Turkey ranks last among OECD and EU countries in health spending

By Turkish Minute
- April 5, 2022

Turkey spent 4.7 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health services in 2020, the lowest score among members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the European Union, Euronews Turkish service reported, citing official data.

According to the report, Turkey’s percentage is nearly half the OECD average of 8.8 percent.

Turkey’s health spending covered by the public budget accounts for 3.6 percent of GDP while the remaining 1.1 percent represents the part paid for by private health insurers and the patients themselves.

According to data from 2020 and 2019, the United States ranks first, spending 16.8 percent of its GDP on health services, followed by the United Kingdom, which spent 12.8 percent.

Germany spent 12.5 percent of its GDP on health services, while France and Canada allocated 12.4 and 11.6 percent, respectively.

The Turkish medical community is suffering from low wages, an excessive workload and violence from patients, all of which reached new heights during the coronavirus pandemic.

Attacks and threats against doctors and other medical personnel by patients or their relatives are frequent in Turkey. Doctors face violence, in some instances even death, for allegedly not giving sufficient or belated treatment to a person in Turkey’s overcrowded hospitals.

In the face of these problems, many healthcare professionals have resigned in recent years, with a number of them seeking to move abroad.

While 1,405 doctors left their jobs in Turkey to work abroad in 2021, 197 more emigrated in January alone, according to the Turkish Medical Association (TTB) figures. Local media reports say that thousands more are getting ready to leave as the Turkish government fails to meet their demands.

The doctors’ departures are a sad indictment of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who burnished his own reputation by expanding universal health care over his 20 years in power. But the strains of those overhauls wrought by Erdoğan, in addition to those brought by the pandemic and increasing inflation, have undermined the very professionals on whom the health system depends.

TURKEY

Columnist for left-wing daily indicted on Erdoğan insult charges due to article
on forest fires

By Turkish Minute
- April 5, 2022

A columnist for the left-wing Evrensel newspaper has been indicted on charges of insulting President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in an opinion piece in which he criticized the government response to wildfires in the country in the summer of 2021, Evrensel reported.

Columnist Ender İmrek faces charges of insulting the president in an article titled “Türkiye yanıyor, saray izliyor” (Turkey burns, the palace [a reference to Erdoğan] watches” dated July 31, 2021.

An investigation was launched into İmrek in December by an İstanbul prosecutor on accusations of insulting the president and provoking hatred and enmity among the public. The prosecutor indicted the journalist at the conclusion of the investigation.

The columnist is accused in the indictment of making statements in his article that were likely to tarnish the honor and prestige of the president and thus committing the crime of insulting the president.

In his article İmrek criticized the inadequate number of firefighting aircraft to contain the wildfires, saying the government could have purchased many such planes with the money spent on Erdoğan’s luxurious presidential palace in Ankara.

Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government attracted widespread criticism over their poor response and inadequate preparedness for the large-scale wildfires that ravaged the country’s southern and western coasts in late July and claimed the lives of eight people and thousands of animals, also destroying large swathes of forestland, until they were fully contained in mid-August.

The harsh criticism by opposition figures and the public targeting Turkish authorities centered around Erdoğan’s inaction and the small number of firefighting planes actively used to respond to the fires.

İmrek denied the insult charges in his defense statement and said his criticism was within the limits of freedom of the press.

They want to silence us,” İmrek tweeted on Tuesday, sharing a copy of his article, which he said included no elements of any crime.

Insulting the president is subject to criminal charges under the controversial Article 299 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK), and thousands of people in the country are under investigation, with most of them facing the threat of imprisonment over alleged insults of Erdoğan. Whoever insults the president can face up to four years in prison, a sentence that can be increased if the crime was committed through the mass media.

The insult cases generally stem from social media posts shared by Erdoğan opponents. The Turkish police and judiciary perceive even the most minor criticism of Erdoğan or his government as an insult.

Sudan's Resistance Committees Prepare to Hold 'Million-strong March' on Wednesday

Tuesday, 5 April, 2022 - 

Member of Transitional Sovereign Council Al-Hadi Idris. (SUNA)
Khartoum - Mohammed Amin Yassin

Sudan's Popular Resistance Committees called on citizens to participate in a million-strong march on April 6 to end military rule and restore civilian authority.

April 6 marks the second anniversary of the arrival of millions of Sudanese to the headquarters of the army's general command in central Khartoum, days after ousting President Omar al-Bashir.

The resistance committees hope the expected million-strong demonstration to be a milestone in the ongoing protests against the army's seizure of power in October.

Meanwhile, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) launched an initiative and a roadmap to meet all political components, announced member of Transitional Sovereign Council Al-Hadi Idris.

Idris told the Sudan news agency (SUNA) that the dialogue adopted by the Revolutionary Front to resolve the Sudanese crisis will take place in two stages.

The roadmap suggested by the Front calls for confidence-building measures and releasing all political detainees, namely former members of the Empowerment Removal Committee.

It also wants to lift the state of emergency, ensure an end to violence against peaceful demonstrators, and form a neutral fact-finding committee to reveal the party behind the killing of the demonstrators.

He explained that the military is included in these measures and must begin releasing detainees and lifting the state of emergency to build confidence.

It must engage in a constructive dialogue between the parties to the Constitutional Document, Freedom and Change Forces, the peace parties, the resistance committees, and all the forces of the revolution to form the government.

Idris explained that this would help address the crisis that resulted from the recent developments and the return to the constitutional document and the democratic path.

The official stated that the UN Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and the African Union (AU) would be the guarantors, facilitators, and mediators between the Sudanese parties in this initiative.

He explained that the Revolutionary Front is not a mediator but rather a partner, based on its position in the government and with all other powers.

If the first stage is completed successfully, the second stage will begin, said Idris, noting that it will include a comprehensive dialogue of all political forces, except for the National Conference, to discuss the elections, the constitutional conference, and the civil democratic transition.

