Gaza Under Attack

'My daughter, my friend': The Palestinian art student killed in Israel's Gaza assault

The family of Doniyana al-Amour, a promising young artist from Gaza, talk to MEE about their warm, loving daughter and sister who made the best cups of tea

A drawing by Doniyana al-Amour, a 22-year-old Palestinian art student who was killed in an Israeli attack, displayed in her destroyed room (MEE/Abdallah al-Naami)

ByAbdallah al-Naami in

Gaza City, occupied Palestine
Published date: 12 August 2022

It was a beautiful Friday afternoon. The al-Amour family was at home in al-Fukhari, a town east of Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip, enjoying the day.

Doniyana al-Amour, 22, was in her bedroom. Her brother, 21-year-old Assim, was getting ready to go out with some friends. In the next room, Assim’s mother and three other sisters were chatting and baking bread.

“We didn’t hear the explosion,” Assim told Middle East Eye. “Suddenly, everything turned dark. The only thing I heard was my mother and sisters screaming and calling for Doniyana.”

An Israeli shell had blown apart the walls of the housing, filling the family’s home with smoke and flames. Assim ran to his sister’s room to check on her. Doniyana was sitting on her bed.

'How can I think of my life without her? She has been not only my daughter but my friend'

- Farha, Palestinian mother

“I was shocked,” Assim said, describing the hardest moment in his life. “The only thing I saw was her blood pouring out and dripping onto the floor, mixing with rubble and papers.”

The 21-year-old carried his sister out into the garden and covered her with a blanket so that his mother and other sisters would not see her.

Seconds after the bombardment, Israeli forces rained heavy machine gun fire down on the house and the nearby agricultural land. The family called an ambulance, the police, and neighbours for help, but no one was able to get near the al-Amour house because of the gunfire.

After 20 minutes of shelling and under gunfire, paramedic Mohammed al-Amour (not a close relative of the family), who lives nearby, reached the house.

“Her injury was very critical,” Mohammed told MEE. “I checked and found that her heart was still beating. We rushed to save her life but we did not hold out much hope.”

Under Israeli fire, Doniyana’s father Adnan, 52, went looking for a car to take his dying daughter to hospital. “I didn’t care if I was going to get shot,” Adnan said.

“I ran through the olive trees until I found my neighbour with his farm truck. We brought the truck to the west side of the house, about 100 metres away, so the Israelis wouldn’t hit it. We carried Doniyana onto the truck and went to the European Hospital, about three kilometres away.”

Doniyana's room after the Israeli attack (MEE/Abdallah al-Naami)

At the hospital, medical personnel spent 20 minutes trying relentlessly to revive Doniyana. Their efforts went unrewarded, though. The 22-year-old Palestinian died in the intensive care unit of the European Hospital.

The Israeli strike that killed Doniyana came at the start of a three-day onslaught on Gaza that was brought to a halt by an Egypt-brokered ceasefire on the evening of Sunday 7 August.

The attacks left 49 Palestinians - including 17 children - dead and 360 injured, including 151 children.
Portrait of a young artist

Doniyana was her family’s lynchpin, a true favourite. Warm, caring, and devoted, she spread joy and love through the home.

Asim remembered his sister, who he called Dunya. “She used to make the best tea ever. Every afternoon the family would gather under the olive trees in our yard and drink tea and chat. Doniyana loved to tell us about her latest drawings and her studies at university,” he said.

Doniyana was a prolific artist from a young age (MEE/Abdallah al-Naami)

Since she was a child, Doniyana had shown a great talent for drawing and painting. She mastered the composition of lively paintings that depicted faces in unusual ways. One of her best-loved paintings was one she had made for her niece, who contracted a fever a year ago and then died.

Doniyana chose to study art at al-Aqsa University and was just a few months from her graduation when she was killed.

“We were proud of her, we spared no effort to support her,” Assim said. “She dreamt of sending out a message of hope and resilience from Gaza to the world.” Despite their constrained situation, the family made sure Doniyana had all the equipment she needed to make her aunt.

Life in the borderland

The al-Amour family lives in a border area, just east of the Sufa Crossing road, and attacks by Israeli forces are recurrent and systematic, they say.

“It’s more like a habit for Israeli soldiers to shoot and fire tear gas canisters at us when we go to work in our fields,” Doniyana’s uncle, Saedd al-Amour, 55, told MEE.

“We are only farmers. We have no connection to military activities. All that Doniyana cared about was her family, her drawings, and her flowers. Why did they kill her?”

Her death brought back painful memories of another Israeli attack on the family. Doniyana’s aunt, Zina al-Amour, was killed by an Israeli shell in 2016. The 50-year-old Palestinian was working in her family’s fields east of al-Fukhari when she was killed.

After the attack that killed Doniyana, the al-Amour family of 10 had to move in with their neighbours, such was the damage done to their house.

“We used to leave our house at the beginning of every Israeli attack, but this time we were the first targets of the aggression,” Assim said. “We didn’t have time to escape.”

A selection of Doniyana's drawings (MEE/Abdallah al-Naami)

The family home was built with the support of UNRWA, the United Nations' Palestinian refugee agency, in 2015, after their previous house had been severely damaged in the 2014 Gaza war.

In a bid to document and trace the latest Israeli attacks, a team of lawyers and human rights activists visited the al-Amour home to look into what had happened. Their visit was part of a bid to file a complaint against the Israeli army.

"To be honest, I do not think that we are going to win a case against the Israeli army. Israel always gets away with its crimes," Doniyana's brother-in-law, Hindi al-Amur, told MEE.
'Buried a piece of my heart'

Less than two hours after declaring her death, Doniyana’s family went to bury her at the family graveyard, known as the “al-Amour cemetery”, in al-Fukhari.

“I was still in shock", Assim said. "A few hours earlier we were talking and now we're at the cemetery to bury her. My father collapsed and I was barely able to stand. I felt like I had buried a piece of my heart.”

Assim stood in the cemetery, struck dumb by what had happened. "Is this really the last time I will see her," he wondered. "My mind was unable to accept this bitter fact."

According to her family, Doniyana always loved to see everything pretty around her. She had a small, beautiful garden where she tended to the flowers. The family has turned that garden into a funeral home, a site of remembrance for their beloved young artist.

Her mother, Farha, 47, was so shocked when she first saw her daughter lying in the garden following the attack, that she refused to accept that Doniyana would not survive her wounds. The loss is immeasurable.

"How can I think of my life without her," Farha asked. "She has been not only my daughter but my friend."

