Carbon Capture Technology And Its Growing Role in Decarbonisation

By Felicity Bradstock - Mar 25, 2023

• CCS technology is gaining popularity among companies worldwide to decarbonize their operations and avoid carbon taxes.
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• The International Energy Agency sees CCS as key to the decarbonization of fossil fuel operations and industrial processes, particularly useful as a bridge to greater renewable energy production.
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• Improved political policies and regulatory frameworks are required to ensure effective rollout of the technology to support a green transition.

With a greater number of climate policies coming into place worldwide, from the Biden Administration’s IRA to the European Union’s New Green Deal, companies are feeling mounting pressure to decarbonise. And while some are doing it to enhance their ESG practices and futureproof their business, others are concerned about rising carbon taxes, which could slash their profits. So, as well as introducing green energy technology, many are turning to carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies to support their decarbonisation efforts. Big Oil is pumping billions into CCS equipment at operations around the globe to keep production ‘low-carbon oil’, while other industries, such as manufacturing, are looking to the technology to help clean up operations.  The International Energy Agency (IEA) sees CCS technology as key to the decarbonisation of fossil fuel operations and industrial processes, particularly useful as a bridge to greater renewable energy production. By 2021, the total annual carbon capture capacity stood at close to 45?Mt?of CO2, a figure that is expected to increase substantially with approximately 300 projects under construction. CCS equipment could capture more than 220 Mt CO2 a year by 2030. This will help companies achieve net-zero ambitions when paired with renewable energy technologies. 

By 2022, 35 commercial facilities were using CCS for industrial processes, fuel transformation, and power generation. Deployment of the technology has been slow to date but investment in the sector is rising sharply, as companies look for ways to reduce their carbon output, improve their ESG practices, and avoid carbon taxes, to support a green transition. However, improved political policies and regulatory frameworks are required to ensure the effective rollout of the technology, in line with climate policies.

Related: Latin America’s Bid To Challenge China’s Dominance In The Lithium Market

According to research by Wood Mackenzie, 2023 will be a milestone year for CCS. The global CCS pipeline rose by more than 50 percent in 2022, with projects planned across several industrial sectors. In recent years, government funding of up to 50 percent has helped CCS projects get off the ground, a trend that is expected to continue. The U.S. government has so far committed $3.7 billion to finance CCS projects and meet its net-zero goal by 2050. The introduction of new climate policies worldwide will also support the uptake of the technology. 

In terms of how the CO2 is used, much of the sequestered carbon is currently going to enhanced oil recovery operations at present, responding to the ongoing need for fossil fuels to ensure energy security worldwide. However, as green energy capacity increases worldwide, much of the CO2 will go to designated storage sites, with 66 percent expected to be pumped deep underground by 2030. New legislation and supporting incentives for CO2 utilisation will encourage this change. 

David Lluis Madrid, the CCUS analyst at BloombergNEF (BNEF), explained, “CCS is starting to overcome its bad reputation.” Madrid added, “It is now being deployed as a decarbonization tool, which means the CO2 needs to be stored. A lack of CO2 transport and storage sites near industrial or power generation point sources could be a major bottleneck to CCS development. But we are already seeing a big increase in these projects to serve that need.” 

One of many projects underway globally is an innovative CCS offshore site, the Greensand project, in the Danish part of the North Sea, where construction began this month. CO2 captured in Belgium will be transported via ship for injection in a depleted oil field, located 120 miles from the North Sea coast. The project is being undertaken by a consortium of companies including Germany’s Wintershall Dea and Britain’s INEOS. It is considered to be the world’s first cross-border offshore carbon dioxide storage with the explicit purpose of tackling climate change.  

Meanwhile, in Norway, a joint venture between Equinor, TotalEnergies, and Shell is also underway. The Northern Lights project will see 1.5 million tonnes of CO2 injected into saline aquifer near the Troll gas field annually, starting in 2024. In the U.K., the Accorn CCS project is being launched off the coast of Scotland, aimed at creating an annual capacity of 5-10 mtpa of CO2 by 2030. The project is being operated by Storegga, Shell, Harbour Energy and North Sea Midstream Partners. And in the Netherlands, the Porthos project by the Port of Rotterdam, Gasunie, and EBN is expected to provide a storage capacity of 2.5 mtpa of CO2. Porthos will be located in depleted Dutch gas fields in the North Sea, with operations expected to start in 2026.  