Idris added that the initiative also addresses the form of the government and institutions, noting that dialogue could lead to a change in the form of the government, even if there are different opinions about the Sovereign Council, the Council of Ministers, and the Security and Defense Council.

The new government's priorities should be people's livelihood, peace, and preparation for elections, stressed Idris.

The Council member stressed that the ultimate purpose of the initiative is to save the country and rescue it from imminent collapse, adding that it is crucial to expedite the implementation of the initiative to ensure the dissolved National Congress would not return to the scene.

CRIMINAL CAPITALI$M
Credit Suisse: Risk chief, executive board ‘extremely surprised’ by Greensill collapse

By Kyle Brasseur

Tue, Apr 5, 2022


Credit Suisse on Monday shared further information regarding its exposure to the collapse of U.K. supply chain finance startup Greensill Capital in March 2021 and how the bank was caught off guard.


With approximately $10 billion tied up between four supply chain finance funds, Credit Suisse was one of the banks most affected by the downfall of Greensill, which occurred the same month U.S. hedge fund Archegos Capital Management went under. Credit Suisse lost approximately $5.5 billion in the Archegos collapse; an independent report into the matter ordered by the bank concluded a series of missteps by its risk and compliance function failed to escalate numerous red flags.

Regarding Greensill, Credit Suisse acknowledged Monday in response to questions from the Swiss-based Ethos Foundation that “individual managers and employees could have averted the reputational damage and economic failure if they had conducted themselves in prior years more appropriately.” However, the bank also defended its due diligence efforts, saying there were “no earlier indications” from Greensill or its founder, Lex Greensill, that it would collapse prior to the expiration of its credit insurance.

Lara Warner, then-chief risk and compliance officer at Credit Suisse, was informed by Greensill on Feb. 22, 2021, that its insurance would expire six days later, according to the bank. Warner told the executive board, which then informed the bank’s board of directors.

“The chief risk officer and the executive board of [Credit Suisse] were extremely surprised that Lex Greensill informed them of this fact only a few days before the expiration of the insurance,” the bank said. “Anyone would have expected an earlier orientation when such a problem arose. Lex Greensill explained this by stating that, due to what Greensill claimed was a missed insurance deadline, he had assumed that the insurance policy would not expire at the end of February 2021. This explanation could not be verified by [Credit Suisse].”

Questioned why the bank was unaware Greensill had difficulty finding a new auditor in October 2020, Credit Suisse said Warner and the executive board “had not been informed” of the issue. Negative media reports regarding Greensill in 2019 and 2020 prompted Credit Suisse to seek answers, but Greensill “was able to provide satisfactory explanations” in each case and no further action was taken, the bank said.

An internal investigation report into the Greensill matter has not yet been published as the bank still seeks to recover funds for investors. It said it expects to pursue litigation and that its efforts might take around five years.

In the aftermath of the collapses of Greensill and Archegos, Warner stepped down in April 2021, and the bank separated its compliance and risk functions. Credit Suisse has further overhauled its board’s composition regarding risk management and announced it would restructure its asset management arm and exit prime services, the division of its investment bank most notably linked to its risk and compliance deficiencies.

In total, Credit Suisse said it terminated 10 employees linked to its Greensill failings. Further disciplinary measures included compensation clawbacks totaling $43 million.

Credit Suisse in its document published Monday also acknowledged February’s “Suisse Secrets” report, in which a consortium of journalists parsed through leaked records at the bank and exposed dozens of accounts belonging to corrupt politicians, criminals, spies, dictators, and other dubious characters. The bank said 90 percent of the accounts detailed were closed or in the process of being closed at the time of the report and that no new information has yet to raise alarm.

“We are comfortable that based on the results of our preliminary investigation to date there are no new concerns which have been identified and actions taken were in line with applicable processes and requirements at the relevant time and in accordance with our legal and regulatory obligations,” the bank said.

Kyle Brasseur is Editor in Chief of Compliance Week. 

His background includes expertise in user personalization with ESPN.com

How Russia’s War Has Hit Ukraine’s Roma People

The Russian invasion has brought fresh hardships for the hundreds of thousands of Romani people in Ukraine, who not only face violence from the invading army but even from the states welcoming refugees.

A woman plays with her child in a sports hall of a high school, transformed into temporary accommodation for people fleeing the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in Przemysl, Poland, March 9, 2022. REUTERS/Yara Nardi

Sean Benstead

On March 22, a Czech-based Roma human rights organisation confirmed reports of several Romani individuals from Lviv being tied to lampposts and publicly humiliated. This was orchestrated by a local vigilante group called “the Hunters” that prides itself on persecuting Roma who are accused of pickpocketing and stealing. Such vigilantism might be brushed aside by some as an unfortunate consequence of a social order harshened in wartime. Yet the civil and state violence inflicted upon Roma communities that lack legal access to work and services is nothing new – and certainly not unique to Ukraine.

Last year, following the murder of Romani man Stanislav Tomáš by Czech police, I explored the poverty of projects for progressive Romani nation building in the context of extreme deprivation and a concerted aggressive siege from violent state and civil forces. This, I argued, was a historically heroic endeavour – but currently a misplacement of priorities and the energy of social movements. Indeed, Romanestan – the name of a proposed Romani nation – remains in a state of emergency. A year later, nowhere exemplifies this state of emergency more than the situation of Ukraine’s Roma population.

Today Ukrainian Roma find themselves between the massive invading forces of an irredentist and criminal Russian state and comparably smaller and outgunned, but nevertheless armed and battle-hardened, fascist militias. Yet to fully appreciate their place in this emergency, we must also look beyond the war itself.

