Here’s a list of all the tech companies taking action against Russia

Ukraine has led a public campaign, mostly through social media, appealing powerful tech institutions to end relationships with Russia.

By SOPHIE FOGGIN and HELEN LI
12 MARCH 2022

Here’s a list of all the tech companies taking action against Russia

As the war in Ukraine rages on, with Russian forces edging closer to the capital, Kyiv, the global tech industry is joining governments and the international community in taking steps to punish Vladimir Putin. Dozens of companies, in Silicon Valley and around the world, are responding to Russia’s invasion by cutting the country off from their products, digital services, and systems.

We’ve put together a list of the companies that have taken action against Russia, and we’ll continue to update this in the days and weeks ahead.

Apple: The tech giant announced it will pause product sales in Russia due to its deep concern over the invasion of Ukraine. It has also limited access to its mobile payment service Apple Pay and restricted the availability of Russian state media apps, including RT and news agency Sputnik, for download outside of Russia. As a safety measure for Ukrainians, Apple has also disabled traffic and live incidents in Ukraine from Apple Maps.

Google: The company has removed Russian state-funded media, including RT, from its news-related features and the Google News search tool. It also paused Russian state media services’ ability to monetize through Google Ads on its websites and apps. In addition, it has banned Russian state media from using Google tools to buy ads and from placing ads on Google services, like Gmail. Google Pay, the company’s digital wallet, blocked several Russian financial institutions from its network.

Meta: The rebranded social network that owns Facebook, Instagram, and WhatsApp restricted access to RT and Sputnik within the EU and prohibited Russian state media from running ads or monetizing on its platforms anywhere in the world. Facebook also refused to stop fact-checking and labeling content from Russian state-owned news organizations — a move that the country called “censorship.”

YouTube: The Google-owned video-sharing website and social media platform paused Russian state media channels’ ability to make money through ads on videos.

Twitter: The social media network paused ads in Russia and Ukraine to ensure they don’t distract from public safety. (Meanwhile, Russia has restricted access to Twitter.)

TikTok: The video social media app TikTok restricted access to Russian state-controlled media accounts, including RT and Sputnik, in the EU. It also suspended its livestreaming services and content uploads from Russia, in the wake of the country’s “fake news” law that levies a punishment of up to 15 years in prison on those who publish false information about the military or publicly call for sanctions against Russia.

Netflix: The streaming platform has refused to air Russian state TV channels like Channel One on its streaming service. It later fully suspended service in Russia.

MIT: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology has cut ties with Skolkovo Institute of Science and Technology, a Russian research university in Moscow.

TSMC: The world’s biggest semiconductor company, based in Taiwan, is halting chip sales to Russia, including Elbrus-branded chips designed in the country.

Intel: The American chipmaker halted sales to Russia.

AMD: Advanced Micro Devices also halted computer chip sales to Russia. Together with Intel, the two companies make up a large part of the desktop CPU market.

Dell Technologies: The computer maker vowed to suspend sales of its products in Russia and Ukraine, promising to closely monitor the situation to determine next steps.

Uber: The ride-hailing app is distancing itself from Russian ride-sharing service Yandex​​.Taxi and said it plans to “accelerate” the sale of its shares in the service.

Bolt: The European ride-hailing startup ceased operations in Belarus after Belarus supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Its delivery app, Bolt Market, removed “all products produced in Russia or associated with Russian companies.”

Snapchat: The social network said it will not display ads in Russia, Belarus, or Ukraine. The company also halted all ad sales in Russia and Belarus.

Viber: Japan’s Rakuten Group, the owner of the popular messaging app, said that it will remove advertising from its app in Russia.

Roku: The company, which makes streaming boxes for TVs, said it will ban Russia’s state-run news channel RT in Europe.

Microsoft: The tech giant said it will remove Russian state-owned media apps from its Windows app store and not run ads on state-owned media websites. It is also suspending all new product sales in Russia, which include Xbox consoles.

Electronic Arts: The major video game publisher said it will remove the Russian national team and Russian club teams from the most recent FIFA games. It will also remove Russian and Belarusian national and club ice hockey teams from the latest NHL game.

Nokia: The Finnish network equipment maker announced it will stop deliveries to Russia, in order to comply with sanctions imposed on the country.

Ericsson: The Swedish telecomms company will also suspend its deliveries to Russia, according to an internal memo from the company’s CEO reviewed by Reuters.

PayPal: The online payments company has stopped accepting new users from Russia. It had previously blocked some users and some Russian banks.

GoDaddy: The web hosting company no longer supports new registrations for domains with the .ru extension, which represents Russia.

Spotify: The music streaming service closed its Russia office “indefinitely” and removed all content by RT and Sputnik in Europe and other regions. It has also restricted shows “owned or operated by Russian state media.”

Oracle: The cloud services giant suspended operations in Russia following Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov’s plea to the company to stop doing business in Russia “until the conflict is resolved.”

SAP: The German software corporation stopped sales of its products and services to Russia to align with sanctions against the country.

DuckDuckGo: The privacy-focused search engine paused its partnership with Russian search engine Yandex.

Reddit: The site banned users from posting links to Russian state-sponsored media outlets.

Airbnb: The platform halted operations in Russia and Belarus.

CD Projekt Red: The Polish game company announced that it will stop selling games in Russia and Belarus, including from its online game marketplace GOG.com.

Sony: The electronics giant is not releasing its flagship PlayStation driving game, Gran Turismo 7, in Russia.

Adobe: The software company stopped all of its sales and services in Russia. It also cut off Russian state media outlets’ access to Adobe Creative Cloud, Adobe Document Cloud, and Adobe Experience Cloud.

Coursera: The online course provider suspended all of its content from Russian universities and industry partners. It also stopped business with Russian institutions.

Samsung: The electronics giant suspended product shipments to Russia.

Siemens: The tech conglomerate suspended business in and deliveries to Russia.

HP: Russia’s largest PC supplier stopped exports to the country.

Sophie Foggin is a Colombia-based journalist covering human rights and social issues.

Helen Li is the producer of Fresh Off the Vote, a podcast on politics and civic engagement among Asian American youth.

