Monday, July 19, 2021

Ancient meteorite could reveal the origins of life on Earth

by Peter Warzynski, Loughborough University

A 4.6-billion-year-old meteorite found in the laying in the imprint of a horseshoe is likely a remnant of cosmic debris left over from the birth of the solar system and could answer questions about how life began on Earth.

It was discovered by Derek Robson, of the East Anglian Astrophysical Research Organisation (EAARO), in a Gloucestershire field, in February, after travelling more than 110 million miles from its primordial home between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter in the Asteroid Belt.

Now, scientists at Loughborough University are analyzing the small charcoal-colored space rock to determine its structure and composition in a bid to answer questions about the early Universe and possibly our own origins.

Along with colleagues from EAARO, researchers are using techniques such as electron microscopy to survey the surface morphology at the micron and nanometer scale; and vibrational spectroscopy and X-ray diffraction, which give detailed information about chemical structure, phase and polymorphism, crystallinity and molecular interactions, to determine the structure and composition.

So far, they have found that the incredibly delicate sample, which resembles loosely held-together concreted dust and particles, never underwent the violent cosmic collisions that most ancient space debris experienced as it smashed together to create the planets and moons of our solar system.

"The internal structure is fragile and loosely bound, porous with fissures and cracks," said Shaun Fowler—a specialist in optical and electron microscopy at the Loughborough Materials Characterisation Centre (LMCC).

"It doesn't appear to have undergone thermal metamorphosis, which means it's been sitting out there past Mars, untouched, since before any of the planets were created meaning we have the rare opportunity to examine a piece of our primordial past.

"The bulk of the meteorite is comprised of minerals such as olivine and phyllosilicates, with other mineral inclusions called chondrules, which, for example, can be minerals such as magnetite or calcite.

"But the composition is different to anything you would find here on Earth and potentially unlike any other meteorites we've found—possibly containing some previously unknown chemistry or physical structure never before seen in other recorded samples."

The ancient rock is a rare example of a carbonaceous chondrite, a type of meteorite which often contains biological material. Fewer than 5% of meteorites which fall to Earth belong to this classification.

Identifying organic compounds would support the idea that early meteorites carried amino acids—the building blocks of life—to supply the Earth's primordial soup where life first began.

"Carbonaceous chondrites contain organic compounds including amino acids, which are found in all living things," said Director of Astrochemistry at EAARO Derek Robson who found the meteorite and who will soon join Loughborough University as an academic visitor for collaborative research.

"Being able to identify and confirm the presence of such compounds from a material that existed before the Earth was born would be an important step towards understanding how life began."

Professor Sandie Dann, of the Chemistry Department in the School of Science, first worked with Derek in 1997 and has kept in touch with him regularly since.

She said: "It's a scientific fairy-tale. First your friend tracks a meteorite, then finds it and then gifts a bit of this extra-terrestrial material to you to analyze.

"At this stage, we have learned a good deal about it, but we've barely scratched the surface.

"There is huge potential to learn about ourselves and our solar system—it's an amazing project to be part of."

Jason Williams, Managing Director of EAARO, added: "One of EAARO's primary objectives is to open the doors of science and technology to those who may not get the opportunity.

"Derek and I felt our new find could help us further these objectives by opening up research opportunities in meteoritical science.

"We carefully chose Loughborough, along with University of Sheffield, a number of commercial partners, and a handful of overseas specialists to work with us on this exciting project as we continue to excite and inspire people young and old by promoting and encourage space research and STEM subjects to a wider community."

Rare meteorite could hold secrets to life on Earth

Provided by Loughborough University

Stakeholders and African rhino conservation: A case study

by David Bradley, Inderscience

"Rhinos are a charismatic symbol of Africa's thriving wildlife," so says a team writing in the International Journal of Teaching and Case Studies, "but their future is threatened."

