Vladimir Putin's right-hand woman is Valentina Matviyenko, a Ukrainian-born politician who passionately supports his war

By Rebecca Armitage for the ABC

As Vladimir Putin's plan to invade Ukraine gained momentum in February this year, he called a surprise meeting of his inner circle.

LONG READ

Russia's President Vladimir Putin awards the Order of St Andrew the Apostle to chairwoman of the Federation Council Valentina Matviyenko during a ceremony at the Kremlin in Moscow on 23 May 2019. Photo: AFP

The Russian President sat glowering behind a desk while members of his National Security Council squirmed on little chairs like schoolchildren.

One by one, Vladimir Putin demanded they come forward and tell him what they thought about his decision to send what he called "peacekeepers" into the separatist Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.

As the cameras rolled, they spoke. Some were enthusiastic. Others stammered as they tried to explain their position, prompting Putin to snap repeatedly: "Speak directly!"

But the sole woman in the room walked confidently to the lectern.

With her coiffed blonde bob and Chanel-inspired boucle skirt suit, Valentina Matviyenko has long been accustomed to standing out in meetings full of men.

But where some equivocated, the chairwoman of the Federation Council was strident.

"A humanitarian catastrophe has been unfolding before our eyes in the centre of Europe," she claimed without evidence.

She made baseless allegations that a "puppet" regime ruled Ukraine, responsible for "genocide" and mysteriously burned bodies in Odesa.

And borrowing one of Putin's favourite talking points, she said the West was "trying to pit the two Slavic fraternal nations against each other".

She concluded with a plea to Vladimir Putin.

"I believe it is time to make a decision," she said.

"It is simply immoral to continue discussing it to death and dragging it out while pretending that something is being done."

With the thanks of her president, Matviyenko returned to her chair.

At no point did she seem fazed that she was asking the president of Russia to invade her homeland.

Russian President Vladimir Putin at the reception to mark the New Year holiday at the Kremlin, seen with Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko on 27 December, 2017. Photo: Sputnik via AFP

Valentina Matviyenko was born in Shepetivka, west of Kyiv, when Ukraine was still part of the Soviet Union.

But her decision to study chemistry as a young university student in Russia's historic imperial capital changed her life.

It put her right in the path of a young KGB agent-turned-politician who would help her become the most powerful woman in Russia since Catherine the Great.

In Putin's Russia, you're nobody unless you're from St Petersburg

Throughout his long reign, Vladimir Putin has projected an image of a solitary, almost monk-like figure who toils, as he puts it, "like a galley slave" for Russia.

Even his former wife, his children and his rumoured new partner never appear publicly by his side.

But in reality, he has surrounded himself with a close-knit group of allies, many of whom he has known since his 20s.

Like others in Putin's inner circle, Valentina Matviyenko got her start in politics in the 1970s in St Petersburg, back when it was known as Leningrad.

"I was not eager for politics," she admitted to Russian media in 2019.

From left: State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matvienko and Presidential Envoy to North-East federal district Alexander Gutsan arrive for a meeting with members of Lawmakers Council in St.Petersburg, Russia on 24 April, 2019. Photo: Sputnik via AFP

While studying to be a scientist, leaders of the youth division of St Petersburg's Soviet Communist Party asked her to join their organisation.

When she refused because she wanted to focus on her science career, they called the head of her graduate program.

"They said 'we do not need irresponsible people either in science or in graduate school'," she recalled.

By the time she met Vladimir Putin, Matviyenko was already a local political heavyweight, if perhaps a reluctant one.

At a time when Soviet women were there to be seen, not heard, she swiftly earned herself the nickname "Valka the glass" for her ability to drink her male comrades under the table.

From left: Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chairperson of the Federation Council Valentina Matvienko, Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation Vyacheslav Lebedev and Russia's Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev at the annual expanded meeting of the Russian Interior Ministry Board on 28 February, 2019. Photo: Sputnik via AFP

Her career skyrocketed and she became the USSR's youngest female MP and the chairwoman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Women, Families, Maternity and Childhood.

But when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, she had a tricky choice to make if she wanted to survive the ensuing decade of chaos and maintain her power.

As Russia's president Boris Yeltsin descended into alcoholism and deep unpopularity, there were two potential successors waiting in the wings.

One was Yeltsin's own prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, an extremely popular politician, with whom Matviyenko was close.

The other was Vladimir Putin, then the director of the country's post-Soviet intelligence agency and virtually unknown to the Russian public.

What few knew at that stage was that Putin had been tapped by Yeltsin's family for mysterious reasons to be Russia's next leader.

Armed with a dossier of kompromat - the KGB term for damaging intelligence - Vladimir Putin was able to swiftly and quietly knock his rivals out of contention.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Valentina Matviyenko visits the Church of Jesus Resurrection of Catherine Palace at the Tsarskoe Selo State Museum in Pushkin, near St. Petersburg, Russia on 10 April, 2019. Photo: Sputnik via AFP

While Valentina Matviyenko was encouraged to run for the presidency, she refused, instead switching her allegiance to Putin.

