Monday, July 04, 2022

Economic crisis is forcing Brits to opt for gambling, crypto: Report

British households are grappling with the highest rate of inflation out of the Group of Seven advanced economies.

Image for representational purpose only (iStock)

By: Chandrashekar Bhat

Britain’s worsening cost-of-living squeeze is pushing some people into gambling and cryptocurrency investments in last-ditch attempts to make ends meet, a gambling charity warned on Thursday.

GamCare said it had increasingly received calls from people receiving state welfare payments who had gambled in the hope they could cover soaring energy and food bills, and lost.

The charity reported that some people who it had helped successfully in the past had relapsed into gambling again under the growing financial pressure.

British households are grappling with the highest rate of inflation out of the Group of Seven advanced economies, which hit a new 40-year high of 9.1% in May. The Bank of England has warned of inflation exceeding 11% by October.

A YouGov survey of more than 4,000 people commissioned by GamCare and published on Thursday showed 46% were worried about their financial situation.

More than half of those polled said they had gambled over the past 12 months, and most of this group had lost money.

“Our helpline advisers are hearing that the cost of living is impacting people’s gambling behaviours – particularly those gamblers who have recovered,” said Anna Hemmings, chief executive of GamCare.

“We also know that our team are hearing from more and more people who are reaching out for help around crypto trading.”

Someone who paid in sterling to invest in Bitcoin six months ago to help hedge against the rising cost of living would have lost 55% of their investment as of Thursday.

GamCare said 43% of problem gamblers had invested in cryptocurrency, and 25% out of this group said they wanted to invest more to chase losses – compared with only 7% of the wider population of crypto investors.

Russia, Ukraine, and the Orthodox church: Where religion meets geopolitics and war

In Ukraine and North Macedonia, the Orthodox Church is facing deep, even violent, splits, on the one hand; and is edging closer to resolving decades-old disputes,  or Not


Engjellushe Morina @EngjellusheM on Twitter
Senior Policy Fellow
Andrew Wilson
Senior Policy Fellow
Commentary
23 June 2022

Two men in military uniforms check out the shop in an Orthodox church in Kyiv, Ukraine
Image by Konrad Lembcke

The Russian Orthodox Church has played a crucial supporting role in the rule of Vladimir Putin. And, with research suggesting a strong association in the Orthodox world between people’s religion and their national identity, church affairs hold particular importance for temporal leaders. This is whether they are, in the case of Ukraine, seeking to defend against an external aggressor; or, in North Macedonia, looking to complete state-building business with legacies left over from Yugoslavia. Recent developments in each country reflect the political divides in eastern Europe, with one sinking into deeper, violent, division and the other on the verge of resolution.

The Russian Orthodox Church – whose leader, Patriarch Kirill, the European Union recently sought to sanction – is the largest and richest church within Eastern Orthodoxy. The worldwide church is headed by Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, with whom the Russian Orthodox Church broke in 2018 over the issue of the autocephaly (self-government) of the then newly formed Orthodox Church of Ukraine, whose autocephaly Bartholomew had granted. Now, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, ordinary Ukrainians seem to be rapidly turning away from the Russian Orthodox Church – which still has many churches in the country in the form (since 1990) of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate (UOC-MP). The UOC-MP is part of the broader Russian church but has a measure of self-government. Meanwhile, another crucial decision by Bartholomew has seen him broker a solution to a seemingly intractable dispute, namely: persuading the Serbian Orthodox Church (traditionally backed by Russia) to accept the full independence of what will now be known as the Macedonian Orthodox Church-Archdiocese of Ohrid.

Ukraine

The UOC-MP has long retained an important presence in Ukraine, making up one-third of all the parishes of the Russian Orthodox Church. The UOC-MP dislikes the ‘Moscow Patriarchate’ tag, arguing that it is based in Ukraine. But it has long resisted pressure from the Ukraine side to adopt autocephaly, most notably at the same Sobor (bishops’ council) of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2000 that canonised Nicholas II and his family.

In Ukraine, the two principal rival churches have diverged over time, in three phases, the first of which began in 2014. The Maidan Revolution in February that year began the process towards creating the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Amid the wider geopolitical tensions, that July the UOC-MP saw the death of its relatively ecumenical patriarch, Volodymyr, and his replacement by the more radical Onufrii, a strong supporter of Putin’s re-imperialising ‘Russian World’ doctrine.

