Wednesday, September 15, 2021

On Being a ‘Muslim’ Atheist


To disbelieve in the existence of God in the Arab world is no easy thing. Yet more and more of us are coming out of the closet

On Being a ‘Muslim’ Atheist
Muslim on paper / Getty Images

Names are not always just names. They can signify very different things to different people. I was reminded of this during a recent visit to Crete, where I encountered an Egyptian from Alexandria.

Ayman moved to Crete 30 years ago after falling in love with the Mediterranean island, which reminded him of his coastal hometown but was quieter and more orderly. Nevertheless, he retained a very Egyptian outlook when it came to names.

“But isn’t Iskander a Christian name?” Ayman asked in confusion, after I introduced our son. His confusion was compounded by the fact that my name is Khaled, which people in Egypt and some other Arab countries associate with Islam. However, neither of these assumptions are correct — nor is the assumption that a Muslim father must necessarily pass on his religion.

Although the vast majority of people named Khaled are Muslim, I have encountered non-Muslims with that name, which is not uncommon among Christians in Lebanon, for example. This is particularly the case among pan-Arabists because Gamal Abdel Nasser’s eldest son was called Khaled.

Just as there is nothing especially Islamic about the name Khaled, which predates Islam, there is nothing terribly Christian about the name Iskander (Arabic for Alexander), which predates Christianity. In fact, Iskander is a fairly common boys’ name in Tunisia, where my son once had two other boys with the same name in his class when we lived there. Before that, the only other Iskander he had met in person was an aging Assyrian Christian in Jerusalem.

Iskander is also a common name in Turkic countries, Iran and some other Muslim-majority countries. In Turkey, it is even the name of a popular kebab dish. When we took our son at age 5 to taste “Iskender kebap” in Istanbul, he refused to touch it until we reassured him that it was not made of young boys named Iskander.

Derived from AlĂ©xandros, which means “defender of the people,” the Greek version of my son’s name was popular in Ancient Greece. In addition to the ease with which Iskander can be pronounced by most people, its lack of association with any (living) religion was a major factor behind its appeal to us.

Before Iskander was born, it was important to my wife (who is Belgian) and me to find a neutral name that did not presuppose a particular faith, because we are both of the firm conviction that our son should be entirely free to choose the belief system that appeals most to him.

And with a few exceptions, like in Egypt and Palestine, it has worked. In Europe, only people with knowledge of Arabic know where the name comes from, with many Belgians assuming, for some bizarre reason, that it is a Scandinavian name.

“We want our son to learn about his dual heritage, but we also want him to decide for himself what his beliefs are,” I explained to Ayman, who is raising his children in the Christian faith and sends them to a small Coptic church in Crete.

This is important not only because of our abstract belief in freedom of religion and of conscience but also because, on a personal level, I did not really enjoy that liberty growing up, and I don’t wish my son to have to struggle with labels he did not choose.

Long before I could even grasp what faith meant, I was branded a Muslim from the moment I entered this world. My Egyptian birth certificate marks my religion as “Muslim,” which is also true of my adult identification papers.

Luckily, despite her own profound faith, my late mother raised us as Muslims but never pushed any of us to practice Islam against our will. She also raised us to question even established religion, out of the belief that the only true path to faith was one of self-discovery and knowledge.

Though this worked for some of her offspring, unfortunately for her, my doubts only grew and multiplied with time, until eventually I abandoned not just Islam but religion in its entirety. While my absence of religious faith broke her heart, and probably made her fear what awaited me after death, she knew I was an atheist before I came out of the closet about it and accepted the reality without recrimination or anger.

My family’s and friends’ acceptance of who I am has made my journey in life much easier than for many others who leave Islam and are disowned, rejected or ostracized by their families and communities.

Out of dread of this social excommunication, some decide to keep their lack of faith to themselves. Becoming what you might call crypto-atheists, they must suffer the agony of deception and dissimulation, living their lives pretending to be what they are not.

In countries where atheism is outlawed — it’s punishable by death in countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia — many must keep their skepticism secret not just from family but also from society.

In Saudi Arabia, one of the most repressive theocracies in the world, those found guilty of atheism or “apostasy” can be flogged pitilessly or receive capital punishment. For example, in 2017, one man, named in the media as Ahmad Al-Shamri, who allegedly renounced Islam and Muhammad on social media, was reportedly sentenced to death.

A thriving community of skeptics and atheists exists out of sight 

Despite the enormous risks involved, a thriving community of skeptics and atheists exists out of sight and beneath the radar of the Saudi authorities, connecting mostly online but sometimes also in the real world. Even though Saudi Arabia is where Islam was born and sees itself as the leader of the Muslim world, a full fifth of the population say they are not religious and 5% are “convinced atheists,” according to a Gallup Poll conducted in 2012.

Some of these atheists are drawn to break cover and seek out like-minded individuals because of the profound sense of loneliness evoked by leading a double life. “I’m as closeted as ever. It makes me feel anxious and I struggle with myself. I sometimes ask myself: What if I’m wrong and everyone who is on the opposite side is right?” Maya (not her real name), an Egyptian who abandoned her faith while living in Saudi Arabia, told me. “That self-confidence I have when I’m surrounded by other nonbelievers or slightly open-minded people, like in Egypt, for example, makes me want to leave here asap.”

Though Egypt is more open-minded and tolerant than Saudi Arabia, it, too, is no paradise for atheists. The contemporary Egyptian state and society possess something of a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde attitude toward unbelief.