Many companies worldwide are now looking to CCS technologies to help them achieve decarbonisation aims without giving up on their traditional operations. The rollout of CCS around the globe will be supported by new climate policies, decarbonisation incentives, and better regulation of the industry. In addition, greater public funding for CCS projects is expected to spur private investment in the sector and boost the world’s CO2storage capacity significantly in the coming decades.

By Felicity Bradstock for Oilprice.com

The Role of Ports in the Energy Transition

Rotterdam is one of the ports that combines energy along with its cargo operations (file photo)

PUBLISHED MAR 24, 2023 6:27 PM BY MIKAEL LIND ET AL.

 

by Mikael Lind, Sandra Haraldson, Wolfgang Lehmacher, Zeeshan Raza, Ellinor Forsström, Linda Astner, Jeremy Bentham, Xiuju Fu, Jimmy Suroto, Phanthian Zuesongdham 

 

Introduction

A port is a transport, digital and energy node. On average 40% of goods going through ports are energy related. Ports are central nodes for sector coupling and energy system integration as they host and serve multiple industries including energy, shipping, trucking, railways, cruise-tourism, and manufacturing.

Decarbonization of transport requires collaboration across cargo owners, freight forwarders, ports, carriers, vehicle and engine manufacturers, energy producers, policy makers etc. Ports can capture the opportunity and play an important model role at the intersection of marine fuel, shipbuilding (including ship supplies), and operational value chains providing enablers of transport decarbonization. 

This contribution, based on a larger Swedish study provides a framework (Figure 1) for guiding ports on building energy node capabilities. This framework's foundation is a port’s energy strategy (Level 1) factoring in, a port’s own energy needs (Level 2), green energy to port visitors (Level 3), and its role as part of the transport and energy ecosystem (Level 4).

 

Figure 1: Maturity framework for the port as energy node (Illustration: Sandra Haraldson)

 

The role of ports in decarbonization

The ports of Antwerp-Bruges, Hamburg, Rotterdam, and Singapore aim to position themselves as multi-fuel bunkering hubs. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the Singapore – Rotterdam Green Corridor in Singapore on 2 August 2022 is indicative of the trend.

As landlord and investor, ports can optimize spatial planning (as e.g. in Hamburg and Antwerp-Bruges) to ensure that land and infrastructure are available to facilitate low/no carbon energy projects, while (co-)investing in sustainable energy solutions.  As “regulators”, port authorities can leverage tariffs and incentives to support low/no carbon measures, and upgrade environmental and safety standards to support the alternative fuels value chain. Ports can create (digitally supported) processes that help other stakeholders to become more (energy) efficient while not necessarily changing to low/zero carbon energy sources. Ports as “enablers” can initiate collaboration, partnerships, and consortia to align climate goals, predict energy demand, and co-run low/no carbon fuels projects. Energy-empowered ports can expand the port community by inviting “energy” actors and tracking/tracing energy flows through big data intelligence and blockchain technologies etc. 

Ports can drive new revenue streams through climbing up the four-step maturity framework. The framework is not to be seen as a one-directional framework but as a self-improving circular system, where ports take actions that move back and forth between the levels.

Level 1: The need for an energy strategy

Port authorities should start by devising an energy strategy for their own energy needs and for their energy supply capacity. Such an energy strategy should encompass all port operations, guiding the entire port community in driving investment decisions. This implies that this strategy is not only a compass for port authorities, but also influences actors in ports or visiting ports. Ports need to animate levels 2-4 of the framework, through stakeholder dialogues, collaborations etc.

Level 2: Sustainable operations within the port

One focus area for ports is to improve energy efficiency and ensure that their own needs for operations within the port area are met sustainably. This can be achieved through electricity from low/no carbon sources powering e.g., cranes, reach-stackers, prime-movers, tugboats, forklifts, and the port’s vehicle fleet and the use of LED and smart lighting at port premises. Some ports produce energy themselves e.g., through solar and wind. Port authorities need to create collaborative platforms, regulative incentives, and partnerships to achieve effective emissions reductions, e.g., through multi-stakeholder roadmaps, investments in grid capacity, and shared port processes for efficient traffic management between terminals.

