Wednesday, June 15, 2022

The Deep State: the Conspiratorial Turn in America

The phrase actually referred to a real and shadowy power in Turkey. In America, it’s the preserve of those harboring extreme and unfounded theories

Josef Burton
May 16, 2022
Jake Angeli, known as the “QAnon Shaman” / Olivier Touron / AFP via Getty Images


In politics, fantasies can be a central motivator for taking action. Such was the case on Jan. 6, 2021, when the mob that stormed the U.S. Capitol was animated by fantasy. The motley crew shared a belief that the 2020 election was stolen and could be overturned via obscure constitutional procedure if only a few patriots could take action. Beyond this immediate goal most shared some degree of belief in QAnon — an amorphous set of pseudo-prophetic political beliefs that hold Donald Trump to be a crusader against a satanic, child-sacrificing “Deep State” made up of media elites, Washington insiders and bureaucrats.

Based on anonymous 4Chan posts from a purported administration insider who is codenamed “Q,” QAnon adherents believe that John McCain did not actually die of natural causes but was secretly executed for treason. Some believe that President Kennedy’s son JFK Jr. is still alive, is a covert political operative and will reveal himself as Trump’s new vice president. Others maintain that Robert Mueller was a secret Trump ally investigating the president as a decoy operation. The phantasms that the rioters were fighting had fuzzy edges and definitions as ludicrous and shifting as the rioters themselves. The picturesque blue-painted and fur clad “QAnon Shaman” — Jake Angeli — was better known before Jan. 6 for live-streaming himself entering shopping malls wearing a horned headdress and screaming about how decorative tiles outside bathrooms were coded signals for secret gangs of Deep State child-trafficking pedophiles to abduct children into a cave network to harvest the chemical adrenochrome from their brains. A subset of QAnon followers believes in the existence of the “frazzledrip tape,” a purported video of Hillary Clinton and her assistant Huma Abedin ritually sacrificing and then eating a baby. This chaotic fever dream of demonic imagery is mixed with more prosaic enemies — elitist diplomats, complacent Washington insiders and Trump’s personal enemies list — to make up the shifting cloud of what is called the Deep State, the hidden enemy. The paranoid rage is all-American, but the term is imported.

The Deep State is the Turkish language’s great contribution to political science. The translation from Turkish — “derin devlet” — is literal and direct. A state that exists below and within. The Turkish term, however, doesn’t imply any outside-the-mainstream milieu of ideas, nor does it serve the same role as the American term “conspiracy theory” in describing a way of seeing the political world. “Deep State” in Turkish is not a flight of fancy or an alternative belief; rather, it describes a very specific set of historical actors in a specific time and place. Who is included within the bounds of the term is of course up for debate, because the Deep State is secretive by definition, but the term describes unauthorized and unknown networks of power operating independently of official political leadership. The Turkish Deep State has imprecise boundaries and includes state-aligned mafia figures as well as industrialists and conservative economic elites, but it is not a catchall term for status quo power structures or hegemonic institutions. The Deep State is a shadowy parallel system of power, not the power structure that you can openly see.

There is credible evidence that some of these covert power networks in Turkey have lineages that go back to the 19th century, to secret political organizations among modernizing Turkish nationalist army officers in the last days of the Ottoman Empire. This history does not mean that the Deep State has been the secret hand behind Turkey’s national destiny from the dawn of time but points to the more reasonable fact that parallel power structures form during times of crisis. It is precisely during these crises in Turkey that the Deep State became something named and observed in political life. The left-right political violence of the 1970s and ’80s that resulted in a series of brutal military coups was a time of pervasive covert state violence and Deep State activity. Leftists and students were disappeared, and in 1977 dozens of trade unionists in Istanbul’s Taksim Square were mowed down by gunmen whose identities and motivations remain unknown to this day. In the 1990s, during the Turkish state’s struggle against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — a fight that broadened into a state assault on Kurdish civil society — the Deep State once again slithered out of the depths and onto the streets. The jarring 1996 “Susurluk incident” was a freak car accident involving a BMW full of cash, guns, drugs, and a notorious mafia drug baron and police general somehow driving together. Susurluk revealed the depths of the connection between the Turkish security services and right-wing organized crime elements in their mutual war against the PKK.

The Deep State is not a fantastic conspiracy but something tangible and real. Parliamentary investigations in Turkey in the early 2000s confirmed the existence of whole military units and intelligence bureaus whose very existence was unknown to the elected government. Some Deep State structures, like the national gendarmarie’s secret intelligence unit JİTEM, have been fully exposed. For others, mystery remains. Turkey’s U.S.-trained counter-guerrilla unit, known variously as the Special Warfare Department or Tactical Mobilization Group, was instrumental to Turkey’s Cold War anticommunist violence. It remains unclear whether that unit operated under Turkish government authority, with some anonymous former members claiming that they answered only to NATO while also readily confessing to involvement in torture and instigating Istanbul’s 1955 anti-Greek pogroms.

Although the Deep State in Turkey refers to a secret network, it is actually very well documented and proven. The term Deep State has left Turkish history and entered into global political discourse because it is a useful and accurate tool to describe specific forms of state and para-state violence that actually happen. The concept is not specific to Turkey or the Middle East. Criminal investigations in Italy and Belgium have uncovered similar Cold War-era networks in Europe under the codename Operation Gladio.

I was very much surprised, then, to see “Deep State” emerge in post-2016 American politics as an explicitly Trumpist term. Devoid of context, Trump administration figures used the phrase initially in much the same way that Barack Obama coined the phrase “the blob” — as shorthand for the Washington establishment consensus. Google searches for “Deep State” spike in April 2017 shortly after Trump’s administration started. In October 2017, posts from “Q Clearance Patriot” appeared for the first time on 4chan, setting the QAnon mythos into motion. Searches for Deep State spiked again and, with time, the phrase has become more sinister and accusatory.

It would be easy enough to write a taxonomy of the term “Deep State,” tracing how it entered into Trumpworld and shifted its meaning therein. There is even a prime candidate for who brought the phrase into the White House: Gen. Mike Flynn, who lasted as Trump’s national security adviser for all of 22 days and who had deep and possibly illegal connections to Turkish politics.

Flynn initially made a name for himself within the U.S. military and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) as a hawk’s hawk, fixated on the threat of militant Islamism. Before he was forced out of the DIA in 2014 for his chaotic and abusive management style, Flynn frequently accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of being a crypto-jihadist and a threat to the West. In 2016 Flynn initially hailed the abortive Turkish coup d’état as an attempt (he assumed) to defend secularism.

Mike Flynn’s tune quickly changed when he launched his consulting company and quickly became one of the most ardent pro-Turkish government lobbyists in Washington. Flynn published editorials denouncing cleric and Erdoğan rival Fethullah Gülen as the puppet master of dark and shadowy forces. Flynn’s reversal was as adamant as it was sudden. The Turkish government would eventually offer the general $15 million cash to kidnap Gülen (a U.S. permanent resident) and transport the cultish and reclusive cleric to Turkey to stand trial for instigating that same coup attempt Flynn once praised. Unbelievably, accepting cash from a foreign government to stage a kidnapping on U.S. soil was not actually the reason Flynn eventually had to resign. His time in the Trump White House was short, but it was only after this brief stint that the administration began to use the phrase Deep State.

This could be a tidy and convenient story: A conspiracy-minded operative falls into the orbit of Erdoğan and picks up a very politically useful narrative of a shadowy conspiracy by hidden establishment actors against democracy. But Flynn was not young and innocent, and his hobnobbing with Turkish government bigwigs was not his introduction to the idea of a Deep State. Before he was a “consultant,” and before he was assistant director of the DIA, Flynn made a career as a young staff officer in the then-small and close-knit U.S. special warfare community. He trained and made plans at Fort Bragg’s John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center in the 1980s. The center was previously known as the U.S. Army Institute for Military Assistance, and the generation of men who trained the young Flynn were veterans of dozens of American covert efforts to fight communism — the men who ran the Phoenix Project death squads in South Vietnam and trained anticommunist secret police and commandos in Thailand, Iran, Italy, Greece, Guatemala and a dozen other countries, including Turkey.

The Turkish Special Warfare Department and its larger counter-guerrilla program, when they functioned openly in the ’50s and ’60s, were supported and organized directly by the American special warfare community via the U.S. military assistance mission. The Green Berets who trained the Turkish operatives who instigated the Istanbul pogroms and tortured dissidents at the Zivirbey Villa in 1971 would, in the twilight of their careers, rotate back to the Kennedy Special Warfare Center to train the next generation of American covert warriors — men like Flynn. The mania for conspiracy and Deep State suspicion is not something Flynn contracted from Turkey like some Oriental disease, but he was shaped and molded within real existing conspiracies. Deep states are not fantastic when they are something you have been trained to construct and support.

In American and Turkish conversations about the Deep State, everything is reversed. In America real and specific Deep State agents — celebrities, politicians, institutions — purportedly commit horrific torture on abstract categories of victims (patriots, children, etc.) who can never be specifically named or seen. Nobody has successfully proved voter fraud in the 2020 election. No child survivor of the elite Soros adrenochrome harvest has come forward.