'A dangerous message': How the West is enabling Israel's orgy of violence against Palestinians

There can be no clearer demonstration of the hollowness of western values than in the persistent, cynical and criminal failure to bring Israel to book for its actions

A Palestinian man carries his daughter after evacuating his home during an Israeli airstrike in Gaza City, on 7 August 2022 (AFP)

David Hearst

Middle East Eye
10 August 2022 

It is increasingly clear that Gaza paid the price for an Israeli military campaign in the West Bank that has little to do with it.

In an orgy of violence, Israel reversed a strategy - which it has been pursuing for decades - of dividing the Palestinians into different camps. It is now forcing them to reunite.

Israel reversed its strategy of dividing the Palestinians into different camps. It is now forcing them to reunite

Israel clearly intended to provoke a wave of missile strikes with the arrest of Bassam al-Saadi, a senior member of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad group (PIJ). For three days, the PIJ did not react. Saadi had been arrested seven times before and even leaked footage of him being dragged by soldiers did not ignite passions. There were no protests in the West Bank.

Israel then launched its attack on Friday afternoon, killing Taiseer al-Jabari, the commander of the northern division of al-Quds Brigades (Saraya al-Quds), the military wing of the PIJ, along with five-year-old Alaa Qaddoum, a 23-year-old woman, and seven other Palestinian men.

By the standards of this long and bitter conflict, Israel’s attack on Gaza was unprovoked. There is no evidence to support the contention that Jabari was preparing an attack on Israeli tanks.

Only three hours after the strikes on Gaza did the PIJ unleash a rocket barrage, but Hamas's much larger rocket force remained in its silos.

All of the targets of this campaign are local commanders and relative unknowns, even to Ran Kochav, the spokesperson for the Israeli army who forgot Jabari’s name on live television on Saturday.

But if the campaign to defang the West Bank is clear, it is equally the case that such an operation would provoke the very uprising it is designed to stem. An armed uprising in the West Bank is no longer a matter of if, only when. This is not just a consequence of the collapse of the Palestinian Authority, whose writ no longer runs in Jenin, or indeed Nablus. Both cities have formed their own brigades.

A leadership deficit

The formation of new armed cells in territory which has largely eschewed armed resistance since 2007 reflects not only the collapse of the PA, but a leadership deficit within all Palestinian factions, PIJ and Hamas included.

The cells themselves may be "inspired" by the Islamic Jihad movement but their members come from all groups, including Fatah, Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Put simply, the West Bank is bristling with guns, most of which can be acquired easily on the Israeli market. A new generation of Palestinians is trading in their cars, careers and, ultimately, their own lives for them.

This decision has little to do with the weight of history. It has more to do with the burden of the present.

If recognising Israel does not work; if Israel is disinterested in talks that lead to a Palestinian state; if every time Israeli forces attack, the outside world commends it for doing so; if vigilante gangs of settlers destroy your olive trees and your houses under the armed protection of Israeli soldiers; if the law that applies to those gangs is civilian, but the law applying to you, who are unarmed, is military; if your own leaders are corrupt, and refuse to hold elections for decades for fear of the popular vote: what else is there left for you to do? Surrender? Leave for London?

Israel is under a profound delusion if it thinks that Palestinians will just melt away. This is the last thing on this generation’s mind. They will stand and fight. It's not flight they are thinking of, but liberation.
Global abandonment

Palestinians are as globally connected as any other generation of youths around the world. What exactly is the message world leaders are giving them in their fact-free reactions to the latest bombardments?

Israel's assault on Gaza is an extension of its bloody war on Jenin

Ibrahim Fraihat     Read More »

US President Joe Biden reacted as follows: "My support for Israel’s security is long-standing and unwavering - including its right to defend itself against attacks.

"Over these recent days, Israel has defended its people from indiscriminate rocket attacks launched by the terrorist group Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the United States is proud of our support for Israel’s Iron-Dome, which intercepted hundreds of rockets and saved countless lives. I commend Prime Minister Yair Lapid and his government’s steady leadership throughout the crisis."

The statement, which is worth reading in full, had no expression of concern about Israel shooting first. Lapid’s actions were commendable.

Or what about Britain’s prime minister to be, Liz Truss? As these events were unfolding, Truss addressed Conservative Friends of Israel with these words: "The UK stands by Israel and its right to defend itself.” In her letter to the group, she added: “We condemn terrorist groups firing at civilians and violence which has resulted in casualties on both sides."

To rub salt into the wound, Truss promised to review the location of Britain’s embassy, which is currently in Tel Aviv - an act which would consign what small role the UK had as a peacemaker or mediator in this conflict to the ashes. There is no domestic pressure for her to do this.

Mourners carry the bodies of Hussein Taha and Islam Sabbouh of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, who were killed by Israel in Nablus on 9 August 2022 (AFP)

The EU acknowledged that the escalation had already led to “a number of casualties” but did not say who they were and which side caused them. France "deplored" the Palestinian civilian casualties, but condemned "the firing of rockets into Israeli territory and reiterates its unconditional commitment to the security of Israel".

Israel is under a profound delusion if it thinks that Palestinians will just melt away. This is the last thing on this generation’s mind

Only the UN and the Irish Foreign Minister Simon Coveney broke ranks - by inches, not feet. Ireland said it was "deeply concerned" by the impact of Israeli strikes on civilians.

What message do these statements send to the families of the 45 Palestinians who have been killed in these attacks, 16 of them children? What message goes through to the hundreds injured?

In this case, Israel clearly fired first not because a Palestinian militant group had reacted. But because it did not react. That is something of a first in this conflict.

And it is applauded for doing so by the very same leaders who are arming Ukrainian resistance fighters against Russian occupiers.

A dangerous message

There can be no clearer demonstration of the hollowness of western values than in their persistent, cynical and criminally responsible failure to bring Israel to book for its actions.

This is a dangerous message to be sending both sides in the conflict, not least Israel itself.

Lapid is unlikely to lead public opinion in Israel. Israel’s next generation of soldiers are not following him, rather the likes of the Kahanist Itamar Ben-Gvir, who took part in the storming of the Al-Aqsa Mosque along with his supporters.

Gaza: The names and faces of the 16 Palestinian children killed in Israel's onslaught

Read More »

If Benjamin Netanyahu succeeds in forming the next government later this year, the extreme right - and from a group once classed by the US and Israel as terrorists - could well be in his cabinet.