CRIMINAL CRYPTO CAPITALI$M

“It’s a mess”: How crypto mining went from boom to bust in Kazakhstan

Bitcoin fugitives from China made the country a crypto power. Now, they’re being forced to flee — again.

Naubet Bisenov/Rest of World

By NAUBET BISENOV and MEAGHAN TOBIN
13 MARCH 2022 • ALMATY, KAZAKHSTAN

Many of the miners who fled China after the government banned cryptomining in 2021 relocated their operations to nearby Kazakhstan.

On the windswept, freezing steppes of northern Kazakhstan, a set of buildings can signal only one thing: cryptocurrency miners. Among them is BTC KZ, a company whose sprawling Ekibastuz facility powers a globe-spanning operation, serving clients as far away as Dubai and Reykjavik.

Times have changed, though. For the past five months, the complex has stood idle.

Inside, halls of ASIC mining units, entangled with cables, are attended by a few staff. Some of the equipment is sturdy enough to withstand temperatures of -15 degrees; other parts need heating to stay above freezing point. The system is drawing 1% of the electricity it would normally require, just enough to maintain a holding pattern.

When Rest of World visited in early February, Aibolat Balgozhin, the company’s chief power engineer, was helpless. “We have not been able to operate properly since October 13, when the first power cuts hit us,” he told Rest of World. “And we are kept in the dark as to when we would be able to work at full capacity or what solutions the power grid operator, KEGOC, is going to come up with.”

In September 2021, when China banned all cryptocurrency-related activity, it reshaped an industry for which it had provided a haven. Miners scrambled into crypto-friendly Kazakhstan, propelling the country into world’s second-biggest Bitcoin production base, by one estimate.

But six months later, the industry is already being pushed out. Facing civil unrest and blackouts on the electricity grid, the government has throttled the power supply of the miners it once welcomed. As it buckles under infighting and government pressure, Kazakhstan’s significant mining base is preparing to move on, industry players and experts say. Smaller players can either flee somewhere like Russia — a risky jurisdiction, whose hostile politics would imply another temporary home — or, for bigger outfits, swallow higher costs to join the swelling ranks in the U.S., where the mining industry is clearly beginning to concentrate.

“It’s a mess, essentially,” said Alejandro De La Torre, previously vice president at Bitcoin mining pool Poolin, “a big mess.”

Widespread protests over the rising price of fuel rocked Kazakhstan in January of this year. 

Valery Sharifulin/TASS/Getty Images

Kazakhstan’s crypto industry opened up after a crash in the value of Bitcoin over late 2019. Though cryptocurrency isn’t recognized as legal tender, miners’ business was encouraged; in his 2020 state-of-the-nation address, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev urged the country to attract $1.2 billion worth of crypto infrastructure investment within five years, before other countries beat them to it. Attracted by cheap electricity and a lack of regulation, the industry in Kazakhstan began to flourish.

Things changed in late 2021. Power blackouts grew more frequent, and peak electricity demand was shown to have jumped in the first three quarters — roughly 1,500 megawatts, a year-on-year leap of 7% — something the country’s Ministry of Energy blamed on the ballooning crypto industry. In October, the Kazakhstan government announced it would cut off their power supply.

Taxes followed. From January 1, it imposed a tax of one tenge (0.20 cents) per kilowatt-hour on registered miners; by February, legislators were already pushing a proposal to increase it tenfold to 10 tenge per kWh. The same month, digital development minister, Bağdat Musin, labeled unregistered mining an “economic crime.”

“We went from hero to zero,” said Denis Rusinovich, co-founder of the industry lobby Cryptocurrency Mining Group (CMG), who has been involved in building the mining industry in Kazakhstan since 2017.

Some of the country’s biggest crypto miners have already fled for greener pastures. BitFuFu, a mining company backed by Chinese mining machine giant Bitmain, simply abandoned an estimated 80,000 mining machines at the end of 2021 for plans to start over in the U.S. After China’s crackdown, Hong Kong–based BIT Mining had said it was moving 3,000 mining machines into the country from China and would invest more than $9 million in a 100 MW facility. In February, however, the company announced that due to the “unstable local power supply” it was abandoning those plans for an even bigger facility — in Ohio.

The real cause of the increasing blackouts, according to market analysts, is not the miners. It’s crumbling power infrastructure from the Soviet era, along with a cronyish system of repair contracts that tend to go to companies linked to lower levels of government, even if they’re procured via an open tender. Power plants are also allowed to reserve generation capacities for their own needs at reduced charges — which can go to companies in favorable private deals and reduce the amount available for distribution.

“Our Energy Ministry is capable of only scheming, not doing systemic work,” Aset Nauryzbayev, an economist and former chairman of KEGOC’s board, told Rest of World. “It is an omission by the Energy Ministry, which has failed to foresee the problems in the country’s power engineering sector and build new capacities. It now needs to add an additional 2–3 gigawatts of power capacity.”

The government has acknowledged the wear on its electricity distribution systems. At a government meeting in May 2021, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said that power generation facilities had been in operation more than 40 years and that age-related damage had led to 4,458 technological breakdowns in 2020.

Still, official figures say that miners accounted for the entire electricity demand increase and more: about 700 MW of power was consumed by those registered with the government (“white” miners), with more than double that drawn by unregistered “gray” miners. Rest of World has been unable to confirm the government’s figures, since the number of unregistered miners is difficult to trace.

The blame game has divided the industry itself. White miners point at gray miners; both accuse the government of scapegoating them for electricity supply problems, using them to attempt to head off unrest.

“It used to be a good supplementary business. But it’s becoming harder to stay in crypto, especially with the blackouts."

Kuanysh is what Kazakhs call a “little hamster,” a small-scale gray miner. In Shymkent, an industrial center planted among the river valleys of southern Kazakhstan, Kuanysh — who asked to be referred to by an alias because he feared investigation — hoards 50 Nvidia GeForce RTX 3090 graphics processing units, which hum steadily inside his family’s run-down shed. The stacked processors crunch algorithms to mine around $750 of the cryptocurrency Ethereum per week — an income stream that helps him add to his family home, run his car, and provide for his family. It’s a volatile business, but he has ridden the waves.