There is growing demand for rhino horn and thus increased poaching. The animals' plight is not helped by corruption and ineffective protection. Deirdre Dixon, Raymond Papp, Chanelle Cox, Melissa Walters, and Julia Pennington of the University of Tampa in Florida, U.S., point out that thousands of these magnificent beasts are killed simply for their horn every year. Botswana, Eswatini, and South Africa are at the forefront of the problem, but scant attention is paid to understanding the position and viewpoint of the local people.

In order to investigate the issues from an ethical stance, the team has conducted qualitative interviews with local ranchers, conservationists, and the general population, and used analytical tools to extract meaning from their data. As they offer in the title of their paper the ethical issues are not "black and white".

The poachers are at odds with the rangers and conservationists, the locals are often at odds with the wildlife itself. The conservationists vehemently disagree with any rhino hunting and want to secure the future of the species. Others are less concerned with such matters and more concerned with their own life and livelihoods.

"Given the different stakeholder vantage points, it is difficult to find common ground and unanimously agree upon one solution for the rhino crisis. However, we can apply ethical frames to foster understanding of each stakeholder group and use these vantage points to explore a combination of solutions," the team writes.

The team offers a range of further discussion points and frames questions that might improve education and understanding in and around this sensitive subject.

Nearly 50 rhinos killed in Botswana in 10 months as poaching surges

More information: Deirdre Dixon et al, Ethical leadership is not black and white: a case study on stakeholders and African rhino conservation, International Journal of Teaching and Case Studies (2021). DOI: 10.1504/IJTCS.2021.116145

Provided by Inderscience

New method allows unambiguous identification of wolf hybrids in Europe's forests

by Senckenberg Research Institute and Natural History Museum

Together with a European team, Senckenberg scientists have presented a new method in the scientific journal BMC Genomics that allows the reliable identification of wolf-dog hybrids on the basis of environmental samples such as feces, hair, or saliva residue. The method has a much higher resolution than conventional methods and is expected to serve as a standard procedure in the future, allowing for comparable detection of hybridization rates across Europe.

In the spring of 2000, for the first time since the wolf was eradicated by humans around 1850, wild wolf pups were born once again in Germany in northeastern Saxony close to the Polish border. After the further establishment of this species initially proceeded rather slowly in the following years, a very dynamic range expansion has been observed over the past 10 years or so. "Especially at the beginning of such a recolonization, there is an increased probability that wolves will mate with domestic dogs—simply due to the lack of a choice of sexual partners of their own species," explains Dr. Carsten Nowak of the Senckenberg Research Institute and Natural History Museum Frankfurt and head of the Genomic Biomonitoring program area at the LOEWE Center for Translational Biodiversity Genomics.

Together with a European team from ten countries including e.g. Romania, Slovenia, Italy, and Spain, Nowak's group has now presented a new method that makes it possible to reliably identify such wolf-dog hybrids using environmental samples. "We can identify hybrids using DNA from fecal samples, hair, or from saliva residue of dead prey animals. The new method has a much higher resolution than conventional methods and allows the reliable detection of hybridization events even after several generations," adds Nowak. This is made possible by the targeted selection of locations in the genome where domestic dogs and wolves differ from each other regardless of breed and origin. The new method thus eliminates the need for similarity matches of individual genetic profiles based on reference samples of wolf and dog, according to the recently published study.

Reliable detection of wolf-dog hybrids is complicated by the close relationship between domestic dogs and the large predators—hybrids can be too similar to genetically pure wolves or wolf-like domestic dogs in their external and molecular genetic characteristics. However, recognizing the hybrids produced by wolf-dog matings is important for wolf management: hybrids can produce viable offspring and may spread dog genes into the entire wolf population if they mate again with wolves. Theoretically, it is possible that this will cause an increasing number of dog genes to accumulate in the wolf gene pool over time. "In addition, social acceptance of wolf-dog hybrids living in the wild is low. Therefore, hybrids are usually removed from the wild. Our published method greatly facilitates their reliable identification," says Nowak.