By giving Lapid the greenest of green lights to kill Palestinians at will, western leaders are sending an even more dangerous message to the next generation of Israeli leaders who are openly talking of killing Arabs come what may. They openly threaten Palestinians with another Nakba.

The latest target of Israel’s operation in the West Bank is described as Israel’s most wanted man in Nablus. But Ibrahim al-Nabulsi was only 19 years old. Before the final firefight of his life, Nabulsi made an audio recording that went viral: “Preserve the homeland after me, and my commandment is for no one to leave gunpowder. I am besieged, and I am going to be martyred,” he said.

Huge crowds attended his funeral, and those of Islam Sabbouh and 16-year-old Hussein Taha, who died in the same Israeli raid.

The relief for Israel in his death will be strictly temporary. The obvious fact is that the more Palestinians Israel kills the more they provide a recruiting platform for fighters to replace them.

Elaine Abu-Shaweesh is all of five or six years old. She was injured in bombings in Rafah on Saturday. Hani Alshaer, a journalist from Gaza, caught her on video with a bloody bandage on her head, and saying: “Israel is not a state, and they are under, under, under my feet. And they are on the ground and are trash and they are not. They are bombing kids and maybe right now they have destroyed our house, because last time they did, last war.”

No one taught this little girl what to say. But come what may she will grow up to resist what is happening all around her. This is Israel’s work. It is also the world’s responsibility.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

This article is available in French on Middle East Eye French edition.

David Hearst is co-founder and editor-in-chief of Middle East Eye. He is a commentator and speaker on the region and analyst on Saudi Arabia. He was The Guardian's foreign leader writer, and was correspondent in Russia, Europe, and Belfast. He joined the Guardian from The Scotsman, where he was education correspondent.

How anti-black racism pervades Europe's asylum systems

Tiara Sahar Ataii
11 August, 2022

In-depth: Viewed as targets for deportation rather than claimants of asylum, Sub-Saharan African migrants find themselves at a crossroads of racial profiling, police brutality, and violent pushbacks.

On 29 June 2022, 30 people crossed the Aegean Sea on a rubber dinghy, hoping to reach the Greek island of Chios.

Thankfully, they arrived without capsizing – and immediately the majority went into hiding, afraid they would be pushed back to Turkey.

They resurfaced three days later, after the Greek authorities had finished their search, and, exhausted and hungry, made their way to the camp where they began to piece together what happened to their fellow passengers.

Of the eleven passengers unaccounted for, the Greek authorities had found eight and forced them back to Turkey. Worse yet, three Somalis from the group were still stranded in the woods where they had been hiding, and without food or water for five days, one was now unresponsive.

"Sub-Saharan African asylum seekers are seen first and foremost as targets for deportation rather than claimants of asylum"

Aid workers and residents began to call the authorities day and night, asking them to bring the remaining three asylum seekers to safety. On 8 July, nine days after the group arrived on the island, the authorities finally responded – but by the time they arrived, one Somali woman had already died.

The police didn’t comment on the whereabouts of the others, nor did they identify which woman had passed away – and so the families of the three asylum seekers were left in agonising limbo, wondering whether it was their loved one who had passed away.

It was at this point that Madi Williamson, a nurse involved in documenting pushbacks, began to intensify her calls to the authorities, imploring them to launch a search and rescue operation for the two missing asylum seekers.

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Tiara Sahar Ataii

She shared the recording of one such phone call with The New Arab. “Two missing people,” she says. “From where?” “They’re Somali nationals”. “Just a second please” – the operator pauses, then tells her to call another number.

Over a month later, the fate of the other two asylum seekers is entirely unknown. The Somali woman who had passed away was only confirmed once a family member flew to Greece to identify the body.

Madi has a multitude of scenarios running through her head; the most terrifying being that their bodies are still in the woods, or that they were found weeks ago and pushed back across the Aegean Sea and left to drown.

A demonstration in Barcelona against the murder of 37 African asylum seekers in Melilla in June 2022. 

[Photo by Robert Bonet/NurPhoto via Getty Images]

Institutional racism

Anti-black racism is mobilised against sub-Saharan refugees from the moment they approach European borders to the asylum deliberation processes, where ignorance and government policy result in miscarriages of justice.

In 2021, 100% of UK Home Office negative asylum decisions from Guinea, Rwanda, Uganda, South Sudan, and Malawi were overturned upon appeal, implying consistently faulty decision-making in the first instance. In the same year, lawyers in the Greek island of Lesbos reported that all of their Somali clients applying for asylum had been rejected with the “exact same argumentation/grounds for the decision”.

The situation is similar across the EU. In 2021, rejection rates were at 77% for the Democratic Republic of Congo, 62% for the Central African Republic, and 63% for South Sudan, countries which have been mired in conflict for decades.

The New Arab spoke to Lorraine Leete, Coordinator at the Legal Centre Lesvos about the endemic racism black asylum seekers must face in the asylum process.

"We've even overheard one European Asylum Support Office employee claim that 'all Africans are lying' – an officer who was responsible for drafting opinions on applicants' eligibility for asylum"

“In the numerous cases we’ve followed, we’ve seen black asylum seekers are all too often rejected on the basis that their testimony or documentation produced from their home countries are not credible, rather than any finding that there is not an actual risk in their home country,” she told The New Arab.

“We’ve even overheard one European Asylum Support Office employee claim that ‘all Africans are lying’ – an officer who was responsible for drafting opinions on applicants’ eligibility for asylum.”

Increasingly, these stereotypes have become baked into policy. In the UK, stereotypes of sub-Saharan Africans as primarily economic migrants ‘posing’ as refugees have become formalised in ‘country of origin’ reports.

In theory, these should lay out the human rights situation in the asylum seeker’s country of origin, but increasingly, they’ve become mired with government policy of expedited removals and exporting European borders deep into Africa.

Now termed Country Policy and Information Notes (CPINs), these reports lay out UK policy first and foremost, which takes precedence in decision-making over the human rights situation in said country, of which the CPIN for Rwanda is the most extreme example.

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The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration slammed this approach in 2018, to no avail.

With little in-house knowledge in the Home Office on sub-Saharan Africa and immense workloads, there’s little hope of asylum decision-makers questioning the information granted in the CPINs.

Whistle-blower testimonies described decision makers, with just two hours to adjudicate on each case, relying upon copy-pasted stock paragraphs for all applicants from the same nationality.

When at scale, under-resourcing access to the asylum regime is synonymous with the purposeful exclusion of certain nationalities from the asylum regime.

