Myanmar’s resistance needs a Zelensky-like charismatic leader
Detained democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi’s day is likely done and no new generation fighting figure has risen to the fore
By DAVID HUTT
Detained democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi’s day is likely done and no new generation fighting figure has risen to the fore
By DAVID HUTT
APRIL 13, 2023
ASIA TIMES
In this file photo taken on March 12, 2021, protesters with placards showing the image of the detained civilian leader sit along a street before holding a candlelight vigil.
Photo: Stringer / AFP
The international community has dutifully condemned the latest barbarism perpetrated by Myanmar’s military junta after a military airstrike killed more than 50 people and injured at least 30 people, including children, on April 11 in Sagaing Region.
The previous day, another airstrike killed at least nine people in Chin state.
“These violent attacks further underscore the regime’s disregard for human life and its responsibility for the dire political and humanitarian crisis in Burma (Myanmar) following the February 2021 coup,” a US State Department spokesman said in a statement.
But the latest in a growing number of murderous attacks on civilians by Myanmar junta forces is unlikely to result in more than tough rhetoric from the West.
More than two years on from a military coup that ousted a popularly-elected government, there is little enthusiasm from the rest of the world – including among Myanmar’s neighbors in Southeast Asia that are supposed to be steering a response to the civil strife – for anything other than stern words.
Tom Andrews, the United Nations’ special rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, tweeted: “The Myanmar military’s attacks against innocent people, including today’s airstrike in Sagaing, [are] enabled by world indifference and those supplying them with weapons. How many Myanmar children need to die before world leaders take strong, coordinated action to stop this carnage?”
According to Andrew, Myanmar is the world’s “forgotten war.”
Indeed, there is an obvious double standard as Myanmar’s disparate rebel forces have been repeatedly rebuffed in their appeals for military and financial aid while, at the same time, Western democracies are propping Ukraine with the latest munitions in its defense against Russia’s invasion.
The international community has dutifully condemned the latest barbarism perpetrated by Myanmar’s military junta after a military airstrike killed more than 50 people and injured at least 30 people, including children, on April 11 in Sagaing Region.
The previous day, another airstrike killed at least nine people in Chin state.
“These violent attacks further underscore the regime’s disregard for human life and its responsibility for the dire political and humanitarian crisis in Burma (Myanmar) following the February 2021 coup,” a US State Department spokesman said in a statement.
But the latest in a growing number of murderous attacks on civilians by Myanmar junta forces is unlikely to result in more than tough rhetoric from the West.
More than two years on from a military coup that ousted a popularly-elected government, there is little enthusiasm from the rest of the world – including among Myanmar’s neighbors in Southeast Asia that are supposed to be steering a response to the civil strife – for anything other than stern words.
Tom Andrews, the United Nations’ special rapporteur for human rights in Myanmar, tweeted: “The Myanmar military’s attacks against innocent people, including today’s airstrike in Sagaing, [are] enabled by world indifference and those supplying them with weapons. How many Myanmar children need to die before world leaders take strong, coordinated action to stop this carnage?”
According to Andrew, Myanmar is the world’s “forgotten war.”
Indeed, there is an obvious double standard as Myanmar’s disparate rebel forces have been repeatedly rebuffed in their appeals for military and financial aid while, at the same time, Western democracies are propping Ukraine with the latest munitions in its defense against Russia’s invasion.
A member of the Karenni People Defense Force (KPDF) holds up their wooden weapon as they take part in military training at a camp near Demoso in Kayah state, July 6, 2021. Photo: AFP / Stringer
“While the two conflicts are not completely analogous, it is nonetheless striking how much Ukraine has galvanized the international community, while Myanmar has almost completely been ignored,” Nicholas Farrelly, of the University of Tasmania, argued recently in an essay.
One reason, he suggested, has to do with the lack of a visible, iconic leader leading the resistance in the name of democracy. “With ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other public figures locked up, Myanmar’s resistance forces have no recognizable public face,” he wrote.
Likewise, The Economist, in an article published on January 31, noted “This new resistance lacks a charismatic leader.” According to Frontier Myanmar, a newspaper, “the lack of an easily recognizable figure equivalent to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky has arguably made it harder to rally international support.”
