National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956.

National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956. By David Brandenberger (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. xv plus 378 pp.).

At a reception for Red Army commanders during World War II, Stalin famously praised the Russian people as "the most outstanding nation of all the nations in the Soviet Union." "I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people," he declared, "not just because they are the leading people, but because they have a clear mind, a hardy character, and patience." (pp. 130-131) This statement marked the culmination of an ideological shift in which the Soviet regime exchanged proletarian internationalist rhetoric and symbolism for russocentric imagery. Historians have long been fascinated by the apparent "great retreat" from communism and revival of Russian nationalism under Stalin beginning in the mid-1930s. Yet few scholars have sought to analyze the origins and nuances of this shift or to assess the reception it found among the Russian-speaking Soviet public.

David Brandenberger's monograph, National Bolshevism, seeks to fill this gap. Using archival and other sources that were unavailable to Western scholars before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, he analyzes the formulation, dissemination, and reception of a "russocentric form of etatism" (p. 2) in Stalin's Soviet Union. Brandenberger argues that it was not genuine nationalist sentiment that induced the Soviet leaders to turn to "national Bolshevism"; rather, they used Russian history and russocentric images to promote an etatist agenda and build support for the communist state. The result, ironically, was something Stalin and his comrades never intended--the emergence of a popular sense of Russian national identity.

This mass Russian nationalism, Brandenberger argues, was something entirely new in Russian history. In an introductory chapter, he makes the case that there was no "articulate, coherent sense of mass identity" (p. 10) in Russia before the Stalinist era. During the first world war, Russian soldiers showed little interest in fighting for their homeland; the allegiances and loyalties of the overwhelmingly peasant population were regional and local rather than national. In the 1920s, the regime actively discouraged Russian national pride and treated tsarist history as an unfortunate and oppressive prelude to the Soviet era. Yet secret police reports in this period revealed that much of the population was apathetic--even hostile--toward Bolshevik goals. Brandenberger sees the 1927 war scare, in which a series of foreign policy setbacks led the regime to fear imminent capitalist attack, as a pivotal moment in the Bolsheviks' ideological evolution. Aware that calls for proletarian solidarity would not suffice to rally the population, the Soviet leaders began to search for a new basis for mass loyalty.

They found it in Russian history. Beginning in the mid-1930s, the regime began to celebrate the virtues of the Russian past. The Stalinist leadership rehabilitated prerevolutionary military and cultural figures, while championing the Soviet state as the natural heir of the tsarist empire. In a move away from the equality of all Soviet nationalities promoted by Lenin, Stalin now described Russia as "first among equals" (p. 43)--a revolutionary vanguard nation leading the other Soviet peoples to socialism. Brandenberger argues that this russocentric rhetoric was meant to supplement, not replace, proletarian internationalism. Along with tsarist-era heroes, the regime also promoted leading figures of the revolution and civil war as models for Russians to emulate. But as the escalating purges of the 1930s claimed more and more Soviet-era heroes, pre-revolutionary figures became the focus of Soviet propaganda. The Russian masses, meanwhile, overlooked the nuances of Stalinist ideology and welcomed the new rhetoric as the outright promotion of Russian nationalism; for some, the shift even became a license to express chauvinist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic views.

Largely thanks to its adoption of "national Bolshevik" ideology, Brandenberger argues, the regime was successful in mobilizing popular support in 1941. The war saw the spread of russocentric language and imagery, not just in official propaganda but also among ordinary citizens. In letters home, front-line soldiers compared Hitler's invasion with earlier incursions by medieval Teutonic knights and Napoleonic troops. Civilians kept up their spirits by reading Tolstoy's War and Peace and the memoirs of tsarist military heroes. By the postwar period, ordinary Russians deftly wielded the tropes of Russian nationalism. Citizens now routinely referred to the Russian "national character," which was said to be exceptionally heroic, patient, and self-sacrificing. The terms "Soviet" and "Russian" had become virtually synonymous. Between the mid-1930s and the mid-1950s, in short, the Stalinist regime had created modern Russian nationalism.


While scholars have known for some time about the Stalinist regime's turn to russocentrism, Brandenberger has made an important contribution by highlighting the impact of this shift on ordinary Russians. Using sources such as student essays, museum comment books, and personal diaries, he demonstrates that the Russian public rapidly learned to speak the language of national Bolshevism. Brandenberger also offers an intriguing look at the political machinations underlying the regime's ideological twist and turns, including Stalin's personal interventions in debates about culture and history. Among other fascinating tidbits, we learn that Stalin criticized the 16th-century tyrant Ivan the Terrible for showing too much kindness to his enemies.

Although Brandenberger's argument about the Stalinist roots of modern Russian nationalism is compelling on many levels, some readers may be left wondering why, if there was virtually no popular Russian nationalism before 1917, ordinary Russians so enthusiastically adopted the russocentric rhetoric of the Stalinist regime. Particularly in light of the emphatic Soviet rejection of Russian nationalism in the 1920s, the eager popular embrace of prerevolutionary heroes and themes in the 1930s seems to suggest the prior existence of a reservoir of common images and symbols of Russianness. Proletarian internationalism, which the Bolsheviks promoted vigorously for nearly 20 years before turning to russocentrism, never managed to evoke such enthusiasm--a fact that Brandenberger attributes primarily to the complex and abstract nature of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Yet I am not convinced that the complexity of Marxism alone can explain the greater appeal of nationalism. Such quibbles aside, National Bolshevism deserves praise for shedding new light on the evolution of Russian identity and significantly advancing our understanding of the Stalinist state and its popular underpinnings.