The second phase began in 2018 with a campaign by Russia to strangle the Orthodox Church of Ukraine at birth. Bartholomew provided a formal letter (or ‘Tomos’) of approval of the church’s autocephaly on Orthodox Christmas Day in January 2019. The Kremlin, the Russian Orthodox Church, and Orthodox oligarchs pressured the other Orthodox churches not to recognise this. As of mid-2022, only the churches of Greece, Cyprus, and Alexandria and All Africa have recognised the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. When the Russian Orthodox Church broke with Bartholomew, it dubbed him a US puppet and described his mere “Istanbul Patriarchate”. It campaigned to reverse the decision and undermine his authority, and even set up two new dioceses in Africa to poach off the Alexandrian church.

If Russia were to prevail, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine would be suppressed, with parishes transferred directly to the Russian Orthodox Church

The third phase – Russia’s current war on Ukraine – raises the stakes much higher. If Russia were to prevail, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine would be suppressed, with parishes transferred directly to the Russian Orthodox Church, as is already happening in occupied territories. Kirill has echoed Putin’s language of Ukrainian-Russian “unity” on Russian terms and endorsed the war against “evil forces”, even comparing it to a metaphysical struggle against gay pride parades. On 12 May the UOC-MP issued a statement saying that religious policy in Ukraine was “one of the reasons for the military invasion of Ukraine”.

In the event of Ukrainian victory, or even just survival, the UOC-MP will come under strong pressure to cut its ties with Russia and negotiate a modus vivendi with the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. However, 400 UOC-MP priests have appealed against what they term Kirill’s “heresy,” and more than 400 parishes have left the UOC-MP since the invasion began. To forestall further radical moves, the UOC-MP has lately become more critical of the war. On 27 May, a special Sobor “condemn[ed] war as a violation of God’s commandment ‘Thou shalt not kill!’” In a minimal formulation, it “expresse[d] condolences to all those who suffered in the war”,” without explicitly blaming Russia. More clearly, the church formally “disagree[d] with the position of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Rus’ on the war”. The Sobor also declared “independence”, although not full autocephaly.

Ukrainian critics thought this move did not make the UOC-MP independent enough; that it was window-dressing, or “little rain from a large cloud”. The Russian parent church thought it made them too independent: on 7 June it retaliated by annexing all three dioceses in Crimea to create a Metropolitanate of Crimea. This is the second such takeover: a multi-ethnic Metropolitanate of Gothia existed until the departure of Crimean Christians in 1778, some of whom founded Mariupol. The Russian church took over, and a Tavrian Eparchy was established in 1859.

The reasons the UOC-MP has sought to distance itself are not hard to guess. Before the war began in February, 40 per cent of Ukrainian believers in one independent poll backed the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and 20 per cent the UOC-MP. A further 33 per cent called themselves “just Orthodox” But now, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine claims the support of 52 per cent of people, with the figure suggesting “just Orthodox” down to 11 per cent, and followers of the UOC-MP at just 4 per cent. An opinion poll in April showed 74 per cent of Ukrainians wanted the UOC-MP to cut its ties with Russia and 51 per cent wanted it banned.

The future of these churches is tightly bound up with the wider political and security concerns. In March, members of the Ukrainian parliament introduced two bills that could lead to a ban on the UOC-MP. There are also two new laws on collaboration and aiding and abetting an aggressor state that could be applied against the church. The Orthodox Church of Ukraine is targeting key properties currently controlled by the UOC-MP and seeking to establish its own rival monastery at the important Pecherska Lavra. Many see the presence of the UOC-MP at this site – in the heart of Kyiv – as a security threat.

The 2018 solution of having two canonical Orthodox churches in Ukraine seems unlikely to survive the current war. It may not even survive the current phase of the war, as Ukraine presses ahead with derussification on other fronts, including restrictions on Russian books and music in June.

North Macedonia

On 12 June – Pentecost Sunday – North Macedonia’s prime minister, Dimitar Kovacevski, attended the divine liturgy held in St George’s Cathedral of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul. Bartholomew presided, celebrating it together with the Archbishop of Ohrid to mark the resolution of the long-running dispute between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Macedonian Orthodox Church-Archdiocese of Ohrid.

This disagreement stretched back to 1967 when the Macedonian Orthodox Church seceded from the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Macedonian church then spent decades formally in isolation from the rest of the Orthodox world until 19 May this year, when its status of equality with the other Orthodox churches was unblocked by the Serbian church. The decision was also celebrated with the Serbian patriarch, Porfirije, in Belgrade. All this preceded an earlier meeting of the Holy Synod (of the worldwide church) and its recognition of what is termed the Ohrid Archbishopric, which will have jurisdiction only within the boundaries of the state of North Macedonia. The Ecumenical Patriarchate excluded the recognition of the name Macedonia as part of the name of the church, and any other derivate of Macedonia.