The anti-junta National Unity Government (NUG)’s acting president is Duwa Lashi La, who is almost unknown outside of Myanmar.
Several resistance leaders have risen and fallen in popularity. In the months after the coup, Dr Sasa, a Chin medical doctor and a National League for Democracy (NLD) campaigner, became one of the main spokespeople for the anti-junta movement, but his pedigree has fallen since last year.
“Dr Sasa’s role in the NUG has visibly diminished. Although still its minister of international cooperation, he is no longer featured so heavily in the administration’s press conferences and events, and he attends fewer meetings with foreign governments,” Frontier Myanmar reported in November.
The newspaper noted another pro-democracy figure, Min Ko Naing, a longtime activist, also rose to prominence in the immediate months after the coup but he deliberately retreated from frontline activity soon afterward.
Analysts reckon that potential leaders are wary of making themselves too well known, as this makes them more of a target for the junta’s forces. There are also claims that many in the civilian PDFs and ethnic militias, those doing the fighting, are quick to mock “armchair activists” and attention seekers.
Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s long-time pro-democracy icon since the 1990s and whose National League for Democracy-led government was toppled in the February 1, 2021 coup, could have played a Zelensky-like unifying role if she were free to operate.
“While the two conflicts are not completely analogous, it is nonetheless striking how much Ukraine has galvanized the international community, while Myanmar has almost completely been ignored,” Nicholas Farrelly, of the University of Tasmania, argued recently in an essay.
One reason, he suggested, has to do with the lack of a visible, iconic leader leading the resistance in the name of democracy. “With ousted leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other public figures locked up, Myanmar’s resistance forces have no recognizable public face,” he wrote.
Likewise, The Economist, in an article published on January 31, noted “This new resistance lacks a charismatic leader.” According to Frontier Myanmar, a newspaper, “the lack of an easily recognizable figure equivalent to Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky has arguably made it harder to rally international support.”
The anti-junta National Unity Government (NUG)’s acting president is Duwa Lashi La, who is almost unknown outside of Myanmar.
Several resistance leaders have risen and fallen in popularity. In the months after the coup, Dr Sasa, a Chin medical doctor and a National League for Democracy (NLD) campaigner, became one of the main spokespeople for the anti-junta movement, but his pedigree has fallen since last year.
“Dr Sasa’s role in the NUG has visibly diminished. Although still its minister of international cooperation, he is no longer featured so heavily in the administration’s press conferences and events, and he attends fewer meetings with foreign governments,” Frontier Myanmar reported in November.
The newspaper noted another pro-democracy figure, Min Ko Naing, a longtime activist, also rose to prominence in the immediate months after the coup but he deliberately retreated from frontline activity soon afterward.
Analysts reckon that potential leaders are wary of making themselves too well known, as this makes them more of a target for the junta’s forces. There are also claims that many in the civilian PDFs and ethnic militias, those doing the fighting, are quick to mock “armchair activists” and attention seekers.
Aung San Suu Kyi, the country’s long-time pro-democracy icon since the 1990s and whose National League for Democracy-led government was toppled in the February 1, 2021 coup, could have played a Zelensky-like unifying role if she were free to operate.
Protesters hold posters with the image of detained civilian leader Aung San Suu Kyi during a demonstration against the military coup in Naypyidaw on February 28, 2021. Photo: AFP / Stringer
On the day of her arrest, she called on Myanmar’s people “not to accept a coup” and warned the international community that a military coup would return the country “back under a dictatorship.”
However, she is only rarely able to convey public messages from detention, which are relayed by her proxies and often cryptic in nature. Last April, she apparently called on her compatriots to “stay united and hold discussions on different views.”
Scot Marciel, an author, analyst and former US ambassador to Myanmar, told Asia Times that “a unifying, charismatic figure would certainly help a great deal, as would a highly professional public communications campaign.”
One can only speculate what would have happened had Suu Kyi managed to escape capture and fled abroad before the coup.
Perhaps, like Zelensky, she would have been invited to deliver speeches to the US Congress and parliaments across the Western and wider world. She would have also been a regular on rolling news.
Newspaper and television editors tend to prefer stories with a human touch, and Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and whose name is immediately recognizable in the West, could have been that spark to keep Myanmar in the news.
Of course, there’s a problem with this wishful narrative.