“I started mining in 2016, first with Bitcoin,” he told Rest of World. “It used to be a good supplementary business. But it’s becoming harder to stay in crypto, especially with the blackouts.”

In February, Mahsat Quandykov, a division head of the Almaty City Department for Economic Investigations, was given the near-impossible task of tracking down gray miners like Kuanysh and forcing them to register.

Illegal miners can operate covertly in densely populated urban areas, camouflaged by general use. Operatives from Quandykov’s department are called up by regional power supply companies to investigate and document power surges they detect in the system. The department also relies on public tipoffs; a WhatsApp hotline has been implemented, along with the offer of monetary rewards. On Facebook, the digital minister has implored people to report on any suspicious mining-adjacent activity.

“Since power shortages have become an issue, we have managed to track down a tiny 150-kilowatt mining farm in a greenhouse, only because we were tipped off,” Quandykov said to Rest of World in early February.

Just a few weeks later, the department ramped up its investigations. On the 21st, the government announced that mobile search groups uncovered illegal mining operations with a total capacity of 202 MW, including 4 MW in Shymkent, the home of “hamster” Kuanysh. Kuanysh, so far, has escaped notice.

In recent weeks, the government itself is beginning to draw public attention. Media figure Arman Shurayev, a self-styled crusader against corruption, accused the ex-speaker of the Kazakh Parliament’s lower chamber, Nurlan Nigmatulin, of running a gray crypto farm under the guise of a ferroalloy plant. Local media reported that the production — 57,000 tonnes of ferroalloys a year, with a total power capacity of 64 MW — consumed more than 10 times the power that other plants of that size, according to Rest of World estimates.

Amid all the turmoil, analysts observe that the U.S. has consolidated its position as the leading source of cryptocurrency creation over the past year. But it’s impractical for many miners to relocate so far, especially smaller operators. Many are looking to Russia, said the CMG’s Rusinovich, for the same reasons they came to Kazakhstan from China: cheap power and close geographic proximity. But even apart from geopolitical turmoil, though, “there’s not much [power] capacity in Russia,” Rusinovich warns. “It’s not like everyone was just waiting for Kazakhstan’s miners to come in.”

It’s not enough to deter those still inside Kazakhstan. “If this situation lasts for another one-and-a-half to two months, we will think of packing up,” the founder of BTC KZ, Din-mukhammed Matkenov, told Rest of World in mid-January. “We’ve already received offers to relocate to Russia, but we are also considering Argentina and Chile as possible options.”

As of early March, their electricity still hasn’t been restored. The Ekibastuz facility remains dark.

Naubet Bisenov is a freelance journalist and researcher based in Nur-Sultan (Astana), Kazakhstan.

Meaghan Tobin is a reporter at Rest of World.

BARTENDER SHARED MOLOTOV COCKTAIL RECIPE

The Russia-Ukraine conflict is a 'fog of war' - analysis

The anomaly to best describe the most documented war in history.

By ERGA ATAD
Published: MARCH 13, 2022 

JERUSALEM POST

RUSSIAN PARATROOPERS run toward aircraft during an operation said to take control of an airfield, in this still image taken from a video released by the Russian Defense Ministry on Saturday.
(photo credit: Russian Defense Ministry/Reuters)

The war between Russia and Ukraine may be the most documented in history, but perhaps that is precisely why the phrase “fog of war” best describes it. The thick fog that is covering the current fighting may even continue over the coming weeks and months. It does not allow much to be known about the course and duration of the confrontation between two large and distant armies, particularly in the absence of embedded journalists reporting from the battlefield.


In addition, the war is being reported from the Ukrainian side, while coverage from the Russian side is almost entirely absent. In view of this, it may be wise to be careful when offering predictions and interpretations, and to admit that we do not know much.


The relocation of journalists’ coverage areas to city centers and borders in Ukraine limited reporters’ access to the battlefield, and made journalists themselves the focus of the story instead of reporting the war. For example, Ukrainian BBC reporter Olga Malczewska, during her report on the progress of the Russian forces, discovered that her Kyiv home had been bombed while she was live on air.

The videos by journalists documenting the fighting have also changed, with the story being told through the eyes of Ukrainian citizens whose world has changed overnight. A picture that became the “face of the war” is that of a teacher named Elena from the city of Kharkiv, whose bloodied face went viral following shelling in the city.

However, there is an absence of images documenting the fighting, the fighters, and the forces from both sides of the battlefield, as well as the voices of Russian citizens.

The war between Russia and Ukraine, which has also been defined as the first TikTok war, has yielded several types of videos: testimonial videos of Ukrainian citizens and influencers, such as the viral video in which an elderly Ukrainian woman turns to Russian soldiers and asks them to take sunflower seeds and carry them in their pockets, so that as they will grow to be flowers after they die on Ukrainian soil.

It's completely unrealistic to prevent our youth from using TikTok. 

(credit: Solen Feyissa/Unsplash)

Similar to the “recommendation” videos distributed in normal times, viral “do it yourself” videos were circulated on the Internet by experts, such as professional tips on Twitter for Ukrainian citizens on how to defend themselves and how to make Molotov cocktails

HOWEVER, THERE is also a high volume of fake photos and videos, such as a scene from the movie Star Wars that was accidentally inserted into news reports. In another example, a video from 2014 in which a Ukrainian soldier is seen saying goodbye to his beloved girlfriend was attributed to the current conflict.

Paradoxically, according to one of the rules of information warfare, in order to deal with fake information, we must be suspicious of dramatic information that we cannot verify, including ostensible information about the locations and progress of the forces and casualty numbers.

On the other hand, vague information – such as the Russians’ disappointment with their progress in the fighting – may be more reliable.

Along with the difficulty of knowing which content is true and which is fake, the truth seems to be being replaced by emotions, such as the feelings of pride and heroism of the Ukrainians in the battle for their home. In the psychology of persuasion, such positive emotions can create both identification and transportation among the audience.