The conditions of Roma in Ukraine

The 2001 Ukrainian census notes that there are just short of 50,000 people who self-identify as Roma in Ukraine. However, this number is disputed by advocacy organisations, which suggest the number is as high as f400,000, with the largest communities in the regions of Crimea, Odesa, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk. There are three main reasons why official figures are inaccurate, of which we will focus on the first two: 1) Roma people’s reluctance to declare their ethnic origin due to fear of persecution or discrimination; 2) Many Roma individuals in Ukraine do not have identity documents and are not registered as Ukrainian citizens, and are thus stateless; 3) Their incorrect registration by authorities as “Romanians.”

Also read: Putin’s Decision to Shoot for Gold Could Move Global Energy Trade Away From the Dollar

The first reason is a well-founded fear. Ukraine, like much of Europe, has a dark history regarding the treatment of the Romani population. A detailed report by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) high commissioner of national minorities confirmed that Ukraine was at the top of the list, alongside other Central and Eastern European states, when it came to rampant skinhead violence against Roma. The study was published in 2000, fourteen years prior to what Vladimir Putin called a putsch by “a gang of drug dealers and neo-Nazis.”

As recently as 2018, to commemorate Adolf Hitler’s birthday, a fascist paramilitary organisation called C14 launched a violent assault on a temporary Romani encampment in Kiev and then went on to stab 17 people from a local Roma encampment in Lviv. More pogroms were reported in 2019 – the year of Volodymyr Zelensky’s election as president – and again in 2020. In response to these brutal attacks, the police response ranged from sporadic and slow arrests to pure indifference. No one has ever been prosecuted. In response to an attack, one Odesa judge ruled that the act of ethnic cleansing in Loshchynivka was “an act of direct democracy.”

These are not historically isolated incidents in Ukraine or the wider region. The history of persecution by Nazi-collaborationist states during World War II, alongside the Stalinist denial of cultural pluralism, is well documented.

Fascist militias are today emboldened and armed with professional military equipment — partly as a result of the 2014 collapse of the Ukrainian state, which in turn desperately clamored for volunteer fighters. And it seems that these incidents are only going to escalate in intensity and barbarity.

The second reason – Roma people’s lack of documents – can be seen as a further symptom of abandonment and the incompetence of state authorities. It is also an effect of discrimination and persecution from both the state and civil society. The scale of statelessness remains unknown even to Ukraine, but the consequences are highly visible. Without legal access to basic services such as health care, education, and formal, legally contracted work, the Roma population finds itself in Dickensian shantytowns and temporary settlements.

Ukrainian Roma are effectively being reproduced as a surplus population, superfluous to the needs of capital or the state, mirroring the condition of Roma across Europe. Given the Zelensky government’s commitment to large-scale privatisation through the State Property Fund – a process affecting even basic utilities – the economic future of the most marginalised didn’t look promising even before the war, with new barriers to accessing even the basic means of everyday existence.

Romani responses to the invasion

In these conditions, Ukrainian Roma communities, like their counterparts across Europe, would have every reason to feel reluctant to rush to the defense of Ukraine’s liberal democratic state. Despite this, Roma in Ukraine are willingly volunteering to join Ukraine’s Territorial Defense Forces, professional military, and international legions. Meanwhile, those who are not engaged in direct combat are engaged in acts of resistance to the invasion that range from capturing Russian tanks, as reported during intense resistance in Kherson Oblast, to building barricades.

Internationally, almost 200 pro-Roma human rights and Romani organisations have condemned the Russian Federation’s war on Ukraine and called on it to end its violent attacks. Their joint statement also calls on the relevant authorities to ensure the human rights of all groups fleeing the war zone are upheld, noting the extreme vulnerability of Roma refugees. In today’s circumstances, Roma families can often be torn from their social networks only to find themselves welcomed by other hostile states on Ukraine’s borders run by right-wing populists.

Also read: By Choosing Not to Condemn Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine, India Defies Its Own Belief in Democracy

Despite Putin’s bogus claims of a fascist junta in Kiev, the liberal democratic state – however incompetent and corrupted by institutional prejudice – retains semi-responsive democratic institutions, and at least the promise of a return to a less authoritarian order once peace has returned. To Ukrainian Roma, this is worth defending with their lives. Within the scope of the Ukrainian liberal democratic state, however damaged and dysfunctional, it is still possible to build social movements, benefit from the counsel of human rights organisations, and gain concessions from political and civil institutions.

Given what we have established above, regarding the economic and legal condition of Ukrainian Roma, any talk of human rights and liberal democracy may easily be charged with hypocrisy. And rightly so. Yet the husk of a liberal democratic state still carries a kernel of liberatory potential, however constrained it may be by inequality and institutional prejudice. The point of movements for social justice is to realise the formal rights-based framework of liberal freedom through giving it content. And Romani social and liberation movements have started to make gains in this regard.

Following its election in 2019, Zelensky’s government set up a special authority to identify and meet the needs of national minorities and Romani communities in Ukraine. Further, a national Romani strategy was approved to ensure inclusion measures were followed through on. It is true that, even without a war, these policies would have likely proven fruitless given the scale of the problem, combined with the incompetence and entrenched prejudice among many state authorities.

From the few human rights organisations that operate in the Russian Federation, it is unclear as to the scale and condition of the one million Russian Roma, and only scant information about pogroms in rural areas have come to light. What is clear, though, is that they are cut off from the lifelines of international organising, international networks of solidarity, and responsive democratic institutions.

Meanwhile, many Ukrainian Roma flee to Ukraine’s western borders and, subsequently, into the European Union. While the EU Commission is engaged in ongoing work to tackle issues related to statelessness among member states, many Ukrainian Roma who do not hold valid biometric passports have been turned away from transport to EU states. Despite the blatant breach of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, this has left many stranded in segregated temporary encampments in border towns and villages’ public sports halls. These encampments for the stateless, many of which are in Moldova (not an EU member state), lack food and sanitary facilities. Illness is endemic.

On March 4, the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive, allowing those fleeing the war to be granted temporary protection in the EU. This should mean that refugees will be given a residence permit, and they will have access to education and to the labor market. At present, this seems to have not been equally applied to a huge number of Roma refugees on the ground.