Suu Kyi was a darling of Western liberals during her 15 years of detention between 1989 and 2010 for her non-violent stand to achieve democracy, and she was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for “an outstanding example of the power of the powerless.”
Awards and accolades followed. French director Luc Besson’s feature biopic “The Lady” made her a recognizable icon in the West, spoken about in the same breath as Nelson Mandela.
But Suu Kyi’s reputation was badly damaged (one French newspaper called her a “pariah” on the day of her arrest) after her NLD was elected to government in 2016 and she became state counselor, the nation’s de-facto leader, in a quasi-civilian arrangement where the military maintained control of top ministries including defense, home and border affairs.
In office, she was often accused of not pressing the liberal policies she long said she held sacrosanct. Worse, her image was irrevocably tarnished after she failed to condemn the military-led “genocide” of Muslim Rohingyas in a spasm of internationally-condemned violence in 2017.
On the day of her arrest, she called on Myanmar’s people “not to accept a coup” and warned the international community that a military coup would return the country “back under a dictatorship.”
However, she is only rarely able to convey public messages from detention, which are relayed by her proxies and often cryptic in nature. Last April, she apparently called on her compatriots to “stay united and hold discussions on different views.”
Scot Marciel, an author, analyst and former US ambassador to Myanmar, told Asia Times that “a unifying, charismatic figure would certainly help a great deal, as would a highly professional public communications campaign.”
One can only speculate what would have happened had Suu Kyi managed to escape capture and fled abroad before the coup.
Perhaps, like Zelensky, she would have been invited to deliver speeches to the US Congress and parliaments across the Western and wider world. She would have also been a regular on rolling news.
Newspaper and television editors tend to prefer stories with a human touch, and Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize winner and whose name is immediately recognizable in the West, could have been that spark to keep Myanmar in the news.
Of course, there’s a problem with this wishful narrative.
Suu Kyi was a darling of Western liberals during her 15 years of detention between 1989 and 2010 for her non-violent stand to achieve democracy, and she was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize in 1991 for “an outstanding example of the power of the powerless.”
Awards and accolades followed. French director Luc Besson’s feature biopic “The Lady” made her a recognizable icon in the West, spoken about in the same breath as Nelson Mandela.
But Suu Kyi’s reputation was badly damaged (one French newspaper called her a “pariah” on the day of her arrest) after her NLD was elected to government in 2016 and she became state counselor, the nation’s de-facto leader, in a quasi-civilian arrangement where the military maintained control of top ministries including defense, home and border affairs.
In office, she was often accused of not pressing the liberal policies she long said she held sacrosanct. Worse, her image was irrevocably tarnished after she failed to condemn the military-led “genocide” of Muslim Rohingyas in a spasm of internationally-condemned violence in 2017.
Rohingya refugees reflected in rain water along an embankment next to paddy fields after fleeing from Myanmar into Palang Khali, near Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh November 2, 2017. Photo: Agencies
More than 730,000 Rohingyas fled to precarious, flood-prone camps in Bangladesh, while about 600,000 remain under oppressive rule in Myanmar, Human Rights Watch estimates.
“Aung San Suu Kyi completely lost all international credibility and sympathy after defending the military against charges of genocide,” Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington DC, said.
“She is part of the problem and she should have no role if there can be a negotiated settlement; she is simply too polarizing,” Abuza added. “But her absence now, as an iconic figure who has the ear of political elites and a pedestal does hurt the NUG in terms of garnering international support.”
Yet it is doubtful whether a unifying charismatic figure, if one existed, would prompt a more coordinated response from the international community.
“I don’t think that it’s an issue of personality, it’s rather about leadership,” a senior foreign diplomat told Asia Times.
The main problem is that the vast resistance movement is disorganized, analysts and observers say. Although the NUG claims to speak on its behalf, the movement is divided between numerous new People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), most of which act independently or are aligned with ethnic armed organizations.
“There is no single charismatic leader that can represent the opposition because there is no unified opposition,” Gregory Poling, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said.
“The National Unity Government claims to speak for all opposition forces, but it doesn’t,” he added. “The ethnic armed organizations or the more important fighting forces, without which the NUG has no hope of victory, are not interested in following the NUG’s political lead.”