"I think she's a political animal," said Dr Sara Meger, a lecturer in International Relations in the School of Social and Political Sciences at Melbourne University.

"I think it's no secret that it's pretty dangerous to be an opponent to Putin during his long reign in power."

With Putin sweeping aside Soviet-era power players and replacing them with KGB colleagues and old friends from St Petersburg, Matviyenko's loyalty was quickly rewarded.

The most powerful Russian woman since Catherine the Great

With the endorsement of Putin, Valentina Matviyenko ran to be governor of their hometown in 2003.

Her rivals festooned the streets with banners claiming: "Being governor is no job for a woman."

But in the end, she won with a commanding majority.

Russian acting President Vladimir Putin (R) and Vice Premier Valentina Matviyenko (L) smile during the session of the trade unions general council, Moscow 16 February, 2000. Photo: AFP

The girl from rural Ukraine who went to St Petersburg for a better life found herself ruling over the 300-year-old city.

Under her leadership, the dilapidated region flourished: New developments sprung up, the birthrate doubled for the first time since the collapse of the USSR and tourism increased.

Her critics claim that it was around this time she got rich - seriously rich.

An investigative group run by Vladimir Putin's arch rival, Alexei Navalny, linked a huge luxury villa sitting on Italy's east coast to her family.

"Where could a Russian official get the money for this?" the group's chief investigator, Maria Pevchikh, asked.

"That's the main secret of Putin's Russia: If you love Putin, money will flow on you like water."

But the biggest prize was yet to come.

In 2011, she ascended to heights not reached by a Russian woman since Empress Catherine the Great in 1762.

Speaker of the Federation Council of Russia Valentina Matviyenko at an expanded meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of State in Sochi on 11 October, 2017. Photo: Sputnik via AFP

She was made speaker of Russia's Federation Council, after winning a seat in the upper house of parliament.

That made Valentina Matviyenko the third most powerful person in Russia.

Her astounding landslide victory - with 95 percent of the vote - was dismissed as "100 percent fraud" by opposition leaders.

And it would be from these lofty heights that her connection to her humble past would be put to the ultimate test.

A possible successor to Vladimir Putin?

When Vladimir Putin sent troops into the country of her birth, Valentina Matviyenko was right by his side.

Sergey Naryshkin (R) Chairman of the State Duma and Valentina Matviyenko (L) the Chairwoman of the Federation Council of the Russian Federation stand next to the Russian President Vladimir Putin as he signs set of laws on reunification of Crimea, Sevastopol with Russia at Ekaterininsky in Kremlin, 21 March, 2014. Photo: AFP

For Dr Meger, it's not a surprising move for a woman of her generation.

"I think we could probably read into her politics and life trajectory as feeling more allegiance to the Soviet Union," she said.

"Older Ukrainians are a lot less optimistic than younger Ukrainians about independence and the turn towards Europe.

"There's a lot more Soviet nostalgia and a belief that things were better under the Soviet Union."

And, as a woman who has survived five decades in one of the most chaotic power structures in the world, Matviyenko has learned how to keep herself in the inner circle.

"She has long been tipped as perhaps the successor to Putin for the Russian presidency, or at least having some sort of major role in Russian politics," Dr Meger said.

"So to her, it's strategic to keep telling the Putin line."

Whether Russia could ever see a president Matviyenko is unclear, according to Dr Meger.

"I think that Russian society certainly would be open to it. I don't think the men of the inner sanctum would allow it," she said.

"She's the eldest of that inner circle. So I imagined that by the time Putin is retiring, or somehow ousted from power, there will be some significant, more youthful challenger."

Russian President Vladimir Putin, Sergei Mironov, chairman of the Federation Council (from left to right, foreground) and St. Petersburg Governor Valentina Matviyenko (first right) after a ceremonial presenting of the certificate and badge of honorary citizen of St. Petersburg in the Mariinsky Palace in 2006. Photo: Sputnik via AFP

Still, Valentina Matviyenko has spent her life being underestimated.

When speaking to the press, she regularly jokes that women are better suited to hold power than men.

"It seems that male politicians with their brutal style have not coped with managing the world. They allowed wars, conflicts, violence," she said in 2019.

"This is, of course, a joke. But, as we say in Russia, there is some truth in every joke."

Bangladesh Cancels Top Rights Group's Registration, Sparking Outrage

June 10, 2022 
Shaikh Azizur Rahman

Human rights group Odhikar activists and volunteers demonstrate against enforced disappearances, in Bangladesh's Khulna district, on International Human Rights Day, Dec. 10, 2021.

The Bangladeshi government canceled the registration of one of the country's top human rights organizations this week, triggering outrage across the international human rights community.