On the one hand, the constitution, rhetorically at least, guarantees absolute freedom of belief and there are no laws explicitly outlawing atheism or apostasy. This enables some atheists to openly express their rejection of religion without any harm inflicted on their person or their freedom.

On the other hand, Egypt has draconian blasphemy laws that are exploited by some elements of the state and crusading vigilante Islamist lawyers to selectively and randomly crack down on and persecute some skeptics and atheists.

One person who has fallen afoul of these laws is Sherif Gaber. The young freethinker first entered the public eye when he was a student at Suez Canal University following a smear campaign in 2013 by faculty members.

In 2015, Gaber was released on bail pending a retrial. He went underground but courageously refused to be silenced by the state or vigilantes. Gaber runs a popular anti-religion YouTube channel where the videos he produced have been viewed millions of times.

When attempting to flee Egypt in 2018, Gaber was arrested at the airport. After his release, he went into hiding again until he could work out an escape plan. Despite repeated attempts to leave Egypt and solidarity from abroad, Gaber appears to still be in Egypt and in hiding.

Compared with people like Gaber, I have had it easy. I have spent over a dozen years openly writing and speaking about atheism, as well as criticizing Islam and religion, not just in the Western media but also in some Arab publications. The worst I have experienced to date is occasional online abuse and threats but nothing serious enough for me to fear for my safety. In the real world, I have angered and riled up some religious conservatives enough for them to lose their tempers and call me unpleasant things. However, no incident has yet come to blows, though there have been some close calls.

Atheists and atheism are also widely misunderstood by many Arabs and Muslims. At one extreme, there are those who believe us to be Satanists, partly out of the conviction that those who do not worship God must, by implication, bow down to the devil.

There are others who believe that we have no moral compass and that we are debauched degenerates and disillusioned depressives. “An Arab atheist is usually a parasite — someone who claims to be knowledgeable but is not and will probably eventually commit suicide,” wrote a columnist in a Saudi newspaper. “An Arab atheist is usually a drunk, certainly a degenerate and has definitely nothing to offer.”

This insulting and ignorant attitude springs partly from the fact that many have not knowingly met an atheist. It is also influenced by the conviction that morality springs from religion, despite the findings of modern anthropological studies that show it is religion that springs from our innate sense of morality.

Although I disagree on many moral and ethical issues with religious conservatives, such as when it comes to sexual freedom and gender rights, I do not feel I am immoral or amoral in comparison. Moreover, I do not feel that the absence of God has made my life poorer or more depressing — quite the contrary.

Some Muslims, including some who claim to be enlightened and progressive, accept my right to believe what I want but do not believe I should talk about it publicly because it offends believers and supposedly challenges and threatens the social fabric.

This view not only does not stand up to intellectual scrutiny, but also is highly bigoted and offensive. There are people in Europe who find Islam to be offensive and a threat to the social fabric. Should European Muslims then be forced to conceal their faith?

Of course not. And I am a vociferous opponent of any forces that try to limit the freedom of belief or expression of Muslims in Europe, so why do some Muslims feel they are entitled to limit my freedom of conscience?

Moreover, do such people really prefer that I and other skeptics live a lie as hypocritical Muslims, rather than be honest and open atheists and unbelievers? If they can live with that, I cannot. My convictions are an integral part of my identity and so hiding or distorting them would involve a personal denial of who I am.

Although I possess no missionary designs and have zero desire to “convert” people to my beliefs, I also find it important to be open about who I am because there are many out there who share similar doubts but are in no position to express them, with the sense of abject isolation and loneliness that engenders. I want people like that to realize that they are not alone and that they are most certainly not freaks.

This kind of concealment also plays into the hands of conservatives and radicals who wrongly claim that atheism and skepticism are foreign imports that have no place in Muslim societies because Islam is so self-evidently true (and probably better than its rivals) and belief is the natural state for Muslims. However, the more I have delved into the three Abrahamic faiths, the more I have become convinced that the differences among them is like the differences in branded sportswear: indistinguishable to the agnostic and heathen but a source of great pride and identity to the wearer.

Skepticism and unbelief have always been and will always be integral to Islamic societies, at some times and places tolerated and celebrated, at others suppressed and persecuted.

In medieval times, for example, Middle Eastern societies were far more accepting and accommodating of irreligiosity, irreverence and unbelief than their European counterparts.

Take Abu al-Alaa al-Maarri (973-1057), the blind Syrian poet, philosopher, rationalist and hermit who was not only skeptical of religion but was also an early advocate of extreme birth control, convinced, as he was, that humans should not reproduce at all.

Despite his irreverent views, al-Maarri was a highly respected scholar of his day who turned his small hometown of Maarra, near Aleppo, into a magnet for poets, philosophers, students, princes and other admirers who were drawn by his philosophy, humility, hospitality, generosity and asceticism.

In one verse, al-Maarri intuited a view confirmed a millennium later by modern anthropological research: that humans are generally, despite the irrationality and contradictions of religion, predisposed to believe in a god and the afterlife and possess a religious “instinct.”

Now this religion happens to prevail
Until by that religion overthrown,
Because men dare not live with men alone,
But always with another fairy tale.

As a sign of how far matters have apparently regressed more than a thousand years after al-Maarri’s death, jihadists from the Nusra Front decapitated in 2013 all the statues of the blind poet it could find. They would have probably beheaded the revered poet and philosopher himself, or at least flogged him and tortured him until he “recanted,” if he were alive today.

But it would be a mistake to think that skepticism died after the so-called golden age of Islam. It continued to survive, and sometimes thrive, at different intensities depending on time and place.