In Germany, only very few hybridization events between wolves and domestic dogs have been registered to date. These occurred in cases where female wolves could not find an unrelated "wolfish" mating partner, such as in Saxony in 2003, or in Thuringia in 2017 and 2019. In such cases, the hybrids are usually ordered to be removed from the wild so that they cannot continue to mate with wolves. Coauthor Berardino Cocchiararo comments: "In our study, we did not find an increased proportion of dog genes in the wolf samples originating from Germany. There are similar findings in other regions of Europe where hybrids are consistently removed and where hardly any stray domestic dogs are present, such as in Scandinavia or the Alpine region."

The new method is already routinely used in German wolf monitoring. In their study, the researchers advocate the standardized use of the method throughout Europe. "This would allow us to identify areas where, for example, feral dogs need to be more closely controlled to ensure ecological separation from wolves. Widespread use of the method to record hybridization rates across Europe would also help us better understand regional differences in wolf-dog admixture," summarizes the study's lead author, Jenni Harmoinen of the University of Oulu in Finland.

Origin of Scandinavian wolves clarified

More information: Jenni Harmoinen et al, Reliable wolf-dog hybrid detection in Europe using a reduced SNP panel developed for non-invasively collected samples, BMC Genomics (2021). DOI: 10.1186/s12864-021-07761-5

Provided by Senckenberg Research Institute and Natural History Museum

Novel coronavirus discovered in British bats

by University of East Anglia

A coronavirus related to the virus that causes COVID-19 in humans has been found in UK horseshoe bats—according to new collaborative research from the University of East Anglia, ZSL (Zoological Society of London), and Public Health England (PHE).

However, there is no evidence that this novel virus has been transmitted to humans, or that it could in future, unless it mutates.

UEA researchers collected fecal samples from more than 50 lesser horseshoe bats in Somerset, Gloucestershire and Wales and sent them for viral analysis at Public Health England.

Genome sequencing found a novel coronavirus in one of the bat samples, which the team have named "RhGB01."

It is the first time that a sarbecovirus (SARS-related coronavirus) has been found in a lesser horseshoe bat and the first to be discovered in the UK.

The research team say that these bats will almost certainly have harbored the virus for a very long time. And it has been found now, because this is the first time that they have been tested.

Importantly, this novel virus is unlikely to pose a direct risk to humans, unless it mutates.

A mutation could happen if a human infected with COVID-19 passes it to an infected bat, so anyone coming into contact with bats or their droppings, for example those engaged in caving or bat protection, should wear appropriate PPE.

Prof Diana Bell, an expert in emerging zoonotic diseases from UEA's School of Biological Sciences, said: "Horseshoe bats are found across Europe, Africa, Asia and Australia and the bats we tested lie at the western extreme of their range.

"Similar viruses have been found in other horseshoe bat species in China, South East Asia and Eastern Europe.

"Our research extends both the geographic and species ranges of these types of viruses and suggests their more widespread presence across more than 90 species of horseshoe bats.

"These bats will almost certainly have harbored this virus for a very long time—probably many thousands of years. We didn't know about it before because this is the first time that such tests have been carried out in UK bats.

"We already know that there are different coronaviruses in many other mammal species too," she said. "This is a case of 'seek and you will find."

"Research into the origins of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19 in humans, has focussed on horseshoe bats—but there are some 1,400 other bat species and they comprise 20 percent of known mammals.

"Our findings highlight the need for robust genotype testing for these types of viruses in bat populations around the world. And it raises an important question about what other animals carry these types of viruses."

Prof Andrew Cunningham, from the Zoological Society of London, said: "Our findings highlight that the natural distribution of sarbecoviruses and opportunities for recombination through intermediate host co-infection have been underestimated.

"This UK virus is not a threat to humans because the receptor binding domain (RBD) - the part of the virus that attaches to host cells to infect them—is not compatible with being able to infect human cells.

"But the problem is that any bat harboring a SARS-like coronavirus can act as a melting pot for virus mutation. So if a bat with the RhGB01 infection we found were to become infected with SARS-CoV-2, there is a risk that these viruses would hybridize and a new virus emerge with the RBD of SARS-CoV-2, and so be able to infect people.

"Preventing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from humans to bats, and hence reducing opportunities for virus mutation, is critical with the current global mass vaccination campaign against this virus."