Level 3: Provision of sustainable energy to port visitors

Increasingly, ports are expected to supply and facilitate sustainable energy consumption by carriers serving different modes of transport. Ports can facilitate bunkering of low/no carbon fuels (e.g., e-ammonia and e-methanol) and offer shore-side electricity to vessels while berthed and charging and alternative fuels stations for heavy vehicles and trains. Just-in-time arrivals and slot management programs in Rotterdam and Singapore resulted in bunker and emissions saving in the range of 4% to 7%.

Level 4: Broader industry role in the energy transition

The EU Green Deal, EU energy efficiency improvement target of at least 32.5% for 2030 and the REPowerEU plan open opportunities for ports. Ports can support the development of productions facilities by providing land and (co-)investing in newbuilds. Ports can also influence the type of cargo handled by entering partnerships and strategically plan terminals that support regional transitions to net zero; ports can also be testbeds for new technologies such as Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).

Concluding remarks

Ports can be a catalyst of the energy transition while generating new lease earnings or incomes through the sale of energy. There are several complementary decarbonization enablers that come with a myriad of opportunities. 

This article brings forward four key messages:

• Ports can play an essential role in the energy transition
• Ports will benefit from anticipating decarbonization pressures and green fuels/energy demand
• Transforming into an energy model node requires the engagement of new stakeholders
• Cross-value-chain collaboration is critical

The port can play a model role in aligning supply and demand of low/no carbon energy sources by engaging actors along the energy value chain. With this comes the need for different behaviors supporting collaboration but also broader knowledge and new skills and, most importantly, a mindset that goes beyond their own turf.

To read more about the port as an energy node, visit the newly released UNCTAD article online.

 

About the authors

Mikael Lind is world’s first (adjunct) Professor of Maritime Informatics engaged at Chalmers, and Research Institutes of Sweden (RISE). He is an expert contributor at World Economic Forum, Europe’s Digital Transport Logistic Forum (DTLF), and UN/CEFACT. He is co-editor of the first two books on maritime informatics, and is co-author of Practical Playbook for Maritime Decarbonisation.

Sandra Haraldson is Senior Researcher at Research Institutes of Sweden (RISE) and has driven several initiatives on digital collaboration, multi-business innovation, and sustainable transport hubs, such as the concept of Collaborative Decision Making (e.g. PortCDM, StationCDM, YardCDM) enabling parties in transport ecosystems to become coordinated and synchronised by digital data sharing.

Wolfgang Lehmacher is partner at Anchor Group and advisor at Topan AG. The former director at the World Economic Forum, and CEO Emeritus of GeoPost Intercontinental, is an advisory board member of The Logistics and Supply Chain Management Society, ambassador F&L, advisor GlobalSF, and member of the think tanks Logistikweisen and NEXST.

Zeeshan Raza is Industrial Researcher at Research Institutes of Sweden (RISE) and visiting lecturer at the University of Gothenburg. He has led and participated in various projects related to sustainability and SDGs, digital transformation, and energy transition of port and shipping industry. He has also authored and co-authored several scientific articles on these topics.

Ellinor Forsström is an engineer and project manager at RISE specialized in the subject of maritime energy systems. She has led the work in several research projects/initiatives concerning alternative fuels in shipping and increased energy efficiency onboards ships as well as similar projects in port areas.

Linda Astner is Head of Sustainability in Port of Gävle, Sweden. She leads a broad collaborative stakeholder program "Energy Optimized Port Cluster 2030" and has led many projects, e.g., in energy transition, digitalization of maritime information and time slot management and green business development.

Jeremy Bentham is the Co-Chair (Scenarios) at the World Energy Council and a retired member of strategy leadership team at Shell. A leading scenarios expert, he was previously Head of the Shell Scenarios Team and Vice President of Global Business Environment at Shell International.

Xiuju Fu is Maritime AI Programme Director and senior scientist at Institute of High Performance Computing, Agency for Science Technology and Research (A*STAR), Singapore and active in developing and applying AI, big data intelligence, simulation, and optimization techniques for complex system management. Currently, she is leading Maritime AI Programme in Singapore for research in maritime data excellence, maritime AI modelling excellence, maritime AI computing and application excellence.  

