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Thursday, April 23, 2026

Correlating US Aggression On Cuba, Venezuela And Iran: The Oil Factor – Analysis



April 22, 2026
Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)
By Dr. Saurabh Mishra

Venezuela and Iran, the two countries that President Trump has targeted for military operations to date, along with the US, account for about one-third of global oil reserves. The endgames of the US aggression against Venezuela, Iran, and possibly Cuba in the near future may focus on long-term deals that include oil benefits. The Trumpian economic strategy hinges on access to cheap oil.

At the beginning of 2026, United States (US) forces abducted President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela with the intention of regime change, although the stated goals were different. We also witness the US facing extreme difficulty in breaking Iran’s will to fight, and Tehran is resisting regime change despite immense losses to its top leadership, military and civilian infrastructure. Cuba, too, has a standing threat issued by President Trump, who had been projecting himself as the ‘President of Peace’ until a few months ago.

Trump threatened Cuba with a “friendly takeover”[1] in “some form”,[2] along with choking the country by blockading its oil imports and threatening its suppliers. The country has been under duress with chronic blackouts due to a fuel shortage. Cuban authorities confirmed that there was no oil shipment from January 2026 until the end of March, when a Russian oil tanker arrived with a consignment of 730,000 barrels.[3] President Trump has repeatedly indicated that he would be focusing on his next target, Cuba, once the conflict with Iran is over.[4]

Venezuela and Iran are very different in terms of their political composition, power and identity, and neither of them is/was an imminent military threat to the US. Although Trump’s military actions have been framed as preemptive responses to the threat to US citizens, its core security interests and safety of assets, one factor that Trump has downplayed or not mentioned while stating his objectives is the presence and potential of oil reserves in the two countries.


President Trump’s actions against Cuba are perplexing as to why he would threaten a tiny island nation that cannot pose any real military or economic threat in the context of contemporary global geopolitics. The return of Cuba, which has gradually been phased out of high-level geopolitical discussions since the end of the Cold War, into US grand-strategic calculations, needs explanation. This brief examines President Trump’s desire to “take over” Cuba and highlights the oil variable correlating his rhetoric and actions on Cuba with operations in Venezuela and Iran.

The Façade and the Truth in Venezuela Operation

On 3 January 2026, US forces abducted President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela, along with his wife, in Operation Absolute Resolve. The couple was accused of heading a drug network impacting the youth and families in the US. President Trump, who previously had reduced US foreign military commitments, expressing a desire for peace and economic prosperity of the US, has ironically been successful in putting military pressure on Venezuela to open up for ‘reforms’ and make structural changes to its economy, especially in the oil sector, so that it could facilitate foreign (US) investments. Venezuela has the largest proven oil reserves, constituting approximately 17 per cent of the global total.[5] The stated objective of eliminating the drug and refugee problems emanating from Venezuela was soon overshadowed by the real calculations and strategies of developing oil fields in the country by US companies with a planned investment of US$ 100 billion over time.[6] The military threat over Venezuela, however, lingers to the degree of the Venezuelan regime’s non-cooperation with the US.[7]

The Bogeyman of Imminent Threat in Iran


Within a couple of months of the Venezuela action, the US, along with Israel, attacked Iran on 28 February 2026 and decapitated its leadership by killing Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with other high-ranking politicians and military officers, in Operation Epic Fury. The stated objectives were “eliminating imminent threats from the Iranian regime” and to “ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon”.[8] Obliterating the Iranian missile industry, annihilating their navy and disabling their regional proxies were a few other stated objectives.[9]

It must be noted that the claims of both the US and Israel after the 12-day war in June 2025 had ranged between “obliteration” of Iran’s nuclear bomb building capability and a “setback” in “Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons by many years”. The assessments claimed that it might take Iran many years to reconstitute the lost capability of enriching Uranium and build a weapon out of it.[10] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office had also claimed, “The achievement can continue indefinitely if Iran does not get access to nuclear material”.[11] Moreover, Joe Kent, Director, National Counterterrorism Centre in the US, resigned, saying, “Iran posed no imminent threat to our nation, and it is clear that we started this war due to pressure from Israel and its powerful American lobby”.[12]


Therefore, a surprise attack on Iran only within a year, against assessments of the country not posing an immediate threat to the US, along with the targeted assassination of its highest leadership and administrators, reveals a calculated intention for regime change with strikes for which no immediate provocation by Iran was visible. President Trump called on the people of Iran to take over the regime, as this might be their chance that they have had in generations.

The range and nature of the targets selected at the beginning of the US–Israeli joint strikes were beyond what was required to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capability, which was allegedly achieved in June 2025 itself. Therefore, the US’s emphasis on the nuclear dimension as justification for the attacks seemed more like a bogeyman. At the same time, the real objectives were different and linked to the long-term Trumpian grand strategy to be achieved through regime change in Iran. President Trump, known for his transactionalism, is spending billions of dollars on military adventures in Iran. Hence, the question is what motivated him to go to this war.

Did Israel Pull Trump into the War?

It is speculated that President Trump was led into the war by Israel. Israel’s objectives and motivations for the strikes can be understood in light of its antagonistic relationship with the country. Israel had been looking for an opportunity to bring the US on board with its designs to eliminate the Iranian regime, and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel succeeded with President Trump this time. But the question again is why Israel could convince Trump.

Given his inclinations and transactional temperament, President Trump should not join a war without concrete business incentives. His real motivations in this war, however, are less understood and quite obfuscated. Differences of opinion have also appeared within the Make America Great Again (MAGA) leadership about the ways of the movement that thrusted him to power. There is a divide within, and Trump, with his adventures in Venezuela and Iran, stands for his own faction. His war on Iran has received credible backing by the Republican Party supporters,[13] anointing his actions as the legitimate MAGA approach. Therefore, to understand his motivations and adventures, we must look into his policy and strategic outlook.

President Trump, in his address after the strikes, mentioned every long-term threat posed by Iran to the US interests in the region, but left out one aspect, i.e. oil. The US has historically had an interest in Iranian oil, but the aspirations to get hold of the source were jeopardised by the Iranian Islamist Revolution in 1979.[14] The Israeli objective of regime change or weakening Iran to a point of no return was deemed as a chance that converged with President Trump’s long-term strategic goals, hinged on an oil vision.

Trump’s approach, discernible in the National Security Strategy 2025, introduces oil as a correlating variable to be discussed in relation to his global strategic adventures, leading to military actions that began in Venezuela.[15] In 2023, Iran accounted for 12 per cent of the global oil reserves and 24 per cent of the Middle East.[16] The two countries that President Trump has targeted for military operations to date, along with the US, account for about one-third of global oil reserves. President Trump’s eagerness to end the war and expression of desire to control Kharg Island and the Iranian oil amidst the conflict alludes towards the original motive of controlling the Iranian oil with a brief blitzkrieg of air power, eliminating its leadership. No other economic factor explains President Trump’s allowing himself to be led into this expensive war.


As there was no immediate provocation by Iran, the US stated objectives appeared to align with Israeli objectives at the outset. However, as the conflict unfolded and the US (especially Trump) considered ending it even without the Strait of Hormuz reopening to normal operations, this revealed the US’s eagerness to get out of the expensive quagmire it had fallen into.[17] This also exposed the difference in goals between the two partners, despite their shared means of regime change. Israel’s motivation for the attack was a shift in the regional strategic balance and long-term security through regime change and weakening of Iran, and this could provide President Trump access to Iranian oil. A Venezuela-like cooperation from the Iranian leadership post the initial strikes appears to have been expected, but the dynamics of the conflict have set back US expectations.
The Centrality of Crude Oil in Trump’s Domestic and Global Strategy

President Trump started his second term with the slogan “drill baby drill”.[18] He concluded that producing more oil would help grow the US economy faster and secure its future hegemony.[19] His pursuit of foreign oil resources is also important to study, as President Trump himself has highlighted that the US is a net energy exporter and does not need foreign oil as it did in the past.[20] It is noteworthy that within a month of the inauguration of his second stint, President Trump signed an executive order stating his administration’s policy of “making America energy dominant”.[21] To this end, the order established the National Energy Dominance Council (NEDC) under the Executive Office of the President.[22]

Now, the question is: why does the US need this Council to dominate energy if the country has a surplus, and who is supposed to be dominated? The executive order, however, did not explicitly mention any other country or region to be dominated; and instead focused on planning from a “long-term” energy perspective towards increasing production of “reliable energy”. For this, the Trump administration prioritises oil drilling over green policies favouring renewables as he has reversed policies that supported and promoted electric vehicles.[23] The Endangered Species Committee in the US has also recently cleared oil and gas drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, exempting it from environmental rules, a move that could threaten a rare whale species and other marine life.[24] The Trumpian economic strategy clearly hinges on access to cheap oil.