Those who do make it to EU member states are unlikely to find respite and complete safety. In fact, refugees who have fled to the Czech Republic, the home of murdered Stanislav Tomáš, have found themselves fleeing again due to assaults by locals. That country is just one example among the many EU member states, highlighted by the aforementioned OSCE report, that is marked by harsh anti-Roma racism in addition to social and economic hardship among its Romani population. Here the latent contradictions of liberal democratic freedom again rears its ugly head.

However, amid those contradictions and within that narrow space for agency, we still see a rich architecture of a plurality of Roma civil rights movements that claim varying mixtures of victories and setbacks. Many of these groups have rallied and organised to appeal for humanitarian aid for Ukrainian Roma.

After the guns fall silent

Questions must be raised about what will happen to Ukrainian Roma after this barbaric war.

In the scenario of a less-than-impossible Ukrainian victory, Will the Ukrainian state come to redeem all those Roma lives lost fighting the invader by cleansing its judiciary and police of prejudiced forces? Will the government commit to resolving the endemic statelessness of Roma communities and rebuild a democratic state that is responsive to the needs of the most marginalised?

In the scenario of a victory for Putin’s war machine, will Europe acknowledge the plight of Ukrainian Roma and their heroic defense of an abstract liberal democracy that has never been realised for them? Will European states welcome the stateless as refugees and offer asylum with fully realised, material human rights alongside enforced legal protections?

Given the long history of large-scale violence against the Romani people and their social exclusion, I am doubtful. But large and dramatic societal changes rarely follow smooth historical trajectories and, as one wise man once remarked, decades can happen in a matter of weeks.

Sean Benstead is an activist and writer based in Greater Manchester.

This article was first published on Jacobin.

Kuwait City and its Fragments

by Nazanin Shahrokni and Spyros A. Sofos
April 5th, 2022

A market worker walking in front of a wall full of graffiti in Kuwait City. Source: Francisco Anzola

Originally a small fishing and pearl diving settlement, Kuwait City became a key point in the East India Company sea routes to India and the east coast of Africa in the 18th century. The affluence brought about by the discovery of oil in the 20th century set in motion a dramatic transformation of the Persian Gulf emirate and Kuwait City whose population rose from 62,627 in 1950 to a staggering 3,115,000 in 2021. Kuwait’s gas and oil extraction industry and the service economy that emerged, relied on the import of foreign workers whose number increased dramatically over the years from nearly 31 percent of the population in 1957, to 70 percent in 2022. In response to a demographic shift of such magnitude, Kuwait’s ruling family had to reimagine and rebuild Kuwait City. Central in the redevelopment was the vision of a modern administrative and commercial centre whose periphery expanded rapidly towards the desert surrounding it. In this periphery, new residential suburbs housed the inhabitants who were granted citizenship. Yet, the vision of a modern Kuwait City had little space for those indigenous and migrant populations whose presence and labour were crucial to the materialisation of a new Kuwait City.

Differential inclusion and exclusion processes have fragmented Kuwait City’s population and shape how these fragments inhabit, relate to and experience it. This coupling of fragmentation and inequality has created a dysfunctional urban space, lacking usable public spaces or adequate public transport, marred by high levels of motorisation and environmental degradation. The more attention one turns to the city’s fragments, the more extended the capacity for building a polyphonic city that is not only more inclusive but also efficient.

Kuwait City’s Social Ecology

According to the latest estimates, just under 1.3 million of the emirate’s population are Kuwaitis, 1.2 million are citizens of other Arab countries, approximately 1.5 million are Asian expatriates, 70,000 come from Africa and close to 40,000 from Europe, North and South America and Australia. Yet, this diversity is but one facet of a much more complex urban ecology marked by inequality and segregation.

Tensions between sedentary and nomadic populations is apparent in the form of a hierarchical distinction between the hadar – settled Sunni urban elite – and the badu – Bedouin tribes that used to live a nomadic life in the badiya (desert) surrounding the citadel. The procedure for acquiring citizenship after independence meant that the badu were granted a ‘lesser’ citizenship: apart from the differential political rights that separated them from the hadar, unlike the latter who were relocated to the al-manãtiq al-numüdhajiyya (fifteen model ‘inner’ residential suburbs inside the four ring roads), the badu were not offered housing until the early 1980s when they were moved to modest-sized housing in outlying areas (al-manãtiq al-khãrijiyya) effectively lacking access to the city centre, its administrative services and amenities.

Another significant divide is the one between citizens and the bidun (without [citizenship]). Originating largely in itinerant groups whose lives were divided inside and outside Kuwait’s historical borders that failed to register or meet the exclusive citizenship criteria, the bidun became effective ‘outsiders’ excluded from the benefits of citizenship, not allowed to own property, denied access to free education, relying on precarious, low status jobs, or in the best case joining the low ranks of the military, police or civil service. Social outcasts, they became spatially externalised, banished to settlements in the outskirts of Kuwait City such as Tayma, Sulaibiyya and Ahmadi. These sha’biyya (popular housing), housing most of Kuwait’s 100,000 bidun, have recently become the locus of protests over their exclusion from rights enjoyed by citizens such as free healthcare and education.

The sharpest divide, though, separates citizens and expatriates – mostly lower paid workers in the oil industry, construction, services and domestic sectors. Out of the 1.77 million legally resident expatriates, over 50 percent, roughly 845,000, are illiterate or have basic education. However, statistics point to an asymmetrical distribution between this large segment of Kuwait’s population taking the most menial and vulnerable jobs and a small, highly educated migrant workforce hailing from developed countries and occupying desirable, high-earning positions in healthcare, business and finance.