Jimmy Suroto is AVP (Group Commercial) at PSA International Pte Ltd. He has extensive experience in engaging the carriers, being pivotal in many Terminals Service Agreements and Joint Venture projects. Recently, he has fronted key Decarbonisation pilots, including PSA’s Just-in-Time Arrival programme (OptEArriveTM), and the Singapore – Rotterdam Green Corridor.   

Dr. Phanthian Zuesongdham is Head of Division Port Process Solution and smartPORT Program Director, responsible for New Business Development for the Hamburg Port Authority (HPA). She is an experienced lead digital strategist and transformation manager in the maritime and port industry. Before she worked with international organizations like UNESCAP, Lufthansa Cargo and BP.

 

To Prepare to Fight, China is Studying America's WWII Pacific Campaign

Tank landing ships disgorge cargo and troops on the beach at Iwo Jima (USN)

PUBLISHED MAR 22, 2023 

BY CIMSEC

 

[By Toshi Yoshihara]

The following article is adapted from a new report by Dr. Toshi Yoshihara at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Chinese Lessons from the Pacific War: Implications for PLA Warfighting. It appears here courtesy of CIMSEC and may be found in its original form here.

Like all militaries, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) studies other nations’ wars to understand the changing character of warfare. The PLA has dissected the Falklands War, the First Gulf War, the air campaign over Kosovo, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and much else. It is no doubt scrutinizing the conflict in Ukraine. The PLA has drawn many lessons from these operations to improve its ability to fight and win future conflicts. Chinese writings about those lessons have, in turn, helped Western observers take better measure of the PLA’s priorities and preferences.

The PLA has even reached back more than eight decades to the Pacific War. Chinese military strategists have examined the origins, conduct, and termination of the ocean-spanning struggle between Imperial Japan and the United States. They have pored over the great battles at sea, rendering numerous judgments about what those engagements mean for the future of PLA warfighting. Chinese lessons from the Pacific War thus offer policymakers valuable insights about the PLA’s thinking and strategy.

The Pacific War’s Appeal to the PLA

In the past, the lopsided conflicts of the unipolar era in which American military might steamrolled third-rate opponents resonated with the PLA. Then, Chinese planners assumed that China would have to fight from a severely disadvantaged position against the United States. However, as the PLA continues its remarkable ascent, it expects to compete and fight with the U.S. armed forces on an equal footing. As such, the lessons from the Pacific War, which featured intense high-end combat between two peer militaries across an oceanic expanse, are increasingly salient to the PLA.

Moreover, the Pacific War stands out for its resemblance to a putative Sino-American conflict. Imperial Japan and the United States fought over an area where the PLA would likely collide with the U.S. military. Just as Japan sought to hold off its opponent in distant waters, the PLA would be attempting to keep its adversary at arm’s length from the mainland. In addition to its large fleet, Japan employed shore-based airpower to conduct maritime strikes. Now, China possesses an arsenal of land-based missiles and aircraft to hold surface combatants at risk, as well as modern fighting ships with increasing reach. 

For U.S. policymakers, Chinese histories of the Pacific War—and the lessons they impart— reveal much about the PLA’s views of strategy and war. These retrospectives offer tantalizing hints of the PLA’s mindset, beliefs, assumptions, and proclivities. By assessing mainland writings about the war at sea and its implications, the policy community can catch glimpses of the Chinese military’s thinking about how it might fight a future great power war.

Drawing from extensive Chinese sources on the great battles at Midway, Guadalcanal, and Okinawa, this analysis reviews three recurring themes that emerge from the literature. Although Chinese analysts offer diverse findings from these campaigns, the following focuses on shore-based airpower, expeditionary logistics, and industrial strength and their corresponding parallels to Chinese strategy, Beijing’s ambitions, and the challenges ahead for the United States. 