For instance, al-Maarri’s “The Epistle of Forgiveness,” which depicts a fictional journey to the afterlife in which pagans and irreverent poets live in a highly bureaucratic heaven, inspired the Iraqi poet Jamil Sidqi al-Zahawi to write “Revolution in Hell” (1931). In this epic poem, humanity’s most daring and original thinkers have been condemned to eternal damnation as punishment for their courage, while the obedient and pro-establishment are rewarded with everlasting paradise, in a remarkable parallel to how Arab patriarchal dictatorships operate. The subversive inhabitants of hell, led appropriately enough by al-Maarri, storm heaven and claim it as their rightful abode, perhaps mocking the widely held belief that atheists are Satanists.

Despite the apparent rise of radical Islamism, I feel recent years have marked a major turning point

Despite the apparent rise of radical Islamism, I feel recent years have marked a major turning point toward the acceptance of and demand for freedom of belief and expression. The violence of conservative Islamic regimes and nonstate groups is, in my view, a sign of weakness, vulnerability and retreat, not strength, confidence and advance.

Not only do surveys and anecdotal evidence point to a rise in irreligiosity and religious skepticism across the Middle East, millions of people of faith are losing or have lost faith in political Islam and want religion removed from politics — the very definition of secularism.

I have witnessed this on a personal level, too. Since I came out of the closet about the abandonment of my faith, I have encountered not only a healthy number of skeptics but also a surprising level of tolerance and acceptance of unbelief by many ordinary Arabs and Muslims.

I am regularly and pleasantly surprised that my writings on religion and Islam, including my book “Islam for the Politically Incorrect,” have generally been well received, including by some conservative Muslims who, even if they don’t agree with many of my conclusions, appreciate both my honesty and the nuanced reality I depict.

It is my hope that, in these tumultuous times of rapid social change and upheaval, it is this tolerant, pluralistic, open and honest streak that ultimately gains the upper hand. 

SEE

 LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment: Search results for ARAB ANARCHISM

http://plawiuk.blogspot.com/2006/02/my-favorite-muslim.htm

 

 

What the Global War on Terror Really Accomplished

Twenty years after 9/11, America didn’t dismantle or destroy jihadist groups, but it fundamentally changed the way they think

What the Global War on Terror Really Accomplished
A security personnel walks past a wall mural with images of US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad (L) and Taliban co-founder Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Kabul on July 31, 2020 / Wakil Kohsar / AFP via Getty Images

Iwas introduced to Maysara in 2015. I wanted to hear from him about his decadelong experience of being part of the Islamic State group, and how he spearheaded the fight against it in eastern and southern Syria the year before. Maysara bin Ali, better known by his nom de guerre Abu Maria al-Qahtani, was also interested in speaking to Syrians from the eastern region — of whom I am one — where he previously worked until the Islamic State captured it in the summer of 2014.

Maysara is a longtime jihadist who has operated in Iraq and Syria for the past two decades. In early 2001, he was moved by the killing a few months earlier of Palestinian fifth-grader Muhammad al-Durrah during the second intifada and joined a paramilitary unit established under Saddam Hussein for the “liberation of Jerusalem.” The volunteer army was made up of Iraqi civilians, and Maysara even signed up as a willing suicide bomber.

After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, he joined the insurgency in 2003, operating mainly in Mosul and nearby Qayyarah, around his birth town of Herarah. He joined al Qaeda in Iraq and rose through its ranks when it rebranded itself as the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006. Being from the prominent Iraqi tribe of Jubour and having received religious training under notable Iraqi clerics, he served in the organization as a cleric and a tribal engagement official.

I have been following Maysara since the early days of the Syrian conflict, initially because he commanded the militant group that dominated my hometown and other areas in eastern Syria for about three years, and later because he was at the forefront of historical events and conflicts that shook up jihadism from within. I was also researching how jihadists operate in tribal environments, and he fit the bill as both a jihadist ideologue and a social interlocutor.

A year before moving to Syria, he had been released from prison in Iraq for medical reasons. Out of prison, he resumed his jihadist activities and revived contacts, some of whom would become founders of other powerful jihadist factions within the Syrian rebellion. After a popular uprising broke out against the rule of Bashar al-Assad in 2011, he and a half-dozen jihadists operating in Iraq traveled to Syria and linked up with existing sleeper cells to establish Jabhat al-Nusra, or the Support Front, as a Syrian franchise of the Islamic State of Iraq.

Today, Maysara personifies a striking transformation within the world of jihadism. He fought the Americans in Iraq; he immersed himself in jihadist ideology and strategies and quickly ascended within a number of Iraq’s militant groups; he helped create a jihadist startup in Syria; and the two organizations he helped establish and lead became central to the dramatic changes that jihadist movements underwent in the past decade.

Yet, he has emerged as a leading voice in a nascent shift away from international terrorism toward localized militancy and governance. Many jihadists like Maysara have defied both the Islamic State and al Qaeda in favor of a new strategy that emphasizes the consolidation and retention of power regionally instead of waging a global jihad against the West. This is not because their ideology has softened: It is because they have learned that inviting overwhelming reprisals from modern militaries is the fastest way to forfeit their conquests, squander their influence and be forced to start all over again.

Twenty years after 9/11, America did not dismantle or destroy jihadist groups, but it fundamentally changed the way they think. Much of the shift in jihadist thinking has to do with the military campaigns launched by the U.S. as well as the popular uprisings that submerged jihadists in local conflicts and compelled them to focus on issues within their national borders.