This lack of an organized movement, some analysts reckon, is the primary reason why foreign governments have shied from wading any further into the conflict.
It isn’t clear to them that greater support for the NUG would amount to anything if the shadow government doesn’t command the will of the movement it claims to speak for.
More than 730,000 Rohingyas fled to precarious, flood-prone camps in Bangladesh, while about 600,000 remain under oppressive rule in Myanmar, Human Rights Watch estimates.
“Aung San Suu Kyi completely lost all international credibility and sympathy after defending the military against charges of genocide,” Zachary Abuza, a professor at the National War College in Washington DC, said.
“She is part of the problem and she should have no role if there can be a negotiated settlement; she is simply too polarizing,” Abuza added. “But her absence now, as an iconic figure who has the ear of political elites and a pedestal does hurt the NUG in terms of garnering international support.”
Yet it is doubtful whether a unifying charismatic figure, if one existed, would prompt a more coordinated response from the international community.
“I don’t think that it’s an issue of personality, it’s rather about leadership,” a senior foreign diplomat told Asia Times.
The main problem is that the vast resistance movement is disorganized, analysts and observers say. Although the NUG claims to speak on its behalf, the movement is divided between numerous new People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), most of which act independently or are aligned with ethnic armed organizations.
“There is no single charismatic leader that can represent the opposition because there is no unified opposition,” Gregory Poling, director of the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), said.
“The National Unity Government claims to speak for all opposition forces, but it doesn’t,” he added. “The ethnic armed organizations or the more important fighting forces, without which the NUG has no hope of victory, are not interested in following the NUG’s political lead.”
This lack of an organized movement, some analysts reckon, is the primary reason why foreign governments have shied from wading any further into the conflict.
It isn’t clear to them that greater support for the NUG would amount to anything if the shadow government doesn’t command the will of the movement it claims to speak for.
Protesters wearing signs in support of the People’s Defence Force (PDF) during a demonstration against the military coup in Dawei, May 10, 2021.
Photo: Handout / Dawei Watch / AFP
“Sympathetic governments are looking to the National Unity Government to create a clear alternative to the military election agenda, which means making the concessions on federalism necessary to bring ethnic armed organizations and ethnic political parties and civil society on board to create a unified front,” Mark Farmaner, director of Burma Campaign UK, a lobbying group, said.
“This hasn’t happened yet.”
While Suu Kyi, 77, remains popular at home, her time in the political limelight has likely ended. Many in the younger generation reckon that Suu Kyi’s domineering control of the NLD was a hindrance to democratic development.
Others reckon that the anti-junta movement needed to shed the NLD’s baggage in order to agree on more revolutionary solutions to the problems that have plagued Myanmar for decades, not least the question of minority groups in ethnic areas.
The NUG, for instance, now proposes a federal solution to the country’s historic divisions, providing more autonomy to the ethnic periphery regions as well as greater representation of minority groups.
The anti-coup revolution has also significantly altered thinking about how to achieve peace and liberty.
Whereas Suu Kyi and several other NUG senior figures are from an older generation who saw non-violent means as the way to achieve political goals, many young PDF members clearly reckon that liberty will come more readily through violent means that result in the military junta’s overthrow.
There is little chance they will accept the return of the status quo antebellum: the system of militarized politics and centralized control over the peripheries must be overturned by revolution. Suu Kyi, despite her charisma and clout, now represents the old failed ways to many in a, for now, leaderless movement.
Follow David Hutt on Twitter at @davidhuttjourno
“Sympathetic governments are looking to the National Unity Government to create a clear alternative to the military election agenda, which means making the concessions on federalism necessary to bring ethnic armed organizations and ethnic political parties and civil society on board to create a unified front,” Mark Farmaner, director of Burma Campaign UK, a lobbying group, said.
“This hasn’t happened yet.”
While Suu Kyi, 77, remains popular at home, her time in the political limelight has likely ended. Many in the younger generation reckon that Suu Kyi’s domineering control of the NLD was a hindrance to democratic development.
Others reckon that the anti-junta movement needed to shed the NLD’s baggage in order to agree on more revolutionary solutions to the problems that have plagued Myanmar for decades, not least the question of minority groups in ethnic areas.
The NUG, for instance, now proposes a federal solution to the country’s historic divisions, providing more autonomy to the ethnic periphery regions as well as greater representation of minority groups.