Lesson One: Shore-Based Airpower

Chinese analysts have paid special attention to the role of shore-based airpower at Midway, Guadalcanal, and Okinawa. They note that less capable and older aircraft on Midway performed critical duties that contributed to the American success. Long-range reconnaissance by flying boats and bombers provided an early warning screen and detected the incoming enemy fleet, buying precious time for the defenders to respond. Although the aircraft launched from Midway were tactically ineffective against the Japanese carriers, they knocked the attacking fleet sufficiently off balance to pry open the chance to deliver a decisive blow by carrier aviation.

Chinese commentators concur that the American seizure and successful defense of Henderson airfield were crucial to victory at Guadalcanal. The contest for control of the airfield became the focal point of the island campaign and the object over which the Japanese army suffered mounting and eventually unsustainable losses. American aircraft launched from the airfield provided close-air support to ground operations, blunted Japanese air offensives, interdicted enemy resupply, and kept Japan’s flattops at bay. By contrast, owing to the distance separating the airbase at Rabaul from the scene of action, Japanese aircraft were unable to stay aloft long enough to influence the course of the conflict.

Chinese analysts have documented the interactive impact of shore-based airpower during the struggle over Okinawa. Once the American fleet fell within range of Japanese aircraft, including the kamikazes, on Kyushu, the Ryukyus, and Taiwan, it came under unrelenting and deadly air assaults. Moreover, U.S. forces were unable to knock out the many airfields on Kyushu, exposing the fleet to a persistent air threat. Naval historian Zhao Zhenyu observes that Japan’s resilient land-based airpower fixed U.S. carriers in their places to defend the airspace around Okinawa.1 Conversely, the American capture of two airfields on Okinawa enabled U.S. airpower to provide close air support, fight off enemy air raids, and conduct deep sweeps against airbases on Kyushu, forcing the Japanese to relocate their aircraft beyond the range of American fighters.

The logic of shore-based airpower during the Pacific War is discernible today. In a major conventional war against the United States, the PLA would employ shore-based firepower—in the form of aircraft and precision-strike missiles launched from the mainland—to degrade or cripple American airpower at sea and ashore. It would hold at risk American carriers and their air wings operating within the range of its land-based firepower, just as Imperial Japanese air forces did to the U.S. Navy at Okinawa. Chinese missile attacks against Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, the hub of American airpower in Asia, could shut down the airfield for weeks or longer. Such an outcome would be analogous to Japan’s loss of shore-based airpower on Guadalcanal and its cascading consequences for Japanese air, naval, and land operations.  

Imagine a scenario in which China knocks out U.S. regional airbases while it keeps American carriers at arm’s length. Should it become too risky for land- and carrier-based airpower to launch sorties from offshore areas of the Chinese mainland, the United States would have to count on aircraft from more distant bases, including those in Guam and Hawaii. China’s deployment of the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile suggests that even Guam may no longer enjoy its sanctuary status. If American airpower were pushed farther away from Chinese shores, the U.S. military’s predicament would echo the dilemma that plagued Japanese airpower on Rabaul during the Guadalcanal campaign.

Lesson Two: Logistics

Chinese writings express profound admiration for superior American logistics during the Pacific War. At Guadalcanal, U.S. forward basing, convoying, and sea lane defense allowed for the constant flow of materiel and troops to the island. The Japanese, by contrast, were ill-equipped to resupply their forces on Guadalcanal while American interdiction worsened Japan’s logistical predicament. Dwindling supplies and reinforcements sapped the Japanese army, leaving soldiers without food and ammunition in the campaign’s closing months. Chinese analysts also criticize the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) for failing to attack vulnerable American resupply efforts and exposed supply dumps on the island during the battle’s early stages. In reference to the U.S. logistics vessels that escaped destruction at Guadalcanal, naval analyst Liu Yi argues:

“Those unremarkable transports determined the war’s trajectory after the attritional campaign over Guadalcanal. The war was not to be dictated exclusively by the gains and losses of warships or islands. Rather, the war was about the ability to continue developing a nation’s industrial potential and to convert that potential into the energy that could sustain frontline combat power in a long-term struggle.”2

Chinese commentators extol America’s overwhelming logistical power during the conquest of Okinawa. They are uniformly impressed by the forward basing at the Kerama Islands, the entire logistical infrastructure across the Pacific, including the great anchorage at Ulithi, the at-sea replenishment fleet, the massive amphibious assault force, and the follow-on resupply efforts to keep the ground offensives going. The administrative and logistical systems needed to sustain the supply chain that stretched from the West Coast through various intermediary bases all the way to Okinawa are awe-inspiring to them.