Contrary to how some understand the U.S. withdrawal in Afghanistan, the lesson extremists are taking from the Taliban’s success is not simply that jihad works but that diplomacy and engagement are a necessary part of the process, which includes reassuring the West about external threats emerging from their areas. What can be gained from parlays in Doha is more significant and lasting than any terror attack.

In the past month, analysts noted with interest how the Taliban assisted U.S. forces at the Kabul Airport during the evacuation of American citizens and their Afghan allies. The Taliban practically held the door while the U.S. troops departed the country. What appeared bizarre and paradoxical was in fact entirely predictable to anyone who has studied how jihadism, shaped by the past 20 years, has reevaluated its priorities.

The question now is if the U.S. has fully appreciated this transformation. For all the overblown rhetoric about ending “forever wars,” the Biden administration still hews to a core counterterrorism doctrine. The global war on terror continues by stealth, with “over the horizon” missions on specified targets. We are now entering an era of invisible wars, premised on the same view of who and what the enemy is that was adopted within days of the 9/11 attack. In this view, jihadism is both static and transnational, and what stops its adherents from flying planes into skyscrapers and setting off bombs in Western cities is the lack of capacity to do so.

What makes Maysara’s case special is that he is a veteran jihadist who operated under both the Islamic State and al Qaeda but whose heterodox views are now prevailing within the jihadist universe.

Nearly two years before the world came to know about the Islamic State, he proposed to his group in late 2012 a plan to arrest the Islamic State’s now-dead leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and one of his closest aides, Abu Ali al-Anbari, when the two were meeting with commanders and senior members of Jabhat al-Nusra. At the time the Iraqi group was trying to merge the two groups under one organization. Jabhat al-Nusra rejected the idea and the two organizations ultimately started fighting each other in eastern Syria and elsewhere. His plots against the leaders of the Islamic State were later corroborated by testimonies of senior Islamic State members jailed in Iraq, as well as in videos produced by the Islamic State on the group’s attempts to capture Deir ez-Zor and eastern Syria in 2013 and 2014. He told me he opposed the Islamic State even though Baghdadi offered him a higher position if he aligned with him.

It was not just a turf war. Maysara had the same ideological fights with the Islamic State and al Qaeda in Syria after 2011 as he did with the Islamic State of Iraq in 2006: they were over political and religious positions that undermine or distract from the real and urgent domestic cause. Sheikh Abdullah al-Miyahi, one of his religious mentors in Iraq, spoke about these ideological battles Maysara engaged in when the two were in an Iraqi prison in 2004, during Maysara’s first of two prison stints. The sheikh is currently jailed in Iraq for association with al Qaeda, and he attacked Maysara in a series of interviews on an Iraqi television channel. Despite his criticism of Maysara, he acknowledged that Maysara was particularly opposed to the “extremists” of al Qaeda in Iraq at the time, which is currently the Islamic State. Maysara differed with those over questions that came to define the Islamic State relative to other groups, such as takfir (the practice of labeling fellow Muslims as apostates) and collaboration with others after the declaration of an Islamic state.

Years later, now in northern Syria, Maysara would continue such debates but against al Qaeda and its ideologues in Syria in the same way he had done with the Islamic State of Iraq. A common denominator between the two situations, he would point out, was Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Jordanian jihadist ideologue linked to al Qaeda. Al-Maqdisi was party to the jihadist infighting in Syria, who eventually took a hard stance against the likes of Maysara who advocated for disengagement from al Qaeda and global jihad, accusing the group of “diluting” its jihadist character. Maysara blamed al-Maqdisi for the creation of the monster that would later become the Islamic State, pointing to his writings as a key source of radicalization among inmates.

Maysara is also not an isolated case: Such traditional views are coming back to the fore — and even dominating debates — because recent events like the defeat of the Islamic State’s territorial caliphate in Iraq and Syria and the recent victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan appeared to have vindicated this line of thought.

The success of groups that turned to local militancy instead of global terrorism have underscored the defects of ideologies that focused on waging ruinous global battles.

The best way to understand and assess the next phase of Sunni militancies is to view them through local insurgencies that predated al Qaeda

The localization of jihadist causes is here to stay, and the best way to understand and assess the next phase of Sunni militancies is to view them through local insurgencies that predated al Qaeda and the Islamic State. In a sense, jihadists are not as much converting to a new form as they are reverting to old insurgencies and norms, before al Qaeda hijacked and internationalized them.

The ideology of transnational jihadism targeting the West, “the far enemy,” as epitomized first by al Qaeda and more recently by the Islamic State, has been an aberration in the long history of Islamist militancy that is rooted in local grievances and conflicts. Groups linked to al Qaeda and the Islamic State can be traced to indigenous insurgencies or hotspots that preceded these organizations by decades, and these groups are now reconnecting with their old roots to further entrench themselves.

In Syria, for instance, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and Ahrar al-Sham can be regarded as a second iteration of the Islamist insurgency in central and northern Syria in the 1970s and 1980s, even if they were created by veterans of the jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s and Iraq in the 2000s. This connection is both ideological and organic. These Syrian groups have been guided primarily by the Islamist and jihadist ideas of Abu Musab al-Suri, who emphasized decentralization, pragmatism and deep ties with local communities above organizational rigidity and vanguard ideas and laid the groundwork for a “third generation” of jihadism after Afghanistan and Iraq. These Syrian groups have also been shaped by memories and events in the country, even among returnees who had left in the 1980s and became involved in battlefields in Afghanistan, Chechnya and Iraq. Many younger members and leaders of these groups also share family links and grievances with those involved in the old insurgencies.

