Saturday, November 21, 2020

Why We Need a Decolonial Ecology
Environmental destruction is inseparable from relationships of racial and colonial domination. It stems from the way we inhabit Earth, from our entitlement in appropriating the planet. All of which means we must recast the past. A conversation with Malcom Ferdinand, whose book, Une écologie décoloniale (A Decolonial Ecology), won the Foundation for Political Ecology literature prize in 2019.

Aurore Chaillou
Louise Roblin
Malcolm Ferdinand
4 JUNE 2020 


Aurore Chaillou and Louise Roblin: We often blame human activities in the industrial age for today’s environmental destruction. But you highlight how this framing hides relationships of domination that have existed for centuries. Does the Western imaginary around the environmental crisis airbrush out colonialism?

Malcom Ferdinand: I am by no means the first to point out the link between social inequality and environmental destructions: that’s what social ecology, political ecology, and ecofeminism all are about. But what I’m interested in is tying these questions to the legacy of racism and colonisation, which remains little explored (except by environmental justice movements).

Environmental destruction and social oppression have always gone hand in hand. However, as we are urged to tackle the climate emergency, we continue to see slogans devoid of social thought. This allows others to co-opt the environmental imperative and advocate a technocratic response, such as combatting pollution and resource scarcity through geo-engineering or carbon markets.

You trace the origins of the environmental crisis back to the 15th century and the age of colonisation.

We have seen several accelerations in environmental destruction, particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the ecological crisis began before these. It comes from a certain way of inhabiting the earth, from some believing themselves entitled to appropriate the earth for the benefit of a few. Starting in the Caribbean, this “colonial habitation” dates back to the end of the 15th century, when Christopher Columbus arrived in America (even though the plantation model dates back even earlier, for example, in Madeira).


The question of racism is almost entirely absent from French political ecology.

The Caribbean occupies an important place in modernity, because the violent meeting of Europeans with Amerindians coincided with the “enclosing” of the earth. We could now measure the resources available on the planet. For many scholars, this moment marked the beginning of globalisation.

You contrast the Anthropocene with the Negrocene, based on “colonial habitation”. Is this different from capitalist exploitation?

The people exploited during colonisation weren’t just anybody: although French peasants were also victims of social violence, they could always consider themselves superior to Blacks. The question of racism is almost entirely absent from French political ecology. On this point, I disagree with certain eco-Marxists for whom capitalism explains everything or who claim that social inequality and structural racism are one and the same. While colonisation and slavery were also driven by capitalist rationales, these processes were above all based on a colonial world view that invented a hierarchy between races and different lands of the globe.

In the colonial era, the lands of the Americas were subordinated to the lands of Europe. They were seen as a means of keeping shareholders happy, and this legitimised any practice. Even measures to protect the fertility of the land were ultimately aimed at maintaining its exploitation. These lands were thought of as different from those of France. It was a violent and misogynistic process, an awful way to inhabit the earth promoted by a coloniser for whom other human beings were dehumanised and for whom colonised lands and the non-humans that inhabited them mattered less than his desires. This is what I call “colonial habitation”. Colonial habitation is a violent way of inhabiting the earth, subjugating lands, humans, and non-humans to the desires of the coloniser.


Colonial habitation is a violent way of inhabiting the earth, subjugating lands, humans, and non-humans to the desires of the coloniser.

A host of justifying narratives and practices – drawing on religion, metaphysics, law, culture, and so on – are then created. In 1848, for example, the second abolition of slavery in France and its colonies was undoubtedly a major political and legal milestone. Yet various fictions were used to keep former slaves on plantations and limit the development of the peasantry. Landowners, who had to grow monocultures on their land under the colonial model, perpetuated a colonial habitat after 1848: the mentality of appropriation and hierarchy remained unchanged.

This way of inhabiting, now conceivable without slavery, spread its practices to other places. Banana growing, silk farming, and mining grew across the French Empire. Regarding the case of the infamous chlordecone pollution in the French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, in just 20 years these practices contaminated lands for centuries and poisoned thousands of people to fill the coffers of a few. My work has shown that we can get caught in a technocratic reading of environmental problems. A chemical is toxic? We take it off the market. Too much pollution? We regulate, or implement a technical solution. But “subalterns” don’t just want to be decontaminated or even want justice for a crime of this magnitude. Rather, five centuries later, with still no indictment made, it’s about changing the way lands are inhabited.

When you talk about “subalterns”, whom do you mean? Oppressed people in general, the working class, women, sexual minorities?

I use the word “negro” fairly freely (in Negrocene, for example). Subalterns are today’s “plantation” negroes, regardless of their gender or skin colour. We’ve essentialised the negro as black: it comes from Spanish, in which the two words are the same. But Blacks are not the only ones who have suffered and who still suffer on plantations. This word was first de-essentialised by writers. A “negro” is a being who does the work of someone else without being recognised for it.


The history of Black enslavement has long been ignored in France; it is still mainly thought of in terms of social or gender relations. But we overlook how it is connected to environmental history.

The Negrocene draws attention to all those beings whose life force was used to satisfy the selfish desires of others. The history of Black enslavement has long been ignored in France; it is still mainly thought of in terms of social or gender relations. But we overlook how it is connected to environmental history. We need to link the exploitation of bodies to that of lands. If we start from the unmodern principle that there are continuities between bodies and ecosystems, we realise that to harm one is to harm the other. This prism helps us to understand anti-slavery revolts also as resistance to this colonial habitation. Marronage – the escape of slaves from plantations – is central to my work because it’s another way of inhabiting. Maroons do more than resist slavery: they adopt a different relationship with the earth and non-humans.

What are the consequences of this “colonial silence” today?

I see two problems. On the one hand, it wasn’t until the 150th anniversary of the abolition of slavery that we started thinking about acknowledging what happened. Slavery is a touchy subject in France. When I give racism and slavery awareness sessions in schools, some teachers don’t want me to talk about Blacks. Presidential candidate François Fillon perfectly illustrated this mentality in 2017 when, on the subject of colonial history, he said that France should “not feel guilty for having wanted to share its culture with the peoples of Africa”. On the other hand, environmentalism is constructed differently to racism. It’s also true that environmental activists are mostly white (as they admit).

I would say, then, that colonial silence contributes to the “double divide” (that separates environmental and colonial thinking) and excludes a whole swath of people who inhabit the earth. Yet people who have been colonised can also contribute to environmentalist thinking. By perpetuating the belief that racialised people are not interested in the environment, we perpetuate the exclusion of racialised people and the way they conceptualise normal spheres and arenas for thinking about environmentalism. This exclusion in turn breeds distrust among the racialised. From its very beginning, the imaginary built around environmentalism has erased the roles and words of others.

What’s more, the colonial divide means environmental issues are downplayed. My book, Une écologie décoloniale, attempts to bridge the divide between environmentalism and decolonisation because it harms both. Contrary to collapsology narratives, I try to show that, since 1492, there have already been collapses, and many communities have already proposed alternative relationships with the world. Their voice has not been heard, at least in the environmentalist movement. Yet it’s by continuing to publish anthologies of environmentalist texts in which not a single Black author appears that we perpetuate the myth of environmentalism only being driven by Whites from the Global North and the myth of an absence of environmentalist thinking among peoples who were once colonised and enslaved.

How should we think about social justice, the fight against racism, and the preservation of ecosystems together? Would redefining the concept of nature allow this link to be made?

Eurocentrism and Western-centrism have prevented us from seeing other worldviews. And, if we do reference them, it’s romantically: “Oh! If only we could all live like the Guarani!”  Yet we can’t celebrate their way of life without recognising their history and their social and political marginalisation. Among indigenous peoples, suicide rates are often 10 times higher than average.


We urgently need to make environmentalism about the world: what world do we want to live in? We must recognise culture and colour, rather than simply addressing the issue through technical environmental management.

