Saturday, October 29, 2022

Fascism Was a Violent Counterrevolution

A century since the March on Rome, it is important to remember the horrors of Benito Mussolini’s regime. Fascism was morally repugnant — but also a movement based on violent counterrevolution.


Benito Mussolini reviews blackshirt militia in Rome in 1936.
 (Bettmann Archive via Getty Images)


BY STEFANIE PREZIOSO
 10.29.2022
 Jacobin

century since the March on Rome, the “return” of Italy’s fascist past has never seemed closer. This month, the Senate elected as its new president Ignazio La Russa, cofounder of the post-fascist Fratelli d’Italia party, just weeks after he declared that “we are all heirs of the Duce.”

In such a context, bringing out a novel about Benito Mussolini — as Antonio Scurati has with his M. trilogy — is a huge responsibility. More than any historical writing, Scurati’s work has become a bestseller, translated into several languages. The responsibility is even greater because Scurati seeks to “bring fascism down to earth, giving real knowledge of it as only literature knows how, when it delves into the details of material life.” M. is thus a “documentary novel”; it deliberately plays on the blurred boundary between history and fiction, on the “intertwining” of the two genres in an era which, Scurati tells us, invites “cooperation between the rigor of historical scholarship and the art of fictional storytelling.”

Does historical writing not imitate fiction, when it fills in the blanks with intelligent narrative, with imagination, with sympathy? Does grasping the past “as it really was” not demand the historian’s ability to immerse himself in other worlds, to make them his own and pass them on to others? Professional historians often prove incapable of speaking to a wider audience, and clumsy when trying to use literary art, which is even more needed with biography or collective biography. From this point of view, Scurati’s three M. books are a masterpiece.

Scurati constructs a cutting, gripping narrative drawing on firsthand sources. He is not afraid to confront the enduring myth of Italiani brava gente (Italians, the good people) — a myth which diminishes Italians’ responsibility for war crimes in World War II. Particularly noteworthy is his description of fascism’s genocidal policy in Libya, to which the second volume dedicates many pages and which still remains an overlooked part of Italian history.

Scurati wanted to “give voice to the thoughts of those who, through their actions, contributed to writing that history.” To do this, he claims that it was necessary to operate without “ideological prejudices.” This is a significant statement in a country where, for decades, historiographical revisionism has found its strength precisely in the claim to produce a “de-ideologized” and “serene” history “without prejudices,” far removed from the “great political passions” of the short twentieth century. Scurati is no exception: he claims that the “anti-fascist prejudice” blocks the ability to analyze fascism, producing a “form of blindness.”

This implies that we ought to overlook the hundreds of studies produced in the heat of the anti-fascist struggle — still today essential to approaching the phenomenon — such as Angelo Tasca’s Rise of Italian Fascism, published on the eve of World War II, from which Scurati nevertheless draws extensively. This is all the more surprising in that the author of M., who describes himself as “democratic, libertarian and progressive,” sees his novel as his “greatest contribution to the re-foundation of anti-fascism,” an anti-fascism that can stand up to new times.
Culturally Produced Ignorance

Awritten work is, like everything else, part of the era in which it was born, the sociohistorical context in which it developed and left its mark. What interest would a work of art have in being stripped out of the world in which it was conceived? Did the French historian Marc Bloch, shot by the Nazis in 1944, not argue that it is impossible to understand the past without looking at the present? The release of Scurati’s work coincides with the centenary of fascism’s arrival in power — a past that seems not to want to pass, in a country where the memory of Mussolini still looms like a threatening shadow, a “ghost.”

The novel also comes out at a time when the return of fascism is on everyone’s lips. The publication of the first volume had coincided with Lega leader Matteo Salvini’s rise to high office (at the time he was Interior Minister), with aggressive policies and open links with neofascist groups, alarming national and international public opinion. The third and last volume — M. Gli ultimi giorni dell’Europa — came out a few days before the election victory, this September 25, of Giorgia’Meloni and her Fratelli d’Italia; a party in whose arteries fascism still circulates and whose logo proudly displays the tricolore flame, representing the still-living spirit of fascism. The noxious atmosphere in which the book appeared was evidenced by the intimidating September 25 article by Alessandro Sallusti, editor of the newspaper Libero, entitled “the prince of the haters,” in reference to the author.

In this context, talking about the “return of fascism” in Italy may seem absurd, as the historian Emilio Gentile said, since fascism never seems to have disappeared. Among other things, Scurati openly takes on the role of revealing the present by evoking certain “surprising and chilling analogies with the modern-day.”

The past as illuminated by the present is part of any literary-creative process of a historical nature — one attentive, as G. W. F. Hegel wrote, to “historical truth” and at the same time “to the customs and intellectual culture of its time.” Scurati insists that “no person, event, speech or sentence narrated in the book is arbitrarily invented,” paying special attention to sources, in the manner of a historian. This is only strengthened by the impression of realism that comes from the inclusion of extracts from archival documents at the end of each chapter. Yet their often-truncated exposition cannot go beyond an illusion of the materiality of the past.

Scurati’s novel, he says, “complements, perhaps, the analytical work of historical research with the synthetic force of narrative” and does not attempt to replace it. From this point of view, M. plays the role of a narrative synthesis of the analyses produced by historians. However — and this will be even more the case when the film based on his novel is released — what Scurati calls the fictual (a mixture of fictional and factual) elaborates a new form of historical thought that breaks away from scholarly history, largely unknown to most people. This new historical thought is called upon to replace it.This is a country where it is still possible to hear that ‘Mussolini did good things, too’; a country where ignorance of the past is commonplace.

It is difficult to ignore the cultural, social, and political environment in which this work emerged. This is a country where it is still possible to hear that “Mussolini did good things, too”; a country where ignorance of the past is commonplace, either because its population is not aware of it or because it does not want to know. An ignorance in the strongest sense, tinged with indifference, has been culturally produced since World War II through the mainstream press and especially television, an extraordinary vehicle of identity and memory. Italy is a country in which, over the last thirty years of the cultural hegemony of the plural right, anti-fascism has been portrayed as sinister, due to its supposedly anti-democratic character and the alleged cruelty of communist violence.

This is not at all a matter of pointing out all the novel’s errors from the impregnable ivory tower of “professional” historians, and reserving the production of historical knowledge to the latter. It is, rather, a matter of questioning M.’s interpretation in the present, of interrogating the relationship between the forms of narrative production that his author favors and the self-consciousness of Italian society. “The future of the past” is at stake, not only its present.
























Fascism “From the Inside”

In the first volume, entitled M. Son of the Century, Antonio Scurati decides to relate the rise of fascism from Mussolini’s own perspective. This narrative choice has raised many questions and criticisms — some of them unjustified — of “closeness” to his “character” or of a latent “rehabilitation” of Mussolini. Scurati’s aim, by adopting the fascist leader’s viewpoint, is to tell this story from the inside. In doing so, Scurati draws on the historians Renzo de Felice, George L. Mosse, Zeev Sternhell, and Emilio Gentile, who defended the need for an analysis of fascism “from the inside,” taking its language and myths seriously.