Consecutive governments, disregarding Kuwait’s dependence on the contribution of migrant labour, represent them as a demographic threat and vow to reduce their numbers. Unskilled migrant workers’ lives have been subjected to restrictions that limit even their basic freedoms. They have been expendable and replaceable, and vilified in the Kuwaiti media on account of their lack of education, ‘their limited health culture,’ and, ironically, their ‘lack of direct contact with mainstream Kuwaiti society’– which is largely the product of design on the part of the authorities.

The kafala (sponsorship) system requires migrants to have a Kuwaiti sponsor (kafeel). In a highly regulated labour market, kafala empowers employers disproportionately and shields them from responsibility in cases of withholding pay, forced labour or abuse as they have the right to petition the immigration authorities to cancel workers’ legal residency, effectively giving them power over the immigration status of those they sponsor. This vulnerability, combined with their precarious presence in Kuwait, strengthens representations of foreign workers as not only outsiders but also inferior. This inferiority is reflected in and further consolidates spatial segregation policies and practices, which are gendered in character: many male workers live in temporary housing near project sites or in higher density residential areas and in the suburbs of Ḥawallī and Al-Sālimiyyah, in cramped rented housing. They are often targeted by government operations such as the 2019 ‘Be Assured’ campaign aimed to remove unmarried or unaccompanied male migrants – so-called ‘bachelors’ – from urban residential areas that left many homeless. Female domestic workers, on the other hand, live with Kuwaiti families in residential neighbourhoods not always served by bus networks as the preference for private transport among Kuwaitis has influenced public transport planning. Their mobility is thus hampered by the cost of taxis given their low income or depends on their employers as the relative lack of leisure and retail infrastructures in residential areas necessitates longer trips.

Despite a tradition of women’s activism, women are often seen as ‘out of place’ in streets, parks, malls and public transport – and are a target of harassment as grassroots initiatives such as the Lan Asket (I will not be silent) Instagram campaign seem to confirm. Patriarchal notions of ‘honour’ curtail women’s freedom of movement and the gendered character of the public/private divide make large swathes of Kuwait City unsafe for them, resulting in gendered geographies of fear. Furthermore, female migrant workers, especially those employed in domestic settings, often experience physical abuse.

The pacifying effects of the state’s welfare provision and the sense of privilege afforded to the citizens, thus, rests on a second distinction between ‘deserving’ insiders and ‘undeserving’ outsiders – bidun and foreign resident labourers while gender, along other social markers of difference, intersects and leaves its own imprint on experiencing the city.

Urban Citizenship: A Bottom-Up Approach

A productive way of looking at the current divides and dysfunctionalities of life in Kuwait is to focus on the city and life in it, especially as the latter is the locus where inequalities have been inscribed in tangible, material ways. Alongside the multiple dividing lines running through Kuwait City, the rapid urbanisation has resulted in the breakdown of traditional forms of solidarity and organisation based on neighbourhoods (firjãn) and tribal kinship structures. This fragmentation and atomisation of city dwellers empowered the state and allowed it to shape the city according to the modernising vision of the ruling elite.

Yet, those populating the urban space rewrite the scripts of living in it in ways that subvert dominant visions and assert different, often splintered visualisations of the right to the city, and acts of ‘(re)assembling’ and reconnecting the urban, of creating their own spatial stories. They reconfigure and claim the city through spatial practices from below, engaging in place-making processes by making communal gardens in disused plots of lands, setting up alternative and inclusive diwanniyat at the seaside – shared spaces where the slow experience of working, living and playing with others unfolds (Amin and Thrift, 2007, p. 137). Ecologies of Belonging and Exclusion in Kuwait City seeks to draw inspiration from such instances/micro-contexts of rewriting the city from below and building a sense of urban citizenship, of starting to think creatively about how this way of ‘planning through community’, to paraphrase Rose (1996), can result in sustainable public spaces and inclusive urban design.



About the author

Nazanin Shahrokni
Nazanin Shahrokni is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Gender Studies at LSE where she is programme director of the MSc Gender and Gender Research. She is PI of the LSE Kuwait Programme 'Ecologies of Belonging and Exclusion: An Intersectional Analysis of Urban Citizenship in Kuwait City' project. Nazanin is author of the award-winning book, Women in Place: The Politics of Gender Segregation in Iran (University of California Press, 2020) and a member of the International Sociological Association Executive Board. Her research focuses on the study of feminist geographies, feminist theories of the state, urban governance, gender segregation and gendered mobility. She tweets at @ShahrokniN

Spyros Sofos
Spyros Sofos is based at the LSE Middle East Centre and is Research Officer at the LSE Kuwait Programme 'Ecologies of Belonging and Exclusion: An Intersectional Analysis of Urban Citizenship in Kuwait City' project. His latest book is Turkish Politics and ‘The People’: Mass Mobilisation and Populism (Edinburgh University Press, 2022) while his research focuses on populism, collective action, polarisation and conflict, and urban politics with particular emphasis on Turkey and the MENA region. He is lead editor of openDemocracy’s #rethinkingpopulism project and leads the Lebanon element of the Swedish Institute 'Co-design for Sustainable, Resilient and Inclusive Urban Spaces' project. He tweets at @spyrosasofos

COULD THE LEFT TAKE POWER IN COLOMBIA?

With the South American country closer than ever to electing a leftwing government, Nick MacWilliam explores what it could mean for peace and human rights.

Gustavo Petro with family members in 2015. 

Credit: Prensa de Bogotá, under a CC BY-SA 4.0 license

ANALYSIS
29 March 2022

As Colombia gears up for its presidential poll in May, the results of recent elections have shown that the Left has reorganized into a powerful electoral force banging at the door of national governance.

Whether that door can be pushed open or not will become clear when Colombians head to the polls on 29 May, with the opportunity to make history. The frontrunner for the top job is progressive senator and former mayor of Bogotá Gustavo Petro, who is running on a platform of public health, public education, environmental protection and the promotion of human rights and peace. These policies represent an antithesis to the current hard-right government of Iván Duque. If elected, Petro would become Colombia’s first leftist president.