Although the conflict between the two churches seems to have been resolved fairly quickly, the process of dialogue was set in motion back in 2018 and was deliberately kept out of the public eye. This was at a time when parallel efforts were in full swing to resolve the name dispute with Greece that had long lingered over what eventually became North Macedonia. The resolution to this problem ultimately unlocked North Macedonia’s path to NATO and potentially the European Union. Zoran Zaev, then the country’s prime minister, together with the church, approached Batholomew to ask him to help end the ecclesiastical isolation. At that time, they hinted that they were open to a name change to “Ohrid”. Bartholomew replied that he was willing to assist and take the initiative to restore the church to the Orthodox canonical framework. This in itself was something of a victory, as until that point Bartholomew had hesitated to get involved and would instead only encourage the Macedonian church to talk to its Serbian counterpart.

Some believers in North Macedonia remain concerned at how other churches, in particular the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, may react

Bartholomew’s decision to welcome the Macedonian church into communion came on 9 May, when he also issued a request for the Serbian church to resolve “administrative issues” with the Macedonian church. Porfirije handed the Tomos to Archbishop Stefan of Ohrid, fully confirming the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church-Archdiocese of Ohrid. The Tomos notes that autocephaly must be submitted for approval by other churches within the Orthodox church.

While the Serbian church has moved towards a smooth resolution of what seemed an intractable dispute, some believers in North Macedonia remain concerned at how other churches, in particular the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, may react, considering that Bulgaria has been blocking North Macedonia’s future EU accession by insisting that Macedonian language and identity are of Bulgarian origin. Given that the Byzantine name of the Bulgarian church is “Archdiocese of Ohrid” there are worries that Bulgaria will not accept the name and new requirements may be added to existing ones.

The Russian Orthodox Church has been keeping tabs on this issue: it branded Bartholomew’s decision an “irregular and politically motivated intrusion” and called on other churches not to recognise his authority in the matter. This indicates the long and close relationship between Russia and Serbia in the resolution of such issues. But its tone altered drastically when the Serbian church accepted the change.

Although the cases of Ukraine and North Macedonia are sharply contrasting, each still faces an uncertain future in which the place of their Orthodox churches are entangled in wider disputes with, or aggression from, neighbouring states. The war in Ukraine in particular has exposed and exacerbated deep rifts within the Orthodox world, with even the Russian Orthodox Church apparently splitting as a consequence of the conflict. The remaining presence and role of the churches in Ukraine will reflect the results of the war and provide symbolic meaning to the contested questions of nationhood and independence there.

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. ECFR publications only represent the views of their individual authors.

The Great Orthodox Battle Amid the Russian Invasion

How can the Russian Orthodox Church exert influence in Ukraine with its leader’s clear support of the invasion?

 

Future of Ukraine Fellow
The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has only exacerbated the tension between Orthodox churches in the country.

The history of the Ukrainian Church is rich and dates back to the times of Kyivan Rus and Prince Volodymyr the Great. They received Christianity from Constantinople in 988, a watershed event that spiritually united the Ukrainian nation. Through centuries, it has also fueled Russia’s obsession to exert more control over Ukraine, rewrite history based on cynical lies and try to establish its religious dominance in its near abroad and far beyond it. In times of war, religion plays one of the most pivotal roles in uniting people and helping them believe in peace and good. 

Editor’s Pick: The Battleground for Ukraine’s Liberal Soul

The Church can serve as a soft power instrument to justify war crimes, sow more hatred and cause more social divisions. The never-ending battle for ‘hearts and minds’ not only between the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC) vs the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) but also between the whole Orthodox global community vs the Russian Orthodoxy seems to be reaching its peak amid the Russian invasion. Who will be the winner? 

How is Putin instrumentalising religion as his tool during the invasion? Can the Church become a robust and reliable peace actor that can be conducive to the conflict resolution in Ukraine and the unity of the Ukrainian nation in the battle for sovereignty? Is there any future for the ROC, Patriarch Kirill and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP

The Russian Orthodox Church — A Dangerous Player

The strong national aspirations of the Ukrainian Church and the religious diversity demonstrate that Ukraine is one of the most religious countries in Europe. Indeed, its Church is a potent soft power instrument for uniting people in challenging times. Social polls show that 63.5 per cent of Ukrainians trust the Church, even more than the authorities. 

The Ukrainian religious landscape is unique and known for its ecumenical cooperation despite inter-church misunderstandings that occur from time to time. The unique structure, namely, the All-Ukrainian Council of Religious Churches and Associations of Ukraine, unites various religious denominations (three Orthodox churches, the Greek-Catholics, the Roman Catholics, Protestants, Anglicans, Lutherans, Pentecostals, Baptists, Jews and Muslims). The organisation grants chairmanship every six months to each denomination that symbolises the true essence of the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution of Ukraine.  