Scurati argues that the fact that he belongs to a generation “born just after the end of all this and just before the beginning of all the rest” allows him to “re-appropriate the explosive twentieth-century narrative material, on the basis of [his own] non-belonging to it.” Born in 1969, he would thus be one incarnation of what he calls the “literature of inexperience,” as represented in this “post-historical novel.” The author would thus finally be freed from any ideological dogmatism with respect to the generation that preceded him, free to find the truth or at least to elaborate a truth: “The equidistance (certainly not the equivalence) of the post-historical author,” he writes, “with respect to the point of view of victims and executioners, therefore his free choice in narrative focus, directly descends from the transcendental of inexperience.”

Scurati’s approach to the literature of inexperience seems characteristic of what Eric Hobsbawm had called “the destruction of the past, or rather of the social mechanisms that link one’s contemporary experience to that of earlier generations,” effectively freeing the younger generation from the categorical imperative of remembering the vanquished, i.e. taking their defeats on board in order to transform them into a “revolutionary” force in the present. The admittedly important distinction that the author makes between “equidistance” and “equivalence” cannot, however, alone resolve the question of his relationship with his characters, the reader to whom he addresses himself, and what his text “postulates” to them.

The reader of M., exposed without mediation to Mussolini’s tale in volume one, is led to experience fascism’s rise from within the belly of the beast. The undeniable strength of Scurati’s writing lies in the description “from below” of the years following World War I; a particularly intense period that must be analyzed hour by hour, region by region, city by city, neighborhood by neighborhood in the attempt to “get to grips with” fascism through its “developments.” The narrative is undoubtedly effective. Using the aesthetics of “horror,” Scurati elicits repentance, not responsibility. He succeeds in captivating a wide readership by immersing them in the everyday life of fascism. However, the narrative of fascism’s rise to power leaves little room for the perspective needed to understand a complex and vivid phenomenon in the collective memory of Italy, Europe, and the world.What is fascism? The answer, according to Scurati, is to be found in its moral and psychological character.

Its everyday developments, seen through the necessarily myopic prism of a “fascination with catastrophe,” attach the definition of fascism to the contingent and ephemeral plane of circumstance and to the reciprocal effects of violence and fear. What is fascism? The answer, according to Scurati, is to be found in its moral and psychological character, which cannot be separated from the “moods” of the slums. Fascists are constantly attached to their plebeian social origins — Roberto Farinacci, “son of the railwayman,” and Mussolini, “son of the blacksmith,” stubbornly repeated, as if these indications were the best way to grasp the phenomenon. The plebeian nature of the “fascists” reinforces the idea of a “revolutionary” fascism: “the revolution will not be made by the communists, it will be made by the owners of two rooms and a kitchen in a suburban apartment block.” A point of view from the inside that is never questioned in Scurati’s three volumes.

From a Crocean perspective, fascism is also seen as a degenerative moral disease. The second volume, which opens with a Mussolini bent in two by the pain of blood and shit, is the most typical example. The image of the virus appears many times, a virus that “infects thousands of postal employees ready to set fire to the labor halls.” The terror that this people armed with sticks inspires is therefore not only related to the violence it produces, but to what it represents in terms of physical and psychic pathology located in the depths of society, in its underbelly, in its basest instincts.

The fear of the “crowd” that “instinctively advances” is coupled with the image of a Benito Mussolini presented as a “superman generated from the belly of the people and not from a privileged caste.” A Mussolini who “despises and fears his own squadrists [an attitude] which is largely reciprocated.” A Mussolini who portrays his troops as “enriched beggars, stormtroopers turned officials” and Italians as “cowards and weaklings.” A Mussolini who hesitates to turn back (“but by now the circle of hatred is tightening on all sides. Perhaps, if he could, he would turn back. But it is too late.” A Mussolini who “is protected from the demeaning spectacle of human misery by a strange kind of hypermetropia: he does not see his peer, his neighbor, the little people, or, if he does see them, they appear blurred, indistinct, insignificant.” A Mussolini who supposedly regretted the death of a man like Giacomo Matteotti, the Socialist MP murdered by Blackshirts 1924.

A man alone in the face of the madness he set in motion: “he should tell of a head of state, idolized by the crowds, who slips day after day into the unenviable fate of the most radical distrust of anyone and into the even more chilling condemnation of having to cultivate an ever greater, absolute, abnormal trust in himself.” A man whose stature has shrunk as much as the distance between his index finger and thumb (hence the stylized lowercase m in the title of volume three) in approaching Hitler and who is “afraid.” The same fear that “twenty years earlier, when deftly orchestrated, had hoisted him to power” was turning against him, driving him to violence and to “throw the Italian people into the carnage of a new world conflict.”

In the third volume, which covers the period from the Racial Laws of 1938 to Italy’s entry into World War II, Scurati’s point of view becomes increasingly clear. He presents a Mussolini in “ecstasy,” fascinated by fear, the “most powerful of political passions,” instilled in him by a “bloodthirsty” Hitler, the “Nazi demon” and his court made up of a “plebeian, upstart, ill-mannered rabble” — yet a Mussolini at the same time a succubus; an aging, fattened, restless leader anxious for the “fate” of “his” people. Scurati here leans toward that reading that makes excuses for Italian fascism, caught up in the orbit of Nazi Germany, an old cliché that casts the alliance with Hitler as accidental, a “fatal error” made on the grounds that it is “better” that Hitler be “with us than against us.”

Meanwhile the racial laws are presented as a “diplomatic instrument,” a pledge given to this alliance, a “reassurance” of the steadfastness of a lasting agreement. This revisionist reading is reinforced by the fact that Scurati’s reconstruction of the course of fascism leaves aside six years (from 1932 to 1938), thus missing out the colonization of Ethiopia — an important transition between colonial racism and the antisemitism at home conceived as an instrument for the “regeneration” of Italians.In the narrative of fascism’s rise to power, as in that of the consolidation of its regime, Scurati gives little space to the economic, political, social, and cultural conditions that provided its basis.

The basic criticism of fascism thus appears abstractly moral because almost only violence and fear dominate. In the narrative of fascism’s rise to power, as in that of the consolidation of its regime, Scurati gives little space to the economic, political, social, and cultural conditions that provided its basis, its political program and ideology, and the regime it established. Historian Giulia Albanese is right to point out that “the pages on the march on Rome show that the event was reversible.” Scurati rightly suggests that fascism was a possible but hardly automatic outcome of contemporary social conflict, and that therefore the convergence between the ruling class and the counterrevolution — essential for fascism’s arrival in power — could not be taken as inevitable.