Things are looking promising for Petro. His Historic Pact coalition held its election primaries on 13 March with almost six million votes cast – 80 per cent of them for Petro himself. Formed of leftwing and social democratic parties, the Historic Pact has unified diverse political strands and draws its base from sections of the electorate long marginalized from political influence, such as the working class, ethnic minorities, young people and rural communities.

If elected, Petro would become Colombia’s first leftist president

The primaries saw a huge vote for Francia Márquez, a renowned feminist and environmental activist. In what was her first electoral outing she came second to Petro and her vote far exceeded many long-established political figures running in other coalitions. Petro then picked her as his running mate, which means Márquez could well become the first black and female vice president of Colombia.

Márquez’s opposition to resource extraction and deforestation in her home region of Cauca elevated her to national consciousness and saw her awarded the prestigious Goldman Prize in 2018. Colombia is the world’s deadliest country for environmental activists – 65 were killed in 2020 alone – and Márquez has faced threats and attacks. Yet, she refused to back down. Her resolute defence of human rights and natural resources has earned her many admirers.

The Historic Pact also made major gains in congressional elections held the same day, winning the most votes at a national level for both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Although this was an unprecedented achievement for the Left, it did not translate into a left majority in either House.

THE CHALLENGE AHEAD

For any hope of a progressive agenda coming out of the presidential election, the Historic Pact will need to build alliances with traditional parties. This could prove tricky given establishment antipathy towards the Left, but it is not insurmountable; the Liberal Party exceeded expectations in its congressional vote and Petro has appealed to it in his bid for a broad alliance.

However, there will be a strong challenge from the Right. Petro’s principal rival is the former mayor of Medellín, Federico Gutiérrez, who received over two million votes in the primaries for the rightwing coalition, Team Colombia. ‘Fico’, as he is known, will enjoy the backing of business elites, much of the press and a large number of middle- and upper-class voters. President Duque’s party, the Democratic Centre, saw its electoral performance tank in the congressional elections, causing its candidate to withdraw and officially endorse Gutiérrez.

The new congressional term also saw the belated enactment of the Special Districts for Peace, 16 congressional seats created for representatives of regions badly impacted by conflict and state abandonment. Though created in the 2016 peace agreement, the seats’ activation had been impeded by Democratic Centre opposition. Unfortunately, a blighted electoral process left these municipalities open to coercion and some of those elected have links to traditional parties or paramilitary networks. Indeed, one of them, Jorge Rodrigo Tovar, is the son of notorious paramilitary commander ‘Jorge 40’ and will now represent the very victims of his father.

PEACE IN CRISIS

Duque’s election victory in 2018 was greeted with dismay on the Colombian Left. ‘The extreme Right is responsible for the very serious problems facing the country in terms of social inequality, of corruption, of human rights violations,’ warned Luis Pedraza, the head of Colombia’s largest trade union confederation, the CUT. As an acolyte of former president Álvaro Uribe, whose 2002-10 government was characterized by state atrocities, scandals and neoliberal consolidation, Duque had campaigned against the 2016 peace agreement between the then-Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas. Many feared for the peace agreement’s future given the new government’s open antipathy towards it.

Those concerns were well-founded: Duque’s four-year presidency has been disastrous for peace and human rights. His government has presided over an insecurity crisis that has killed over 1,000 activists and 300 former FARC combatants since the peace agreement was signed. A combination of free-market policies and the Covid-19 pandemic has driven millions more Colombians into poverty, which today affects over 42 per cent of the population. In April and May 2021, mass protests over these issues encountered extreme state repression, with security forces killing, sexually assaulting and blinding scores of unarmed protesters – drawing condemnation from the United Nations, the European Union and Amnesty International. Yet neither Duque nor his ministers have faced any repercussions – nor, for that matter, have the police officers behind the abuses.

Perhaps the rightwing realize that the peace process could cause their political dominance to recede

In spite of these challenges, the peace process has endured and today more than 13,500 former FARC combatants have transitioned to civilian life, while the FARC-formed Comunes political party recently began its second guaranteed term in Congress, under the peace agreement’s chapter on political participation. The transitional justice system continues to investigate major human-rights violations committed during the conflict and will soon start issuing sentences. These investigations underpin one theory about the rightwing opposition towards the peace process: that powerful business and political figures want to ensure that their complicity with state-backed atrocities, such as the murder of over 5,000 members of the leftwing Patriotic Union party between 1984 and 2018, never comes to light.

Or perhaps the rightwing realize that the peace process could cause their political dominance to recede. While Colombia was at war, the Right routinely smeared progressive movements, including political parties, trade unions and human rights organizations, as guerrilla sympathisers, or even as guerrillas themselves. This legitimized horrific violence against anyone who advocated for a fairer society and virtually eliminated the electoral Left, as evidenced in the ‘political genocide’ of the Patriotic Union. But the mass movement for peace has countered rightwing militarism and generated democratic space for the articulation of values and ideas that resonate with large sectors of society.

While Colombia’s problems are too deeply rooted to overcome in a single term, the election of the first progressive government in national history would provide a foundation on which to begin the arduous process of genuine national transformation. For a great many people, especially in communities scarred by violence and scarcity, a new approach is sorely needed.

Nick MacWilliam is Trade Union and Programmes Officer at Justice For Colombia.

This article is from the March-April 2022 issue of New Internationalist.

STOLEN TREASURES

Taken during a violent British raid, the Benin bronzes have sat in Western museums and private collections for over a century. Kieron Monks reports on Nigeria’s battle to get them back and what it means for the wider push to return works robbed from Africa.

Swapsies: Nigerian artist Lukas Osarobo-Okoro, photographed outside the British Museum in London. Osarobo-Okoro and the Ahiamwen Guild of Benin have offered to donate new artworks to the institution. 

DYLAN MARTINEZ/ALAMY

REPORT
5 April 2021
Benin

‘We are very happy and excited,’ said Abba Issa Tijani ahead of the ceremony.