Today, the PLA appreciates that logistical prowess—of the kind the United States demonstrated in the Pacific War—is essential to its global ambitions. The PLA will need to establish forward bases, field transport and logistical ships, and set up various support facilities at home and abroad. It must not only deploy forces that can credibly engage in sea lane defense and interdict enemy supply lines, but it must also demonstrate those skills through peacetime exercises and training. Chinese strategists concur that the infrastructure necessary to support distant missions must align with the sinews of China’s national power to avoid Imperial Japan’s fate at Guadalcanal.

Naval ships assigned to flotillas with the navy under the PLA Eastern Theater Command steam in formation to conduct alongside and astern replenishment-at-sea during a comprehensive replenishment training exercise on February 10, 2023. (eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Zhang Weile)

The PLA understands that logistical weaknesses, like Imperial Japan’s, can be fatal. It recognizes that modern wars consume huge quantities of materiel, placing enormous strains on logistical systems. Disruptions to resupply could lead to the loss of battlefield initiative or worse. The PLA’s doctrine thus calls for attacks against the enemy’s lines of communications to undermine its warfighting capabilities. The theory is that an effective strike against the opponent’s supply chain would cut off the essentials needed to keep its frontline combat units fighting, much as American airpower did to Japanese defenders on Guadalcanal.

Lesson Three: Industrial Power

Chinese analysts acknowledge the importance of economic power and industrial strength in carrying out a protracted war at sea. To them, the mismatch between Imperial Japan’s economy and its ambitions led to severe overextension at Guadalcanal. The destruction of transports and ground forces there accelerated the consumption of scarce resources and compounded Japan’s overreach. The cumulative effects of attrition spilled over into Japanese campaign plans on the Asian continent, compelling Tokyo to call off offensives against Nationalist positions in southcentral China. Losses that Japan could ill afford thus sharpened its dilemma of fighting a two-front war on the mainland and in the Pacific.

Chinese observers have analyzed the interplay between industrial capacity and attrition of forces on the battlefield. They find that Japan’s lack of industrial depth and personnel to recover from combat losses was a critical factor in the conduct and the outcome of the war. Imperial Japan’s inability to rapidly reconstitute its forces had a particularly baneful impact on Japanese warfighting. The loss of irreplaceable pilots at Midway and Guadalcanal was a major contributing factor to Japan’s declining fortunes. To mainland analysts, Japan’s struggle with material and manpower shortfalls illustrates the importance of harnessing all elements of national strength in fighting protracted great power wars.

Today, there are concerns about the U.S. Navy’s capacity to sustain and make up for its losses in a prolonged war. Armed with a large arsenal of missiles, the PLA would seek to land decisive blows against the approaching U.S. surface fleet, just as the IJN and the U.S. Navy inflicted heavy losses on each other in single encounters. The PLA’s ability to drive up attrition means that mass will be at a premium for the United States. Yet, decades of decline, neglect, and mismanagement have led to an atrophied defense-industrial base and an undersized, aging fleet. This resource quandary raises unsettling questions about whether the United States, in a naval war against China, might encounter material constraints like that of Imperial Japan.

Aiming High 

History lessons and historical analogies are not predictions. They hint at the shape of things to come. If the PLA’s interpretations of the Pacific War are any indication of its ambitions, then U.S. policymakers should take notice. Tellingly, Chinese strategists see the United States in the Pacific War as their surrogate for China in a future war. They depict the Imperial Japanese Navy’s failings as a cautionary tale while they show the U.S. Navy’s successes as a model for emulation. Their fascination, if not obsession, with America’s logistical prowess is just one sign of China’s aspirations. The literature conforms to Beijing’s expectation that the PLA must strive to become an equal to the U.S. military. Policymakers should thus treat Chinese lessons from the Pacific War as early warning signals of the PLA’s aims and plans.

Toshi Yoshihara is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). His latest book is Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy (Georgetown University Press, 2022). 