Prof Bell added: "The main risks would be for example a bat rehabilitator looking after a rescued animal and infecting it with SARS-CoV2—which would provide an opportunity for genetic recombination if it is already carrying another sarbecovirus.

"Anyone coming into contact with bats or their droppings, such as bat rescuers or cavers, should wear appropriate PPE—in order to reduce the risk of a mutation occurring.

"We need to apply stringent regulations globally for anyone handling bats and other wild animals," she added.

The new virus falls within the subgroup of coronaviruses called sarbecoviruses which contains both SARS-CoV-2 (responsible for the current pandemic) and SARS-CoV (responsible for the initial 2003 SARS outbreak in humans).

Further analysis compared the virus with those found in other horseshoe bat species in China, South East Asia and Europe and showed that its closest relative was discovered in a Blasius's bat from Bulgaria in 2008.

The UK discovery was made by undergraduate ecology student Ivana Murphy, from UEA's School of Biological Sciences, who collected bat droppings as part of her final year research dissertation. Jack Crook conducted the genetic analyses in partnership with other researchers at PHE.

A total of 53 bats were captured, and their feces collected in sterile bags. The research was conducted under strict Health and Safety protocols. Full PPE was worn and Ivana was regularly tested for COVID-19 to avoid any chance of cross contamination. The bats were released immediately after their droppings had been collected.

Ivana said: "More than anything, I'm worried that people may suddenly start fearing and persecuting bats, which is the last thing I would want and would be unnecessary. As like all wildlife, if left alone they do not pose any threat."

"Metagenomic identification of a new sarbecovirus from horseshoe bats in Europe" is published in the journal Scientific Reports on July 19, 2021.

Bats in Switzerland harbor diverse viruses, some potentially zoonotic

More information: Jack M. Crook et al, Metagenomic identification of a new sarbecovirus from horseshoe bats in Europe, Scientific Reports (2021). DOI: 10.1038/s41598-021-94011-z

Journal information: Scientific Reports

Provided by University of East Anglia

COVID-19 made unequal access to food worse, study suggests

by Jeff Grabmeier, The Ohio State University

When COVID-19 hit, affluent Columbus, Ohio, residents responded by taking significantly fewer trips to large grocery and big-box stores, apparently ordering more online and stocking up when they did go out to shop.

With fewer options available to them, low-income people had to double down on what they had always done: regular trips to the local dollar stores and small groceries to get their family's food.

That's the conclusion of a new study that analyzed traffic to Columbus grocery sellers before, during and after the COVID-19 lockdown.

Dollar stores and small local grocers in neighborhoods housing mostly low-income people of color didn't see as much of a decline in customers during the lockdown as did large grocery and big-box stores, said Armita Kar, lead author of the study and a doctoral student in geography at The Ohio State University.

"Most low-income people still had to shop for groceries in person during the COVID lockdowns and may not have had the economic ability to stock up on food," Kar said.

"They took fewer trips to mid- and high-end grocery stores outside their neighborhood and continued to go regularly to the stores that were nearest to them, which were the dollar stores and local grocers."

The problems faced by poor people during the pandemic lockdown were not new, said study co-author Huyen Le, assistant professor of geography at Ohio State.

"COVID-19 exacerbated the existing problems of unequal access to food for low-income people," Le said.

The study was published online recently in the journal Applied Geography.

The researchers used anonymized and aggregated cell phone location data to analyze 2020 travel patterns to nearly all Columbus area grocery stores (393 in total) during pre-lockdown (Jan 6—March 15), lockdown (March 16—April 19) and initial reopening (April 20—May 31).

The goal was to find out how different kinds of grocery stores were affected by the lockdown and how travel to stores differed between high- and low-income neighborhoods.

Results showed that mid- and high-end grocery stores and big-box food retailers in the city saw their in-person customer levels plunge when COVID-19 lockdowns began, presumably because their mostly affluent clientele could shop online and stock up on supplies, so they went to stores less often.

