In Cuba’s Report, US Blockade Comes Off as Weapon of War
Photo by Jeremy Stewardson
Cuba’s foreign ministry annually reports on the U.S. economic blockade of Cuba and its recent impact mostly in order to enlighten delegates of the United Nations General Assembly prior to voting on a Cuban resolution. For 31 consecutive years the General Assembly has overwhelmingly approved a resolution claiming “the necessity to put an end to the economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.”.
On September 12 in Havana, Cuba’s foreign minister Bruno Rodríguez held a press conference to introduce “Knock Down the Blockade – CUBA’S REPORT March 2023 – February 2024.” Providing information on blockade workings and the damage it causes, the 65-page Report is comprehensive and detailed.
Rodríguez cast the blockade as “the most comprehensive, far-reaching, and prolonged coercive economic measures [ever] applied against any country.” The yearly reports tally economic losses from blockade effects the year before and cumulatively since the blockade’s onset. The figures this year, cited by Rodríguez, are $5.057 billion and $164.14 billion, respectively. With inflation, the latter amount is $1.499 trillion.
Why the blockade has lasted for over 60 years is not clear. The linkage of planned healthcare difficulties and food shortages with the likelihood of some Cubans dying is reminiscent of war. The United States has trouble ending its wars.
The Report covers U.S. legislation, regulations, and policies reflected in the blockade. Three categories get top billing: requirements imposed by U.S legislation, regulations stemming from executive orders, and the designation of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism (SSOT).
The Cuba Democracy Act of 1992 requires that ships docking in Cuba don’t visit U.S. ports for six months afterwards, that companies abroad tied to U.S. corporations don’t trade with Cuba. The 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act enables the heirs of the former owners of properties nationalized by Cuba’s government to utilize U.S. courts to secure compensation from the third-country investors and companies presently involved with the properties. Consequently, many prospective investors are now hesitant about doing business in Cuba.
Regulations put in place by the U.S. government’s executive branch have long restricted U.S. travel and commercial arrangements with the island. One galling regulation disallows products from abroad containing more than 10% U.S. components from being exported to Cuba. The Trump administration issued dozens of new regulations restricting U.S. travel to Cuba, and they continue. Regulations requiring “specific licenses or permits” and payments “in cash and in advance” diminish food imports from the United States, approved under legislation in 2000.
The SSOT designation entraps international banks and financial institutions in a system that already restricts the dealings of international corporations and traders with Cuba. According to the Report, the SSOT label “has brought about serious difficulties to our country’s financial and banking transactions, foreign trade, sources of income and energy, [and] access to credit.”
The U.S. offers its Visa Waiver Program to the travelers of 42 countries. Persons visiting Cuba are ineligible, because of its SSOT designation. Travelers protecting their waivers stay away from Cuba. Tourism takes a hit.
Indeed, “[t]he US government has used tourism, the main source of income for the country, as a political weapon against Cuba.” In 2023, Cuba … received 2,436,980 international visitors, which represents … 57 per cent of the figure achieved in 2019.”
The Report contains dozens of illustrative examples of harm, shortages, and/or diminished imports bedeviling agencies, activities, and individuals within the various sectors of Cuba’s economy. These are the education, sports, culture, biotechnology, and transport sectors, and the mining, energy, healthcare, agricultural, and food sectors.
According to the Report, “The US blockade against Cuba violates International Law. It is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It constitutes a violation of the right to peace, development and self-determination of a sovereign State.”
The blockade continues despite appeals to fundamental principles. A journalist in Havana portrays a “humanitarian crisis throughout Cuba.” Describing “hungry people scavenging through dumpsters and panhandling,” he indicates that, “With pharmacy shelves barren, the price of medicines on the black market has slipped beyond the reach of much of the population. Without money to repair old infrastructure, hundreds of thousands now live without running water.”
Humanitarian disaster in Cuba, the product of prohibitions and restrictions applying to Cuba’s healthcare, food, and agricultural sectors looks to be purposeful rather than accidental.
Highlighted in the Report are shortages of spare parts for intensive care units and operating rooms, spare parts for a device that encapsulates medicines and fills vials, blood gas analyzers, reagents to diagnose immunodeficiency diseases, drugs used to treat cancers, new equipment for neonatal care.
Now 51% of drugs on a “national list of essential medicines … are not available … surgeries have dramatically decreased.”
Food production is down due to shortages of the “fuels, oils and lubricants needed to operate the existing agricultural machinery” and “a shortage of antibiotics, antiparasitic medications, vitamin supplements.” Significant too are: a “deteriorated fleet of agricultural equipment,” loss of “capacity to refrigerate 26,360 tons of products,” and “limited access to fertilizers and pesticides.”
According to Cuba’s Report, “The historical yields of several crops have deteriorated by almost 40 per cent … [leading to] a remarkable decrease, as compared to 2022 figures, in products such as rice, beans, bread, coffee, cooking oil, soybean yogurt, meat products, powdered milk, sugar, as well as in medical diets. As compared to 2019, the production of rice, egg and milk has decreased by 81 per cent, 61 per cent and 49 per cent respectively.”
The president of the Cuban Association of Animal Production indicates that, “The blockade makes it impossible for cooperatives and farmers to have access to inputs, such as spare parts for machinery, tractors, harvesters and other means of transportation that remain paralyzed and are obsolete, as well as raw materials and other products that would otherwise make it possible to use idle land for production.”
One assumes that, what with an intended humanitarian crisis, at least some Cubans are going to die due to the blockade. What one side intends – restrictions, prohibitions, and shortages – becomes coercion for the other side. Coercion bearing the risk of death, whether of one Cuban or more, is war, or something like it.
The object of U.S. policy toward Cuba was clear in 1960, and remains so. In his famous memo a year after the victory of Cuba’s Revolution, State Department official Lestor Mallory writes of a “a line of action … [that would] bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of government.”
To remove a governing system not to its liking, the U.S. government could have turned to diplomacy or to a coup mediated through proxies or agents. It opted for force, with lethal possibilities.
War against Cuba manifests in the U.S. feat, through its blockade, of helping to force a million Cubans out of the country – 10% of the population. It’s a re-worked version of aggressors’ “drain the swamp” theory.
Prospects for ending the blockade correlate with why it exists and its warlike characteristics. Many U.S. wars seemingly possess a momentum of their own, for instance, the still-unsettled Korean war, U.S. troops still in Iraq, and the prolonged U.S. debacle in Afghanistan. Regime-change in Cuba is a long-term objective. For those in charge and the dominant U.S. media, getting rid of socialism is worth any amount of waiting.