So, we should let their worldviews challenge us, without forgetting the history of these peoples and what they are asking for. What are the terms that these people use to assert their relationship with the world? That’s how we will bridge environmental justice’s double divide. Talking about ecocide, for example, creates an intergenerational fabric (we connect our actions to the lives of our children, we take responsibility for our legacy, we negotiate that of our parents), but this fabric is thought about in environmentalist terms, rather than social and political ones. Yet understanding that destruction was possible thanks to the exploitation of indigenous peoples means recognising these peoples’ need for justice, as well as demands for slavery reparations.

Today’s political and economic decision-makers have every interest in continuing to conceal this colonial dimension…

We urgently need to make environmentalism about the world: what world do we want to live in? We must recognise culture and colour, rather than simply addressing the issue through technical environmental management. This is what I mean when I talk about “decolonial ecology”.

This change in paradigm looks very much like a change in the imaginary. Your book is written in an almost literary style.

If I’ve taken literary licence, it’s to make things felt, and not just demonstrate them. Historians, when they claim to be scientific, give numbers. But once we have the facts, we are not necessarily ready to think about and feel what has happened. Putting names to numbers, retracing journeys, that’s what lets us make slavery a story about the world and the earth.

“Touching the world” requires values like love and justice. If we ask how we can build a world after colonisation and slavery, the answer is not for everyone stay away from one another. In my book, I present on side figures who flee (because of the violence done onto them), and on the other side figures who deny the world to the other. But I also talk about those who decide to stay on board the ship shared with all beings. We’re all in the same boat after all.


You cannot build a world on either an ark or a slave ship. I propose imagining a world-ship, populated with humans and non-humans, by taking into account the history of each and every one.

But among environmentalists, this image is haunted by the story of Noah’s Ark. Michel Serres, for example, uses paintings and images of Noah’s Ark to put forward a political theory of the environment: “We are all Noah.” It’s a foundation myth for society that allows a theorisation of the relationship with the world. But Noah’s Ark talks about a selection process which I consider violent. Furthermore, it focuses on the boarding process: we know nothing of what happens on board. The way it is used politically seems problematic.

I prefer to use the slave ship, an imaginary shared by many afro-descendants in the Americas, because while we are all in the same boat, we are not all in the same conditions. Historically, the question of who would have been saved among the Black populations of the Americas is painful: we know very well who would have been saved and who would have been abandoned. You need look no further than the Mediterranean to understand this. Even today, the climate storm could become an excuse for not living with others and for building walls.

That said, you cannot build a world on either an ark or a slave ship. I propose imagining a world-ship, populated with humans and non-humans, by taking into account the history of each and every one. On this boat, there is nobody in the hold. Everyone lives on deck.

This interview was first published in French in Revue Projet. 

GREEN EUROPEAN JOURNAL
COVID-19: Anti-lockdown militias on streets of Michigan as virus surges across US

The number of coronavirus-related deaths in Michigan alone is up 150% on what it was two weeks ago.


By Helen-Ann Smith, news correspondent in Lansing, Michigan


Thursday 19 November 2020 14:25, UK
Image:Anti-government militia The Boogaloo Bois say they will use force to defend their freedoms

On the first day of a new lockdown in Michigan hundreds of people ventured out to one of the only places still open for business - a COVID-19 testing site.

People waited for up to four hours to be swabbed. Not all had symptoms, but all shared a weariness at spiralling infections and new lockdown measures in their state.


There's a sense that America has been distracted. People, politicians and media alike all focused on a gripping national election.

But while the world looked away the virus has surged.

The number of coronavirus deaths across the US has passed 250,000, there are an average of 150,000 new daily cases and more people are in hospital than at any other time during the pandemic.


In Michigan alone COVID-related deaths are up 150% on what they were just two weeks ago.


The new rules here mean no in-person teaching at schools or colleges, no inside dining and no theatres, cinemas or gyms can open.

"I'm retired," says Terry Fiedler who has come to get tested. "I'm just glad I'm not trying to make a living. If I was trying to make a living it would put me right out of business. They need to be fair with them somehow. Trump would have been a lot fairer but that's the way it goes."

And that's the striking thing here, very few people talk about the pandemic without also mentioning politics.

Many rolled their eyes when we asked why some Americans are resistant to new restrictions.

One man was more blunt: "One word, Trump."

The politicisation is understandable. Few issues divided Joe Biden and Donald Trump more on the election trail.


Trump has already it made clear there will be no national lockdown under his watch - the imposition of new measures, in Michigan as elsewhere, is being taken by local, largely Democrat, politicians.

It means many of his supporters feel restrictions are unnecessary and unfair.

And they're joined by other vocal groups who resist being told what to do by lawmakers in the name of freedom and liberty.

Image:Zakkari Clark is opposed to the Michigan lockdown

"You've been told 'no' by the people, you've been told 'no' by the Supreme Court and you're still continuing to do this, people aren't gonna stand for that," says Zakkari Clark addressing the Michigan governor directly.

He's a member of the so-called Boogaloo Bois, a self-styled, anti-government militia.

A small number of them gathered outside the state capital today, their faces covered and heavily armed with assault rifles.

"Right now, we're the rational people. If you keep pushing out you're gonna get irrational people."


This isn't a big group but their presence speaks of palpable tension and distrust.

"We're gonna do everything in our power to try the peaceful route, you know, civil disobedience and stuff like that," says Nomad, another heavily armed Boogaloo Boi. "But when it comes to our livelihoods and our rights that we are born with as humans, we're not going to budge."

Would he use violence? "If my life was threatened. Or my rights."

No matter where they are, the imposition of measures to protect lives often means a threat to livelihoods.


Under the new restrictions bars will have to close.

Stephanie Fox has worked in hospitality most of her adult life, she has no safety net and says she's deeply fearful of what the next few months will bring.

She looks emotional when she talks about the impact on her personally.

"I'm seeing all my savings are gone, my bills are coming up, my dog needs surgery, you know. But at the same time I get it, but it's scary, really scary."

Joe Biden has said he'll step up efforts to bring the virus under control and reduce the tensions surrounding it.

If Michigan is anything to go by, it won't be easy.

Far right groups in Norway instigate more street provocation than before

New groups are adopting more radical measures.


In November last year, the group Stop Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) set fire to a Quran in Kristiansand. Counter-protesters reacted, resulting in a brawl.
(Photo: Tor Erik Schrøder / NTB scanpix)


Ida Kvittingen
JOURNALIST
Ingrid P. Nuse
ENGLISH VERSION
Wednesday 29. january 2020 - 

They march in the streets, burn the Quran and hoist the Nazi flag.

Activists from the far right are trying to be provocative other places than the Internet more often than before, according to a study of seven groups in Norway.

The researchers have tracked what the groups say about their own activities on their websites and on YouTube, and everything the newspapers write about them. They found a total of 553 incidents over eleven years.

“Before 2011 we saw the far right make a shift from the streets to the Internet. Now we’re seeing that they’re on their way back to the streets, whether it’s Stop Islamisation of Norway (SIAN) or the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement (NRM) demonstrating,” says Anders Ravik Jupskås.

Jupskås is a political scientist and the deputy director of the Center for Extremism Research (C-REX) at the University of Oslo.

New groups

The nationalist groups range from right-wing radicals working within democracy to right-wing extremists who reject democracy and in some cases condone the use of violence.

Their activities change as new groups emerge.

Engagement accelerated when Pegida arrived on the scene in 2015. Of the various groups, this anti-Islamist group has been the one that has gathered most often in the streets between 2008 and 2019. About 200 people showed up for their first demonstration.

The following year, Soldiers of Odin (SOO) were very visible. They patrolled the streets in the evening.

The researchers denote ‘confrontational activism’ when groups tape off the entrance to organizations they don't like or burn the Quran.

Most of the time, however, so-called ‘mailbox activism’ – like handing out flyers and hanging posters – is still the most prevalent.

These were the most common type of activities before 2015. At that time, the People's Movement Against Immigration (FMI) tended to be behind the activities, which peaked in 2012.