Adrienne Edgar
University of California, Santa Barbara

COPYRIGHT 2004 Journal of Social History

David Brandenberger - History - University of Richmond

Professor of History and Global Studies

Global Studies Concentration Advisor: Politics and Governance

David Brandenberger has written on Stalin-era propaganda, ideology and nationalism in journals like Russian Review, Slavic Review, Kritika, Revolutionary Russia, Nationality Papers, Europe-Asia Studies, Jahrbuecher fuer Geschichte Osteuropas, Noveishaia istoriia Rossii and Voprosy istorii. His first book, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 (Harvard, 2002), focuses on the USSR's reliance on russocentric mobilizational propaganda and the effect that this pragmatic use of historical heroes, imagery and iconography had on national consciousness among Russian-speakers, both during the Stalin period and after. His second book, an interdisciplinary co-edited volume titled Epic Revisionism: Russian History and Literature as Stalinist Propaganda (Wisconsin, 2006), elaborates on many of these themes in its examination of the Stalin regime's co-option of canonical classics from Pushkin and Lermontov to Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible. His third book, Propaganda State in Crisis: Soviet Ideology, Indoctrination and Terror under Stalin, 1928-1941 (Yale, 2011), explores the USSR’s failure to inculcate a sense of communist identity in interwar Soviet society—a failure that precipitated the mobilizational exigencies detailed in his earlier books. His forth book, Stalin’s Master Narrative (Yale, 2019), is a co-edited critical edition of the general secretary’s infamous 1938 party history textbook. He is presently writing a book on the 1949 Leningrad Affair, Stalin's last political purge, and co-editing the purge-era diary of a high-ranking member of the USSR’s Politburo.

Russia’s occupation of Ukraine: a historical and centuries-old process


Ukrainian artist Dariya Marchenko created a portrait of Russian President Vladimir Putin from 5,000 spent shell cases collected from location of battles in Russia's aggressive war in the Donbas. Photo: dashart.com.ua


2020/11/13 - 10:04 • HYBRID WAR


Article by: Oksana Syroyid


Editor’s NoteThis year’s Lviv Security Forum brought together security experts from different countries in order to model the resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict so that the sovereignty of Ukraine on territories temporarily occupied by Russia would be restored and Ukraine would be protected against Russian aggression in the future. In the preface to the report of the modeling exercise, the Security Forum’s co-chair Oksana Syroyid laid out an essential introduction to Russia’s war against Ukraine — that is, the centuries-old struggle of Russia to access warm-water ports. It is through this prism that the current war against Ukraine — and Russia’s attempts to resurrect its former empire altogether — should be viewed.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict reaches back to the times when Ukraine emerged on the world map. In fact, it had started long before Russia established itself as a state. The nature of this conflict, though, has remained unchanged.

Since the creation of the Tsardom of Muscovy, its eastern and northern territories have been protected by seas, and the southern territories have been protected by mountains.


Photo: lib.byu.edu

However, basic human resources, agricultural land, and infrastructure routes were located along the western border. In addition, while possessing vast natural resources, the Russian Empire didn’t have access to warm-water ports.

This determined the main strategy of its expansion westward – to secure access to the Baltic and Black Seas and increase the buffer zone around the lifeline containing vital infrastructure and resources.

The defeat of the Tsarist Russian Empire in World War I and the October Coup didn’t in any way change the imperialist policies of Bolshevik Russia.

In fact, immediately after its formation in 1917, Soviet Russia began the occupation of the newly established Ukrainian People’s Republic. The occupation began with the formation of the “Ukrainian People’s Republic of Soviets” – an enclave controlled by the Bolsheviks (similar to today’s ORDLO – Separate Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions).

During the Paris Peace Conference in Versailles in 1919 – 20, the leaders of the three nations – the United States, United Kingdom, and France – conceded statehood to nations that emerged from the ruins of European empires. The leaders of the Ukrainian People’s Republic sought support to oppose the Bolsheviks and the recognition of their statehood. However, it was the offensive of Bolshevik Russia that prevented the recognition of the Ukrainian Republic.

Western powers were exhausted by World War I and didn’t have the resources and desire to resist the Bolsheviks, whose intentions were unclear to them. They chose to isolate and ignore the Bolsheviks instead.

The return of control over Ukraine and its resources opened up new opportunities for the Russian Bolshevik government. The most valuable of such resources was grain, which could be exported to raise funds necessary for the industrialization of the Soviet Union.
However, taking grain from peasant owners was not easy, and collectivization pressed for technical development.

Collectivization and “dekulakization” provoked thousands of peasant revolts throughout Ukraine. People demanded the return of land and local governance to their communities. In order to prevent any potential peasant revolts and to secure control over land and grain, which was the main currency back then, Stalin killed millions of Ukrainian peasants by starvation in 1932 – 33.

Nazi Germany was the closest ally for Stalin’s empire at that time. Hitler and Stalin relied on each other’s resources in preparation for their own wars.

Stalin intended to move west, establish control over the seas and increase the “sanitary zone” under the banner of the socialist revolution. Hitler needed Ukrainian lands as the source of a workforce and food for his future empire.

Ukraine, or rather its land, remained the main trophy in the war between the two dictators. That’s why people weren’t spared. Ukrainians accounted for almost 40% of all human losses of the Soviet Union in World War II.

World War II was started by both dictators, but only one of them was punished.

Stalin ended the war as a winner who spelled the terms of peace. As a result, as of 1945, the Soviet empire had advanced its borders to Berlin.

Stalin intended to move even further west. He first laid siege to West Berlin and established the German Democratic Republic (once again, similar to today’s ORDLO) in breach of the conditions of the occupation zones.