Why the Threat to ‘Take Over’ Cuba?


After Venezuela and Iran, which are oil-rich countries, Cuba is a curious case that has not been in global news for its oil reserves. The island, home to around 10.9 million people, located only 90 miles off the southern US state of Florida, is associated with President Fidel Castro, its communist revolution, and its very close relationship with the Soviet Union (USSR) despite being a ‘non-aligned’ country during the Cold War. Cuba was governed by the Castro family under the banner of the Communist Party of Cuba, with single-party rule from 1959 to 2018. And, since then, it has been ruled by President Miguel Díaz-Canel under the same system.


Cuba is known for its famous cigars, sugar production (once among the highest globally but currently at record-low levels and negligible on a global scale), world-class rum, and pristine beaches, but not for oil. It is also recorded in modern history and international relations for the infamous Cuban Missile Crisis, which took the world to the brink of nuclear war in October 1962. The US had blockaded the country during the Crisis, and it has been under a strict US sanctions regime since then. The end of the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the weakening and reinvention of Russia as a successor state and polity, reduced Cuba’s strategic importance in global geopolitics. The state, however, remains a communist-run system with currently declining industrial and well-being indicators. It has ideological opposition to US policies, but cannot pose any military or political threat in the post-Cold War scenario.

Due to the historical baggage, Cuba keeps good relations with countries that oppose US hegemonic policies and its ambitions of unipolarity. Therefore, in the executive order signed on 29 January 2026, President Trump found Cuba’s “policies, practices and actions” as constituting “an unusual and extraordinary threat” to the “national security and foreign policy of the United States”. The allegations are that Cuba has relations with “numerous hostile countries”, “terrorist groups”, and “malign actors hostile to the United States” that include Russia, China, Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah. Citing Cuba’s relations with these actors and blaming it for having “Russia’s largest overseas signals intelligence facility” and “deep intelligence and defence cooperation” with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the executive order links it with the US’s notion of Western Hemisphere security and dominance.[25] The country, in fact, has been doing this for decades, but still cannot pose any real threat to the US.

A situation that was considered non-threatening and manageable with sanctions has now been categorised as a “national emergency”. The reasons for this shift are President Trump’s ideological perspective and the resulting threat perception, which makes him sensitive to anything linked to China in the American neighbourhood. Trump has concluded that he needs to push back against the increasing Chinese reach and penetration into the economic and strategic sectors in Latin America, especially in countries ruled by left-leaning leaders. Venezuela and Cuba, from the US perspective, are seen as classic autocratic ideological opponents in the region. Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, too, have left-leaning leadership. Still, they are viewed as functional democracies and may be more difficult to handle due to their size, resources, political culture and international relations. Colombia is a case in which there is a left-leaning government for the first time in modern history, and the upcoming presidential elections may alter the current government. Power in these countries may change hands between the right and left, but Cuba is different. President Trump’s military threat to the country is not justified by any explicit economic reason. The reasons cited are strategic, and Cuba has also been designated as a “state sponsor of terrorism” for sheltering members of US-designated terror organisations.[26] It may be noted that Trump had similar allegations against Venezuela and Iran, which also have the common mineral resource factor of substantial oil reserves that could be turned into long-term energy and economic benefits for the US. Given the absence of a large oil industry, Cuba, at the surface, seems to be a different case altogether. But, with a further inquiry into the country’s crude oil potential, the perception changes.

Cuba as a Potential Petro Power in the Western Hemisphere


Cuba currently has only 124 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, ranking it the 67th largest reserve holder.[27] The US and Cuban geological surveys estimate recoverable oil reserves between 4.6 and 20 billion barrels, respectively.[28] Various geological assessments of Cuba, especially its northern offshore Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) blocks, identify and acknowledge its potential to catapult itself among the top 20 largest proven oil reservoirs in the world and become a significant player in the oil economy of the Latin American Region. Even if the mean potential of the reserves is realised, only Venezuela and Canada would be able to surpass Cuba in terms of per capita oil reserves in the Western Hemisphere.[29] The estimates for the Cuban offshore fields are at least half the size of the US’s Alaskan oil reserves.[30]

Since the discovery of Cuba’s oil potential in the early 21st century, the country has sought to reduce its energy dependence on Venezuela and Mexico amid the post-Cold War geopolitical landscape. Oil companies from Canada, China, Russia, Spain, Norway and India had shown interest and invested in Cuba’s offshore exploration blocks, but nothing productive has come of it. Almost 80 per cent of the exploration area lies in deep or ultra-deep waters, and oil cannot be easily extracted with old technology.[31] The state-of-the-art exploration technology is owned and controlled by the US, which has imposed sanctions and a blockade against Cuba, making it difficult to drill due to technology and investment denial, and practically choking the country from becoming energy self-reliant.[32] The development of offshore oilfields over time could boost the Cuban economy and national prosperity, making Cuba a significant player in the region’s petroindustry, although possibly at the cost of economic diversification.[33]

US companies in the agricultural and pharmaceutical sectors have been pressing, sometimes successfully, for relaxations or normalisation of relations with Cuba to gain better access to its lucrative business opportunities.[34] Similarly, US oil companies have also been, though unsuccessfully, lobbying the US Congress to permit them to bid for oil and gas exploration in Cuban Waters. With only a small fraction of the world’s proven oil reserves open to foreign involvement,[35] they do not want to be left out of the race.[36] Former US President Barack Obama took steps to ease sanctions and build a normal relationship with the country. But, his efforts were thwarted by President Trump’s reversal of his policy towards Cuba. President Trump not only reinstated stringent sanctions on Cuba but also choked its essential crude supplies responsible for more than 80 per cent of its electricity generation.[37]

Amidst the downplayed oil dimension in Venezuela and Iran adventures, President Trump’s attention on Cuba as well as the US companies’ interest in exploration of its oilfields converge at a point where the country needs to be opened up for exploration. President Obama took a few steps towards engagement, but President Trump has a different way of achieving his goals. The oil potential of Cuba fits into his long-term scheme of Making America Great Again (MAGA), for which dominating the global energy market, along with the geopolitics of the Western Hemisphere, is an important condition.

The Political Dimensions of a Cuban Energy Self-Reliance


Industry experts do not expect any global disruption due to the availability of Cuban oil in future, and the realisation of the estimated potential may not impact the global prices in general. But, Cuba shall be energy self-reliant with the realisation of even the lower end of the estimates.[38] Further, the country’s transition to being a net oil exporter will have a positive impact on its economy, leading to the failure of the long-term US sanctions policy against Cuba.[39] Hence, it is imperative from the US perspective to keep Cuba energy-starved until the geopolitical and economic positions of the two countries are aligned. The alignment is possible either with regime change in Cuba or a paradigm shift in the US policy to engage the country with its political system intact. President Obama’s efforts to engage and relax sanctions on Cuba faced tough resistance, especially by migrant Cubans who have a grudge against the Communist regime.

President Trump, however, in the new geopolitical context of increasing influence of China and Russia in the Latin American Region, wants to decisively change the long-maintained status quo to benefit the US through regime change. His rhetoric on Cuba is explained by the convergence of his strategic visions of securing the Western Hemisphere for the US by driving China and Russia out, and of dominating the global energy market. As President Trump’s actions in Cuba are being analysed more from strategic and high-level geopolitical perspectives rather than economic ones, the correlation with oil has received little attention from analysts, who focus only on the country’s current proven reserves and production capacity.[40]

Trumpian Actions Have a Long-Term Economic Perspective on Oil

The US military actions and objectives on Venezuela and Iran are being shaped from a long-term Trumpian economic and strategic perspective, and Cuba is no exception. The exploration and development of oil fields in these countries may take around a decade or more and require heavy investment. Cuba, with its oil potential, is also among the top global producers of Cobalt and Nickel (critical metals for electric vehicle battery production) that may be important to a futuristic US foreign policy. But, President Trump has already ‘debunked’ US policy supporting and promoting electric vehicles by prioritising oil and gas over green and renewable energy sources.[41] Hence, oil has emerged as a clear priority in his calculations for engaging or targeting countries to achieve his strategic and foreign policy goals. In the context of Cuba, too, potential oil fields have to be given greater weight than renewables and critical minerals to understand the Trumpian economic and strategic calculus.