For the past three years, SIAN and NRM have been the most active groups.

Little violence

Only five times during the eleven years of the study has the far right initiated violence.

Counter-protesters tend to start the fights far more often. This happened 26 times during the period. In seven instances, it is unclear who started the clashes.

The researchers did not collect reports from the police.

“We may have missed some violent incidents because the groups themselves didn’t want the attention. But serious violence is likely to be picked up by the media,” says Jupskås.


At the opposite end, it’s conceivable that putting brochures in mailboxes is so commonplace for the groups that they don’t bother to mention it on their own websites. If the local newspaper also chooses not to write about it, the researchers won't have captured the activity.
Websites disappearing

The far right groups in Norway have been quite unsuccessful as street activists, according to researcher Anders Ravik Jupskås at the University of Oslo. (Photo: Tron Trondal, UiO)

Jupskås and his colleagues are writing a scientific article, so their findings have not yet undergone quality assurance by other researchers.

Lars Erik Berntzen does research on anti-Islamic activism in Western Europe. He previously worked at the same centre as Jupskås, now he is a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Bergen.

He encountered challenges when mapping the activities of Pegida and other groups.

“Websites are constantly being shut down and information disappears, especially on Facebook, so there may have been more past events than what we’re detecting here,” says Berntzen.

He still finds it likely that the number of confrontational activities has increased.
Failed activists

Berntzen found that when the media reported on the Pegida demonstrations, many people flocked to the group’s websites afterwards.

“One of the main goals of these stunts is attention. Being seen and heard is challenging and requires more drastic measures,” he says.

Jupskås and his colleagues have not yet investigated whether what the groups do on social media is related to their activities outside the Internet.

“But it’s clear that they haven’t been able to mobilize on the street. About 17 people show up at the demonstrations on average,” says Jupskås.

At the same time, 31 000 people follow SIAN on Facebook.

On the whole, they are quite unsuccessful as street activists, according to Jupskås.

Far right groups in Norway 2008-2019


Folkeaksjonen mot innvandring (FMI). The People’s Movement Against Immigration is the longest-lived far-right organization. Founded in 1987.

Vigrid. Founded in 1998.

Stop Islamisation of Norway (SIAN). Founded in 2000; became part of Stop Islamisation of Europe in 2008.

Norwegian Defence League (NDL). Founded in 2011. Norwegian branch of the English Defence League.

Den nordiske motstandsbevegelsen (DNM). The Nordic Resistance Movement. Founded in 2011, began with activism in 2012. Norwegian department of the Swedish organization.

Patriotiske europeere mot islamiseringen av Aftenlandet (Pegida). Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Western World. Founded in 2015. Inspired by German organization founded a few months before.

Odins soldater. Soldiers of Odin. Founded in 2016. Norwegian branch of Finnish organization.


“I think they get too much media attention,” he says.

“None of the groups are particularly lasting. After two or three years they often split into factions.”
Thinks we take them a little too seriously

The groups often disagree on what to do, and personal conflicts abound.

Three of the groups have already almost left the streets: Pegida, Soldiers of Odin and the Norwegian Defence League.

The same people keep coming around. Ronny Alte is a well-known figure who has been in three groups.

Jupskås thinks there’s something comical about the internal quarrels and the constant divisions.

He believes that the community often takes the amateur street activists a little too seriously, but emphasizes that it is important for the police and the authorities to monitor what the groups do.

Berntzen reminds us that the actions of a few people can have major consequences.

"Burning the Quran can generate debate about legislative changes, the limit to freedom of speech and national security with fear of retaliation from jihadists," he says.
Inspired from abroad

Four out of ten activities target immigrants, and three out of ten target Muslims.

The Nordic Resistance Movement differs slightly from the other groups. Every tenth time they mobilize offline, they try to recruit new members. They are against everything from globalization to Jews and gays.

But the groups themselves are quite international. The NRM is governed by Sweden.

SIAN is part of Stop Islamisation of Europe, and Pegida was originally a German organization.
The hard core

Why is provocative activism increasing?

Although they are few, street activists can create a ripple effect in society, says researcher Lars Erik Berntzen at the University of Bergen. (Photo: forskning.no)

Jupskås wants to do more research on this question. So far he has some theories.

In addition to being inspired by groups in other countries, he thinks that the Norwegian far right reacted to the refugee crisis in 2015. He believes the public conversation about immigration in Norway became more negative and facilitated the growth of the groups.

At the same time, the anti-immigration Progress Party established itself in government and lost its role as a protest party.

Berntzen, for his part, believes that the shift in activities has a lot to do with internal strife in the groups.

“Members argue about who will decide what, and those who are willing to sacrifice something for the cause can use their activism to achieve status. Burning the Quran can present a real risk of being subjected to violence. In some circles that commands respect,” he says.

Constant confrontations with counter-protesters can also harden the lines,” the researcher believes.

Police response sharpened

Police response has also changed in recent years. Far-right groups are now more often arrested or fined than before.

Even more often, the police ask them to leave.

Most often, however, the police are content to simply observe demonstrations and other activities.

The far right took to the streets most often in 2018. In 2019, activity levels dropped slightly. The number of confrontations, demonstrations and violent incidents has not increased since 2016.

Jupskås believes there might have been even more activity if the police did not react as decisively and quickly as they have.

“We’ve seen examples of activism that have been stopped by the police, like when Soldiers of Odin were not allowed to walk in uniform with their hoodies in the streets. It wasn't so much fun anymore then,” he says.

But it could have just as well gone the other way, according to Berntzen. Some animal and environmental protection organizations, for example, have become more extreme when the police tighten their grip.

“The groups may lose support when the less risk-averse drop out, leaving just the hard core. Given the internal leadership struggles, this may increase the likelihood that these hard-core members will push their cause that much harder", he says.


Right Now!
Dying for the Cause? Not really.

The Far-Right has its own take on “martyrdom”.

Suicide attacks are virtually absent in far-right terrorism. A recent study of the subcultural, strategic, and historic references to martyrdom, self-sacrifice, and suicide in the contemporary far right shows the potential reasons for this, highlighting the peculiar political mythology of “martyrdom” that characterizes this extremist environment.


Martyrdom of St Lawrence by Lawrence OP.

Daniel Koehler
DIRECTOR OF GERMAN INSTITUTE ON RADICALIZATION AND DE-RADICALIZATION STUDIES (GIRDS)
Thursday 22. october 2020 - 

Immediately after 17-year-old Kyle Rittenhouse was arrested for shooting 3 and killing 2 persons with an assault rifle during the August 25, 2020 Kenosha protests, a stunningly quick and widespread process of idolization and heroization within the far-right began to kick in.

Many in fact addressed Rittenhouse, who was charged with two counts of first-degree murder, as a “true American hero”. Memes glorifying him, crowdfunding campaigns in his support or even cosplaying as Rittenhouse during far-right rallies are only few examples for the intense idolization surrounding him.

Similar forms of “lionization” are common in other, politically more extremist milieus, such as the white supremacist or neo-Nazi environment.

It was the case with right-wing terrorists Anders Breivik (who killed 77 persons on July 22, 2011 in Oslo, Norway), Dylann Roof (who killed 9 persons on June 17, 2015 in Charleston, USA) or Brenton Tarrant (who killed 51 persons on March 15, 2019 in Christchurch, New Zealand).

Breivik quickly became an inspiring hero among far-rightists, Roof and his bowl haircut were made the core symbol of militant neo-Nazi online groups (for example the so called “Bowl Patrol” or “Bowlwaffen Division”), and Tarrant is typically called a “saint” within the militant far-right online milieu, accompanied with picture montages placing his face into paintings of Christian martyrs and saints.


But all these cases have at least one element in common: All of the perpetrators actually survived the violent acts. None of them is actually a “martyr” in the true meaning of the term, as none of them die for the cause.

