Hate propaganda in India

Modi opponents labelled 'anti-national'

Aggressive propaganda is increasingly distorting public debate in India. Government agencies tolerate and sometimes even promote Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Hindu chauvinism. Those daring to criticise the government face intimidation, harassment and suppression. By Arfa Khanum Sherwani

In December 2021, leading Hindu supremacists met for a three-day conclave in the north Indian town of Haridwar. One demand raised was that Muslims in India be treated in the same way as Myanmar’s Rohingya minority. It was a blatant call to genocidal action. After all, the Rohingya were murdered in pogroms, villages were burned down and masses had to flee the country. The message spelt out in Haridwar was that Hindus should perpetrate bloodshed in order to entrench their lifestyle in India. Hate speech of this kind must be taken seriously, in view of the country's dark track record of pogroms.

It is illegal to stir communal hatred in India. Nonetheless, the authorities did not intervene even after the nature of what the extremists had discussed in Haridwar became known. As nationwide outrage at the news grew, the police finally arrested some participants, but it is unlikely they will be punished. Yati Narsinghanand, the mastermind of the meeting, was granted bail in February.

By contrast, non-violent government critics often languish in jail for years before a trial even starts. One current example is Umar Khalid, a prominent student activist who became a face of the protest movement against the anti-secular Citizenship Amendment Act in 2019/2020, in which Muslim women played leading roles.

Khalid has been detained since September 2020 and is accused of having instigated riots in Delhi. The charge is absurd because the "riots" were actually an anti-Muslim pogrom. Dozens of people were killed; mosques were torched. Two thirds of those who died were Muslims. After perpetrating acts of violence, Hindutva fanatics can mostly expect impunity, but state action against dissidents is usually very harsh. As with Khalid, the latter are often accused of violating India's draconian anti-terror law UAPA (Unlawful Activities Prevention Act).

Sowing hate reaps violence: in February 2020, riots against Muslims in New Delhi saw dozens of people die and hundreds injured. India has a long history of anti-Islamic violence, which is why it is illegal to sow discord between religious communities. Yet the authorities do not intervene when radical Hindu nationalists spread hate propaganda. In December last year, there was a three-day top-level meeting of Hindu chauvinist forces in Haridwar in northern India. One of the demands was that the Muslim community in India be treated like the Rohingya in Myanmar. This amounted to a blatant call tor genocide

Unconstitutional ideology

The ideology of Hindu dominance is called Hindutva. Modi’s party, the BJP, belongs to a network of organisations that insists that India must be a Hindu nation. The organisation at the heart of this movement is the RSS, which was inspired by Italy’s fascists in the 1920s. International observers tend to underestimate the totalitarian aspirations of Hindutva proponents.

The RSS is mostly intolerant of any worldview other than its own. The RSS and its network equate "the nation" with "Hindus", yet mainly focus only on the upper castes. Minorities do not figure and are expected to simply accept the social order the RSS wants. Its approach to governance is at times undemocratic and at times authoritarian. The Hindutva right longs to gain total control of India’s institutions and resents being challenged, as it was by the farmers' movement or the movement against the national citizenship law. BJP-controlled state agencies often respond with UAPA charges, accusing opponents of terrorism.

Hindutva ideology is fundamentally incompatible with India’s secular constitution, according to which no religious community may be oppressed or marginalised. Modi himself is a member of the RSS. He is known for his right-wing authoritarianism and his unwillingness to disown supporters who perpetrate violence.

To a large extent, mainstream media have caved in to his government. Commercial TV stations in particular make a point of multiplying its aggressive propaganda. These channels do not have a reputation for fact-checking and generally accept everything the government says at face value.

Controversial citizenship law reform: those protesting against the reform must expect harsh sanctions from the state, like student Umar Khalid, a prominent activist who became a face of the protest movement against the anti-secular Citizenship Amendment Act in 2019/2020, in which Muslim women played leading roles. Khalid has been detained since September 2020 and is accused of having instigated riots in Delhi. The charge is absurd because the "riots" were actually an anti-Muslim pogrom. Dozens of people were killed; mosques were torched. Two thirds of those who died were Muslims. After perpetrating acts of violence, Hindutva fanatics can mostly expect impunity, but state action against dissidents is usually very harsh

Social media manipulation

At the same time, Hindutva trolls spread hate on social-media platforms. Anyone who dares to disagree with the Modi government is called "anti-national", "treasonous", or a "terrorist". As the independent website The Wire, for which I work, recently revealed, the trolls use an app called Tek Fog to co-ordinate their action and to make disinformation go viral. To a considerable degree, Tek Fog manipulates digital media by technological means. The multinational corporations who own the platforms hardly intervene. They have shown on several occasions that pleasing the government is more important to them than promoting democratic discourse. Moreover, they do not really pay any attention to languages other than English.

The result is that Hindu supremacists appear more numerous and stronger online than they actually are in Indian society. In more ways than one, Facebook and Twitter have allowed themselves to become machines that spread hatred, misused to intimidate anyone who opposes the majoritarian agenda.

Targeted persons include social activists, human-rights defenders, members of opposition parties, lawyers and journalists. I myself have been exposed for a long time. Indeed, I am now on the list of the 10 Indian women who are most attacked on social media. Death and rape threats occur regularly.

Last year, the Hindu supremacists launched an app called Bulli Bai on which they staged fake auctions of Muslim women, using real photos and names. Due to public pressure, the app was taken down again, but it certainly served its purpose of harassing and intimidating the minority community.

 

Oppressed minorities

Minorities feel the impact in their daily lives. At the end of February, Muslim schoolgirls and students were barred from entering their educational institutions in the southern Indian state of Karnataka if they wore the Muslim headscarf. A court had passed an interim order permitting colleges to implement dress codes that were already in place. That order was misinterpreted, so all over the state, Muslim girls and young women were suddenly prevented from attending class. Karnataka’s Chief Minister Basavaraj Bommai belongs to Modi’s BJP.

Recently, Hindutva mobs have also regularly disrupted Friday prayers in Gurgaon, the Delhi suburb, which has officially been renamed Gurugram. The hooligans demanded that Muslims pray indoors, though everyone knows that the mosques are too small and too few to accommodate all the faithful on Fridays. At Christmas, Christian communities in southern India were attacked in a similar way.