Yet the object of the author’s attention is not, in the words of the historian Charles S. Maier, “crisis capitalism armed with a truncheon,” but rather, and only at times, the inadequacy of the traditional ruling class, “people from a museum,” composed of an “Italian bourgeoisie that is the spiritual enemy of fascism” in the face of the new situation that opened up in March 1919. The description of the king as a “prisoner of war” and of liberal prime minister Giovanni Giolitti’s “partial, laborious, contradictory attempt to transform an ancient and archaic country into a modern democracy” seem to exonerate the liberal state, at least in part.


The Absent Oppressed

Scurati has in numerous interviews maintained that “the novel generates a precise and firm historical, moral and civil judgement condemning fascism. And it does so precisely because it does not start from an ideological prejudice.” The whole question this poses is the definition of anti-fascism that results from the novelist’s “third-party” but not “neutral” exposition. What does Scurati want to tell us about anti-fascism in the past and, perhaps more importantly for him, about its adaptation to new times?

The question brings us back to the political role of the “historical” novel. In the mid-1930s, György Lukács devoted some illuminating pages to the anti-fascist novel, a literature that, he said, marked the “break between the writer and the life of the people.” He wrote that “It is above all prejudice that lives in the people, in the masses, the principle of irrationality, of what is purely instinctive, against reason. With such a conception of the people, humanism destroys its best anti-fascist weapons.” The Hungarian philosopher then called for the “unmasking of fascism’s hostility” toward the oppressed in order to “protect the creative forces of the people” because “the great ideas and actions that humanity has produced so far originated in popular life.”

After reading M.’s three volumes, there are no doubts as to its moral condemnation of fascism — despite the limitations and neglected elements highlighted above. But for Scurati, the anti-fascist battle is essentially a struggle between reason and brutal and barbaric irrationality: “Today we are at a crossroads: we must choose between culture, democracy and progress, or throw ourselves into the arms of despotism, blindness and obedience.”

By reducing the anti-fascist battle, this struggle for eternity (as Carlo Rosselli called it), to a struggle between progress and reaction, between democracy (but which one?) and despotism, Scurati leaves no concrete space for the creative force of the oppressed. Clearly, anti-plebeian class prejudices color Scurati’s fresco: the landless peasants are described as “idiotic grey oxen”; the “crowd” is seen as “docile, primitive”; the people seem to be guided by their instincts, their stomachs, their “humors,” of which Mussolini is said to have a “formidable intelligence”; a people at best absent, at worst consenting out of laziness. “Yes, the majority of Italians,” Scurati writes, to account for the atmosphere following the assassination of socialist leader Matteotti, “horrified by the crime, would like the fall of the regime to reclaim their ghost-infested homes. But, then, around dinnertime, the demands of life prevail. Morality is not one of them. The country is opaque, its sense of justice is sluggish, blurred.”

In this fresco, the anti-fascists from below appear almost exclusively in their role as victims, killed, beaten, humiliated, like the “two poor people” condemned for insulting the Duce, who are presented as “meek and harmless animals.” The antifascist émigré circles in Nice in which Gino Lucetti — who tried to kill Mussolini — developed are presented as: “a court of miracles of poor emigrants, communists, anarchists, revolutionaries, outcasts, the beaten, the expelled, men who cheated hunger in front of the tables of lowly taverns, among inverts, thieves and whores, in a laudable and, at the same time, sublime mixture of drunkenness, vain hopes of redemption, desperate idealisms and chronic, ferocious, destitution.”

Even more significant in this regard is the fact that anti-fascism disappears in the third volume, with Scurati deciding to leave aside the most important moment of the anti-fascist struggle abroad. The 1930s proved to be a decisive test for antifascism. Ten years of the “academy of exile” in Paris had made only one alternative possible: death or “redemption.” Scurati deals with the end of the parable, the republican defeat in the Spanish Civil War, summed up as an “internecine war between republicans and Francoists.” Again, the anti-fascists are those immediately executed on Mussolini’s orders but not those who fought with weapons in hand, “today in Spain and tomorrow in Italy”; those who called for a preemptive war and an anti-fascist revolution; those who needed Spain more than Spain needed them, as Emilio Lussu wrote.How can one understand fascism without considering its profoundly counterrevolutionary dimension?

Everything is as if the oppressed could not play any active role in the fight against a movement and a regime built precisely in opposition to their struggles. Scurati ignores the oppressed, perhaps as a function of this double fear: the people who are afraid, but also the fears spurred by this “formless, stupid and apathetic mass.” Yet how is it possible to contemplate the anti-fascist struggle while ignoring the subaltern, and vice versa, how can one understand fascism without considering its profoundly counterrevolutionary dimension? Because fascism did indeed wage war against the subaltern.

Under Scurati’s pen, the emancipatory struggles of the biennio rosso (the “two Red Years” of strikes and occupations in 1919 and 1920) appear as “revolutionary delusions” that ruined Italy through a “fury of strikes,” suggesting that the “revolutionary” outrages of the labor movement somehow set off the powder keg. Scurati has Mussolini say that “[Communists] did not start this civil war but they will finish it. It is a question of making violence ever more intelligent, of inventing surgical violence.”

Hope guided the steps of those who took part in the strike waves in the immediate interwar period, demanding not only wage increases, shorter working hours, and an end to food shortages, but also to change the fate of the world, to break the chains. Everything seemed possible when in Russia, the first socialist revolution finally seemed to open new vistas. Scurati does not speak of this enthusiasm but dwells at length on the “millions of Italians [who] had stopped hoping for change and began to feel threatened by it. The chanting of the squares choked into a chorus. A shout that no longer begged the future to finally redeem the present, but implored it to remain uncreated. Not a prayer but an exorcism.”

At times Scurati even equates (pre)revolutionary violence and counterrevolution; his ahistorical and abstractly ethical critique of violence allows him to confuse the opposing camps: “Demonstrations, devastation, fires are everywhere. On all sides. The escalation culminated on a tram in Rome where, on September 12, policeman Giovanni Corvi murdered fascist trade unionist Armando Casalini with three revolver shots while the child’s eyes were still open.” Leading Communist Nicola Bombacci serves this purpose perfectly. The man the author describes as “the man from Moscow,” Lenin’s “Italian confidant” (it is unclear on what basis), who was later to become one of Mussolini’s ardent supporters, serves as a link between the two violent sides of the same “European civil war” — about which, however, Scurati says nothing.

For counterrevolution was not only organized in Italy but everywhere after the Russian October Revolution. Anti-communism not only targeted the newborn Soviet state, on which all manner of fantasies were focused, but was also expressed in hostility toward the dominated and an elitist conception of democracy, the result of what Peter Gay would call the culture of hatred. The European democracies that emerged from World War I supported reactionary solutions to deal with a communism, which was seen as the much greater danger.The author’s ahistorical and abstractly ethical critique of violence allows him to confuse the opposing camps.