More broadly, far-right terrorists have almost never used suicide tactics for their attacks, neither did they commit suicide afterwards to avoid arrest.

In a recent study, I looked at the potential reasons for this, by assessing subcultural references, far-right strategic manuals, and the role model concept of Nazi martyrdom cult in the contemporary extreme right.
Celebrating the Warrior but Shunning Death

Of course, there are cases of far-right terrorists or murderers who commit suicide before arrest.

Take the examples of white supremacist Wade Michael Page, who shot and killed 6 persons on August 5, 2012. After what came to be known as the Wisconsin Sikh Temple attack he turned the gun on himself.

In a similar fashion, the German neo-Nazis Uwe Böhnhardt and Uwe Mundlos killed each other before they could be apprehended for a killing and bombing spree that lasted over a decade producing 10 victims.

Even Dylann Roof reportedly attempted to commit suicide but failed.

Yet, living to fight another day appears to be the main requisite for large-scale idolization in the extreme right.

As Cynthia Miller-Idriss has shown in her seminal work “The Extreme Gone Mainstream”, modern extreme right subculture includes abundant references to death.

Typically, they come in three forms:

(1) abstract death (e.g., the SS death head)

(2) collective death (e.g., the death of a whole nation or ancestral group as existential threat to evoke violence for restauration or salvation from destruction)

(3) specific death (e.g., being political soldiers). A person sacrifices himself or herself to save the nation from destruction. Dying for one’s race, the nation, or as an honourable soldier in battle are omnipresent themes in extreme right music, clothing, literature, or other subcultural products.


So why then, is right-wing terrorism and violence almost completely deprived of suicide tactics (in a narrow sense, whereby the death of the attacker is part of the attack design)?

One important explanation for suicide terrorism, the rational choice perspective, maintains that for such a tactic to appear in significant scale within a given extremist environment, there must be personal, social, and religious incentives. Of course, there is much more to it, but this is a good place to start.

Even though the far-right is a diverse and heterogenous milieu, one can hardly find elaborate incentives in these categories. Religious support for suicide is not to be expected in the Christian fundamentalist parts. Much more present is the “fight till the end” notion praised among pagan far-rightists worshipping Norse gods and Viking warrior culture.

The far-fight also has little to offer in terms of social or personal incentives. There is no known widespread practice of providing for families of those members who committed suicide, even during an act of violence against the enemy. Those who killed themselves during an attack are not even remotely celebrated as much in subculture (e.g. music, clothing etc.) as compared to those who survived.

The contemporary far-right widely communicates to its members that death must be embraced as the consequence of fighting for the cause until the end, meaning until the “political soldier” is stigmatized, ostracized, and eventually killed by the enemy.

Steadfastness in the face of a much superior opponent and surviving to continue the fight is typically seen as the highest virtue in this milieu. This appears to connect well to the role model of martyrdom in Nazi Germany, which also sacralised those Nazis who were killed during street fights with Communists (e.g., Horst Wessel): the “Blutzeugen” (blood witnesses).

Strategic manuals also rarely include references to suicide terrorism.

One notable exception are the “Turner Diaries”, deemed “one of the most influential works of violent extremist propaganda in the English language”. Chapters XIV and XVI feature a planned suicide attack against a power plant involving radioactive material. In the end, the main protagonist is ordered to embark on a suicide mission at the climax of the book. He flies an agricultural aircraft equipped with a nuclear warhead into the Pentagon and destroys it.

Other important manifestos or strategic manuals (e.g., Tarrant’s “The Great Replacement” or Breivik’s “2083 - A European Declaration of Independence”) are much more focused on the “political soldier” theme: finding honourable death in the battle to save the white race.

In short, within the contemporary extreme right, personal, social, and religious/ideological rewards are mostly structured to incentivize murder-suicides or “death by cop” in the most extreme form. “Martyr” status is usually reserved for those who remain ideologically committed in the face of persecution, imprisonment, or societal stigmatization.
Implications for Future Threats

Summing up this short overview of my recent study on modern far-right suicide, martyrdom, and self-sacrifice, it is fair to say that the extreme right environment is highly unlikely to produce significant suicide tactics in the narrow sense.


This holds true even though some groups have openly flirted with admiration for jihadist martyrdom and suicide terrorism in general.


Much more likely, and oftentimes no less harmful, are the attack tactics evolving around mass shooting murder-suicides, with a particular hypermasculine connotation, which open the threat spectrum for male lone actor attacks fuelled by the far-right’s glorification of the (male) “warrior hero” who goes down fighting till the end.

About this blog:


Welcome to the “Right Now!” blog where you will find commentary, analysis and reflection by C-REX’s researchers and affiliates on topics related to contemporary far right politics, including party politics, subcultural trends, militancy, violence, and terrorism.

The Center for Research on Extremism, C-REX, is a cross-disciplinary center for the study of right-wing extremism, hate crime and political violence. It is a joint collaboration with five of the leading Norwegian institutions on extremism research, hosted by the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Oslo.

Read more blog entries from Right Now!
Germany's anti-mask movement draws strange bedfellows

Issued on: 21/11/2020 - 
A demonstrator carries a mock grave marker inscribed "German Basic Law" (constitution) in Berlin on November 18 
Odd ANDERSEN AFP/File

Berlin (AFP)

A dancer in harem pants moves down a Berlin street next to a skinhead wearing a "Reich" flag: Germany's escalating anti-mask protests in the coronavirus pandemic draw from a wide, seemingly contradictory range of political camps.

A rally of nearly 10,000 opponents of government-imposed social restrictions to curb the spread of Covid-19 in Berlin this week brought together a motley band of demonstrators with ostensibly little in common -- apart from crumbling faith in institutions and representative democracy.

On Saturday, another demonstration is set to take place in the eastern city of Leipzig. The protest in the German capital, which led to 365 police detentions, gives a taste of what could be expected.


The scene in front of the Brandenburg Gate Wednesday marked a dizzying confluence of LGBT rainbow flags and Gandhi banners intermingled with posters for the increasingly international QAnon conspiracy movement.

Marchers wearing red Trump "MAGA" hats could be spotted in the crowd next to evangelicals, climate activists and "peace"-shouting hippies.

Most of the protesters remained peaceful while they railed against vaccines and dismissed the dangers of the virus, but a violent hard core attacked police.

Some 77 officers were injured at the demonstration, with Berlin police chief Barbara Slowik saying that "the brutality of the violence was immense."

"Some have told me that we have not experienced something like that in decades," she told the Tagesspiegel daily.

"We are moving away from a very colourful public and are now increasingly dealing with a spectrum of people who generally reject our system and are prepared to use extreme violence."

- New conspiracy theorists -

Repeating a common but false refrain of the demonstrations, one protester, Ina Meyer-Stoll, claimed: "The death rate isn't higher than ones you see for flu outbreaks."

Another activist on the streets, Achim Ecker, an erstwhile Greens voter in his 50s, said he had "lost confidence in the political parties" particularly with regard to potential approval of a vaccine.

Others' harmless appearance belied jaw-dropping views.

Grandmother Birgit Vogt, 75, denied the existence of the pandemic and didn't hesitate to draw a parallel between the restrictions and the seizure of dictatorial powers by the Nazis in 1933: "Fear and panic allow you to control the masses, as in Hitler's time".

"Just like after 9/11, which gave way to countless conspiracy theories, I worry that we're seeing the same phenomenon with the pandemic," warned Miro Dittrich of the anti-extremism group Amadeu Antonio Foundation.

He told AFP that such movements were "dramatically increasing their followers and many are newcomers. The shutdown has played a role, as people are cut off from their social environment and spend an extremely large amount of time online."

- 'Think differently' -

In the meantime, right-wing extremist groups and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party have been effective in harnessing a wide range of objections to the government response to the pandemic.

On Wednesday, about a dozen demonstrators began shouting "Sieg Heil" while performing the banned stiff-armed Hitler salute, in the presence of police, an AFP reporter saw.