Things are probably worst in Kashmir. The region was previously India's only Muslim-majority state, but the Modi government dismantled its relative autonomy and put it under central rule in 2019. Repression is rife. In February, the arrest of Fahad Shah, the editor of the independent website The Kashmir Walla, made international headlines. The New York Times spoke of "harassment and intimidation", while The Guardian stated that "a crackdown on the press in Indian-administered Kashmir continues to escalate". Indian democracy needs more attention of this kind.

Arfa Khanum Sherwani

© D+C | Development & Cooperation 2022

Arfa Khanum Sherwani is managing editor of the independent online newspaper The Wire

Islam in Southeast Asia

Autocratic versus democratic Islam

Indonesia has become a primary battleground between democratic and autocratic visions of Islam in the 21st century, with Nahdlatul Ulama pitted against Abdullah bin Bayyah, a Sunni high priest who provides UAE autocrats with religious legitimisation. Commentary by James M. Dorsey

© Qantara.de 2022

Indonesian President Joko Widodo risks finding himself in the battle’s crossfire. Although closely associated with Nahdlatul Ulama, the world’s largest civil society movement with 90 million followers, Widodo has agreed to co-operate with the UAE on religious affairs in return for massive Emirati investment in the Southeast Asian archipelago nation.

After all, UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed has pledged to lead a committee that will oversee the construction of a new US$32.5 billion capital city for Indonesia and invest $10 billion in the country’s sovereign wealth fund with a focus on infrastructure.

At the heart of the battle between rival theologically packaged visions of governance is the relationship between Islamic clerics and the state. Abdullah bin Bayyah favours a state-controlled clergy that stifles free-flowing debate, avoiding what the jurist terms the "chaos of the fatwa". The jurist heads the Emirates Fatwa Council, established in 2018 "to take the fatwa out of the hands of terrorists and extremists".

Hamdan Al Mazroui, head of the Emirati General Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowments at the time, said the Fatwa Council had been created to "ensure alignment of fatwas in the country and ensure preaching of moderate Islam". Control of religious debate in the UAE mirrors the country's crackdown on freedom of expression in general. The Emirates Fatwa Council also counts among its members Professor Amany Burhanuddin, a prominent Islamic scholar, who heads Indonesia's Council of Scholars for Women and Youth.

Dazzling the Indonesians with dollars: UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed has 

pledged to lead a committee that will oversee the construction of a new US$32.5 billion 

capital city for Indonesia on Borneo (see map), while also investing $10 billion –

 with a focus on infrastructure – in the country’s sovereign wealth fund

Nahdlatul Ulama's very different agenda

In diametric contradiction to Bin Bayyah and the UAE, Nahdlatul Ulama, under the leadership of its newly elected chairman, Yahya Cholil Staquf, a proponent of humanitarian Islam that propagates democracy, respect for human rights and pluralism, has launched a frontal attack on Indonesia's once-powerful Ulema Council. Made up of representatives of all strands of Sunni Islam, the Ulema Council is a remnant of erstwhile state control that many view as the country’s top body of Islamic scholars.

The assault is designed to marginalise the council, which is seeking to retain that authority as a de facto independent group. By undermining the Ulema Council, Nahdlatul Ulama is encouraging the very "chaos of the fatwa” that Bin Bayyah and his UAE backers would prefer to repress.

Created in 1975 by then-President Suharto as a quasi-independent body, the Ulema Council has long projected itself as the authoritative voice of Islam. However, even if successive Nahdlatul Ulama supreme guides have since chaired it, control of the council has been up for grabs ever since Suharto was toppled in 1998 by popular revolt.

For years the council propagated discriminatory policies against Muslim sects accused of being heretical such as the Ahmadis and the Shias, as well as against gender minorities. It did so with the support of conservative Nahdlatul Ulama clerics, including Jokowi’s vice-president, Ma'ruf Amin. In 2017, Amin played a key role as chairman of the council in mass protests that brought down Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, aka Ahok, an ethnic Chinese Christian, and led to his sentencing to two years in prison on charges of blasphemy against Islam.

Keeping religion and state separate? The world’s largest civil society movement could

 conclude that preventing Jokowi, tempted by UAE financial largesse, from buying into 

the Gulf state’s autocratic notion of 'moderate Islam' is reason enough to maintain close ties 

with the president. "While Staquf has publicly pledged to return Nadhlatul Ulama to being a 

politically neutral organisation, signs suggest it may well retain its close ties with the Jokowi 

regime, working with the government to promote the brand of 'moderate Islam' Jokowi

 endorses at home and abroad," says Indonesia scholar Alexander R. Arifianto

The Nahdlatul Ulama assault began when the group’s supreme leader Miftachul Akhyar resigned his post as chairman of the Ulema Council in March. The resignation appears to have thrown the council into disarray. At the same time, the ministry of religious affairs has deprived the council of its monopoly on halal certification by opening the sector to competition.

Halal certificates are big business. The Halal Product Assistance Agency issues the certificates based on an Ulema Council fatwa addressed to companies in the food, fashion, education, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, tourism, media, travel, medical, health, art, culture, and finance sectors. By undermining the council, Nahdlatul Ulama is attempting to remove the last remnants of state influence over the issue of fatwas.

Unfettered debate versus uniform state-approved guidance

It no doubt opens the door to what Bin Bayyah fears most. Echoed in statements by top UAE officials, Bin Bayyah blames instability and volatility in the Middle East on a cacophony of fatwas that fuel unfettered debate rather than provide uniform state-approved guidance to the faithful.

To Bin Bayyah's mind, autocracy – uninhibited by religious jurists who do not know their proper place – is best positioned to ensure societal peace. Bin Bayyah remained silent when his Emirati paymasters rendered his theory obsolete with military interventions in Libya and Yemen. Their interventions fuelled civil wars, while political and financial support for anti-government protests in Egypt that overthrew the country’s first and only democratically elected president in 2013 produced a brutal dictatorship.

More than 800 protesters against the coup were killed in its immediate aftermath. The UAE's intervention in Yemen in co-operation with Saudi Arabia sparked one of the world's worst humanitarian crises, while UAE support for Libyan rebel leader Khalifa Haftar in contravention of a United Nations arms embargo helped push the North African nation into protracted violent conflict.

Bin Bayyah's silence on chaos fomented by Emirati autocrats suggests that he "is not opposed to 'chaos' unconditionally, but rather he only refers to as 'chaos' efforts to oppose autocracy on the part of democratically-oriented forces in the region," says Usaama al-Azami, a British Middle East scholar of South Asian descent who also trained as a classical Islamic scholar.