As for the anti-fascist parties, in M. all that can be discerned is the “blindness” of their leaders: “The factional hatreds, the slavery to formulas, the ideological blindness, the language that turns time and again to formal issues, to pure logic, the eternal wheel of personal rivalries, the deafness to the din of the world, to the promises of the dawn.” The twenty-first century Scurati forgets to portray anti-fascism from the inside, day by day, as a concrete movement anchored in its time, with its mistakes but also its strengths. This severely hems in the complexity of the situation, even at a particularly intense phase of the political struggle.

Certainly, the anti-fascist opposition proved incapable of adapting its struggle to the new political configuration. This was an inadequacy linked at worst to a radical misunderstanding, and at best to a narrow conception of fascism as a phenomenon. Italian socialism undoubtedly proved disastrously inadequate faced with the post–World War I situation in Italy. But dismissing the foundation of the Communist Party in 1921 — the result of serious reflection, careful elaboration and intense political and social action — as a “demented split” or reducing the history of the Italian workers’ movement on the eve of Mussolini’s rise to “factional hatreds” hardly allows one to go beyond value judgements, of little use for a refoundation or consolidation of anti-fascism.

The blindness denounced by Scurati does not help us understand what should have been done, or rather, what should be done (the famous unveiling of the present) in such a situation. Unless we consider that only the sacrifice of a few individual heroes (Matteotti is the only totally positive figure in history) can redeem all Italy.

Under Scurati’s pen, the subalterns turn from bearers of emancipation into willing “victims” or sacrificial heroes. From this perspective, despite its declared objective, M. cannot be a basis for refounding anti-fascism. Its “victimizing” reading of the opposition of those times cannot serve the collective remembrance and redemption of the victims of past struggles. By ignoring the properly revolutionary dimension of antifascism (and the counterrevolutionary dimension of fascism), M. cannot fulfil the revolutionary critique of the present, which is the only one capable of confronting the new fascism. M. strives to chase after the world that was, without understanding the world that really is.


Stefanie Prezioso is associate professor at Lausanne University and author of numerous works on European anti-fascism.
KKKONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERIKA
Where Will This Political Violence Lead? Look to the 1850s.

In the mid-19th century, a pro-slavery minority — encouraged by lawmakers — used violence to stifle a growing anti-slavery majority. It wasn’t long before the other side embraced force as a necessary response.


The destruction of the city of Lawrence, Kansas, and the massacre of its inhabitants by the Rebel guerrillas, August 21, 1863. Quantrill's Raid. | Wikimedia Commons


By JOSHUA ZEITZ
POLITICO USA
10/29/2022

Early Friday morning, an intruder broke into the San Francisco home of House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and bludgeoned her husband, Paul Pelosi, 82, on the head with a hammer.

Details are still scant, but early indications suggest that the suspect, David Depape, is an avid purveyor of anti-Semitic, QAnon and MAGA conspiracy theories. Before the attack, the assailant reportedly shouted, “Where is Nancy? Where is Nancy?”

This is the United States of America in 2022. A country where political violence — including the threat of political violence — has become a feature, not a bug.

Armed men wearing tactical gear and face coverings outside ballot drop boxes in Arizona. Members of Congress threatening to bring guns onto the House floor — or actually trying to do it. Prominent Republican members of Congress, and their supporters on Fox News, stoking violence against their political opponents by accusing them of being pedophiles, terrorists and groomers — of conspiring with “globalists” (read: Jews) to “replace” white people with immigrants.

And of course, January 6, and subsequent efforts by Republicans and conservative media personalities to whitewash or even celebrate it.

Pundits like to take refuge in the saccharine refrain, “this is not who we are,” but historically, this is exactly who we are. Political violence is an endemic feature of American political history. It was foundational to the overthrow of Reconstruction in the 1870s and the maintenance of Jim Crow for decades after.

But today’s events bear uncanny resemblance to an earlier decade — the 1850s, when Southern Democrats, the conservatives of their day, unleashed a torrent of violence against their opponents. It was a decade when an angry and entrenched minority used force to thwart the will of a growing majority, often with the knowing support and even participation of prominent elected officials.

That’s the familiar part of the story. The less appreciated angle is how that growing majority eventually came to accept the proposition that force was a necessary part of politics.

The 1850s were a singularly violent era in American politics. Though politicians both North and South, Whig and Democrat, tried to contain sectional differences over slavery, Southern Democrats and their Northern sympathizers increasingly pushed the envelope, employing coercion and violence to protect and spread the institution of slavery.

It began with the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, which stripped accused runaways of their right to trial by jury and allowed individual cases to be bumped up from state courts to special federal courts. As an extra incentive to federal commissioners adjudicating such cases, it provided a $10 fee when a defendant was remanded to slavery but only $5 for a finding rendered against the slave owner. Most obnoxious to many Northerners, the law stipulated harsh fines and prison sentences for any citizen who refused to cooperate with or aid federal authorities in the capture of accused fugitives. Southern Democrats enforced the law with brute force, to the horror of Northerners, including many who did not identify as anti-slavery.

The next provocation was the Kansas Nebraska Act of 1854, which effectively abrogated the Missouri Compromise and opened the western territories to slavery. It wasn’t enough that Democrats rammed through legislation allowing the citizens of the Kansas and Nebraska territories to institutionalize slavery if they voted to do so in what had long been considered free territory. They then employed coercion and violence to rig the territorial elections that followed.

Though anti-slavery residents far outnumbered pro-slavery residents in Kansas, heavily armed “Border ruffians,” led by Missouri’s Democratic senator David Atchison, stormed the Kansas territory by force, stuffing ballot boxes, assaulting and even killing Free State settlers, in a naked attempt to tilt the scales in favor of slavery. “You know how to protect your own interests,” Atchison cried. “Your rifles will free you from such neighbors. … You will go there, if necessary, with the bayonet and with blood.” He promised, “If we win, we can carry slavery to the Pacific Ocean.”

The violence made it into Congress. When backlash against the Kansas Nebraska Act upended the political balance, driving anti-slavery Democrats and Whigs into the new, anti-slavery Republican party, pro-slavery Democrats responded with rage. In 1856, Charles Sumner, a staunch anti-slavery Republican, delivered a speech entitled “The Crime Against Kansas.” In response, a Democratic congressman from South Carolina beat him nearly to death on the Senate floor with a steel-tipped cane — not entirely dissimilar from the hammer-wielding conspiracy theorist who attempted to murder Paul Pelosi Friday.

“Bleeding Sumner,” as the outrage came to be known, was not a one-off. Pro-slavery congressmen began showing up armed on the House floor. They threatened their Northern colleagues with whippings and beatings. They talked openly of civil war and rebellion.

In some ways, none of this was new. Pro-slavery forces had long been violent and anti-democratic. When abolitionists in the 1830s began sending anti-slavery literature to Southern slaveholders, the pro-slavery forces tried to ban them from using the postal service. They destroyed the printing presses of abolitionist publishers and, in 1837, famously lynched Elijah P. Lovejoy, an abolitionist clergyman — after dumping his press in the river.