A June 5 order from the government canceled the registration, or operating license, of Bangladesh-based Odhikar. Founded in 1994, the organization is known for its regular documentation of human rights violations in the country, working closely with the United Nations, Human Rights Watch and other international rights groups.

The NGO Affairs Bureau, a wing of the Bangladeshi prime minister's office, issued the order, stating that "the activities of the organization are not satisfactory."

Odhikar "created various issues against Bangladesh by spreading propaganda against the state by publishing misleading information on its own website about various extrajudicial killings, including alleged disappearances and murders," the order said. It added that the organization “has seriously tarnished the image of the state to the world."

Accusations of rights violations

The security agencies in Bangladesh have long been accused of extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances and other serious human rights violations.

In December 2021, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), an elite paramilitary force of Bangladesh, for its dismal human rights record. Odhikar regularly documented human rights violations by the RAB.

SEE ALSO:
Rights Activists Welcome US Sanctions on Bangladesh’s Elite Paramilitary Force

Since the beginning of this year, Odhikar has reported that the rights groups accusing RAB and other security agencies of rights violations were facing reprisals from the government.

For years, Odhikar has been facing persecution because of its work, Adilur Rahman Khan, the organization's secretary, told VOA.

"In 2014, we sought to renew the registration of Odhikar to receive foreign donations. But our application for renewal of the registration with the NGO Affairs Bureau has remained pending for eight years, critically hindering our ability to conduct human rights monitoring and reporting," said Khan, who has received several international human rights awards.

In 2019, Odhikar filed a writ petition to the High Court seeking renewal of its registration, and in May, the hearing on this matter resumed in the court, he said.

"Now, in the midst of the hearing, the NGO Affairs Bureau has arbitrarily canceled Odhikar's registration, bypassing the judicial process, in another attempt to stall our human rights work in the country."

Despite several attempts, VOA failed to get a comment from the NGO Affairs Bureau. The director of the bureau did not respond to queries from VOA.

Rights advocates see red flag

Rights advocates have condemned the action against Odhikar in strong terms.

Eleven human rights groups, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights, said in a statement June 9 that Bangladeshi authorities should immediately reverse their decision to deregister Odhikar.

Nur Khan Liton, a well-known rights activist in Bangladesh, called the cancellation of Odhikar's registration an "autocratic action" by the government.

"By canceling the registration of Odhikar, the government has aimed to warn individuals and groups against raising their voices against human rights violations in the country," Liton told VOA.

The arbitrary deregistration of Odhikar is a serious red flag, said Matthew Smith, CEO of the rights group Fortify Rights.

"The authorities can't improve the country's human rights record by arbitrarily deregistering its leading human rights organization," Smith told VOA.

The reprisal against Odhikar is "an egregious and shameless act to silence and intimidate human rights defenders" in Bangladesh, said Saad Hammadi, South Asia campaigner for Amnesty International.

"Odhikar's deregistration is a clear demonstration of the government's anger about the credibility the human rights organization enjoys internationally," Hammadi said.

Deregistration ‘outrageous, unacceptable’

Mohammad Ashrafuzzaman, liaison officer of the Hong Kong-based Asian Legal Resource Centre, noted that Odhikar is the most prominent Bangladesh-based human rights organization, and its deregistration was a big blow to the human rights community as well as to the victims.

"The Sheikh Hasina regime, which accuses rights group Odhikar of 'tarnishing the country's image,' has adopted the policy of using enforced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and systemic torture under arbitrary detention as tools against the dissidents and political opponents," Ashrafuzzaman told VOA. Sheikh Hasina had served as the prime minister of Bangladesh from 1996 to 2001, and she assumed office again in 2009.

Calling the decision to deny the registration "outrageous and unacceptable," Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch's Asia Division, said that the government's action was "nothing less than a full-frontal assault" on human rights defenders such as Odhikar who dare to speak truth to power about the government's systematic rights violations.

"Ever since Hasina returned as prime minister, the authorities have subjected Odhikar staff to intrusive surveillance and harassment and made politically motivated attacks on the organization's work and findings," Robertson told VOA.

"The NGO Affairs Bureau under the PM's Office exists not to regulate or support civil society groups but rather to exercise control, violate freedom of association, and bar access to foreign funds, and Odhikar has borne the brunt of all this discriminatory government treatment over the years," Robertson said.

Dhaka-based diplomats, U.N. agencies, and the wider international community should pressure the Bangladesh government to immediately and unconditionally restore Odhikar's license to operate, Robertson added.

"The Bangladesh government uses misleading information all the time, so this accusation against Odhikar — that the organization is tarnishing the country's image — is a clear example of the pot calling the kettle black," he said.

Reporting on human rights violations is "not anti-government or anti-state," Amnesty's Hammadi noted. He said the government’s “decision to deregister Odhikar is akin to shooting the messenger.”

Does Erdogan have a green light from Russia to move into Syria?