Unconditional support for autocracy: Bin Bayyah's silence on the chaos fomented by the UAE

 suggests he "is not opposed to 'chaos' unconditionally, but rather he only refers to as 'chaos' 

efforts to oppose autocracy on the part of democratically-oriented forces in the region," 

says Islamic scholar Usaama al-Azami. Bin Bayyah believes jurists should not impinge 

on the decisions of a ruler because they do "not know the facts of the matter or the 

consequences of particular courses of actions". By contrast, "the ruler understands the

 underlying reasons for his decisions and delays with situations that are hard for others 

to understand"

Bin Bayyah's silence is grounded in his belief that jurists should not impinge on the decisions of a ruler because they do "not know the facts of the matter or the consequences of particular courses of actions". Moreover, Bin Bayyah argues that Islamic scholars may not be aware of a country's "internal tensions or external concerns that may lead to civil war which need to be taken into account in matters of state". By contrast, "the ruler understands the underlying reasons for his decisions and delays with situations that are hard for others to understand," Bin Bayyah has said.

Rather than subjugating Islamic scholars to state control, Staquf, the newly elected Nahdlatul Ulama chairman, has pledged to take the group out of politics. The assault on the Indonesian Ulema Council may be the first step in that direction. Still, the litmus test will be the future of the numerous Nahdlatul Ulama activists that serve in Widodo's cabinet and as ambassadors and board members of state-owned enterprises.

"While the new chairman has publicly pledged to return NU to being a politically neutral organisation, signs suggest it may well retain its close ties with the Jokowi regime, working with the government to promote the brand of 'moderate Islam' Jokowi endorses at home and abroad," said Indonesia scholar Alexander R. Arifianto.

Nahdlatul Ulama may well conclude that preventing Jokowi, tempted by UAE financial largesse, from buying into the Gulf state’s autocratic notion of 'moderate Islam' is reason enough to maintain the group’s close ties to the president.

James M. Dorsey

Saints of Islam

Capturing the light of sages

For over fifty years, British photographer Peter Sanders travelled across the Middle East and further afield, seeking out the saints of Islam. His work uncovers a little-known world. 

By Marian Brehmer

Since the mid-20th century, many in the West have been aware of the masters of the Indian subcontinent. Books such as Swami Yogananda's Autobiography of a Yogi influenced a whole generation in its quest for meaning; so much so that Steve Jobs, for instance, had the book handed out at his funeral.

The saints and enlightened beings of Islam, on the other hand, are hardly known to anyone. In mediaeval Islamic mysticism, there is a lively tradition of recording the biographies of great masters in the form of hagiographic legends and narratives. However, the fame of contemporary Muslim saints rarely extends beyond their homelands.

It was thus from a sense of vocation that British photographer Peter Sanders went to seek out saints in the Islamic world and invited them in front of his lens, to be recorded for posterity. For nearly five decades, Sanders travelled between North Africa and Southeast Asia to spend time in the presence of spiritual leaders of Islam and – if they gave permission – to take their portrait.

Yet the early years of Peter Sander's career were very different: in London of the sixties, the young artist made a name for himself by photographing the great idols of contemporary youth culture. Sanders put legends like Bob Dylan, Eric Clapton and the Rolling Stones in front of the camera, taking one of the last photos of Jimi Hendrix before he died from drug and alcohol overdose.

Disillusioned with the materialism in British society

“These people were the poets of our time. They were commenting on what was happening in society,” Sanders says in an interview on Zoom, sitting in his study in front of a shelf of photo books and records. "Before I embarked on a spiritual journey, those were my reference points. However, after becoming a Muslim, my reference points came to be men of wisdom." In retrospect, he sees rock stars as similar to the poets of the jahiliyya – the period of ignorance in Arabia before the Prophet Muhammad – because they were poor role models to base a life on.

In addition to Morocco and the Maghreb, Sanders documents spiritual leaders from Egypt,

 the Arabian Peninsula, Turkey, Syria, the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia and China.

 "The portraits are touching. There is nothing of folklore about them, but they convey a sense of the deeply transformative

 potential of Islamic spirituality," 

writes Marian Brehmer

Disillusioned with the materialism and hedonism in English society, Sanders, like many of his contemporaries, embarked on a spiritual quest to India. In 1971, following a dream, he embraced Islam as a spiritual path. Three weeks later, he travelled to Morocco and had an encounter that was to have a profound impact on his life – a meeting with Muhammad ibn al-Habib, Sufi master of the Dharqawi order.

The encounter with al-Habib in Ramadan 1971 is documented at the beginning of Meetings with Mountains, Sanders’ impressive volume of photographs. Besides the impactful shot showing the saint in white robe and turban, with kohl-rimmed eyes and prayer beads, Sanders describes how his initial shyness dissolved in the saint’s presence:

"It felt like we had slipped into a still pool of peace, and under his gaze my fears suddenly and inexplicably melted into ease. There was very little conversation. Sayyiduna Shaikh emanated a compassion that filled the room. When he did speak to me, it was with great gentleness and an acceptance of all I was, without any judgement."                                                                                                            

Not charisma, but a quality of the soul

It was then that Sanders got a sense of what is called in Sufism an insan-i kamil or "perfect man" – a person who has realised the highest potential in himself: "There is something special about looking into the faces of these people. They have beautiful faces. It is not about charisma, much more about a quality that comes deeply from the soul. It is so refined that you can easily miss it."

In addition to Morocco and the Maghreb, Sanders documents spiritual leaders from Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Turkey, Syria, the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia and China. The portraits are touching. There is nothing of folklore about them, but they convey a sense of the deeply transformative potential of Islamic spirituality.

 

"Taking portraits was never easy for me, because I am rather shy by nature. I had to first find the courage. But it is easier with those people, because they don’t have any ego. It’s harder with people who have an ego, as they put on a mask," says Peter Sanders. "Many of these saints have never been photographed before. That's because of their modesty, because they don't want to give the impression that they are something."

Over the years, Sanders noticed that many of his subjects died just weeks after he had photographed them. Muhammad ibn Al-Habib also died in early 1972 while on the way to Mecca on his third hajj. What at first seemed to Sanders like an uncanny chain of coincidences soon led him to realise that the old masters' willingness to be photographed might actually stem from their knowledge that they would soon leave the earth.