Anti-Semitic slogans have been a fixture of some of the corona-sceptic demonstrations in Germany this year.

"The link between the conspiracy theorist scene and the far right is unfortunately quite logical because they have a lot in common," Dittrich said.

"Both believe that a small elite secretly controls events at the expense of 'the Germans', as well as controlling the mass media, and that the truth can only be found in 'alternative' media."

The umbrella group for most of the demonstrations since the outbreak of coronavirus is called Querdenken or "Lateral-thinkers".

Founded in Stuttgart, it calls itself a "freedom movement" that embraces "peaceful and non-partisan" ideals and claims to have more than 100,000 supporters, including personalities such as international footballer Thomas Berthold.

But "the organisers of Querdenken have shown in the past that they're not afraid of contact with the (virus) deniers and conspiracy theorists," warned Simon Teune, a researcher at Berlin's Technical University who specialises in protests.

"The original intention of the demonstrations -- namely to protest against the measures initiated by the state -- is often overshadowed," it said.

"Instead, they are being used to turn governments and the media themselves into 'objects of protest and hatred'."

© 2020 AFP

Rally Around the Flag? The Far-Right Response to Covid-19















11 SEPTEMBER 2020
Alexander Ruser
Amanda Machin

Europe’s far-right parties such as Alternative für Deutschland, the Lega and the Swedish Democrats have all struggled to find a message amid the pandemic. However, things might be changing. As populations tire of lockdowns and fear for their livelihoods, these parties are attempting to harness discontent and speak for “the people”. While some hope that scientific truths will win out against populist lies, the prominent place given to experts could produce a backlash. Ultimately the social and economic consequences of government measures will be decisive for the future of far-right populism.

The coronavirus pandemic has brought huge changes to all corners of the world. Daily life has been fundamentally transformed; working conditions, social events and international travel have all been disrupted. Besides the profound economic and social transformations in the wake of a global health crisis, how has the political landscape been affected? How have political parties fared? What has been the response of the far-right populist parties, who might have been expected to appreciate the closed borders? Six months ago, these parties were poised to make sweeping electoral gains. Before the pandemic, a populist surge was regarded by some as almost inevitable due to deep structural changes across Europe and the lack of political alternatives. An important question today is whether the coronavirus pandemic has dampened this surge or whether, on the contrary, it will provide it with new fuel.

Though there is good reason to be wary of sweeping generalisations and simplistic assumptions often made about populism in general, and right-wing populism in particular, it is worth comparing these parties in order to understand the variations and commonalities of far-right populism. Broadly speaking, populism works by championing “the people”, who are distinguished in populist discourse from “elites” or the “establishment”.[1] While left-wing populism makes the people an inclusive category, the populism of the far right constructs them in exclusive and ethnic terms, and distinguishes them from an unresponsive elite as well as from immigrants.[2]


Perhaps unsurprisingly in a war-like situation, we have witnessed what is referred to as a “rally around the flag” effect: many leaders and parties of governments have seen an increase in their approval ratings.

This division has apparently been difficult to maintain over recent months. Perhaps unsurprisingly in a war-like situation, we have witnessed what is referred to as a “rally around the flag” effect: many leaders and parties of governments have seen an increase in their approval ratings. This has made it difficult for far-right populist opposition parties to find and assert a strong message. And indeed, as Cas Mudde points out, “Populist parties and politicians have responded very differently, in part depending upon whether they are in government or opposition. They are also faced with very different contexts, both in terms of number of infections and control of the media.” Things might be changing. As populations tire of lockdowns and fear for their livelihoods, these parties are attempting to harness discontent and speak for the people against what is construed as hostile government policy.

This certainly seems to be the case with three far-right parties: the Italian Lega, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and the Swedish Democrats (SD). These parties have had striking electoral successes over recent years. They have acted very differently in response to the coronavirus-induced crisis but they all seem to struggle to carve out an appealing message and a strong identity during the pandemic. Currently, these parties are all continuing to construct national government policy as illegitimate and damaging. What is most pertinently revealed in our comparison is that this indictment is made regardless of government response to the crisis. Whether the strategy is to enforce a lock-down or resist it, populist parties construct a division between the people and the “other” by exploiting the coronavirus crisis.


Whether the strategy is to enforce a lock-down or resist it, populist parties construct a division between the people and the “other” by exploiting the coronavirus crisis.
Wavering message, wavering support

The Italian Lega, led by Matteo Salvini, is certainly not letting up on its populist framing of the crisis. With slogans such as “let’s close our borders”, the Lega is notorious for connecting immigration to insecurity as well as promoting the fining and expulsion of migrants. The Lega connected the Covid-19 virus directly to immigration from the outset. According to Salvini, the “terrible virus” was “spreading from China”. Note that in his discourse, the specific characteristics of the migrant might have changed (they no longer come from Africa but from Asia), but the construction and blaming of a foreign other has not.

During the first months of the lockdown, this anti-immigration discourse seemed to be completely out of touch with reality. First of all, due to the lockdown, NGO rescue boats had effectively ceased to operate, resulting in a sharp decline of people reaching Italy. Secondly, concerns over fresh food shortages, created by the disruption of the influx of legal seasonal workers, has sparked an acknowledgement of the importance of illegal immigrants for Italy’s agricultural sector.

Up until now at least, Salvini’s messages have largely fallen flat. Part of the reason may be that the lively rallies, where the Lega thrives most, are now banned under social distancing rules. Another may be that he has promoted inconsistent messages and flip-flopped. In February, Salvini argued that the Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte was not doing enough but by July, he began touting that the prime minister was doing too much. Now Salvini is pronouncing the lockdown as unnecessary and harmful to the Italian people: “keeping them terrified, distanced and locked up is an attack on our democracy and our economy.” Although the Lega remains Italy’s strongest party, with 26 per cent share of the national voting intention, it has slipped in the polls. Yet it is important to acknowledge this slip as not indicating a weakening of the far right in Italy, but rather shifts of popularity within the country. The Lega has lost 10 per cent to the post-fascist party Fratelli d’Italia (FdI), turning its leader and Salvini’s most important ally, Giorgia Meloni, into a potential rival.
Germany’s struggling far right

The challenge for the far right in Germany has not been to maintain a consistent message but rather to find one in the first place. Like the Lega, the AfD is overtly populist. Consider its 2017 manifesto in which the party publicised its wish to: “maintain our language and traditions in a peaceful, democratic, and sovereign nation state for the German people” since “Germany’s political class has exploited and modified election laws and procedures with increasing cunningness in order to reduce the influence of the electorate.” It also targets migrants, in particular Muslims (established Muslim communities are targeted too), unambiguously declaring that “Islam does not belong to Germany. Its expansion and the ever-increasing number of Muslims in the country are viewed by the AfD as a danger to our state, our society, and our values.”


[…] while the stringent travel restrictions and strict border controls fit within the far-right discourse, the enactment of such policies has deprived the AfD of a distinctive position.

The problem for the AfD since the pandemic, however, has been that the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has been widely credited with effectively managing the crisis. Her party, the Christian Democrats, has seen the most noticeable increase in support in Europe. And this simply does not fit with the AfD’s populist insinuation that elected elites do not serve the German people. So while the stringent travel restrictions and strict border controls fit within the far-right discourse, the enactment of such policies has deprived the AfD of a distinctive position.

In general, the leadership of the party has been quite subdued throughout 2020, and the party has slipped to 10 per cent of the national voting intention. The pandemic came at a time when the party was already dealing with internal division and party infighting. The party has a radical far-right wing (known as “the wing”) which was formally dissolved in late March 2020, after the German domestic intelligence agency deemed it a potential threat to the constitution and put it under surveillance. In addition, prominent figures in the party have been pushed out due to their former membership in a banned neo-Nazi group.