The director general of Nigeria’s National Commission for Museums and Monuments (NCMM) had arrived in Cambridge with Prince Aghatise Erediauwa, younger brother of the Oba (King) of the Royal Court of Benin, the ancient kingdom in what is now southern Nigeria. Aides buzzed around the pair, attempting to corral herds of TV crews.

The delegation was in town to receive a 400-year-old bronze cockerel that was looted by British soldiers during the violent conquest of the Kingdom of Benin in 1897. Thousands of masterfully-crafted artefacts, some dating to the 13th century, were stolen. These objects, dispersed to museums and private collections across the world, came to be known as the Benin bronzes – although many are made of brass and ivory.

With the handover of the cockerel on 27 October 2021, the University of Cambridge became the first British institution to return a bronze. The following day, the Nigerian delegation travelled north to the University of Aberdeen to receive another – a sculpture depicting the head of an Oba. And a few weeks earlier, an agreement was struck with the German government to transfer ownership of around 1,100 bronzes.

‘The coming years are going to be very busy for us,’ says Tijani as he reels off a list of institutions in Europe and the US that the Nigerian government is at various stages of negotiation with. ‘We are not going to relent.’


DEVASTATING LOSS

Campaigns for the restitution of stolen artefacts are growing around the world, with Ethiopia and the Republic of Benin among the nations to secure returns in 2021. But Nigeria has always been at the vanguard of the movement, and no claim has been harder-fought than for the bronzes.

This is partly because of the shocking violence of the raid of 1897. Dozens of villages were annihilated and Benin’s inhabitants were massacred with high-powered weaponry. An empire that had stood for centuries, and stretched from the Niger Delta to Accra at its height, was crushed and its territory annexed to Britain.

The campaign is also sustained by the great importance of the bronzes to Nigerians, particularly Binis. ‘The idea that they are simply artefacts is in many cases misleading,’ says Palace Chief Charles Edosomwan, spokesperson for the Royal Court, explaining that some were used for private rituals of supplication to the ancestors. Others formed a visual diary of life in the Court, depicting events and characters.

Edosomwan believes the losses, in such brutal and humiliating circumstances, have inflicted lasting damage to the national psyche. ‘You can’t fully recover, you can only compensate,’ he says. ‘A lot of children grew up not knowing their history.’

Enotie Ogbebor, a Bini artist, explains through analogy: ‘If the works of Da Vinci, Michelangelo, Bach, Shakespeare, Picasso, and Monet...were taken from Europe,’ he asks. ‘Do you think European civilization would be where it is today?’

RIGHTFUL RETURNS

Nigeria has been seeking the return of its heritage since before independence in 1960, with limited success.

Several factors have contributed to the recent breakthroughs, including greater awareness and activism about stolen artefacts. The worldwide Black Lives Matter movement has drawn connections between the crimes of colonialism and racial injustice today. Tijani also credits the determination of the University of Cambridge students who campaigned to return the cockerel.

A flurry of new books has also laid bare the brutality of the raid on Benin and the negligent treatment of its spoils. In The Brutish Museums, author Dan Hicks finds centuries-old masterpieces used as doorstops in forgotten basements, undermining Western museums’ argument that they are the most assiduous guardians.
You can’t fully recover, you can only compensate... A lot of children grew up not knowing their history

The Benin Dialogue Group (BDG) has brought the Nigerian government and Royal Court of Benin together with European museums to discuss plans for restitution since 2007, laying the groundwork for recent breakthroughs. The Group also launched the Digital Benin project, which tracks and catalogues the thousands of works taken in 1897 alongside historic photographs and documentary material.1 This is particularly useful as many museums have not made thorough inventories of their African collections.

Nigeria is also working with civil society groups such as the Art Loss Register to pursue pieces stolen since independence. A bronze from the city of Ife was recovered via the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York after the Register exposed a fake letter approving its sale, supposedly signed by Nigerian officials. The letter was typed on Microsoft Word but dated to before the software was available.

Another avenue for the return of valued works is UNESCO’s restitution committee, at which Nigeria recently made its first claim for an Ife head stolen in 1987. The bronze, valued at more than $5.3 million, was acquired by a Belgian trader before being seized by police at a British auction house. The trader has since dropped his demands for the full value of the piece down to about $53,000 but Nigeria is only offering the $265 he paid for it. A resolution is expected shortly.

According to a report commissioned by the French government, more than 90 per cent of ‘the material cultural legacy’ of Sub-Saharan Africa is held outside the continent.2 But while more Western governments and museums are becoming amenable to restitutions, many are still resisting. The British Museum holds the world’s largest collection of around 900 pieces and has long been a focus of Nigerian campaigning. In October 2021, Tijani served director Hartwig Fischer with a formal request for their return, which the British Museum says is being ‘reviewed and addressed’.

National museums in Britain and other European countries often point to laws that forbid them from ‘deaccessioning’ – permanently removing – works in their collections. In 2020, former UK Culture Secretary, Oliver Dowden, threatened the funding of museums that return or remove controversial objects.3

But there are inconsistencies in how stolen works have been treated. Tijani points to exceptions created for artworks looted by the Nazis in the 1930s and 1940s, and says Nigeria may lobby the British government to change the law. Germany and France have taken steps to override similar statutes, for example in 2020 French senators approved a bill to return 27 colonial-era objects in museum collections to the Republic of Benin and Senegal while Germany is implementing new legislation for the return of the Bronzes.

‘ON OUR TERMS’

Not every artefact has to come home. Tijani emphasizes that Nigeria is primarily seeking recognition of ownership and some can stay in Europe on loan. There can be collaborative exhibitions. The objects have value as ambassadors abroad showcasing the skill of Nigerian artists and the richness of their traditions. ‘But this must be on our terms,’ he says.