In fact, Sander's photographs are often the only pictures ever taken of the respective saint. They thus carry a historical significance of which Sanders only became aware in retrospect. "It's important that we get to see the faces of these people. It is as if this picture has been removed. We need to restore that image of Islam," says Sanders. "Many Muslims today don't even know why they are actually Muslims. Many feel alienated from the religion as it is lived at the moment. We live in such divisive times. Especially now it is important to bring people together."

Marian Brehmer

© Qantara.de 2022

Build a community with shared security for a world free of chemical weapons

By Tan Jian | chinadaily.com.cn | Updated: 2022-04-29 14:21

JIN DING/CHINA DAILY

In Commemoration of the 25th Anniversary of the Entry into Force of the Chemical Weapons Convention

Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

April 29 marks the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”) and the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Convention is a milestone in international disarmament. It is the first international legal instrument for the comprehensive prohibition and thorough destruction of an entire category of weapons of mass destruction with a strict verification mechanism. From the 1675 Strasbourg Agreement to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and to the entry into force of the Convention in 1997, the consistent pursuit of peace and security across more than three centuries has borne mankind’s vision for a world free of chemical weapons.

China is one of the first signatories to the Convention. Over the past 25 years, China has been faithfully upholding the purpose and objective of the Convention. China fully honors its obligations under the Convention, has established an effective national compliance system and keeps updating the legislation for implementation. As the State Party with the largest number of declared and inspected facilities, China always submits its declaration in a timely and accurate manner, and receives verifications and inspections efficiently and strictly. As of today, China has successfully received 593 industrial inspections. China is now the second-largest contributor to the OPCW and provides crucial financial support to its operation. Both of the two OPCW designated laboratories in China have achieved excellent results over the previous annual proficiency tests.

Over the past 25 years, China has been firmly safeguarding its sovereignty, security and development interests. The handling of Japanese Abandoned Chemical Weapons (JACW) on the territory of China is a matter concerns reckoning the history of Japanese militarist invasion of China, the safety of the Chinese people and its ecology and social stability, and the international fairness and justice. During the negotiations on the Convention, China insisted on the inclusion in the Convention that "each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party", and made important contributions to the successful conclusion of the Convention. It is with China’s push and support that the OPCW Policy-Making Organs review the issue of JACWs on a regular basis and request Japan’s fulfillment of its obligations under the Convention. As of January this year, a total of about 60,000 JACWs have been destroyed, which contributes to safeguarding the safety of local people, property and environment in China. Yet this is an unfinished task and we will push for the total destruction of JACWs.

Over the past 25 years, China has been unswervingly maintaining international fairness and justice. China firmly opposes the use of chemical weapons by any country, organization or individual under any circumstances and for any purpose. China supports the OPCW to stick to the principles of objectivity, impartiality and independence, and to investigate alleged uses of chemical weapons in strict accordance with the provisions of the Convention. In 2014, China participated in the international operation to jointly escort the shipping of chemical weapons from Syria and contributed to the elimination of the chemical weapons and the defusing of the regional crisis.

Over the past 25 years, China has been vigorously advancing international cooperation in the chemical field. China, committed to promoting international cooperation under the Convention framework, has made important contributions to OPCW including financial ones. China supports the construction and operation of the future OPCW Centre for Chemistry and Technology, and earnestly provides assistance to States Parties, especially the developing countries, to enhance their capacity building. Last year, China tabled at the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly the resolution entitled “Promoting International Cooperation on Peaceful Uses in the Context of International Security”. It aims to foster peaceful uses and benefit sharing of the science, technology and resources in chemical and other related fields, which has garnered widespread support among developing countries.

After 25 years of development, the number of States Parties to the Convention has reached 193, and 99 percent of the world's declared chemical weapons have been destroyed. The Convention and the OPCW have contributed significantly to world peace and security. However, given the changes in the international situation, the OPCW and the authority and effectiveness of the Convention are confronted with severe and complex challenges. Certain countries prefer confrontation over dialogue and cooperation because of their Cold War mentality and attempt to make the OPCW a political instrument. The deadline for the destruction of the US’ stockpiles of chemical weapons has been extended several times. The JACW destruction process has been prolonged for years. Incidents of alleged use of chemical weapons have also been reported from time to time. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of chemistry is yet to be strengthened with concrete actions. All these challenges undermine the achievement of the purpose and objective of the Convention and its full implementation requires further actions.

Recently, President Xi Jinping proposed the Global Security Initiative at the Opening Ceremony of the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference 2022 and highlighted that “it is important that we stay committed to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and work together to maintain world peace and security; reject the Cold War mentality, oppose unilateralism, and say no to group politics and bloc confrontation; stay committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation, support all efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of crises.”

Faced with such situation and challenges, these principles also apply to the Convention and the OPCW, which are indispensable parts of the global security governance. China stands ready to work with the OPCW and other States Parties to promote the international chemical weapons disarmament and non-proliferation process. Its position can be further elaborated as follows:

First, the authority of the Convention should be jointly safeguarded. The Convention forms an essential part of international arms control regime. States Parties should live up to their commitments, fulfill their due obligations in good faith, strive to practice multilateralism and defend the authority of the Convention. We should stand firm against unilateralism and hegemonism, and bridge differences through dialogue. The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW should uphold the principles of objectivity, impartiality and independence, and fulfill its mandate under the Convention.

Second, the process of chemical weapons destruction should be continued. The complete and thorough destruction of chemical weapons is the core objective of the Convention. As the sole possessor State of chemical weapons stockpiles, the United States should speed up its complete destruction. Japan should make all possible efforts to accelerate the JACW destruction in a pragmatic and responsible manner, so that a world free of chemical weapons can become a reality sooner.

Third, international cooperation should be strengthened. International cooperation is a cornerstone of the Convention and is also the direction of the transition of the OPCW. China stands for more inputs into the prioritized areas of the developing countries and the expansion of the “toolkit” for international cooperation, so as to enhance States Parties’ compliance capability. Meanwhile, we should pursue both security and development by finding a balance between non-proliferation and peaceful uses, in a bid to ensure States Parties’ full entitlement of the right of peaceful uses.

The Fifth Review Conference of the Convention will be held next year. China is ready to work with all parties to practice true multilateralism and uphold the global governance principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits. China will continue to advocate the common values of humanity, strive to build a community with shared security and concertedly work for a world free of chemical weapons.

The author is Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn

Reverse-Orientalism, feminism inform work of Omani artist Eman Ali

Sexuality, the performance of gender, and religious and socio-political ideologies are at the forefront of Omani artist Eman Ali's art, and her hybrid of artistic expression ranges from photography to installation.