Later on, in 1952, he attempted to expand westward, proposing that German leader Konrad Adenauer unite the GDR and the Federal Republic of Germany under conditions of an amnesty to former members of the Nazi party, new elections, and the non-aligned status of a united Germany. To this Chancellor Adenauer replied,

“Refusal to integrate with the West will lead to the capture of Germany by the Bolsheviks and will be tantamount to “political suicide.”

Despite unsuccessful attempts at further expansion to the west, the Soviet empire achieved the cherished dream of all Russian tsars.

Control of the Baltic Sea was secured by the Kaliningrad enclave – the remnant of the Kingdom of Prussia with its capital Königsberg, as well as the occupation of Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and the GDR satellite.

The Black Sea was put under Russian control as a result of control of the Crimea and the Ukrainian coastline, which was further boosted by the occupation of Georgia and the turning Bulgaria and Romania into Soviet satellites. The “sanitary zone” was expanded enough to keep the empire’s lifeline safe.


After WWII, Russia expanded its influence far to its east via the Eastern Bloc. Image: Wikipedia


Without control over the Baltic and Black Seas, as well as without control over Ukrainian resources, “Greater Russia” is impossible.

Meanwhile, Europe needed to recover from the war of the past, protect itself from the Soviet military threat of the present, and prevent wars between European nations in the future.

To maintain geopolitical balance on the European continent, the North Atlantic Alliance was established, whose aim, according to its first Secretary General, Baron Ismay, was to “keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”

The democratic world assessed the purpose and methods of the Soviet threat adequately. However, the West was unable to look into the roots of the problem: throughout the decades of the Cold War, it was communism as an ideology, not the imperial nature of Russia which was considered a threat.

That is why Russian aggression against Ukraine, unfortunately, was inevitable. It is no coincidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the twentieth century.”

Without control over the Baltic and Black Seas, as well as without control over Ukrainian resources, “Greater Russia” is impossible.

Initially, Russia took advantage of Ukrainians’ lack of experience in state-building and management of their resources after independence, and during large-scale privatization, they freely bought up strategic enterprises and critical infrastructure.

Most of the figures now called “oligarchs” have monopolized Ukrainian regional gas companies, oblenergos, thermal power plants, shipyards, and access to key natural resources for Russian money and in Russia’s interest.

They have never held a Ukrainian identity or interest in the development of Ukraine, so they easily pumped out and continue to pump out money from Ukraine through offshore jurisdictions. At the same time, in order to maintain their monopolies and guarantee Ukraine’s movement in the Russian fairway, those actors established control over Ukrainian politics through dependent media and political projects.

After all, today these oligarchs no longer make a secret of their reliance on Russia, openly lobbying for a Russian “appeasement” scenario in both Ukraine and the United States.

However, even this control wasn’t enough for Russia’s plans. Generations of people were born and raised in Ukraine, for whom any pro-Russian sentiments were alien and who increasingly looked to the West, identifying with European civilization and not with the “single Slavic people.” Time played against Russia – the territory got out of control.

The Revolution of Dignity proved to be only a pretext for the Russian invasion. The main purpose of the annexation of Crimea was to gain control of the Black Sea and strengthen geopolitical leverage in the greater Mediterranean region.

Thus, the main reasons for the occupation of East Ukraine were the levers of Russian pressure on Ukraine in both domestic and foreign policies.

Is it possible to resolve the age-old Russian-Ukrainian conflict? Is Ukraine able to do it alone? Is the democratic world ready to recognize the dependence of its own security on Ukraine’s security, realizing, in historical perspective, the price it will have to pay in the event of Ukraine’s loss of its freedom and independence?

“Thus it would be hypocrisy to deny that an independent Ukraine is as essential to […] the tranquility of the world. Merely because it is inconvenient to consider it and highly so to attempt its solution, the problem has too long been ignored. But it is a problem which has deep and intricate roots in history and in its modern form has assumed extreme urgency. Voltaire noted admiringly the persistence with which Ukrainians aspired to freedom and remarked that being surrounded by hostile lands, they were doomed to search for a Protector.

Until they are assured of liberty they will be faithless to whichever State they are bound and will continue freely to shed their own blood and that of their conquerors. So long, too, as this situation continues other nations will be tempted to exploit it. What then is the use of pretending that there is peace when there is no peace? Nor will there be any until this Ukrainian question is satisfactorily disposed of.”

These are the words of Lancelot Lawton, a British soldier, historian, economist, Ukrainian scholar, public figure, and international journalist, which he spoke in 1935. Ignoring these words then cost Europeans tens of millions of lives. Perhaps, history provides us with a chance to correct this mistake, doesn’t it?


Editor’s Note

Read the entire report here. The text in this article has been slightly edited for clarity.[/editorial


Oksana Syroyid is co-chair of the Lviv Security Forum, leader of the Samopomich Union political party, Deputy Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament in 2014-2019.

 

The Kremlin and its alleged rise of zombie voters in US: propaganda review

Collage: EU vs Disinfo. The wall screen in Rossiya-1's studio reads, "1.8 mln 'dead souls' at the U.S. elections." 

2020/11/12 - 14:20 • HYBRID WAR

Source: EU vs Disinfo

Edited by: Yuri Zoria

The US presidential election has predictably dominated world news this week. The protracted tally of the votes; the incumbent president’s persistent refusal to concede, the legal battles – all excellent material for reporting – and for disinformation. While most world leaders and professional and reputable international media have identified Joe Biden as President-elect, the Kremlin and its media continue supporting claims on election fraud. Of 74 cases this week, 21 were devoted to the US elections.