But dollar stores and smaller independent grocers, particularly in low-income neighborhoods and those housing people of color, saw only a small decline in their customer levels during the lockdown.

When the initial reopening occurred in April, the larger grocery stores and big-box retailers saw their customer numbers recover quickly—with an important caveat.

Most of the returning customers lived in the immediate area, results showed. Customers who used to come from longer distances—often from low-income neighborhoods—did not return in the same numbers, Kar said.

"We believe the transportation options for people in low-income neighborhoods were limited," she said. "Public transit was still less regular, and some may not have been able to combine work and shopping trips as they once did."

COVID-19 exposed many of the inequalities in our food system in a way that made them harder to ignore, said study co-author Harvey Miller, professor of geography and director of Ohio State's Center for Urban and Regional Analysis.

"The rich and poor were mostly shopping at different food stores before COVID-19, and those differences became even more stark when the lockdown came," Miller said.

And these results point to the need to support better food shopping options for low-income people living in food deserts, Le said, so they don't have to rely on dollar stores.

"Dollar stores mostly offer packaged and highly processed foods that aren't healthy," Le said.

"Policymakers should examine ways to provide better shopping options for people in low-income areas, so they have better access to healthy foods."

The impact of COVID-19 on food-shopping behavior for food-insecure populations

More information: Armita Kar et al, COVID-19 exacerbates unequal food access, Applied Geography (2021). DOI: 10.1016/j.apgeog.2021.102517

Provided by The Ohio State University

Bioweapons research is banned by an international treaty but nobody is checking for violations

by Gary Samore, The Conversation

Scientists are making dramatic progress with techniques for "gene splicing"—modifying the genetic makeup of organisms.

This work includes bioengineering pathogens for medical research, techniques that also can be used to create deadly biological weapons. It's an overlap that's helped fuel speculation that the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus was bioengineered at China's Wuhan Institute of Virology and that it subsequently "escaped" through a lab accident to produce the COVID-19 pandemic.

The world already has a legal foundation to prevent gene splicing for warfare: the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. Unfortunately, nations have been unable to agree on how to strengthen the treaty. Some countries have also pursued bioweapons research and stockpiling in violation of it.

As a member of President Bill Clinton's National Security Council from 1996 to 2001, I had a firsthand view of the failure to strengthen the convention. From 2009 to 2013, as President Barack Obama's White House coordinator for weapons of mass destruction, I led a team that grappled with the challenges of regulating potentially dangerous biological research in the absence of strong international rules and regulations.

The history of the Biological Weapons Convention reveals the limits of international attempts to control research and development of biological agents.

1960s-1970s: International negotiations to outlaw biowarfare

The United Kingdom first proposed a global biological weapons ban in 1968.

Reasoning that bioweapons had no useful military or strategic purpose given the awesome power of nuclear weapons, the U.K. had ended its offensive bioweapons program in 1956. But the risk remained that other countries might consider developing bioweapons as a poor man's atomic bomb.

In the original British proposal, countries would have to identify facilities and activities with potential bioweapons applications. They would also need to accept on-site inspections by an international agency to verify these facilities were being used for peaceful purposes.

These negotiations gained steam in 1969 when the Nixon administration ended America's offensive biological weapons program and supported the British proposal. In 1971, the Soviet Union announced its support—but only with the verification provisions stripped out. Since it was essential to get the USSR on board, the U.S. and U.K. agreed to drop those requirements.

In 1972 the treaty was finalized. After gaining the required signatures, it took effect in 1975.

Under the convention, 183 nations have agreed not to "develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain" biological materials that could be used as weapons. They also agreed not to stockpile or develop any "means of delivery" for using them. The treaty allows "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful" research and development—including medical research.

However, the treaty lacks any mechanism to verify that countries are complying with these obligations.

1990s: Revelations of treaty violations

This absence of verification was exposed as the convention's fundamental flaw two decades later, when it turned out that the Soviets had a great deal to hide.

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin revealed the Soviet Union's massive biological weapons program. Some of the program's reported experiments involved making viruses and bacteria more lethal and resistant to treatment. The Soviets also weaponized and mass-produced a number of dangerous naturally occurring viruses, including the anthrax and smallpox viruses, as well as the plague-causing Yersinia pestis bacterium.