Western museums that have expressed concerns that large-scale restitution could decimate their collections need only look to Germany for a chance to see the benefits of such action, believes Barbara Plankensteiner of the Museum of Ethnology in Hamburg, and a co-founder of the BDG.

‘I don’t think it will damage museums,’ she says. ‘Restitution will establish new relationships and partnerships.’
According to a report commissioned by the French government, more than 90 per cent of ‘the material cultural legacy’ of Sub-Saharan Africa is held outside the continent

One possibility is for Western museums to acquire more contemporary Nigerian and African art while letting go of historic pieces. The Ahiamwen Guild of Benin has made an offer to the British Museum of a vast plaque weighing two tons to replace bronzes. Ahiamwen co-founder Lukas Osarobo-Okoro says they wanted to draw attention to the quality of artisanship that still exists in Benin.

‘[The bronzes] are portrayed like dinosaur fossils from some desert, they are not associated with living, breathing people,’ he says. ‘But we never stopped...We can create a new era of artefacts that will have the same impact and amaze people in the same way.’

The British Museum is open to the proposal, says Osarobo-Okoro, and further announcements will follow the resolution of logistics planning.

CELEBRATING BEAUTY

Nigeria has detailed plans for the long-awaited return of the bronzes and to capitalize on this historic moment. The NCMM is developing several new museums, including one in the capital city of Abuja and the Royal Museum in Benin next to the Oba’s palace. Tijani says security is being finalized for travelling exhibitions intended to maximize access, while smartphone apps are being developed to appeal to young audiences.

The project that has attracted most attention is the Edo Museum of West African Art, designed by star architect David Adjaye, under development by the non-profit Legacy Restoration Trust (LRT). This complex will include a museum showcasing art of the region, an archaeology site, storage facilities and event spaces.

‘The idea is to try to attract creative industries, as well as being relevant to local audiences,’ says LRT director Philip Ihenacho.

Ogbebor, a trustee on the LRT board, believes the bronzes can be inspirational: ‘My hope is that they awaken the interest of the people to find out more about their history, to take pride in their history, culture and tradition, and also to be influenced by the sheer beauty of these works to want to emulate it in their professions.’

The impact will register beyond Nigeria. Tijani says he is in regular contact with other countries seeking to reclaim heritage and he hopes returns of bronzes can set a precedent for further returns. Tentative steps at a region-wide approach are underway.

He also hopes this might prompt a wider re-evaluation of relations between former colonies and colonial powers: ‘Before, artefacts were stolen and taken to these countries. Now they are exploiting resources like oil, gas, minerals,’ he says. ‘We should be partners for advanced countries rather than [suffer] this exploitation.’

1 digital-benin.org 

2 Felwine Sarr and Bénédicte Savoy, ‘The Restitution of African Cultural Heritage…’, November 2018, nin.tl/sarr-savoy

 3 Peter Stubley, ‘Museums risk funding cuts if they remove controversial objects…’, Independent, 27 September 2020, nin.tl/funds-risk

This article is from the March-April 2022 issue of New Internationalist.

Red River crest expected in Manitoba between April 8 and 15

Tuesday, April 5th 2022 - Only localized flooding expected in some places between Emerson and Winnipeg

Flood forecasters say they expect the Red River to begin cresting in Manitoba later this week at a volume that should only result in localized flooding.

The U.S. National Weather Service expects the Red to crest on Wednesday at Pembina, N.D., near the Canada-U.S. border.

Manitoba's hydrologic forecast centre expects the Red to crest between Emerson, Man., and Winnipeg sometime between this Friday and the following Friday, April 15.

The river is expected to spill over its banks at some locations, forecasters said. The peak volume of the spring flood is expected to be somewhere between 45,000 and 57,000 cubic feet per second south of Winnipeg at the Red River Floodway inlet.

That's roughly one third the volume of the Flood of the Century in 1997, when the river peaked at 138,000 cubic feet per second south of the floodway.

 

Some provincial roads closed during the spring flood along the Red River in 2020. This year's flood is expected to be slightly lower in volume. (Thomas Asselin/CBC)

The province says the floodway may be put to use, provided river ice moves off in time.

The Red River in Winnipeg is nonetheless expected to peak somewhere between 17.3 and 18.3 feet above normal winter ice level at James Avenue.

That level straddles the line between a minor and moderate flood in the city. Only 16 low-lying city properties have been identified as potentially being at risk, the City of Winnipeg said last week.

As of Monday evening, the Red in Winnipeg had risen to 15.5 feet James.

No significant flooding is expected this spring along the Assiniboine River, Souris River or Pembina River, the province said.

This story was originally published by CBC News on April 4, 2022.

ICYMI
Lebanon goes bankrupt: Deputy Prime Minister

Lebanon as a State, and its Central Bank, has gone bankrupt, according to Deputy Prime Minister, Saadeh Al-Shami.

April 4, 2022 


Lebanon as a State, and its Central Bank, has gone bankrupt, according to Deputy Prime Minister, Saadeh Al-Shami.

"The State has gone bankrupt as did the Banque du Liban, and the loss has occurred, and we will seek to reduce losses for the people," Al-Shami told the local Al-Jadeed channel.




Prime Minister Najib Mikati: Lebanon heading towards collapse – Cartoon [Sabaaneh/Middle East Monitor]

He said the losses will be distributed among the State, the Banque du Liban, banks and depositors.

"There is no conflict of views about the distribution of losses," he added.

Since late 2019, Lebanon has been grappling with a severe economic crisis, including a massive currency depreciation as well as fuel and medical shortages.

The Lebanese currency has lost 90 per cent of its value, eroding people's ability to access basic goods, including food, water, healthcare, and education, while widespread power outages are common due to fuel shortages.

Al-Shami said the country's situation "cannot be ignored" hence bank withdrawals cannot be open to all people.

"I wish we were in a normal situation," he added.

Cash withdrawals in foreign currency in Lebanon have been strictly limited since 2019, due to the ongoing economic crisis.