Cyberspace is an Analogy, Not a Domain: Rethinking Domains and Layers of Warfare for the Information Age

Michael P. Kreuzer
July 8, 2021


For ten years, the United States military has defined cyberspace as the fifth domain of war, equating it with the four physical domains of warfare as a core planning assumption.[1] But classifying cyberspace as a domain is fatally flawed both because it obscures the purpose of recognizing the four physical domains, and because it unnecessarily puts cyber into too small a box.[2] The buzzwordification of the term domain has long passed the point of diminishing returns, and nowhere is that a greater hazard than with cyber operations.[3] It’s time to re-think cyber to reflect the realities of modern war, and with it the broader lexicon of what constitutes domains and layers of warfare.

This article proposes the United States re-focus the definition of domains of warfare on the four physical domains, which require distinct organizations and doctrines to effectively control and exploit, while elevating the parallel concept of functional multidomain operations such as Special Operations and Cyber Operations with fixed representation at the Undersecretary of Defense level. This is necessary not because denying cyberspace or information as a domain would diminish its importance, but because it is a flawed analogy that both undercuts the need for the current service structure and would treat cyber as a separate pillar of defense.[4] It implies cyberspace should have an independent service—which is the wrong solution to the growing all-domain challenges of cyber operations.[5]
DOMAINS OF WARFARE: AN UNDEFINED DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION

Domains of warfare sit at the core of U.S. and NATO military doctrine, defining the purpose for major military services of Western powers and shaping the lenses through which soldiers, airmen, sailors, marines, and guardians understand the operating environment. But a lack of precise language clouds critical discussions of space and cyber, and even why we need to maintain some of the arrangement of the United States’ current services.[6] In recent years, other concepts have been proposed as domains, to include the electromagnetic spectrum and human domains.[7,8]

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How did we get to this point? Domains entered the lexicon with the 2000 publication of Joint Vision 2020, with information proposed as a new domain “as important as those conducted in the domains of sea, land, air, and space.”[9] Before this point what we now know as domains were called dimensions, and “domain of warfare” itself was left undefined.[10] As with most military terms, the word has clear non-military definitions that are instructive.[11] In law it is “[c]omplete and absolute ownership of land…or a territory over which dominion is exercised.”[12] A common alternative definition is a “sphere of knowledge, influence, or activity,” as in a domain of knowledge. In math it is a “set of numbers that define a function.”[13] In computing, it is a realm of administrative autonomy—from a website to a top-level domain (e.g., .org).

The first definition was likely the basis for the use of the term in Joint Vision 2020, as “full spectrum dominance” was its central message. The Air Force’s creation of AFCYBER—the US Air Force’s service-specific Cyber Command—proclaimed as much, stating fighting in the cyber domain means cyber domain dominance.[14] This is also a source of confusion because outside of land, physical control of other domains has been based on transitory control—the ability to freely operate while limiting one’s adversaries’ ability to do so.[15]

Absent a fixed doctrinal definition of domain itself, only the standing definitions of the five currently assumed and recognized domains remain. Each has a clear definition, but together they lack internal consistency:

Land Domain: The area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high-water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals.

Maritime Domain: The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals.

Air Domain: The atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible.

Space Domain: The area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible.

Cyberspace: A global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.[16]

The first four place the word domain in the term to be defined, while cyberspace places it in the definition itself. The first four are defined by physical—if somewhat arbitrary and disputed—boundaries within which organizations, technology, and doctrines are the variables; in cyberspace there are no fixed boundaries, as rapidly evolving technology itself defines the domain.[17]

THE PROBLEM WITH CYBERSPACE

The original three domains of land, maritime, and air developed separate identities and independent services because unique characteristics dictated distinct requirements for humans to fight in those domains, unique equipment, organizations, and perspectives of the operating environment yielding unique systems of warfare. The land domain is directly tied to the existence of the state—preservation of sovereignty through direct physical control of territory—dictating large manpower-centric forces to compel the state’s will through firepower and maneuver.[18] War at sea secures the state’s vital interests, but requires ships for humans to operate, different operational concepts for naval warfare, and a different concept of control from land. The air domain added the vertical dimension of warfare, range, speed, and put advanced technology at the forefront to facilitate aerial combat and support ground operations. Space is moving closer to parity with the first three as the unique physical environment of space distinct from the air—defined by orbital mechanics, the physical limitations of space lift, and an environment hostile to human life—and has led to the realization of an independent U.S. Space Force to organize, train, and equip forces that had previously been neglected by other services focused on other domains.
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Then-Secretary of the Air Force Barbara Barrett, Space Force Command Senior Enlisted Leader CMSgt Roger Towberman and CMSgt Roger Towberman present President Donald Trump with the official flag of the United States Space Force in the Oval Office in May 2020. (Samuel Corum-Pool/Getty)


Cyberspace appeared a natural extension to this evolution, and in its early years it likely appeared the ability to control and exploit cyberspace was the next iteration for defense. The problem, however, is there is no cyberspace.[19] There is instead a metaphor to help humans understand the near instantaneous sharing of information across widespread computer networks—much like the cloud, which may no longer be someone else’s computer, but is certainly not data floating in space like physical clouds.[20] The term cyberspace first arose in the 1960s, then gained widespread appeal in the 1990s when the internet appeared new, distinct, and distant.[21] In the era of the internet of things, cyberspace is increasingly “a layer on top of our existing reality,” permeating all equipment across all domains of warfare.[22,23] Operations rely on cyber power to execute remotely piloted operations, reach-back support, and global command and control.[24] Space control is also almost entirely reliant on cyber operations.[25] Even the foot soldier is increasingly networked, from their blue force tracker and other GPS-guided tools, to increasing use of automated equipment.[26]

As the U.S. concept of cyberspace evolved, so too has its definition. More recent definitions run more than a standard paragraph in length, discussing networks, nodes, networks of networks, and power relationships.[27] As cyber continues to evolve to an all-encompassing aspect of life, the inability to define what does not constitute part of cyberspace puts it in marked contrast to the other domains. The physical domains may have arbitrary boundaries that are subject to debate, but that is a left/right boundary debate over fixed space, not ongoing technological change redefining reality.[28]

RE-THINKING THE FOUNDATION: DOMAINS, LAYERS, AND OPERATING CONSTRUCTS

If cyberspace is not a domain of warfare, then what is it? Cyber is certainly a critical sphere of knowledge distinct from other fields, but by this logic in this sense any military specialty can be called a domain of some form. The Defense Department definition appears to make it the operational domain of the information environment, but this is problematic as well. Cyberspace is within the information environment, but many parts of the information environment are excluded from the cyber definition—and at the same time most of cyber exists in the physical environment as physical systems and nodes, further complicating the definition. Cyber may be an operating warfighting space depending on the lens that the operating environment is viewed, but there are many sub-components of the operating environment that do not qualify in the U.S. Department of Defense as domains of warfare, which is a particularly concise list.