But the formal dissolution of the wing has clearly done nothing to stop some of its members from questioning the reality of the global health crisis: various prominent party figures and former wing members have publicly referred to the “alleged corona crisis” while one posted a “checklist” to distinguish a pandemic from a “fake pandemic”. Prominent wing activists have also been active in the so-called “Hygiene Demonstrations” which have drawn thousands of people in cities across Germany to protest the government’s coronavirus policy. Protestors blame Jews and immigrant communities for the spread of Covid-19 in Germany.

These responses have begun to dominate the public impression of the AfD’s current position, and party leaders are concerned that the connection of members to neo-fascist groups, conspiracy theorists and anti-vaccination activists will alienate more moderate conservative voters. The coronavirus has therefore exposed the cleavage between the national-conservative party mainstream and the marginalised far-right wing – a divide that may, according to former party leader Alexander Gauland, actually end with the dissolution of the party.


The coronavirus has […] exposed the cleavage between the national-conservative party mainstream and the marginalised far-right wing – a divide that may, according to former party leader Alexander Gauland, actually end with the dissolution of the party.
Swedish exceptionalism, one step too far for populists

In contrast to both Italy and Germany, countries that have been experiencing strict lockdown policies, Sweden has kept its schools, restaurants and borders open. Its exceptional approach to the pandemic has been defended as entirely in line with science. The Swedish Minister for Health and Social Affairs Lena Hallengren stated: “All countries do the best they can, but so far there is no one who knows exactly how to best deal with this virus”. Swedish health experts have been given priority over advice from the World Health Organization (WHO), especially since their strategy is considered more in line with cultural particularities of the Scandinavian country.

This has left the far-right SD in a difficult position. Over the last decade, they have sharply increased their share of the vote to 20 per cent. Their unambiguously populist and ethnic-majoritarian discourse constructs an ethnically homogenous Swedes as antagonised by immigrant-friendly and politically correct elites. In order to oppose the Swedish government, the SD not only decries the relatively high mortality rate resulting from Sweden’s solo run a “massacre”, but they also urge the government to fall in line with the “international consensus”. This is an odd situation: the Swedish government’s strategy on the coronavirus crisis is based on highlighting the country’s exceptionalism and, of all parties, the SD is advocating the adoption of international blueprints.
No time for a victory lap

What can be concluded from the comparison of the three parties? Despite operating in different political landscapes and coping with their own issues, these parties have, nevertheless, continued to maintain a populist division between the people and the other (discursively constructed as immigrants and elites). Until recently, this has not resonated with publics. Commentators have observed that, so far, the far right might well be floundering in opposition while those in power are also struggling. However, this may well not be the case for much longer. Far-right populist parties are using the crisis to continue to divide the people from others: immigrants, foreigners, and social and political elites. As Yannis Stavrakakis and Giorgos Katsambekis note in an important recent report, crises are often seen as particularly opportune moments for the exaggeration of social and political divisions. The unevenly distributed effects not only of the virus itself, but of the strategies to tackle it, create an environment ripe for far-right populism.


The unevenly distributed effects not only of the virus itself, but of the strategies to tackle it, create an environment ripe for far-right populism.

Whether populist messages strike a chord with voters in the near future may well hinge on the way the forthcoming economic turbulence and uncertainty is handled. The potential of far-right parties to speak to popular discontent will depend upon the extent to which government responses to the crisis are seen to be legitimate, representative and democratic. This applies not only to the national and regional but also the European level. The general lack of coordination between EU institutions and the bitter negotiations between the member states on post-pandemic relief efforts may have opened the opportunity to reinforce the far-right populist divisions between national peoples and European elites. FdI leader Meloni, for example, directly accused the European Commission president of bias: “When the coronavirus was just an Italian problem it didn’t interest anyone in the European Union. When we had the first red zones in Lombardy, Ursula von der Leyen was with Greta Thunberg. They only did things when the virus arrived in Germany.”

Some believe that the recent struggles of the far right can be seen as a result of the triumph of scientific truth and rational decision making. They claim that people have finally realised that in a crisis what is needed is expertise rather than the conspiracy theories, shocking exaggerations, blatant mistruths, and the entertaining antics of certain populist parties. However, these claims downplay the impact that developments in the upcoming months will have on public opinion of government policies, and the fact that the privileged role of scientists in political decision-making is in danger of being anti-democratic.


Any claim to epistemic authority, in the face of an unknown virus especially, can be challenged.

Politicians have relied upon the “epistemic authority” of medical experts, which has not only been a valuable resource during the pandemic but has allowed them to shift responsibility for stringent measures. However, any attempt to delegate policymaking to experts is likely to further justify populist backlash against professional elites. Any claim to epistemic authority, in the face of an unknown virus especially, can be challenged. Politicians have to choose experts from a large pool of trained professionals leaving plenty of room for criticising a particular choice. Moreover, different experts can deliver diverging or even directly contradictory advice.

The distinct path taken by Sweden illustrates that scientific evidence can be interpreted in various ways; in a context of uncertainty created by a health crisis, the prior scientific knowledge available is often deficit. To be democratically valid, a decision must not only be based on expertise but on genuine political debate between real alternatives. Governance of the pandemic should not only be a matter of following the science, but of sustaining a tangible commitment to economic equality, social justice and political discussion. If not, Europe might well witness a renewed surge of far-right populism.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Stavrakakis, Y. and Katsambekis, G., 2020. Populism and the pandemic: A collaborative report. Available at: < https://bit.ly/2Rc9kll > [Accessed 10 Sep. 2020].

[2] Ruth Wodak (2015). The politics of fear: what right-wing populist discourses mean. London : SAGE Publications Ltd.

REGULATING CAPITALI$M

Food health star ratings can improve diets, study finds

More evidence has emerged that food labelling can encourage manufacturers to improve product nutrition, but University of Melbourne experts say the star labelling system must be compulsory to make a big difference.

UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE

Research News

More evidence has emerged that food labelling can encourage manufacturers to improve product nutrition, but University of Melbourne experts say the star labelling system must be compulsory to make a big difference.

A team from the University of Melbourne, the University of Auckland, and the George Institute for Global Health analysed product nutrition labels in Sydney and Auckland supermarkets to see if the Health Star Rating system (HSR) made a difference to how the food industry formulates food.

Nutritional information is mandatory on the back of packaged Australian and New Zealand foods but HSR labels, which have appeared on the front since 2014 and rate a food from 0.5 (least healthy) to five (most healthy) stars, are voluntary.

The most comprehensive study of food industry response to the HSR system, published in PLOS Medicine, has confirmed that HSR labelling causes some products to become healthier.

The Australia and New Zealand Ministerial Forum on Food Regulation introduced the voluntary front-of-pack HSR and a published HSR calculator decides how many stars a food gets. HSR labels aim to improve diets by encouraging consumers to choose healthier products and prompting manufacturers to reformulate their products to be healthier.

This study looked at the reformulation effects of HSR labels. Researchers analysed nutrition and labelling information on packaged products in four major New Zealand supermarkets annually from 2013, and Sydney supermarkets Aldi, Coles, IGA, and Woolworths from 2014.

They tracked the nutrition information of 58,905 unique packaged food products to see if HSR labelling led to nutrient composition changes. Using the HSR calculator, they also scored unlabelled products to allow control comparisons.

Products that elected to display the HSR on-pack were 6.5 and 10.7 per cent more likely to increase their HSR score by 0.5 stars than those that didn't display the stars in Australia and New Zealand respectively.

New Zealand products with HSR showed a four per cent decline in salt content, while Australian products fell by 1.4 per cent. The HSR was associated with a 2.3 per cent decrease in sugar content in New Zealand and a statistically insignificant 1.1 per cent decline in Australia.

The healthiest products that would have scored four to five stars showed little healthier reformulation - most reformulation occurred in less healthy products with HSR labels.

In Australia, an average product with HSR that scored 0.5 to 1.5 stars lost 14kJ of energy per 100g (1.3 per cent), compared to a product that scored four to five stars which saw almost no changes in energy. Similar patterns were observed for almost all nutrients studied in both countries.