Conclusion


The oil potential of Cuba would be an unsaid benefit for the US if the stated strategic objectives are achieved through regime change. US involvement in oil exploration and production in Cuba could be a viable option for the communist Cuban government as well, but it cannot happen without the US securing guarantees to protect its stated strategic interests in the country. President Trump had already indicated the possibility of a deal between the two countries without an invasion, referring to a takeover in “some form”. Any deal, however, would depend on the Cuban government’s willingness to shed its ideological opposition to the US government. Apart from the US desire to detach Cuba from China, Russia and other unfriendly states in the region, oil exploration could be another lucrative potential benefit for the Trump Administration.

President Trump’s conflict with countries that posed no immediate or imminent military threat to the US should at least be explained by economic logic and motivation. Any conflict initiated for any reason ultimately has its economic endgame. And, as we examine here, oil fits in as the variable correlating to Trump’s aggression and military threat against Venezuela, Iran and Cuba. The presence of the correlation is further highlighted by President Trump’s statements and executive order regarding his energy policy. The US–Israel–Iran war has not yet concluded, and the outcomes may not be as the US expected, but oil could be a benefit in all the three. The endgames of the US aggression against Venezuela, Iran and Cuba may focus on long-term deals that include oil benefits.

The focus on the nuclear material issue might be more useful for legitimising the catastrophe unleashed. But, from the perspective of Trumpian MAGA priorities, the success, rationale, wisdom and the economics of these military adventures would remain highly questionable in the absence of any energy/oil deals.


Endnotes:

Will Grant, “Russian Oil Tanker Docks in Cuba Ending Near-Total Blockade”, BBC News, 31 March 2026.

Cuba War Next? Trump Drops ‘Wait for Two Weeks’ Bombshell as Iran Conflict Explodes”, The Times of India Channel on YouTube, YouTube, 6 March 2026.

Country Analysis Brief: Venezuela”, Energy Information Administration, United States of America, p. 5.

Michael Scherer, “Trump Threatens Venezuela’s New Leader with A Fate Worse than Maduro’s”, The Atlantic, 4 January 2026.

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council (NSC 5402)”, Office of the Historian, Washington, USA, 2 January 1954.

National Security Strategy 2025, pp. 5, 14, and 28.

Alexander Ward and Meridith McGraw, “Trump Tells Aides He’s Willing to End War without Reopening Hormuz”, The Wall Street Journal, 31 March 2026.

President Donald Trump’s Inaugural Address”, The White House, 25 January 2026.
National Security Strategy 2025, p. 14.

Establishing the National Energy Dominance Council”, The White House, 14 February 2025.
Ibid.

State Sponsors of Terrorism”, U.S. Department of State.

Cuba Oil Summary Table”, Worldometer, 15 April 2025
.
H. Michael Erisman, “Cuba as a Hemispheric Petropower: Prospects and Consequences”, International Journal of Cuban Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2019, pp. 43–44.
Ibid.

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute”, Florida International University, November 2006, p. 6.

H. Michael Erisman, “Cuba as a Hemispheric Petropower: Prospects and Consequences”, no. 28, p. 48.

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute”, no. 30, p. 4.
H. Michael Erisman, “Cuba as a Hemispheric Petropower: Prospects and Consequences”, no. 28, p. 50.
Ibid., pp. 54–55.

Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, “The Current Status and Future Prospects for Oil Exploration in Cuba: A Special Report for the Cuban Research Institute”, no. 30, p. 2.
H. Michael Erisman, “Cuba as a Hemispheric Petropower: Prospects and Consequences”, no. 28, p. 55.

Where Does Cuba Get Its Electricity?”, International Energy Agency, 7 April 2026.
Robert Sandels, “An Oil-Rich Cuba?”, Monthly Review, Vol. 63, No. 4, 2011, pp. 40–45.
Ibid.

Arnab Chakrabarty, “Cuba – Cracks in the Red Citadel, and the US’ Unfinished Geostrategic Dream”, Indian Council of World Affairs, 7 April 2026.

Jeremy M. Michalek, “Trump Reversed Policies Supporting Electric Vehicles − It Will Affect The Road To Clean Electricity, Too”, no. 23.


Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

About the author: Dr. Saurabh Mishra is a Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi. Prior to MP-IDSA he was an Associate Professor at the Amity Institute for Defence & Strategic Studies (AIDSS), Noida, preceded by his assignments as Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), an autonomous think-tank of the Ministry of External Affairs, India and Research Assistant at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) was formerly named The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

Thursday, April 16, 2026

 World Nuclear News


Bruce Power to share large reactor experience with SaskPower


Bruce Power has signed a memorandum of understanding with SaskPower to share its expertise in nuclear generation, project development, and long-term operations as Saskatchewan evaluates large nuclear technologies for potential use in the Canadian province.
 
The Bruce site in Ontario (Image: Bruce Power)

The provincial government of Saskatchewan and utility SaskPower announced plans in January to formally evaluate large nuclear reactor technologies for use in the province. Saskatchewan already has plans for the deployment of small modular reactors (SMRs).
 
In October last year, the Government of Saskatchewan released the Saskatchewan First Energy Security Strategy and Supply Plan, setting out its vision and long-term strategy for electricity in the province. The plan sees the provincial government reiterate its commitments to nuclear power, as communicated in the provincial Growth Plan and the Interprovincial Strategic Plan on Small Modular Reactors. Specifically, it says, the Government of Saskatchewan will continue to examine the feasibility of two SMR units near Estevan, and evaluate the feasibility of large reactors and/or advanced SMRs to meet industry demand for electricity and heat to identify if either can be economically deployed in Saskatchewan.

Crown utility SaskPower has begun the formal process to evaluate large reactor technologies. The technology selection process will take place in parallel with SaskPower's existing SMR project.

The MoU with Bruce Power will "formalise information-sharing, enable alignment on federal and provincial nuclear strategy, and leverage Bruce Power's national leadership in nuclear expertise", Bruce Power said.

The Bruce Power site in Ontario was home to Canada's first commercial reactor, Douglas Point, which operated from 1967 to 1984, and its current fleet of eight Candu pressurised heavy water reactors are being refurbished to operate for several decades to come. Bruce Power is also exploring the option for a Bruce C project and up to 4,800 megawatts of new nuclear on its site. The proposed Bruce C Project is the first new nuclear development in Canada to enter the federal Impact Assessment process.

"We're uniquely positioned to collaborate with SaskPower as it explores new nuclear to power the province with clean energy for the next generation," said James Scongack, Bruce Power's Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice-President. "We will share what we've learned in 25 years of operating the Bruce site and in planning projects and planning for new nuclear."

Rupen Pandya, President and CEO of SaskPower, added: "The growing demands for reliable, baseload power, not just in Saskatchewan, but across the country, reinforce the vital role that nuclear power will play in the years ahead. Power is a key economic driver in Saskatchewan that's needed to advance critical sectors such as mining, oil and gas and agriculture."

Saskatchewan is home to the largest and highest-grade uranium mines in the world, but does not currently have any nuclear power reactors. It is working alongside the provinces of Ontario, New Brunswick and Alberta on the deployment of SMRs under a joint strategic plan released in 2022.

SaskPower has previously selected GE Vernova Hitachi Nuclear Energy's BWRX-300 SMR for potential deployment in the province in the mid-2030s. It announced in 2024 that it had identified two potential sites for SMR deployment, both in the Estevan area in the south-east of the province. It also signed a memorandum of understanding with Cameco and Westinghouse to explore technical and commercial pathways to deploy Westinghouse's reactor technology, including the advanced AP1000 reactor and AP300 SMR for long-term electricity supply planning.

"Saskatchewan's Energy Security Strategy sets out a pathway to nuclear power generation from both SMRs and large nuclear reactors to prepare for rising electricity demand and future export opportunities, including electricity and critical minerals such as potash and uranium," Minister Responsible for SaskPower Jeremy Harrison said. "Collaboration is key to ensure we make informed, future-focused decisions that benefit our provinces and our country."