Corridors of Power - Eman Ali

Naima Morelli
@naimamorelli

April 26, 2022


There are times in which both the life and work of an artist are in communication, representing a stance against conservatism, and paving the path for others to express themselves more freely. This is certainly the case with Omani photographer Eman Ali, 36. “Through my life and art I want to leave a legacy of courage,” told Al-Monitor. “I hope to inspire future women, especially those living in Oman, to be brave, to push against the grain and harness the power of their own voice and creativity.”

One of the hottest and boldest artists from the Gulf, Ali is a sophisticated woman whose attitude and allure recall Italian singer from the 1960s Mina. Born in London and raised in Oman, she constantly travels between London, Manama and Muscat, realizing much of her work in the Gulf, and reviving her connection and roots in these three cities.


Her artworks are rich in both tradition and an empowered representation of women, confronting the history of the Arabian Peninsula. In her work, Ali heavily draws inspiration from her own background and life experience, and she is not afraid to question the cultural intricacies of Khaleeji societies, constantly reflecting on national identity, history, memory and loss.

Recently gaining representation by the all-women artist Hunna Contemporary Galley, Ali started off with documentary photography, and slowly integrated light, video and sound to create installations. Today, she employs different mediums depending on the context, but her cinematic aesthetic mixed with an Arab feminist sensitivity remains extremely recognizable

The beginning of Ali’s interest in art started in her childhood. “I was always drawn to art but was never really good at drawing or painting. I never thought of becoming an artist; I wanted to be a forensic scientist,” she said.

Ali mentions her brother as the one who helped shape her artistic sensibilities. He handed her down his Canon camera when she was just 10. She recalled, “From then on my photographic journey began. I discovered photography was the perfect medium for me to play with.”

Ali left Oman when she was 18 to pursue her studies in graphic design in London. “Being away allowed me to appreciate my country and cultural traditions more,” she noted. “The distance helped me look at familiar things with a fresh pair of eyes. This new perspective opened up exciting ways of seeing that I began exploring in my work.”

After she graduated with a Master of Arts in Photography, she started doing documentary photography upon her return back home, observing culture and social life in the Arabian Peninsula. She honed her reporter and journalistic eye during the 2011 uprising in Bahrain, where she lived at the time, and created the black and white photo series “Pearl,” documenting peaceful demonstrations at Manama's Pearl Roundabout, which at the time was occupied by a community of protesters, opposing the government’s laws, political arrests and the ruling family’s grip on power.

The following year, she investigated the LGBTQ+ community in Bahrain with the photo series “Wendy’s,” focusing her exploration on the homonymous unofficial gay club and a safe space for the community to come together. In the series, the news coverage of the political unrest in Bahrain was juxtaposed with the sheer instinct of liveliness at Wendy’s.



The reflections on her identity as a woman within a heavily traditional society became increasingly evident over time, and her work shifted more from documentarian to representation, as she became interested in visual art. An example is "Her Holeyness” (2017), an installation composed of luminous panels and video screens, where she recreates commercial presentations of female bodies, who are continually asked to be cleaning and purified in Arab culture. Her idea was to question the place of the woman and societal expectations by using the visual language of advertising.

Her latest project — “Succession” — a book created by collecting visual archives from the 1970s, opens up a new chapter in her artistic practice and focuses on the figure of the late Sultan Qaboos bin Said, who had a big impact on the development of the entire Omani nation. “The period before his rule — pre-1970s — was described as the dark ages,” Ali explained. “Many restrictions affected people’s day-to-day lives. There was no proper infrastructure in the country at that time with only three schools and two hospitals available.”

When the sultan ascended the throne, he began the process of modernizing the state, using oil revenues, by introducing development and social services. Health care and education became accessible to all, roads were paved, new development projects were initiated and job opportunities were created. Women became active participants in the workforce and contributed to political decisions. He also played a pivotal role in uniting the country as one by ending the tribal feuds. An indication of this is the change in the name from Oman and Muscat to simply Oman.

“Everyone was empowered to work toward the country’s progress," Ali noted. "It’s a huge leap from how things used to be and greatly impacted the generation that was born after this time for the better, including myself."

Ali found her first inspiration for “Succession” in her father’s collection of publications called “Oman.” These were newsletters published by the Omani Embassy in London during the 70s and 80s to inform people within the diplomatic circle what was going on in terms of the development of a new modern state, presenting Sultan Qaboos bin Said as a “Renaissance man.”

“I was immediately drawn to these publications because they served as a time capsule, a record of an era coming to an end. The images themselves were so arresting that I knew I had to archive them somehow,” she said.

To preserve them, Ali decided to scan them in high resolution front to back. At the time, she was also taking iPhone pictures of the photographs in the publication that she felt instantly connected to. “My approach was very instinctual and I just ran with my gut feeling,” she recalled, saying that if there was a certain shape or someone looked interesting in a picture, she would zoom in on it and capture it. “I appropriated the images on the camera. I had no clear idea of what I was going to do with all these photos, but knew that I would use them for something in the future.”

Shortly after, David Drake, director of Ffotogallery in Wales, contacted her about the exhibition “The Place I Call Home” and commissioned her to produce a new body of work that related to the theme. The project was to be shot in Oman and since the country was at a very critical stage politically, Ali wanted to make something relevant to the time. “The images that I had previously collected then began to make sense to me as a body of work to explore,” she explained.

The captured images were reworked to create a series of cropped images arranged into a sequence. “It was a challenge that inspired me to create. The book for me was a way to question my own understanding of the modern history of Oman, to explore the unreliability of memory and to show the important role photography had in reinforcing a new national identity,” she noted.

In the selection of images, Ali chose to show the viewer her subjective viewpoint in a sort of reverse-Orientalism. “I wanted to employ their methodology and subvert the white colonial gaze to reintroduce these images from my own perspective as an Omani woman,” she added.

Ali’s explorations into Oman's national history are still ongoing. The artist is currently completing a series of photographs captured in Oman as part of a historic project that will live on the blockchain. She has also set up a temporary studio in Oman where she will be expanding her practice outside of photography.

Women in Yemen trapped by war, abuse
Eight years have passed since the war in Yemen began, and women there continue to exist in dire situations in which they are faced not only with the hardships of displacement but also with threats, persecution, imprisonment and banishment from exercising their political rights.