Finally, the TikTok war includes a large variety of videos and media reports, but as noted lacks reports from the battlefield, especially from the Russian side. Social and traditional media find it difficult to provide comprehensive strategic information and present a coherent and clear picture of the fighting, such as the position and location of Russian forces and the number of casualties on both sides.

Each viral video presents a small moment in time, almost without context, resulting in an emotional and highly fragmented picture.


The writer is a lecturer and researcher in persuasion and communication strategy at Reichman University.

Residents of Kazakh capital score rare win against urban APARTMENT development

A small but determined group of activists made Nur-Sultan keep its promise.

Mar 14, 2022

EURASIANET.ORG

An oasis in the “concrete jungle.” (courtesy Bauyrzhan Sadiev)

Residents of Nur-Sultan who rallied to defend a patch of designated parkland from high-rise developments have scored a victory, setting a rare example of successful urban activism in Kazakhstan’s tightly controlled civic space.

The conflict over the strip of land wedged between two thoroughfares in central Nur-Sultan dates to 2020, when city planners gave part of the park’s territory over to a construction project.

(THIS IS AUTHENTIC URBAN DEVELOPMENT)

Prior to this decision, there had been plans to transform the 11-hectare tract into a fully functional recreation zone complete with playgrounds, a skate park and 3,500 trees. That was supposed to have been completed by 2018.

In a letter penned earlier this year in response to residents angered by the change in tack, the head of Nur-Sultan’s architecture and planning department, Nurlan Urankhayev, said the residential development was necessary to solve the problem of over a thousand debtors who had missed mortgage payments.

The development would affect only a third of the park, Urankhayev wrote.

For a small but determined group of residents, that was a third too much.

Viktor Sapulnik, one of the members of the movement, told Eurasianet that residents are fed up with Nur-Sultan’s growing “concrete jungles,” and the dirty air that has accompanied frantic overdevelopment.

“A capital that wind used to blow through all the time is now getting gassed out,” complained Sapulnik, who has tried and failed nine times to register a green non-profit with the Justice Ministry.

Sapulnik and his initiative group held gatherings against the development plans throughout February.

One meeting of 150 people on February 20 appealed to President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to scrap the apartments plan, finish the park project this year, and punish the planning officials and municipal construction company responsible for the change in course.

If the demands were not met, the initiative group said, they would call a general rally in the city.

At some point, the government decided it had heard enough.

Tokayev’s press secretary Berik Uali wrote on Facebook on March 6 that Tokayev had ordered the mayors of Nur-Sultan and former capital Almaty to listen to the appeals of residents not to build high-rise infrastructure in the cities.

“The president considers it necessary to pay attention to the construction of social infrastructure, squares and children's playgrounds,” Uali said.

On March 10, Nur-Sultan’s city hall said in a statement that the apartment project was no longer under consideration.

Sapulnik told Eurasianet that he and his colleagues are aiming to take municipal planners to court. But most important was to ensure community ownership of the new space, he said: “We need to return the city to ourselves.”

City planning in Nur-Sultan, a city named in 2019 for Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, has always been a top-down affair.

Its transition in the 1990s from a provincial backwater to a metropolis and the seat of government was Nazarbayev’s brainchild, but miscalculations dogged the execution.

Kisho Kurokawa, the Japanese architect who oversaw the city’s design, is most often blamed by officials for failing to anticipate population growth. Kurokawa passed away in 2008.

In Almaty, the former capital, urban activism has fared better.

One former mayor of the city, Bauyrzhan Baybek, was particularly keen to portray himself as being in dialogue with residents on planning issues.

His tenure from 2015 to 2019 saw roads transformed into pedestrian zones and river footpaths extended through the city.

Nur-Sultan’s hesitation to follow Almaty’s lead may have been motivated by the fact that the new pedestrian zones became popular locations for anti-government demonstrations.

But activists in both cities are catching the government at the right time.

Since political unrest now popularly referred to as Bloody January rocked Kazakhstan and left hundreds dead at the beginning of the year, the Tokayev administration has been looking for easy wins.

One of those came on March 2 when Tokayev’s office announced plans for the area housing the presidential residence in Almaty that was besieged and burned during those clashes. Rather than rebuilding the residence, Uali wrote, the government had decided to transform the area into a public square.

'UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES'

Explainer | The ruble’s rubble: Economic fallout on Central Asia
Local currencies rise and fall with the ruble.

Maximilian Hess

Mar 10, 2022

EURASIANET.ORG

Russia’s collapsing currency is bad news for Central Asia. 

(Vladislav Zolotov/iStock)

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Western sanctions in response have left former Soviet states in Central Asia facing economic chaos.

Since Vladimir Putin launched his war on February 24, the ruble has collapsed by 50 percent with no bottom in sight. Russia has enacted currency controls reminiscent of the early 1990’s and telegraphed plans to default on foreign debtholders.

The uncertainty is gripping Central Asia, where Russia is a top trading partner and the source of critical remittances. Local currencies rise and fall with the ruble.

In short, Central Asia’s economies are highly exposed to Russia.

Kazakhstan was the first to respond to the crisis, raising its baseline interest rate from 10.25 percent to 13.5 percent just hours after the war began. The National Bank rapidly intervened in the currency market, selling U.S. dollars to protect the tenge.

Nur-Sultan also announced a new anti-crisis plan promising further intervention in forex markets and a new “tenge deposit protection program.” Under this attempt to forestall bank runs, a 10 percent payment will be deposited into tenge-denominated bank accounts next February, tax-free. This effectively amounts to a further interest rate hike and will likely negatively impact investment, already bound to be tempered by Russia’s economic implosion and market uncertainty after Kazakhstan’s own nationwide unrest this past January.

Kazakhstan is blessed with substantial reserves. The Samruk-Kazyna sovereign wealth fund held some $65 billion as of January. The National Oil Fund reportedly holds another $60 billion or more. While the ongoing restructuring at Samruk-Kazyna could result in revelations that cast doubt on those numbers, tens of billions are known to be held with Bank of New York Mellon and are relatively liquid.

In short, Kazakhstan should be able to continue to manage the tenge and control its monetary policy. Indicating its optimism, on March 9 the National Bank said it was not lifting the baseline rate further.