In arguing that cyber is not a domain, the goal is not to minimize it or suggest it is less important than land, sea, air, or space—in some regards it is far more important and will only grow more so in the coming years. The doctrinal lexicon and how it shapes first norms and second U.S. organization and budgets is really the larger challenge. To ensure cyber operations receive the budgetary and acquisitions priority it needs, the United States has worked to shoehorn it into the domains of warfare category, historically the highest echelon of importance for Defense Department constructs. Rather than pursuing this route, and eventually evaluating other potential would-be domains of warfare, this article argues for a re-evaluation of how the U.S. defines the parameters of the operating environment itself, and in turn how that shapes its organizations. This new model would comprise three equally important foundational constructs: two parameters to define the operating environment, and one focused on multi-domain exploitation.

In this typology, the operating environment is divided between two major lenses: layers of warfare and domains of warfare. The layers of warfare are defined as mediums of the operating environment through which military operations can be conducted and operational effects achieved that span all domains of warfare. A domain of warfare is defined as a sphere of the operating environment that has physical characteristics requiring unique doctrines, organizations, and equipment for military forces to effectively control and exploit in the conduct of military operations. The fixed nature of physical domains serve as the basis of uniformed services, while the interplay of the domains and layers with evolving technology would shape more organizationally flexible, multi-domain operating constructs with service-equivalent leadership through the U.S. Defense Department and Functional Unified Commands.

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Table of Proposed Typology of Warfare (Author’s Work)


Layers of warfare are part of the natural environment in which military operations take place, both in the physical and social contexts. They are not inherently distinct from one another either, as all occupy the same physical space and functionally are interconnected. The information and cognitive layers focus on the human and technological sides of the joint operating environment, with the former being data- and communication-centric and the latter focusing on the culture, psychology, sociology, and other contextual factors that define how states and organizations make decisions. The electromagnetic layer is also a physical, though invisible and non-Newtonian part of the battlespace. Interestingly, the U.S. Defense Department notes “the [electro-magnetic spectrum] is not a separate domain of military operations because the [electro-magnetic spectrum] is inseparable from the domains established in joint doctrine,” a situation cyber similarly finds itself in as the reach of cyber has grown.[29]

The four domains remain the four physical domains previously defined, with the additional note of three trans-domain regions that have resulted in differing solutions to mitigate challenges. The maritime/land boundary, the littoral regions, has roles for the U.S. Army and Navy, but the Marine Corps is historically the primary service for force projection from the sea. The gap between air and surface has been more complicated, with key functions dispersed among all U.S. military services—the Army controlling anti-aircraft missiles and artillery, the Air Force controlling fixed wing air support, and the Navy retaining maritime air operations. As space exploration grows, the conception of space may morph to a trans-domain region of orbital space, and the space domain as interplanetary to intergalactic space. But absent ambiguity surrounding trans-domain regions, there is a clear dividing line between regions that require distinct capabilities—two surface domains with unique challenges on land and at sea, and two vertical domains defined by atmospheric versus orbital effects.

In this typology, cyberspace would be a multi-domain operational construct, more akin to special operations or intelligence operations than the space domain. These constructs are function-centric, often concerned with issues critical to modern warfare but not always in the conventional military environment. Special Operations are “activities or actions requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment, and training often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments.”[30] Intelligence operations are “the variety of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks and activities within the intelligence process, to include globally integrated [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and human intelligence operations.”[31] These constructs operate across all layers and domains of warfare, with the main distinctions being their primary emphasis, and with the overlap and shifts in the focus of operations contingent on the evolving character of warfare. Their focus is not control of territory, but operational effects often in the absence of control or under ambiguous control. The concepts do not organize, train, and equip distinct forces, but instead executes operations with specialists drawn from each of the physical domains of war to perform highly specialized operations affecting and drawing from all domains of warfare, in a command structure with similar U.S. Department of Defense status to a service, but with an operations-focused role. Cyber operations, then, would be the employment of electronic network capabilities to create denial effects in the physical domains, and to identify and defeat threats to friendly networks including malware, physical attack, or the unauthorized activities of users.

As with intelligence and special operations, cyber operations pose a number of non-traditional challenges to organization and execution of operations. How should military cyber operations be executed under Title 10, Title 50, and within Posse Comitatus limitations?[32] Given how cyber operations transcend state boundaries and much is within the private sector, multinational, and/or proprietary, to what degree are state military forces ultimately responsible for active cyber defense of private companies with servers in foreign nations, or does this problem-set more closely resemble espionage than warfare?[33] Should the National Security Agency remain operationally tied to U.S. Cyber Command given the level of overlap in vital functions?[34] For these reasons and more, it makes better logical sense and will make cleaner multi-domain doctrine to keep cyber and special operations in the same, equally important but distinct, category from the physical domains of warfare.
CONCLUSION

It is tempting to draw attention to new concepts by either attaching new terms to them or trying to categorize them with other important concepts. This has the short-term effect of drawing attention in a more familiar, established way, but in the long-term confuses implementers. When it comes to the terms themselves, the label is less important than the meaning. This article has identified domains of warfare as being the four physical domains of land, maritime, air, and space, and the dimensions of war as natural environmental factors of the battlespace that cross and affect all domains, the physical, electromagnetic, information, and cognitive layers. By standardizing this typology, the U.S. joint force and its partners will be better positioned to operationalize cyber power, to understand the need for and purpose of independent military services, and to better integrate multi-domain operations.


Michael P. Kreuzer is a U.S. Air Force officer and an assistant professor of international security at Air University. He has written extensively on integration of technology into military forces and the nature of revolutions in military affairs. All views presented are his own and do not represent the Department of Defense.

NOTES:

[1] Jacquelyn Schneider et al. (2020). Ten Years In: Implementing Strategic Approaches To Cyberspace. Newport: U.S. Naval War College, December 2020. NATO similarly adopted this assumption in 2016, expanding the construct to all key U.S. allies. See Steve Evans. “Cyberspace is the New Domain for War: NATO.” in Infosecurity Magazine, June 16 2016. Accessed 24 June 2021 from https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/cyberspace-is-new-domain-for-war/

[2] Chris Demchak. “Cybered Conflict vs. Cyber War.” The Atlantic Council New Atlanticist. October 20, 2010. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/cybered-conflict-vs-cyber-war/

[3] For discussion on buzzwords and their merits/harm to Defense concepts, see Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr. “DIB Calls BS On Buzzwords: Defense Innovation Board,” in Breaking Defense. October 24, 2018. Accessed June 24, 2021 from https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/dib-calls-bs-on-buzzwords-defense-innovation-board/ and Kate Bateman. “War on (Buzz)Words,” in Proceedings, January 2019. Accessed June 24, 2021 from https://www.chds.us/ed/resources/uploads/2019/01/War-On-Buzz-Words.pdf

[4] One example of confusion of terms (is information a domain or instrument of power? is information or cyber the domain?) while critiquing those who question its status can be seen at this link: https://www.cyberdominance.com/cyberdominance/dominate-the-information-domain-synchronize-strategy-and-cyber-efforts/

[5] This argument was made again most recently by David Barno and Nora Bensahel. “Why the United States needs an independent Cyber Force.” War on The Rocks, May 4, 2021. Accessed May 21, 2021 from https://warontherocks.com/2021/05/why-the-united-states-needs-an-independent-cyber-force/

[6] For a prominent example, see Robert M. Farley. Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2014.