A woman works on a mural on the southern wall of Sanaa's university in the Yemeni capital during the Open Day of Art annual event on March 15, 2017. - MOHAMMED HUWAIS/AFP via Getty Images

Boshra Alhomaide
April 28, 2022

A recent report by a Yemeni-based NGO revealed shocking numbers regarding the scale of abuses women in Yemen have faced since the beginning of the war.

SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties said in its report issued March 8 on International Women’s Day that more than 4,000 cases of abuses against women were recorded until the end of 2020, including murder, injury to the body, arbitrary arrest, forced disappearance, torture and prevention of movement.

The report also indicated that there are more than 900,000 displaced women in the camps of the Marib governorate as a result of the ongoing war in the country.

The Houthi movement has the highest rate of abuses against women with 70% of the cases, followed by Yemen government forces with 18%, the Southern Transitional Council with 5% and other parties with 7%. The violations varied between deliberate killings and severe injuries against female civilians and activists — acts that are tantamount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, according to the report.

Former Yemen Minister of Human Rights Houria Mashhour told Al-Monitor, “The war is a calamity for all people, affecting both men and women. But its impact on women is more severe. These usually lose their male relatives who perish in the conflict, and (the women then) become the sole breadwinner for their children and families, struggling to get work and the basic necessities of life such as water, food, medicine and other needs that have become scarce.”

“The war affects young women and men as well. The latter have to drop out of school to go to the battlefields. Also, women face health problems, especially mothers, in light of the deterioration of health services and the dispersal of families due to displacement or asylum,” she added.

Huda al-Sarari, head of the Aden-based Defense Foundation for Rights and Freedoms, told Al-Monitor, “Over the past few years of the war, women have faced gradual systematic practices to strip them of their rights amid the absence of laws, the disruption of state institutions and the militias’ control of most areas across the country, especially groups affiliated with the Houthis.”

“The de-facto authorities have committed crimes and violations against women that have never occurred in the history of Yemeni conflicts, stripping women of their rights and committing transgressions with purely ideological motives,” she said. “Many women have been sacked from their jobs and were not allowed to take up jobs in certain professions. This is not to mention restrictions of their rights, freedoms and prohibition of travel except with a male companion."

Sarari added, “Women have been under close scrutiny when it comes to community activities. They are banned from gathering and marching to call for rights and freedoms. This is not to mention arrests and [forced] disappearances. Many women faced death sentences and life sentences in prison for their actions, judged as being immoral from a wrong and narrow religious perspective.”

“Women face great challenges in demanding justice in the absence of laws and the lack of legal protection. Meanwhile, women’s and human rights organizations have been preoccupied with humanitarian relief as the war is still ongoing, in which women continue to be the first victims through systematic attacks on their lives and physical safety in the absence of psychological support, laws to protect women in armed conflicts, and the lack of commitment by the warring parties to international human rights laws and absence of accountability in Yemen,” Sarari said.

In a report issued in December 2020, the Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms documented 4,282 cases of abuse against women in Yemen from Sept. 21, 2014 (the start of the war), to Oct. 25, 2020. This figure includes 1,456 deaths; 2,379 cases of injury as a result of artillery shelling, the explosion of mines and explosive devices, and sniping; and 447 cases of kidnapping, disappearance and torture.

Qoboul Abdo al-Absi, head of the Qarar Foundation for Media and Sustainable Development, told Al-Monitor, “The war has caused the displacement of millions of Yemenis from the conflict areas. Some 5 million were displaced, mostly children and women who were left to look after their families amid poor basic services, which made them vulnerable to exploitation, torture, violence, deterioration in economic conditions and deprivation of education.”

“Women were also marginalized in the government formation (in 2020), with only one woman being part of the negotiations. Many women are also arrested and tortured with no regard to social morals. Many female activists and journalists are being threatened and arrested. They are not immune to abuses and killings in the most horrific ways, torture or boobytrapped, as was the case of the journalist Rasha,” she added, in reference to Rasha al-Harazi who was killed in a car explosion in Aden in November 2021.

War-weary Yemenis aspire for peace

As April 29 marks the World Wish Day, many Yemenis say their main wish is to see peace restored to Yemen

Mohammed Alragawi |29.04.2022
File photo showing UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres (2nd R), UN special envoy to Yemen Martin Griffiths and Foreign Minister of Sweden Margot Wallstrom (L) attend a press conference during the closing session of Yemen peace talks in Rimbo town of Stockholm, Sweden, on December 12, 2018. ( Atila Altuntaş - Anadolu Agency )

ISTANBUL

The formation of a new presidential council and a UN-brokered truce have raised hopes among Yemeni civilians of establishing peace and security in the war-ravaged country.

Earlier this month, Yemen’s newly formed presidential council was sworn in to lead the country through a transitional period, sparking hopes of putting an end to the 8-year conflict in the Arab country.

Yemen’s warring rivals also agreed to a UN-brokered two-month truce during which all offensive military operations were halted.

As April 29 marks the World Wish Day, many Yemenis speaking with Anadolu Agency said their main wish is to see peace restored to their country.

Abdulhamid El-Ain, a Yemeni doctor based in Saudi Arabia, said establishing peace and security in Yemen is “everyone’s wish”.

“Achieving this wish is enough to guarantee other wishes of millions of Yemeni people,” he told Anadolu Agency on Friday.

Yemen has been engulfed by violence and instability since 2014, when Iran-aligned Houthi rebels captured much of the country, including the capital Sanaa.

A Saudi-led coalition, which seeks to reinstate the Yemeni government, has worsened the situation, causing one of the world’s worst man-made humanitarian crises.

Nearly 80%, or about 30 million people, are in need of humanitarian assistance and protection, and more than 13 million in danger of starvation, according to UN estimates.

Better life

Bekil El-Dulai, a chief financial officer, said the life of Yemenis will greatly improve if peace and security are restored to the country.

“With an established peace in the country, the war will eventually end, prices will fall, and there will be more opportunities for work, investment, freedom and a decent life for everyone,” he said.

Mohammed El-Ghouly, a university student, opines that restoring state institutions is vital to bring stability to Yemen.
“Without effective governmental institutions, the country may turn into a militia state,” he said.

“Strong state institutions would pave the way for a permanent ceasefire and lasting peace, and eliminating the humanitarian crisis that killed many Yemenis for years,” he added.

Lasting peace

For Daifallah El-Quhali, a Yemeni journalist, without strong state institutions “no wish is coming true.”

He believes that establishing strong state institutions is a “necessity for a dignified, humane and secure life.”