Lorraine speaks of the systemic lack of access to interpreters for asylum speakers who speak 'rare' languages such as Portuguese across Europe, which limits access to medical, social, housing, and the asylum procedure itself.

A quarantine area for Covid-19 with barbed wire fences in a refugee camp in Kara Tepe in Lesbos island, Greece, in September 2020. 

[Photo by Nicolas Economou/NurPhoto via Getty Images]


A vicious cycle of border violence

Discrimination and a lack of access to the asylum process inevitably translate to violence at borders. High rejection rates, typically amongst sub-Saharan Africans, allow politicians to paint them as ‘undeserving’ economic migrants, ‘taking advantage’ of European protection for refugees and threatening our sovereignty, transforming them from the victims of border policy into the aggressor.

Madi describes this as the ‘securitisation argument’, that pits migrant rights against the security of Western society in a zero-sum game.

In 2017, the Greek government opened a fast-track procedure for individuals included on the ‘National List of Undesirable Aliens’, based on the high rejection rates of said nationalities. Largely comprised of Africans and South Asians, those being ‘fast-tracked’ essentially underwent a sham asylum procedure that resembled an expedited deportation platform.

Given just one day to prepare for their asylum interview, the vast majority received a negative decision, following which they had five days to appeal. The whole process could be completed within seven days.

"Our asylum regimes are built on white supremacy – the belief that the security of white, Western superior nations is more important to protect than the safety and wellbeing of others"

The speed at which the fast-track procedure was conducted was clearly aimed at preventing asylum seekers from accessing their rights, leaving them almost no time to get to grips with a notoriously complex asylum regime.

Neither did the fast-track allow them to prepare for their asylum interview which tests credibility by probing every detail of the last few years – a feat made even more challenging by the trauma of the journey to Greece. Providing just 24 hours for the interview, which asylum claims are hinged upon, essentially guaranteed rejection.

More worryingly, the fast-track created a quasi-legal front for what was essentially pushbacks of African and South Asian migrants, as confirmed by a leaked Greek Police circular which mandated deportation for those on the ‘National List of Undesirable Aliens’ for nothing more than ‘delinquent behaviour’.

Unable to pass for the image of the ‘deserving’ refugee often associated with Syrians, sub-Saharan African asylum seekers began to be seen first and foremost as targets for deportation rather than claimants of asylum and placed at the crossroads of racial profiling, police brutality, and pushbacks.

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Systems born of violence

Lorraine told The New Arab that it’s no surprise that asylum regimes so frequently create unjust outcomes when the system itself is born out of racism.

“Migration policy in Europe is itself an exclusive policy, which allows migration from the global south only to those who meet the narrow category of the definition of a refugee from an over 50-year-old treaty written in the aftermath of World War II,” she said.

“It doesn’t take into account all of the legitimate and valid reasons people find themselves choosing to migrate – for example, African asylum seekers with familial ties to countries such as the UK, France, Belgium, or the Netherlands, due to past colonial relationship between the countries, are prevented from migrating,” she added.

"Migration policy in Europe is itself an exclusive policy, which allows migration from the global south only to those who meet the narrow category of the definition of a refugee from an over 50-year-old treaty"

“Similarly, those no longer have a means of surviving in Senegal, due to fishing regulations that have allowed for over-fishing by multinational corporations, are also denied protection, or a legal and safe means of migrating.”

Madi echoed the same sentiment. “Our asylum regimes are built on white supremacy – the belief that the security of white, Western superior nations is more important to protect than the safety and wellbeing of others.”

This is how she accounts for the shocking levels of apathy that she often confronts when working with authorities. The phone call where the operator refused to conduct a search for the Somali woman, ultimately resulting in her death, was just one tragic vignette.

“In the name of our ‘safety’, we’ve managed to dehumanise black migrants so much that they’ve become collateral of securitisation.”

Tiara Sahar Ataii has worked in humanitarian response for the UN and major NGOs in 11 countries. She founded SolidariTee, which fights for refugee rights. She is also part of the 2022 'Forbes 30 under 30'.
Follow her on Twitter: @tiara_sahar

Spain and Morocco: A new friendship inked in blood

Basma El Atti
Rabat
11 August, 2022

In-depth: Madrid and Rabat agreed to strengthen cooperation on irregular migration after reconciling in March. The Melilla killings demonstrate how far Morocco is willing to go to maintain this new phase in diplomatic ties.

Seven weeks on from the Melilla massacre, those responsible for killing 23 migrants and injuring dozens more at the Spain-Morocco border have still not been held accountable.

On 24 June, around 2,000 migrants attempted to cross the Barrio Chino fence, one of many border passages separating Morocco’s Nador and the Spanish-controlled enclave of Melilla, one of the European Union's only land borders with Africa.

At least 23 migrants were killed and 77 were injured, according to Moroccan-Spanish official numbers.

“We expect the death toll to be higher than the official number,” Mohammed Amin Abidar, head of the office of the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) in Nador, told The New Arab.

"The instrumentalisation of migration is not something new to Spanish-Moroccan diplomatic relations"

Morocco's state-backed Council of Human Rights (CNDH) said the migrants were armed with stones and hooks and injured more than 140 Moroccan officers during the "clashes".

The council also said that the majority of migrants died from 'suffocation'.

Nador has for years been a hub for Sub-Saharan migrants and asylum seekers from war-torn countries seeking a safer refuge away from the dangers and high prices of the maritime migratory routes.

So what has changed?

Madrid and Rabat's new friendship

On 20 July, the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH), a non-governmental organisation, released a 21-page investigation concluding that the Melilla massacre was a “token of love” from Rabat to its new friend Madrid.

The violence of Moroccan authorities was motivated by a desire to show their Spanish partners "how far they can go to stop migratory flows when the two [Madrid and Rabat] are partners," the investigation said.

In an interview with The New Arab, Mohammed Amin Abidar, head of AMDH-Nador, said that the migrants walked for an hour from the Gourougou forest in Morocco to reach the border fence.

 

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Basma El Atti

“No authorities stopped them even though they noticed their movement,” he said.

Videos shared on social media showed groups of migrants walking freely in empty streets in the town of Nador, just hours before the killings.

The instrumentalisation of migration is not something new to Spanish-Moroccan diplomatic relations.

In recent years, the borders of Melilla and Ceuta, the EU's only land borders with Africa, have become diplomatic leverage to resolve conflicts and seal deals.

In 2021, 8,000 migrants surged across the Moroccan-Spanish border in what was widely seen as a punitive move by Rabat against Madrid for hosting Brahim Ghali, the head of the Polisario Front, a Western Saharan separatist group.