But the 1850s were different — not just in the intensification of pro-slavery violence, but in the reaction it elicited.

Southerners had long assumed that their Northern antagonists would buckle and fold. Anti-slavery men and women tended to draw their faith from evangelical Protestantism, which favored moral suasion over coercion. They were pacifists by nature. They seemed unlikely, when faced with threat and violence, to fight back.

That was probably true in 1850. But by mid-decade, something changed.

It probably began with the Fugitive Slave Act, which inspired resistance — increasingly, violent resistance — on the part of Northerners. When in 1852 President Franklin Pierce sent a battery of Army and Navy servicemen to seize Anthony Burns, a fugitive who had escaped to Boston, many former moderates found became angry, and radicalized. Amos Lawrence, a conservative businessman and politician, later attested, “We went to bed one night old fashioned, conservative, Compromise Union Whigs & waked up stark mad Abolitionists.”

Armed anti-slavery mobs increasingly proved willing to engage in standoffs with federal officials. Outside Christiana, Pennsylvania, a Maryland slaveowner and his son, accompanied by armed marshals, showed up at a farmhouse and imperiously demanded the return of a Black man whom they claimed was their runaway slave. Local residents, Black and white alike, engaged in a gun fight with the “man stealers,” leaving one of them dead and two others wounded.

Something changed in the tenor of anti-slavery rhetoric as well. Frederick Douglass, a former enslaved person and lay preacher, declared that he was a “peace man,” but white men who willingly acted as “bloodhounds,” hunting down human beings to return them to slavery, had “no right to live.” “I do believe that two or three dead slaveholders will make this law a dead letter.” In a speech entitled “Is It Right and Wise to Kill a Kidnapper?” Douglass conceded that perhaps it was not strategically smart, given the disbalance of power, but he affirmed that it “is in all cases, a crime to deprive a human being of life” and not a sin to kill those who would. “For a white man to defend his friend unto blood is praiseworthy,” Douglass wrote in 1854, “but for a Black man to do the same thing is crime. It was glorious for Patrick Henry to say, ‘Give me liberty or give me death!’ It was glorious for Americans to drench the soil, and crimson the sea with blood, to escape the payment of three-penny tax upon tea; but it is a crime to shoot down a monster in defense of the liberty of a Black man and to save him from bondage.”

His was a minority opinion in the mid-1850s, but it was catching steam.

A new generation of leaders welcomed an eye-for-an-eye approach to keeping the western territories free. Subsidized by a group of Massachusetts businessmen and religious abolitionists, the New England Emigrant Aid Company offered material assistance to Northern homesteaders willing to relocate to Kansas to populate the state with an anti-slavery majority. It also furnished them with rifles (known popularly as “Beecher’s Bibles,” an homage to Henry Ward Beecher, the prominent anti-slavery clergyman) and ammunition to help settlers stave off attacks by border ruffians who pillaged Free State property and rigged territorial elections. By 1857 the normalization of political violence advanced to far that when a prominent abolitionist urged the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society to furnish material support for armed insurrections by enslaved people, even Wendell Phillips, a leading abolitionist and heretofore a pacifist, rose to agree. “I want to accustom Massachusetts to the idea of insurrection,” he said, “to the idea that every slave has the right to seize his freedom on the spot.”

It was this embrace of retributive justice and support for violent liberation that led figures like Thomas Wentworth Higginson (a Unitarian minister), Gerrit Smith (a wealthy reformer and founder of a nonsectarian church in upstate New York), Theodore Parker (also a Unitarian clergyman), and Frederick Douglass to furnish John Brown with funds for his failed attempt to organize an uprising of enslaved people. Brown, a religious zealot who came to believe that he was God’s instrument in the service of emancipation, was widely scorned as a fanatic when in 1859 he was hanged for murder, incitement of an enslaved people’s rebellion, and “treason” against the state of Virginia. Within a few short years, many Union soldiers would come to memorialize him in song as they marched through the South.

Members of Congress, too, tired of being under the Southern Democrats’ boot. When Galusha Grow, a Republican from Pennsylvania, wandered over to the Democratic side of the House floor in 1858, Lawrence Keitt of South Carolina snarled, “Go back to your side of the House, you Black Republican puppy.” Grow, a future House speaker, clocked Keitt with a right hook and sent him spinning.

In 1860 Rep. Owen Lovejoy, a Republican from Illinois and brother of the slain editor, rose to deliver a blistering anti-slavery harangue. In response, Rep. Roger Pryor of Virginia physically assaulted him, prompting Rep. John Potter of Wisconsin to intercede. Potter so thoroughly walloped Pryor that the Virginian felt compelled to challenge him to a duel — a common ploy, as Northerners tended to view dueling as barbaric, and normally declined. Potter astonished his Southern colleague by accepting the challenge and stipulating (as was the right of the challenged party) bowie knives as his weapon of choice. Pryor, recognizing that he’d likely be hacked to death, backed out, claiming that knives were beneath the dignity of a gentleman’s duel. (Potter might well have taken his cue from Benjamin Wade, a radical Republican senator from Ohio who, when challenged to a duel by a Southern colleague, stipulated squirrel riffles at 20 paces.)

Within a year, full-blown war had broken out.

Today, political violence is on the rise. It doesn’t always emanate from the right. Several years ago, a left-wing radical attempted to gun down several Republican congressmen and nearly succeeded in killing GOP Whip Steve Scalise. But in the main, the coercion and bellicosity reside on the right. We see it in the rise of far-right, white power militias like the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, who in some cases enjoy semiformal relationships with local Republican Party organizations and leaders. We see it in MAGA rallies, where former President Donald Trump regularly incites violence against journalists and political opponents, oftentimes with GOP officeholders and candidates standing silently beside him. We see it in the growing number of political ads in which Republican candidates brandish assault weapons and even shoot things up.

On some level, none of this is new. The United States has seen more than its share of political violence — from Redemption (the process by which white Southerners violently ended Reconstruction in the South) and Jim Crow, to presidential assassinations in 1865, 1881, 1901 and 1963. As recently as the early 1970s, bombings and sabotage were a common tool of far-left domestic terrorists. All told, between January 1969 and April 1970 there were over 5,000 terrorist bombings in the United States and 37,000 bomb threats, many emanating from the radical left, not including the attempted bombings of over two dozen high schools.

But here is the difference this time: In 1970, liberal members of the Senate didn’t march alongside members of the Weather Underground, pump their fists in the air and egg them on. They didn’t align themselves with violent extremists — court their votes, grant interviews to their underground newspapers, appear at their conferences. That’s the stuff of the 1850s, when mainstream Democrats turned away from democracy and openly embraced violence, vigilantism and treason to protect a world they saw at risk of disappearing.

The decision of so many American conservatives to embrace political violence, or the language and symbolism of political violence, is a troubling reality. We can’t have a functioning democracy if one side refuses to accept its norms and rules.

But history suggests we might have more to worry about.