The victims of the Turkish Deep State, on the other hand, are not hypothetical or mythical. From the 1970s hundreds of people, mostly leftists and minorities, were murdered by state or para-state gangs. When encountering a real Deep State the question is never if what is happening is real, but to what degree it will do harm. Were the masked men who threw grenades into a Kurdish bookstore undercover military, or were they a far-right mafia gang? Or were they from a conservative Kurdish clan given money and arms to suppress separatists? The fear and doubt that an unknown perpetrator provokes is a key part of Deep State violence. Only the victims are real: A comrade’s body is dumped outside the union office; protesters die after being gunned down in a rainy square; a reporter simply never comes home one day. You do not have to posit the existence of underground child-abuse tunnel networks when there are funerals to go to.

Almost as if they have become sensitive to the absurdity and implausibility of many contemporary conspiracy theories, there is a strain within the Jan. 6/QAnon world who are much less prone to the fantastic and make more concrete (although still totally baseless) claims. The events that they claim happened, the jargon they use to impart verisimilitude to their stories, and frequently the conspiracy theorists themselves are linked to the U.S. military or security services.

A month before Jan. 6, rumors swirled among the Telegram channels and yet-unbanned Facebook groups where the Capitol rioters mobilized. For example, a specific military unit, the 305th Military Intelligence Battalion, was reported as having raided a secret underground server farm in Frankfurt, Germany. It was there, the story went, that the CIA had secreted away a server farm full of voting data with incontrovertible proof that the 2020 election had been stolen from Donald Trump. There had been casualties, but the raid was a success. The 305th had captured CIA Director Gina Haspell, and she had already been flown to Guantánamo Bay and been executed for high treason. While the real public affairs officer for the actual battalion was busy drafting a statement explaining that no, the Arizona-based unit of analysts was not a secret shock troop tasked with overturning the 2020 election and had not been engaged in a subterranean battle with the CIA in Germany, a retired lieutenant general, Thomas McInerney, was solemnly intoning that the 305th had taken heavy casualties. A month later, while the QAnon Shaman stood shirtless on the Speaker’s rostrum in the House of Representatives chamber in a horned headdress and howled about impending doom for traitors, Larry Rendall Brock stood on the House floor in a tactical plate carrier and helmet giving instructions to other rioters. A former Air Force lieutenant colonel, Brock had tucked into his vest a bundle of zip ties meant to restrain detainees. (After his arrest, he claimed he actually had no targets for detention in mind but wanted to give the zip ties to the police.)

Seven percent of Americans are veterans, but almost 20 percent of the Jan. 6 rioters had served in the military. A midlevel State Department official who covered South American affairs has now been charged with assaulting a police officer during the riot. This strike against the American Deep State on Jan. 6 was therefore demographically closer to any putative Deep State than to the general public. Not all American security institutions are bad in this fantasy world.

Guantánamo Bay looms especially large in the fantasies of QAnon. It will be the site of execution, trials, extrajudicial torture and retribution visited on the Deep State child abuse mainstream media globalist sickos. Hillary Clinton and George Soros will be hanged there. There is a good reason that the lurid fantasies of revenge and torture in “The Storm” — the QAnon day of judgment when Trump and his patriotic allies defeat the Deep State — all take place at Gitmo: Everybody in America knows that Gitmo is where the United States actually sends people to be extra-judicially tortured. Men held there are fed out of dog bowls. They are hooded and kept in sensory deprivation. They are subject to sexualized abuse and kept in solitary confinement for years at a time and detained for decades without trial. The place of Guantánamo Bay in QAnon mythos tells us something very important about the actual American Deep State, the one that ran a torture camp outside Kabul, the ruins of which you can now find on Google maps (it has a one-star review), and the actual secret intelligence services that are probably skimming metadata off the device you are using to read this article. Indeed, since 9/11, what would amount to a Deep State in the U.S. is no longer deep. It functions brazenly, right in the open, without any conspiracy or concealment, in places you can find on Google maps. Former Army officers Brock and McInerney want to send their enemies there.

In the days after Jan. 6, the entire U.S. military was tasked with addressing extremist infiltration within their ranks. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon met behind closed doors to privately reaffirm their commitment to a constitutional transfer of power. It has become clear that conspiracy theories like QAnon and militias like the Oath Keepers that participated in the Jan. 6 insurrection have found fertile recruiting ground within the ranks of law enforcement and the military. Indeed, when investigating far-right domestic terrorism, the FBI no longer shares suspect information with local police departments, assuming a level of sympathy among local cops. U.S. President Joe Biden took the oath of office surrounded by tens of thousands of troops, the individual loyalties of whom were not entirely certain.

When I was serving at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, my job was mostly administering the Trump-era Muslim ban as it applied to thousands of would-be immigrants from Iran. It was a disgusting, bigoted policy I made no secret of opposing. My newly arrived boss, who I forgot also spoke Farsi, overheard me being too sympathetic to a family I had just banned. My supervisor took me aside. “No trash-talking policy in front of applicants.” He also hated the ban. “If you are going to be a Deep Stater, do it in private.” Outside of the conspiratorial fringe, this is what we mean when we say Deep State in America. Obstructionist insiders. Two multilingual bureaucrats from “The Blob” in J. Crew suits trying to pull a little polite veneer over their opposition to Trump.

I walked away from my desk into the old embassy grounds, shrugging off the incident in the same cafeteria garden in which generations of American officials had sat while mulling over their own pet issues in Turkish-American relations. It was the same garden where U.S. officials celebrated after the 1980 Turkish coup d’état — the height of Deep State power in Turkey — which arrested tens of thousands overnight and crushed the left in that country for a generation. It was where the legendary Radio Free Europe psychological operations expert and self-identified CIA official Paul Henze had probably sat to relax during his own Cold War assignment in Ankara. After his work in Ankara was done, Henze would be the man who would lean over to Jimmy Carter and gleefully proclaim that “the boys in Ankara have done it!” as they watched American-trained officers overthrow an elected government in 1980.

The situation in which I found myself exemplifies the exact problem with translating the idea of Deep State between the U.S. and Turkey. There are two versions of this term now: a Turkish one that describes something horrifyingly real and an American one that stands for either stodgy bureaucratic annoyance or lurid fantasy. This gap in translation is not a linguistic inadequacy. Rather it masks a central truth: that the Turkish Deep State was an American-backed project. The most dangerous, capable and avid adherents of Deep State conspiracies in the U.S. are themselves products of the same military and security institutions that supported the Deep State in Turkey. The targets of the real existing Turkish Deep State and the Americans who regard themselves as fighting against a fictional Deep State are the same. They are democracy, minority rights and the left.

Standing in the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, a place as tied to the Turkish Deep State as any American building can be, while being half-scolded by a supervisor who calls us Deep Staters with a hint of pride, illustrates the poverty of American understanding of this term, which should be taken seriously. As it meanders in translation, Deep State loses useful meaning and becomes the territory of wingnuts and cranks. If this continues to happen, we will lose sight of one last terrifying irony: that with their infiltration of the military and the security services, contempt for democratic processes and willingness to use political violence, the anti-Deep State conspiracists in the United States are well on their way to creating the unauthorized and unknown networks of power that the term Deep State was coined to describe.

Years after Ankara, on my way to work at another diplomatic post, I watched Jan. 6 unfold on my phone. The rioters stormed up the steps of the Capitol with the same vigor any U.S. trained officer might have displayed while overturning a Cold War-era election in some foreign country. America’s support for anti-democratic violence has finally come home. I think of Paul Henze as the rioters breach the Capitol doors. The boys have indeed done it.


Josef Burton is a former American diplomat. He worked on Iranian and Afghan immigration issues during the Trump presidency
How Wahhabism Led the Fight Against the British in the Gulf

At the end of the 18th century, the empire’s trade began to encroach on the routes of the kingdoms and sultanates of the Arabian Peninsula. It was Wahhabism that gave religious justification to their anti-colonial resistance
 is a scholar and author on the history and culture of the Middle East
June 10, 2022
Illustrated by Joanna Andreasson for New Lines


On a hot day in March 1813 in the area of Bidiyyah, located in what is today the Eastern Region of the Sultanate of Oman, the renowned Wahhabi military leader Mutlaq bin Mohammed al-Mutairi and his forces arrived near the Gulf of Oman. This occurred more than 50 years after the founding of the first Saudi kingdom, a dynasty based on the Salafist reform movement known as Wahhabism. Since that time, al-Mutairi’s strong leadership and fearsome reputation had helped expand and consolidate Saudi influence in the region, including the areas under the control of the Qasimi clan (the Qasimis or Qawasim) in Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah.