At the time, Madrid accused Rabat of blackmail and Rabat responded by recalling its ambassador to Madrid.

A woman holds a placard reading "37 dead in Melilla, 'progressive' government responsible" during a demonstration in Madrid on 26 June. [Getty]

Facing criticism, Morocco's Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, a diplomat who has gained relative popularity among many Moroccans for his pro-Moroccan Sahara policy, said at the time that Rabat "refuses to play the role of immigration gendarmes to protect the European border”.

The conflict was exacerbated when Saad Eddin El Othmani, Morocco’s PM at the time, addressed the enclaves as “occupied Sebta [Ceuta] and Melilla,” a term that upset Spain.

But after a year of trading barbs, Madrid decided in March 2022 to walk away from its decades-long policy of neutrality on Western Sahara and backed Morocco’s autonomy plan in the disputed territory.

The decision cost Madrid the friendship of Algeria, the Polisario’s loyal sponsor, but gained instead 'strong cooperation' with Rabat, mainly on issues of migration.

"The violence of Moroccan authorities was motivated by a desire to show their Spanish partners how far they can go to stop migratory flows"

AMDH, one of the only Moroccan organisations that have followed the crisis, announced on 30 July that “the death of those young Africans on the European borders is a warning to us about the deadly nature of the Moroccan-Spanish security collaboration on immigration”.

The group’s press statement was also co-signed by 40 Moroccan and Spanish NGOs.

Despite the heavy fatalities in Melilla, comments from the Spanish government reflected Madrid’s enthusiasm for maintaining diplomatic ties after Rabat’s excessive use of force.

Pedro Sanchez, Spain’s prime minister, applauded Morocco’s efforts, stating that the migration crisis was “well handled”.

Facing criticism, the socialist PM took back his statement. However, he continued to stand by the efforts of Moroccan authorities in facing the immigration crisis.

“We must remember that many of these migrants attacked Spain’s borders with axes and hooks,” he told The Associated Press.

Christiane Waked, a Spain-based political analyst and columnist specialising in MENA and Kurdish issues, believes that “Sánchez will do everything to back its position regarding his new politics with Morocco”.

Since siding with Rabat in the Western Sahara dispute, Sanchez has started facing criticism from his own coalition members.

Radical immigration policies and turning down support for the Saharawi people were never on the agenda for socialists in Spain.

However, Waked argues that Sanchez has actually scored several victories since befriending Rabat, despite betraying his party's agenda.

“He recently enjoyed a victory when the Spanish Parliament confirmed the position of his government in favour of the autonomy plan for the settlement of the Sahara conflict, by rejecting with an overwhelming majority a draft resolution hostile to Morocco,” she told The New Arab.

A picture taken on 26 June 2022, shows a member of the Moroccan security forces on the border fence separating Morocco from Spain's North African Melilla enclave, near Nador in Morocco. [Getty]

African allies: Rabat's neglected friends

Strongly identifying with the Saharawi people's struggle, most African countries have recognised the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and have officially sided with the Polisario Front.

After a 33-year-hiatus, in 2017 Morocco decided to increase its engagement with its West African neighbours and other countries across the continent.

This new outreach sought to expand Rabat's regional leadership role and attempt to convince other countries to reconsider their position on Western Sahara.

Through royal visits and investments in struggling African states, the Moroccan monarchy managed to convince most western and southern African countries to shift their position on the disputed territory.


"The Melilla massacre highlighted Morocco's readiness to sacrifice its friendship with its African neighbours to gain the validation of a European state"

That same year, King Mohammed VI launched a second regularisation campaign for African migrants and asylum seekers that was applauded by international NGOs.

Following a similar campaign in 2014, Rabat allowed 25,000 migrants to receive one-year renewable residency permits.

In 2021, thirteen of the nineteen states that opened embassies in Western Sahara as part of their diplomatic recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory had previously endorsed the Polisario Front.

Apart from South Africa, even those who had not fallen for Rabat’s charm offensive prefered to stay neutral on the dispute so as not to anger the North African Kingdom.

However, the Melilla massacre highlighted Morocco’s readiness to sacrifice its friendship with its African neighbours to gain the validation of a European state.

Political analyst Christiane Waked believes that, so far, Rabat has not been forced to choose between its allies as African leaders did not express much concern over the killing of their citizens in Melilla.

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“Many of the migrants came from various African countries, mainly Sudanese and South Sudanese. Though this event might be a cause of important tension between Sudan and Morocco, so far it doesn’t seem to be the case,” Waked told The New Arab.

The day after the massacre, dozens of African diplomats gathered at the headquarters of the ministry of foreign affairs to voice their support for Morocco as it tackled the "human trafficking rings that were behind the events of June 24".

A Hollywood-style story then emerged of a human trafficking boss based in Algeria who ruled over the migratory routes along the road from Nador to Melilla.

The story was promoted by Moroccan media outlets close to the state, as well as Spain's official news agency EFE.

However, AMDH, and independent Spanish media, said the human trafficking story was unfounded and called on African diplomats to stand up for their own compatriots.

"The death of those young Africans on the European borders is a warning to us about the deadly nature of the Moroccan-Spanish security collaboration on immigration"

“If similar events are to be repeated, this will surely create tensions and will push citizens and families of victims to demand that their countries hold accountable those responsible on both sides of the borders,” said Waked in a statement to The New Arab.

Mohammed Amin Abidar, the head of AMDH - Nador, said dozens of families have reached out to the association as the Moroccan state refuses to communicate any information about the massacre.

“When we contact the hospital to check the health situation of certain migrants they say they cannot share any information since everything about the day is classified by the interior ministry,” Abidar told The New Arab.

Until this day, Rabat continues to hide behind a wall of silence to avoid accountability, even as many migrants still remain missing since the massacre.

Basma El Atti is The New Arab's Morocco correspondent.
Follow her on Twitter: @elattibasma

From Bourguiba to Ben Ali: The failures of state feminism in Tunisia


Jyhene Kebsi
12 Aug, 2022

In light of Tunisia’s national Women’s Day in August, Jyhene Kebsi writes about the history of government policies regarding gender equality, their many limitations and why so much distrust remains towards ‘state feminism’ post-revolution


On the 13 August Tunisia marks its national Women's Day, but many questions regarding gender equality in the country still remain.

On 13 August Tunisia celebrates its national ‘Women’s Day’ but this takes place against an unequal backdrop for many. Despite the efforts of feminists and human rights activists, Tunisian women are still unable to enjoy equal inheritance rights.