Yeltsin in 1992 ordered the program's end and the destruction of all its materials. But doubts remain whether this was fully carried out.

Another treaty violation came to light after the U.S. defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. United Nations inspectors discovered an Iraqi bioweapons stockpile, including 1,560 gallons (6,000 liters) of anthrax spores and 3,120 gallons (12,000 liters) of botulinum toxin. Both had been loaded into aerial bombs, rockets and missile warheads, although Iraq never used these weapons.

In the mid-1990s, during South Africa's transition to majority rule, evidence emerged of the former apartheid regime's chemical and biological weapons program. As revealed by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the program focused on assassination. Techniques included infecting cigarettes and chocolates with anthrax spores, sugar with salmonella and chocolates with botulinum toxin.

In response to these revelations, as well as suspicions that North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria were also violating the treaty, the U.S. began urging other nations to close the verification gap. But despite 24 meetings over seven years, a specially formed group of international negotiators failed to reach agreement on how to do it. The problems were both practical and political.

Monitoring biological agents

Several factors make verification of the bioweapons treaty difficult.

First, the types of facilities that research and produce biological agents, such as vaccines, antibiotics, vitamins, biological pesticides and certain foods, can also produce biological weapons. Some pathogens with legitimate medical and industrial uses can also be used for bioweapons.

Further, large quantities of certain biological weapons can be produced quickly, by few personnel and in relatively small facilities. Hence, biological weapons programs are more difficult for international inspectors to detect than nuclear or chemical programs, which typically require large facilities, numerous personnel and years of operation.

So an effective bioweapons verification process would require nations to identify a large number of civilian facilities. Inspectors would need to monitor them regularly. The monitoring would need to be intrusive, allowing inspectors to demand "challenge inspections," meaning access on short notice to both known and suspected facilities.

Finally, developing bioweapons defenses—as permitted under the treaty—typically requires working with dangerous pathogens and toxins, and even delivery systems. So distinguishing legitimate biodefense programs from illegal bioweapons activities often comes down to intent—and intent is hard to verify.

Because of these inherent difficulties, verification faced stiff opposition.

Political opposition to bioweapons verification

As the White House official responsible for coordinating the U.S. negotiating position, I often heard concerns and objections from important government agencies.

The Pentagon expressed fears that inspections of biodefense installations would compromise national security or lead to false accusations of treaty violations. The Commerce Department opposed intrusive international inspections on behalf of the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. Such inspections might compromise trade secrets, officials contended, or interfere with medical research or industrial production.

Germany and Japan, which also have large pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries, raised similar objections. China, Pakistan, Russia and others opposed nearly all on-site inspections. Since the rules under which the negotiation group operated required consensus, any single country could block agreement.

In January 1998, seeking to break the deadlock, the Clinton administration proposed reduced verification requirements. Nations could limit their declarations to facilities "especially suitable" for bioweapons uses, such as vaccine production facilities. Random or routine inspections of these facilities would instead be "voluntary" visits or limited challenge inspections—but only if approved by the executive council of a to-be-created international agency monitoring the bioweapons treaty.

But even this failed to achieve consensus among the international negotiators.

Finally, in July 2001, the George W. Bush administration rejected the Clinton proposal—ironically, on the grounds that it was not strong enough to detect cheating. With that, the negotiations collapsed.

Since then, nations have made no serious effort to establish a verification system for the Biological Weapons Convention.

Even with the amazing advances scientists have made in genetic engineering since the 1970s, there are few signs that countries are interested in taking up the problem again.

This is especially true in today's climate of accusations against China, and China's refusal to fully cooperate to determine the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic.COVID-19 lab leak theory highlights glaring lack of global biosecurity regulation

Provided by The Conversation

Climate change is forcing conservationists to be more ambitious

by Sarah Elizabeth Dalrymple, The Conversation

As climate change brings record droughts and floods, extended fire seasons continue to make headlines, and the role of humans in this terrible situation is now undisputed, institutional change has been slow and unsteady. In particular, conservationists have been wary of pointing to climate change as the biggest threat to biodiversity, given the many other threats that exist.