Russian state TV declares, entirely without foundation, that 1.8 million dead voters took part in the election. And it’s not even Halloween! Russian state radio notes that the US cannot be called democracy and that the trade union of US mail employees supported Joe Biden and were hence prone to falsifying votes delivered by mail. RT openly suggests the entire process was “rigged”. Of course, George Soros, a perennial Kremlin bogeyman, stands behind what is described as a color revolution and the dirtiest elections in history. Not US history, but history.

A Clever Plan

All the above-mentioned claims on the US elections have been carefully scrutinized and debunked. The US legal system is handling a number of cases on alleged inconsistencies in the voting system and technical flaws and mistakes that are to be addressed. International observers from the OSCE have described the election as “competitive and well managed despite legal uncertainties and logistical challenges”. Recounts, court appeals – all are normal procedures within the established US electoral system. A timeline of the process can be found here.

The loud claims in pro-Kremlin media about zombie voters and rigged processes will eventually create a problem for the Russian leadership: if even the state media questions the very integrity of the US election – and by default, the legitimacy of the next president, who will take an oath in January – with whom will Russian leaders work?

But, in the parallel universe of pro-Kremlin media, everything might be a clever plan by the incumbent president. All fakes will be disclosed and the Biden team will be caught cheating, red-handed, and Donald Trump triumphantly installed for a second term as president.

The Really Important Election

The US election process is dramatic and complicated, but for the Kremlin, the stakes are even higher in elections in the neighborhood: like in Moldova, where incumbent President Igor Dodon and challenger Maia Sandu will face each other in a second round of the election. Ms. Sandu’s victory in the first round is described as a result of Western falsification. Corruption, social issues, health care, education – no matter the priorities of the actual voters, for the Kremlin media the only relevant question in an election is loyalty or disloyalty to Russia.

This is mirrored in the pro-Kremlin media’s reporting on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue: disloyalty to the Kremlin is a deadly sin. Armenia dared to attempt an independent policy. Now, Margarita Simonyan, the head of state-owned RT and Sputnik blames the people of Armenia for the war,

The citizens of Armenia can criticize no one but themselves. For electing to power a traitor who created preconditions for the war after falling out with the only historical ally of the Armenian people. Where is his Soros now? The US State Department? Pentagon, Macron or whoever?

Ms. Simonyan’s statement correspondents with a trope on “Globalists” behind the war in Nagorno Karabakh and Russia as the real victim in the war. This perspective is repeated virtually anytime pro-Kremlin outlets report on the news: the protests in Belarus are a scheme against Russia, with the US and the West plotting a color revolution. The poisoning of Alexei Navalny is a plan to stop Russia’s Nord Stream 2 energy project; and the protests in Kyrgyzstan are, of course, another scheme against Russia’s interests in Central Asia.

Almost twenty of this week’s cases are devoted to Ukraine. This is much in line with the pro-Kremlin media’s general obsession with the war in Ukraine actually being a scheme against Russia. In the five years of the EUvsDisinfo database, roughly a third of all cases have been about Ukraine. There is a Ukrainian spin to all three above-mentioned topics: President-elect Joe Biden is responsible for war crimes in Ukraine; Ukraine is planning an attack on the Moldovan breakaway territory of Transnistria and the Azerbaijani blitz against Nagorno Karabach is inspiring Ukraine to take similar actions against Donbas and Crimea.

This week’s Russian propaganda: Ukraine to smuggle Russian vaccine via EU as British vaccine turns people into monkeys





2020/10/27 - 20:16 • HYBRID WAR

Article by: EU vs Disinfo
Source: EU vs Disinfo


Vaccines: nothing but a monkey business

As COVID-19 cases skyrocket across Europe, so does disinformation on the pandemic. Take, for example, a story claiming that Ukraine will buy a Russian vaccine and that the purchase will be made via European Union Member States. In reality, experts fear the approval of the Russian vaccine was premature. According to the Lancet, one of the world’s best-known medical journals, at that time the vaccine had not even started phase 3 trials. Another difficulty with this claim is the fact that none of the Member States had announced their intention to buy it.

Read also: These Rt graphs show how fast COVID-19 is spreading in Ukraine

The story is part of a broader narrative asserting that Russia fights the pandemic more effectively than Western democracies, boosting the credibility of a Russian vaccine and undermining that of other (Western) vaccines.

How do you erode the credibility of Western vaccines?An old trick is to administer a lie packed in a larger truth.

Successful campaigns often “shield a forgery under the armor of a larger truth,” explains disinfo scholar Thomas Rid. His acclaimed book, Active Measures, showcases a spectacular example of World War II, the forged Tanaka Memorial. This document (allegedly from 1927) was instrumental in convincing many states that Japan elaborated a military strategy to achieve world domination. It was not authentic though.

Why was this false narrative so effective? Because it was rooted in Japan’s actual assertive foreign policy of that time.

How do you apply this larger-truth method to Western vaccines?

To undermine the credibility of these vaccines, the pro-Kremlin media took a part of the truth (the Oxford vaccine is developed using chimpanzee viral vector) to rebrand it as “the monkey vaccine”. This enables the pro-Kremlin media to suggest that the British vaccine will turn people into monkeys and also tap into criticism of animal rights supporters and anti-vaxxers.

However, a point of no small irony: the principles behind the Sputnik V vaccine are, in most respects, the same as Oxford’s. Monkey see, monkey do?

The monkey narrative tries to erode the credibility of Western vaccines. Despite all this ambitious monkey business, one should remember a good old Jamaican proverb: the higher a monkey climbs, the more exposed he is.