But his power came with cruelty, and ultimately this led to his demise, with the locals of Bidiyyah vowing to take revenge no matter the cost. In his book “The Clear Victory of the House of Busaid,” the Omani historian Hamid bin Raziq (1783-1874) recounts the battle that put an end to this most famous of Wahhabi leaders. Bin Raziq states that al-Mutairi arrived with his forces in the Bidiyyah region at sunrise, setting up his camp in a nearby area known as Al Wasil. When al-Mutairi’s army launched raids on the villages of the area, the local citizens were determined to attack him at all costs, victory or martyrdom. “They vowed and swore to God that they would not bend to him, even if it meant their deaths.” Bin Raziq then writes about six rounds of fighting against al-Mutairi’s army that day. The first three rounds targeted the camp of his brother, Batal bin Mohammed al-Mutairi, whom they defeated, followed by occupation of his camp. The locals then attacked al-Mutairi’s own camp during the last three rounds of fighting. Al-Mutairi repelled the first two attacks, while the third ended with his death and the defeat of his army. One eyewitness recounted with amazement and admiration the resolve and determination of the Hajiri warriors, residents of this region, in confronting the Saudis and fighting them to the death.

This battle was a turning point in pushing back the tide of Saudi Wahhabi influence before the ultimate demise of the First Saudi State five years later, in 1818, at the hands of Egyptian-Ottoman forces. And it wasn’t the only time that local tribes rose against invading forces. The Qasimis were to prove formidable opponents to the increasing hegemony of the British along the Oman coast, though this time the fight did not, despite fierce resistance, go in their favor. The British gained the upper hand and, consequently, full control of the seas and trade from India.

The history of Wahhabism is often told exclusively in the context of Saudi Arabia, with occasional references to its attempted expansion north, into Iraq and the Levant. Contemporary Wahhabi influence in other corners of the Arabian Peninsula is often understood as a product of later proselytization. But Wahhabism’s expansion south, all the way to Oman and today’s United Arab Emirates, is an overlooked part of the history of the region: how Wahhabism was first defeated but then took root as a local resistance ideology against the British and how Wahhabi “piracy” along the Persian Gulf caused the British Empire to turn its attention to the Gulf region and strike deals that shaped the formation of the modern Arab states of the Gulf.

But the British presence in that region was not an extension of its colonialism in Iraq and the Levant north of the Arabian Peninsula. In fact, it preceded it, and came through the Indian Ocean from the south. Wahhabism gave a religious flavor to the resistance against the infidel invaders, but the Qasimis and other local tribes were already experienced in standing up for their land and way of life and did so until the British turned the full weight of the world’s most powerful army against them. And so began British influence in the Arabian Gulf.

In 1727, Muhammad bin Saud (1710-1765), whose lineage can be traced back to the Banu Hanifa, one of the ancient Arab tribes of Bakr bin Wael, and who would later become the founder of the First Saudi State, assumed control over his tribe in the region of old Diriyah, a mere 12 miles from the modern-day capital of Riyadh. At the same time, a reformer emerged who had been educated in Najd, Hejaz and Iraq. His name was Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1791), a descendant of the famous Tamim tribe of Najd, located in the heart of the Arabian Peninsula. He issued an urgent plea to return to the foundations of Islam from which these tribes, in his view, had strayed far away. He also believed that these same tribes must try again to do what the Prophet and his companions after him had done before: unify the Arabian Peninsula.

Ibn Abd al-Wahhab realized that his reformist message would not resonate much within the Arabian Peninsula, especially among hostile and infighting tribes, without the support of an armed power on his side. After several failed attempts, he went to Emir Muhammad bin Saud in Diriyah and convinced him of his ideas, which relied upon a Hanbali Salafist methodology as the basis for reforming and redeploying Islam throughout the Arabian Peninsula. In doing so, he also promised the emir that he would become the indisputable lord of the Arabian Peninsula.

When reading Wahhabi literature and sources from that time, whether written by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab himself or his offspring who later became religious leaders at the founding of the Third Saudi State, we find the recurring concept of “invasion to spread the message.” This principle is — and has always been — central to early Wahhabism. All four emirs of the First Saudi State believed in the firm relationship between the sheikh’s religious leadership and the emir’s political leadership to achieve the goals of his reformist message.

In the earliest historical Wahhabi literature, such as “The History of Najd” by Ibn Ghannam, one of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s pupils, we find a description of converts to Wahhabism as “Muslims.” It appears that this description is used exclusively for adherents of Wahhabism, which shows the extent of religious fervor and responsibility possessed by Wahhabis at that time. According to their faith, they were reenacting the first invasions of the Prophet to once again restore the people and tribes of the Arabian Peninsula to their conception of the creeds of “Islam” and “monotheism.” This religious zeal was undoubtedly the main reason behind the expansion of the First Saudi State and the people’s adherence to it, willingly or coercively.

The subsequent string of military successes of the Saudis resulted from armed force combined with the strength of religious persuasion and advocacy of the Sunni Wahhabi doctrine, which was tempting to many Arab tribes in its call to return to the pure Islam that was brought by the Prophet Muhammad. It was an appealing message, and it allowed the First Saudi State to expand its sphere of influence in all directions. It stretched to Al-Qatif, Al-Ahsa and Bahrain to the east; to the borders of Kuwait, Iraq and southern Syria to the north; to the outskirts of Hejaz and the Red Sea to the west; then to inner Oman, Muscat and the UAE (known then as the Omani Coast or Coastal Oman) to the south and southeast. The Saudis also saw it necessary to control the strategic Al-Buraimi Oasis, which is now divided between the Emirati city of Al Ain and the Omani Al-Buraimi Governorate. 

The so-called “Pirate Coast” around the turn of the 19th century. 
Borders approximate. 
Map by Joshua Martin / MapTiler / OpenStreetMap contributors

Abu Dhabi was the first of the emirates to meet with the Saudi campaigns along the Omani Coast. In his book “The Meteor’s Gleam,” the Wahhabi historian Al-Rikki mentions that while the commander Ibrahim bin Suleiman bin Ufaisan was waging Saudi expansion campaigns in Qatar in 1793, orders came from Abdulaziz bin Muhammad bin Saud (1721-1803), the second leader of the First Saudi State in Diriyah, Najd, commanding him to direct al-Mutairi to invade Oman and go as far as the land of Sir (today where Oman and Sharjah meet).

And so the First Saudi State reached the Al-Buraimi Oasis in 1795, led by bin Ufaisan, and the Saudis subsequently dispatched several military campaigns to the same region led by Salem bin Bilal al-Harq, one in 1800 and another in 1803. During each of those campaigns, the tribes of that region became indebted in allegiance to the Saudis, sometimes through soft power employed by the Wahhabi sheikhs and other times through armed military might and coercion. The tribes of the Banu Yas, Banu Na‘im, Banu Qutb and the Qasimis were quickly incorporated into the First Saudi State. In 1809, the Saudis sent their most famous military leader, al-Mutairi, whose raids reached and subdued Muscat for a time. He remained the most influential of the Saudis in that region until his death in 1813.

From their important and stable foothold in the Al-Buraimi Oasis, the Wahhabis were able to reinforce their influence, religious/political messaging and military movements throughout all of Oman, Sir and the Omani Coast. After several military confrontations, they were able to coerce the Qasimis and their supporters into adopting Wahhabism. However, there is some disagreement among historians about the date of this conversion, with various writers dating it to 1797, 1800 or 1803.

Historian Charles Rathborn Low referenced this three-to-six-year discrepancy in his book “History of the Indian Navy 1613-1862.” The Qasimi tribes, in fact, resisted the Wahhabi invasion in this region during that period. Russian historian Viktor Leonovich Mikhin confirms as much in his book “The Qawasim Alliance,” stating that the chief of the Qasimis at that time, Sheikh Saqr bin Rashid Al Qasimi, refused to convert to Wahhabism. This refusal came when Emir Abdulaziz bin Muhammad bin Saud, the second leader of the First Saudi State, issued his decree to the Banu Na‘im in Ajman and the eastern Arabian Peninsula to attack the Qasimis and subjugate them, which they failed to do. Afterward, bin Saud sent forces from Diriyah to join with those of the Banu Na‘im and his Wahhabi commander, al-Mutairi, who were stationed in Al-Buraimi. Yet their attack failed a second time because of the Qasimis’ fierce resistance in Ras Al Khaimah.

The Wahhabis never gave up on the idea of conquering the Qasimis. This time, however, once again under the leadership of al-Mutairi and with the support of several tribes loyal to the Saudis, the Wahhabis laid siege to Ras Al Khaimah with 4,000 soldiers for 17 days. Although they succeeded in defeating the Qasimis, a new conflict and war erupted between the two sides because of the Wahhabis’ handling of the Qasimis’ religious affairs and their destruction of some shrines and graves. Once again, the Wahhabis subdued the Qasimis, aided by their allied tribes. However, a sizable portion of the Qasimis’ supporters from the Zaab tribe in Al Jazirah Al Hamra and the Tunaij tribe in Rams continued to stubbornly resist the Wahhabis until they were forcibly defeated. With this definitive defeat, all of them became adherents of Wahhabism — for a while.

