Tuesday, January 03, 2023

Ukraine: Safety Systems Of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plants Complex – Analysis

Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia is Europe's largest nuclear power plant (Image: Engergoatom)

By 

By Aasi Ansari*

On 27 February 2022, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was alerted by Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry that the Russian army was approaching the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) complex.1 Within a week, Russia informed IAEA that its military took control of the area around the Zaporizhzhia NPP.2 After the Fukushima Daiichi accident, this was the first time when the IAEA’s International Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC) immediately went to the highest alert.3 The Director General of the IAEA, Rafael Grossi, warned that an accident at nuclear facilities could have severe repercussions.4

The shellings and war activities near Zaporizhzhia NPP have raised concerns in the international community about the safety and security of the nuclear reactors. Grossi termed the shellings as ‘playing with fire’ due to the risk of nuclear catastrophe.5 Concerns about the quality of the safety systems of the reactor and the ability of the reactor design to withstand missile attacks were raised. The possibility of a technological error that could lead to an accident similar to Chernobyl, or a blackout situation similar to Fukushima, were also raised.

The IAEA Director General called for restraint and reiterated the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security based on existing nuclear safety and security conventions. These are the need to maintain the physical integrity of the facilities; a functional security system and equipment; staff being able to do their duties without any pressure; availability of an off-site power supply; uninterrupted transportation and supply chain from and to the site; effective monitoring system and emergency preparedness and response measures; and reliable communication with the regulator and others.6

After Russia took control of Zaporizhzhia plant under the management of Russian state atomic energy corporation ‘Rosatom’7 , staff were required to take approval from the local Russian commander to operate and maintain the power plant.8 The President of Ukrainian national nuclear energy generation company Energoatom9 , informed the IAEA in March 2022 that about 400 Russian soldiers were present at the plant.10

Reports noted that the Russian army was using the plant as a cover to fire at the city.11 In the ongoing conflict, multiple arms were used at Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. For instance, on 4 March 2022, the first missile hit the ZNPP training building causing a fire.12 No radiation leakage though was detected.13 Later the fire was extinguished14 and some unexploded munition found at that training building were disposed.15 Such indiscriminate use of weapons was said to be affecting the morale and emotional state of the plant employees,16 violating the third pillar of nuclear safety and security.

The war activities have compromised other pillars of nuclear safety and security as well. For instance, the transfer of safeguards data from ZNPP was interrupted multiple times though it was re-established within few days.17 Due to the shellings, the plant’s external power supply system was damaged, a unit was disconnected from the grid, a security guard at ZNPP was injured, spent fuel storage facility sustained damages in its walls,  but there was no damage to the spent fuel container nor was any radiation leakage detected.18

After Russian shellings became frequent, the Ukrainian government requested the IAEA and UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to redouble their efforts.19 In response, the IAEA delivered monitoring equipment to ZNPP offered by Australia and France, which are among 12 of IAEA’s ‘Response and Assistance Network ’ (RANET) countries. The IAEA also delivered more than 160 radiation measurement devices and protective equipment, including masks, gloves, full-body suits, among others.20

While shellings near Zaporizhzhia do involve serious risks, they may not result in an accident like Chernobyl or Fukushima. The Chernobyl accident happened due to insignificant understanding and lack of safety technology.21 The reactors of Chernobyl NPP did not have a containment building.22 Modern reactors like Zaporizhzhia are designed with protection against events such as aircraft crashes, fire, explosions, flood, and extreme meteorological conditions, etc.23 The reactors of Zaporizhzhia have 1.2 meters thick concrete shell and are designed to withstand explosions and crash of an airplane.24 Thus, it can be said that the containment building should be able to resist missile attacks.

Other than the reactor, the spent fuel storage facility contains liquid and solid waste which can cause potential radiation hazard, if damaged. However, after multiple shellings at Zaporizhzhia plant, the spent fuel container was not damaged and the cooling system has been good enough to maintain the temperature and radiation level under control.25

Without external power, the reactor as well as the spent fuel storage might lose the cooling system. Therefore, multiple power supply systems are needed. If the external power supply is disconnected for cooling water to circulate, the loss of power could result in an accident like Fukushima. There are three back-up power supply of 330 kV and three off-site power lines of 750 kV connected to a nearby thermal power plant in case the back-up power supply gets disconnected.26 Even if the reactor is shut down, it still requires electricity to maintain the reactor temperature, hence backup power and off-site power supplies are crucial for nuclear safety.27

If the external sources of power supply are lost, then the nuclear plant has to depend on emergency diesel generators. This situation has been occurring time and again during the conflict.28 When the plant lost the power for cooling system, it first relied upon the power generated by the plant itself and then on back-up power line linking to the grid through the nearby thermal power plant.29 There are 20 diesel generators on site and nine of them are operating (as of November 2022) to provide power to all the six reactors and ensure the safety of the plant.30 These diesel generators have enough power to operate up to 15 days without any external power supply.31 The reactor had to rely on diesel generator multiple times through the conflict but every time the emergency diesel generators started automatically and operated till the back-up power was available. 32

The IAEA was not able to visit ZNPP since the conflict began but on 1 September 2022, experts, as part of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhia (ISAMZ), were finally able to arrive at the Zaporizhzhia NPP.33

After 20 November 2022, there has been no shelling on the site per se but there has been shelling in the nearby areas. Zaporizhzhia NPP has been reconnected to the off-site power through a 750 kV external power line and a 330 kV back up line.34 An additional 330 kV power line as a back-up is being repaired, as informed to the IAEA by Rosatom.35 On 31 October 2022, four of the six reactors were kept under cold shutdown which requires less energy for cooling and the other two reactors are under hot shutdown, which allows them to supply heat to the nearby city.36

In conclusion, it can be said that Zaporizhzhia NPP has better and proven technology with multiple safety systems and multiple power supply, along with a strong containment building that is designed to withstand terrorist attacks and crash of an airplane.37 Despite the ongoing military activities, the IAEA has been inspecting the Zaporizhzhia nuclear facilities and has stated that no radiation leakage has been detected in those facilities. Nonetheless, the complete demilitarisation of Zaporizhzhia NPP is essential to assure the full safety of the plants. 