RUSSIA USES RED SCARE COLD WAR PROPAGANDA FROM THE JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY ABOUT POLIO AND MONKEY VIRUS VACCINATIONS

See all Disinfo Reviews by EU vs Disinfo

Further reading:
Secret labs and George Soros: Kremlin’s COVID-19 disinformation in the EU Eastern Partnership countries
Russian disinformation activities accompanying the MH17 trial
Why are Russian hackers targeting COVID-19 vaccine laboratories?
Vaccine hesitancy and pro-Kremlin opportunism: top-5 COVID-19 conspiracies
How pro-Kremlin outlets employed Satan to prop up disinformation efforts

Death of Belarus protester sparks unrest and threat of more EU sanctions

Reuters13 November 2020


FILE PHOTO: People gather to mourn the death of anti-government protester Roman Bondarenko in Minsk


KYIV (Reuters) - Thousands of people took to the streets of Minsk and other Belarusian cities on Friday after the death of a 31-year-old anti-government protester who died in hospital after what demonstrators say was a severe beating by security forces.

Witnesses say Roman Bondarenko was detained after scuffling with people in plain clothes who had come to a playground to remove red-and-white ribbons that represent the protest movement against veteran President Alexander Lukashenko.

The interior ministry denied responsibility for Bondarenko's death, saying he was killed due to a scuffle with civilians.

The state Investigative Committee alleged Bondarenko was drunk, which was disputed in local media, citing the official medical report into his death.

The death is the latest flashpoint in months of mass protests against Lukashenko following a disputed presidential election in August. The opposition says Lukashenko rigged the vote to secure a sixth successive term.

Lukashenko denies electoral fraud and, buoyed by support from traditional ally Russia, has shown little inclination to step down. A violent crackdown prompted a new round of Western sanctions on Minsk.

The European Union called the death "an outrageous and shameful result of the actions by the Belarusian authorities" who have "directly and violently carried out repression of their own population". The bloc, which has blacklisted some Belarusian officials, threatened further sanctions.

Rupert Colville, the United Nations human rights spokesman, called for a "thorough, transparent and independent investigation".

Videos posted by Belarusian media on Friday showed people standing along roads, near universities, factories and hospitals with white-red-white flags in their hands and portraits of Bondarenko.

In a video from the courtyard where Bondarenko was detained, hundreds of people stood in a minute of silence and then chanted: "We will not forget, we will not forgive."

"It's impossible to bear, what they did. Everybody is crying here," said a participant in one of the human solidarity chains in Minsk.

The news outlet Nasha Niva reported that police had detained protesters in at least four towns.


(Additional reporting by Emma Farge in Geneva and Robin Emmott in Brussels; Writing by Matthias Williams; Editing by Peter Graff)

Three months of Belarusian gridlock: do the protesters have a chance?

Students at the Belarusian State University join the strike on 26 October.

Photo: RFE/RL

2020/11/12 - • INTERNATIONAL

Editor’s Note

Belarusian protesters are in gridlock with their dictatorial regime. For over three months, they have been relentlessly resisting electoral fraud and police brutality with touching solidarity and admirable civility. A nationwide strike started on 26 October. Nevertheless, dictator Lukashenka remains defiant. Is the strike working? Will the public disobedience do the regime in? Euromaidan Press talked to protest participants to find out.

It is now three months since Belarusians said they had enough of the rule of the “last dictator in Europe” and rose up against rigged elections. Every day of these three months, Belarusians from all regions and walks of life resisted by holding protests, pickets, rallies, marches, strikes, solidarity chains, and mini-concerts. They defied the threat of criminal prosecution and even death, withstood police torture, and kept hanging up the banned white-red-white flag every time it was torn down.

Since Belarusian police and utility workers tear down any instances of the banned white-red-white flag, Belarusians found creative ways to recreate it with random objects, like these three-meter underpants hanging between two skyscrapers. Photo: Cascade Live telegram channel

As the protesters have remained defiant, so has self-proclaimed president Alyaksandr Lukashenka. After a ghastly crackdown in the several days after election day on 9 August, his regime appeared to grow more tolerant of the insubordinate populace, which led to a proliferation of creative protest forms, including multi-hundred-thousand marches, all over the country.

Chilling testimonies of police brutality, humiliation & “re-education” amid vicious crackdown on Belarusian protesters

Lukashenka, who is widely believed to have stolen the election, was unfazed.

He jailed or expelled all the remaining active opposition, including his challenger Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, viewed by the protesters as the rightful president-elect, and is pushing through changes to the Constitution while again cracking down on dissidents, who he derogates as “terrorists” steered from abroad. At least 17,000 have been detained across the country, with the riot police using stun grenades, rubber bullets, water cannons against the protesters, amid reports of torture in police departments.

From exile, Tsikhanouskaya gave the embattled strongman Lukashenka a deadline of two weeks to resign, put an end to police violence and release political prisoners, warning that he would otherwise face a nationwide strike from 26 October.

Can it force the dictator, who is seemingly unperturbed by EU sanctions against him and his entourage, finally heed the rallying call of the protests, “Leave!”? Or will the dissident nation be pacified into submission?

Students come to the forefront


THIS IS THE BELARUSIANS SECOND ATTEMPT AT A STRIKE. THE FIRST ONE TOOK PLACE IN AUGUST:
Wave of strikes sweeps over Belarusian industry on third day of protests against rigged elections

Compared to the first attempt at a strike in August, which was announced by anonymous Telegram channels directing the nascent protest movement, the participation of enterprises is now somewhat lower. That is not surprising given that the authorities had managed to frazzle the August strikerrs through intimidation and threats of layoffs.

On the first day, 26 October, over 255 people were detained at strikes and other protests in the country, according to the human rights organization Viasna. Students in several universities refused to attend lectures and marched in Minsk in protest. Hundreds of small private companies declared Monday a non-working day. Meanwhile, shops and cafes closed their doors, with their owners and employees forming human chains all over Minsk.