“The wishes for lasting peace, acceptable level of freedoms, and a strong economy that enables people to live with honor and dignity are going to become a reality when the state and its institutions are back on track,” El-Quhali said.

The years-long conflict in Yemen has destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure and undermined the ability of most institutions to deliver essential social services.

Nabilah Saeed, a human rights activist, said: “without strengthening the state institutions, the ongoing war will continue to affect the daily routine of Yemenis.”

“Yemen currently has very weak and ineffective institutions, and restoring those institutions means restoring hopes of the Yemeni civilians, and restoring the state’s strength,” she added.

Saeed said establishing strong state institutions requires a “comprehensive national project” that considers all the needs of people, eliminates the political obstacles, and adapts possible arrangements.

Opposition head displaces Ankara, Istanbul mayors as Erdogan's next election rival

Republican People’s Party head Kemal Kilicdaroglu has entered the running for the Turkish opposition’s presidential candidate.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu, chair of the Republican People's Party, arrives at his home after a power outage in Ankara, Turkey, on April 21, 2022. - ADEM ALTAN/AFP via Getty Images

Andrew Wilks
April 28, 2022

ISTANBUL — The lights were back on in Turkish opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu’s Ankara home on Thursday after a week without electricity in protest at surging energy prices.

The end of his protest — he had refused to pay his electricity bill since February — coincided with Kilicdaroglu emerging as the most likely candidate to face President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in an election scheduled for June 2023.

As leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), Turkey's largest opposition party, Kilicdaroglu is the de facto head of the Nation Alliance, a electoral coalition of four opposition parties that formed for the 2018 elections.

In recent months, he has said he would be “honored” to be the alliance’s presidential candidate but refrained from indicating whether he would run.

Speaking on Tuesday, the day after philanthropist Osman Kavala was jailed for life in a case viewed as deeply unjust by many, Kilicdaroglu called on supporters to “join me or get out of my way right now.”

His rousing speech was interpreted by unnamed CHP insiders speaking to local media as a declaration of his candidacy. The Cumhuriyet newspaper, which has ties to the CHP, reported that other opposition party leaders backed the move.

Previously, two other prominent CHP figures had been touted as the likeliest candidates: Ankara Mayor Mansur Yavas and Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. Both won office in the 2019 local elections, replacing incumbents from Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey’s two largest cities.

Since their victories, Yavas and Imamoglu have adopted wide-ranging policies to improve public services and root out corruption and mismanagement.

Before he turned to politics, Kilicdaroglu was a civil servant who rose to head the social insurance agency. He has often been characterized by his bureaucratic background and criticized for not connecting with ordinary voters.

Critics have also pointed to his record since taking over leadership of the CHP in 2010, during which the party has failed to gain more than 26% of the vote in four parliamentary elections.

“It’s only natural that Kilicdaroglu becomes the candidate of the opposition because he’s the president of the largest party in the Nation Alliance. He’s the leader of the main opposition party,” said Ozgur Unluhisarcikli, director of the German Marshall Fund in Ankara. “Yes, he has a track record of losing elections against Erdogan but he also has a track record of experience.”

He added, “Because he’s a senior figure, his candidacy cannot easily be contested by other people in his party or even by the other parties in the alliance.”

Kilicdaroglu’s pivotal role in forming the Nation Alliance, which has coalesced into a group promising wide-ranging reforms and a return to Turkey’s parliamentary system, is also seen as an achievement that now presents a united front to Erdogan.

He was also instrumental in helping the newly formed Iyi Party, now the second largest party in the alliance, to compete in the 2018 election by lending 15 CHP deputies shortly after the party was formed in a break from the Nationalist Action Party (MHP). The MHP is allied to the AKP as the People’s Alliance.

A year earlier, Kilicdaroglu embraced a new form of Turkish politics when he set off on a 25-day Justice March from Ankara to Istanbul to protest the imprisonment of a CHP lawmaker.

The march by the party leader, then 68, attracted support from a wide spectrum of government opponents. Islamic State suspects were arrested for planning to bomb the demonstration.

One concern for CHP campaign planners will be Kilicdaroglu’s Alevi roots. Alevis, who largely adhere to Shiism mixed with Sufi beliefs, are Turkey’s largest religious minority and have historically been subject to prejudice and pogroms.

“First of all he’s an Alevi in a Sunni-majority country. That will certainly have a negative impact on his chances; we don’t know by how much,” said Unluhisarcikli.

Journalist Murat Yetkin said Kilicdaroglu’s background could provide an avenue of attack for the AKP, telling Al-Monitor, “As soon as Kilicdaroglu is announced as a candidate, [the CHP] are worried that him being Alevi could led to black propaganda under the table, or perhaps openly, from Erdogan and the AKP that will deter conservative voters, the vast majority of whom are Sunnis.”

However, as the leader of a centrist, social democratic party, attracting Turkey’s vast right could prove to be the main obstacle on Kilicdaroglu’s path to power.

“It’s doubtful whether he’s the best person in the alliance to gain support from right-wing voters, ideally including from the AKP and MHP as well,” said Unluhisarcikli. “Other potential names that have been mentioned, first and foremost Mansur Yavas, would find it easier to attract AKP and MHP voters, as well as the votes from the right-wing parties in the Nation Alliance.”

This weakness could be countered by nominating opposition politicians from the right, such as Iyi leader Meral Aksener, for his cabinet if he wins, he added.

Turkish opposition

Courting Turkey’s disenchanted electorate

Despite the economic crisis and Turkey's increasingly undemocratic track record, surveys show the ruling AKP is still the party of choice. So what exactly is holding back the opposition? Ayse Karabat reports from Istanbulp

March 2022 saw the release of Turkey’s official annual inflation rate. The figure – 61 percent – was met with disbelief by many Turkish citizens, including Baki Ersoy, MP for the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Like many Turks, Ersoy complained about the recent price hikes, saying the government should stop turning a blind eye to reality. Consequently, he was forced to resign from the MHP, a staunch ally of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The official inflation rate produced by The Turkish Statistical Institute (TUİK) was directly countered by the Independent Inflation Research Group (ENAG). This group of prominent independent Turkish economists found the country's annual inflation in March to be 142 percent. ENAG could face serious repercussions for challenging the official figures. An AKP bill proposing imprisonment for those who publish alternative statistics without using TUİK-approved methodology is currently awaiting ratification.