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

*About the author: Mr Aasi Ansari is Research Intern at the Centre for Nuclear and Arms Control, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.

Source: This article was published by Manohar Parrrikar IDSA


Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) was formerly named The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

Concerns for Pacific democracy, but no crisis yet

Author: Kerryn Baker, ANU

In 2022, considerable pressure was put on democratic norms and practices in the Pacific Islands. Taken together, the year’s events paint a bleak picture of democratic resilience in the region. But there are also bright spots of progress to celebrate, notably in terms of women’s political representation.

Local resident Tarusila Boseiwaqa walks along a sea wall at Serua Village, Fiji, 14 July 2022 (Photo: REUTERS/Loren Elliott).

The two largest Pacific Islands states both went to the polls in 2022. The Papua New Guinean (PNG) general election was plagued by delays, issues with the electoral roll and concerning incidents of violence, resulting in many fatalities and thousands of displaced citizens. Transparency International PNG stated that the election ‘continued the trend of deterioration in the quality of elections in PNG’.

The general election in Fiji — pitched as a showdown between two former coup leaders, the incumbent Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama and challenger Sitiveni Rabuka — resulted in a hung parliament, with the Social Liberal Democratic Party (SODELPA) holding the balance of power.

In the aftermath of the election, amid messy negotiations to form coalition government, there were serious concerns that a peaceful transfer of power would not take place. Rabuka accused Bainimarama of ‘sowing fear and chaos’ in an attempt to maintain power. But ultimately, an agreement was reached between Rabuka’s People’s Alliance, SODELPA and the National Federation Party. On Christmas Eve, Rabuka was sworn in as Prime Minister, a significant milestone in Fiji’s democratic history.

Across the region, there are concerning trends related to the practice of democracy between elections too. In Kiribati — which withdrew from the Pacific Islands Forum in July 2022 — the government attempted to deport one of its high court justices, David Lambourne, who is also the husband of Kiribati’s opposition leader. In the aftermath, four other senior judges were suspended, leaving the country without an operational high court. Kiribati’s attorney-general was appointed acting chief justice in October. The New Zealand Law Society argued that this appointment ‘would challenge the independence of the judiciary and constitutional separation of powers that is fundamental to a functioning democracy’.

In Solomon Islands, the upcoming election — originally scheduled to be called by May 2023 — was delayed until 2024, with the government claiming it could not afford to host the Pacific Games and hold an election in the same year. Peter Kenilorea Jr, a member of the opposition and outspoken critic of the government, labelled it ‘an authoritarian move’. Extending terms of government has also been done before in the region, notably in Samoa in the early 1990s.

These moves came after the controversial security pact that Solomon Islands signed with China earlier in 2022, which prompted significant concern and renewed attention from Western powers. Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched diplomatic recognition of Taiwanese sovereignty to China in 2019.

While concerning, none of the issues highlighted above are new. Electoral issues in PNG and constraints on civil liberties in Fiji have been well-documented by academics and non-governmental organisations. The use of foreign judges and the potential use of deportation as a threat against them has been a long-standing issue, particularly in the former British colonies of the Pacific.

In the postcolonial era, a perennial debate in the region has been around democracy and whether it is a ‘foreign flower’, unsuited for the Pacific environment. This belies the fact that, on the whole, the region has a quite extraordinary postcolonial history of democratic continuity. The majority of Pacific states have unbroken track records of regularly scheduled elections and peaceful transfers of power.

But the crisis narrative has continuously emerged. In the late 1980s, former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans noted increased Australian interest in the region as a result of political turmoil in Fiji, New Caledonia and Vanuatu, saying the Fiji coups in particular represented ‘a blow to democratic principle’. In the early 2000s, the Australian government labelled Melanesia an ‘arc of instability’ and think tanks warned that without external intervention, failed states would emerge in the region.

While there is certainly reason for concern about the current state of democracy in the Pacific, there are also opportunities for optimism. Despite fears of military intervention, the election in Fiji resulted in a peaceful transfer of power, an encouraging sign for democratic consolidation. Another promising development in the region is the increased participation of women in politics, with further advances in this space following the 2021 election of Samoa’s first woman prime minister, Fiame Naomi Mata’afa.

After years of languishing at the bottom of global league tables with zero women members of parliament, both PNG and Vanuatu saw a change this year. Rufina Peter and Kessy Sawang were elected in PNG, while Gloria Julia King won a seat in Vanuatu’s October snap election. Following by-elections in Tonga in November, there is now — for the first time ever — at least one elected woman member of every Pacific parliament.

2023 will bring renewed attention from the United States and other Western powers as the Pacific once again becomes a site of geopolitical contestation. Democracy support and promotion programs will play an important, but perhaps contested, role. Elections and parliaments are the cornerstones of democratic systems, but the strength of democracy relies on a broader ecosystem encompassing the media, civil society, education systems and the inclusion of historically underrepresented groups. Democratic norms and practices have a solid foundation in the Pacific, but the events of 2022 prove that this cannot be taken for granted.

Kerryn Baker is a Fellow at the Department of Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University.