[7] Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr. “VCJCS Mulls Newest Domain: Electromagnetic Spectrum,” in Breaking Defense. April 22, 2016. Accessed June 24, 2021 from https://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/vcjcs-mulls-newest-domain-electromagnetic-spectrum/

[8] Erik Heftye, “Multi-Domain Confusion: All Domains Are Not Created Equal,” The Strategy Bridge, May 26, 2017. Accessed online May 17, 2021, from https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/5/26/multi-domain-confusion-all-domains-are-not-created-equal

[9] Department of Defense. Joint Vision 2020. June, 2000. Accessed 24 June 2021 from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=446826

[10] Heftye, 2017.

[11] Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. s.v. “Domain.”https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/domain

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Staff Sgt. C. Todd Lopez. “Fighting in cyberspace means cyber domain dominance.” Air Force Print News, February 28, 2007. Accessed online May 17, 2021, from https://www.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/127803/fighting-in-cyberspace-means-cyber-domain-dominance/

[15] Heftye, 2017.

[16] All definitions pulled from the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, January 2021, Accessed May 17, 2021 from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf?ver=2019-05-29-162249-290

[17] For an example of the Air Force and Army dispute over the Air Domain and Land Domain boundary with respect to the Fire Support Coordination Line, see R. Kent Laughbom, Synchronizing Airpower and Firepower in the Deep Battle, Maxwell: Air University Press, 1999. Accessed May 17, 2021 from https://media.defense.gov/2017/Nov/21/2001847061/-1/-1/0/CP_0003_LAUGHBAUM_SYNCHRONIZING_AIRPOWER_FIREPOWER.PDF

[18] Stephen Biddle. Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. p. 6.

[19] One strong argument outlining the problem with cyberspace as originally defined and as it has evolved in understanding can be found at P.J. Patella-Rey. “There is no ‘Cyberspace’”. February 21, 2012. Accessed 24 June 2021 from https://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2012/02/01/there-is-no-cyberspace/

[20] For further discussion of the challenges with cloud computing analogies, see Mary Branscomb. ”Stop saying the cloud is just someone else's computer - because it's not.” ZDNet. July 12, 2016 (Accessed 17 May 2021 from https://www.zdnet.com/article/stop-saying-the-cloud-is-just-someone-elses-computer-because-its-not/) and Reuven Cohen. “An Inconvenient Truth about Cloud Analogies.” Information Week, December 6, 2013 (Accessed 17 May 2021 from https://www.informationweek.com/cloud/software-as-a-service/an-inconvenient-truth-about-cloud-analogies/d/d-id/1112944?).

[21] Mark Neale. No Map for These Territories. Video documentary accessed online 24 June 2021 from https://www.amazon.com/No-Maps-Territories-William-Gibson/dp/B08M93BDJC and “Highlighting Artificial Intelligence: An Interview with Paul Scharre.“ Strategic Studies Quarterly. September 26, 2017. Accessed May 17, 2021 from https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-11_Issue-4/Scharre.pdf

[22] Jacob Morgan. “A Simple Explanation of ‘The Internet of Things.’” In Forbes Magazine. May 13, 2014. Accessed on 24 June 2021 from https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2014/05/13/simple-explanation-internet-things-that-anyone-can-understand/

[23] Scharre interview, 2017.

[24] Michael P. Kreuzer. Drones and the Future of Air Warfare. New York: Routledge, 2016.

[25] Pete Dowdy. “Cross-agency plans for space cybersecurity will strengthen the US in all domains.” C4ISR.net. Accessed online May 17, 2021 from https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/12/01/cross-agency-plans-for-space-cybersecurity-will-strengthen-the-us-in-all-domains/

[26] “The Blue Force Tracker System.” In The Smithsonian Institute Series Time and Navigation: The Untold Story of Getting from Here to There. Accessed June 24, 2021 from https://timeandnavigation.si.edu/multimedia-asset/the-blue-force-tracker-system

[27] Marco Mayer et al. “How would You Define Cyberspace?” Accessed online May 17, 2021 from https://www.academia.edu/7096442/How_would_you_define_Cyberspace

[28] See Laughbom, 1999, and Nadia Drake. “Where, exactly, is the edge of space? It depends on who you ask.” National Geographic. December 20, 2018. Accessed May 17, 2021 from https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/where-is-the-edge-of-space-and-what-is-the-karman-line

[29] Department of Defense Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority Strategy, October 2020. Accessed May 17, 2021 from https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/29/2002525927/-1/-1/0/ELECTROMAGNETIC_SPECTRUM_SUPERIORITY_STRATEGY.PDF

[30] DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, January 2021

[31] U.S. Air Force. Air Force Doctrine Publication 2-0: Global Integrated ISR Operations. Accessed 24 June 2021 from https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Doctrine-Publications/AFDP-2-0-Global-Integrated-ISR-Ops/. Defense Intelligence Agency. Human Intelligence. Accessed 24 June 2021 from https://www.dia.mil/Careers-Internships/Career-Fields/Human-Intelligence/

[32] Extensive work is underway evaluating these key issues. For examples, see Robert Chesney, “Title 10 and Title 50 Issues When Computer Network Operations Impact Third Countries,” Lawfare (Accessed May 17, 2016 from https://www.lawfareblog.com/title-10-and-title-50-issues-when-computer-network-operations-impact-third-countries), and Susan W. Brenner, “Cyberthreats and the Posse Comitatus Act: Speculations,” St Johns Contemporary and International Law, 2013 (Accessed May 17, 2021 from https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/sjjicl4&div=4&id=&page=)

[33] For examples of various categorizations of cyber attacks see Emily VanDerWerff and Timothy B. Lee, “The 2014 Sony hacks, explained,” Vox June 2015 (Accessed May 17, 2021 from https://www.vox.com/2015/1/20/18089084/sony-hack-north-korea), David Ignatius, “Russia’s SolarWinds hack was espionage, not an act of war,” The Washington Post Dec 22, 2020 (accessed May 17, 2021 from https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/russias-solarwinds-hack-was-espionage-not-an-act-of-war/2020/12/22/ffa8f88a-4498-11eb-b0e4-0f182923a025_story.html), and Hunter Walker, “Gingrich: ‘America Has Lost Its First Cyberwar,’ Business Insider December 2014 (Accessed May 17, 2021 from https://www.businessinsider.com/gingrich-america-has-lost-its-first-cyberwar-2014-12).

[34] James Di Pane. “Now is not the right time to split NSA and CYBERCOM.” C4ISR.net. December 29, 2020. Accessed May 17, 2021 from https://www.c4isrnet.com/opinion/2020/12/29/now-is-not-the-right-time-to-split-nsa-and-cybercom/

Opinion | 

Could Ransomware Become a Geopolitical Weapon? 

Game Theory Says Yes.

Ransomware is a cheap, easy way to extract concessions from powerful countries—and adversaries are likely to figure that out soon.


The game theory that drives a ransomware attack could make it an attractive form of geopolitical coercion. | AP Photo/Jenny Kane


Opinion by JENNY JUN
POLITICO
07/08/2021 

Jenny Jun is a Nonresident Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative and Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University. She is a co-author of North Korea’s Cyber Operations: Strategy and Responses.

Over the weekend, the REvil ransomware gang locked up the data of more than 1,000 businesses in an unprecedented supply-chain attack on the software firm Kaseya, demanding $70 million for the data’s release. While it’s unclear which, if any, of the individual businesses have paid the group anything, just a month ago JBS and Colonial Pipeline paid nearly $11 million and $5 million, respectively, to resume operations after a ransomware attack.