References 

1. Zhao Zhenyu, History of Sea Battles in the Pacific (Beijing: Haichao Press, 1997), pp. 643-644.

2. Liu Yi, The Combined Fleet (Wuhan: Wuhan University Press, 2010), p. 206.

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

Ukraine's Uncrewed Boats are Changing the Way Wars Are Fought

PUBLISHED MAR 23, 2023 

BY DR. ADAM JAMES FENTON

 

When Ukraine successfully deployed self-driving “drone” boats for a major attack on the Russian navy at Sevastopol in Crimea in September 2022 it was a defining moment that changed the future of naval warfare. Uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) have been used before, but this was the first instance of multiple, armed USVs, used simultaneously in combination with aerial drones for a successful, offensive naval operation on a military target.

Several Russian ships were damaged in the attack, and the USVs were reportedly able to penetrate the harbour defences and cause damage to ships in protected anchorages. This will cause a rethink of the role of uncrewed vessels for offensive naval ops, and of harbour defences to protect against such attacks.

USVs offer a number of advantages over regular manned vessels which make them attractive to navies – and many countries have been developing or experimenting with them in recent years. The US has invested heavily with a strategic plan to acquire medium, large and extra-large “unmanned vehicles” to operate both on the surface and underwater. By 2052, more than half of the US naval fleet could potentially be uncrewed.

Other navies are reluctant to be left behind and are actively developing their uncrewed and autonomous capabilities. These include China, UK, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Australia, and others.

By removing human crews from naval vessels a number of efficiencies can be achieved. The design of the ship can be streamlined, disregarding human needs such as sleeping, eating and safety (sleeping berths, galleys, life-rafts and life-jackets can all be removed). So they can be smaller, cheaper to run, faster and able to remain at sea for longer periods of time, in harsher conditions, without any risk of injury or human error.

If armed, they are able to strike targets at the push of a button. And if armed with artificial intelligence (AI) enabled weapons, they are able to identify, acquire and engage targets without any human oversight – and at much greater speeds. Vice-admiral Roy Kitchener, the commander of US naval surface forces, commented in December 2022 that USVs would be a “catalyst for innovation” in the US Pacific fleet, adding that: “The implementation of unmanned systems will increase decision speed and lethality to enhance our warfighting advantage.”

Ethical and legal questions

But the use of these uncrewed warships raises a number of important legal and ethical questions. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – often referred to as the “Constitution of the Oceans” – a “warship” is legally defined as being “under the command of an officer” and “manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline” (emphasis added).

As the “Articles to the Law of the Sea with Commentaries” from 1956 explains, “the definition of the term ‘warship’ has been based on articles 3 and 4 of The Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 relating to the conversion of merchant ships into warships”. The purpose of Article 29 was not to ensure the presence of human crews on warships. That was assumed. It was actually directed at ensuring crews of naval vessels were subject to state oversight and military discipline in response to the practice of privateering which had been employed by some states.

At present there is no settled legal position on the status of uncrewed vessels as “warships”. So how different states use them will be instrumental in forming a more solid position in international law.

Arguably, an expansive, evolutionary approach to interpreting the convention in light of modern advancements, and the purpose of Article 29, could allow an uncrewed vessel to be regarded as a “warship” to ensure a state’s accountability for its actions. This is precisely the view taken by the UK Ministry of Defence in a submission to the House of Lords in November 2021. On the question of whether UNCLOS is “fit for purpose” in the 21st century, it said that Article 29 confirms that:

State responsibility for the actions of warships and requires that the state have an accountable system of discipline to control the actions of those who operate them. Uncrewed vessels should be incorporated into this regime to regulate their proper use. This would be best achieved by an acceptance that Article 29 applies to state operated military uncrewed vessels.

The House of Lords, in its report on UNCLOS: the law of the sea in the 21st century, noted the “absence of international regulation” on the question of “whether maritime autonomous vehicles can be classified as warships or not” and the need to “work with like-minded partners to regulate these technologies”. Effectively leaving the question open until further international practice, opinion and consensus builds up.

The rapidly evolving technology means that the pace of naval conflict will continue to increase. Swarms of networked drones, equipped with AI will give significant speed and lethal advantages to those forces that use them. This will make human “in-the-loop” decision-making increasingly redundant – and even disadvantageous in future conflicts.