But the situation may now be changing. In the last 18 months, the IUCN Red List—which lists species' extinction risk status—recorded a 52% increase in species listed as being threatened by climate change. Conservationists are being forced to consider whether their conventional approach of maintaining, not changing ecosystems, needs to be adapted to a changing world.

You may have heard of situations where threatened species are released back into areas they used to occupy in the wild. Examples include the restoration of rhinos in Africa and wolves in North America.

However, in our research, my colleagues and I showed that many failed reintroductions are taking place in regions where the climate isn't suitable for the species being released.

This undermines attempts to protect species in their former habitats and is a warning that climate change is already restricting the habitat of threatened species.

In some cases, new habitats become available as the change in climate conditions allows species to survive in areas that were previously too cool. But unless they can populate these new habitats—an adjustment which is tricky for most—many threatened species will experience a reduction in their current range.

"Conservation translocation", also known as assisted migration, assisted colonization and managed relocation, describes interventions that could be used to tackle climate change-driven species declines and extinctions.

Instead of leaving species to suffer in hotter and drier environments, we can try to expand their range by moving them to new habitats. This overcomes situations where species can't move by themselves, such as plants whose seeds disperse only a few meters at a time, or birds who won't leave the safety of their woodland home to seek new territory.

However, this approach remains controversial due to the perceived risks of moving species to ecosystems they've never experienced before. Risks include spreading diseases into new habitats, aggressive competition with resident species for prey or space, and the introduction of new predators.

An example of this last problem is that of the Tasmanian devils moved to Maria Island off the coast of Tasmania, to protect against a contagious cancer ripping through their population.

These predators found an easy supply of prey in the form of short-tailed shearwaters (also known as moonbirds) and little penguins, themselves species of concern. Both bird species have now been eradicated from Maria Island.

But translocations are a conservation option that we can't just dismiss. A new paper on assisted migration from a team of international researchers calls for the risks of translocation to be balanced against the risks of doing nothing at all. Given the immediacy of the climate crisis, it is now the path of least risk that we must take.

Early days

There are only a handful of attempted assisted migrations undertaken specifically to reduce the negative effects of a warming world.

A good example is the western swamp turtle: Australia's rarest reptile, thought to be extinct for a century but recently discovered near Perth. The turtle feeds in ephemeral pools that appear after seasonal rains, but droughts are shortening their feeding window by several weeks: with consequences for the species' reproductive success.

For the western swamp turtle, translocations to cooler, wetter sites to the south of their current range offer the right type of habitat and enough food to survive ongoing droughts. These appear to be the safest long-term place for the turtles to thrive, and trial translocations are already reporting good results.

Time to act?

Plants are in a similar predicament. In a recent collection of papers in the Journal of Ecology, a group of Italian researchers estimated under pessimistic (but highly probable) climate change scenarios that 90% of 188 threatened plant species may need assisted migration to cope with habitat loss.

But while researchers are using computer models to predict the future needs of threatened species, one group has decided that the time to act is now. The Florida torreya, the most endangered coniferous tree in the US, has been moved north by a group of citizens known as the Torreya Guardians. They exploited a loophole in US law that allows plant translocations on private land by the public but prevents federal conservation authorities from doing the same thing.

The species' current range is extremely restricted but was much more widespread before the last global ice age. The Torreya Guardians argue that the specimens of Florida torreya growing across the US provide evidence that the species can thrive beyond its current restrictions.

With new temperature records being set all the time—and melting ice, sea-level rise and historic droughts affecting the whole planet—it's only a matter of time before climate-induced extinctions become a regular feature in the headlines.

It's time for calls for better global policy on assisted migration to be heeded. We need guidance so that we, as a global community of concerned citizens and conservation scientists alike, can act decisively to protect the survival of threatened species.

Monitoring species condemned to extinction may help save others as global temperatures rise