Application lodged to build microreactor at US university


The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission announced it has received an application from the University of Illinois to construct the first research KRONOS micro modular reactor on the university's campus.
 
A rendering of the KRONOS plant at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (Image: NANO Nuclear)

The Construction Permit Application (CPA) was submitted on 31 March by The Grainger College of Engineering at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, NANO Nuclear Energy Inc's partner for the KRONOS MMR deployment at the University of Illinois (U of I).

"With this submission, NANO Nuclear becomes the first commercially-ready microreactor developer and the third commercially-ready Generation IV advanced reactor developer to submit a CPA, placing NANO Nuclear among a small group of advanced nuclear companies progressing toward commercial deployment," the company said.

It added: "The preparation of a CPA represents the culmination of years of engineering development, thousands of pages of technical documentation, coordinated input across reactor design, safety analysis, environmental review, and regulatory compliance disciplines, and establishment of a viable supply chain. In NANO Nuclear's partnership with the U of I, the CPA submission builds on an extensive body of work developed through continuous engagement with the NRC, including completion of the readiness assessment, a voluntary but highly rigorous process aimed at ensuring a complete and high-quality application. Importantly, this iterative process reflects a high level of alignment with regulatory expectations and provides strong confidence in the application's readiness for acceptance for docketing and formal NRC review."

"The NRC is reviewing the application to determine whether it is complete," the regulator said. "If accepted, the agency will begin a detailed technical evaluation of the reactor's safety and security and publish a notice of opportunity to request an adjudicatory hearing on the application before the NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board."

It noted that if the construction permit is granted, the university would need to submit a separate operating licence application and receive NRC approval before the reactor could begin operation.

NANO Nuclear acquired the Micro Modular Reactor Energy System technology through its USD85 million acquisition of Ultra Safe Nuclear Corporation's nuclear technology, which was completed in January last year. At that time, NANO Nuclear renamed the technology as the KRONOS MMR. The MMR is a 45 MW thermal, 15 MW electrical high-temperature gas-cooled reactor, using TRISO fuel in prismatic graphite blocks and has a sealed transportable core.

NANO Nuclear signed a strategic collaboration agreement with the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in April 2025 to construct the first research KRONOS micro modular reactor on the university's campus. The agreement formally established the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign as a partner in the licensing, siting, public engagement, and research operation of the KRONOS MMR, while also identifying the university campus as the permanent site for the reactor as a research and demonstration installation.

The university plans to re-power partially its coal-fired Abbott power station with the KRONOS MMR, providing a zero-carbon demonstration of district heat and power to campus buildings as part of its green campus initiative. The project team aims to demonstrate how microreactor systems integrate with existing fossil fuel infrastructure to accelerate the decarbonisation of existing power-generation facilities.

"Through every step of the process thus far, we at The Grainger College of Engineering have worked diligently alongside our partners at NANO Nuclear Energy to ensure our goals in constructing the first KRONOS MMR on the university's campus can become a reality," said Caleb Brooks, Professor and Donald Biggar Willett Faculty Scholar of Nuclear, Plasma and Radiological Engineering at The Grainger College of Engineering. "By submitting the Construction Permit Application to the NRC, we are taking the next step in signifying that the work will be done correctly and precisely. And we continue to look forward to the possibilities of what can become the most advanced nuclear research platform on any US campus."

Growing recognition of nuclear fuel cycle's importance, WNFC hears



This is a significant time of change for the nuclear energy sector - and existing nuclear capacity is the bedrock for nuclear growth that could be unprecedented, according to nuclear industry leaders at the World Nuclear Fuel Cycle 2026 conference in Monaco.
 
(Image: World Nuclear Association)

Speakers at the event co-organised by the Nuclear Energy Institute and World Nuclear Association highlighted the challenges and opportunities at a time when geopolitical uncertainty means nuclear energy - underpinned by reliable fuel supplies - is more important than ever.

"Governments all over the world recognise that energy security - and the security of fuel supplies - is more important than ever," World Nuclear Association Director General Sama Bilbao y León said as she opened the conference together with Nuclear Energy Institute Vice President of Technical & Regulatory Services Jennifer Uhle. But she also called for pragmatism.

"Frankly, momentum is building all over the world, over all markets … but much of that progress is still just ambition," Bilbao y León said. 

"This really is a moment that demands much more than technical progress and technical expertise. We need to continue to ensure that policies support long-term investment, we need to ensure that finance is aligned with clean energy policies, and we need to ensure that regulation is proportional and risk-informed. We need to remember that ambition by itself will not deliver new reactors, will not mine new fuel, and won't build the supply chains that we need."

Uhle said this was a moment of profound importance for nuclear energy - and especially in times of geopolitical uncertainty, a stable fuel supply lies at its heart. "Nuclear power doesn't run just on technology, but also on trust: trust that fuel will be delivered on time and this global network will remain reliable," she said.

Director General of the nucleareurope trade association, Emmanuel Brutin, and Framatome Senior Senior Executive Vice President Lionel Gaiffe were in agreement that this is a time of change. A shift in sentiment is being seen in European institutions as well as in some countries, Brutin said, calling for support, particularly in terms of policy backing and finance, to foster this.

Now is a "good time to rediscover merits of nuclear energy", Gaiffe said - and not just in terms of new capacity. Existing reactors provide energy stability, low carbon, and grid stability. Framatome is firstly devoted to providing service to existing reactors. And those reactors need support from a reliable - and sovereign - nuclear fuel supply chain, Gaiffe said. 

Incentives

Brutin also stressed the importance of having a sovereign - and also diversified - nuclear fuel supply chain. Brussels is realising that Europe is still dependent on imported fossil energy - and that is expensive, he said. "The solution for Europe is home-grown, clean sources of energy," he said.

As a net-zero energy source with a value chain that is entirely based in Europe, nuclear is a "huge asset" to the bloc, he said, and several EU-level initiatives are recognising and providing support for this resiliency. The European Investment Bank - a key EU financial institution - has provided significant loans for fuel cycle projects such as the expansion of Orano's Georges Besse II conversion plant, and having EU financing helps attract other investors. "Even a bit of EU money can go a long way," he said.

The REPowerEU plan, which was adopted by the European Commission in 2022, aims to rapidly reduce EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels. The legislation defining the policy is still to be finalised.

But while nuclear generation is recognised as environmentally sustainable under the EU Taxonomy Regulation - legislation aimed at channelling finance flows towards sustainable activities - the nuclear fuel cycle itself is not yet part of the Taxonomy. Ensuring the fuel cycle is in the EU Taxonomy would help to attract investors, he said.

Policy support would incentivise fuel cycle capacity, Gaiffe said, but would need to be balanced and "realistic" to ensure capacity grows at a suitable pace to meet demand and avoid a situation of overcapacity. 

On-time and on-budget delivery remains the main focus for politicians, Brutin said, but building stakeholder trust in projects is an important factor to drive nuclear fuel cycle growth. "There is this new momentum for nuclear - let's use it," he said. 

Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6 resumes commercial operation


Unit 6 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear power plant has resumed commercial operation, becoming the first reactor owned by Tokyo Electric Power Company to do so since the accident at its Fukushima Daiichi plant.
 
The control room of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa 6 during the comprehensive load performance test (Image: Tepco)

The 1,356 MWe Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) in Japan's Niigata Prefecture, which had been offline since March 2012, was restarted in the evening of 21 January. Tepco aimed to return the reactor to commercial operation on 18 March. However, shortly after midnight on 22 January, "an alarm was triggered in the control rod operation monitoring system for one control rod during the control rod withdrawal operation, causing the withdrawal operation to be suspended". The unit's restart was subsequently suspended while an investigation into the cause of the alarm was carried out.

After replacing parts, the reactor was again restarted on 9 February. It was taken offline between 20 and 24 February for inspections as part of procedures for its full-scale restart. The unit was taken offline again in mid-March after a damaged electric conductor was discovered.

A comprehensive load performance test was carried out on Tuesday, observed by the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA).

"Today, following the issuance by the Nuclear Regulation Authority of a pre-operational confirmation certificate and a certificate of passing for the pre-operational inspection for Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station Unit 6, Tepco recommenced commercial operation at 4:00pm [local time]," Tepco said.