The same goes for the Islamic State of Iraq, with roots in old extremist movements north of Mosul and in Kurdistan, and a particular brand of sectarianism that existed in the country, and was even promoted by Saddam’s regime, in the 1980s and 1990s. Maysara, for example, explained that the anti-American atmospherics promoted by the former regime in the 1990s and early 2000s “primed” Iraqis to join the jihad after 2003, and he himself relates to an older and indigenous militancy, in the north, through jihadist mentors from Iraq, more than to materials or individuals from outside the country.

The Taliban, too, are said to look at earlier incarnations of their movement in the 1980s anti-Soviet jihad, and before that in the Afghan Pashtun Islamism, as inspiration to be less dogmatic than they were in the 1990s. As Afghan journalist Ahmed-Waleed Kakar put it in Newlines last week: “Those considered moderate during the Soviet jihad consisted of traditionalists and monarchists keen on accommodating local context and norms.” The Taliban were among those traditionalists, he added. The Taliban will probably not change in any significant way, but the idea of how they seek to justify flexibility by looking back is illustrative of the broader point about older roots for contemporary militant groups, parallels to which can be found in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Yemen.

These views existed before al Qaeda, and under al Qaeda as undercurrents, and their vindication means they can emerge as more grounded than the vanguard ideologies that dominated the scene in the better part of the past two decades, because they have an established basis in local realities across the region. The process of reverting to old roots started before the Arab uprisings in 2011, but the consolidation of such changes at the expense of transnational jihadism has taken time to play out.

Militants, thrust into sudden conflicts, needed time to acclimate and establish a footing in their given area. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, meanwhile, provided a ready and functional framework for militants. Many of the conflicts in the region caught locals off guard and pushed them to embrace ideologies already locked and loaded for such armed conflicts. Ahmad Abazeid, a jihadism expert from Syria, attributed the weakening of Syrian militant groups relative to veteran jihadist groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to the lack of a jihadist or militant ideology grounded in the Syrian context, especially since the country had not seen conflict for four decades. A Syrian jihadist or militant ideology had to be developed in the diaspora, namely in Afghanistan and Iraq. These veterans came back to Syria as part of foreign-led jihadist leagues. It took a while for some of these groups to free themselves from the shackles of the veterans and seek to localize their operation, even if their priorities were shaped by local events and ideologies all along.

When Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi came to Iraq in 2002, to prepare for the fight against the U.S. invasion, he brought with him jihadist expertise and experience, gained through years spent in Afghanistan, that local groups lacked. The foreign jihadists had many such advantages, enabling them to ride the local waves and become leaders of men. Nevertheless, no jihadist ideology could succeed without a local support base that served as its core, and it is that core that eventually took over and “re-Iraqized” the group, in terms of ideology and direction.

The shift to local jihad was not consolidated earlier also because the jihadist splits took time to be crystalized. Take the differences between al Qaeda and the Islamic State. The two had strategic and tactical disagreements since the early days of the war in Iraq, as exemplified in the famous letter Ayman al-Zawahiri, then the deputy leader of al Qaeda, sent to al-Zarqawi in 2005 warning him about his vicious and sectarian tactics in Iraq. Later, after al-Zarqawi died, the Iraqi group ended its oath of allegiance to Osama bin Laden and formed the Islamic State of Iraq, declaring its Iraqi leader as “the leader of the faithful” who reported to no one. Despite such disagreements, however, the two sides maintained a civil discourse, and the Iraqi branch continued to respect and refer to al Qaeda’s leaders as their elders. This dynamic changed drastically after 2013, when quiet disagreements turned to loud schisms that polarized the jihadist scene and hardened existing differences among various strands of jihadism and militancy. This caused the sharp fragmentation of jihad for the first time despite differences existing for decades before.

What may have appeared as the recovery of al Qaeda after the popular uprisings and the death of bin Laden in 2011 was arguably an illusion: The very groups that caused the demise of al Qaeda and made it obsolete were the ones that made it look like it was still powerful because jihadists pretended and outsiders assumed that various groups in the region still deferred to it. It would take several years for this dynamic to become apparent, as the dust settled and new realities emerged. Al Qaeda under al-Zawahiri could not keep its own branches, permanently losing the key ones in Iraq and Syria. Other al Qaeda branches, such as in Yemen and Africa, pledged publicly that they would not allow their terrain to be used for attacks against the West. Such pledges were dictated by local imperatives, even if they had the al Qaeda stamp of approval.

Few today doubt that al Qaeda is moribund. The group functions largely through the so-called Hattin Committee (which U.S. officials mistakenly refer to as the Hattin Shura) that includes al-Zawahiri’s aides deputized in his chronic absence to deal with conflict resolution and mediation among jihadists particularly in places like Syria, and even these aides tend to be viewed suspiciously by many jihadists because they were based in Iran. Yet ground-level changes in jihadism and militancy, more than the dysfunctionality of its organization and absence of its leadership, can better explain why al Qaeda has little chance to reverse its fortunes. It is not a question of whether al Qaeda can field a more charismatic or functional leader than al-Zawahiri; instead, the idea itself no longer has the same utility it once had within the extremist circles. Unlike in the past, the jihadist leadership is contested, the movement itself is fragmented, and the vanguard ideas that once attracted a following under the symbolic leadership of bin Laden no longer resonate.