Many Tunisians, including women, refuse the equalisation of inheritance and reject the UN discourse on gender equity in favour of a version of women’s rights that is grounded in religious interpretations of the Quran.

The opposition to changes in inheritance law in post-revolutionary Tunisia, largely stems from the continued importance of religion. This is despite the secularised feminist policies which were introduced under the first two presidents after the country gained its independence from France.

Habib Bourguiba, who ruled Tunisia from its independence until 1987, introduced the Family Code in 1956. This Personal Status Code, which secured more rights to women, represents the legislative text that departs the most from the Islamic norms. For this reason, the code was and still is unprecedented in the Arab and Muslim world.

'' The return of many Tunisian women and men to conservative values, and their reclamation of their “authentic” Arabo-Islamic identities in post-revolutionary Tunisia, strongly links Tunisian feminists and grassroots feminist movements with French neo-colonialism.''

While Islamic law makes divorce the exclusive right of the husband, the Family Code made it a civil matter available to wives and husbands alike. While repudiation continues to be a common Muslim tradition practised until today in many Arab Muslim-majority countries, the Code put an end to a husband’s ability to dissolve the marriage by simply telling his wife “you are divorced” three times. Polygamy was also criminalised.

The Code represented an important step in the modernisation and relative secularisation of the country. Bourguiba linked his legal secular innovations to repeated public criticism of Islamic scholars and religious traditions like fasting, veiling and pilgrimage. In line with this, he banned the University of Zeitouna and spoke against the veil, which he described as a “miserable rag” and an “appalling shroud.”

However, Tunisian legislation of this nature was not totally secularised. On the contrary, and unlike what many people in and outside of Tunisia think, the Personal Status Code was and still is rooted in Islamic teachings, as it has been based on the Maliki (Sunni school of thought) family law. As the Tunisian scholar Nouri Gana argues: “Unmatched in the Muslim world except perhaps by the 1924 Turkish Civil Code, the Tunisian Code did not, however, abolish the sharia, or Islamic law, altogether, nor did it proceed to sweepingly mimic the somewhat ‘à la Ataturk’, a European model.”

Despite his attacks on the clergy, Bourguiba presented the Code as a fresh return to the true spirit of Islam through the reform of matters related to women’s status. The first article of the Tunisian Constitution defined the country’s religion as Islam, Bourguiba insisted that the Code did not infringe the laws of the faith and that he consulted some Islamic scholars who affirmed that it conformed to the spirit and proper interpretation of it.

 

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Admittedly, the legislation that was implemented after 1956 was limited. Despite progressive reforms that diverge from Sharia, Tunisia’s reluctance to sign the United Nations’ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), in 1979, indicated the restricted scope of secularised state feminism.

In 1984, the government made reservations on some of the rights in the Copenhagen Convention on the CEDAW, particularly in relation to the issue of inheritance equality. The Tunisian government did not ratify the agreement until 1985 after the Association of Tunisian Women for Research and Development (AFTURD) and the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) presented a document in which they demanded full implementation of the treaty.

When Zine El Abidine Ben Ali took power in a coup d’état, a similar approach of state feminism continued. Then, in 1993, he abolished a part of the Code related to a wife’s duty of obedience towards her husband.

Ben Ali also revised the Nationality Code, thus allowing Tunisian mothers to pass down their nationality to children born outside Tunisia, regardless of the father’s nationality. This was also unprecedented in Arab-Muslim majority countries at the time.

The 1993 reform also gave automatic guardianship of children to the mother in the case of divorce. However, it did not change the mother’s status in the family institution, as the husband was still considered the ‘head’. Once again, state policies towards women were limited.

Furthermore, due to Ben Ali’s dictatorial rule, any associated policies introduced by his government – including those related to women – were seen as problematic.

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This distrust towards (state) feminism has continued until the present today.

Indeed, state feminism historically relied on the secularisation of different aspects of Tunisian society. However, religion has remained an important part of life for the people, including in their approach to gender equality, family and civil liberties. In addition, some of the secular strategies introduced in the last decades, alienated the local population – particularly the ban on the veil.

Opposition to changes regarding the inheritance law in post-revolutionary Tunisia can, thus, be understood within the same framework of both traditionalists’ fear of losing what they perceive as their Muslim roots, and a repressive leadership.

Not to mention, the return of many Tunisian women and men to conservative values, and their reclamation of their “authentic” Arabo-Islamic identities in post-revolutionary Tunisia, strongly links Tunisian feminists and grassroots feminist movements with French neo-colonialism. This was particularly the case following the call for equal inheritance.

Protests were organised against the equalisation of inheritance which indicated many Tunisian women reject secular and state feminism in favour of an Islamic conception of women’s status in society and the family institution.

All of this ultimately reflects the complexity of gender politics in post-revolutionary Tunisia which despite many changes over the decades, continues to be marked by unequal inheritance laws towards women.

Jyhene Kebsi is a Lecturer in Gender Studies at Macquarie University, Australia and a recipient of multiple prizes and awards, including Fulbright.

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.

Losing Lebanon: In limbo and longing for hope

Hugo Goodridge
William Christou
12 August, 2022

The New Arab Voice is our weekly podcast bringing you compelling stories from the Middle East, North Africa and beyond.

In the final part of our three-part special on Lebanon, we're examining the stagnant nature of Lebanon.
Lebanon's recent history has pushed the country to the limit and left it crippled and uncertain. Today, Lebanese citizens remain unsure about what the future may hold for them. Can the country be rescued from its economic problems? Will a new raft of independent MPs be able to implement political change? Can the judiciary every be reformed?

On the latest episode of The New Arab Voice, we speak with Yasser Farej, the Programme Manager at the Lebanese NGO Learning Through Action, and also Ali al-Mays, a school teacher who also volunteers for Yasser. We also speak with Najat Aoun Saliba (@najat_saliba), one of the 13 reform MPs who were elected this year, and Samer Makarem (@samermakarem), a Lebanese political activist with the reformist party Mintishreent.

You can listen to part one and part two of this special series, wherever you get your podcasts.

  
This podcast is written by Hugo Goodridge (@hugogoodridge) and Will Christou (@will_christou). This episode was produced by Hugo Goodridge. Theme music by Omar al-Fil (@elepheel).

Other music by Blue Dot Sessions.