The US and Iran oppose the planned Turkish operation, as Erdogan digs in further on

 Finland and Sweden’s NATO bids, and warns Greece on the Aegean Islands.

Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan attends a press conference after his meeting with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in Ankara on June 8, 2022. - ADEM ALTAN/AFP via Getty Images

Week in Review
@AlMonitor
June 10, 2022


In shift, Russia ‘understands’ Turkey’s concerns in Syria …

Perhaps Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is channeling Winston Churchill, who once said "never let a good crisis go to waste."

For Erdogan, that good crisis is the Ukraine war, a time for a star turn on the world stage as mediator, as well as for settling accounts with Syrian Kurdish "terrorists" and redefining Turkey's role within NATO.

In Syria, Erdogan is giving no sign that he is reconsidering his plan for another military operation to carve out a 30-km "security line."

On June 9 he said, "We hope that none of our true allies or friends will object to these legitimate security concerns of our country, or particularly go for terrorist organizations."

By terrorist organizations, Erdogan means Syrian Kurdish groups — the Democratic Union Party (PYD), People’s Protection Units (YPG), and the US-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — which he considers as linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a US- and Turkish-designated terrorist group.

Turkey is also in the midst of an economic freefall, as Mustafa Sonmez reports, and burdened by over 3.6 million Syrian refugees, whom Erdogan would like to return to the envisioned "secure" zone.

Khaled Al-Khateb reports from Aleppo that Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions in northern Syria are preparing for a seemingly imminent Turkish offensive by conducting their own military drills.

Russia, given its international isolation over the Ukraine war, hopes to stay at least somewhat in Turkey’s ally or friend camp, despite many points of friction, including Turkish drone sales to Ukraine.

So perhaps it was no surprise that Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said after meeting with his Turkish counterpart Mevlut Cavusoglu in Ankara, "We understand fully the concerns of our friends over the threats created on their borders by outside forces that are fueling separatist sentiment."

The reference to the "outside forces" is a dig at the US military presence in Syria (900 troops) and American support for the SDF — a remark likely appreciated in Ankara.

Lavrov’s "understanding" seemed a shift from just last week when Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said, "We hope that Ankara will refrain from actions that could lead to a dangerous deterioration of the already difficult situation in Syria." Such a move "would be a direct violation of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” she said, and would “cause a further escalation of tensions."

… while US is ‘unstinting’ to get Turkey to back off

As for the US, Turkey is "well aware" of the Biden administration’s opposition to a move.

“We are completely unstinting in our efforts with the Turkish government to back them off on this ill-considered venture,” US Assistant Secretary of State Barbara Leaf told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 8.

The State Department has expressed to Turkey its "deep concern" about the impact of a new military incursion on civilians, US counterterrorist operations, and efforts to promote political stability in Syria. The US has called on Turkey to respect ceasefire lines and Ankara’s October 2019 commitment to halt military operations.

The question is whether, in private, these statements of concern are proffered with some type of carrot and stick to give Erdogan pause. The Turkish president doesn’t seem to bend to "concern."

Iran, Turkey face off

Opposition to another military operation is also coming from the east.

"Turkey and Iran appear headed for a face-off in Syria," writes Fehim Tastekin, "with Tehran explicitly opposing Ankara’s plan for a fresh military operation against Kurdish-held areas, wary of risks to its own posture in the region."

Iran has sent "militia reinforcements to two Shiite settlements northwest of Aleppo, not far from a key area in Ankara’s crosshairs, while trying to talk Turkey out from making the move — apparently with little success thus far," Tastekin adds.

Despite differing and sometimes conflicting interests, Turkey, Russia and Iran have hung together as partners in the ‘Astana’ diplomatic forum for dealing with Syria. But the strains are beginning to show.

"Tehran feels pushed aside as a guarantor of the trilateral Astana process on Syria," writes Tastekin. "The hardening climate might undermine the whole process as the three sides prepare to hold an 18th round of talks later this month."

Erdogan calls out ‘terrorists’ in Sweden’s parliament

Meanwhile, Erdogan is not yet showing any hints of compromise in his opposition to the NATO membership bids of Sweden and Finland.

Speaking at a press conference in Ankara on June 8 with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, Erdogan said PKK/YPG/PYD terrorists run "rampant in Sweden … even in their parliaments there are terrorists."

The Swedish parliamentarian he is referring to is Amineh Kakabaveh, a former Kurdish guerrilla whose swing vote has allowed the government to pass the budget and survive a no-confidence vote this past week.

Kakabaveh is an independent who conditioned her support for the government of Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson on Andersson’s Social Democrats recognizing the Kurdish-led autonomous administration in northeast Syria.

The Kurdish connection to Sweden is deep and complex, and difficult to unwind.