This does not mean the end of al Qaeda, however. Should the pendulum swing and the jihadist experiment in local governance fail, one can imagine the argument for attacking the “far enemy” gaining renewed support among some. This scenario could also happen if drones and bombs continue to drop on civilians in rural areas across the region in the name of counterterrorism. And no organization or movement is monolithic: It is entirely plausible that some individuals inspired by jihadists will continue to seek to carry out attacks against the West. But as a broader remit, it is unlikely that jihadists today will be as ambitious and daring as al Qaeda was in 2001. And this will likely prove to be the rule for the foreseeable future, for several reasons.

First, al Qaeda commands little respect among jihadists today. Al-Zawahiri has a narrow fan base among jihadists, and mostly because he was a companion and a successor to bin Laden. Al Qaeda had the advantage of being an early adopter of transnational Sunni jihadism, which provided them with the symbolism, through bin Laden and others who had just emerged victorious from the fight against the godless Soviets, to lead the Sunni jihadist movement for a while. This leadership role ended after 2011, with the death of bin Laden, the eruption of Arab uprisings and the subsequent jihadist infighting.

Second, jihadists teach their recruits about the need to focus locally not as part of their external propaganda but internally to their own audience. They dismiss the old “jihad of the elite,” of the vanguards and globalists, and advocate for the “jihad of the people,” which caters to local needs. The old way of bin Laden belonged to a different era, they say.

Third, they also take inspiration from their Shiite counterparts, who went through a similar global-to-local evolution. They did not target the West or seek a global caliphate, but they succeeded in controlling several Arab countries with the help of Iran. Within the region’s Islamist landscape, Shiite groups pioneered transnational terrorism and suicide bombing, especially in the 1980s after the Iran-Iraq war. Even though Sunnis were fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, they would adopt suicide bombing and transnational terrorism only a decade later, through Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which learned directly from Hezbollah, and with al Qaeda, respectively.

Most important, though, is that the changes within jihadism are happening not just because the localized approach has benefits but also because the alternative carries immense costs. Jihadists have learned two lessons from the past 20 years which have had a moderating and sobering effect. One is that local fights are the priority and more can be achieved by focusing on the local environment, an opportunity that had not necessarily been available in the 1990s and early 2000s. The Arab uprisings were an opportunity that presented itself one decade into the U.S.-led war on terror, and involvement in these uprisings taught jihadists to moderate their views, limit their ambitions and ground their views in country-specific contexts. They now have to fight as insurgents operating and embedding within communities, rather than as vanguards preaching from ivory towers. The other lesson is to not mess with the U.S. if you can help it; in the case of Iraq and Afghanistan, jihadists fought the U.S. as an occupier not as the “far enemy” as such. The Taliban limited their fight to Afghanistan, while al Qaeda and the Islamic State took the fight to the West. The first succeeded and the other two failed.

This jihadist transformation is playing out at a time when the U.S. is similarly shifting its priorities away from counterterrorism and maximalist positions in foreign policy, to focus on domestic threats or on great power competition, which in turn reflect widespread attitudes in many circles within the U.S. This two-way change — in American priorities and in the jihadist outlook — will likely further reinforce the dynamics that deemphasize confrontation, not in the sense that the two sides will like each other but in that both have changed their priorities and have less time for each other.

As it did with the Taliban in Afghanistan, the U.S. will likely learn to live with the reality of jihadists controlling certain areas. Washington seems less willing to initiate campaigns against jihadists as a policy reflex, as the U.S. did in many places over the past 20 years to deny jihadists the ability to congregate and operate in certain areas, such as Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, Somalia and Libya. In many of these cases, the U.S. had no particular strategy beyond preventing radical forces from controlling areas merely because they were jihadists, and they left no room for engagement or compromise.

That approach slightly changed with the Taliban, when the U.S. did the unthinkable by engaging, negotiating and striking a deal with their foe of 20 years. This engagement endured under three administrations, with direct negotiations ultimately starting under a Republican administration and enforced under a Democratic one. Even more unthinkable were the scenes of the Taliban and U.S. fighters standing mere inches from each other outside the Kabul airport, coordinating their efforts through mediators.

But it is simplistic to view the persistence of jihadism as a defeat for the U.S.

Behavioral changes within jihadism are in part a product of the U.S.-led campaigns against global jihadism. The Americans may not have defeated or eliminated jihadism, but they helped transform it from being a vanguard movement committed to international terrorism into local actors responsive to both local and international imperatives who came to view as counterproductive the fight as previously defined by bin Laden and al Qaeda.

And that is the unheralded accomplishment of the war on terror, which, besides all the destruction and misery it caused, transformed jihadism. The U.S. achieved its core objective, notwithstanding the rhetoric about nation building, human rights and women’s emancipation, by tempering jihadism to be a threat only to local populations, not to Westerners. In this sense, the global war on terror was in fact won, just not on the high-minded terms in which it was fought.

The Shared Struggles of Bedouins and Native Americans

Whether in the Middle East or North Dakota, tribal societies struggle to navigate long-held traditions with occupation and displacement

The area between the ancient cities of Jerusalem and Jericho is at once unremarkable yet beautiful — a space made up of modest yet wide sloping valleys that transition in color slowly and unevenly from green to the many shades of brown and tan that make up the desert landscape. Heading east toward Jericho, one gets the impression that this is where the fertile valleys and merchant cities of the Levant finally meet the vast expanse of the great deserts of the Arabian Peninsula.

Today we no longer think of these geographic markers of space but instead of the zone between Israeli-annexed East Jerusalem and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In order to cross the Jordan Valley, we have to travel through the science-fiction-sounding “Area C,” a highly militarized section of the occupied West Bank where Israeli settlements exist directly alongside various small gatherings of Palestinian Bedouins — their makeshift dwellings dotting the empty landscape along the modern highways built exclusively for Israeli settlers.