Democratic violence in the 1850s ultimately led a majority of Republicans, who represented the political majority, to draw a line in the sand and enforce it by violence when necessary. If history is a guidepost, we are on the precipice of dangerous future in which politics devolves into a contest of force rather than ideas. That’s a future everyone should want to avoid.
CLOSE GUANTANAMO
Oldest Guantanamo Bay prisoner transferred to Pakistan after 17 years in custody, U.S. says


OCTOBER 29, 2022 / CBS/AP

A 75-year-old from Pakistan who was the oldest prisoner at the Guantanamo Bay detention center was released and returned to Pakistan on Saturday, the foreign ministry in Islamabad and the U.S. Defense Department said.


Saifullah Paracha was reunited with his family after more than 17 years in custody in the U.S. base in Cuba, the ministry added.

Paracha had been held on suspicion of ties to al Qaeda since 2003, but was never charged with a crime. In May 2021, he was notified that he had been been approved for release. He was cleared by the prisoner review board, along with two other men in November 2020.
Saifullah Paracha, shown posing for an International Committee of the Red Cross delegate at Guantanamo in an undated photo.
MIAMI HERALD VIA GETTY IMAGES

As is customary, the notification did not provide detailed reasoning for the decision and concluded only that Paracha is "not a continuing threat" to the United States, according to Shelby Sullivan-Bennis, who represented him at his hearing at the time.

The DOD said in its Saturday statement that the U.S. appreciates "the willingness of Pakistan and other partners to support ongoing U.S. efforts focused on responsibly reducing the detainee population and ultimately closing the Guantanamo Bay facility."

In Pakistan, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said it had completed an extensive inter-agency process to facilitate Paracha's repatriation.

"We are glad that a Pakistani citizen detained abroad is finally reunited with his family," the ministry said.

Paracha, who lived in the United States and owned property in New York City, was a wealthy businessman in Pakistan. Authorities alleged he was an al Qaeda "facilitator" who helped two of the conspirators in the Sept. 11 plot with a financial transaction.

He has maintained that he didn't know they were al Qaeda and denied any involvement in terrorism.

The U.S. captured Paracha in Thailand in 2003 and held him at Guantanamo since September 2004. Washington has long asserted that it can hold detainees indefinitely without charge under the international laws of war.

In November 2020, Paracha, who suffers from a number of ailments, including diabetes and a heart condition, made his eighth appearance before the review board, which was established under President Barack Obama to try to prevent the release of prisoners who authorities believed might engage in anti-U.S. hostilities upon their release from Guantanamo.

At the time, his attorney, Sullivan-Bennis, said she was more optimistic about his prospects because of President Joe Biden's election, Paracha's ill health and developments in a legal case involving his son, Uzair Paracha.

The son was convicted in 2005 in federal court in New York of providing support to terrorism, based in part on testimony from the same witnesses held at Guantanamo whom the U.S. relied on to justify holding the father.

In March 2020, after a judge threw out those witness accounts and the U.S. government decided not to seek a new trial, the younger Paracha was released and sent back to Pakistan.

In its statement on the elder Paracha's repatriation, the DOD said 35 detainees remain at Guantanamo Bay as of Saturday, and that 20 of them are eligible for transfer.

Five prisoners there who have been charged for their roles in the 9/11 attacks are negotiating potential plea deals that could take the death penalty off the table and keep the detention camp at the military base in Cuba open for the foreseeable future, CBS News reported last month. The possible plea deals angered some victims' families, who said they want justice over closure.

The number of prisoners at Guantanamo has, however, diminished in recent months, as several have been transferred elsewhere. In March, Mohammad Mani Ahmad al-Qahtani, who had been linked to 9/11, was sent to Saudi Arabia, and the following month, Sufyian Barhoumi, who was accused of being an extremist, was repatriated to Algeria after spending nearly 20 years in the detention center. In July, a review board determined that Khalid Ahmed Qasim, known as one of Guantanamo's "forever prisoners," should be released to an undetermined country.

US Finally Releases 75-Year-Old Guantanamo Bay Inmate

The detention center for the “worst of the worst” is becoming an assisted living facility.



STEPHANIE MENCIMER
Senior Reporter
 Mother Jones 


Tents used for overflow housing for Office of Military Commissions personnel at Camp Justice, in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba. Alex Brandon/AP Photo

The Guantanamo Bay detention center isn’t anyone’s idea of an assisted living facility. But the controversial prison that former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld declared in 2002 would hold “the worst of the worst” terrorism suspects has been open for so long that many inmates are now elderly people with health problems. Today, the Biden administration finally released the oldest prisoner, a 75-year-old Pakistani man, Saifullah Paracha, and returned him to Pakistan. Paracha, once a wealthy businessman who lived in New York City, had been at the Cuban base since 2003, when the US government “captured” him in Thailand. He was never charged with a crime.

According to the Associated Press, Paracha suffers from diabetes and heart problems, among other ailments, and is in such poor health that the government says he is “not a continuing threat” to the US. It’s not clear that Paracha was ever a threat to the US. His son Uzair Paracha, then 23, was convicted in the US in 2005 of providing material support for terrorism, in a prosecution based on the same witnesses who provided the basis for holding his father in Cuba. In 2020, a federal judge threw out those witness statements in his case, largely because the government had withheld exculpatory material about them from Uzair’s lawyers, and Uzair was returned to Pakistan.



Saifullah Paracha at the Guantanamo Bay detention center.

Counsel to Saifullah Paracha / AP

Those witnesses, also held at Guantanamo, included people the CIA tortured and waterboarded, notably Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the man the government accuses of masterminding the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. After nearly 20 years in US custody, first in a secret prison, then at Guantanamo, KSM will finally stand trial for his alleged role in 9/11 early next month. (He’s not as old as Paracha, but at 57, KSM has reached the age of AARP membership eligibility.)

In 2003, the Guantanamo detention center held more than 700 people that the George W. Bush administration alleged could be held indefinitely without trial because the military base was on foreign soil. President Barack Obama tried to close the facility but struggled to find countries to take many of the inmates, particularly a group of 17 innocent Uyghurs who hadn’t commit any crimes but did not want to return to their home country of China, where the Turkic language-speaking Muslims were sure to be persecuted. In 2008, a federal judge required the Bush administration to resettle them in the US, and they were headed to a small Uyghur community in Northern Virginia before Republicans blocked the transfer. They ended being sent to Palau, an island doomed by climate change to be underwater soon.

Obama did manage to whittle down the population at Guantanamo before President Donald Trump stopped the process. President Joe Biden has resumed the effort to shut down the detention center. In April, the administration released an Algerian detainee who’d spent 20 years at Guantanamo. His release came 14 years after the government had dropped all terrorism charges against him and six years after he’d been cleared for release to Algeria. There are now 35 inmates at the Cuban naval base, 20 of whom have been cleared for release.

B.C. permanently bans use of rat poison

CBC/Radio-Canada - Yesterday

The province of B.C. has decided to make a temporary ban on the use of rat poison permanent.