The fact that attackers can mount these attacks so frequently and extort large sums of money from victims shows that encryption has emerged as a really good way to hold hostages. What if an adversary state or a terrorist group starts using the same tool to demand something more than money?

Today, ransomware is treated mostly as a criminal problem, but it may also soon be a geopolitical issue. I use game theory to study ransomware, and I’ve also examined how adversaries like North Korea use cyber tools for strategic goals. My research suggests it’s only a matter of time before encryption is used for geopolitical gains. The incentives built into ransomware attacks — for both the attacker and the victim — will make it easier for smaller, poorer players to extract concessions from more powerful adversaries. But the good news is that two can play at that game: In the future, encryption might also become a way for countries to proportionally respond to cyberattacks without causing all-out war in cyberspace.

Throughout history, state and nonstate actors have sought to hold an enemy’s valued assets at risk to bargain for political gains. Land invasions that captured capital cities have been used to compel governments to surrender, threats to close critical maritime chokepoints have been used as bargaining chips, and hostages have been taken to negotiate political or monetary concessions. In other cases, adversaries have kidnapped each other’s princes or held one another’s cities at risk with nuclear weapons, creating mutual hostage relationships to ensure neither side upsets the status quo.

Ransomware — or the underlying encryption algorithm that locks up data — is just another chess piece in this game. But the game theory that drives the attacker and the victim in a ransomware attack may sometimes make this a more attractive way of coercing the enemy than bombings, blockades or nuclear threats.

The nature of encryption increases the incentives for attackers to attack and for victims to concede. First, once the victim’s data is locked up, the attacker can keep it that way for as long as it takes to get their demands met, at no extra effort or cost. Compare this to other methods of holding enemy assets at risk — laying a siege, blockading a port — which can be as costly to maintain for the attacker as they are to endure for the defender. Even after a siege starts, the attacker needs to be able to credibly commit to applying force for long enough to convince the defender to acquiesce.

If the capacity to keep the asset at risk is limited by how long an army can keep attacking or how much airpower the military has, the attacker’s threat to hurt the asset may not be credible. The defender may decide to just wait it out, predicting the attacker will eventually back down. But the attacker faces no such credibility problem when using encryption — it costs nothing to keep the “siege” going as long as necessary.

Second, encryption is reversible, which makes it more appealing for the victim to concede. As with kidnapping, it is the prospect of getting the hostage back — in this case, the recovery of data and systems — that makes concessions attractive. On the other hand, a threat that relies on destroying part of the asset creates sunk costs. Every hostage executed and every building bombed cuts away from what the attacker can promise to give back if the victim concedes.



Third, ransomware attacks are just easier to carry out than other forms of geopolitical coercion. Compared to a conventional military operation or a nuclear program, the barrier to entry is very low. Encryption algorithms are readily available and even lazier attackers can purchase highly customizable ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) subscriptions for as low as $40 per month.


Encryption can also hold assets at risk around the globe without geographical constraints. Without having to punch through the Ardennes, acquire long-range missiles or control strategic chokepoints on land and sea, an attacker can take hostages. It’s a cheap, easy way to create more bargaining chips whenever something needs to be exchanged but cannot be taken by brute force. To an impoverished and isolated state like North Korea, or a nonstate group with few resources, these practical benefits would seem quite attractive.

Of course, encryption has limitations. Because ransomware relies on denying access, encryption cannot inflict costs if the victim doesn’t value what’s being encrypted, or can replace the asset relatively easily. A defender that can adopt real-time, offline backups has an alternative way to get their data back after a ransomware attack, which reduces the attacker’s coercive power. This option to back up data is a unique advantage for the defender, unlike in other domains.

However, the ability to adopt seamless backup is not always correlated with the business’s importance. For example, a power plant that runs on a legacy operating system will probably struggle with backups because it most likely requires custom solutions. Therefore, a ransomware attack is primarily a selection problem: An attacker needs to identify a victim who is either unlikely to have good backups or who has such large daily costs that even a week or two’s disruption inflicts large costs. This is why ransomware has moved away from targeting individuals towards businesses such as hospitals or utilities. Now, attackers are casting an even wider net, encrypting multiple businesses at once by exploiting supply chains.

Ransomware and encryption have additional limitations that they share with other forms of coercion. Any effort to hold enemy assets at risk can prompt retaliation and escalation, and victims may resist making concessions out of fear of acquiring a reputation as an easy target. These common problems make it difficult in general to force geopolitical adversaries to do what you want. Nonetheless, because encryption resolves certain credibility concerns, it is likely to appear in the toolbox of both state and non-state actors as they seek new ways to make gains without blatantly inviting retaliation.

Given these factors, when might ransomware be used for geopolitical purposes instead of simply extorting money? Here are a few ways it might play out — and they’re not all bad.

The bad news is that ransomware could be used as an additional tool by any state and non-state actors that have previously attempted to extract concessions by holding enemy assets at risk. Iran has held Americans as hostages and seized ships in the Strait of Hormuz to compel states to unfreeze Iranian financial assets, undermining U.S. sanctions. It’s conceivable that Iran could attempt to create a similar situation using ransomware as it experiments with new ways to conduct cyber operations. Iran has already used ransomware as part of a destructive cyber campaign against Israel since last year, and it may be only a matter of time before they demand something in return rather than just cause destruction.

Non-state actors such as Yemeni rebels have taken hostages to negotiate prisoner swaps, pro-Russian insurgent groups have occupied government buildings to demand a referendum on secession, and ISIL seized Iraq’s largest oil refinery. Because ransomware greatly reduces the cost of occupation for the attacker and does not require geographical and military advantages, it can be a viable alternative to physical occupation of buildings and or taking of actual hostages.

The geopolitical use of ransomware is therefore an asymmetric threat. Poorer, less connected state and non-state actors will be able to use encryption to punch above their weight and force concessions from more powerful states. In a tit-for-tat exchange of ransomware, target-poor states such as Iran and North Korea simply have less to lose from having their own critical systems frozen than their target-rich Western counterparts, because these smaller states are less reliant on cyberspace for everyday activity.

Non-state actors like civil war belligerents and terrorist groups will have even less to lose, assuming the technology remains ubiquitously available at low cost. While conducting ransomware attacks requires basic cyber operations training and Internet infrastructure, the barrier to acquiring these prerequisites is relatively low. We can expect some of these actors to try their hand, now that it is common knowledge that ransomware pays.

The good news is that encryption can be used to respond to a fait accompli in cyberspace. If an adversary has taken something valuable, whether a piece of territory or cryptocurrency stolen from an exchange, one way to respond is to take something that they value in turn to create a mutual hostage relationship, then negotiate for both assets’ return. For instance, the quickest way to get North Korea to return its stolen cryptocurrency is probably by freezing some of its own assets, instead of a long process of trying to regulate intermediary money launderers. Such measures may be useful if the United States cannot rely on purely defensive measures to prevent such grabs from occurring in the first place, or rely on international law enforcement efforts to apprehend hackers.