Yet other parameters are also indicative of growing fatigue towards Erdogan's government. The official unemployment rate is over 10 percent, more than 1,400 doctors have left the country due to poor working conditions and the tally of femicides continues to grow by the day. A recent survey conducted by Yeditepe University and polling company MAK revealed that 64 percent of young people aged between 18 and 29 want to leave Turkey because they see little hope for the future. 

Other polls suggest, however, that the AKP, which has been in power since 2019 and has seen its popularity wane, is still some four to five points ahead of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP).

Plenty of reasons not to vote AKP: ENAG – Turkey's Independent Inflation Research Group – found Turkey's annual inflation in March to be 142 percent, more than double the official figure issued by government body TUIK. Unemployment is officially running at over 10 percent, more than 1,400 doctors have left the country due to poor working conditions and the tally of femicides continues to grow by the day. One recent survey revealed that 64 percent of young people aged between 18 and 29 want to leave Turkey because they see little hope for the future

From identity- to class-based politics

Turkey is a highly polarised society, based largely on differing identities and lifestyles. This is also reflected in the population's voting behaviour. Regardless of income levels, most conservative, religious citizens and some nationalists vote for the AKP and its ally, the MHP, while citizens with secular ideas and modern lifestyles support the opposition, dominated by the CHP. This societal division dates back to the founding of modern Turkey in 1923.

The CHP, established by the founder of the republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, supported a headscarf ban in the 1990s and early 2000s in public spheres and universities. In 2010, it was the AKP that lifted the ban. The ruling party remains adept at reminding the public about former grievances caused by the CHP. Leader of the opposition Kemal Kilicdaroglu has even criticised his own party’s past mistakes – such as the headscarf ban – several times.

He has also acknowledged mistakes made by the Turkish state, including harsh taxes imposed on non-Muslim minorities during the early decades of the republic, in which many believe the CHP to have been complicit. When and if his party comes to power in the next election, Kilicdaroglu has promised reconciliation and acknowledgement regarding those events. He has not, however, provided any details as to how his party intends to go about this.

According to Kilicdaroglu, there needs to be an end to politics based on fuelling tension and polarisation. "They are trying to stay in power by consolidating the masses using tensions and polarisation. This style of politics needs to end," he said in interview.

Bekir Agirdir, general manager of KONDA polling company and prominent political analyst, says that lifestyle-based political behaviours and voting habits are changing. Surveys conducted by KONDA reveal that "as unemployment, poverty and inequalities in income distribution increase, class tensions come to the fore and identity tensions are replaced by class tensions".

How to unite the country? Turkey has a history of polarisation along cultural, religious and ideological lines. Despite pleading for an end to politics based on fuelling division and preaching reconciliation, CHP leader Kilicdaroglu must offer more than solidarity with the working class. Committing to ongoing social support for the vulnerable and a 'strengthened parliamentary system' is a good start

On the other hand, it remains hard to assert that switching to the CHP and its leader, Kilicdaroglu, whose Alevi origins mark him out as a member of a historically persecuted Shia sect, will be easy for low-income conservatives. For his part, Kilicdaroglu is careful not to mention his Alevi or Kurdish origins, preferring to demonstrate his solidarity with the people on class issues, such as unpaid bills, rather than identity.

Unpaid bills

On 20 April 2022, Kilicdaroglu began a week of sitting in the dark in his flat in Ankara. His electricity had been cut off after he refused to pay his bills in protest over the 127 percent increase in electricity prices. He said he wanted to stand in solidarity with the 4 million Turkish households that were reportedly unable to pay their electricity bills last year.

Things are no different when it comes to gas. Prices increased by 93 percent last year; more than 1 million households were unable to pay their bills. In response, the government introduced state gas relief: more than 200,000 households applied for it within the first three days. This new social benefit comes on top of an estimated 22 million people who already rely on the state. The AKP is particularly proud of the increases in social benefits it has achieved since coming to power in 2002. The opposition, however, claims that citizens would not have to rely on the state were the right economic policies in place.  

Some are afraid that if the AKP loses power, they could lose their benefits. They also fear losing their jobs in the public sector. There is a widespread belief that to secure public sector employment, which accounts for six million of the country's 22 million jobs, you need good connections.

The CHP is trying to convince people that both these fears are groundless. After all, when the opposition party won local elections in Ankara and Istanbul in 2019, staff recruited by the former AKP authorities were neither sacked nor replaced. CHP municipalities have also introduced social support programmes such as "pending invoices", a website where families in need upload their bills for volunteers to pay.

Such efforts have been welcomed by the public, but the CHP-led opposition has yet to publish a comprehensive economic agenda, explaining how it intends to improve the situation. Just one more reason why voters aren’t jumping on the CHP bandwagon, even if they are unhappy with the current government. Various polls have revealed that some 20 percent of those eligible to vote remain undecided. 

Don't ignore the Kurdish HDP: bearing in mind Erdogan's AKP still enjoys a maximum five point lead over the opposition in the polls, failure to involve the Kurds in any election campaign is likely to end in defeat. With a ten percent share of the vote, the HDP and its voters deserve to be taken seriously – particularly if the CHP is in earnest about reconciliation within Turkey

The CHP and five other opposition parties – the "Nation Alliance" – agree that the main reason for Turkey's current problems is the presidential system, introduced in 2018 after a constitutional referendum. The alliance’s key pledge so far is to change the system to what they call a "strengthened parliamentary system".

This foresees stripping the presidential office of its wide-reaching powers, effecting a separation of the executive. The opposition is also promising to install an independent judiciary, with checks and balances to ensure politically motivated rulings are outlawed.

Kurdish party excluded; no presidential candidate

Although the Nation Alliance’s leaders assured the public they would continue to act together to defeat the ruling AKP, they are still excluding the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which attracts around 10 percent of the votes, mostly from Kurdish-populated areas. The government, especially the MHP, is attempting to criminalise the HDP, many of whose elected mayors and MPs have been jailed. The opposition's hesitation when it comes to including the HDP is preventing them from reaching another 10 percent of voters at least – a crucial margin if they want to defeat the AKP.

Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has boosted President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s approval rating, which had been declining steadily. The public believes his diplomatic efforts towards regional peace and stability are valuable during such turbulent times.

The opposition has yet to present a joint presidential candidate. They say they will decide once a date for the election has been announced. But by the time a date is set, it may be too late for the opposition to campaign – and what momentum they had may be irrevocably lost.

Ayse Karabat

© Qantara.de 2022