"Nesrin Abdullah, commander of the YPG’s all-female arm, is a frequent visitor to Stockholm where she enjoys hero status and is received by top officials," Amberin Zaman reported from Sweden. "They include the foreign minister, Ann Linde, a long-time campaigner for minority rights. Photos showing Abdullah, Linde and Kakabaveh together in the Swedish parliament in May drove Ankara mad, leading Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu to blast her at a NATO gathering last month for her 'so-called feminist policies.'"

"Turkey says no such visits can be repeated," Zaman adds. "All support for the YPG, which enjoys the protection of US forces in Syria, needs to end. The activities of PKK-leaning groups inside Sweden must be banned. Ankara also wants Sweden to extradite individuals, mainly Kurds and associates of Fethullah Gulen, the Sunni preacher accused of orchestrating the failed attempt to violently overthrow Erdogan in 2016."

"As long as these terrorists remain in their parliaments and as long as terrorist organizations continue to hold demonstrations with the pictures of terrorist leaders in the streets of Stockholm … we cannot tell them ‘Go ahead, please, join NATO,’" said Erdogan on June 8.

"The same goes for Finland, too. Finland, as well, is engaged in many similar activities unfortunately," he added.

Erdogan: ‘This nation is determined’

Erdogan’s NATO issues extend beyond Sweden and Finland.

He has amped up the rhetoric on Greece, and those NATO countries which provide Athens weapons, in another sign of the deepening schism between the two countries over the Aegean islands.

“Behave yourself," Erdogan warned Athens. "Turkey, if need be, will not hesitate to exercise its rights emanating from international agreements concerning the militarization of islands, let alone giving up on its rights in the Aegean."

"I’m not joking, I’m speaking seriously. This nation is determined," he added.

Given Turkey’s economic crisis, Erdogan may be open to the "highest bidder," says Hadley Gamble of CNBC, on the latest ‘On the Middle East’ podcast.

It may end up being a "question of weapons," adds Gamble, referring to pending US sales of F-16’s to Turkey, which the Biden administration has said is separate from the discussions over Sweden and Finland joining NATO.

CRIMINAL CAPITALI$M

New Evidence on the Role of Subnational Diplomacy in China’s Pursuit of U.S. Technology

By Ryan Scoville

Friday, June 10, 2022

Chinese flag radiowood, https://flic.kr/p/7asMfM

 CC BY-NC 2.0, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/

In a recent interview, FBI Director Christopher Wray explained that the People’s Republic of China has stolen more U.S. corporate data than all other nations combined and is seeking to acquire American trade secrets and intellectual property “on a scale that is unprecedented in history.” China reportedly relies on a combination of industrial espionage, academic contacts, investment, and cyber theft in pursuit of this acquisition. Senior U.S. officials have observed that China also relies on subnational relations with U.S. state governments, but the nature and extent of those relations have generally been unclear. In this post, I will help to address that lack of clarity by presenting new evidence that China has entered into a substantial collection of written agreements with U.S. states for the purpose of promoting technology transfer in a number of strategically sensitive fields of innovation, including information technology, nanotechnology, aerospace, biotechnology, and semiconductors. Most of these agreements appear to have been adopted not only without federal notice, consultation, or approval, but also at China’s initiative and without public disclosure. The evidence thus suggests that subnational diplomacy has played an inconspicuous but material role in Beijing’s effort to acquire cutting-edge American technology. To address this and other problems that can arise from state engagement in foreign relations, Congress should enact legislation to ensure federal monitoring and public disclosure of future agreements.

Background

Before getting into the details of the evidence, a bit of background on how it emerged: In 2019, the Trump administration filed a lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality of a 2017 agreement on carbon dioxide emissions between California and the Canadian province of Québec. The lawsuit failed in the district court but not before revealing a marked lack of transparency about the nature and extent of U.S. state agreements with foreign governments. States typically do not publish these arrangements, so neither the litigants nor amici had a clear sense of whether California’s was typical or aberrational. Duncan Hollis conducted an important study on state practice in this area in 2009, but a decade passed, no one followed up, and there was reason to believe that conditions had changed, so I decided to use state public-records laws to investigate. In 2020, my research assistant and I filed more than 650 public-records requests—one with every major executive department and administrative agency in each of the 50 states—in an effort to obtain copies of all commitments in force at that time.

The New Evidence

The results were surprising in a variety of ways, and two of the biggest surprises involved China.

The first was that, although U.S. states have traditionally entered into the largest number of agreements with Canada and its provinces, states disclosed more operative commitments with China than with any other country. It appears, moreover, that this shift occurred sometime in roughly the past decade. Hollis’s 2009 study found that states had concluded 70 agreements with Canada, followed by 61 with China or Taiwan and 41 with Israel. In contrast, the new evidence shows that, out of a total of more than 600 agreements in force between U.S. states and foreign governments in 2020, 115 are with mainland China alone, followed by 94 with Canada and 59 with Mexico. The agreements with China include 24 different U.S. states as parties and focus on economic relations more than any other issue. Many may still be in effect.