Using encryption to create mutual hostage relationships might offer a useful solution to the dilemma of how to proportionally respond to malicious cyber campaigns without violating international norms. Cyber practitioners and scholars have long debated how to respond to cyber operations and other internationally wrongful acts that fall below the threshold of war. Encryption could be an appropriate tool because it can be calibrated to be proportional, has limited potential for casualties and can be reversed upon the target state’s compliance. If encryption comes to be accepted as a more proportional and temporary method of cyber retaliation, it could counterintuitively help build international “rules of the road” for cyberspace — similar to how “letters of marque” were issued for anti-piracy efforts in the olden days.

It may be several years before we see the first coercive encryption used in a geopolitical context. Ransomware was first used in the 1980s, but it wasn’t until a few years ago that it became a pervasive threat as criminals learned and fine-tuned their operations over time. The skyrocketing ransom demands and emergence of new tactics, such as encrypting backups and exploiting supply chains, indicate that in many ways this learning is still ongoing. Likewise, the first documented case of cyber espionage was in 1986, but it took years before states adopted this new means of conducting espionage in earnest.

Given these lengthy timelines, the idea that encryption could be another chess piece in the greater geopolitical game is still probably relatively obscure to national security practitioners more used to traditional forms of warfare. However, increasingly high-profile ransomware incidents like Kaseya and Colonial will get policymakers — as well as adversaries — thinking in this direction more and more.

As the source of wealth moves elsewhere — that is, as countries’ most valued assets move from the physical to the virtual realm — the weapons will also adapt accordingly. Encryption is one excellent tool to hold such connected assets at risk, and soon actors will learn to use this tool to extract more than money.

DR FREUD I PRESUME

Kyle Rittenhouse's attorney wants to argue one of his victims was a sex-offender who tried to grab the teen's gun

KYLE RITTENHOUSE SITTING, SHOOTING TWO MEN 

ONE ON SKATEBOARD THE OTHER IN FRONT OF HIM

NO ONE IS TOUCHING HIS PENIS GUN

• Rittenhouse, 18, shot and killed two people in Kenosha, Wisconsin, on August 25
• His lawyer on July 1 filed documents seeking to argue one of his victims was a sex offender who was prohibited from owning a gun, so grabbed Rittenhouse's
• Joseph Rosenbaum was convicted of having sex with a minor in Arizona in 2002
• Kimberley Motley, an attorney representing Rosenbaum's estate, rejected Richards' theory and said that Rittenhouse was the aggressor
• Rittenhouse will go on trial on November 1 in Wisconsin 

 

New Ontario study finds even one COVID-19 vaccine dose provides strong protection against variants

A person waits to receive their COVID-19 vaccine during a drive-thru clinic at Richardson stadium in

Kingston, Ont., on Friday, Jul. 2, 2021. THE CANADIAN PRESS/Lars Hagbe

Published Monday, July 5, 2021

A new study of Ontario COVID-19 data finds all vaccines approved for use in Canada are doing better than first expected at preventing symptomatic infection, hospitalization or death from coronavirus variants of concern, even after just one dose.

The pre-print study published on Saturday shows one dose of the Pfizer, Moderna or AstraZeneca COVID-19 vaccines had between a 48 to 83 per cent effectiveness against symptomatic infection by any of the four variants of concern detected in Ontario recipients this past winter in spring.

Each of the vaccines also had a 78 to 96 per cent efficacy against preventing hospitalization or death from infection by a variant of concern, two weeks after a first dose.

“Our real-world vaccine effectiveness estimates suggest that even a single dose of these three vaccine products provide good to excellent protection against symptomatic infection and severe outcomes caused by the four currently circulating (variants of concern), and that two doses are likely to provide even higher protection,” Scientists at Public Health Ontario, University of Toronto and several hospitals wrote.

The P.1 “Gamma” variant first discovered in Brazil showed the greatest ability to neutralize the positive effects of all vaccines studied.

Of more than 3,000 people infected with P.1 during the study period, a first dose of AstraZeneca showed only 48 per cent efficacy at preventing infection, while Pfizer was 60 per cent effective and Moderna was 77 per cent effective.

The study found just 0.4 per cent (26 people) of those who received two doses of Pfizer became infected with a B.1.1.7 Alpha variant case requiring hospitalization one week after their second dose.

For Moderna, it was 0.2 per cent who required intense intervention with B.1.1.7 one week or more after their second dose, and for AstraZeneca it was less than 0.1 per cent.

A parallel ongoing survey by Public Health Ontario found only 0.15 per cent of partially vaccinated people developed a symptomatic case of COVID-19 during the same period, and only 0.02 per cent of fully vaccinated people developed a detectable case.

For the Delta B.1.617+ variants of concern, the study’s authors had to rely on much smaller and less reliable sample sizes, as Delta cases are only confirmed through whole genomic sequencing which is too expensive and laborious to apply to all positive cases.

Even so, they found first shots of Pfizer, Moderna and AstraZeneca were 57, 72 and 67 per cent effective respectively in preventing symptomatic infection from Delta, roughly in line with studies conducted in the UK and B.C.

One week after a second dose, they found Pfizer was 87 per cent effective at preventing Delta infection, but there were not enough Moderna or AstraZeneca recipients to calculate efficacy.

Across all four variants of concern, the three vaccines showed strong efficacy in preventing symptomatic infection one week after dose 2, ranging from 92 per cent for Moderna against the Alpha variant to 87 per cent for Pfizer against the Delta variant.

The study used data generated by more than 420,000 people who were either infected with COVID-19 in Ontario or received a COVID-19 vaccine, or both, between December 2020 and the end of May 2021.

Of those, more than 40,000 tested positive for a variant of concern during the study period.

A previous letter published in the New England Journal of Medicine by researchers in Qatar found far lower rates of efficacy for Pfizer and AstraZeneca vaccines against the “Alpha” B.1.1.7 variant, but used data involving people infected sometimes only days after receiving a first dose.

Canadian officials embarked on a strategy in March of giving out as many first doses as possible, extending the interval between doses up to 16 weeks in the belief that more partially vaccinated people would suppress transmission better than fewer fully vaccinated people in the context of restricted vaccine supply.

Also contributing to the study were authors from the Institute for Clinical and Evaluative Sciences and The University of Ottawa.

Lambda variant is now spreading in Canada — Here’s what we know so far

By Karen Graham
Published July 8, 2021

Concern is rising over potentially more dangerous variants of the coronavirus - © AFP

With multiple variants of the coronavirus already circulating in Canada, it is not surprising that a new one has now been identified. The variant is responsible for 11 cases in the country so far, according to Health Canada.

The World Health Organization (WHO) designated Lambda as a “variant of interest” on June 14. This designation means the resulting mutations are believed to affect the virus’s transmissibility and severity and are causing “significant community transmission or multiple COVID-19 clusters” in multiple countries.

“Lambda has been associated with substantive rates of community transmission in multiple countries, with rising prevalence over time concurrent with increased COVID-19 incidence,” reads an epidemiological update from the WHO released on June 15.

The Lambda variant, also called C.37, was first identified in Peru in August 2020, according to Global News. It has since spread to 29 countries, including Canada and the United States.

The WHO says Lambda is now accounting for an increasing share of cases in some South American countries like Argentina and Chile.

Keep in mind that Lambda is still only a “variant of interest.” To become a “variant of concern,” the virus would have to be shown to be more transmissible, cause more severe illness, or be able to get around existing vaccines and treatments.