After the Qasimis were brought into the fold under Saudi Wahhabi control, their attacks against the British in the Gulf took on a religious tone. According to historical and literary texts from that time, their raids against British warships and commercial vessels were a stand against the “Christian enemies of the faith.” As a result of this new policy, the Qasimis expanded their maritime activity into the Indian Ocean, where their ships appeared along the Malabar Coast north of Bombay (present-day Mumbai), India, for the first time in 1808. The Qasimis used to send a fifth of the spoils they got from their naval operations to the Saudis as a confirmation of their faith in the Wahhabi message and their submission to the House of Saud.

At that time, the British were keeping track of developments in the important regions of the Gulf from the safety of British-controlled India. Their greatest concern was stable security and business conditions to ensure the uninterrupted flow of commerce for the British East India Co. (EIC) from Bombay to Basra via the waters of the Gulf. For this reason, the British understood the importance of Oman and the Omani Coast in securing their presence, commerce and ships.

This formed the basis of Omani-British relations, which began during the start of the Yarubid dynasty in the 1650s. They held talks about the establishment of a British center in Muscat, but the Yarubids refused to allow any European base or presence there because of their experiences under Portuguese occupation in the 16th and 17th centuries. The situation changed with the arrival of Ahmad bin Said in 1741, the first imam of Oman from the House of Busaid, which still rules today. After his ascent to power, Omani-British relations took shape surprisingly quickly.

On Oct. 12, 1798, the British brokered a commercial and political pact with the House of Busaid in the Sultanate of Oman. This treaty stipulated ‌the latter allow the British to have a military presence in the port of Bandar Abbas along the Iranian coast, which was under Omani control‌. It also required the sultanate not to interact with any other European powers present in the Gulf, especially the French and Dutch, and to forbid them from setting up shop in Muscat and Bandar Abbas. In short, the Busaidis could only deal with the British.

The British had achieved a massive, easy win through this agreement. Researchers conclude that the pact successfully hampered French activity in the Gulf ‌and in Oman in particular. The signing of this agreement was extremely important for travel to India as it allowed the British to broaden their political, commercial and military sphere of influence, not only in Oman but also across the Gulf. Oman’s geographical position forced the British to focus their movements throughout the region in Oman, especially in the Qasimis’ territories of Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah. Thus, the Qasimis had genuine reasons to resist the British presence.

The first half century ‌of this agreement (1741-1798) was a period in which the House of Busaid consolidated its rule over the sultanate. They were converts to the Ibadi sect of Islam, which differed from orthodox Sunnism on various points. They faced challenges from an alliance of Sunni Ghafiri tribes along the Omani Coast, spearheaded by the Qasimis tribes in Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah, as well as regions within Oman, such as Samail, the area south of Muscat called Al Dhahirah and other areas in northern Oman. This alliance collided with the Ibadi Hinawi confederation led by the House of Busaid, and the two sides fought in several armed conflicts that ended with the latter overcoming all the Ghafiri tribes along the coast and within Oman, except for the Qasimis. For this reason, the Omani-British alliance was not only geared against the French but also the Qasimis. The Wahhabi Saudis supported the Qasimis against this alliance, as they had supported the Qasimis since the French conquest of the Qasimis in the 19th century, even though the Qasimis had initially resisted Saudi rule and dominance in the region.

The British exploited this complex, competitive political situation in the Gulf, working with the commercial and military fleets of Oman to attract another important power to its side: Bahrain. Since 1783, the rulers of that island had been the House of Khalifa, who were allied to the Banu Utbah tribes that had immigrated from Kuwait to Bahrain and Zubarah (a port town across from Bahrain in Qatar) in 1763. Britain tried to court the House of Khalifa to join their side, even though Bahrain was another area of the eastern Arabian Peninsula under Wahhabi control, one that the sultan of Muscat attacked from time to time. Nudged and pressured by the British, the Banu Utbah and rulers of Bahrain joined the sultan of Muscat in 1813 by launching a naval and ground assault on the Qasimis in Ras Al Khaimah. However, the attack failed because of the Qasimis’ fierce resistance, as recounted by historian and the colonial administrator in British-occupied India, J.G. Lorimer (1870-1914), in his book “Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman and Central Arabia.”

The British continued employing a pernicious policy aimed at exaggerating the risk of the Qasimi fleets to both sides. They initiated a smear campaign against the Qasimis to portray them as pirates, even calling the areas under the Qasimis’ control (Ras Al Khaimah, Sharjah, Umm al-Quwain, Ajman, Al Hamriya, and Al Jazirah Al Hamra) the “Pirate Coast.” Remarkably, the Qasimis’ control during the 18th century and first quarter of the 19th century stretched all the way to the Iranian coast, on the other side of the Gulf.

However, before exploring the reasons for the tense relations between the British and the Qasimis tribal confederacy, we must first familiarize ourselves with the origins of these tribes and how they came to power in the southeast Arabian Peninsula and Omani Coast. Historians are divided over the origin of the Qasimis tribes. Some believe that the tribe’s name goes back to a tribe of the Banu Ghafir in Najd that emigrated to the Omani Coast in the 17th century, while others think ‌they are descendants of the Arab Huwala tribes that used to reside along the eastern coast of the Gulf in what is now Iran. The current ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, states in a small note titled “The Definitive History and Origin of the Qasimis” that the foundations of his tribe go back to the Ahl al-Bayt, the family of the Prophet Muhammad, as the descendants of Hassan bin Ali bin Abu Talib and Fatima bint Muhammad.

In exploring the documents of the British National Archives from the 18th century, we discover that the term “the Qasimis” became a banner for all the Qasimis together with their allied tribes in the regions of Ras Al Khaimah, Sharjah and the Omani Coast. This emphasizes the sway and control that this tribe had over this region, the main reason its members became the vanguard in resisting the British presence in the Gulf.

With the Qasimis living on barren land unsuitable for agriculture, maritime trade represented their only source of income and wealth. Their business with Indian ports, in particular, was extremely important, as they had brought back from there the most important supplies and timber needed to build their ships. As such, they saw the British as stiff competitors who could deprive them of their livelihoods‌. Foreign commercial competition had been a way of life for a long time, and local residents had become used to living under those circumstances. However, the British added an extra element to the mix. They started demanding that all ships trading in the Gulf carry British permits to do so, indicating that they considered themselves the masters over these waters, as Mikhin notes in his book, “The Qasimis Alliance and British Policy in the Arab Gulf.”

Toward the end of the 18th century, the British finally cemented their control over India, overcoming all their other European competitors, such as the French. Around the turn of the century, British commercial agents in countries connected to the Gulf began turning one after another into political pawns. In 1798, Britain signed a treaty with the rulers of Muscat aimed squarely against the French, but in reality, the treaty meant the start of Muscat’s submission to British rule, and their eventual transformation into an auxiliary unit against the Qasimis.

The charges made against the Qasimis were ostensibly part of Britain’s intentional and systematic policy to curb piracy, crafted by the British EIC. British residents and agents repeated these charges vigorously, working to spread this lie to create the pretext for using British sailors and ships to protect their trade. After a thorough examination of all the naval activities conducted by the Qasimis in the Gulf at that time, Mikhin confirms in his book that all instances in which the Qasimis were accused of piracy by the British were actually acts of self-defense.

In Lorimer’s “Gazetteer,” we find an entire chapter dedicated to the “Rise and Suppression of Piracy” between the years 1778 and 1820, the year in which the British destroyed the Qasimis fleets and imposed an armistice treaty upon them, making the British the true lords over the eastern coast of the Gulf. Lorimer describes the region as the Pirate Coast, as was common in British propaganda at the time, and details all the Qasimis acts of aggression, year by year, against British trade ships or the ships of their allies in the region‌. In one case, he states:

On the 18th of May 1797, off Rams, a fleet of Al Qawasim boats attacked and captured the snow [ship] ‘Bassein,’ though under British colours and carrying public dispatches, and took her to Ras Al Khaimah, where she was detained for two days and then released by order of the Shaikh. No reparation seems to have been exacted for this insult to the British flag. Impunity bore its natural fruit.

In this passage, he means to say that this instance led to many more Qasimi attacks on British trade ships.

Numerous British historical sources and documents indicate that the British deliberately attempted to depict the Qasimis as pirates, but this description is questionable for several reasons. The concept of piracy during the Middle and Modern Ages used to mean, and still evokes, an image of roving gangs operating in a specific area to plunder and pillage. While the Qasimis (and allied tribes) were engaging in acts that could be described as piracy, the attacks were driven by ideology rather than the aim of simply looting by sea. The Qasimis, just like the other Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, had lived on these lands for hundreds of years before Britain ever considered establishing a presence in India and expanding their commerce in the Gulf, and their actions were part of a resistance against them, a resistance, moreover, that gained religious legitimacy from Wahhabi doctrine. As a British resident of Muscat, Francis Warden, noted in 1809: “The Qasimis’ piracy is nothing more than the result of the Wahhabis’ inducing them to do so.” This was jihad against the British, and the spoils from their actions on the seas but a (licensed) part of this sanctioned resistance against the infidel.