The seven-unit Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant was unaffected by the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami that damaged Tepco's Fukushima Daiichi plant, although the plant's reactors were previously all offline for up to three years following the 2007 Niigata-Chuetsu earthquake, which caused damage to the site but did not damage the reactors themselves. While the units were offline, work was carried out to improve the plant's earthquake resistance. All units have remained offline since the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

Although it has worked on the other units at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa site, Tepco is concentrating its resources on units 6 and 7 while it deals with the clean-up at Fukushima Daiichi. These 1,356 MWe ABWRs began commercial operation in 1996 and 1997, respectively, and were the first Japanese boiling water reactors to be put forward for restart. Tepco received permission from the NRA to restart units 6 and 7 in December 2017. Restarting those two Kashiwazaki-Kariwa units - which have been offline for periodic inspections since March 2012 and August 2011, respectively - would increase the company's earnings by an estimated JPY100 billion (USD633 million) per year.

Since the Fukushima Daiichi accident, 14 Japanese reactors have gradually resumed operation.

Bulgarian minister wants fixed price for Kozloduy 7 and 8


Minister of Energy Traycho Traykov has said Bulgaria wants its proposed new nuclear power units at the Kozloduy plant to be built at fixed prices.
 
(Image: Bulgaria's Ministry of Energy)

Traykov was speaking during a meeting with South Korea's Ambassador to Bulgaria, Dong-bae Kim, and representatives from Hyundai Engineering and Construction, which included a discussion on progress.

According to the Ministry of Energy report, Traykov "welcomed the commitment of the Korean side to assign 30% of the activities to Bulgarian companies. According to him, Bulgaria's expertise and long-term experience in the operation of nuclear power plants make it a safe and reliable partner in the implementation of such large-scale projects".

The engineering contract for the construction of the two new units was signed in November 2024. During the discussions, the two sides agreed on the terms of its extension "so that work on the project is not interrupted".

Traykov, who is energy ministry as part of the caretaker government in place ahead of elections this weekend, was reported by the ministry to have said "we have traumatic experience from other similar projects, where endless extension and lack of control over the price ultimately lead to failure" and emphasised "the need for the new capacities at the Kozloduy NPP to be built at fixed prices".

Background

Kozloduy units 1-4 were VVER-440 models which the European Commission classified as non-upgradeable and Bulgaria agreed to close them during negotiations to join the European Union in 2007. Units 5 and 6 feature VVER-1000 reactors that were connected to the grid in 1987 and 1991, respectively. Both units have been through refurbishment and life-extension programmes to enable extension of operation from 30 to 60 years. The country's two operable reactors generate about one-third of its electricity.

Westinghouse's AP1000 has been selected as the technology for the two proposed new units and in November 2024 Hyundai Engineering & Construction, Westinghouse and Kozloduy NPP-New Build signed an engineering contract for the new capacity, with ministers saying that signing the contract meant that schedule and finance details would be firmed up for the new capacity. The Ministry of Energy and the USA's Citi bank agreed on a partnership in July last year to secure funding for the construction of the new units, and site location applications were submitted.

In December Kozloduy NPP-New Build EAD and a consortium comprising Laurentis Energy Partners, its subsidiary Canadian Nuclear Partners SA (CNPSA) and BWXT Canada, signed an owner’s engineer contract to advance the two new AP1000 units.

How the two new units could look at Kozloduy (Image: Westinghouse)

The aim is for the first new Westinghouse AP1000 unit - unit 7 at Kozloduy - to be operational in 2035 and the second one - unit 8 - to be operational in 2037. The 2,300 MWe capacity of the two new units would exceed the 1,760 MWe capacity of the closed first four units. The Bulgarian government has also said that further units will be needed to replace units 5 and 6 by 2050.  It has also been considering the deployment of small modular reactors in the country.

Grohnde nuclear fuel transfer completed

All the used nuclear fuel assemblies in the storage pool at Germany's Grohnde nuclear power plant have been transferred to an on-site interim storage facility, PreussenElektra announced.
 
(Image: PreussenElektra)

Grohnde was shut down on 31 December 2021. PreussenElektra - a subsidiary of EOn Group - applied for approval to decommission and dismantle the 1,360 MWe pressurised water reactor in October 2017. In December 2023, the Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection issued the first decommissioning and dismantling permit to PreussenElektra for the Grohnde plant, with dismantling work beginning in the following month.

To achieve fuel-free status, a total of 694 fuel assemblies have been transferred from the plant's storage pool into CASTOR used fuel storage casks since 2023.

On 7 April, the last CASTOR container was successfully loaded, removed from the reactor building, and transferred to the Grohnde interim storage facility for used fuel elements.

"This means that the radioactive core of the plant has been completely removed – and with it, over 99% of the radioactivity," PreussenElektra said.

Plant manager Jörg Bornemann said: "The elimination of nuclear fuel is an important milestone in the decommissioning of our plant. It forms the basis for further technical and organisational adjustments. Now we can shut down and dismantle further systems and reduce staffing levels. Their valuable expertise is urgently needed elsewhere – for example, for the dismantling of the reactor pressure vessel internals, which will begin at the end of this year."

PreussenElektra noted that in order to carry out the fuel transfer operation, various components and plant parts had to first be removed from the area of ​​the emptied used fuel pool to create the necessary storage, handling, dismantling, and packaging areas. The newly constructed transport preparation hall is  now available for receiving the low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste from the decommissioning process. The Lower Saxony Ministry for the Environment, Energy and Climate Protection granted the necessary permit for the storage of radioactive waste and residues at the beginning of April.

Decommissioning of the Grohnde plant is scheduled for completion by 2039. Afterwards, the plant site will be available for redevelopment. About 500 people are currently employed at the site.

PreussenElektra is responsible for the decommissioning of eight nuclear power plants in Germany. Isar 2 was the last of the PreussenElektra plants to cease operations on 15 April 2023. The Brokdorf and Grohnde plants were shut down on 31 December 2021. With the already decommissioned Isar 1, Stade, Unterweser and Würgassen plants, all of PreussenElektra's nuclear facilities are now in various phases of decommissioning and dismantling. The company's goal is to dismantle its power plant fleet by 2040.

Outer dome installed at Changjiang unit 4


The outer steel dome has been installed at unit 4 of the Changjiang nuclear power plant in China's Hainan province, China National Nuclear Corporation has announced.
 
(Image: China Huaneng)

The dome - measuring 52 metres in diameter, 12 metres in height and weighing about 415 tonnes - was hoisted into place on top of the containment building using a 4,000-tonne crawler crane on 13 April. The process of raising the outer dome into position took two hours.

China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) said the installation of the outer dome of unit 4 "marks the entry of the second phase of the Changjiang Nuclear Power Plant civil construction project into the final stage".


(Image: CNNC)

The Hualong One reactor design features a double-layered containment building, the main function of which is to ensure the integrity and leak tightness of the reactor building, and it plays a key role in the containment of radioactive substances.

Construction of the unit is being undertaken by CNNC subsidiary CNNC 22nd Engineering Co Ltd. "This installation was the result of a series of systematic innovations and collaborative efforts in the fields of technology and management," CNNC said. "The CNNC 22nd Engineering Co Ltd project team adopted several groundbreaking measures to build a comprehensive support system for the installation task."


(Image: CNNC)

The entire hoisting process utilised 3D modeling technology, CNNC noted. A full-size digital model of the outer dome was constructed in advance, allowing for precise simulation and collision detection of the hoisting path and key connection points, thus mitigating potential risks from the outset. Based on the 3D model, multi-level technical briefings and construction simulations were conducted, providing solid technical support for the successful one-time hoisting of the outer dome.

Two Hualong One reactors are being constructed in the second phase of the Changjiang plant. First concrete was poured for the base slab of unit 3's nuclear island in March 2021, with that of unit 4 being poured in the December of that year. Changjiang Phase II - units 3 and 4 - represents a total estimated investment of CNY40 billion (USD5.9 billion), according to China Huaneng, which holds a 51% share in the project. The construction period is expected to be 60 months. Both units are scheduled to be fully operational in early 2027.


(Image: CNNC)

"After completion, the annual power generation [by Changjiang units 3 and 4] will reach 18 billion kilowatt-hours, which is equivalent to saving 6.326 million tonnes of coal and reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 11.68 million tonnes per year," China Huaneng said.