To get in touch with the producers, follow then tweet us at @TheNewArabVoice or email hugo.goodridge@alaraby.co.uk

DECRIMINALIZE DRUGS
'You feel invincible': Inside Lebanon's thriving underground Captagon scene

In-depth
Niko Vorobyov
12 August, 2022

In-depth: Delivering euphoria and alertness, Captagon is popular with partygoers and soldiers alike. The New Arab spoke with smugglers, psychiatrists and drug policy experts about the drug's effects, trafficking, and the emergence of narco-states.

"During the war I saw slaughter, barrel bombs dropped from helicopters, everything you can imagine," Hamza, now a refugee in neighbouring Lebanon, remembered of his time in the Free Syrian Army.

Hailing from the city of Hama, where dictator Hafez al-Assad ruthlessly crushed a Sunni uprising in the 1980s, left him with a burning hatred of the Assad dynasty. So at the time of the Arab Spring, he joined first the protests then the rebellion against Bashar al-Assad.

Throughout history, armies have relied on chemical courage for their troops, and this time was no different. A slightly bitter-tasting pill was handed out among the fighters along with food and water.

“You feel invincible, like Jean-Claude Van Damme; you can defeat anyone,” Hamza recalled. “The effects last up to 48 hours, depending how much you take. Afterwards you feel down, with no power to move, so if you miss the feeling you can take some more. But it’s up to you. I don’t take it any more.”

"Much as cocaine once did in the Americas, [Captagon] is playing an increasingly important role in the Middle East, from powering the Syrian civil war and the Assad regime to fruit exports"

Captagon is a stimulant popular with both Middle Eastern combatants and wealthy partygoers in the Gulf. The effects kick in after about an hour: you feel alertness and a sense of euphoria. Much as cocaine once did in the Americas, it’s playing an increasingly important role in the Middle East, from powering the Syrian civil war and the Assad regime to fruit exports.

Captagon, chemical name fenethylline, was originally produced as a medication to treat narcolepsy and ADHD in the 1960s, but was taken off the shelves in the 1980s for side-effects such as inducing anxiety and paranoia. Production has moved to Syria and Lebanon. After the 2015 Paris attacks, it gained an unfair reputation in Europe as “jihadi speed”, even though the autopsy found no drugs or alcohol in the terrorists’ bodies.

Although most customers are in rich Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia, there’s a market at home in Lebanon as well, with tablets stamped with a double-C logo selling for 50,000 Lebanese pounds (roughly 1.70 USD) a pop.

Fenethylline, which metabolises into amphetamine, is generally considered safer than other drugs of its kind since it doesn’t raise your blood pressure to the same degree, and less addictive because of the indirect route the chemical takes to your brain. But partakers should be cautious.

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“The risks are real and cannot be minimised,” warned psychiatrist Ramzi Haddad. “It can produce delusions, worsen pre-existing psychiatric conditions. It's not frequent but yes, it can be fatal, mainly by cardiac arrhythmias. Even if it is less potent than the classic amphetamine, the fact that it is cheap and readily accessible increases its potential for dependence.”

Captagon pills nowadays are rarely the real deal, and more commonly contain a cocktail of speed, caffeine and other stimulants. Since the last batch of legal fenethylline was produced in 2009, the criminal world has filled the vacuum with dodgy alternatives.

In drug policy circles this is known as the iron law of prohibition: traffickers prefer dealing in more potent substances because they‘re more expensive and take up less space, meaning they’re easier to smuggle. By 2020, Syria was importing 50 tonnes of pseudoephedrine, the key ingredient for crystal meth, for Captagon production.

“For the past three years we’ve been witnessing a trend of young people using synthetic drugs,” said Nadia Badran, the executive director of SIDC, an organisation which provides harm reduction and mental health services to drug users in Lebanon.

Nine million Captagon pills hidden in a shipment of oranges, destined to one of the Gulf countries, were intercepted by customs at the port of Beirut, Lebanon on 29 December 2021. [Getty]

“After a while they become addicted and start to have mental health disorders as an effect of all these drugs. Even though they don't consider themselves addicted, they cannot stop using. They only ask us for support when they are down and they are starting to lose everything, or they have problems with the police and their family.”

Badran added that the situation has worsened since Lebanon’s financial meltdown began in 2019, as more young people lost their jobs and turned to drugs to escape depression and uncertainty.

On top of suffering addiction, the stigma and persecution of drug users further complicates their lives.

“The mindset of the general public is perhaps these people need a jail term because they’ve had no discipline before, and this is why this person became a criminal and a drug addict,” Badran explained to The New Arab.

"Upon arrival, a Captagon trafficker in his mid-thirties told us to leave our phones in the car in case we were being tracked before we sat down at the house of his business partner, a Syrian smuggler"

“If the police suspect someone is using drugs, they can take your phone, search through your numbers, call your friends and parents. And if you are arrested, it stays on your criminal record and you cannot clean it for three years. So imagine, you could stay unemployed for three years because of your record.”

Only an hours’ drive east of Beirut lies the Bekaa Valley, the heart of Lebanon’s narco-business for the past century. Cannabis and poppy plantations sprouted here in the 1920s, at the start of global drug prohibition, then flourished during the 1975-1990 civil war as the various armed factions tried to bankroll their war effort. To this day, the Lebanese government has only a tenuous grip on the valley, which is ruled by tribal clans and the Shia militant group Hezbollah.

Upon arrival, a Captagon trafficker in his mid-thirties told us to leave our phones in the car in case we were being tracked before we sat down at the house of his business partner, a Syrian smuggler.

“I dropped out of school at thirteen to work on the family business - first hash, then Captagon,” said the smuggler.

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“I ask the owner of the secret factory to prepare an order, for example one million pills, then I liaise with my partner who sends them elsewhere. The main components are caffeine and amphetamine. Once, we bought an M&M machine to press the pills - it was confiscated by customs, but we brought a chocolatier before the judge to say it was his and we got it back! I buy the tablets for one US dollar each and sell them for ten, leaving me nine dollars profit.”

The trafficker explained that Syria is central to the enterprise.

“Before 2011, the factories were mainly in Syria, and Lebanon was just a passageway. During the war, refugees came here and established factories. Now there are factories on both sides, and those on the Syrian side are protected by their government.”

Figures in Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle have been accused of taking payoffs in return for guarding Captagon shipments and factories. One estimate put the value of intercepted shipments as $5.7 billion in 2021, several times greater than Syria's legitimate exports which stood at merely $860 million in 2020.