The anti-coup revolution has also significantly altered thinking about how to achieve peace and liberty.
Whereas Suu Kyi and several other NUG senior figures are from an older generation who saw non-violent means as the way to achieve political goals, many young PDF members clearly reckon that liberty will come more readily through violent means that result in the military junta’s overthrow.
There is little chance they will accept the return of the status quo antebellum: the system of militarized politics and centralized control over the peripheries must be overturned by revolution. Suu Kyi, despite her charisma and clout, now represents the old failed ways to many in a, for now, leaderless movement.
Follow David Hutt on Twitter at @davidhuttjourno
Successful insurgent group stands in stark contrast to NUG shadow government’s weak, feckless and divided resistance
By DAVID SCOTT MATHIESON
APRIL 12, 2023
ASIA TIMES
ASIA TIMES
Arakan Army insurgent fighters take aim in their conflict against Myanmar state forces in Rakhine state.
Photo: YouTube / Arakan Army promotional video
The Arakan Army (AA), one of Myanmar’s most audacious and effective insurgencies turned 14 years old this week, underscoring what can be achieved by anti-military resistance as civil war rages on multiple fronts.
“Felicitation” notices were duly made to the rebel group and its leaders on the day, standard communications among resistance groups to each other on key anniversaries.
The anti-military National Unity Government (NUG), formed after the 2021 coup, also sent its best regards, as did the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), the Chin Defense Force-Mindat, the Yaw Defense Force (YDF) and the Anti-Dictatorship Revolution People’s Army (DRPA), among others.
Well-wishers had to be careful about posting on Facebook: the platform still bans the AA and three of its ethnic armed organization (EAO) allies and posting anything related risks a suspension of any account. But this censorship threat has not diminished the AA’s popularity and reach.
The NUG’s acting president, Duwa Lashi La, sent a handwritten letter which was in many ways more touching for the occasion, congratulating the AA on uniting the people of Rakhine. His note received a positive reply from the AA’s charismatic founder and leader, Major General Twan Mrat Naing.
This reflected a respectful acknowledgment of the AA’s near-top position on Myanmar’s revolutionary ziggurat, and the struggles of the NUG to unite hundreds of disparate People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) to better coordinate armed struggle against the State Administration Council (SAC) junta.
In many respects, the AA is the preferred model for many emerging armed groups, who admire the AA’s determination, fighting spirit and elan, and its successful model for mobilization against military repression.
Myanmar has become an incubator for insurgent innovation, but this had spread well before the February 2021 democracy-suspending coup.
Formed in northern Kachin state on April 10, 2009, the AA cut its teeth in battling the Myanmar military after its 17-year-long ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) – the AA’s and other Rakhine insurgent groups’ initial benefactor and trainer – broke down in 2011.
Starting in 2009, the KIO nurtured three “startup insurgencies”; the AA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the reformed ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), now collectively known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
The Arakan Army (AA), one of Myanmar’s most audacious and effective insurgencies turned 14 years old this week, underscoring what can be achieved by anti-military resistance as civil war rages on multiple fronts.
“Felicitation” notices were duly made to the rebel group and its leaders on the day, standard communications among resistance groups to each other on key anniversaries.
The anti-military National Unity Government (NUG), formed after the 2021 coup, also sent its best regards, as did the Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), the Chin Defense Force-Mindat, the Yaw Defense Force (YDF) and the Anti-Dictatorship Revolution People’s Army (DRPA), among others.
Well-wishers had to be careful about posting on Facebook: the platform still bans the AA and three of its ethnic armed organization (EAO) allies and posting anything related risks a suspension of any account. But this censorship threat has not diminished the AA’s popularity and reach.
The NUG’s acting president, Duwa Lashi La, sent a handwritten letter which was in many ways more touching for the occasion, congratulating the AA on uniting the people of Rakhine. His note received a positive reply from the AA’s charismatic founder and leader, Major General Twan Mrat Naing.
This reflected a respectful acknowledgment of the AA’s near-top position on Myanmar’s revolutionary ziggurat, and the struggles of the NUG to unite hundreds of disparate People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) to better coordinate armed struggle against the State Administration Council (SAC) junta.