The Changjiang nuclear site is already home to two operating CNP-600 pressurised water reactors (PWRs) - Changjiang 1 and 2 - which entered commercial operation in 2015 and 2016, respectively. In 2021, CNNC also began construction of a demonstration ACP100 small modular reactor at the site. The multi-purpose 125 MWe PWR - also referred to as the Linglong One - is designed for electricity production, heating, steam production or seawater desalination. It is currently undergoing pre-commissioning tests.

The island province of Hainan is China's southernmost point. Energy policies published in 2019 by Hainan Province Development and Reform Commission specify that nuclear power will become the primary source of electricity for the island, which has a population of close to 10 million.

Sunday, April 12, 2026

World Nuclear News


Three US states pave way for new nuclear



Legislation lifting a long-standing nuclear moratorium has been signed in New Jersey; legislation to incentivise nuclear construction has been signed in Kentucky; and in Texas, applications have opened for USD350 million of funding appropriated by the state to boost advanced nuclear construction.
 

Governor Mikie Sherrill signs the New Jersey legislation at the Salem nuclear power plant (Image: Office of Governor/Tim Larsen)

New Jersey Governor Mikie Sherrill signed the legislation to remove the permitting hurdle that has created a de facto moratorium and announced the launch of the state's new Nuclear Task Force after a tour of PSEG's Salem nuclear power plant.

"For costs to come down, we need more energy supply. New Jersey is well-positioned to be a leader in next-generation nuclear energy to help bring that supply, and we are open for business," Sherrill said. "By lifting outdated barriers and bringing together leaders across government, industry, and labour, we're setting the stage for our state to pursue new advanced nuclear power. This will help New Jersey secure a stronger, cleaner, more affordable, and reliable energy future - while keeping the state at the forefront of innovation, job creation, and economic growth."

A nuclear moratorium is a state-imposed ban or restriction on building new nuclear capacity, but how this looks varies from state to state: for example, a state might set conditions related to legislative approvals, voter consent, or waste disposal requirements before construction can begin. According to the US Nuclear Energy Institute, eight US states - California, Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Oregon, Rhode Island and Vermont - have long-standing nuclear moratoriums. Connecticut has partially lifted its moratorium, and while New York conditionally lifted its moratorium many years ago a specific moratorium remains in parts of Long Island.

New Jersey's Coastal Area Facility Review Act blocks new permits for the construction and operation of new nuclear energy facilities by requiring an approved method by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for radioactive waste disposal, which New Jersey says is an outdated standard that cannot be met. The new legislation - S3870/A4528 - resolves the issue by allowing the commissioner of New Jersey's Department of Environmental Protection to approve permits that are "based on safe, NRC-compliant waste storage", removing the de facto moratorium and clearing the path for new nuclear energy development.

The newly formed Nuclear Task Force, co-chaired by Elizabeth Noll, Senior Strategist for Energy at the Office of the Governor, and Christine Guhl-Sadovy, President of the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities, will be organised across five focus areas - Financing, Supply Chains and Technology Development, Workforce Growth and Training, Regulatory and Permitting Framework, and Public Trust and Confidence - with the goal of ensuring that New Jersey is "ready to capture the benefits of new nuclear power, while maintaining the highest standards of public safety and transparency."

Two nuclear power plants - the two-unit Salem and the single-unit Hope Creek, all owned by PSEG - currently provide around 42% of New Jersey's electricity.

Kentucky incentives

Legislation signed by Governor Andy Beshear on 8 April establishes the Kentucky Nuclear Energy Development Authority and, under it, the Nuclear Reactor Site Readiness Pilot Program "to facilitate the application for and procurement of early site permits, construction permits, or combined operating licences from the NRC for the siting of new nuclear energy generating facilities".

Beshear said Senate Bill 57 would potentially lead to lower utility rates for Kentuckians over the long term. "Every step makes a difference when it comes to helping our people save their hard-earned dollars," he said.

Kentucky does not currently have any nuclear generation capacity.

Texas funding

Texas has issued a request for applications for USD350 million of funding appropriated to the Texas Advanced Nuclear Development Fund (TANDF). Applications are being accepted for the TANDF's Advanced Nuclear Construction Reimbursement Program and Project Design and Supply Chain Reimbursement Program.

The fund is under the Texas Advanced Nuclear Energy Office (TANEO), which was established by the Texas legislature to provide strategic leadership for the advanced nuclear industry and associated supply chain industries in Texas and to promote the development of advanced nuclear reactors in the state, amongst other things.

Eligible applicants must be businesses, nonprofit organisations, and governmental entities, including institutions of higher education "that have - or reasonably expect to have - a docketed construction permit or licence application for the project at the NRC on or before 1 December 2026". Applications are due by mid-May.

Production begins at US uranium project


Uranium Energy Corp's Burke Hollow in Texas is the first new in-situ recovery operation to start up in the USA in over a decade.
 
Burke Hollow (Image: CNW Group/Uranium Energy Corp)

In-situ recovery - or ISR - is a method of mining uranium by dissolving and recovering it via wells. It is also known as in-situ leaching. Ground water fortified with a complexing agent, and often with an oxidant (such as gaseous oxygen), is introduced into the orebody to dissolve the uranium from the sandstone host. The uranium-bearing before being recovered and processed into yellowcake.

Uranium Energy Corp (UEC) has two ISR hub and spoke platforms in South Texas and Wyoming, with a central processing plant as the "hub" with several ISR uranium projects providing "spokes". Production from Burke Hollow will be processed at the company's Hobson Central Processing Plant, which is licensed to produce up to 4 million pounds of uranium per year.

"The startup of Burke Hollow is a significant achievement for UEC, advancing the project from a grassroots discovery in 2012 to production in 2026," UEC President and CEO Amir Adnani said. "With two ISR operations now producing, and our Ludeman ISR project planned for startup in 2027, we are building a scalable, multi-faceted platform supported by the largest uranium resource base in the United States."

According to UEC, Burke Hollow is the largest ISR uranium discovery in the USA in the past decade, with significant long-term development potential: only about half of the property, which covers some 20,000 acres (over 8,000 hectares) has been explored to date. The estimated mineral resource for the project is currently 6,155,000 pounds U3O8 (2,368 tU) in the measured and indicated category, plus 4,883,000 pounds U3O8 of inferred resources.

Production was able to start following the receipt of final approvals from the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ). Craig Wall, UEC's Vice President, Environmental, Health & Safety, Texas said the commission's approval, coming after more than a decade of exploration, permitting and development, "reflects the strength of our technical and operational execution. We appreciate the collaboration and professionalism of the TCEQ throughout the process and look forward to continuing to work with them as the project advances."

UEC's South Texas team will now focus on ramping operations and constructing additional wellfields across the project.

In addition to the largest uranium resource base in the USA, with 12 million pounds per year of uranium production capacity across its Wyoming and South Texas hub-and-spoke ISR operations, UEC also controls extensive land and resource portfolios in Canada's Athabasca Basin, including the Roughrider Project in Saskatchewan. The company is also pursuing domestic refining and conversion capabilities in the USA through its United States Uranium Refining & Conversion Corp subsidiary.

New Korean reactor cleared for start up


South Korea's Nuclear Safety and Security Commission said it has completed all nine inspections required to be performed prior to the reactor's initial criticality during the pre-operation inspection of Saeul unit 3.
 
Saeul 3 (Image: KHNP)

In January 2014, the government authorised construction of two APR1400 units as Saeul units 3 and 4 (formerly known as Shin Kori 5 and 6). Construction was originally scheduled to start in September 2014, but was then delayed. The regulator issued a construction licence in June 2016, and site works began immediately. Construction of unit 3 commenced in April 2017. However, following the change in government in June 2017, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) decided to suspend work for three months. In October 2017, a government-organised committee voted 59.5% in favour of resuming construction of the two units. The committee stated that stability of power supply had been cited as a primary reason for the choice in survey responses. In September 2018, construction of unit 4 commenced.

Prior to the delay, commercial operation of the units was due in March 2021 and March 2022, respectively. In late December 2025 the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) issued an operating licence for Saeul 3, with fuel loading and approximately eight months of testing to follow. Commercial operation is expected around August 2026. Saeul 4 is expected to follow in late 2026.

"Since the operating licence was issued last year, the NSSC has been conducting pre-operational inspections (5 stages) on Saeul unit 3," the regulator said. "During this process, inspections were conducted on items that must be performed before criticality, such as nuclear fuel loading inspections and high-temperature functional tests. As a result, it was confirmed that reactor criticality can be safely achieved."