CBC Canada is reporting that Dr. Lucas Castellani, an infectious diseases specialist at the Sault Area Hospital in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario says, “There are mutations on the spike protein portion of the virus, which as we know is one of the important pieces of the virus, and the mutations are slightly different than some of the previous mutations we’ve seen.”

“That said, what we don’t know is what all of this means.”

Dr. Anthony Chow, professor emeritus at the University of British Columbia’s division of infectious diseases, also cautioned that the strain has the potential to turn into a variant of concern.

“It is highly transmissible, and that it has been a hallmark of variants of concern — the way they spread,” said Chow.

The best defense against any of the variants to date is being vaccinated. A recent lab study done in the U.S. has been published online but has not yet been peer-reviewed. It suggests that the “vaccines in current use will remain protective against the lambda variant and that monoclonal antibody therapy will remain effective.”

The Lambda Covid-19 variant is now spreading beyond Latin America

REUTERS/JOSE CABEZAS Waiting and watching.

By Manavi Kapur & Tripti Lahiri
Published July 8, 2021

While the world reels under the effects of the Delta variant, a new Covid-19 mutation is now on the radar of several countries.

The Lambda variant, or C.37, believed to have originated from Peru, was designated as a “variant of interest” by the World Health Organization (WHO) on June 14. A variant of interest categorisation is a level below the “variant of concern.”

There are currently four variants of interest, which are characterised by the presence of mutations that are associated with increased transmissibility, severity of disease, or the ability to evade immunity from vaccines or past infections. This does not mean that these variants have been yet confirmed to be more transmissible or to cause more severe infections—only that the genetic structure of the mutated virus points to the possibility of these happening. In addition to these criteria, variants of interest are also classified when there are known cases of community transmission or Covid-19 clusters.


Though the Delta variant, a variant of concern first detected in India and thus far believed to be the most transmissible and resilient variant of Covid-19, dominates most infections across the world, six cases of the Lambda variant have now been found in the UK, all linked to international travellers. There are no cases of the variant reported in India yet.

Lambda’s origins

Initially known as the “Andean variant” after being detected in Peru in December 2020, the C.37 variant drew little notice beyond Latin America as the Alpha variant, first seen in Kent, England around the same time, preoccupied the world.


When the WHO moved to rechristen variants to discourage them from being associated with the place where they surfaced, the variant was renamed for the Greek letter lambda.

Is Lambda more transmissible than Delta?

“There is currently limited evidence available about this variant,” Dr Alicia Demirjian, Covid incident director at Public Health England (PHE), told BBC Science Focus magazine. The PHE is currently testing the viral strain in laboratories to identify its characteristics and its possible impact on community transmission. “There is currently no evidence that this variant causes more severe disease or renders the vaccines currently deployed any less effective,” it said.


As Peruvian microbiologist Pablo Tsukuma pointed out in a long Twitter thread on the Lambda in May, variations in regional capacity for sequencing explain why we know so much less about Lambda than Alpha, or even Delta, right now.
Where in the world is Lambda?

As of late June, Lambda has been found in more than two dozen countries, according to the UK government, which designated it a “variant under investigation” on June 23, citing its “international expansion.”


It’s so far widely prevalent only in Latin America, including Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Argentina. In Peru, for example, it accounted for 81% of the cases sequenced between mid-April and mid-June—from less than 1% when first discovered. It’s also the country that has reported the highest official per capita death rate from Covid-19.

And so far, in places where the Delta variant is also present, the latter appears to spread far more easily. Portugal for example saw its first Lambda cases in April—but in Portugal, like in the UK, the Delta accounts for the vast share of new cases.

Despite Risks to Climate, U.S. Backs Oil Boom in Guyana

The Biden Administration is supporting ExxonMobil’s oil exports from the South American nation, ignoring the dangers of global warming caused by fossil fuels.


BY EDWARD HUNT
THE PROGRESSIVE
JULY 8, 2021


Under the Biden Administration, the United States is helping ExxonMobil establish major new oil operations off the coast of Guyana, a small South American nation that is set to become one of the world’s major suppliers of oil.

U.S. diplomats have continued to support the country’s transition to energy production, despite President Biden’s repeated acknowledgments of the dangers of global warming and his campaign pledge to “transition away from the oil industry.”

While President Joe Biden warns about the dangers of global warming and supports global action to reduce emissions from fossil fuels, his administration is undermining his stated goals by shepherding an oil boom in Guyana that has the potential to transform the country into an oil-exporting powerhouse.

The amount of oil in Guyana is “staggering” and “just incredible,” said U.S. Ambassador to Guyana Sarah-Ann Lynch, at a forum in March. “Guyana is on track to become the second or third largest oil producer in the Western Hemisphere over the next twenty to forty years.”

Since 2015, ExxonMobil has made several major oil discoveries off the coast of Guyana. The company claims to have identified an estimated nine billion barrels of recoverable oil, an amount comparable to the proven oil reserves of major regional oil producers such as Brazil and Mexico. ExxonMobil now has six drillships operating off the coast of Guyana.

Once ExxonMobil began oil production in December 2019, it sparked major economic growth in Guyana. In 2020, the nation’s economy grew by nearly fifty percent, even as much of the world faced economic hardship due to the impact of the coronavirus pandemic.

“Despite a crash in global oil prices and economic headwinds brought on by COVID-19, Guyana’s nascent oil production made it the fastest growing economy in the world,” Lynch noted last May.

U.S. diplomats have played a central role in facilitating Guyana’s transformation. They have worked to mitigate several controversies that have threatened to disrupt the country’s shift to oil production, including a border dispute with Venezuela, a controversial contract with ExxonMobil, and a disputed presidential election in 2020.

In September 2020, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Guyana, signaling the country’s growing importance to the United States. Pompeo was the first U.S. secretary of state to visit Guyana since its independence from Great Britain in 1966.

“The United States is ready to be your partner of choice as you face big decisions moving forward, especially on energy and future prosperity in your country,” Pompeo told Guyanese President Mohamed Irfaan Ali.

Under the Biden Administration, U.S. diplomats have continued to support the country’s transition to energy production, despite President Biden’s repeated acknowledgments of the dangers of global warming and his campaign pledge to “transition away from the oil industry.”

At the U.S. Embassy in Guyana, Lynch regularly hosts meetings with business leaders interested in capitalizing on the oil boom. The virtual forum she spoke at in March was an oil and gas webinar. In May, she gave a talk on opportunities in the country’s agricultural markets.

“This is a time of unprecedented opportunities,” Lynch said.

Critics say that Guyana is taking a major risk by embracing oil production. The country’s transformation will likely worsen global warming and undermine Guyana’s commitments under the Paris Climate Agreement.

Most Guyanese people live along the country’s coastal plain, making them especially vulnerable to flooding and rising sea levels. Recent severe flooding affected thousands of households, leading President Ali to declare a national disaster.

“Climate change poses a serious threat to Guyana,” USAID official Clinton White acknowledged after the flooding.

Trying to stop the country’s shift toward oil production, two Guyanese citizens are suing the Guyanese government over its decision to move forward with offshore drilling. They argue that the government’s actions threaten the right of the Guyanese people to live in a healthy environment.