In many respects, the AA is the preferred model for many emerging armed groups, who admire the AA’s determination, fighting spirit and elan, and its successful model for mobilization against military repression.
Myanmar has become an incubator for insurgent innovation, but this had spread well before the February 2021 democracy-suspending coup.
Formed in northern Kachin state on April 10, 2009, the AA cut its teeth in battling the Myanmar military after its 17-year-long ceasefire with the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) – the AA’s and other Rakhine insurgent groups’ initial benefactor and trainer – broke down in 2011.
Starting in 2009, the KIO nurtured three “startup insurgencies”; the AA, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the reformed ethnic Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), now collectively known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance.
Arakan Army fighters in a promotional video in 2018.
Photo: YouTube screengrab
With methodical logistics, the AA has built up its base area in Paletwa in Chin state, the isolated northern back door to Rakhine state, and slowly pushed into the plains of central Rakhine.
A furious two-year heavy fighting period ensued from 2018 to late 2020, with the Myanmar military losing, by some estimates, 2,000 soldiers in furious battles across multiple Rakhine state townships that also displaced some 200,000 Rakhine civilians. Those fights are a microcosm of what is happening all over Myanmar now.
A surprise bilateral ceasefire agreed in the aftermath of the November 2020 nationwide elections restored some calm, but tensions and open fighting resumed before a November 2022 “humanitarian ceasefire” was brokered by controversial Japanese envoy Yohei Sasakawa of the Nippon Foundation.
The AA has prioritized consolidating administration in the areas it controls in Rakhine, but further hostilities with the SAC are inevitable.
The widespread popularity of the AA and its United League of Arakan (ULA) political arm stands in stark contrast to widespread public criticism of the longer-established Arakan Liberation Party-Arakan Liberation Army (ALP/ALA), which spent decades headquartered on the Thai-Myanmar border and since 2012 has engaged in bilateral and multilateral peace talks with previous quasi-civilian governments.
But the ALP has not been a serious rival to the AA for many years, and has fallen into deeper disarray as the AA has superseded it for several years.
In early January, following Myanmar Independence Day Celebrations in the Rakhine state capital of Sittwe, ALA chief of staff General Khaing Soe Mya and two subordinates were assassinated in town. Although the AA is strongly suspected, no one has claimed responsibility for the lethal attack.
The ALP’s leadership split in February, with the public face of the party, Saw Mra Razar Lin, expelled before bizarrely establishing her own parallel ALP on March 19.
A day after, the mainstream ALP banned her “new” party and prohibited her from attending Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) peace talks with the SAC in late March: she went anyway, injecting even greater absurdity to the wan proceedings of seven micro armed groups still discussing constitutional issues while Myanmar burns far and wide.
With methodical logistics, the AA has built up its base area in Paletwa in Chin state, the isolated northern back door to Rakhine state, and slowly pushed into the plains of central Rakhine.
A furious two-year heavy fighting period ensued from 2018 to late 2020, with the Myanmar military losing, by some estimates, 2,000 soldiers in furious battles across multiple Rakhine state townships that also displaced some 200,000 Rakhine civilians. Those fights are a microcosm of what is happening all over Myanmar now.
A surprise bilateral ceasefire agreed in the aftermath of the November 2020 nationwide elections restored some calm, but tensions and open fighting resumed before a November 2022 “humanitarian ceasefire” was brokered by controversial Japanese envoy Yohei Sasakawa of the Nippon Foundation.
The AA has prioritized consolidating administration in the areas it controls in Rakhine, but further hostilities with the SAC are inevitable.
The widespread popularity of the AA and its United League of Arakan (ULA) political arm stands in stark contrast to widespread public criticism of the longer-established Arakan Liberation Party-Arakan Liberation Army (ALP/ALA), which spent decades headquartered on the Thai-Myanmar border and since 2012 has engaged in bilateral and multilateral peace talks with previous quasi-civilian governments.
But the ALP has not been a serious rival to the AA for many years, and has fallen into deeper disarray as the AA has superseded it for several years.
In early January, following Myanmar Independence Day Celebrations in the Rakhine state capital of Sittwe, ALA chief of staff General Khaing Soe Mya and two subordinates were assassinated in town. Although the AA is strongly suspected, no one has claimed responsibility for the lethal attack.