The NSSC said it plans to finally confirm the safety of the unit by conducting follow-up inspections, including power increase tests, from the time Saeul 3 achieves first criticality - a sustained chain reaction - until it enters commercial operation.

Once commercially operational, Saeul 3 will account for about 1.7% of South Korea's total power generation and 37% of Ulsan's electricity demand.

South Korea has four operational APR1400 units - Saeul units 1 and 2 (formerly Shin Kori 3 and 4) and Shin Hanul units 1 and 2, plus the APR1400s under construction as Saeul units 3 and 4. Four APR1400 units have also been built at the Barakah nuclear power plant in the UAE, which are all now in commercial operation.

Dismantling of reactor channels to begin at second Ignalina unit


With the dismantling of the reactor channels of unit 1 at Lithuania's Ignalina nuclear power plant complete, the country's nuclear regulator has now issued a permit for dismantling and decontamination works on the upper and lower zone equipment of the reactor channels of unit 2.
 
(Image: Altra)

In accordance with the approved technical design, the steam-water discharge piping at the top of the reactor and the water supply piping at the bottom of the reactor, as well as other related systems and their components, will be dismantled, and initial treatment of radioactive waste will be carried out. The project also includes the dismantling of the fuel channels and the reactor control and safety channels located within the reactor.

Altra - the Lithuanian state-owned company leading the decommissioning of the Ignalina plant - said dismantling work is scheduled to begin at the end of 2026. Until then, the company will carry out preparatory work: installation of engineering systems, testing of remote control equipment, and upgrading and adaption of the radioactive waste management infrastructure to handle the waste generated during this project.

"The dismantling of the reactor channels of the first power unit has been completed, therefore the permit for the second unit paves the way for a consistent continuation of the dismantling process of both reactors," Altra said.


(Image: Altra)

"Nobody in the world has ever dismantled a power plant of this size and radiation contamination," said Altra CEO Linas Baužys. "The transition to the second unit is a significant step forward in implementing the mega-project for decommissioning the Ignalina nuclear power plant. We have dismantled two-thirds of the first reactor with our own forces - the most complex and radiation-hazardous dismantling of the reactor cores remains, for which we will use external contractors. Our experience with the first unit allows us to confidently move on to the dismantling stages of the second unit. We are carrying out some of the work using remote and robotic technologies to ensure the highest safety standards."

The dismantling of unnecessary systems and equipment at the power plant has been carried out since 2010, and the overall dismantling progress has already reached 45.7%, Altra said. It is planned that the final dismantling of the reactors, including the dismantling of the most complex reactor cores, will take place by 2043, and all decommissioning-related work will be completed by 2050, with the final cleaning of the reactor buildings.

This year, Altra also plans to carry out dismantling and decontamination works on the steam drum separators of both power units of the Ignalina plant. There are eight such devices - metal cylinders with a diameter of almost 3 metres and a length of about 30 metres - in both power units of the plant, the total weight of which exceeds 6,000 tonnes. In November 2024, US-based company Amentum was awarded a contract worth an estimated EUR5.5 million (USD6.5 million) to consult for the first-of-a-kind dismantling of steam drum separators at Ignalina units 1 and 2.

Lithuania assumed ownership of the two RBMK-1500 units - light-water, graphite-moderated reactors, similar to those at Chernobyl - in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It agreed to shut down the Ignalina plant as a condition of its accession to the European Union, with unit 1 shutting down in December 2004 and unit 2 in December 2009. The reactors are expected to be fully decommissioned by 2038, with most of the cost of the decommissioning being funded by the European Union via the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and other funds.

ČEZ eyeing 80-year operation of Dukovany units


Czech energy group ČEZ announced it has started a preparatory process to enable the long-term operation of the four reactors at its Dukovany nuclear power plant. It is also considering extending the operation of the two reactors at its Temelín plant.
 
Dukovany (Image: CEZ)

ČEZ currently operates four VVER-440 units at Dukovany, which began operating between 1985 and 1987. Their output has gradually been increased from the original 440 MWe to 512 MWe through extensive modernisations. Ongoing modernisation work aims to ensure the units can operate for at least 60 years, to 2045-2047.

A CZK407 billion (USD19.6 billion) contract was signed with Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power last year for two of its APR1000 reactors near the existing Dukovany units. The aim is to start construction in 2029. Two more units at the Temelín plant are also being considered. There are also developing plans for small modular reactors in the country.

"We have planned to operate our nuclear power plants for about 60 years so far and we are convinced every day that they are in excellent condition," said ČEZ CEO Daniel Beneš. "Current economic and safety analyses confirm that it will be possible to operate Dukovany for longer. Eighty-year operation is becoming a trend in the world, and a number of units have already been licensed for 80 years of operation. We see this as realistic for us as well, provided of course that the condition of the equipment and the safety of operation are regularly evaluated. Of course, this will not affect the project to build a new nuclear power plant at Dukovany and other small modular reactors. Electricity consumption will grow rapidly, and the Czech Republic will need as much emission-free electricity as possible."

ČEZ said it regularly evaluates the future operation of its nuclear power plants using a technology and financial model, which assesses the technical condition of key components and the expected development of electricity prices and other inputs. "These analyses also indicate that the long-term operation of the Dukovany nuclear power plant is very well feasible," it said.

"Every year we evaluate the conditions for further operation in great detail, and all key decisions are supervised by the State Office for Nuclear Safety," said Bohdan Zronek, Director of ČEZ's nuclear energy division. "In ten-year cycles, our nuclear power plants undergo detailed and demanding 'periodic safety assessments'. Rigorous preparation and perfect knowledge of the condition of the plant is a prerequisite for any decision."

The company noted that 80 years of operation encompasses extensive capital projects and upgrade programmes. These include, for example, the renewal of some elements of the engine rooms - generators as well as other large units, the reconstruction of selected piping routes, valves and electrical elements as well as the gradual introduction of new control and safety systems.

ČEZ said the extended operation of the Dukovany plant "is a step that significantly strengthens the energy security of the Czech Republic and confirms ČEZ's long-term strategy as a stable and reliable supplier of low-emission electricity, even in times of dynamic changes on the energy market."

The company said analyses are now being carried out on the potential extension of the Temelín plant's operation. Two VVER-1000 units are in operation at Temelín, which came into operation in 2000 and 2002. The capacity of the two units has increased from the original 1,000 MWe per unit to 1,086 MWe.


(Image: Ministry of Industry and Trade)

At a press conference to announce the possible extension of the operation of the Dukovany units, Minister of Industry and Trade Karel Havlíček said: "We must decide on future energy sources at the same time as how long we can safely and effectively operate the existing ones, especially nuclear units. The operation of Dukovany for up to 80 years is not a replacement for new units, but their logical addition within the framework of the Czech energy strategy. The Czech Republic has extraordinary know-how in nuclear energy and we can operate our power plants safely, efficiently and with a high degree of reliability. Therefore, it makes sense to prepare for the long-term operation of Dukovany up to the 80-year mark. At the same time, however, this does not change the need to continue the construction of new nuclear sources and the preparation of small modular reactors, because the Czech Republic will need stable, safe and competitive electricity in the maximum possible volume."

Štěpán Kochánek, Chairman of the State Office for Nuclear Safety, added: "The service life of nuclear power plants in the Czech Republic is not strictly limited to a specific number of years. Simply put, it is governed by the condition of safety-relevant components. Extension of operation is possible only if the operator proves that the facility meets all safety requirements, has managed the aging management of the facility and the technical condition corresponds to current standards, and at the same time has the necessary personnel resources to ensure continued operation. We will always assess every step and every submitted assessment very strictly and in detail."

First criticality for Indian fast breeder reactor

The initiation of a controlled nuclear fission chain reaction at the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor sees India move into the second stage of a three-stage nuclear programme which ultimately aims to achieve a closed fuel cycle using the country's abundant thorium.
 

Celebrating initial criticality at PFBR (Image: BHAVINI)

The 500 MWe Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalkpakkam in Tamil Nadu attained first criticality on 6 April at 08:25 pm, the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) announced, with the milestone marking "a significant step toward strengthening India's long-term energy security and advancing its indigenous nuclear technology capabilities."

