especially across the North Atlantic, has lessened due to the Clean Air Act. Airborne pollution decreases the amount of sunlight reaching the Earth and helps cool us, masking some of the greenhouse warming. But as pollution has decreased in recent decades the Atlantic ocean temperatures have increased.

One very prominent example of this is very recent. In 2020, cargo ships, which traditionally burned the dirtiest of fuel, were forced to substantially reduce Sulphur dioxide (SO2) emissions. Now, cargo ships are running much cleaner. The reduction in pollution, which is otherwise good news, means an increase in ocean heating.

In this graph, you can see the dramatic drop in SO2 in the last 2 years. The jury is still out on how much this is contributing to ocean heating.

Lastly, we should address a real wildcard. In January 2022, the underwater Hunga Tonga Volcano erupted in the South Pacific Ocean. The resulting explosion spewed large amounts of water vapor high up into the atmosphere where it still lingers.

(NOAA)

This water vapor cools the upper atmosphere but warms Earth’s surface. It is an unexpected natural phenomenon.

So, it is clear from the analysis above that there is not one culprit for the ocean’s uncanny warmth. Instead, it seems like the unfortunate coincidence of various factors, both natural and human. If this logic is correct, then this perturbation is not evidence of humans tripping a climate tipping point, for now.

But as 2023 unfolds, El Niño will continue to intensify in the Pacific, infusing the climate system with even more energy. On top of global heating, this will supercharge global weather patterns yielding extremes modern man has yet to experience.

And as global heating persists in the coming decades, tipping points may very well be breached in the climate system, causing irreversible impacts.

TAGS ELIOT JACOBSON