Soldiers in the Jordanian army patrolling along the border with Syria to prevent drug trafficking, in response to an increase in Captagon smuggling operations, on February 17, 2022. [Getty]

The trafficker told The New Arab that since he can’t ship to the Gulf directly, he uses Lebanese ports to export to Turkey or Africa, where it’s repackaged and rerouted.

“They hide it in all sorts of ways,” imparted a senior Beirut customs officer, who asked to remain nameless. “Inside shoes, fruits, steering wheels. Inside lemons - it looks fresh but you open it up and there’s Captagon inside. Among animal hides, because they smell so bad no-one wants to check.”

A Captagon shipment hidden in Lebanese pomegranates was uncovered by Saudi officials in April last year, leading the Kingdom to block all agricultural imports from Lebanon. Other loads cross by land.

In January, a convoy of Syrian smugglers drove into Jordan under the cover of a snowstorm. A gun battle erupted with Jordanian soldiers: 27 smugglers were killed, and many others were wounded or escaped back to Syria, leaving behind 3.4 million Captagon tablets and 2,500 packets of hash.

"The banning of Captagon may have caused more trouble than it was worth: the relatively mild fenethylline replaced with stronger substances by a powerful and violent underworld"

“Usually we pay off the customs and our officer tells his men to look another way while we sneak through, but sometimes the elements don’t come together and there’s a firefight. In that case we drop the cargo and run,” said the smuggler.

In the past few years authorities have uncovered some very large shipments. In 2020, 84 million pills were found in the port of Salerno, Italy, possibly after a tip-off from a mafiosi upset at someone else moving drugs through their territory.

“Our biggest risk is informers. We hide it in a professional manner so we’re sure it cannot be found. So when it’s discovered, it’s usually because of an informant,” the smuggler claimed.

Despite these mega-busts, the flow of Captagon continues. Studies have shown that even huge hauls of drugs rarely dent the market, since cartels are ready to lose a portion of their product as an inevitable cost of doing business. In fact, the illusion of scarcity created by drug busts helps keep the business profitable.

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“We can’t do anything, I’ll be honest with you,” admitted the customs inspector. “It’s like if we seal one crack, another opens.”

The Middle East is repeating the usual mistakes in the war on drugs. The banning of Captagon may have caused more trouble than it was worth: the relatively mild fenethylline replaced with stronger substances by a powerful and violent underworld. Meanwhile, those suffering addiction are pushed to the edges of society by a system that seeks to lock them away.

“What we need now is a change in the law, to stop the criminalisation of people who use drugs,” Badran said in her office while a young man, one of her patients, anxiously waited outside.

Radwan Mortada contributed to reporting.

Niko Vorobyov is a freelance journalist and author of the book Dopeworld.
Follow him on Twitter: @Narco_Polo420

Iraq: Sadr's rivals begin Baghdad sit-in to press for new government
\
The New Arab Staff & Agencies
13 August, 2022

Supporters of Iraq's Coordination Framework said they would hold an 'indefinite sit-in' to counter protests held by the Sadrists and push for the swift formation of a new government after months of political deadlock.


Protesters started constructing tents in Iraq's Green Zone [source: Getty]

Opponents of populist Shia cleric Muqtada Sadr launched their own Baghdad sit-in on Friday, nearly two weeks after Sadr supporters stormed parliament and began an open-ended protest first inside, then outside the legislature.

The opposing encampments are the latest turn in a standoff between Iraq's rival Shia blocs which has so far remained peaceful in the war-scarred country.

The pro-Iran Coordination Framework said it would hold an "indefinite sit-in" to press for a new government to be formed quickly to end months of deadlock.

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The announcement came in a statement read out to thousands of the bloc's supporters who had gathered on an access road to the capital's Green Zone, home to government and diplomatic buildings, as well as parliament.

"We don't know how long we're going to stay," said Abu Jabal, a 32-year-old day labourer. "Five months, 10 months, we don't know. Everything is ready, there will be food."

An AFP correspondent saw protesters assembling large tents in readiness to camp out.

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Loyalists of Sadr, a revered Shia cleric who once led a militia against US and Iraqi government forces, have been demanding fresh elections after the Coordination Framework named a candidate for the premiership.

The Coordination Framework - an alliance that brings together the party of ex-prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, a longtime Sadr foe, and the Hashed al-Shaabi, a pro-Iran former paramilitary network now integrated into the security forces - wants a new government as quickly as possible.

A statement from the alliance demanded the "formation of a new government" that would provide public services and solutions to power outages and water shortages.

Maliki said in a statement that Friday's mobilisation showed "no party can take hold of the street at the expense of another".

"We're here to protect the state and the constitution," said Abu Mehdi, a protest organiser from the city of Hilla, south of the capital.

"Give the Coordination Framework the chance to form a government."

Earlier in the day, thousands of Sadr supporters gathered near parliament for the Muslim weekly prayers.

A week earlier, Sadr had called out tens of thousands of his followers for prayers in the area.

For nearly two weeks, his supporters have held daily sit-ins, first inside the legislature and later on its grounds.

Their protest reflects months of failed negotiations by Iraq's political forces to form a new government after inconclusive October elections.

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Outside parliament Umm Hussein, a Sadr supporter in her 50s, said she was there to protest "the regime that for 20 years has done nothing for the people, except plunder and steal public money".

"Ninety percent of the population live in poverty, in sickness, in hunger," she complained, demanding "new faces" at the helm who would "serve the people".

Sadr's supporters also rallied Friday in the southern cities of Amarah, Kut and Nasiriyah. Their rivals demonstrated in the main northern city of Mosul, AFP correspondents reported.

On Wednesday, Sadr demanded that the judiciary dissolve parliament by the end of next week, as part of his call for new elections.

To further his campaign, Sadr called on his supporters to petition the courts en masse.

Stewards handed out printed forms outside parliament on Friday, to which demonstrators only had to add their names and signatures.

The Framework had initially said they were conditionally open to new elections.

Asked what he would do if the courts rejected the petitions, 32-year-old engineer Ahmed al-Ibrahimi said: "Revolution is a lengthy struggle. Beating the retreat is not in our vocabulary.

"We will keep up our sit-in and we will maintain our demand for the overthrow of this corrupt political junta."

Also on the street Friday were dozens of supporters of an anti-government protest movement that erupted in late 2019.

"Both camps are part of a corrupt system that steers the country," said Ali Jaber, a 50-year-old communist activist, alluding to the rival Shia blocs.

"Getting rid of them is thefirst step to fulfil the dreams of the Iraqi people," he said from a Baghdad square.