The second surprise was that, although the agreements with China often seem innocuous or beneficial to state and national interests, well over a dozen expressly promote cooperation, collaboration or even “technology transfer” in strategic sectors. For instance, Alabama, California, Maryland, and Pennsylvania have signed memoranda of understanding that call on them to foster cooperation between U.S. and Chinese firms in the field of information technology. A 2016 agreement between New York and China provides that the parties will “support cooperation” in nanotechnology. A 2015 memorandum of understanding between Washington and China states that the parties “will support companies to cooperate” in the aerospace industry. Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas have each pledged to promote cooperation with China in biotechnology. Idaho—home to Micron Technology, one of the largest manufacturers of semiconductors in the U.S.—has an arrangement with China’s Ministry of Commerce to “facilitate trade and investment activities” in the semiconductor industry. And many other commitments call for economic cooperation in general terms. Implementation may very well complicate federal efforts to protect U.S. technological leadership by encouraging private transactions that flout U.S. export controls, expand China’s influence over American companies, and burden federal oversight by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.

Certain features of the agreements and their adoption make these risks especially concerning. First, it appears that China took the lead in much of the drafting. Several documents use the same formatting, language, and organization, even though they involve different states as parties. Others use syntax that is atypical for a native English speaker. These patterns seem to indicate that the Chinese government has been handing predrafted documents to their state counterparts and simply asking for signatures. If that is indeed the case, there is reason to question whether states are getting as much out of the agreements as China, and whether they are resisting any language that disserves U.S. national interests.

Second, most of the agreements have been in effect for a decade or more. Idaho’s arrangement on semiconductors, for example, was signed in 2006. This longevity has created ample opportunities for implementation.

Third, state governments generally have not been transparent about the agreements. As far as I can tell, only three are referenced in official state sources, only one is available online, and states have not reported them to Congress or the executive branch. In my 2021 interview with Reta Jo Lewis, former State Department special representative for global intergovernmental affairs, she explained that the State Department is not responsible for monitoring subnational engagement in foreign relations and that states typically enter agreements with foreign governments without consulting or notifying federal authorities. I have not seen any evidence to the contrary in these cases.

Finally, China’s engagement with U.S. states is likely to persist. In a recent article in The Diplomat, Flora Yan reported that, under the Biden administration, China-U.S. subnational exchanges “have largely continued, with signs indicating expansion.” For Beijing and states alike, the incentives for such expansion seem obvious: enhanced trade and investment between the world’s two largest economies, along with a potential way around U.S. federal gridlock and hostility. These incentives may very well spur states to enter additional agreements of concern in the future.

To be sure, it is not clear whether anything has or will come from the agreements. All appear to be nonbinding, so states may simply disregard them. At the same time, it is hard to imagine that states would enter commitments with a foreign sovereign in the absence of any intention to comply. There is anecdotal evidence, moreover, that even nonbinding subnational arrangements have generated economic benefits in the context of Sino-U.S. relations. This suggests that states have acted to fulfill their agreements in at least some cases.

A Proposal for Reform

The circumstances create a strong case for transparency going forward. As I explain in a new article detailing my research, Congress should respond by enacting legislation that is loosely analogous to the Case-Zablocki Act. This legislation would require states to timely transmit to the State Department the text of all commitments with foreign governments, including China’s. It would also require the department to publish the results on a public website. Such legislation has precedent in foreign countries such as Australia (see also the resulting online database) and in reporting mandates that Congress has imposed on states in various other contexts.

The benefits of the resulting transparency seem clear. It would help to deter states from violating the Constitution’s Compact Clause, which generally requires them to obtain congressional consent to enter into any binding “Agreement or Compact” with a foreign power. It would help to deter states from infringing the Article I Treaty Clause, which prohibits them from entering into any “Treaty.” It would promote the accountability of state officials by facilitating public knowledge of any commitments that disserve state or national interests. It seems unlikely to discourage agreements that advance those interests. And it would likely create only limited financial and administrative costs.

Recent congressional interest in subnational diplomacy suggests that there may be a realistic chance for reform. In the 116th Congress, Rep. Ted Lieu and Sen. Chris Murphy each introduced the City and State Diplomacy Act, part of which would have required the State Department to “maintain[] a public database of subnational engagements.” In the 117th Congress, Lieu and Murphy introduced newer bills that omitted the original provision for a public database but proposed to task the State Department with “tracking subnational engagements.” Although not enacted into law, this language also appeared in a version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (NDAA) that passed the House of Representatives in September 2021, so the notion of federal monitoring clearly enjoys substantial support.