Now, in times of war, there is a more dangerous outside player than ever, encroaching on Ukraine’s spirit — the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), one of the most potent weapons in Putin’s hybrid warfare toolbox, dubbed as the ‘supplier’ of the Kremlin’s ideology. It has always been a vital instrument of the Russian foreign policy in promoting ideas of the so-called ‘Russian World’ and justifying Putin’s aggression and imperialism. Dr Cyril Hovorun explains Putin’s formula of all his wars: ‘Putin’s regime supplies guns, the church supplies ideas.’ 

After centuries of religious oppression, the Ukrainian Church became more united than ever after the illegal annexation of Crimea and the Russian hybrid war in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. The Revolution of Dignity was a catalyst for uniting various churches that acted as mediators. Ukraine’s inspiration to have an independent national church came as a natural and logical process. But the Ukrainian state lacked a piece to complete its complicated puzzle on the path of breaking away from the Russian orbit of influence toward true European civilisation.

After unsuccessful attempts to get canonical independence, on 9 January 2019, a remarkable event occurred — the Ecumenical Patriarchate Bartholomew, ‘first among equals,’ signed the Tomos (a decree of independence) in Istanbul. As a result, the newly-established Orthodox Church of Ukraine was granted its canonical independence from the Russian Church after seven centuries.

It united the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP), Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and some parishes of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP). Metropolitan Epifaniy became Head of the new denomination, pointing out that — ‘the Russian Orthodox Church is the last advance post of Vladimir Putin in Ukraine and that the appearance of the OCU undercuts the imperial goals of the leader in the Kremlin.’ 

This canonical independence was considered an affront to the Kremlin’s worldview that deems Ukraine as a failed state and Ukrainians as a second-class nation. Thus, the reaction of the ROC was predictable: it unilaterally severed ties with the Ecumenical Patriarch, Bartholomew I and the churches of Greece, Cyprus and Alexandria, which recognised the independence of the Ukrainian Church. It was just a mere act of retaliation that Patriarch Theodore II of Alexandria, who has ecclesiastical jurisdiction in Africa, recognised the independence of the Ukrainian Church.

The Tomos has undermined, to some extent, the ROC’s influence in Ukraine before the invasion. It strengthened Ukraine’s independence and united Ukrainians spiritually. At the same time, it led to the further radicalisation of the ROC, nourishing Kirill’s obsession with accusing the West of dismantling Orthodox unity and his desire to establish Moscow’s dominance in the Orthodox world. He was a long-time staunch ally of Putin’s plan, who justified and fully abetted the Russian invasion since its very start. As for the ROC, this war is against sin, imminent threats from the liberal West, ‘gay parades,’ and ‘excess consumption.’ It is a crusade to defend the divine law and ‘tried-and-true’ conservative values. Anyone opposed to the so-called ‘special military operation’ automatically becomes a pagan enemy.

Putin’s Religious Rationale for Invading Ukraine

Behind Putin’s ostentatious piety, there is a clear goal to fill the ideological void after the collapse of the Soviet Union and create a new, purely Russian identity, ‘defending’ its values and all Russians in the world. 

2021 Putin’s ‘notorious’ essay on the ‘Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians‘ showcased the imperialistic ambitions of the Kremlin’s dictator from many convoluted angles, particularly the spiritual one: ‘Most importantly, people both in the western and eastern Russian lands spoke the same language. Their faith was Orthodox. The unified church government remained in place until the middle of the 15th century. The secular authorities, making no secret of their political aims, have blatantly interfered in church life and brought things to a split, to the seizure of churches, the beating of priests and monks. Even extensive autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church while maintaining spiritual unity with the Moscow Patriarchate strongly displeases them. They must destroy this prominent and centuries-old symbol of our kinship at all costs.’ 

On 21 February, an hour-long lecture by Putin on his personal beliefs on history endorsed the distorted religious subtext of this war as well: ‘In Kyiv, they are preparing reprisals against the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Ukraine is not just a neighbouring country for us. It is an inalienable part of our history, culture and spiritual space.’ 

But it is the Russian invaders who continue to destroy the religious sites. Even the Svyatogorsk Lavra, a symbolic church for the ROC, was shelled and burned down, having claimed the lives of three priests. The Russian troops bombed Mariupol levelling everything in the city, including sacred sites. A Ukrainian priest, Father Pavlo Tomaszewski, managed to escape. He gave the following testimony ‘They bombed and shelled us without any break for four days — since our monastery had no cellar for hiding in, we could see tall apartment blocks exploding in front of us…By the end, we had lost contact with parishioners or the outside world.’ 