Since 2014, as part of our multimedia research project, The Native and the Refugee, we have produced a dozen films on the ongoing settler colonialism in North America and the Middle East. The Native and the Refugee juxtaposes the Palestinian movement with indigenous struggles in the United States by focusing specifically on the native reservation and Palestinian refugee camp as spaces of exception. What are the worldviews, histories and ways of life of these communities, who persevere in their demands for dignity and self-determination?

From the Standing Rock Indian Reservation in North Dakota to the Jericho Governorate in the West Bank — from Washington to Jerusalem — the political questions of our time revolve around indigeneity, refugeehood and sovereignty. The continued processes of state formation in the U.S. and Israel both mirror and reinforce each other, and this is nowhere better seen than in the reservations and refugee camps left in their wake.

The struggles that take place within and around many American Indian reservations represent an attempt to articulate both an alternative mode of governance and relationship to the land. When the people of Standing Rock protested the passage of the Dakota Access Pipeline under the part of the Missouri River that abuts their reservation, the struggle that emerged resonated within a longer horizon of sovereignty beyond the reservation itself.

Few, if any, communities have been as fundamentally affected by the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the nation-states of the modern Middle East as the nomadic Bedouins. This includes not just Bedouins who reside in what is today Israel, but even more so the Bedouins of the occupied territories, especially the West Bank. In every area around the Arabian Peninsula there are liminal spaces between geographic regions wherein lines were drawn to divide countries — the desert region that separates the Levant from Mesopotamia contains the border between Iraq and Syria; the Sinai Peninsula contains a border separating Egypt from the Levant; and then there are the currently contested sites in the valleys between Jerusalem and the border town of Jericho.

It is into and within these liminal spaces that the Bedouin exists, challenging our geographies and the political edifices of the state. Just as the displacement of Arabs from Israel — and their subsequent refugee status while living just hours from their original village— reveals something fundamentally illusory or artificial about these modern nation-states, so too, it is with the Bedouin whose way of life is in fundamental contradiction to the borders of the modern Middle East and the nations they demarcate.

As we write, there are currently around 6 million people in Lebanon. Approximately 1 million are Syrian refugees, 450,000 are Palestinian refugees, 100,000 are Kurds, and at least another 100,000 are Bedouins. More Lebanese people live in Brazil than in Lebanon. The prejudices and political contradictions of the modern nation-state exist wherever such a form is found: ethnic and religious minorities contending for status and survival alongside refugees, indigenous populations and elites of all stripes.

It was during the Nakba of 1948 that Israel occupied the Negev Desert and forced the displacement of the native Bedouin population into many of the surrounding countries. People who had once migrated only with the demands of nature were now forcibly moved again and again by the occupying Israeli authorities, from 1948 through 1967, up until the present day. The Bedouins of Palestine transitioned painfully from the free migrations of nomadism to the forced migrations of refugeehood. Today, 85% of the Bedouins in the occupied West Bank are refugees from what is now Israel, though most have refused to move into refugee camps in order to try to maintain their traditional lifestyle.

The Bedouins, through their various displacements, have continually faced harsh decisions as both a people and as individual tribes. Given the choice between a partially compromised nomadism that allows for subsistence living and an abandoned way of life that will likely lead to precarity and poverty, the Bedouins have largely chosen the former, grasping at whatever strands of their traditional way of life remain possible. But even here they find themselves under threat. Israel’s current plan is to round up all of the Bedouin tribes from all of their gatherings in the occupied West Bank, allot each family a mere 0.1 acres of land and cram the majority of them into what would effectively be a giant Bedouin reservation, in an area called al-Nuweima on the outskirts of Jericho.

The Bedouins harbor no illusions about what this forced relocation would mean. As one Bedouin leader told us, “We will not be able to raise sheep or practice our traditional lifestyle and will be forced into becoming day laborers. For us, this is out of the question.” The Israeli plan to place all West Bank Bedouins in a giant reservation on the borders of Jericho is part and parcel of the forced evictions in East Jerusalem. The majority of these Bedouin gatherings are located in the stretch of land between Jerusalem and Jericho, precisely the area that the Israelis would like to turn into the greater suburbs of a united Jewish Jerusalem, free of Palestinians.

In 2014, Israel first announced this proposal to relocate and resettle 12,500 Bedouins living in Area C, and it was that same year that we started work on The Native and the Refugee, researching and listening to the experiences of Palestinian refugees and American Indians. We traveled from Beirut’s Burj Barajneh to New York’s Akwesasne, Amman’s Wihdat to Arizona’s Navajo Nation, Bethlehem’s Dheisheh to South Dakota’s Pine Ridge, documenting their movements for self-determination.

The al-Nuweima plan recalls an important chapter in the history of the American Indian reservation. In the Dawes Act of 1887, the U.S. government forced a system of private property onto what was previously communal land tenure, dividing native territory into parcels to be owned by each family and putting the remainder out onto the open market. Allotting land to each individual family not only resulted in the loss of overall native territory but also worked to eradicate their tribal system of governance and social structure, imposing an external form of life based on a static familial privatization of the land.

Then as now, it was done for the benefit of the settlers, either to occupy and privatize formerly held native land, to extract its natural resources or to build infrastructure for the profit of the urban dwellers. By uprooting a traditional economy and trading in communal autonomy for a division of spoils, it reduced a proud and self-sufficient people to dependence on the setter-colonial economy, which caused their displacement in the first place.