The province of B.C. is banning the use of second-generation anticoagulant rodenticides (SGARS).© AFP/Getty Images

Last July, the government imposed an 18-month ban on the use of rodenticides over concerns the poison is inadvertently killing owls, among other wildlife.

The permanent regulatory changes announced Friday will ban the widespread sale and use of second-generation anticoagulant rodenticides (SGARs), which the province says risk the secondary poisoning of animals who consume poisoned rodents.

The province spent the last 15 months conducting a review of SGARS and their impact by speaking with technical experts and holding a public consultation which received almost 1,600 responses. It outlined proposed regulatory amendments in an intentions paper.

The permanent ban will come into effect on Jan. 21, 2023 to align with the end of the temporary ban.

The ban applies to all sale and use of SGARs by members of the public, and most commercial and industrial operations in B.C., except for those services considered "essential" like hospitals and food production.


Essential services using SGARS will have to hire a licensed pest-control company, be licensed, have a site-specific integrated pest-management plan and record the use of the poison.

According to the government, the ban will reduce pesticide use by requiring individuals and businesses to resort to other methods of pest control, such as traps, less toxic rat poisons, and removing food sources.

Wildlife impacts


Rat poison has been widely criticized for how it moves through the food chain after it's ingested by a rat. Trace amounts are found in local wildlife and can be harmful to predators like owls.

A 2009 study on 164 owls in Western Canada found that 70 per cent had residues of at least one rodenticide in their livers. Researchers found that nearly half of those owls had multiple rodenticides in their system.

Rat poison has also been found in higher-order predators like weasels and coyotes, as well as scavenger species like birds and squirrels.

Opponents say the use of rat poison contradicts Canada's guidelines for hazardous materials.

The B.C. SPCA urges people to rodent-proof their homes instead of relying on rat poison.


ALBERTA RAT FREE SINCE 1953



















1950 to 1953

Norway rats were first discovered on a farm in Alberta near Alsask, on the eastern border, during the summer of 1950. The discovery was made by field crews from Alberta Department of Health who were engaged in studies of sylvatic plague, a disease of Richardson's ground squirrel.

Although aware of the economic destruction caused by rats, provincial authorities were initially concerned that rats might spread plague throughout Alberta. Consequently, the Alberta government decided to halt, or at least slow, the spread of rats into Alberta In 1950. Responsibility for rat control was transferred from the Alberta Department of Health to the Department of Agriculture.

https://www.alberta.ca/albertas-rat-control-program.aspx

Albertans have enjoyed living without the menace of rats since 1950 when the Rat Control Program was established. Alberta's rat-free status means there is ...

https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/597846/how-did-alberta-canada-become-rat-free

Aug 23, 2019 ... Alberta is the only province in Canada that does not have any rats and is, in fact, ...

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/alberta-canada-rat-free-for-70-years/2019/09/27/4caf1cb6-de2b-11e9-be7f-4cc85017c36f_story.html

Sep 28, 2019 ... Alberta, Canada: Rat-free for 70 years! ... The phone call left veteran investigator Phil Merrill “shocked.” But also, he admits, just a tiny bit ...

https://dailyhive.com/vancouver/alberta-rat-free

Aug 9, 2022 ... If you ever find yourself in the lovely province of Alberta, you are practically guaranteed to not spot something most people despise — a rat.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-iq9ake0fek

Jun 29, 2021 ... Why Alberta is the World's Only Rat-Free Place (With Humans) ; Stay secure on the internet with three months free from ExpressVPN: https://www.



Shirin Neshat: 'Biggest uprising since Islamic revolution'

DW
10/28/2022
October 28, 2022

The exiled Iranian is one of the world's most important artists, whose works also cover women's rights in Iran. She speaks about her new film "Land of Dreams" and the situation in Iran.


Shirin Neshat is an award-winning Iranian visual artist, whose works as a photographer and filmmaker have focused on women, identity, politics and Iran. She's been living in exile in the United States since 1979. Her latest film, "Land of Dreams," will be released in German theaters on November 3. It is a fictional story about an Iranian woman balancing her Iranian past and the American culture she was raised in. DW's Andrea Kasiske spoke to Neshat about the current situation in Iran and her new film.

DW: The death of 22-year-old Jina Mahsa Amini while under the custody of the morality police has triggered demonstrations and anger across the country. Especially from women. Did that surprise you?

Shirin Neshat (SN): The frustration and rage of the Iranian people have been brewing for a long time and the murder of Mahsa Amini unleashed this explosive anger. That's why it's not just about her death. It's the culmination of all the frustration of women who have been forced to veil themselves for 43 years. It's not just about the hijab as that's just a symbol. It's about how their lives have been affected living under a regime that sees them as second-class citizens, worth half as much as men, that treats them as if they just belong in the house and gives them very little power in public spheres.

There are many educated women and they realize that they do not have the same human rights as men. Even more so now that this government has gone so far as to murder a young woman just because she showed some hair.

VIDEO
02:58


DW: There are over 200 dead and the regime is striking back brutally. Is this extreme reaction a sign of fear?

SN: This movement, which we Iranians now call a revolution, is the biggest uprising since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. We've had a number of different short lived uprisings in the last few years. There was the Green Movement in 2009, which lasted no more than ten days or so. And so many expected this to be another upheaval, kind of a hiccup. But we are now in the second month and it is not as trivial as they thought. This time it is not about the economy, unemployment or water — it is about women. And women are a very sacred part of society. For the men, these are their sisters, wives, mothers. So, the murder of a young woman is sacrilegious to the Iranian people. That's why I don't see the women or the people in Iran going back to the way they were six weeks ago.

DW: You have family and friends in Iran. What have you heard from them?

SN: Yes, I am in constant contact with my family and the people of Iran. There are some who are very cautious because they are uncertain about the future and whether there might be much bloodshed. Some remember the Iranian Revolution and the violence; others believe this is finally the end of the dictatorship. There are conflicting views. But I think when there were over 80,000 demonstrators on the streets in Berlin and people in Iran saw these images on satellite TV in their living rooms, it added momentum to the movement. They understand that this is very serious and that they may soon have to come out on the streets of Tehran and show that they support their young people.

VIDEO
04:27


DW: You have released a digital work titled "Woman — Life — Freedom," which was shown in Los Angeles and at London's Piccadilly Circus and is also for sale. 50% of the proceeds will go to Human Rights Watch. So far, you've held back on concrete artistic interventions. Have you become an activist?

SN: I don't consider myself an activist. But my work has always revolved around three things, women, religion and politics, so I would not say I am not a political artist. From my photo series "Women of Allah" (1993 -1997), which shows women who are voluntarily militant and religious, to the film "Women without men" (2009), which is about the 1953 military coup in Iran, all my works are about politics, history and religion. But many artists, including myself, would rather just be poets or artists. And yet you find yourself in a position where you realize that your voice counts and that you have to support the people who don't have a voice. And if several people know me and I'm publicly advocating and asking for help, then maybe I am an activist after all. It's just we're born in a country that is in constant political upheaval and we have a public presence, and therefore we have a responsibility to speak up. And that's what I'm doing.