The reasons behind the British depiction of the Qasimis were either that Britain did not understand them very well, or that they knew them and intentionally distorted the truth. We must realize that the Qasimis’ subservience to the Wahhabis, and conversion to their sect, forced them to engage in the holy war that the Wahhabis had declared against the “enemies of the faith,” i.e., the British, among others. The British were also allies with the Qasimis’ regional and ideological archenemies, ‌the House of Busaid in Oman. The war between those regional enemies had gone on since 1741, when the Busaidis seized control of Muscat. The Omani-British alliance led to wider British commercial, political and military activity in the southern Gulf, which represented a serious threat to the Qasimis’ trade and fleets in that region.

In light of the Qasimis’ subordination to the First Saudi State and harsh Wahhabi supervision over them, their sheikh, ‌Sultan bin Saqr Al Qasimi, longed for independence. He grew tired of the Wahhabis’ ever-increasing influence and direct intervention in the affairs of Ras Al Khaimah and Sharjah, namely through the Wahhabi commander in the Al-Buraimi Oasis, al-Mutairi. The Saudis then decided to strip Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr of his authority, summoning him to their capital in Diriyah in late 1808. He was arrested and imprisoned but managed to escape in 1812, seeking refuge in the Egyptian military camp in Jeddah on the Red Sea coast. The camp was under the command of Tusun ibn Muhammad Ali Pasha, who led the Egyptian-Ottoman military campaign of 1808-1811, which resulted in the demise of the First Saudi State.

After arresting Sultan bin Saqr Al Qasimi, replacing him with another person more loyal to the Wahhabis, the Qasimis’ attacks on British ships intensified in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, during which ‌they seized several British ships. By 1809, the Qasimis fleet in Ras Al Khaimah on the Gulf coast and Bandar Lengeh on the Persian coast had reached 630 large ships, 810 smaller crafts, and 8,700 sailors. The leader of the Qasimis relied upon them in demanding that the British government in India pay a tax to allow British ships to freely pass through the Gulf. For this reason, Britain prepared for a military naval campaign, armed with 13 warships bearing cannons, 1,500 soldiers, a campaign officer, and four troop-carrying vessels. Their mission was to destroy the Qasimis’ naval might and force them into a treaty on British terms.

Between 1811 and 1818, the First Saudi State entered into a risky open conflict against Muhammad Ali Pasha of Egypt, who waged war at the behest of the Ottoman Empire. Under the influence of British propaganda, the Ottomans were convinced they had to confront the Wahhabi threat. This campaign culminated in Ottoman-Egyptian forces entering Diriyah and eliminating the First Saudi State in 1818. The Qasimis’ attacks on British ships did not cease with the fall of the Wahhabis, but rather after the fall of the Saudi State. These raids continued for genuine and possibly more profound reasons than the Qasimis subordination to the Wahhabis. The British were the ones who started harassing the Qasimis ships, accused them of piracy, and demanded that they comply by bearing British permits when conducting their trade in international waters. They were also the ones who allied themselves with the sultan of Muscat, who was launching attacks on Ras Al Khaimah periodically. All of this forced them to continue what may be described as attacks, carried out as an effective means of self-defense.

In the end, after the fall of the Saudi State, the British government dispatched a large military campaign to destroy the Qasimis’ forces once and for all, even though the latter had broken their alliance with the Saudis. In November 1819, this campaign was launched from Bombay, India, under the command of Gen. William Keir Grant, whose mission was to destroy all the Qasimis’ fleets in Ras Al Khaimah, be they commercial or military. After that, he was ordered to destroy the Qasimis’ boats, bases and ports in Umm al-Quwain, Rams, Al Hamriya, Al Jazirah Al Hamra, Ajman and Sharjah, then attack their ports on the Iranian coast, such as Maghoh, Bandar Lengeh and Kharaj. Grant was even given the authority to make any necessary political decisions.

On Dec. 2, English cannons fired a barrage at Ras Al Khaimah for seven consecutive days. Despite their staunch and bold resistance, the Qasimis began running low on ammunition and lost dozens of men to the English cannons, especially the large ones, forcing them to retreat. The city suffered massive looting and vandalism, and 80 of their large ships were seized. After negotiations concluded between the two sides, the English imposed a treaty on the leaders of Sharjah, Ras Al Khaimah, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Al Jazirah Al Hamra.

The Ras Al Khaimah Agreement was signed on Jan. 20, 1820, and formed the basis for Britain’s political and economic hegemony over the nations of the Gulf. Britain’s position in the region was an indispensable part of its empire in India, aside from its successful and brutal naval and land power. With the help of other regional parties, the British destroyed the Qasimis naval forces and required them and the other emirates to submit to British authority in the Gulf.

Despite this outcome, the Qasimis continue to take pride in their decades long resistance against the mightiest empire of the time to defend their right to trade and ensure their survival.

HIS LAST LETTER BEFORE BEING DISAPPEARED
Russia's Navalny scolds Google and Meta for helping Putin


LONDON (Reuters) - Jailed Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny scolded Google and Meta Platforms Inc on Thursday for shutting down advertising, a step he said had undermined the opposition and thus was a gift to President Vladimir Putin.

Navalny, by far Russia's most prominent opposition leader, casts Putin's Russia as a dystopian state run by thieves and criminals where wrong is cast as right and judges are in fact representatives of a doomed lawless country.

In a written address to the Copenhagen Democracy Summit, Navalny, who is currently in a Russian jail, said technology was being used by the state to arrest dissidents but that it also gave an opportunity to get to the truth.

"The Internet gives us the ability to circumvent censorship," Navalny said in the address, a copy of which was posted on his official blog.

"Yet, at the same time, Google and Meta, by shutting down their advertising in Russia, have deprived the opposition of the opportunity to conduct anti-war campaigns, giving a grandiose gift to Putin."


Neither Google nor Meta immediately responded to a request for comment on Navalny's remarks. Both companies paused advertising targetting users in Russia in March, just days after Russia invaded Ukraine.

Navalny earned admiration from the disparate Russian opposition for voluntarily returning to Russia in 2021 from Germany, where he had undergone treatment for what Western laboratory tests showed was an attempt to poison him with a nerve agent in Siberia.

The Kremlin has repeatedly dismissed Navalny's claims about Putin, who it says has won numerous elections in Russia since 2000 and remains by far the country's most popular politician. It has dismissed Navalny's assertion that Russia poisoned him.

Navalny, a former lawyer who rose to prominence more than a decade ago by lampooning Putin's elite and voicing allegations of corruption on a vast scale, said the titans of Silicon Valley had a lot of questions to answer.

They would have to decide, he said, whether or not they were really "neutral platforms" and whether or not users in democracies should operate under the same rules as those in repressive societies.

"How should the internet treat government directives, given that Norway and Uganda seem to have slightly different ideas about the role of the internet and democracy?" he asked.

"We love technology. We love social networks. We want to live in a free informational society. So let's figure out how to keep the bad guys from using the information society to drive their nations and all of us into the dark ages."

(Reporting by Guy Faulconbridge; Editing by Mark Heinrich)
Largest Palestinian displacement in decades looms after Israeli court ruling

2022/6/12 
© Reuters


By Henriette Chacar

MASAFER YATTA, West Bank (Reuters) - Some 1,200 Palestinians in the occupied West Bank region of Masafer Yatta face the risk of forced removal to make way for an army firing zone after a decades-long legal battle that ended last month in Israel's highest court.

The ruling opened the way for one of the largest displacements since Israel captured the territory in the 1967 Middle East war. But residents are refusing to leave, hoping their resilience and international pressure will keep Israel from carrying out the evictions.

"They want to take this land from us to build settlements," said Wadha Ayoub Abu Sabha, a resident of al-Fakheit, one of a group of hamlets where Palestinian shepherds and farmers claim a historic connection to the land.

"We're not leaving," she said.

In the 1980s, Israel declared the area a closed military zone known as "Firing Zone 918". It argued in court that these 3,000 hectares (7,400 acres) along the Israel-West Bank boundary were "highly crucial" for training purposes and that the Palestinians living there were only seasonal dwellers.

"It has been a year of immense grief," said Abu Sabha, her voice breaking as she sat in one of the few tents left standing, lit by a single light bulb.

The communities in this part of the South Hebron Hills traditionally lived in underground caves. Over the past two decades, they have also started building tin shacks and small rooms above ground.

Israeli forces have been demolishing these new constructions for years, Abu Sabha said, but now that they have the court's backing, the evictions are likely to pick up.

Steps away, her family's belongings were reduced to a pile of rubble after soldiers arrived with bulldozers to raze some of the structures. She lamented the significant losses - the dwindling livestock even more than the destroyed furniture.

Much of the argument during the protracted case centered on whether the Palestinians who live across the area are permanent residents or seasonal occupants.

The Supreme Court concluded that the residents "failed to prove their claim of permanent habitation" before the area was declared a firing zone. It relied on aerial photos and excerpts from a 1985 book that both sides cited as evidence.

The book, titled "Life in the Caves of Mount Hebron", was authored by Israeli anthropologist Yaacov Havakook, who spent three years studying the lives of Palestinian farmers and shepherds in Masafer Yatta.