The Orthodox Wingman of Putin’s Regime

Kirill is a big fan of boasting Russian Orthodoxy’s might, its new identity intertwined with Putin’s militarism. A symbol of this new might was introduced to the general public in 2020 — the Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed forces, rumoured to have cost more than 80 mln dollars. 

Its mosaics depict all of Russia’s wars and military interventions. Paradoxically, the idea behind creating such a shrine belongs not to Kirill but to Russia’s defence minister, Sergei Shoigu, who hopes to add more mosaics regarding what is happening now. This likeness of the Church was another religious symbol of the upcoming invasion with nostalgic tones for its grandeur during the Great Patriotic War.

On 23 February, Defender of the Fatherland Day, a symbolic holiday for Putin, the Primate of Moscow and all of Russia, Kirill (Volodymyr Gundyaev) warmly congratulated the Kremlin’s leader, pointing out his active role in ‘preserving national historical memory and affirming the principles of traditional morality in the lives of contemporaries.’ 

Such a gentle hint at future ‘defence’ of Russia’s ‘historical’ borders in the face of non-existent threats was thrown by one of the spiritual creators of the doctrine of the ‘Russian World,’ the embodiment of Putin’s ethnic cleansing. After the unjustified invasion, he continued to echo standard Russian propaganda ‘grand’ narratives in his sermons. On 28 February, he cynically prayed for peace in ‘Russian lands,’ including Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

In his homily, delivered on 6 March before the start of Orthodox Lent, he accused the West of the atrocities in the Donbas region for the last eight years without breathing a word about the current war atrocities in Ukraine: ‘Today, our brothers in the Donbas, Orthodox people, are undoubtedly suffering, and we cannot but be with them, first of all in prayer. It is necessary to pray that the Lord would help them preserve the Orthodox faith, not succumbing to temptations and temptations.’ 

He openly ignited Putin’s religious purge in his sermon speeches at a metaphysical level. He deliberately avoided the word ‘war’ but used euphemisms such as ‘military actions’ or, more generally ‘, events’. Moreover, he even gave a military icon to the Director of the Russian Guard of the Russian Federation, General Viktor Zolotov, to inspire young soldiers. One example of this blind veneration of the Russian state ideology espoused by the Kremlin was a symbol Z on Easter cakes to support Russian soldiers in their ‘noble mission.’

However, Patriarch Kirill, Putin’s spiritual advisor, insists that there is no invasion of Ukraine but a battle against ‘external and internal enemies,’ ‘Neo-Nazis’ who are in the way of the historic ‘unity’ between the Slavs of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus.

UOC-MP Versus UOC: Is Mutual Understanding Possible?

This war was a great challenge for the UOC-MP, which mirrored and cherished Russian propaganda in Ukraine before the invasion on a large-scale basis and did not speak out during eight years of the undeclared Russian war. Its interests were lobbied by the pro-Russian oligarch from Mariupol, Vadim Novinsky, who was ordained a deacon by Onufry. It is no surprise that now the position of the UOC-MP and its further steps are monitored under a microscope as it has been a vital propaganda instrument in the Kremlin’s hands. 

Since the start of the war, the Primate of the UOC-MP Onufri supported the Ukrainian soldiers. It appealed to Putin to stop the fratricidal war, comparing the invasion with the sin of Cain. 

Before the Easter holidays, Onufri suggested holding a religious procession to ‘Azovstal’ in Mariupol to contribute to the resolution of the tragic humanitarian crisis there. Still, it was not accepted by the Russian side. 

It is worth mentioning that the influence of the UOC-MP is stronger than the UOC even after the Tomos. It has more parishes across Ukraine than the UOC, more than 12 000, and still plays a considerable role for most Orthodox Christians in Ukraine. However, this war has caused a max exodus from the UOC-MP. Most of its parishes are joining the UOC rapidly, and most of the clergy, bishops, and lay people are appalled by Kirill’s distorted religious backing of the invasion. Meanwhile, Rovenkivska Diocese in the Luhansk region, Crimea, and Sevastopol Diocese refused to cut their ties with the ROC, which will definitely strengthen Russian influence on the temporarily occupied territories and further impose ideas of the so-called ‘Russian World.’ 

In temporarily-occupied parts of the Donbas region and Crimea, all Christian denominations — except those that fall under the MP jurisdiction — were brutally persecuted by the ROC. 

Appeals from the dioceses of the UOC-MP to bishops not to commemorate Kirill in the Liturgy sound louder each day. However, top-ranking clerics hesitate to join this symbolic protest. Some continue to put their signatures on the petition to convene an inter-church court over Kirill. The procedure is complicated and lengthy but sends a clear-cut signal to the Primate of the Moscow Church that his stance will not go unnoticed and he will face judgement. Some went further: the Volodymyr-Volyn eparchy called upon Metropolitan Onufry to convoke an All-Ukrainian council to petition Patriarch Kirill for autocephaly. 