The Bedouins of the Jordan Valley are well aware that the al-Nuweima plan would yield similar results, undoubtedly collapsing their tribal structure, forcing them into an impoverished urban environment and leaving them with no other option than to work as individual day laborers for the Israeli settlers. Because of the purposeful eradication of the Palestinian economy in recent decades, the end of the Bedouin’s subsistence economy would mean their forcible integration into Israel’s colonial one.

This spatial colonization is at the heart of Israeli ethnic cleansing efforts against the Bedouin people. In Area C, the very infrastructure of the Israeli settlements is often deadly for the Bedouins. We saw a highway, exclusively serving settlers, erected near the gathering of Khan al-Ahmar, forcing the children of this community to walk across it on the way to school, heedlessly causing numerous deaths and countless injuries. This occurs alongside other forms of stark infrastructural inequality, where the newest illegal Israeli settlements are furnished with electricity and running water while Bedouin gatherings, there for decades, are systematically denied both. Meanwhile, if the sheep of the Bedouins stray onto territory designated for Israeli military or settler use, the animals are confiscated and impounded, either to be returned in exchange for a heavy fine or not at all.

We observed what the Bedouins themselves call “psychological warfare,” waged by settlers and the military in an effort to break their collective spirit and force them off the land. This includes forced demolitions of Bedouin gatherings, the spraying of sewage water onto their structures and land, and the specific targeting of women as a form of gendered violence used to humiliate the members of the gathering. Such was the case, for example, with the daughter of the chief of Khan al-Ahmar, who told of us of being brutally beaten by the Israeli military.

All of the above tactics find resonance in the history of the U.S., where the same methods of forced displacement of an indigenous population were used by both the government and settlers. We heard stories shockingly similar to those of the Bedouins when we visited DinĂ© (Navajo) families currently living on the Black Mesa in the Southwest of the U.S. Much like the Bedouin, the DinĂ© find themselves in a position of estrangement from both the U.S. government and from the Hopi reservation’s tribal government, which now controls much of their traditional territory. Black Mesa has historically been inhabited by both Hopi and DinĂ© people.

But in order to conclude an agreement concerning mineral extraction, the U.S. government passed the Navajo-Hopi Land Settlement Act of 1974, dividing 1.8 million acres of formerly shared land, leading to the forced relocation of more than 10,000 DinĂ© people. Those families that “illegally” remain maintain their traditional economy and continue to live autonomously from the machinery of U.S. financial governance and because of this they face constant threats, harassment and violence from both the Hopi police and U.S. federal officers.

The Bedouins of the occupied territories find themselves in a singularly difficult position as they are denied recognition as a displaced Indigenous or minority group, both by Israel as well as by the Palestinian National Authority. This is to say that they are not recognized politically as Bedouins, as a distinct group within Palestinian society, making it difficult for them to demand the rights that should be afforded to them as both refugees as well as an indigenous people.

Much like native peoples in the U.S. have had to successfully balance their specific tribal identities within a larger pan-native identity so, too, the Bedouins must negotiate between their identity as individual tribes, their larger identity as Bedouins and finally their national identity as Palestinians. As with indigenous movements around the world, the foundation of this identity remains the Bedouin’s day-by-day articulation of their own worldview as a people, rooted in their particular symbiotic relationship to the land, their own systems of tribal governance and their own inherently communal way of life. Its lessons and examples then become not only a form of political resistance but also an ethical model in helping humanity confront the depths of the problems we face — from the downsides and dangers of nationalism on the one hand to unrestrained industrial development on the other.

Indeed, as with American Indians’ continued resilience and survival, the Bedouin communities’ very existence poses a particular and direct challenge to the occupation. It is not just that they inhabit the land that Israel wants in order to expand its settlements, but it is also because their way of life, society, means of subsistence, and relationship to the land and each other are in conflict with the developmentalist, corporatist model that Israel would like to export to the region, and forcibly sublimate the Bedouins into. However, as the chief of a Bedouin gathering near Jericho told us, “We will not leave, we will not leave no matter the cost.”

All stills are from the The Native and the Refugee / Vanessa Teran and Mitra Azar

Taliban find dozens of ballistic missiles in Panjshir Valley

By Dylan Malyasov
Sep 15, 2021



Taliban members found dozens of short-range ballistic missiles and warheads stored in Panjshir Valley.

Taliban militants had taken the last holdout – Panjshir Valley in the east of Afghanistan – and released a video showing the depot of Soviet-made 9K72 Elbrus (NATO reporting name Scud B) tactical ballistic missiles and 9K52 Luna-M (NATO reporting name FROG-7) short-range artillery rockets.

A dozen missiles and artillery rockets along with warheads in separate containers were found in Panjshir Valley after the regime overcame the resistance of the remaining government forces.

Based on this video, the missile weapon have been stored in the open air for a long time and are in a deplorable state.

According to open sources, several hundred missile systems were gifted to the Afghan government in the 1980s from the friendly Soviet communist regime as military aid.

9K72 Elbrus is a tactical ballistic missile with a range of 300 km with a circular error probable (CEP) between 450-900 meters. It was designed to engage important enemy targets such as airfields, command posts, large concentrations of troops and vehicles, air defense batteries, supply depots and so on.

9K52 Luna-M is a Soviet short-range artillery rocket system that fires unguided and spin-stabilized 9M21 rockets. It was originally developed in the 1960s to provide divisional artillery support using tactical nuclear weapons but gradually modified for conventional use.

About this Author
Dylan Malyasov
U.S. defense journalist and commentator. Aviation photographer. Dylan leads Defence Blog's coverage of global military news, focusing on engineering and technology across the U.S. defense industry.