Havakook declined to comment and instead referred Reuters to his book. But he said he had tried to submit an expert opinion on behalf of the residents following a request from one of their lawyers, and was prevented from doing so by the Israeli defence ministry, where he was employed at the time.

INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM

The United Nations and European Union condemned the court ruling and urged Israel to stop the demolitions and evictions.

"The establishment of a firing zone cannot be considered an 'imperative military reason' to transfer the population under occupation," the EU spokesperson said in a statement.

In a transcript 

of a 1981 ministerial meeting on settlements uncovered by Israeli researchers, then-Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, who later became prime minister, suggested the Israeli military expand training zones in the South Hebron Hills to dispossess the Palestinian residents of their land.

"We want to offer you more training zones," Sharon said, given "the spread of Arab villagers from the hills toward the desert".

The Israeli military told Reuters the area was declared a firing zone for "a variety of relevant operational considerations" and that Palestinians violated the closure order by building without permits over the years.

According to the United Nations, the Israeli authorities reject most Palestinian applications for building permits in "Area C", a swathe of land making up two-thirds of the West Bank where Israel has full control and where most Jewish settlements are located. In other areas of the West Bank, Palestinians exercise limited self-rule.

U.N. data also showed that Israel has marked nearly 30% of Area C as military firing zones. The designations have put 38 of the most vulnerable Palestinian communities at increased risk of forced displacement.

Meanwhile, settlements in the area have continued to expand, further restricting Palestinian movement and the space available for residents to farm and graze their sheep and goats.

"All of these olives are mine," said Mahmoud Ali Najajreh of al-Markez, another hamlet at risk, pointing to a grove in the near distance. "How can we leave?"

The 3,500 olive trees he planted two years ago - he counted each one - were beginning to bud.

"We will wait for the dust to settle, then build again," Najajreh told Reuters. "We would rather die than leave here."

(Reporting by Henriette Chacar; Editing by James Mackenzie and Mark Heinrich)






Puerto Rico at a crossroads as Congress mulls vote to decide statehood or independence

2022/6/12 
© New York Daily News
Parade attendees wave Puerto Rican flags on Fifth Avenue in Manhattan during the annual Puerto Rico Day Parade in 2019.. - Luiz C. Ribeiro/TNS

NEW YORK — As more than 1 million Puerto Ricans return to Fifth Avenue on Sunday for the pageantry and pride of their annual parade, their beloved homeland could soon face a grave choice about its future relationship with the United States.

The swirling celebration comes as the Caribbean island where the revelers trace their roots could soon face a once-in-a-lifetime choice between becoming the 51st state or an independent nation — or something in between.

A recent breakthrough agreement has united both supporters and opponents of Puerto Rico statehood in the U.S. Congress behind a push by a Democratic-led House of Representatives vote to authorize a binding referendum on Puerto Rico’s status.

The three choices would be statehood, independence or a hybrid known as independence with free association, whose terms would be negotiated.

Puerto Rican legislators in the U.S. Congress, and particularly New York City, are deeply divided about which option is best for the U.S. territory and the 5-million-strong diaspora on the mainland.

“This must be a decision coming from the people,” Rep. Nydia Velazquez, D-N.Y., said this month during a fact-finding mission to the island with Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, D-N.Y. “We are here to listen.”

Velazquez, the dean of the Puerto Rican caucus, is a staunch opponent of statehood, which she fears would dilute the island’s fiercely unique culture and dependence on the Spanish language. Ocasio-Cortez agrees.

But Rep. Ritchie Torres, D-N.Y., whose South Bronx district includes the most Puerto Ricans in the nation, says statehood is a must if Puerto Ricans are to have a real voice in their future.

One option that would not be on the ballot: keeping the current territorial status. It gives Puerto Rico’s more than 3 million residents U.S. citizenship but does not allow them to vote in presidential elections, denies them many federal benefits and allows them one representative in Congress with limited voting powers. Puerto Rico became a commonwealth in 1952.

From Brooklyn and El Barrio to the South Bronx, New Yorkers with roots in Puerto Rico appear equally split on the island’s future status.

Charles Gonzalez, who hawks Puerto Rican flags, masks and T-shirts emblazoned with the motto “One Proud Rican” from a makeshift market on a Williamsburg, Brooklyn street corner, doesn’t believe the island will ever become the 51st state.

“That’s talking, talking, talking,” Gonzalez said. “The Congress is never going to do that with Puerto Rico.”

Even though Yari Ortin lives in Crown Heights, Brooklyn, she considers herself “solely Puerto Rican” and steadfastly wants the island to be an independent nation.

“We are unique, we have our own culture,” said Ortin, 35. “I know many people say it will be bad if the island becomes independent. But things are bad right now.”

Soon-to-be high school graduate Christopher Velez, 18, likes the idea of a hybrid independence with an association agreement with the U.S.

“With independence we won’t survive on our own,” said Velez, of Jamaica, Queens, who was shopping with his dad for a giant Puerto Rican flag ahead of the weekend’s festivities.

Despite the hunger for change, it’s very possible that nothing will happen any time soon. If the House does pass the measure it will go to the Senate where it faces a very uncertain future.

Some Republicans, including Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., support statehood, but GOP leaders fear the political impact of admitting Puerto Rico as a state.

Puerto Rico would have two senators and four House representatives. Although the island’s political parties don’t completely align with the two major ones on the mainland, Republicans fear Democrats would have a big edge, potentially shifting the balance of an evenly split Congress.

During their recent trip to the island, Velazquez and Ocasio-Cortez participated in a public forum in San Juan where speaker after speaker denounced the status quo.

The next step is hearings in the House, followed by a vote possibly this summer. Democrats want to move before the midterm elections that could hand power back to the GOP.

“The visit reminded us just how big the stakes are for so many,” Rep. Raul Grijalva, D-Ariz., chair of the House committee with jurisdiction over Puerto Rico’s status, told The News.

———

(With Matthew Euzarraga, Ellen Moynihan and Chris Sommerfeldt)
Saudi officials seize rainbow toys in 'homosexuality' crackdown

Agence France-Presse
June 15, 2022

Saudi Arabia is known for its strict interpretation of Islamic law FAYEZ NURELDINE AFP/File

Saudi officials are seizing rainbow-colored toys and articles of clothing from shops in the capital as part of a crackdown on homosexuality, state media reported.

Targeted items include rainbow-colored bows, skirts, hats and pencil cases, most of them apparently manufactured for young children, according to a report broadcast Tuesday evening by the state-run Al-Ekhbariya news channel.

"We are giving a tour of the items that contradict the Islamic faith and public morals and promote homosexual colors targeting the younger generation," says an official from the commerce ministry, which is involved in the campaign.

Gesturing towards a rainbow flag, a journalist says: "The homosexuality flag is present in one of the Riyadh markets."

The colors send a "poisoned message" to children, the report says.

Homosexuality is a potential capital offense in Saudi Arabia, known for its strict interpretation of Islamic sharia law which forms the basis of its entire judicial system.

In April, the kingdom said it had asked Disney to cut "LGBTQ references" from "Doctor Strange in the Multiverse of Madness", the latest Marvel movie, but that Disney had refused.

The film ultimately did not screen in Saudi cinemas.

Disney's latest animation "Lightyear," which features a same-sex kiss, has also been banned in Saudi Arabia and more than a dozen other countries, a source close to Disney told AFP Tuesday, though Riyadh has not commented on that film.

Tuesday's Al-Ekhbariya report also showed stills of Benedict Cumberbatch in "Doctor Strange" and of apparently foreign children waving rainbow flags.

The report did not detail how many establishments were targeted or items seized in the commerce ministry operation, and Saudi officials did not immediately respond to an AFP request for comment Wednesday.



© 2022 AFP



How progressives lost the 'woke' narrative – and what they can do to reclaim it from the right-wing

Joshua Adams
June 11, 2022

Donald Trump Speaks at CPAC Orlando, Fla. 2022 (CHANDAN KHANNA AFP)



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The first novel in recorded history was published in Japan. It was called The Tale of Genji. It was completed in the early 11th-century by a woman who was later given the name of Murasaki Shikibu. A few years ago, I found out that printing existed in Asia hundreds of years before Johannes Gutenberg assembled his printing press in Europe.

These are facts I never learned in college, let alone K-12. All tended to focus on the Gutenberg story when the history of reading and printing came up. If I suggested that we should teach this in school, many today would call me “woke.” And it wouldn’t only be folks on the right

Many on the left who embrace it’s-class-not-race politics, and who say they value historicism and material reality, would assert that merely broaching these facts (whether true or not) can only be, in essence, about representation, “political correctness” and “identity politic

It’s interesting how these folks say woke, often with a scoff.

Though without the right’s disgust, the overlap on the left is “this argument is unserious and you don’t have to engage with it.”