Nevertheless, the tenge has lost some 20 percent against the dollar since the war began, comparable with its decline in 2015 when it abandoned its dollar peg in the face of falling oil prices. That crisis saw growth crater and prompted a break in the social contract – nepotistic rule in exchange for rising living standards – that helped seed political malaise that culminated in the bloody events this past January. And uncertainty reigns about Kazakhstan’s ability to export its oil; the bulk of its shipments currently transit Russia.

Likewise, Uzbekistan has a relatively healthy sovereign balance sheet. Borrowing has grown substantially since President Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power in 2016, but foreign indebtedness is still well below Kazakhstan’s levels. Tashkent’s foreign currency reserves stand at $34.4 billion – over half is in gold – roughly 60 percent of GDP.

But unlike Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan has left its baseline interest rate unchanged at 14 percent, having cut it by 100 basis points last September amid signs that efforts to tame inflation sparked by the 2017 liberalization of its currency, the sum, were finally succeeding.

Despite the lack of interest rate action, the sum has, in contrast to the tenge, lost little of its value against the U.S. dollar since Putin’s invasion. The Uzbek Central Bank has not announced any formal currency interventions, though they are all but certain to be underway – it has stated that demand for selling rubles is nearly 10 times the demand to buy them.

The sum stands at 10,900 to the dollar – down from 10,850 a month ago, a fall of just 0.5 percent. Over the same time, the ruble has fallen over 45 percent against the som from 150 to 80 som-per-ruble.

Uzbekistan may not be as economically dependent on remittances as Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan but has more economic migrants in Russia than all the other Central Asian states put together. The strengthening of the sum and dollar against the ruble means that millions of Uzbek migrant workers earning rubles in Russia have taken a 50 percent wage cut in sum and U.S. dollar terms because of Putin’s war.

The reality is also stark for Uzbeks holding rubles at home. There are reports that Uzbek banks are offering below-market rates for exchange. That can fatten a bank’s profits at the expense of migrant laborers. Yet it can also protect the local currency in times of volatility. If banks become too permissive in allowing the buying and selling of rubles – by offering competitive rates – the region risks becoming a path for capital to flee Russia. This could also result in panic selling of local currency.

Turkmenistan is the Central Asian economy least affected by Putin’s war and sanctions. Its markets are plagued by economic mismanagement and a yawning disparity between the official and unofficial exchange rates. The government does not publish any reliable data, nor does any independent organization. Ashgabat has also repeatedly chased Russian businesses out of the country. The economy is effectively isolated.

Russia’s renewed gas purchases since 2019 have offered a glimmer of hope for rebooting Russian-Turkmen economic ties. Yet with Western nations trying to cut Russian gas exports, Moscow is likely to have a surfeit and will stop imports from Turkmenistan. Russia is also likely to re-orient exports towards China, potentially competing with the proposed Line D of the Central Asia-China gas pipeline, which Turkmenistan and neighbors have sought for years.

Line D would also cross Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, bestowing on them gas supplies and transit fees. These two are arguably the most immediately exposed to the unfolding Russian economic collapse.

The importance of remittances to both cannot be overstated, in particular for Tajikistan where they are the only notable source of foreign currency. Its central bank is nearly as poor as Turkmenistan’s in publishing data, but it does effectively manage the liquidity of the somoni: The currency is both small and thinly traded; combined with Tajikistan’s capital controls, that makes it difficult to subject to speculative trades.

The National Bank of Tajikistan sets an official exchange rate that generally tracks other currency movements, unlike Turkmenistan, and limits the supply of hard currency. But a mounting economic crisis like we are currently seeing can foster a black market that quickly overwhelms an economy. Without a major injection of hard currency, it is difficult for a country to bring rates back into alignment once a spread emerges.

On March 9 Dushanbe announced a new rate of 13 somoni per dollar, down from 11.3. But Tajikistan lacks any notable international reserves, and is heavily indebted, in particular to neighboring China. It faces a debt crunch if remittances collapse, which would pile added pressure on its currency.

Kyrgyzstan’s som has weakened, but not as much as the ruble – once again effectively cutting wages for migrant workers in local currency terms. When the som strengthens against the ruble, every ruble sent home buys fewer som. Kyrgyzstan is also exposed to further downside risks because it is dependent on Russian fuel imports paid for in dollars, which are becoming scarcer.

These dependences are somewhat mitigated by Kyrgyzstan’s gold sales, though production has been battered by sparring with its largest Western investor and angry mobs chasing off Chinese partners. Planned Russian investments in the sector now appear at risk, too.

Given that no economy Russia’s size has ever been so abruptly cut off from global capital markets, it is premature to predict how severe Central Asia’s pain will be. But one thing is certain: A collapsing Russian economy risks mutating into a deadly pathogen for Central Asia.


Maximilian Hess is a London-based political risk analyst and writer.

Central Asia - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Central_Asia

Central Asia is a region in Asia which stretches from the Caspian Sea in the west to China and Mongolia in the east, and from Afghanistan and Iran in the south to Russia in the north. The region consists of the former Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and

 ...

See more

Armenia: Russian mining takeover bears hallmarks of old regime

The prime minister promised to do business differently. But he owes Moscow.

Arshaluis Mgdesyan 

Mar 14, 2022

EURASIANET.ORG

The Zangezur Copper Molybdenum Combine has operated since 1951.

 (ZCMC handout)

When Armenia’s largest taxpayer passed into the hands of a Russian tycoon last fall, the deal unleashed widespread concern that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was retreating from a pledge to de-Russify the economy.

Pashinyan had promised to do business differently when he came to power on a transparency platform in the 2018 “Velvet Revolution.” Yet many say the takeover of the lucrative and historic Zangezur Copper Molybdenum Combine (ZCMC) looks too much like the old way of doing business in Armenia.

The ownership change dates to early 2020, when German company Cronimet sold its 75 percent stake back to the plant, a legal entity represented by management. Other shareholders, among them former Russian Health Minister Mikhail Zurabov, began to wrestle for control. At Zurabov’s request, the 75 percent stake was frozen by an Armenian court for a year, during which time the National Security Service searched the offices of ZCMC and filed tax evasion charges against management.