But there are significant cyber-security concerns and questions about the reliability and timeliness of human oversight of autonomous systems operating hundreds of nautical miles – possibly underwater – away from human oversight or control. Further, the UK’s commitment to the ethical and legal use of autonomous systems does in no way guarantee that rivals, enemies, or even allies, will show the same restraint – especially in times of war.

The international debate over lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) and calls for a convention to ban them are relevant in this context. An issue of this importance needs to be subject to a public debate and parliament, as a representative of the people, needs to determine their legality and use.

Dr. Adam James Fenton is a Marie Sklodowska-Curie Research Fellow at Coventry University’s Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR). His current research project STRAITSECURITY: Hybrid threats to Maritime Security, is an assessment of cyber and cyber-physical vulnerabilities in the world's busiest shipping lanes

This article appears courtesy of The Conversation and may be found in its original form here. 

Cost Estimates for Repairs to HMS Prince of Wales Skyrocket

HMS Prince of Wales during her maiden arrival at Portsmouth (Royal Navy photo)

PUBLISHED MAR 22, 2023 2:08 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

The UK’s troubled plagued aircraft carrier the HMS Prince of Wales is the focus of a new controversy after The Times [London] published a report at the end of last week contending the problems were known before the Royal Navy took delivery and that taxpayers will now have to pay for the repairs to the vessel. The carrier remains in a dry dock in Scotland with her return to service being delayed till late spring with the Ministry of Defense having also launched an investigation into the carrier and its issues.

Costing an estimated £3.2 billion ($4 billion) to build, the carrier which was the most expensive warship ever built for Britain was delivered to the Royal Navy in December 2019. Reports indicate that the vessel has spent more time undergoing repairs since her delivery than in service as the Royal Navy sought to complete her commissioning and preparation for active duty. In August 2022, she was set to begin one of her highest-profile duties since delivery with a tour that was to cross the Atlantic for joint exercises with the U.S. Navy. Shortly after departure from Portsmouth, however, the carrier was forced to anchor and it was later determined that a coupling had failed on her starboard shaft causing significant damage to the shaft and propeller, with superficial damage to the rudder.

According to the report in The Times, the repair costs for the carrier have skyrocketed to an estimated £20 million. Original reports estimated the cost at £3 million. After entering the dry dock at Rosyth, Scotland in October 2022, an inspection identified potential similar issues with the port shaft. In February reports surfaced in the media that the Royal Navy as a precaution had decided to overhaul the second shaft at the same time and that the carrier’s return to service was then being delayed as they awaited the arrival of parts.

The Prince of Wales requires an exceptional high tide to move from the dry dock and the delays are complicating the timing of her return to the Navy homeport according to the media reports. It is being said that the Navy had expected she would return to base in February and that it is now being delayed till at least May.

A Royal Navy spokesperson responded to The Times saying, “We expect HMS Prince of Wales to commence her operational program as planned, in autumn 2023. This will include flying training and trials.” The spokesperson responded to further speculation confirming, “An investigation is underway to establish the cause of the starboard shaft failure and once complete ministers will provide an update on the outcome.”

The British tabloids are highlighting new accusations that the delivery of the carrier may have been rushed to suit political purposes and that there may have been an awareness of potential problems with the shafts. They are alleging that reports show that issues were identified with the shafts but that it was decided to take delivery regardless of the potential for failure. They contend that the carrier’s problems stem from a misalignment of the shafts during construction.

Ministry of Defense investigators are said to be looking into who knew about the potential problems and when they were first identified as a concern. They also want to know if the issue was ignored or who made the decision not to highlight the issues up the chain of command. 

The Royal Navy responded to inquiries from The Times stating that during tests performed on the HMS Prince of Wales before delivery in 2019, both shafts and the vibration measurements had “remained within the established limits.”

Experts also point out that the government will have a difficult time potentially recovering any of the costs of the repairs from the building group, which was disbanded after the delivery of the second carrier. Both the HMS Prince of Wales and her earlier sistership HMS Queen Elizabeth were built by a specially formed Aircraft Carrier Alliance, a partnership between defense companies BAE Systems, Babcock International, and Thales Group.