In an article for The Nation, I explained the Black communal origin of woke in a time before it became a catchall anti-progressive buzzword:

“Woke” was used in the Black community to convey the need to be socially aware of anti-Black oppressive systems, ideas, etc. in order to at least safely navigate through them — and at most dismantle them. A simple analogy would be the code in The Matrix — just knowing it’s there can help a character survive. Woke could range from James Baldwin in “If Black English Isn’t a Language, Then Tell Me, What Is?” or Laurence Fishburne’s character yelling Wake up! in Spike Lee’s School Daze, or Georgia Anne Muldrow saying “Woke is definitely a Black experience.”

Black people have also used woke in (often, but not exclusively) Afro-centric spiritual, cosmological or metaphysical discourse. The topics could be anything from “opening your third eye,” staying attuned to the energy of the people around you, or more charged discussions like not praying to white Jesus or what is the “correct” religion for pan-African people to have.

Now woke can mean anything.

Calling a person by their chosen pronouns? Woke.


A history teacher teaching the truth about slavery? Woke.

Critical of Dave Chappelle’s comedy or Joe Rogan’s podcast? Woke.

An interracial couple in a Pepsi commercial? Woke.

A Black character in Jurassic Park? Woke.

Asking why you can’t make a Black character in Elden Ring? Woke.

According to US Senator Ron Johnson, wokeness is responsible for the Uvalde massacre. This absurdity comes from the right, but some on the left have been just as reactionary toward “wokeness.”

Many on the right and left argue that progressives have been poisoned by the ideology of group essentialism. They say progressive are rejecting individualism and forcing identity politics on the masses.

A more sophisticated leftist critique argues that “wokeness” is another formulation of consumer capitalism preventing class solidarity.

You’d think the anti-woke left would spot the right’s game. You’d think they’d have the tools to disentangle what is good faith and bad faith.

The right often reduces everything on the left to “Marxism.” I hope most folks know that’s silly. However, when the right says everything progressive is “woke,” many on the left, who argue against reductionism and essentialism, end up becoming reductionist and essentialist.

There’s a part of the left that offhandedly dismisses the historical processes and material reality that spur people to galvanize democratic political power through groups that are not solely based on class.


When it comes to politics, there are good reasons why groups (for example African Americans) have had to wield power collectively. When it comes to education, this part of the left often reduces progressive historicism to feeble diversity and inclusion initiatives.

In doing this, they dismiss the possibility that to a teacher (progressive or otherwise), the operating principle underlying the best teaching is teaching the best obtainable version of the truth — something well in keeping with the left’s propensity to historicize and contextualize.

Progressivism has excesses. It can become akin to a cultural bureaucracy. The phrase “cancel culture” makes me want to sigh for an hour. But to the extent that it exists, progressives have their share of responsibility.

But in an effort to distance themselves from “liberals” and “progressives,” too many of the left uncritically accept the right’s castigation of “wokeness” and are often blind to the reactionary logic they would disavow in a different context.

Republicans' stunning misogyny is getting in the way yet again

Amanda Marcotte, Salon
June 15, 2022

John Cornyn (Shutterstock)

Mea culpa time. In the latest edition of my newsletter, Standing Room Only, I was quite sour about reports about the bipartisan gun bill being negotiated by Sen. Chris Murphy, D-Conn. The reporting I'd read suggested the bill was primarily focused on funding for "red flag" laws and mental health spending, both of which are nice but will do little to actually stem the problem of gun violence, especially in red states. But more fleshed-out details since show that one under-discussed aspect of the bill may end up being the most important: A proposal to finally close the "boyfriend loophole" in the federal background check law.

This is something that both feminists and gun control activists have been demanding for decades, only to have Republicans — no fans of either preventing gendered violence or gun deaths — get in the way.

Republican opponents to closing the boyfriend loophole simply see hitting a girlfriend as a lesser crime than hitting a wife.

It's doubly frustrating for how nonsensical the allowance is. Under the current background check system, a person with a domestic violence conviction should be flagged and prevented from purchasing a gun — but only if they married or lived with the person they assaulted. Someone who attacked a dating partner they hadn't moved in with yet can buy all the guns they want. Half of domestic violence murders, however, are at the hands of someone who hasn't lived with their victim. So it's not like this is a minor problem. The ugly implication has been that the Republican opponents to closing the boyfriend loophole simply see hitting a girlfriend as a lesser crime than hitting a wife.

And, well, most still do.


The Republicans who are ever-so-tentatively signed onto Murphy's compromise bill — and who, let's face it, may bolt the first time an NRA lobbyist clears his throat — are a distinct minority in the GOP. Indeed, Sen. John Cornyn, R-Tex., is already indicating that Republicans still refuse to believe beating your girlfriend is as bad as beating your wife.

The other issue: "Well, the other issue has to do with the way that nontraditional relationships are handled in terms of domestic violence and misdemeanors. We got to come up with a good definition of what that actually means."
— Manu Raju (@mkraju) June 15, 2022


If for some reason Republicans relent on this, it could save some lives, because it remains very true that people who commit domestic murders usually committed quite a bit of domestic violence beforehand — just not the lives of women who were able to leave their abuser before marrying them. That's why this provision, if it remains intact, could go a long way toward preventing mass shootings.

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The media loves to focus on age, race, motive, and other such factors when looking at commonalities between mass shooters. But ultimately, the biggest one is gender: Nearly all of them are male.

The second most common factor shared by mass shooters is domestic violence.

Statistics compiled by Everytown for Gun Safety show that, in more than half of mass shootings, the shooter killed a member of his family. Further research shows that in nearly 70% of mass shootings, the killer had a history of domestic violence or was targeting a family member in the shooting. And while there are outliers like the Uvalde shooting or the Sandy Hook shooting — where the very young perpetrators shot an older female relative — most of these shooters fit the typical pattern of a man who lashes out at a wife, girlfriend or dating partner.

Indeed, the most deadly mass shooting in Texas — the 2017 church shooting in Sutherland Springs — was a direct result of an angry man seeking to hurt his ex-wife by shooting her family as they worshipped. America's original school shooting, the infamous sniper attack at the University of Texas at Austin in 1966, started when the killer murdered his mother and his wife at home.


It remains hard to get a domestic violence conviction, even when an abuser is guilty. Still, over 300,000 people have been denied the chance to buy a gun because of a domestic violence conviction, despite the boyfriend loophole. If that were closed, not only will thousands of domestic murders be prevented, but some mass shootings will probably be prevented, as well.

There's a point where things get so bad that even the tuned-out must tune back in.

That is, of course, if the law survives the Supreme Court.

On that front, there is reason to worry. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote in a recent dissent, this is a "restless and newly constituted Court." With three Donald Trump appointees, this court is prepared to push through a fascist wishlist of decisions, unchecked by anything resembling a good faith reading of the Constitution. We know this not just by the leaked majority opinion in a recent Mississippi abortion case that indicates the court is about to overturn Roe v. Wade. The decision Sotomayor was rightfully complaining about — which has gotten very little press attention — amounts to the court simply deciding the protections of the Fourth Amendment don't apply to the nearly two-thirds of Americans who live within 100 miles of a border.

60% of the population of the United States just lost any constitutional protections against warrantless assault or home invasion by armed agents. https://t.co/9raxif09hP pic.twitter.com/T0AeoY3eR6
— anildash (@anildash) June 8, 2022

Among the many decisions where the court will likely go full Infowars is New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, a challenge to New York's law requiring people seeking a concealed carry license to demonstrate "proper cause." Unsurprisingly, the much-ballyhooed conservative commitment to "states' rights" only applies when states pass laws that the far-right likes. State legislatures controlled by Democrats have no rights, it seems, to pass laws. It is widely expected that the court will lay waste to New York's right to regulate guns more stringently than, say, Texas.

Unfortunately for those committed to the prevention of mass murder, it's already easy to see how the federal ban on convicted girlfriend-beaters getting guns could face a legal challenge leading directly to an overturn at the Supreme Court. As the Kansas City Star reported on Tuesday, Missouri just passed a law in 2021 preventing "local and state law enforcement from enforcing certain federal gun laws." And Missouri wants to make sure every man who beats women can collect as much lady-killing firepower as he desires: "[S]tate legislators in 2016 voted to allow convicted domestic abusers to carry firearms."


Never let anyone bamboozle you into thinking that GOP enthusiasm for abortion bans is about anything but hating women. It certainly isn't about "life."

While it's still a little unclear how this could end up in litigation, one should have little doubt about the dangers ahead. Regardless of who sues who, Missouri has set up a showdown over whose law-making power around guns matters more: Congress or the states? And they have a Supreme Court whose answer will likely be, "depends on which government makes it easier to shoot up a grocery store or elementary school."

Not that the situation is totally hopeless.