Students are increasingly coming to the forefront of resistance. The first university to join the strike was Minsk State University, where 100 students held a “sitting protest,” leading to the administration announcing that mass events will be limited in the following days.

Other universities on strike included the Minsk State Linguistic University, where teachers submitted a strike notice to the university’s chancellor, the Belarusian State Economic University, the State Medical University, and the Belarusian State University of Informatics and Radioelectronics, where approximately 35 employees announced an indefinite strike. Several teachers had resigned, while students held numerous protest actions.





Students of the medical university on strike. Photo: EuroradioFM


Karina during a student protest on 1 September. Snapshot from RFE/RL broadcast

At least 138 students and 15 teachers have been expelled as of 3 November. One of these students is Karina Kalinka, who together with three other students was disenrolled from the Academy of Arts for her political stance.

“I was motivated by my conscience and solidarity with people risking their future, going out in the streets,” Karina told Euromaidan Press. After the start of the strike, the management of the university ramped up pressure on the students and teachers critical of the Belarus regime. It seems to be working: one of her teachers did an ideological U-turn and is now loyal to Lukashenka, at least in words.

“I, as an artist, want to live in a free country, where there would be no censorship for media and artists so that anybody could express her opinion without fear of persecution,” Karina explained her motivation.

Censorship permeates Belarusian society, especially the arts. Karina experienced this herself when she and her co-students, one of whom was also expelled, created an art installation criticizing the Belarusian political system, replete with descriptors such as “violence,” “impunity,” “lawlessness,” “violence,” “corruption,” “murder.”

“They closed the door, threatened us with reprimands, locked the auditorium up so no photos would, God forbid, leak into the media. The censorship is very strong when it concerns politics. When it concerns other topics they don’t like, it’s softer — like, go away and don’t show this to anyone.”

Karina’s censored 30 September art installation

Karina’s censored July art installation
Photos: courtesy of the artist

Like many other people of her age, she was not politically active prior to the rigged elections. That has now changed:

“Prior to the protests, we were all divided, did not communicate; now I am witnessing the revival of the Belarusian nationality, everyone starts talking, making friends, incredible things are happening, in my opinion.”

Now, having been expelled, Karina will continue protesting and supporting her striking friends.

Like other expelled students, she is eligible for support from the BySol fund, one of the many funds set up to help striking workers who have been fired. As well, several western universities have set up scholarships for Belarusian students expelled for their political activities.

The teachers who do not give in to political pressure could be dismissed or fired, like it happened to one of the best specialists in the Italian language and culture, Associate Professor Natalia Dulina. After emerging as a strike leader at the Minsk State Linguistic University, she was called upon to voluntarily resign by its management. Upon refusing to do so, she was kidnapped by law enforcement, driven away to a detention center, and given 14 days in jail.

Yana, a 23-year-old teacher of the Polish language at the private Minsk-based Center for Slavic Languages, took part in the strike as well, together with other teachers and students. It lasted one day — the employees and students met to write letters to political prisoners while the Center was put on a “technical pause.” But there’s no major sense from her private school taking part in the strike, she says:


“While small private firms take part in the strike, it won’t reach its goal, unless the strike will grow to the national level, like with Solidarity in Poland, when everything stopped for long.”

The strike was supported by the service sector: dozens of bars and restaurants announced a “technical break” on 26 October. There were closures of markets in Brest and Lida due to strikes, as well as shopping centers.


“The cafes and companies take part in the strike so that those who are afraid of losing their jobs at the factories knew that they are not alone, that we’re not afraid, either; we all take part in the strike and all lose money,” Yana explains.


She and other teachers donate a fraction of their salary to solidarity funds which offer compensations to strikers who were fired for their political position. As of 3 November, these funds have paid $2.7 mn to such people. They include employees from all walks of life across the vast state sector of the Belarusian economy, including 14 artists from the Minsk theater of drama. But factory workers are under the greatest pressure: it is the state-owned factories, preserved from the Soviet era, that fill up the state coffers propping up Lukashenka’s regime.

“It’s sad that they didn’t start striking at the large factories: they had a chance in August [at the first strike], but didn’t start. After several days of threats of dismissal, they returned to work. There are many initiative groups of 5 people who started striking, they were fired and jailed. Unfortunately, you can’t really go out on a strike in our country. The fact that they are being fired doesn’t help the protests grow — others see and decide that it’s better to not join the strike.”

The Belarusian regime finds ways to pressure the private sector strikers as well. The cafes that were on strike on Monday are all being shut down for three months and more, after sudden raids of state sanitary inspection services found such violations as scratches on pots and imperfections in mask-wearing.

Of factory workers


A logo of the strike committees of Hrodna Azot and BelarusKali.

Photo: @stachkomazota / Telegram

Several medium-sized enterprises attempted to join the movement, but so far, the major players had not joined the fray.

Striking workers were reported at the companies Belarusneft, fertilizer giant Belaruskali, automakers Minsk Automobile Plant (MAZ), MZKT, BelAZ, and Belkommunmash, tractor manufacturer MTZ and appliance maker Atlant, Hrodna Azot, BelarusKali, the Minsk Electro-Technical Plant carried out strikes. No enterprise stopped completely: the strike was limited to separate departments and workers.

According to the latest data from the independent trade union, only 84 state factory workers joined the strike, with the number incrementally growing each day. Nevertheless, this was enough for strikebreakers to be detached to Hrodna Azot, a major nitrogen fertilizer plant. They didn’t help: on 10 November, two departments at the factory stopped working, most likely due to the plant being understaffed because the management keeps firing “problematic” workers.