The court unfroze the shares on September 30, 2021. That evening, Industrial Company JSC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian billionaire Roman Trotsenko’s GeoProMining, mysteriously acquired a 60 percent stake. Industrial Company promptly donated 15 percent of the equity to the Armenian government, which transferred its stake to the Armenian National Interests Fund, a government-held trust chaired by Tigran Avinyan, a former deputy prime minister and close Pashinyan ally. Zurabov’s lawyer, Aram Orbelyan, told Eurasianet that the deal was concluded suddenly, without warning, and suspiciously fast.

The government has not said how Trotsenko’s GeoProMining became the recipient or what he paid for his stake.

This reticence to talk about the deal is fanning concern. Mkrtich Karapetyan, an investigative journalist with CivilNet and Armenian public television, says both ZCMC and the prime minister’s office have denied his requests to see the purchase documents.

Whatever the story, it seems unlikely the ownership tussle has come to an end. Trotsenko is an influential player in the Russian economy, which is cratering under sanctions over Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. The U.S. Treasury Department has listed him as an oligarch, potentially putting him and his business empire in the sights of future penalties.

Business is politics

ZCMC is one of the anemic Armenian economy’s few bright spots. In 2020 the plant alone was responsible for 18.8 percent of Armenia’s exports.

Over the years, local media have alleged that the family of Armenia’s second president, Robert Kocharyan, acquired shares in ZCMC during his rule from 1998 to 2008. Kocharyan has denied these allegations. Later, the same rumors circulated around Mikael Minasyan, the son-in-law of the third president, Serzh Sargsyan. The shares belonging to Minasyan, the current government has said, were then illegally acquired by Artur Vanetsyan during his time as head of the National Security Service in 2018-2019.

Apart from Zurabov, the former Russian health minister, another 12.5 percent ​​of the shares belong to AMP Holding, a firm reportedly owned by Karen Hakobyan, the brother of Vahe Hakobyan, an opposition member of parliament. Together Mher Poloskov, the former director of ZCMC, and Narek Hambaryan, brother of the military prosecutor Tigran Hambaryan, own another 12.5 percent, according to the state company registry. The remaining 15 percent remains in the hands of ZCMC.

Trotsenko’s acquisition was extensively discussed in Yerevan’s business and media circles and quickly became a lightning rod for the opposition. Kocharyan, the former president, called the deal “the biggest scam in the history of Armenia” and an example of “blatant corruption.”

Pashinyan argues that the transaction, by putting 15 percent of the company in the hands of the government, is in the Armenian people’s interests.

“If this 15 percent [stake] belonged to an offshore company instead of the government, and if this offshore company was taken over by another offshore firm, which, in turn, was owned by a member of the prime minister’s family or some other minister, then this would be a shady transaction,” the prime minister told Parliament on October 7.

Russia dominates

Yet there is widespread unease at the way a Russian oligarch managed to take such a large stake in a firm that the State Revenue Committee listed as the country’s largest taxpayer last year.

Pashinyan, critics point out, promised transparency when he came to power. At the time, he defiantly began prosecuting Russian-firms with connections to the former regime, ignoring concerns that he could not afford to anger Moscow.

With his acquisition, Trotsenko became the most significant player in Armenia’s mining industry, which is already dominated by Russians.

His GeoProMining is not new to Armenia. Since 2012, the company has been operating a massive gold mine at Sotk in the Gegharkunik region. It also owns the Agarak Copper Molybdenum Combine.

In September 2018, another key asset, the Teghut copper and molybdenum mine, was transferred to Russian-owned VTB Bank after the mine’s owner, Vallex Group, was unable to service a $380 million loan granted by the Russian bank. Teghut is the second-largest deposit of copper and molybdenum in Armenia, containing an estimated 1.6 million tons of copper and about 99,000 tons of molybdenum. (It reportedly suspended production last week amid fallout from Western sanctions).

Russians also have their eyes, according to media, on the Amulsar gold mine, which was licensed to Lydian Armenia, a subsidiary of the U.S.-British Lydian International, in 2016. Operations were suspended in 2018 amid a wave of protests from environmentalists and local residents. Since then, the company has made several unsuccessful attempts to resume exploitation.

Last December, the Economic Journalists Club of Armenia reported that Lydian Armenia was planning to sell the rights to exploit the Amulsar gold mine to an unnamed Russian company. “The state will receive 20 percent of the stake from this deal, which, in all likelihood, will be managed by the Armenian National Interests Fund,” said the statement.

The Armenian authorities have neither confirmed nor denied the claim. The Economy Ministry declined Eurasianet’s request for comment. The press service of Lydian Armenia issued a denial, but the rumors continue to spread.

Apart from this, the government recently initiated a series of amendments to the Subsoil Code. The amendments, if passed, will facilitate mining by allowing firms to skip some environmental impact reviews.

Coupled with the government’s silence, the moves have aroused suspicion, notes Tehmine Yenokyan of the Armenian Ecological Front. Since the 2020 war with Azerbaijan, Armenia has grown even more dependent on Russia for security. Many Armenians now assume that their government is too weak to resist the consolidation of the mining sector in the hands of Russian businesses.

“But any new buyer, be it from Russia or any other country, must remember that it assumes not only the rights to operate the mine, but also the problems with numerous court cases […] and local residents strongly opposed on environmental grounds,” Yenokyan told Eurasianet.

Arshaluis Mgdesyan is a journalist based in Yerevan.

Prosecutor’s office says January riots in Kazakhstan aimed at seizing power

Online News EditorMarch 14, 2022

 

Nursultan, Mar 14 (EFE).- Seizing power by force was the final objective of the mass riots in Kazakhstan in early January, in which 230 people were killed, including civilians and children, the Central Asian republic’s Prosecutor General, Berik Assylov, said Monday.

“The final objective (of the riots) was to seize power by force. (…) Actions were coordinated. It was obviously a planned action,” Assylov told the Mazhilis, the lower house of the Kazakh parliament, during the presentation of the preliminary results of the investigation into the January violence.