However, autocephaly for the UOC-MP is a distant prospect that can last centuries. The UOC is a living example of it. There is still a powerful pro-Russian lobby of the UOC-MP that supports the ROC. One vivid example is the dean of one of the Mariupol districts of the UOC-MP warmly greeting a puppet leader of the so-called DNR, Denis Pushilin and the Russian invaders.

Fr. Andrii Pinchuk strongly criticised Kirill’s rhetoric, alluding to the historical precedent when phyletism was condemned in 1872 at the Council of Constantinople. He said, ‘We are convinced that the idea of ‘Russkyi mir’ should be condemned, which is essentially a kind of ethnophiletism, which puts national and political interests above religious ones.’

On 27 May, the Local Council of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church declared complete independence from the ROC. The UOC-MP did not cut its ties with its mother church, ROC, but ultimately rejected Patriarch Kirill’s stance on the invasion of Ukraine and called to stop bloody atrocities without indicating the name of the aggressor country. Amendments were made in the Statute (as of writing, it is not officially published yet), but it is just the facade without the exact outcome. 

Metropolitan Epiphanius of the UOC insists on further dialogue and creating a one and only Ukrainian Orthodox church to beat the aggressor. The support from civil society for such unity is more prominent than ever. This seems to be the only viable solution, but neither of the churches wants to give up its position and prefers to sit on the fence. 

There is also the option to join a possible Ukrainian exarchate of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople if there is a will of the Ecumenical Patriarch to intervene. However, it can add fuel to the war and will be perceived by Moscow as further encroachment on its daughter church.

















International Reaction and the Role of Pope Francis

Patriarch Kirill’s abetment of the Kremlin’s war machine and war crimes has united not only Ukrainians but also world Orthodoxy in the face of his claims and blatant violation of God’s Commandments, particularly the sixth one ‘thou shalt not kill.’ Kirill’s rhetoric shook and shocked Orthodoxy across the globe. The appeal from Human Rights Without Frontiers calls for action ‘to hold personally accountable and prosecute Vladimir Mikailovitch Goundiaiev, known as Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, for inspiring, inciting, justifying, aiding and abetting war crimes (Art. 8 of the Rome Statute) and crimes against humanity (Art. 7) perpetrated and being perpetrated by the Russian armed forces in Ukraine.’

Hundreds of Russian Orthodox clerics signed a letter calling for a halt to the war. ‘The life of every person is a priceless and unique gift of God, and therefore we wish for the return of all soldiers — both Russian and Ukrainian — to their homes and families safe and sound.’

Pope Francis is the most influential figure in the Orthodox world who can influence the war’s outcome. He can play a crucial role in the war, if not by stopping it, but by at least mitigating it with various diplomatic channels at his hand. But it is not as simple as it seems. His rhetoric was a bit ambiguous from the start. He did not directly rebuke Putin but put a pinch of the blame on NATO for ‘barking at the gates of Russia,’ leaving no other choice for Russia but war. However, during the video conference on 16 March, the Pope asked Kirill not to be ‘Putin’s altar boy’ as the language of politics is not the language of Jesus. The pontiff also appealed to Putin to lift the blockade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports — ‘heartfelt appeal not to use wheat, a basic foodstuff, as a weapon of war,’ pledging to find any diplomatic means to stop this bloodshed. 

‘Do Not Venerate Idols — Venerate Only God’

The religious subtext of the current war is vital and should not be ignored in trying to understand the rationale behind Putin’s invasion. There are many reasons behind the war, and religion is one of them. Orthodox unity in the face of Russia’s invasion is set to be tested more than ever. Various religious denominations across the globe will further support Ukraine in resolving the severe humanitarian crisis and helping Ukrainian refugees. It is a practical manifestation of genuine Orthodoxy as a tool of peace within itself, unlike the pernicious Russian Orthodoxy, pitting nations against each other.

The UOC voice will get stronger, and there is a window of opportunity to be recognised by other churches. But, the chasm between the ROC and the Western Church will be hard to overcome soon. 

Putin has subsidised the ROC to restore its ‘greatness,’ and the church ‘repays’ by ideologically supporting Putin’s aggression. This Russian National Orthodoxy is aimed at crushing not only any dissent at home but advancing its ideas abroad and acting as an ‘alternative’ to the liberal West’s ‘decadent civilisation.’ 

Ukraine is just the initial phase in this grand ‘religious crusade.’ The ROC and Putin aim higher, seeking the restoration of the Russian Empire, the heir to ‘Byzantium’s fallen Orthodox greatness.’ 