DW: What about the visibility of women artists in Iran? Many women attend art schools, but only a few become internationally known.

SN: There are several prominent female artists who have exhibited internationally. But it's difficult because there is no freedom of expression. They have the government on their backs, inspecting every single piece of art that is to be exhibited in a gallery or museum. Or they cannot export their works. These artists and performers live in a very repressive environment and obviously their narratives are a reflection of the life they live; instead they have to hold back and paint flowers or landscapes. You can see their dilemma and frustration. But, there are a number of women who are very active artistically. I curated an exhibition in New York and was able to connect with some and learn about their work. But it's very difficult to access their works.

'Land of Dreams' - a film about the USA and its nightmares
Image: Beta Cinema

DW: Your latest film, "Land of Dreams," is about Simin, a young Iranian woman living in the United States. She collects data on people for the Federal Statistical Office and logs their dreams. These are often nightmares, and Simin is also plagued by one. Her father, a communist, was murdered in Iran. You look at the USA, but Iran doesn't let you go?

SN: My works that are related to Iran are partially based on my private narrative — of living outside my country, my unresolved relationship with Iran, my trauma of separation from my family. But I did not want to create autobiographical works. There are many of my fears in my works, but always also the collective fears of the people of Iran in general. "Land of Dreams" is about my relationship with the United States. And sure, I'm an immigrant, I have my own experiences in the US, both positive and negative. I want to tell stories about the country, whether it's Iran or the US. In this case, it's also a critique of American society.

DW: Towards the end of the film, Simin has to justify herself to the office because she has collected photos of people and, in a kind of artistic role-playing, transforms herself into these very people. She utters the central sentence: "You can't control people's dreams, they are powerful, you should fear them." Has this sentence now acquired a new meaning in relation to Iran?

SN: When we talk about Iran now, it's about dreams and nightmares. And the nightmares reflect our fears. I have this obsession, I really want to understand our subconscious. Dreams and nightmares cross broundaries, are universal, and often they are about simple things, violence, uprooting, being abandoned. In terms of Iran today, it's similar. We dream of reunification, of being able to go back, of people being free in Iran. But there are also the nightmares of bloodbaths, of people killing us. We are between these two poles. My film, "Land of Dreams" is also about dictatorship, the United States in the future, a country not unlike Iran. That could use surveillance to control people's dreams and subconscious. Just like the Iranian government does.

This interview has been shortened and edited for clarity.



Defiant Iranians protest violent crackdown and killings of youths

NEWS WIRES - Yesterday

Iranians took to the streets around the country again on Friday to protest against the killings of youths in a widely documented crackdown on demonstrations sparked by Mahsa Amini's death.


Defiant Iranians protest violent crackdown and killings of youths
© Wana News Agency via Reuters

The clerical state has been gripped by six weeks of protests that erupted when Amini, 22, died in custody after her arrest for an alleged breach of Iran's strict dress rules for women.

Security forces have struggled to contain the women-led protests, that have evolved into a broader campaign to end the Islamic republic founded in 1979.

Videos widely shared online showed people rallying Friday across Iran, including in Mahabad, the flashpoint western city where a rights group said security forces had killed at least four people in the past two days.
The demonstrations came despite a crackdown that the Oslo-based Iran Human Rights group said Friday had killed at least 160 protesters, an increase of 19 since its last toll on Tuesday, and including more than two dozen children.
IHR called for "diplomatic pressure" on Iran to be stepped up, with its head Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam warning of a "serious risk of mass killings of protesters which the UN is obligated to prevent".

At least another 93 people were killed during separate protests that erupted on September 30 in the southeastern city of Zahedan over the reported rape of a teenage girl by a police commander, IHR says.

Automatic gunfire


Violence erupted in Zahedan again on Friday "when unknown people opened fire" killing one person and wounding 14 others, including security forces, the official IRNA news agency reported.

IHR said security forces opened fire at protesters in the southeastern city, with deaths reported "including a 12-year-old boy".

The Norway-based Hengaw organisation added that two more people were killed Thursday in Baneh, another city near Iran's western border with Iraq.

The bloodshed in Mahabad came as mourners paying tribute to Ismail Mauludi, a 35-year-old protester killed on Wednesday night, made their way from his funeral towards the governor's office, Hengaw said.

Related video: Angry protesters target scholars & clerics as Iranians adopt a new symbol of protest
Duration 8:34

"Death to the dictator," protesters yelled, using a slogan aimed at Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, as the governor's office burned, in an online video verified by AFP.

Other verified footage showed clashes outside the western city of Khorramabad near the grave of Nika Shahkarami, a 16-year-old killed by security forces, where dozens of people were marking the end of the traditional 40-day mourning period.

"I'll kill, I'll kill, whoever killed my sister," they were heard chanting, in a video posted online by the US-based Human Rights Activist News Agency (HRANA).

Dozens of men were seen hurling projectiles under fire as they drove back security forces.

At least 20 security personnel have been killed in the Amini protests, rights groups say, and at least another eight in Zahedan, according to an AFP tally based on official reports.

Local media meanwhile quoted a joint statement from Iran's intelligence ministry and the Revolutionary Guards accusing the United States' Central Intelligence Agency of plotting against the Islamic republic.

The CIA was conspiring with spy agencies in Israel, Britain and Saudi Arabia, "to spark riots" in Iran, the statement said.


'More killing would encourage protesters'

The latest Amini protests were held in defiance of warnings from Khamenei and ultra-conservative President Ebrahim Raisi, who appeared to try to link protests to a mass shooting Wednesday at a key Shiite Muslim shrine in the southern city of Shiraz after prayers, that state media said killed at least 15 worshippers.

But the protests triggered by Amini's death on September 16 show no signs of dwindling, inflamed by public outrage over the crackdown that has cost the lives of many other young women and girls.

The Iranian authorities have had to quell the protests through various tactics, possibly in a bid to avoid fuelling yet more anger among the public.

They staged rallies on Friday in Tehran and other cities to denounce the Shiraz attack, which was claimed by the Islamic State group.

"I doubt that the security forces have ruled out conducting a larger-scale violent crackdown," said Henry Rome, an Iran expert at the Washington Institute.

For now, they "appear to be trying other techniques" including "arrests and intimidation, calibrated internet shutdowns, killing some protesters, and fuelling uncertainty", Rome said.

"They may be making the calculation that more killing would encourage, rather than deter, protesters -- if that judgement shifts, then the situation would likely become even more violent," he added.

An official Iranian medical report concluded Amini's death was caused by illness, due to "surgery for a brain tumour at the age of eight", and not police brutality.

Lawyers acting for her family have rejected the findings and called for a re-examination of her death.

(AFP)