The prosecutor general said that the protests were diverse in character: the first wave consisted of peaceful rallies, which authorities did not prevent.

Many types of extremists joined the demonstrators and radically changed the protest, characterizing the second wave.

Criminal gangs joined the third wave, leading to disturbances and arson, according to the prosecutor.

“Armed radicals took advantage of the chaos to launch targeted attacks against different targets, that is, we saw a fusion of extremism, criminality and religious radicalism,” Assylov stressed.

Lawyer and human rights activist Aiman Umarova, head of the Aqiqat (Truth) Commission into the January riots, agreed with the prosecutor general.

“The trigger was undoubtedly the increase in gas prices in the Mangystau region (in western Kazakhstan), but it is difficult to say that only the socio-economic problems that have worsened over the past five years were the real reason for the January events,” she told the Mazhilis.

In her opinion, Kazakh citizens’ discontent was inevitable in the face of entrenched power, increasing corruption and the concentration of national resources in the hands of a certain group of people.

She also claimed that the mass riots had been planned by National Security Committee (KNB) agents and had been prepared for at least two years.

According to Umarova, the NSC’s subversive activity aimed to discredit Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev.

“The president paid special attention to human rights and the NSC, which has unlimited power and terrorizes people, saw this as a loss of control,” she said.

The lawyer also believes that the riots involved professionally prepared groups that came to Kazakhstan from abroad, as she witnessed in the main square in Almaty when she saw on January 5 many Asians who spoke neither Kazakh nor Russian among the demonstrators.

“We have information that since 2019 people have entered Kazakhstan from Afghanistan with a certain status and whose passport data were recently revoked after the January events,” she said, adding that she believes they have already left the country for Turkey or Europe.

The criminal investigation continues against NSC chairman Karim Massimov for the committee’s alleged involvement in organizing the mass riots.

“The former head of the NSC and three of his deputies, as well as two other heads, face charges of treason, attempted seizure of power, abuse of power and taking large bribes. The former NSC chief and three of his deputies have been arrested,” Assylov said.

They face up to 17 years in prison.

Another of his deputies, Samat Abish, nephew of former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, was removed from his post.

On Sunday, another of Nazarbayev’s nephews, Kairat Satibaldiuli, was arrested, accused not only of corruption but also of other crimes against national security. EFE

kk-egw/jgb/lap

Kazakhstan: Net tightens around

Nazarbayev clan as nephew arrested

Satybaldy appears to have been linked to

the unrest in January.

Joanna Lillis

Mar 13, 2022

EURASIANET.ORG

Kairat Satybaldy being detained by security personnel. (Photo: Yedilov Online Telegram account)

The authorities in Kazakhstan have detained the nephew of former president Nursultan Nazarbayev and say that they are investigating him over possible involvement in “crimes undermining the security of the state.”

The wording of the statement issued by the state anti-corruption agency on March 13 appeared to suggest Kairat Satybaldy, an influential businessman and former security officer, is being linked by officials to the unrest that tore through the country in January. The stated reason for his arrest, however, is alleged embezzlement at the expense of Kazakhtelecom, the state-controlled telecoms operator, in which Satybaldy owns a 24 percent share.

This surprise move suggests President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev may mean business in his unstated agenda to curb the power of the Nazarbayev family in the wake of the unrest that broke out at the start of this year.

Satybaldy and his brother, Samat Abish, who was dismissed as deputy security chief following the disturbances, have been the object of sustained media speculation over a possible alleged role in plotting against Tokayev, who has described those events as an attempted coup d’etat.

Abish has so far escaped the fate of Karim Masimov, his former boss at the National Security Committee, or KNB, who is under arrest on treason charges along with several of his deputies. The whereabouts of Abish and many other family members are unknown. It is rumored that some may have fled abroad.

Tokayev has moved to curb the political and economic muscle of the Nazarbayev family since the January violence, in which at least 227 people died.

But the arrest of Satybaldy, whose father, a brother of Nazarbayev’s, died in a car crash at the age of 35, is the first known detention of a member of the former ruling family.

Forbes Kazakhstan in 2018 estimated Satybaldy’s wealth at $163 million, although he later vanished from the publication’s list of the country’s most influential entrepreneurs. The magazine described him at that time as holding shares in Kazakhtelecom and Kaspi Bank, which controls Kazakhstan’s most popular mobile payment system. He later divested himself of his stake in Kaspi. His diverse portfolio of business interests included areas such as private security provision and agriculture.

The 51-year-old began his career as an officer in the Soviet armed forces just before the Soviet Union collapsed. After independence, he served as an officer in the KNB.

Under Nazarbayev, he held powerful positions as deputy mayor of Kazakhstan’s capital, deputy president of the state-owned Kazakh Oil company and vice president of Kazakhstan Temir Zholy, the national railway company.

Joanna Lillis is a journalist based in Almaty and author of Dark Shadows: Inside the Secret World of Kazakhstan.

Squatters occupy London mansion owned by Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska in protest over Ukraine war


Anarchist group says it ‘will go further’ to see more oligarchs’ properties occupied

Lamiat Sabin,Zoe Tidman

THE INDEPENDENT, UK

Squatters have occupied a London mansion owned by a Russian oligarch in protest over Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine.

Several activists from the group known as the London Makhnovists took over the luxury townhouse in Belgrave Square on Monday, claiming that it now “belongs to Ukrainian refugees”.

They hung a Ukrainian flag from an upstairs window and unfurled a banner that reads “this property has been liberated”.

Another banner reads: “Putin go f*** yourself.”

The property is owned by Oleg Deripaska, a Russian billionaire industrialist with close links with the British political establishment, who was targeted by government sanctions last week.

Sign The Independent’s petition to help the people of Ukraine

He was described as “a prominent Russian businessman and pro-Kremlin oligarch”, who is “closely associated” with both the Russian government and Putin.
Anarchist activists speaking from the balcony of 5 Belgrave Square
(Lamiat Sabin)

The house at 5 Belgrave Square was worth £25 million back in 2002, and is one of the many UK properties in Deripaska’s property portfolio – having been owned via an offshore British Virgin Islands company.