Even as Guyana faces threats from climate change, U.S. officials remain focused on transforming the country into a major oil exporter. U.S. diplomats openly support President Ali’s plan to use oil to transform Guyana into the region’s “economic powerhouse.”

Some members of Congress have voiced their support, suggesting that Guyana’s transformation presents geopolitical advantages to the United States. Supporters believe that transforming Guyana into an oil-exporting powerhouse will sideline U.S. regional rivals, especially Venezuela.

“With Guyana’s oil sector growing and potentially providing an alternate to Venezuela’s, the oil and gas sector is critical to their country and could transform it from one of the Caribbean’s poorest countries to its wealthiest,” U.S. Representative Mark Green, Republican of Tennessee, said at a Congressional hearing last month.

Other U.S. officials have been more critical of the U.S. approach, especially as it concerns climate change. They believe the United States should take into account the ways global warming will affect low-lying Caribbean countries such as Guyana.

As U.S. Representative Albio Sires, Democrat of New Jersey, said last month, “The severe flooding that Guyana has faced in recent months is a reminder that climate change is having a devastating impact on our friends in the Caribbean.”

Cast no better than brace for broken ankles

UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK

Research News

* Clinical trial at University of Warwick compares the familiar cast, traditionally signed in sympathy, to modern removable brace for immobilising broken ankles
* Cast was not more effective, with patients reporting similar levels of pain and functionality, suggesting that choice should be down to patient preference and cost effectiveness
* Some data suggested a patient preference for the removable brace - sometimes referred to as the 'Beckham boot' after David Beckham

Using a cast is not more effective than a brace for treating broken ankles, according to University of Warwick researchers - a conclusion that could hasten the decline of the tradition of signing a cast.

With little difference in the clinical effectiveness of either method, the researchers conclude that the choice of which to use should be down to cost and patient preference, with some evidence suggesting that the flexibility of the removable brace could prove more appealing to patients.

The research reports the results of the Ankle Injury Rehabilitation (AIR) Trial at Warwick Clinical Trials Unit at the University of Warwick, and is published today (6 July) in The BMJ. This four-year trial funded by the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) aimed to compare cast to functional brace in the treatment of individuals with an ankle fracture.

Ankle fractures are very common and tend to occur when you land on your foot and twist it. They are most commonly related to sports, traffic accidents or falls in older people, though it is an injury that everyone is susceptible to. Not all ankle fractures will require surgery, but in all cases patients will need to keep their foot immobilised typically for a period of around 6 weeks to allow the bones to heal.

As part of the AIR trial, 669 patients were randomly given either a cast (334 patients) or removable brace (335 patients) to immobilise their foot following an ankle fracture. Those with the brace were given information advising them to take the boot off around three times a day and perform repetitions of ankle movement exercises. The cast group were not given specific ankle movement exercises from the trial as they were unable to remove their cast, nor move their ankle.

They were then followed up four months afterwards with a questionnaire that asked them if they had any pain or functional problems. Specifically, patients were asked about problems with pain when walking, stiffness, swelling, climbing stairs, running, jumping, squatting, use of supports and activities. Their answers were combined into a score called the Olerud Molander Ankle Score (OMAS), and these scores combined for each group and compared.

The research showed no statistically significant difference in the scores of those using a cast and those using a boot after four months. The results were also the same when comparing those who received surgery and those who didn't.

Lead author Professor Rebecca Kearney of Warwick Medical School at the University of Warwick said: "With cast not being better, it comes down to a decision on the cost of the interventions, patient preferences and if there's a difference in complications, which we did not find evidence of. Patients should discuss their preference with their clinician, who should take into account these factors.

"When people think of ankle fractures they think of the pain, swelling, and not being able to do things. But it has more far-reaching consequences than just the immediate physical limitations of a broken bone, which we're only just starting to appreciate."

Like many types of broken bone, ankle fractures have traditionally been treated by using the familiar cast that generations have signed their names on in sympathy. In more recent years, it has become just as common to use a removable brace - at one time referred to as the 'Beckham boot', after being popularised by former professional footballer David Beckham.

The brace is a plastic boot that comes in two halves with Velcro to wrap round and secure it. They're designed to be walked on and being removable allows patients to perform leg exercises and keep their leg clean.

Professor Kearney, who was supported by an NIHR Fellowship for this research, adds: "If you keep the ankle really still it allows the bones to heal up, but that's not great if all the joints around it stiffen up and all the muscles weaken. The idea behind the boot is that you can do movement exercises with the ankle and walk on it to encourage weight-bearing. In theory, that could result in decreased muscle wastage and joint stiffness. In practice though, it didn't result in better functional outcomes.

"It was also clear in the quantitative data that when patients swapped treatments, they swapped in predominantly one direction - from the cast to the brace."

###

* 'Use of cast immobilisation versus removable brace in adults with an ankle fracture: multicentre randomised controlled trial' will be published in The BMJ, DOI: 10.1136/bmj.n1506 Link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.n1506 (to go live after embargo lifts)

 

Zoo amphibians were on display while humans were locked away

UNIVERSITY OF EXETER

Research News

 

IMAGE: COMMON TOAD. CREDIT JACK BOULTWOOD FROM WWT view more 

CREDIT: JACK BOULTWOOD FROM WWT

While the UK was in lockdown, certain species of captive amphibians became more visible, a new study suggests.

The COVID-19 pandemic forced the closure of zoos across the UK for several months from March 2020, with gradual re-openings from summer into autumn and winter.

These closures provided a team of researchers, from the University of Exeter and WWT Slimbridge Wetland Centre, a unique opportunity to study the effect of visitor presence on several species of amphibian at Slimbridge.

The project assessed the number of individuals of six species - common toad, common frog, smooth newt, pool frog, golden mantella and golden poison dart frog - visible to observers while their exhibit was closed, when it partially reopened to more staff and when it reopened to visitors.

"Amphibians responded to the lack of people at the wetland centre differently," said lead author Dr Paul Rose.

"Some species of amphibian were more likely to be on view when there were smaller numbers of visitors at their enclosure.

"These differences are probably related to the specific camouflage or anti-predation tactics of certain species, with aposematic frogs (toxic, brightly coloured species) being less impacted by visitor presence but cryptic (camouflaged species) being less visible when the public were around."

For example, the study found the camouflaged species of common toads were most likely to be on view when the centre was in lockdown compared to when visitors returned. They also showed the most significant decline in visibility from lockdown to when more staff returned to the centre.

These findings show it may be beneficial to offer more cover and camouflage opportunities for captive common toads, in a way that allows the toads to feel hidden but can still be viewed by visitors.

The results of the study can also be used help inform husbandry, collection planning and provide a useful benchmark for further, more complex, welfare assessment measures.

The paper, published in the journal Animals, is entitled 'Bold Frogs or Shy Toads? How Did the COVID-19 Closure of Zoological Organisations Affect Amphibian Activity?'