To address the risks posed by state agreements with foreign governments, and with China in particular, Congress should revive the City and State Diplomacy Act, with a few key revisions. First, drafters should expand the bill’s definition of “subnational engagements.” All of the recent versions defined this term as “formal meetings or events between elected officials of State or municipal governments and their foreign counterparts.” Agreements, however, are not “meetings or events” under the ordinary meanings of those terms, so this definition would exclude all agreements from federal oversight, even while requiring the State Department to monitor attendant events such as signing ceremonies. It is hard to see the logic in that choice, given the general importance of written agreements for structuring and managing foreign relations. In addition, it is common for agreements to be signed not by a state’s “elected officials” but rather by appointees. The recent definition would thus exempt many agreements from federal monitoring even if they somehow qualify as “meetings or events.” To correct these problems, the next iteration of the City and State Diplomacy Act should redefine “subnational engagements” explicitly to include all written commitments.

Second, Congress should not task the State Department merely with “tracking” subnational engagements, as proposed in the most recent version of the bill. While better than nothing, tracking per se does not ensure the disclosure of any engagements to the public or even to Congress, which holds primary authority to grant or withhold consent to state agreements and compacts with foreign powers under the Compact Clause. A separate provision of the bill recommended annual briefings to Congress regarding the department’s “work” on subnational diplomacy, but that language also seems insufficient, as it leaves open the possibility of briefings that detail State Department activity but omit information about the subnational engagements themselves. To address this issue, legislators should revive the original proposal for a public database, thereby promoting access to agreement texts for Congress and voters alike.

Finally, Congress should add language to facilitate the database’s creation and maintenance. The recent bills contained no requirement for states to notify the State Department of their engagements, much less a deadline for notification. Nor did the bills contain any provision to enforce or even encourage state cooperation with federal efforts to create the database. These omissions created a risk of belated and incomplete collection on the part of database managers. To fix them, legislators should require states to provide copies of the texts of their agreements to the State Department and impose a deadline for doing so. The Case-Zablocki Act, for example, requires the transmittal of the text of an international agreement to which the U.S. is a party no later than 60 days after entry into force. If concerned about state compliance, Congress might also consider enforcement options, such as a provision indicating that no commitment shall carry any force or effect prior to transmittal, or a provision that expressly conditions the availability of pertinent federal funding on state compliance.

Conclusion

As a general matter, it is neither surprising nor troubling that U.S. states enter into agreements with foreign governments. It is striking, however, that they typically do so without notifying the public or even the federal government. And it is concerning that a significant number of the agreements affirmatively encourage the transfer of strategically important technologies to America’s chief geopolitical rival, despite U.S. federal efforts to protect American technological leadership. These conditions call for transparency and federal monitoring under a revived and revised City and State Diplomacy Act.

BUDDHISTVA LIKE HINDUTVABuddhist dedication ceremony to take place at Tamil temple site despite court order

BUDDHISTVA LIKE HINDUTVA

Buddhist dedication ceremony to take place at Tamil temple site despite court order

 10 June 2022

A dedication ceremony for a new Buddha statue is set to take place tomorrow with the assistance of the Sri Lankan army in Kurunthurmalai, Mullaitivu, in a further attempt to seize the site of an ancient Tamil temple.

The ceremony, where a Buddha statue carved in Kabok stone be consecrated, is expected to attract a large number of Sinhalese from the South, including senior Sri Lankan army officers, police officers and Buddhist monks.

The Athi Aiyanar temple, a native place of worship of Tamils located in the Thannimurippu area, has been targeted by intense landgrab efforts by Sinhala Buddhist monks over recent years. Their efforts have been met with fierce resistance from locals which in 2018 led to a court order decreeing that no changes could be made to the site. The court also stated that the archaeology department had abused its power in allowing Buddhist monks to survey the area.

In January 2021, Vidura Wickramanayaka, Sri Lanka's state minister for 'national heritage', accompanied by army soldiers and archaeology department officers, led an event at Kurunthurmalai,  in which a new Buddha statue was placed and consecrated at the site of the Athi Aiyanar temple despite the court order banning them to do so. Since then, the Sri Lankan army and the archeology department have intimidated and banned local Tamils from entering the area.

Tamil National Alliance (TNA) spokesperson M A Sumanthiran and former Northern Provincial Councillor T Ravikaran have filed an interim injunction has been filed to stop any excavation work. However, the inunction has still not been granted. 

In a recent report, People for Equality and Relief in Lanka (PEARL) highlight that since the end of the armed conflict in 2009, Sri Lanka's Director General of Archaeology "has ordered excavations and instructed district authorities to put up Buddhist structures on pre-existing Tamil worship sites and private Tamil lands, regardless of any opposition to it." 

The advocacy organisation also notes how the state have justified Buddhisisation across the North-East by destroying and appropriating Tamil and Muslim places of worship to erect Buddhist shrines which in turn has provided "space and authority for Buddhist monks to influence the agenda" of the Sri Lankan government. 

Related Articles: 

17 February 2022 : Buddhist monk bans cultivation of Tamil land in Mullaitivu  

26 March 2021 : Sri Lanka's archaeological department and Buddhist monks attempts another land grab in Mullaitivu

02 June 2022 : Sinhalisation continues as Sri Lankan army helps construct Buddhist shrine in Tamil area of Muttur

ICC publishes protocols for ethical engagement in the Arctic

The Inuit Circumpolar Council's protocols were developed in response to negative experiences with outside researchers and other visitors.