When The Independent asked the activists how long they plan to be at the property, one of the squatters shouted from the balcony: “Until Putin stops the war.”

The group is named after the 1917 Ukrainian anarchist movement known as the Makhnovists, that was led by Nestor Ivanovich Makhno.


In response to the The Independent asking how they entered the house, the activist joked that the “ghost of Nestor Makhno manifested itself and opened the door.”
The area cordoned off while six police vans are parked outside the house
(Lamiat Sabin / The Independent)

The activists described their group as a “property liberation front”, and are demanding that properties of oligarchs are seized to house refugees.

One of the activists vowed to “go further” to occupy properties – adding “no more oligarchs’ mansions!”

They also said: “Do we want to live in a society that protects mansions of oligarchs, or that houses refugees?”

Government website for Ukraine sponsorship goesdown within minutes of going live


A passer-by was overheard saying: “Good for them. F*** Putin.”

Later, the Met Police said they searched the mansion and are “satisfied” that no protesters are inside – adding that four men are still sitting on the edge of a balcony.

In a statement, police said: “We continue to engage with those on the balcony as we balance the need for enforcement with the safety of all involved.”

Police officers in riot gear enter Oleg Deripaska’s mansion
(REUTERS)

An activist accused police of “restricting the protest” and claimed that “the only thing standing in the way of refugees being housed is the police”.

Officers had cordoned off part of the street in the area where embassies of many countries are located.

Officers at the scene declined to answer reporters’ questions.

Six police vans were outside the property, including those of the Metropolitan Police’s Territorial Support Group

.

Metropolitan Police Territorial Support Group watching over the property
(Jonathan Brady/PA)

In a statement, the Met Police said officers were called to the property at 1am on Monday, and found that “a number of people had gained entry and hung banners from upstairs windows”.

The anarchists said, in a statement, that they had taken over the mansion “in protest against Putin and his world” and wanted to show solidary with Ukrainians whose lives are devastated by the invasion.

In Ukraine, about 600 civilians have been killed – according to the United Nations, more than 2.5 million people have been forced to flee, and Russian troops’ bombardments have destroyed infrastructure and homes across the country in the invasion launched on 24 February.

A university in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on fire – allegedly caused by Russian troops’ shelling
(Sergey Bobok/AFP via Getty Images)

“This mansion belongs to a Russian oligarch, complicit in Putin’s invasion of Ukraine,” the squatters said in a statement.

They said the residence would “serve as a centre for refugee support, for Ukrainians and people of all nations and ethnicities”

.


This map shows the extent of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
(Press Association Images)

While the activists occupied the house, Mayor of London Sadiq Khan repeated his call for some oligarch-owned London properties – that he called “gold bricks used to launder money” – to be used for housing displaced Ukrainians.

“I think the government should be seizing them, and before selling them – because they’ll take some time – they should be using them to house those Ukrainians who are fleeing Ukraine, who we’ll be offering a safe haven in London,” he told Times Radio.


“It’s a form of poetic justice, but also it’s a good use of these many, many empty properties sitting across London simply with dust being gathered inside rather than them being used to house people who need homes.”

Over the weekend, housing secretary Michael Gove said the government wants to “explore” the option of using sanctioned oligarchs’ properties to house Ukrainian refugees.

The Independent has a proud history of campaigning for the rights of the most vulnerable, and we first ran our Refugees Welcome campaign during the war in Syria in 2015.

Now, as we renew our campaign and launch this petition in the wake of the unfolding Ukrainian crisis, we are calling on the government to go further and faster to ensure help is delivered.

To find out more about our Refugees Welcome campaign, click here. To sign the petition click here. If you would like to donate then please click here for our GoFundMe page.

Russia rejects Peppa Pig trademark infringement claim to retaliate against sanctions for Ukraine war


The cartoon is popular among children, as well as parents such as Boris Johnson

Lamiat Sabin

THE INDEPENDENT

Russia is using Peppa Pig to retaliate against economic sanctions imposed worldwide against its invasion of Ukraine.

The popular British cartoon – featuring Peppa the pig, her family, and her friends – can now be copied by Russian businesses, without any threat of punishment for trademark infringment, after a court ruling in Russia.

In September, Peppa Pig’s owners Entertainment One took sued a Russian entrepreneur who had created his version of the characters

The company – that was acquired by Hasbro in 2019 – had demanded that Ivan Kozhevnikov pay 40,000 roubles (up to £400) compensation.

But judge Andrei Slavinsky, at a court in Kirov 600 miles north-east of Moscow, has dismissed the case and has mentioned that the “unfriendly actions of the United States of America and affiliated foreign countries” had influenced the ruling.

Even if the ruling was in Entertainment One’s favour, the compensation would have been reduced to about £230 as a result of the value of the rouble plummeting during the brutal invasion of Ukraine

.
Peppa the pig, the protagonist of the popular kids’ cartoon
(Entertainment One)

The court case’s conclusion comes several months after Boris Johnson had voiced his liking for Peppa Pig.

The PM has two young children with wife Carrie, and the family went to visit Peppa Pig World – which he had said, in a bizarre speech to the Confederation of British Industry in November, was “very much [his] kind of place”.

More trademark violations could be seen in the near future, after the Russian government had announced that patented inventions and industrial designs from hostile countries will be allowed to be used without permission or compensation.

Boris and Carrie Johnson at Peppa Pig World with son Wilfred
(PA)

Earlier this month, the Kremlin issued its list of countries that have imposed sanctions on Russian oligarchs and businesses in response to Vladimir Putin launching the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February

The countries include the UK, the US, Canada, the 27 in the EU, Australia, Ukraine, Iceland, Norway, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, and about 10 others.
Russian army tank fires at an apartment block in Mariupol, Ukraine
(AP)

Since the invasion of Ukraine, dozens of well-known companies and brands have cut business ties with Russia.

They include Apple, Ikea, Disney, McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Starbucks, Chanel, Hèrmes, L’Oréal, Adidas, Levi’s, Heineken, and Burger King.