The PFBR technology was designed and developed by the DAE's Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR). The reactor was built and commissioned by Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd (BHAVINI), a government enterprise under the DAE. Construction began in 2004, with an original expected completion date of 2010. India's Atomic Energy Regulatory Board officially granted permission for the First Approach to Criticality - including the loading of fuel into the reactor core and the start of low power physics experiments - in mid-2024. Last August, Minister of State Jitendra Singh told India's parliament that delays in completion of the project had been mainly due to "first-of-a-kind technological issues" during the commissioning process.

The attainment of first criticality "follows the successful completion of all stipulated safety requirements, with clearance granted by the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) after rigorous review," BHAVINI said.

"Today, India takes a defining step in its civil nuclear journey, advancing the second stage of its nuclear programme," Prime Minister Narendra Modi said on social media, adding that the PFBR "reflects the depth of our scientific capability and the strength of our engineering enterprise. It is a decisive step towards harnessing our vast thorium reserves in the third stage of the programme. A proud moment for India."

The PFBR uses uranium-plutonium mixed oxide, or MOX, fuel surrounded by a 'blanket' of uranium-238, which, through neutron absorption, is converted into fissile plutonium-239. This enables the reactor to generate more fuel than it consumes - it 'breeds' fuel. The PFBR is also designed to use thorium-232 in the blanket, which can be transmuted into fissile uranium-233.

"This unique capability significantly enhances the utilisation of nuclear fuel resources and enables the country to extract far greater energy from its limited uranium reserves while also preparing for large-scale use of thorium in the future," BHAVINI said. The fast breeder programme "strengthens strategic capabilities in nuclear fuel cycle technologies, advanced materials, reactor physics and large-scale engineering," and the knowledge and infrastructure developed through the programme "will support future reactor designs and next-generation nuclear technologies".

Fast breeder reactors form the second stage of India's three-stage nuclear programme, using plutonium recovered from the reprocessing of used fuel from the pressurised heavy water and light water reactors that form the first stage of the programme. The third stage envisages using advanced heavy water reactors to burn thorium-plutonium fuels and breed fissile uranium-233, achieving a thorium-based closed nuclear fuel cycle.

According to World Nuclear Association information, some 20 fast neutron reactors, including some that have supplied electricity commercially, have operated around the world since the 1950s - although not all have been breeders.

India currently has about 7,900 MW of nuclear generation from 24 operable nuclear power plants, and is planning a large expansion of its nuclear capacity. The country says that 17 nuclear power reactors with a total of 13,100 MW capacity are either under construction (7) or under pre-project activities (10). It is aiming to reach a nuclear energy capacity of about 100 GW by 2047 as part of its Viksit Bharat development strategy.

EDF, NTPC sign MoU to explore new Indian nuclear projects


The non-binding Memorandum of Understanding sees India's largest integrated power utility come together with the French international energy company to explore cooperation in developing new nuclear power projects in India.
 
(Image: NTPC)

The MoU was signed following approval from Indian ministries and government departments, NTPC said. It establishes a framework for both companies to jointly assess the feasibility and approach for collaboration, including understanding EDF’s EPR technology and its suitability for Indian requirements, exploring opportunities to maximise localisation for large-scale deployment, examining economic and tariff aspects, developing human resource capabilities through training programmes, evaluating potential project sites, and providing technical support as mutually agreed.

"This initiative aligns with NTPC’s strategy to expand into clean, reliable energy and contribute to India’s long-term energy security," NTPC said.

The MoU was signed by Arnada Prasad Samal, CGM (Nuclear Cell), on behalf of NTPC, and Vakisasi Ramany, Senior Vice President, International Nuclear Development, on behalf of EDF.

NTPC is a Public Sector Undertaking under India's Ministry of Power. It currently operates more than 89 GW of installed capacity, with another 32 GW under construction, with a target to reach 149 GW of total capacity by 2032, including 60 GW from renewable energy sources, with a balanced mix of thermal, hydro, solar, and wind power plants, ensuring supply of reliable, affordable, and sustainable electricity to the country.

Proposals for six EPR units at Jaitapur have long featured in India's energy plans, under the control of Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd (NPCIL).

Restrictions under Indian law have in the past presented a barrier to the participation of private companies like NTPC in nuclear power projects, but in 2024, the Indian government approved the creation of Anushakti Vidhyut Nigam Ltd (Ashvini), a joint venture between NPCIL and NTPC, to construct, own and operate nuclear power plants in India. The joint venture is now developing two Indian-designed 700 MWe pressurised heavy water reactors, Mahi Banswara Rajasthan Atomic Nuclear Power Project units 1 and 2, for which excavation works began in late March. The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act 2025 - enacted at the end of last year - opens up India's nuclear sector to participation from private companies, including in plant operations, power generation, equipment manufacturing, and selected activities such as nuclear fuel fabrication.

Study highlights opportunities for Dutch nuclear supply chain



With the Dutch province of Zeeland under consideration as the location of two new nuclear power plants, a new report says local businesses could capture up to EUR4.6 billion (USD5.4 billion) in direct economic value during the 12-year construction period.
 
(Image: Impuls Zeeland)

The study - conducted by Tractebel and Technopolis and commissioned by the Province of Zeeland, Impuls Zeeland and VNO NCW Brabant Zeeland - outlines how companies in Zeeland, one of the preferred locations for new nuclear reactors, can position themselves within the nuclear supply chain and benefit from future investments.

Conducted between July 2025 and January 2026, the analysis explored prospects primarily for large nuclear new build projects, as well as for small modular reactors (SMRs) and the lifetime extension of the existing Borssele nuclear power plant.

The study identified 130 Zeeland businesses that could potentially supply nuclear projects, mostly as component suppliers and subcontractors. "Opportunities are strongest in construction, infrastructure, and transport & logistics, and during early construction phases and site clearance/landscaping," it says. "As a first estimate, local involvement could account for roughly 15% of total plant costs."

The direct economic potential for the business sector in Zeeland is estimated to be between EUR3.1 and EUR4.6 billion over a 12-year construction period. Direct economic benefits emerge from the direct supply to nuclear power plants, whether under construction or in operation. "The actual order size that can land in Zeeland will strongly depend on various factors, including the technology vendor chosen," the report says. "This estimate should therefore be considered a first estimate based on best available data and assumptions at this stage of the nuclear new-build project in the Netherlands." The indirect economic potential (resulting from regional spending of businesses directly involved in the supply chain and of on-site workers or visitors) for the business sector in Zeeland is estimated to be around EUR1 billion.

"Given the opportunities for Zeeland businesses in the nuclear supply chain, we recommend positioning Zeeland as a hotspot for nuclear energy and actively promoting its businesses in new-build projects," the study says." Stakeholders should be informed about nuclear developments, supply opportunities, and requirements, while businesses should be connected regionally, nationally, and internationally, and regional and national governments should align business support activities. Support should be provided to establish the right ecosystem for Zeeland companies to enter the nuclear domain, including further developing and implementing the proposed roadmap, backed by public and private investments.

"To facilitate this, we recommend establishing the Nuclear Delta platform, a public-private initiative bringing together businesses, government, and education institutions. The Province of Zeeland, Impuls Zeeland and VNO-NCW Brabant-Zeeland can play a part in this as well. Additionally, clear agreements with the national government should be made on conditions for hosting a new nuclear power plant, ensuring maximum economic benefit for regional businesses and reinforcing Zeeland’s ambitions as a nuclear energy hotspot."

The Netherlands currently has one 485 MWe (net) pressurised water reactor at Borssele - operated by EPZ - which has been in operation since 1973 and accounts for about 3% of the country's total electricity generation. 

In December 2021, the Netherlands' new coalition government placed nuclear power at the heart of its climate and energy policy. In addition to keeping the Borssele plant in operation for longer, the government also called for the construction of new reactors. Based on preliminary plans, two new reactors will be completed around 2035 and each will have a capacity of 1,000-1,650 MWe. The two reactors would provide 9-13% of the country's electricity production in 2035. The cabinet announced in December 2022 that it currently sees Borssele as the most suitable location for the construction of the new reactors. Three other locations are also being considered for the reactors: the Tweede Maasvlakte near Rotterdam, Terneuzen in Zeeland and Eemshaven in Groningen. A location selection is expected in September of this year. The government is also taking steps to prepare the Netherlands for the possible deployment of SMRs.