The ‘crusade against the West and gays’ weakened and will further diminish the position and credibility of Kirill as a Patriarch and the ROC in Orthodoxy. More churches abroad will move away from the ROC. After the EU tried to include Kirill in its sixth package of sanctions but failed due to Orban’s objections, he became a persona-non-grata in the Orthodox world. Great Britain has already showcased it by imposing sanctions on him. There seems to be no other choice for the World Council of Churches but to oust the ROC from the Orthodox family.

The religious instigation of violence must be investigated. Kirill must face the Tribunal by a Council of Orthodox Patriarchs and be stripped of his Patriarchy, possibly anathematised, as soon as possible, just like Moscow Patriarch Nikon in 1666. A person who exploits religion as an excuse for war and serves the geopolitical goals of Putin in return for revenue has no moral right to be a Patriarch. The ROC has to be deputinised and demilitarised.

Published as part of our own Future of Ukraine Fellowship. Read more about the project here and consider contributing here.

Picture: Kremlin.ruVladimir Putin at the Sretensky Monastery (2017-05-25) 07, Cropped and Filter added, CC BY 4.0

Christine Karelska

Future of Ukraine Fellow

Christine Karelska is an alumna of the College of Europe in Natolin and the Democracy Study Centre in Kyiv. Her main specialization is the European Neighborhood Policy. Christine was an intern-analyst of the Public Association “Community Associations” in Odesa. Her main academic spheres of interest are security studies, international relations, gender equality and local governance. Currently, she is working as an Advisor on International Relations of the Vice Mayor of Odesa and as an Assistant to the Deputy of the Odesa City Council. Previously, she worked as a Project Manager of the Ze!Women movement aimed at gender equality and promotion of the First Lady of Ukraine Olena Zelenska’s projects in the Odesa region.







The Russia-Ukraine Battle Over Black Sea

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The latest developments, including:
– Ukraine’s successful attacks on Russian gas platforms
– Russian missile strikes on Odesa
– Black Sea heating up as new theater of conflict
– Putin denies Russian responsibility for food crisis

Eric Draitser is an independent political analyst and host of CounterPunch Radio. You can find his exclusive content including articles, podcasts, audio commentaries, poetry and more at patreon.com/ericdraitser. You can follow him on Twitter @stopimperialism.


Ukraine war: as the conflict at sea intensifies, Russia’s prospects of victory look further off than ever


Basil Germond 
THE CONVERSATION
Published: June 23, 2022 

The Ukraine war is at a strategic turning point. As the Russian offensive intensifies in the Donbas without resulting in any substantial gains, western leaders warn that the war will be long, and supporting Ukraine must be sustained in the long term. At the same time, a less perceptible change is happening. The war at sea is intensifying.

From the blockade in the Black Sea, to growing tensions in the Baltic Sea, Ukraine’s assertiveness in destroying Russian naval assets and the role played by civilian shipping sector in sanctioning Russia, the war’s maritime aspects are now emerging and are likely to be more influential in the outcome of the conflict. Consequently, Russia, which is a continental power, is now more likely to be strategically defeated.

The longer a war, the more likely it is to be won by a sea power. As the maritime dimension of the conflict intensifies, the west’s mastery of the sea, its dominance of relevant maritime forums (such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO)) and its influence over big insurance brokers and shipping companies, will eventually be fatal to Putin’s war.

Russia, like its predecessor, the Soviet Union, lacks a maritime outlook – which prevents Moscow from grasping the strategic importance of sea power beyond its short-term naval preponderance in the Black Sea.

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Ukraine is a land power as much as Russia. But Putin is also confronted by a coalition of maritime (mainly western) nations, which champion freedom of navigation, have superior naval capabilities and a strong influence on the world’s maritime affairs. This grants the west with the capacity to gradually suffocate Putin’s regime by exercising strategic sea power.

The blockade of Ukraine, which prevents the shipment of grain and other agricultural products to the global south, is responsible for a worldwide food crisis. This has drawn attention to the importance of freedom of navigation.
Moves and strategies

At first sight, Russia seems to be in a dominant position. It can blockade Ukraine and use the resulting food crisis as a bargaining chip (or blackmailing tool) to negotiate the lifting of western sanctions. But this is also offering the west an opportunity to take the upper hand where they have a comparative advantage: upholding freedom of the sea and rallying partners under the banner of humanitarianism.

Technical, legal, operational and strategic difficulties make it arduous to establish a safe corridor to and from Ukraine. In particular, agreeing on procedures and safeguards with Russia, clearing the corridor of mines to an acceptable standard for maritime insurances and operators, and managing Turkey’s interpretation of the Montreux Convention, which gives Ankara control over the access routes between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and beyond.