Right now, the biggest problem in American politics is too many voters are unaware of how far-right Republicans are or how corrupt the Supreme Court is. The main cure for our crumbling democracy would be for people to wake up already, and stop assuming Donald Trump was an anomaly. Already that process is happening with the Supreme Court, as increasing numbers of Americans are starting to realize how corrupt the court is. The Roe overturn will help speed up that waking up. A decision throwing out the right of Congress to pass even minimum gun laws would help slap people awake, as well. Unfortunately, many innocent people, including little kids, will die in the painfully slow waking-up process. But this situation should be rated as "bleak, but not hopeless." There's a point where things get so bad that even the tuned-out must tune back in. And gun violence is one of those issues where the public seems to be getting very fed up with the far-right minority that has unjust power over the rest of our lives.
'Jesus, guns, babies': Religious violence is now at the core of the Republican Party
Thomas Lecaque, Alternet
June 14, 2022

Gage Skidmore

At the tail end of last week, Rep. Lauren Boebert of Colorado took the stage at the Charis Christian Center's Family Camp Meeting. The event claims that, "you will hear God's Word shared through speakers who have proven God's Word," and follows the speakers' list with Acts 2:17-18:

And in the last days it shall be, God declares, that I will pour out my Spirit on all flesh, and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, and your young men shall see visions, and your old men shall dream dreams; even on my male servants and female servants in those days I will pour out my Spirit, and they shall prophesy.

The apocalyptic context notwithstanding, Boebert's talk made quite a splash because of her invocation of Psalm 109:8 in the context of praying for President Biden — "May his days be few and another take his office" — before laughing at the cheers of the crowd. This is certainly not a new use of that text by the GOP — Sen. David Perdue of Georgia invoked it against Obama in 2016, and it became an anti-Obama slogan featured on bumper stickers. With the passage divorced from its full context, people can laugh — but Psalm 109 is a war psalm, calling for the death of the man in question, with 109:9 reading "Let his children be fatherless, and his wife a widow." And that's the point: As with so many aspects of contemporary Christian nationalism, give the line people can nod along to, and hold back the violent context. This is a prayer for the death of the president, and it is one we can honestly say has become normal for Republicans to use about Democratic presidents.

Maybe that's a big enough problem that we should acknowledge it not just as a fringe phenomenon, but as part of the core problem of the contemporary, MAGA-infused GOP.

Of course, Boebert has gone much further than prayers against the president. She met with organizers of the Jan. 6 coup attempt beforehand. She tweeted the locations of lawmakers, including Speaker Nancy Pelosi, as insurrectionists were breaking into the Capitol. Like Rep. Thomas Massie of Kentucky, Boebert and her family have posed for Christmas cards with AR-15-style weapons, with all of the problematic associations of the birth of Jesus of Nazareth with weapons designed for combat. These things — Jesus, guns and, with family photos, babies — are in fact pillars of the Christian nationalist branch of the GOP.

Georgia candidate Kandiss Taylor called fellow Republican Brian Kemp "Luciferian" and defined the First Amendment as "our right to worship Jesus freely — that's why we have a country."

Kandiss Taylor's failed Republican gubernatorial primary campaign in Georgia was incredibly instructive on where the GOP now stands. Her campaign bus, which literally had "Jesus, Guns, Babies" emblazoned on the side, was just the most overt aspect of her Christian nationalist campaign. She told followers to pray for good sheriffs and said that corrupt ones would be executed for treason, strongly implying her belief in the extremist "constitutional sheriff" doctrine, which holds sheriffs are arbiters of what the law is in their counties, not enforcers of it. She said at one campaign rally, "We're gonna do a political rally and we're gonna honor Jesus. They're not gonna tell us 'separation of church and state.' We are the church! We run this state!" — an aggressively Christian nationalist idea. Taylor called Gov. Brian Kemp's administration a "Luciferian regime," andsaid that as governor she would release an executive order against the "Satanic elites," and vowed to tear down the "Satanic" Ge orgia Guidestones.

Taylor even championed Native genocide, saying, "The First Amendment right, which is our right to worship Jesus freely — that's why we have a country. That's why we have Georgia. That's why we had our Founding Fathers come over here and destroy American Indians' homes and their land. They took it." And, of course, she champions the Big Lie, saying on Twitter, "We are in a spiritual war ... it's God versus Satan. If GA goes down, if we let them steal the election from us .. we're gonna steal it back if we have to." That carried over to her own loss — despite losing the primary by 70 points, she refused to concede.

We might well ask: So what? Taylor was defeated by a staggering margin, as were numerous other Christian nationalist candidates. Rep. Madison Cawthorn, for example, lost his primary race in North Carolina after the Republican establishment turned on him. Idaho Lt. Gov. Janice McGeachin embraced extremism, appearing with militia members in photo ops, administering oaths to them reserved for the state military, and appeared on video at the America First PAC meeting, saying, "God calls us to pick up the sword and fight, and Christ will reign in the state of Idaho." She lost by 20 points. The Republican candidate for secretary of state in California, Rachel Hamm, said she decided to run for office because she was a prophetic dreamer, and because her youngest son, "a seer," had found Jesus in the closet where she prays, holding a scroll telling her to run. She also lost and then claimed fraud, tweeting, "When you've fought the good fight, had an honest contest & lost, that's when you concede. So, in my case, there will be no concession. Stolen elections=stolen Republic."

And then there those who are still running. Greg Lopez, a GOP gubernatorial candidate in Colorado, believes in a blanket ban on abortion, rejects climate change, has said that the "educational system has now been converted into state indoctrination centers" and is a proponent of the Big Lie. He appeared, alongside a range of conspiracy theorists and far right figures, at the Western Conservative Summit at the beginning of the month. And he is not shy about his negative views of the LGBTQ community, a common theme among GOP candidates.

Mark Burns in South Carolina, for example, was an early Trump supporter in 2016. He's an evangelical minister, a conspiracy theorist and pastor at the Harvest Praise & Worship Center. He's running for Congress in the state's 4th congressional district, and his platform reads like a grab bag of right-wing ideas:

Our right to bear arms is INHERENT, given to us by God almighty -- NOT by any man;
If we don't fix these elections NOW, America will be lost. Without open, honest, transparent elections, no other issue matters;
Life begins at conception;
Marriage is defined as between one man and one woman;
Critical Race Theory is Communist, anti-white Racism;
Vaccine and mask mandates are medical tyranny, and have no place in America;
The Pelosi budget opens the door wide open to full-blown communism.

And while these may sound like wild ideas, they're nothing compared to what Burns says. He has called for reviving the House Un-American Activities Committee — yes, the infamous Red-hunters of the 1940s — to investigate LGBTQ "indoctrination," which he calls a national security threat, saying that anyone engaged in it (or in gun control) should be tried for treason, and executed. Burns is literally calling for reviving the "lavender scare," which has a certain evil logic because that, in essence, is where Christian nationalists have settled in the culture wars: anti-trans legislation, anti-LGBTQ rallies and attacks, and pushing to re-criminalize sexual minorities.

The Jesus part is obvious. The guns have been covered, be it Pennsylvania gubernatorial candidate Doug Mastriano's links to the apocalyptic Rod of Iron Ministries or the marketing of AR-15-style guns as sacred weapons. But babies may be the most important part of it. Attacks on the LGBTQ community must be understood in the context of right-wing ideas about sexual purity and a full-blown mania for forced birth legislation. Anti-abortion laws, attacks on contraception and attacks on sexual minorities are all part of a Christian nationalist assault on the nation. Movements like Quiverfull, taken from Psalm 127, have a number of political aspects alongside a belief system that shuns birth control and believes God will give them the right number of children. They literally believe that whoever has the most babies wins, and see that as the fundamental political and spiritual battle. One Quiverfull-affiliated author has said:

It is the womb that conceives and nourishes the "godly seed" who will come forth to be the light in the darkness and who will destroy the works of Satan in this world. God is looking for an army. ... The womb is a powerful weapon against Satan. Some women fear to bring babies into this evil world, but this is one of the greatest reasons for having children — to be the light in this dark world!

Quiverfull is a Christian patriarchy movement, not only pushing female submission to husbands and fathers, and eschewing education and contraception to win the culture war — as Salon reporter Kathryn Joyce has detailed in her book "Quiverfull: Inside the Christian Patriarchy Movement" — but also contributing to the protection of sexual predators in church communities and vigorously promoting the anti-abortion and forced birth laws being passed around the country.

I would also suggest, rather forcefully, that Christian patriarchy and Christian nationalism are linked to the "great replacement" theory, the deeply racist and xenophobic notion that nonwhite people are being brought into Western countries to "replace" white voters, in order to further a specific political agenda, leading to the supposed extinction of white people. As is well understood, this delusional ideology has fueled multiple massacres, including the mass shooting in Buffalo in May and earlier mass shootings in El Paso, Pittsburgh and Christchurch, New Zealand. Forced-birth laws and abortion bans are also part of this perceived demographic war, part and parcel with the spiritual battles Christian nationalists believe they are fighting and the very real stockpiling of arms, association with militia groups and opposition to government. PRRI's August 2021 survey shows that "great replacement" ideas are growing in evangelical circles, and have only become more mainstream since then.

Religious violence is the bedrock of Christian nationalism, and Christian nationalism is becoming the bedrock of the contemporary Republican Party. Forced birth laws, anti-LGBTQ legislation and the "great replacement" theory are all forms of violence, and all but certain to fuel the spread of more lethal violence. "Jesus, Guns and Babies" may seem like a laughable slogan, stripped of context. But it isn't funny at all.