Lead author and University of Melbourne Research Fellow Dr Laxman Bablani said while the improvements sounded small, even modest changes could lead to big health impacts at a population level.

"If the labels were compulsory the impact could be much greater, as HSR adoption by the unhealthiest products was less than half that of the healthiest products," Dr Bablani said.

In 2019, around 15 per cent of products that scored two stars had HSR labels in both countries, compared to more than 35 per cent of those that scored four stars and above. Examples of positive reformulation included:

  • A popular flavoured cracker now has six per cent less fat and roughly 10 per cent less sodium per 100g than before it adopted HSR labels in 2016. This took it from 1.5 to two stars.

  • Several instant soup varieties cut sodium and energy to increase their rating from three to 3.5 stars in the year they were labelled.

  • A major supermarket branded barbeque sauce cut sugar by 4.5g per 100g (9.6 per cent) in 2017 when it adopted HSR labels.

University of Auckland Professor Cliona Ni Mhurchu said the HSR could have a much bigger impact if more unhealthy products adopted it.

"Our study suggests that the total effect of HSR on supporting healthier population diets could be markedly increased if it was adopted by many more products," Professor Ni Mhurchu said.

"In short, it suggests that making the HSR mandatory would generate substantially greater public health benefits than the current voluntary system."

Senior author and University of Melbourne Professor Tony Blakely agreed compulsory HSR labels could improve unhealthy foods.

"There is little incentive for manufacturers to label unhealthy foods voluntarily," Professor Blakely said.

"If it was compulsory, the quality of packaged food would improve, and consumers may possibly make better choices about healthy and unhealthy foods."

###

Disclaimer: AAAS and EurekAlert! are not responsible for the

Mysterious remains of a huge, 'ship-shaped' house discovered near the Viking ship grave at Gjellestad

Archaeologists suggest that the almost 40-metre-long building may have been a house for ancient rituals, or a feasting hall.


This is all that remains of the houses near Gjellestadhaugen. To the right you can see the holes that were discovered using ground-penetrating radar-technology. They imply that there once was a huge, 40-metre-long house at H3. Could this be an ancient feasting hall, or a place of worship? 
(Photo: Gustavsen et al/Antiquity 2020)


JOURNALIST
Thursday 12. november 2020 - 

When archaeologist first examined Gjellestad in 2018, they were having a rather bad day at work, says Lars Gustavsen. He is an archaeologist at the Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research (NIKU).

The archaeologists were examining the site with a ground-penetrating radar, an instrument that uses radar pulses to map patterns and artifacts found under the ground. The georadar is mounted on a small tractor or an ATV.

“It was so wet that day, that we kept getting stuck, and repeatedly had to get help getting out”, Gustavsen says to sciencenorway.no.

But as the data they had collected was transferred to the computer, the world underneath them started to reveal itself. The images showed them a place that was probably very important in the ancient history of Norway.

“So all of a sudden it was a very good day at work”, Gustavsen says.

Burial mounds used to be lined up here

The most famous part of the Gjellestad-site, is the grave containing the Gjellestad Viking ship. This ship is currently under excavation, making it Norway’s first Viking Ship excavation in 100 years. The archaeologists who examined the findings found that it had to be excavated as soon as possible due to extremely unfavourable conditions.

But this ship grave was one of the last things that were built at Gjellestad, which is to be found near the city of Halden in South-Eastern Norway, on the eastern shores of the Oslofjord.

Currently, the only burial mound left is the large Jell Mound, but once upon a time burial mounds were lined up one after the other on this site. A site that may have played an important role in the surrounding society for several hundreds of years.

The mounds were leveled to the ground several decades ago, due to modern farming.

The meaning of the site at Gjellestad is now being discussed in a recent scientific article in the journal Antiquity. Sciencenorway.no has spoken to Lars Gustavsen, who led the work with the new study.


What was in that big building?

From the radar images, the archaeologists could see that four buildings were placed close to the burial mounds. You can see this yourself in the illustration at the top of this article.

This has not been excavated yet, so the researchers are left to interpret what the buildings may have been based on the images from the radar pulses.

Not much is left from the buildings, but you can se rows of holes. These are postholes. These holes were for solid posts that held up the entire roof of the building, Gustavsen explains.

One of these buildings, called H3, is being highlighted by the researchers as something special. It’s very large compared to other buildings found from this same period of time in this same area. The building is 38 metres long and seven metres wide. The placements of the postholes suggest that the building had outwardly curved walls, convex walls, sort of in the shape of a ship.

The postholes are so big that it is likely that this was a very tall and large building. The placement of the building would have made it visible in the landscape, so it could have had the function of a landmark.

Finally, there are no signs of this being a building where people lived. There are for instance no findings of a fire pit. In the article, the researchers argue that this could have been a cult house or a feasting hall.

“It could have been like a high seat of a chieftain, where perhaps everything from networking to religious rituals took place. There could have also been abundant drinking and brawls here.


“The other buildings that surround this large one are also odd, which draws our interpretations toward a house of rituals”, says Gustavsen.

In the scientific article, the archaeologists argue that Gjellestad could have been a so-called high-status ‘central-place’ in the Late Nordic Iron Age (AD 550–1050) in this part of Norway. But what does that mean?


To the left you can see a diagram showing all the burial mounds in Gjellestad. To the right you can see the pictures from the geo-radar. The Ship-grave can be seen clearly at the bottom of both pictures. 
(Photo: Gustavsen et al/Antiquity 2020)

Wealthy people?

As the name suggests, this could have been an important place.

The typical features of such places are that there are burial mounds with rich findings, possible ritual buildings, and also trade and production of goods, says Gustavsen.

The researchers aren’t sure that trade and production took place nearby, but Gustavsen believes there are good chances it did.

“This is a place that expresses a position of power in the landscape”, he says.

“The family or the people who made these buildings, are maintaining their position of power by showing off with these buildings and these burials mounds”, says the archaeologist.

Several other features also suggest that this was a seat for the elite. In the Gjellestad mound, where the ship was buried, they have used turf collected from a different location – which suggests that great resources were used here.

You can read more about this in this article from The Norwegian Institute for Cultural Heritage Research: The Gjellestad burial mound belonged to the Iron Age elite.

But the timeline for this place is still not clear.

The ship grave was the last addition

Several clues suggest that the first burial mounds are from around 500 AD. This is called the age of migration in Norway, and is part of the Norwegian Iron Age.

But there are few good datings from this place. Archaeologists cannot date the place based on the images from the georadar. In order to date the place properly with a carbon dating, they need biological material which has not been contaminated, for instance coal from a fire pit.

The Viking ship has so far been dated to having been built some time between late in the 700s and early in the 900s, in other words early Viking age.

“We can with certainty say that this ship grave is one of the last things that happens on this site”, says Gustavsen.

He tells sciencenorway.no that this can be interpreted in different ways. Either this is a dominant family fortifying its position by placing a large and eye-catching ship grave on the site.

“Or it could be another family coming in and taking over. They are then demonstrating the take-over by placing their ship grave in an already existing site of power”, he says, adding that:

“We may never know which it is”.

If this area is to be excavated in the future, Gustavsen believes it would be useful to get good carbon dating from the different buildings and the burial mounds. Then we could find out if the buildings were built here at the same time, or if it was a place that developed over centuries.

“We also don’t know why this place was important. Did they perhaps have control over the sea lane, or control of the roads?”.

There are still many unanswered questions about Gjellestad.

Translated by: Ida Irene Bergstrøm

Reference:

Gustavsen et al: Gjellestad: a newly discovered ‘central place’ in south-east Norway. Antiquity, 2020. DOI: 10.15184/aqy.2020.39.


Remains of what may be a temple where Norse gods were worshiped have been found in Norway

Researchers believe they have found the remains of a pagan temple, where Vikings made sacrifices to gods like Thor and Odin. If so, then this would be the first Norse temple identified in Norway.