It is also crucial to prevent the approach to the port city of Odesa from becoming vulnerable to a Russian attack following its de-mining and avoiding potential escalation between Russian forces and escort vessels. Nevertheless, this option is still on the table.

Ukraine itself is proactively targeting Russian assets in the Black Sea. Since the sinking of the cruiser Moskva in April, the Russian navy is not safe when operating too close to the shore.

No longer the ‘pride’ of the Black Sea fleet: the Russian cruiser Moskva in better times. EPA-EFE/Sergei Ilnitsky

The pressure exercised by Ukraine in the Black Sea has further increased in June. Using harpoon missiles supplied by the west, Ukraine successfully attacked a Russian tugboat supplying Snake Island, which is strategically vital for Russia’s control over the area. Ukraine also targeted oil rigs located in the Crimean waters (occupied since 2014) and launched air strikes against Russian installations on Snake Island.

These tactical victories will challenge Russia’s ability to deny Ukraine access to the north-western Black Sea – with long-term strategic consequences. Also, a weakened Russia in the Black Sea might open the door to the establishment of a safe corridor.

At a diplomatic level, freedom of navigation – especially when its disruption causes food shortages – is a core norm of the global maritime order that seafaring nations, led by the west, are committed to upholding. The high representative of the EU for foreign affairs and security policy, Josep Borrell, said that the blockade of Ukraine that disrupts grain shipments is “a real war crime”.

The blockade might contribute to further diplomatically isolate Russia by making the global south, until now reluctant to condemn Russia’s aggression, revise its stance and side with the west in pointing at Russia’s wrongdoings. But there is still a long way to go.
Beyond the Black Sea

There is also a strong civilian maritime dimension to the war. All major shipping companies but the Chinese have stopped operations to and from Russia. Ships that are either owned or operated by Russia or sail under the Russian flag are banned from EU, UK, US and most others ports. This is gradually putting a great deal of pressure on the Russian economy and – down the line – on its war machine.
Russian navy: impressive in port, faltering on the ocean wave. EPA-EFE/Anatoly Maltsev

The Baltic Sea is also becoming a theatre of tensions between Russia and the west. Finland and Sweden’s potential accession to Nato will further transform the Baltic Sea into a “lake” controlled by the EU and Nato, whereas it has always been an important sea lane of communication for Russia. Both Nato and Russia have recently conducted naval exercises in the Baltic Sea.

Additionally, to apply EU sanctions, Lithuania has now blocked the transit of prohibited goods (notably metal ore) from Russia to Kaliningrad, which is the headquarters of the Baltic Sea Fleet. As a result, freedom of navigation in the Baltic Sea becomes even more crucial for Russia in order to ensure supplies to the Russian “exclave”.

Read more: Kaliningrad: Russia's 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' deep in Nato territory

At the same time, recent incursions by Russian warships in the territorial waters of Denmark (which incidentally supplied Ukraine with harpoon missiles) highlight Russia’s willingness to assert its status as a Baltic Sea power, but also demonstrates its nervousness as it faces the determination of maritime nations.
Advantages of sea power

The consensus among sea power scholars (for instance see books by US maritime expert Colin S Gray and British maritime strategist Geoffrey Till) is that the possession of powerful naval forces is not sufficient to win a war. But command of the sea grants strategic advantages – from the ability to control the global supply chain to carrying out projection operations, such as targeted air strikes and amphibious assaults.

But for sea power to exert its influence on a continental enemy requires time and perseverance. Thus, the longer the war the more likely it will be won by a coalition of maritime nations.

Beyond its naval dominance, the west – as a collective of maritime nations – has been in a position to shape the international order at sea, from IMO procedures to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), to naval war laws. Similarly, major civilian stakeholders, especially maritime insurers, are closely associated with western interests.

The preponderance of sea power in war, peace and hybrid contexts (such as the current confrontation between Russia and the west) derives from maritime nations’ ability to use their dominance to produce strategic effects via their control of the global supply chain and their ability to deny such control to continental states. These effects can only be felt in the longer term.

Russia is able to exercise some pressure on Europe via its control of the energy supply in the mid-term. It has also managed to operate naval units in the Black Sea in a way that – currently – prevents the free flow of goods to and from Ukraine.

But as a traditional continental power, Russia lacks the ability to oppose the coalition of maritime nations in the longer term and at global level. Sea power will eventually contribute to Moscow’s strategic failure.

Author
Basil Germond
Senior Lecturer and Director of Research Training, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Lancaster University

THUMBNAIL
Snake Island, seen here in commemorative postage stamps, has become a symbol of Ukraine’s resistance. EPA-EFE/Mykola Tys