“The shifts have halved, and it takes at least a year to train a replacement: six months of obligatory internship plus six months of practical work. The higher-ups gave the management two orders which were made public several times: fire all the strikers and keep the plant running. This is an opportunity to test whether it is possible to execute these orders in reality. It isn’t. And it’s only going to get worse,” the strike committee of Hrodna Azot told.

Employees from various large enterprises report that the most active factory workers who take part in solidarity actions are questioned by the management. Leading to fears for their livelihood and curbing the spread of the strike movement, many strikers have been fired.



One of them was Vitaliy, a member of the strike committee of state-owned BelarusKali, the flagman of Belarus’ mining industry which produces 1/6 of the world’s potassium fertilizer.


Striking workers of BelarusKali. Photo: @stachkom / Telegram

Only 59 of BelarusKali’s 17,000 workers joined the strike, Vitaliy says, but many more are hesitating and in the meantime hold a so-called “Italian strike” at their workplaces, stalling production by demanding that the management ensures its workers are protected by all safety measures, which are routinely ignored in Belarus.

Funds supported by the Belarusian diaspora help the strikers who are fired, but management tries to discourage recalcitrant workers by issuing premiums and raising wages — a sign that it is panicking, according to the strike participants.

The demands of the strikers remained stable throughout the months of protests:
to hold real democratic elections without Lukashenka,
bring the perpetrators of police brutality to responsibility,
and release the political prisoners.

Lately, the list has been topped up with economic demands, as workers were stripped of many of their guarantees and bonuses, Vitaliy says. He believes that the number of strikers on the state-owned enterprise will grow, leading to falling revenues to the state.

What can the EU do to support the protests of the Belarusian workers? One promising avenue, Vitaliy says, is holding off contracts with state factories while repressions of Lukashenka’s regime are ongoing. One such company is Norwegian Yara International, one of BelarusKali’s largest clients, which has hinted it may drop contracts if the factory management keeps firing strikers:


“Support us… It’s difficult to deal with the regime from inside the country. Our demands are simple — we want economic and trade relations with all the countries of the world, with Russia, Ukraine, the West, we just want a normal life and development. We want to just live in peace and raise our children, but not with this regime. Either we can stop the situation with peaceful strikes, or Lukashenka will shed blood. Nobody needs this.”

What keeps the protests going?


Anton Ruliou. Photo – courtesy of Mr. Ruliou

Why did the first strike, launched right after the election, fail? Anton Ruliou, editor at the analytical center Belarus in Focus, explains that it was an emotional reaction to the uncovered monstrous falsifications. It died out because the mandatory “Sectors for ideology” present in all state factories pressured the workers into submission: some were intimidated, some were jailed. But at the same time, the strikers saw that they were in the majority.

The present strike that started on 26 October is the second attempt to set the wheels spinning, and it is better planned: the first time, there were no funds for workers who lost their jobs for expressing their political position. Now they don’t need to worry about losing their income: the funds will keep them afloat until they find another job in the private sector.

Solidarity and a decentralized, incessant protest is how he describes the events of the last three months. The protest tactics are incredibly diverse. 100,000-200,000-strong Sunday marches, self-organization initiatives such as community get-togethers in the city neighborhoods, solidarity chains, strikes, boycotts of state goods, flyers, stickers, symbols — any form of disobedience chips away at the facade of Lukashenka’s regime. IT workers bring pizza to striking students. Students hold rallies in solidarity with detained medical workers.


Graffiti such as this traditional Pahonya knight are ubiquitous markers of resistance springing up throughout all of Belarus. Photo from @NEXTA / Telegram

Symbols are of special importance. Utility workers are obliged to remove symbols like the banned national white-red-white flag or the Pahonya knight, but they often can’t keep up: whenever one gets removed, three spring up in its place.


“The regime goes into overdrive to extinguish all the fires. For instance, the riot police first chases the participants of the Sunday march and throws stun grenades, and on Monday they again run across the whole city the whole day. They complain that they don’t see their families. It’s important to understand that the regime’s resources are not endless,” Anton Ruliou told Euromaidan Press.

According to him, Interior Minister Karaev claimed that in the regions, he needed to admonish the police so they would repress local protests. The mayors are reluctant to put a clamp on rallies, as in small towns, residents all know each other, and such unpopular measures draw public reprehension.

“It feels like we live in the Middle Ages.” Screams of tortured Belarusian protesters recorded near prison




According to a Chatham House study, 85% of protesting Belarusians are ready to take part in them until victory — a year and more.

Do they get tired? Anton says the fatigue is building, but the protesters can take a break from protesting and then return with renewed energy — unlike the riot police. Multi-hundred-thousand Sunday marches, which, however, the regime managed to suppress the last two weeks, are something that gives protesters strength and motivation.

For many protesters, Lukashenka’s savage crackdown right after the elections, on 9-12 August, was an eye-opener: they didn’t imagine that our country was permeated with such atrocities. They were shocked: they don’t want those who started the war against their own people to remain in power. Moreover, if the protests stop, everyone who participated and stood next to them will be caught. Retreating is more dangerous than not retreating.

Constitutional amendments plan wins little support

Critics believe that the Constitutional reform that Lukashenka has peddled since October is but a method to distract the protesters. It’s not working very well, say my Belarusian interlocutors.


“With Lukashenka in charge of the country, no Costitutional reform is possible. The man clearly indicated that power for him equals life, and he isn’t about to give it up. To propose such things, there has to be a certain level of credibility; you can’t suggest such things and simultaneously lie, threaten, and intimidate the protesters. Many times over, Lukashenka said the protesters were high on drugs. They do not trust him at all, and therefore, his proposals aren’t trusted, either,” Anton Ruliou explained.