South of the settlement was the cult house, which here is illustrated using planks. (Photo: University of Bergen)

JOURNALIST
Wednesday 14. october 2020 - 10:42

The find was uncovered during an excavation of the Ose farm in Ørsta, in Møre og Romsdal County. The regional bureau of the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, NRK, was first to report on the find.

Researchers found evidence that people have been calling the location home for a long time, perhaps as far back as the 6th century.

But it’s not the remains of houses and longhouses that got people’s attention.

Instead, it was evidence on the ground of a large structure, as long as fourteen metres and eight metres wide, with evidence of thick walls and smoky rituals.

The researchers believe this was a so-called god's temple or pagan temple. A place where people made sacrifices to Odin and his extended family, before Christianity came to Norway.

Very rare

“This is the first of its kind in Norway,” Søren Diinhoff said to sciencenorway.no.

Diinhoff is a researcher at the University of Bergen who is in charge of the dig.

The researchers started their excavation because new homes were going to be built in the field, but Diinhoff says that he and his colleagues had suspicions that they would find something even before they put a shovel in the ground.

“The northern part of the area already contains a historic yard for the Ose farm, so we knew there was a high likelihood of at least finding a medieval settlement,” he said.

And it is precisely in the northern part of the field that researchers have now uncovered evidence of several buildings. The team has not yet sent pieces of charcoal for dating, but the settlement probably dates back to the 6th century AD.

“It has been difficult to find this settlement for many years,” Diinhoff said.

He says this is probably because Viking-era buildings were located inside and under the current farm yard.

“Unfortunately, it’s not that often that archaeologists have the opportunity to dig in places like this. Being able to excavate Ose is of great value,” he said.

The northern part of the excavation. Here, the researchers found traces of long-term settlement. To the right you can see rows of posts from a large longhouse dated to the middle of the Iron Age. To the left are ten pillars from a longhouse from around the 13th century. (Photo: University of Bergen)

Viking religious life

Several sources provide an insight into the northerners' religious life during the Iron Age, including traces of burial customs and rituals, sacrificial sites in the landscape, and buildings that show evidence of cults or worship.

Other researchers have previously presented what they believe are similar findings. Diinhoff says it’s not that simple.

“Just because you have found a fireplace and a gold bracteate (a type of gold jewellery) it doesn’t mean you have found what we found. A spade may be a spade, but not everything is a house for the worship of the gods,” he said.

Some of the finds that provide evidence of the northerners' spiritual life are pits — cooking pits. Large clusters of cooking pits were common during the middle of the Iron Age in the areas between farms.


Diinhoff himself believes that these places, with their raised terraces and water views, are what are called "horg" in old texts. Researchers have found these kinds of places in Hardanger, for example.

“These were a ritual sacrificial site where consecrated meals were prepared for religious celebrations,” he said.

Read more about one such possible sacrificial site in this article, produced and financed by NTNU: More than 1000 cooking pits of yore found in one area. Was this a ritual gathering place?

Gods like Odin and Thor could have been honoured in buildings like this. This reconstruction is modest, as the researchers want to wait until they get more information about the dating of the site. (Photo: Ragnar Børsheim / University of Bergen)
Upheavals

Researchers have found evidence of major societal changes throughout the Roman Iron Age.

Contact with the aging Roman Empire and Germanic tribes in the south increased, and the farms with the best soil expanded considerably — some were up to seven times larger than they were before.

An elite of rich peasant families held power, farmers with large landholdings left behind rich graves, imported goods and large farms.

“It was expected that the families on the large farms would seize power and control in society. The big farmer (chief) was now the lawgiver, warlord and leader of the cult,” says Diinhoff.

During this period, the cooking pit fields and parties moved indoors — into large halls, under the chief's control.

“We see this in Ose. We have what is probably a large longhouse from the middle of the Iron Age, and we have a cooking pit field. We also have a strange circular enclosure with a small hut in it in the southern part of the longhouse,” he said.

“This find has quite a few parallels in southern Scandinavia, where it is also considered to be evidence of worship,” says Diinhoff, who added that a ritual penis-shaped stone had been found at Ose earlier

This is how the inside of the structure may have looked, when the gods were given tributes. “When we have more information on the dating, we can add more information about the furnishings that would be inside,” says Diinhoff.
 (Photo: University of Bergen)

Large temple

“All in all, it’s clear there was a large farm established at Ose sometime towards the end of the older Iron Age, and this farm has had a central function in the cult in the area,” Diinhoff said.

“Then, later in the younger Iron Age, we have the distinctive building that we see as a place of worship,” he said.

This is where the big house of the gods comes in.

It was fourteen metres in length, and seven metres in width. The walls were strong, and four posts in the centre of the building supported an elevated central section. In short, a significant building.

“There are really no other parallels than a handful of buildings from southern Scandinavia that are this kind of place of worship. They have been found in a few very large settlements, such as Uppåkra (in Skåne, in southern Sweden) and Tissø (in Sjælland in Denmark).

“These structures appear at a time when we have the first indications of the worship of Odin, and thus the Nordic gods. And since this is a house of worship that belonged to the elite of society, there is little doubt that this is the foremost house of worship in the Norse religion,” he said.

"Osehuset" is a clear parallel to the southern Scandinavian structures, the researcher said.

“It has the same size, the same appearance. It is surrounded by thick, charcoal-containing layers of coke, and had it not been for the acidic soil, then surely many animal bones,” he said.

Danish archaeologist not quite convinced

Søren Sindbæk, professor of archaeology at Aarhus University in Denmark, says that the newly discovered building is reminiscent of a house of the gods like the one found in Skåne.

“At Uppåkrå and other areas that have been said to be places of worship and houses of the gods, a number of objects and sacrificial offerings have also been found that support the theory. But I don’t see that they have found these things in Ørsta,” Sindbæk said to the website videnskab.dk.

“The most common feature of localities we have recognized as pre-Christian cult buildings is the discovery of destroyed weapons, which appear to have been part of the cult. We have seen this both at Tissø and Uppåkrå,” he said.

“So if they had found three or four curved spearheads in Ørsta, I would have been very excited about the find. But without having found those kinds of objects, it is difficult to be convinced that it is a place of worship,” Sindbæk said.

However, the archaeologists have found the same kinds of gold objects that have been found in Sweden and Denmark. Diinhoff believes this is due to the fact that Osehuset dates to the Viking Age, while the other gold finds have been made in temples from the age of migration.

“Had the floor layer in our house been preserved, we would probably also have found objects offered in sacrifice,” Diinhoff says.

This is how the researchers worked: an excavator removed the top soil layer. Behind it came researchers who combed the area, and mapped all finds. 
(Photo: University of Oslo.)

Unique?

The findings are described by the University of Bergen as “unique”; but Diinhoff is more modest. When asked if this is a fantastic find, he answers:

“Not really. At least it shouldn’t be. The fact is, however, that it is the first of its kind in Norway,” he said.

He points out that there has been discussion about similar finds having been made in Norway, but says that he doesn’t think that is the case, even though he says that some colleagues have been close.

“For example, when gold foil figures (small thin pieces of beaten gold that have been stamped with a motif) have been found under medieval churches, it is probably a house of worship like this that was once there. But the buildings themselves have not been found until now,” he said. “So yes, the find is rare.”

Read more about gold foil figures in this article: The mystery from pre-Viking days: Only the most powerful had these little pieces of gold

When the Norse religion disappeared, and Christianity came to the elites, these places of worship perhaps disappeared under the churches, and were thus wiped out.

“It is also a strange coincidence that we also find cooking pit fields near the early churches. The connection is that these were the place where people worshipped for a long time,” says Diinhoff.

“First as a cooking pit field (horg), then a house of the gods (hov), and finally a church. At Ose, the house of the gods was preserved because the first church was not built here, but on one of the neighbouring farms,” he said.

Translated by: Nancy Bazilchuk