CAPTION

Pool frog. Credit Jack Boultwood from WWT

CREDIT

Jack Boultwood from WWT

CAPTION

Golden mantella. Credit Jack Boultwood from WWT

CREDIT

Jack Boultwood from WWT

Minnesota House passes modest police accountability measures



FILE - In this June 12, 2020, file photo, protesters demanding change in the wake of the death of George Floyd hold a media briefing outside the Minnesota State Capitol, in St. Paul, Minn. Minnesota’s top Democratic and Republican lawmakers reached agreement on the highlights of a public safety bill that includes police accountability measures, a day after former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin was sentenced to 22 1/2 years in prison for the death of Floyd. While some details had yet to be finalized, leaders from both parties said the compromise reached late Saturday, June 26, 2021, settles the major issues after months of negotiations.
Jim Mone



FILE - In this Sunday, May 31, 2020, file photo, a police officer points a hand cannon at protesters who have been detained pending arrest on South Washington Street, as protests continued following the death of George Floyd, in Minneapolis. Minnesota’s top Democratic and Republican lawmakers reached agreement on the highlights of a public safety bill that includes police accountability measures, a day after former Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin was sentenced to 22 1/2 years in prison for the death of Floyd. While some details had yet to be finalized, leaders from both parties said the compromise reached late Saturday, June 26, 2021, settles the major issues after months of negotiations.
John Minchillo


By STEVE KARNOWSKI Associated Press

Jun 29, 2021

ST. PAUL, Minn. (AP) — The Minnesota House approved a modest set of police accountability measures Tuesday night that's part of a broader public safety budget bill as a deadline loomed for the state's divided Legislature to avert a partial state government shutdown.

The 75-59 vote came on the heels of last week's sentencing of former Minneapolis police Officer Derek Chauvin to 22 1/2 years for murder in the death of George Floyd. It wasn't clear for most of the day whether leaders of the slim House Democratic majority had enough votes to pass the compromise and send it to the Republican-controlled Senate for final approval. In the end, even a few Republicans voted yes.

Leaders delayed the start of the debate for several hours and huddled in private for more discussions before finally bringing the bill to the floor for over six hours of debate.

The bill contains limits on no-knock warrants and on the use of informants. It was amended on the floor to allow “sign-and-release” warrants so that police aren't required to arrest low-level offenders just because they had missed a court appearance. But Democrats dropped their push for a ban on “pretextual” traffic stops for minor offenses such as expired license tabs.

It follows on a police accountability package passed last summer that included a statewide ban on the use of chokeholds. Several lawmakers with the People of Color and Indigenous Caucus said ahead of the debate that the bill didn't go nearly far enough, while stopping short of saying they would vote against it.

Democratic Rep. Carlos Mariani, of St. Paul, chairman of the House public safety committee and one of the top negotiators on the bill, agreed it didn't go far enough but urged lawmakers to approve it anyway and to keep pushing for deeper change. He blamed the Senate GOP majority for blocking stronger action.

“This is a mighty bill,” Mariani said. “And yet as meaningful as all these provisions and more are, it also lacks, in my opinion, the necessary weight of accountability to respond to the persistent use of deadly force by licensed police officers that have produced a steady stream of killings of Black and brown people in Minnesota.”

Senate Republicans resisted stronger measures for months, saying they couldn't support anything they regarded as anti-police. They put a higher priority on passing a $52 billion, two-year state government budget to replace the current budget, which runs out Wednesday night. Democratic Gov. Tim Walz had signed eight of the big budget bills by Tuesday, but the public safety package was one of a few still needing approval ahead of the looming deadline.

WHO warns of ‘epidemiological stupidity’ as infections rise by eight-fold in London

Countries are falling foul to the “dangerous assumption” that “everyone is protected” as cases spike, he said.

by Emily Atkinson
08 July 2021



A World Health Organisation official has warned of “epidemiological stupidity” over the premature relaxation of social distancing measures as cases rise by eight-fold in London, according to a new report.

The address made by Mike Ryan, executive director of the WHO Health Emergencies Programme, forewarned that the gains made in Europe are at risk of being undone as restrictions are swept aside amid swelling mutations of the virus.

Ryan’s comments come alongside news that coronavirus infections are continuing to grow exponentially in the UK as cases rise by eight-fold in London and four-fold nationwide over the past month, according to a REACT study published this morning.

“Dangerous assumption”

He spoke of European countries falling foul to the “dangerous assumption” that “everyone is protected” as cases spike despite high vaccination coverage and threaten to again overwhelm our health systems.

“We ask governments to be really careful at the moment to not lose the gains you have made, to open up very carefully,” he said.

“We have seen over the last six months, case after case, country after country in which there was a lot of increase in social mixing without adequate vaccine coverage and wave after wave of cases. I would hope in the European environment we won’t see a return to the overwhelmed hospitals and exhausted health workers.


“This virus is evolving, this virus is changing and we need to be very careful at this moment so that the gains that have been hard-won by the behaviours and actions of our population are sustained.


“Many countries have suffered – even the high-vaccination countries have suffered, the health systems have suffered. We need to think about what we truly value.”

A return to the overwhelmed hospitals and exhausted health workers?

As we teeter on the precipice of a third wave, hospitals are again having to cancel vital operations amid spiralling covid-related hospitalisation and staff shortages due to increased self-isolation.

Currently, 5.3 million people are waiting for hospital treatment in England, including cancer surgeries, set to worsen over the coming weeks as the WHO’s fears begin to crystallise in the UK.

Pretty worrying stats (compared with a week ago)

Patients admitted to hospital with Covid – up 70%
Patients with Covid in hospital – up 50%
Patients in ventilation beds – up 40%

If it continues at these rates for the next 2 weeks, are we really going to scrap the rules on 19th? https://t.co/E3sugwk6dl— Andrew Fisher (@FisherAndrew79) July 7, 2021

With the carpet pulled from under the NHS and rolled out for so-called ‘Freedom Day’, the dropping of all restrictions on 19 July is drawing growing criticism on the world stage.

“The world is at a perilous point in this pandemic. We have just passed the tragic milestone of four million Covid-19 deaths, which likely underestimates the overall toll,” said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO director-general.

“Some countries with high vaccination coverage are now planning to roll out booster shots in the coming months and are now dropping public health social measures, relaxing as though the pandemic is already over.”
“It is more important than ever to get that life-saving second jab”

Despite encouraging data showing lower infection prevalence in people who have had both doses of the vaccine, there is rapid growth in infections, especially among younger people.

According to most recent data from Imperial College London, the highest prevalence was found in 13–17-year-olds, in which the rate of infection has increased from 0.16 per cent to 1.33 per cent since 7 June.

There is now “real nervousness” surrounding the number of unvaccinated young people who have mild Covid symptoms developing long-covid symptoms, according to Chris Hopson, head of NHS Providers.

He said: “It’s not just about hospitalisations, it’s actually potentially people having really serious long-term conditions once they have caught Covid.

“It wasn’t just a few of these young people who had mild Covid symptoms and then really quite severe long Covid symptoms, it was actually quite a few.

“There’s a real nervousness here that still don’t fully understand what the long-term health consequences are if you catch Covid. We all need to be careful and aware of the risks here.”

With the rates of infection being three times lower in fully vaccinated people under the age of 65 compared to unvaccinated people, government messaging is focussing on encouraging people to get their second dose.

“It is more important than ever to get that life-saving second jab so we can continue to weaken the link between cases, hospitalisations and deaths,” said Sajid Javid, Health and Social Care Secretary.

“As we move from regulations to guidance and get back to our everyday lives, see our loved ones and return to work, it is vital people practice good sense and take personal responsibility for their own health and those around them.”