By

 Yereth Rosen, Alaska Beacon

 -

June 9, 2022

Alaska’s Dalee Sambo Dorough (left) is seen in a 2018 file photo after being elected chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council at the group’s quadrennial meeting in Utqiagvik. Here she’s pictured with outgoing ICC chair Okalik Eegeesiak, of Canada. (Yereth Rosen / ArcticToday file photo)

As more scientists, policymakers, industrial developers and mariners head north into the warming and melting Arctic, some of the region’s Indigenous people have developed standards for how the visitors should operate respectfully and collaboratively.

The Inuit Circumpolar Council, representing Inuit people from Greenland to Chukotka in the Russian Far East, last week released a set of protocols intended to ensure that Indigenous people have more say in what happens in their homeland.

The ICC’s Circumpolar Inuit Protocols on Equitable and Ethical Engagement, was developed over three years, said Carolina Behe, a science and Indigenous knowledge advisor with the organization’s Alaska affiliate. But the motivation for the protocols began much earlier, she said.

Over many years, Inuit residents have chafed at “the heavy, heavy top-down” approach to scientific research and other activities, Behe said. There have been persistent complaints, for example, about researchers coming to the Arctic, doing their projects, leaving and then never communicating with the residents in any follow-up, she said.

“Over and over, the point came up about lack of engagement,” she said.

The protocols are intended to protect Inuit rights, including intellectual rights, as activity in the Arctic intensifies, said ICC officials from Alaska.

“We persist with the call for all others to recognize our status, rights, and role in relation to every issue of concern to us,” Dalee Sambo Dorough, the organization’s international chair and a professor at the University of Alaska Anchorage, said in a statement.

“As the first inhabitants and stewards of the Arctic, we have the right and responsibility to protect our environment and culture,” James Stotts, president of ICC Alaska, said in the statement. “Our knowledge must be relied upon to inform decision-making in all matters.”

The protocols are divided into eight categories. They include guidance for building partnerships, sharing data, co-producing knowledge, practicing good governance and distributing funding.

In the category of communication, for example, there are specific pieces of advice, such as: “Listen more than you speak.” The communications category also lists the Arctic’s Inuit as the experts on local safety whose guidance should be followed. In the category of funding, there is a call to prioritize local hiring and to adequately and fairly pay local people.

“Inuit need to be compensated for our knowledge, expertise, time, and labor. Agree upon appropriate compensation before work begins,” the document says.

In the scientific community, there is increasing attention to collaboration with the Indigenous people of Alaska and the Arctic.

The National Science Foundation’s Navigating the New Arctic initiative is one program that is putting a recently strengthened emphasis on community engagement and co-production of knowledge. The program funds and manages numerous research projects, with a series of Arctic operating principles intended to be applicable to each project.

The ICC’s newly released protocols, however, go beyond such specific research projects and beyond the category of scientific research entirely, Behe said. They are applicable to local people’s relationships with industries, with government agencies and with international organizations like the Arctic Council and United Nations, she said.

This story was first published by Alaska Beacon and is republished here under a Creative Commons license. You can read the original here.

Finland plans to build barriers on its border with Russia

The move is meant to prepare against hybrid threats from Russia.

By Reuters
-June 10, 2022

A general view of the border town of Imatra, Finland on March 24, 2022.

 (Essi Lehto / Reuters File Photo)

Road signs are seen at the Imatra border crossing with Russia, amid Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in Imatra, Finland on March 23, 2022. (Essi Lehto / Reuters File Photo)


HELSINKI — Finland’s government plans to amend border legislation to allow the building of barriers on its eastern frontier with Russia, it said on Thursday, in a move to strengthen preparedness against hybrid threats amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Finland, which is currently applying for membership in the Western military alliance NATO, has a history of wars with Russia, although currently the forest-covered border zone between the two countries is marked merely with signs and plastic lines for most of its 1,300-kilometer (810-mile) length.

The Finnish government has rushed to strengthen border security as it fears Russia could attempt to put pressure on Finland by sending asylum seekers to its borders — as the European Union accused Belarus of doing at the end of last year when hundreds of migrants from the Middle East, Afghanistan and Africa got stuck on the Polish border.

The government’s amendments to the law include a proposal to enable concentrating the reception of asylum applications only at specific points of entry.

Under existing EU rules, migrants have the right to ask for asylum at any given entry point to an EU member country.

The amendments would also allow the building of barriers such as fences, as well as new roads to facilitate border patrolling on the Finnish side.

“Later on, the government will decide on border barriers to the critical zones on the eastern border, on the basis of the Finnish Border Guard’s assessment,” minister of internal affairs Krista Mikkonen said in a statement.

Reporting by Anne Kauranen.