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya called upon Belarusians to vote against Lukashenka’s project. An online poll on the alternative vote count platform Golos revealed that out of the 460,000 participants, 99% voted against adopting Constitutional amendents before new presidential elections would take place.

But there is little detail on what the reform would be about. Despite hints being dropped that they would serve to curb presidential powers, a leaked project document revealed no such plans.

Mr. Ruliou believes that the amendments will be adopted not through a referendum, but through the Belarusian People’s Gathering, consisting of the so-called “best people of the country,” such as the ideological workers at factories or loyal business groups. The protesters will not accept this decision.


“I believe that the Constitutional reform is Lukashenka’s attempt to distract us from our main goal, with which we come out to the streets. We want Lukashenka to leave. We were cheated at the elections, the president is illegitimate,” believes Yana.

What next?

AS A RESULT OF THE CRACKDOWN, PROTESTERS ARE NO LONGER ABLE TO HOLD THEIR REGULAR SUNDAY MARCH:
Lukashenka’s crackdown on protesters is increasingly brutal, over 1000 detained this Sunday





Amid the intensifying crackdown, a sense of desperation grows among the protesters. During a dispersed Sunday march in early November, protesters were shot at and beaten by swarms of riot police. Those detained are facing criminal charges of organizing mass unrest, instead of merely participating, which is punishable up to 10 years in jail.


“I personally started being afraid to come out,” Yana shares. “It’s bearable if you get jailed for two weeks, for a month. But three years, 10 years, and criminal charges? The perspectives are totally different.”

What can the world do to support Belarus?


“Don’t forget that the nightmare is growing in Belarus.

Many of my friends were simply kidnapped from their apartments. There are many missing people and many dead bodies found, many more than are officially declared. So when a friend doesn’t pick up his phone, I am scared that we might end up finding him in the forest.

You can help with moral support — I would like to thank the Poles, who mention us during their protests, this really helps. Please support the funds helping refugees — now there are many who flee because of the criminal charges.

Please don’t forget what is happening here; it will continue for a long time. The ideal revolution didn’t happen. Considering that our new Interior Minister [Minister Ivan Kubrakov replaced Yuriy Karaev on 29 October – Ed] is even harsher than the previous one… We know that they will beat our pensioners, shoot at them.

Terrifying things are happening, but it’s valuable that the people are peaceful. There are no firearms from our side, we don’t track them down, don’t ruin their life. But, unfortunately, the story is not mutual,” Yana told.

We thank the initiative Pray for Belarus for their assistance in writing this article.

UK abuse inquiry says Catholic Church prioritised reputation over children


By Estelle Shirbon


LONDON (Reuters) - The Roman Catholic Church in Britain betrayed its moral purpose over decades by protecting those who sexually abused children rather than caring for their victims, an independent inquiry said on Tuesday.



FILE PHOTO: Cardinal Vincent Nichols attends a reception at the Urban College in Rome Italy October 13, 2019. Arthur Edwards/Pool via REUTERS/File Photo

In a report, it said the Church had consistently prioritised its own reputation, moving abusive priests and monks to different parishes where some continued to prey on children, and resisting any external intervention.

“Child sexual abuse was swept under the carpet,” the report said, describing “appalling” attacks including sadistic beatings driven by sexual gratification, often perpetrated by deeply manipulative people in positions of trust.

“Victims described the profound and lifelong effects of abuse, including depression, anxiety, self-harming and trust issues,” the report said.

The Catholic Church received more than 900 complaints involving over 3,000 instances of child sex abuse in England and Wales between 1970 and 2015, and there have been more than 100 reported allegations a year since 2016. The report said those figures likely under-estimated the scale of the problem.

Lawyer David Enright, representing 20 victims who gave evidence to the inquiry, said the findings showed the Church was incapable of making itself a safe place for children despite repeated inquiries and damning reports.

“The Church has had many, many chances to reform and root out child abuse. It has failed,” he said

The report criticised the most senior Catholic leader in England and Wales, Cardinal Vincent Nichols, for failing to acknowledge any personal responsibility or show compassion for victims in recent cases.

Shortly after the publication of the report, Nichols said he was ashamed.

“I want to say to every single person who has suffered childhood abuse in the context of the Catholic Church, I am sorry, we will work at this, we will get it better, and to do so we need your help,” he said in an interview on Sky News TV.

VATICAN CRITICISED

But victims and their representatives called for Nichols to resign.

“He has lost all moral authority and must go,” said one victim, a former seminarian identified only as Frank, who gave evidence to the inquiry.

The report also criticised the Vatican and the Apostolic Nuncio, its ambassador to the UK, for failing to provide a witness statement to the inquiry despite repeated requests.

“The responses of the Holy See appear at odds with the Pope’s promise to take action on this hugely important problem,” said Alexis Jay, the inquiry chair.

Asked about that, Nichols said only that the Holy See was a sovereign state and he had to accept its decision.

The long-lasting Independent Inquiry on Child Sexual Abuse, which is examining the problem across British institutions and society, published similar findings about the Church of England on Oct. 6.

Its report on the Catholic Church comes on the same day that the Vatican has published a report into disgraced ex-U.S. Cardinal Theodore McCarrick, a sex abuser, which pointed to failings by popes, Vatican officials and senior U.S. clerics.

Separately, the Vatican’s former ambassador to France went on trial in Paris accused of molesting four men.

Additional reporting by Michael Holden; editing by Stephen Addison and Raissa Kasolowsky

Cardinal declined to meet abuse victim before Vatican ...

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/02/cardinal-vincent-nichols...

2019-03-03 · Sun 3 Mar 2019 01.00 EST First published on Sat 2 Mar 2019 09.29 ... wrote to Cardinal Vincent Nichols, the archbishop of Westminster, several times in the run-up to the Rome …