The ALP’s leadership split in February, with the public face of the party, Saw Mra Razar Lin, expelled before bizarrely establishing her own parallel ALP on March 19.
A day after, the mainstream ALP banned her “new” party and prohibited her from attending Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) peace talks with the SAC in late March: she went anyway, injecting even greater absurdity to the wan proceedings of seven micro armed groups still discussing constitutional issues while Myanmar burns far and wide.
Myanmar’s military likes to flex its hardware muscle. Photo: Facebook
For the AA, it is pursuing a measured path to consolidating its rule and using the humanitarian pause to expand its administration, including over judicial issues tax collection, and expanding its armed forces, which some estimate may now number somewhere between 25,000-30,000 soldiers.
Despite some Rakhine political parties re-registering in recent weeks for the SAC’s planned elections at an indeterminate date, their potential participation in the widely criticized polls will likely be decided by the AA/ULA’s leadership.
The AA’s once prolific media strategy has also gone into a hiatus of sorts – at least the English language version – since its “state-building” phase began in late 2020. This shouldn’t be surprising.
The AA/ULA realizes its relationships with neighboring China, India and Bangladesh (and to a certain extent Thailand) are more important than with the West.
In fact, having to deal with Sasakawa is another symptom of how the Western-funded and misdirected peace process excluded the new, and arguably more representative, insurgents ever since it was signed in 2015.
It is no surprise that the AA and its northern allies have established close relationships with the Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF): they pride themselves on having an eye for talent.
AA/ULA deputy leader Dr Nyo Twan Aung told an online session on resistance “liberated areas” in early April, “Our Brotherhood recognizes the KNDF as a partner organization, and we are fighting this revolution together. We will continue to either operate separately or work together in the future, depending on the situation of the country.”
This also tracks with several other emerging groups receiving recognition for performance on the battlefield and political strategy over elite entitlement from the coup-toppled former ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which has hobbled the NUG since its formation.
The Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), led by the charismatic activist poet Maung Saungkha, has established close ties with renowned Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) leader Lieutenant General Baw Kyaw Heh, whose group is operating in northern Kayin state, and in early 2023 established the multi-ethnic Brigade 611 in the Kokang area near the China border.
Observers say the AA is likely providing clandestine aid to PDFs in the neighboring Magwe region, while the wider Brotherhood is likely supporting anti-SAC PDFs and EAOs with weapons in the southeast of the country.
But this support, if confirmed as some assess, is likely based on inter-group relations and not the efforts of the increasingly maligned NUG and its two widely perceived as feckless armed resistance leaders: Minister of Defense U Ye Mon and Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration Lwin Ko Latt.
Perhaps, then, Lashi La’s handwritten note to Twan Mrat Naing was a gesture toward establishing better relations with an armed group many believe it needs to model its comparatively torpid resistance.
For the AA, it is pursuing a measured path to consolidating its rule and using the humanitarian pause to expand its administration, including over judicial issues tax collection, and expanding its armed forces, which some estimate may now number somewhere between 25,000-30,000 soldiers.
Despite some Rakhine political parties re-registering in recent weeks for the SAC’s planned elections at an indeterminate date, their potential participation in the widely criticized polls will likely be decided by the AA/ULA’s leadership.
The AA’s once prolific media strategy has also gone into a hiatus of sorts – at least the English language version – since its “state-building” phase began in late 2020. This shouldn’t be surprising.
The AA/ULA realizes its relationships with neighboring China, India and Bangladesh (and to a certain extent Thailand) are more important than with the West.
In fact, having to deal with Sasakawa is another symptom of how the Western-funded and misdirected peace process excluded the new, and arguably more representative, insurgents ever since it was signed in 2015.
It is no surprise that the AA and its northern allies have established close relationships with the Karenni National Defense Force (KNDF): they pride themselves on having an eye for talent.
AA/ULA deputy leader Dr Nyo Twan Aung told an online session on resistance “liberated areas” in early April, “Our Brotherhood recognizes the KNDF as a partner organization, and we are fighting this revolution together. We will continue to either operate separately or work together in the future, depending on the situation of the country.”
This also tracks with several other emerging groups receiving recognition for performance on the battlefield and political strategy over elite entitlement from the coup-toppled former ruling party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), which has hobbled the NUG since its formation.
The Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), led by the charismatic activist poet Maung Saungkha, has established close ties with renowned Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) leader Lieutenant General Baw Kyaw Heh, whose group is operating in northern Kayin state, and in early 2023 established the multi-ethnic Brigade 611 in the Kokang area near the China border.
Observers say the AA is likely providing clandestine aid to PDFs in the neighboring Magwe region, while the wider Brotherhood is likely supporting anti-SAC PDFs and EAOs with weapons in the southeast of the country.
But this support, if confirmed as some assess, is likely based on inter-group relations and not the efforts of the increasingly maligned NUG and its two widely perceived as feckless armed resistance leaders: Minister of Defense U Ye Mon and Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration Lwin Ko Latt.
Perhaps, then, Lashi La’s handwritten note to Twan Mrat Naing was a gesture toward establishing better relations with an armed group many believe it needs to model its comparatively torpid resistance.
Twan Mrat Naing, commander-in-chief of the Arakan Army, attends a meeting of leaders of Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups at the United Wa State Army headquarters in Myanmar’s northern Shan state. Photo: Twitter
To be sure, the AA has not jumped into the NUG’s embrace. This is for a number of reasons. The first is that the ULA’s political project of “Arakan Dream 2020” and “The Way of Rakhita” predated the February 2021 coup and was clearly defined as seeking more autonomy from the central ethnic Bamar state, which has maligned and marginalized Rakhine people for decades.
The AA, like other armed groups, will not easily forget or forgive the NLD’s years of withering dismissal of their political, economic and social claims.
It should also cast doubt on NUG Ministry of Defense claims it has the clout to effectively coordinate between well-established EAOs. Two years into the anti-SAC resistance and the NUG has failed to attract the AA and other EAOs into an effective anti-military coalition.
Twan Mratt Naing and his AA have a clear-eyed vision for the Rakhine revolution, a resolve that stands in contrast to the lukewarm lethargy of so many NUG leaders.
On the occasion of the Myanmar air force bombing a KIO celebration in Hpakant in October 2022, killing over 50, he posted on social media that it was a “clarion call for concerted action to exterminate the military fascism.”
As news comes in around the latest mass murder of civilians by a military air strike against a civilian food distribution center in Kantbalu in Sagaing Region, it’s precisely the professional yet ruthless leadership model of the AA that the wider resistance needs to adopt before its too late.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues on Myanmar.
To be sure, the AA has not jumped into the NUG’s embrace. This is for a number of reasons. The first is that the ULA’s political project of “Arakan Dream 2020” and “The Way of Rakhita” predated the February 2021 coup and was clearly defined as seeking more autonomy from the central ethnic Bamar state, which has maligned and marginalized Rakhine people for decades.
The AA, like other armed groups, will not easily forget or forgive the NLD’s years of withering dismissal of their political, economic and social claims.
It should also cast doubt on NUG Ministry of Defense claims it has the clout to effectively coordinate between well-established EAOs. Two years into the anti-SAC resistance and the NUG has failed to attract the AA and other EAOs into an effective anti-military coalition.
Twan Mratt Naing and his AA have a clear-eyed vision for the Rakhine revolution, a resolve that stands in contrast to the lukewarm lethargy of so many NUG leaders.
On the occasion of the Myanmar air force bombing a KIO celebration in Hpakant in October 2022, killing over 50, he posted on social media that it was a “clarion call for concerted action to exterminate the military fascism.”
As news comes in around the latest mass murder of civilians by a military air strike against a civilian food distribution center in Kantbalu in Sagaing Region, it’s precisely the professional yet ruthless leadership model of the AA that the wider resistance needs to adopt before its too late.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues on Myanmar.
Junta making plans for a meaningless Myanmar election
Regime deregisters coup-toppled National League for Democracy ahead of elections designed to launder military atrocities, not reset democracy
By DAVID SCOTT MATHIESON
MARCH 29, 2023
ASIA TIMES
ASIA TIMES
A trishaw driver wears a face mask promoting the National League for Democracy (NLD) party during an election campaign rally in Yangon, Myanmar, September 8, 2020.
Photo: Agencies
Myanmar’s military regime on Tuesday (March 28) took the major step of deregistering the National League for Democracy (NLD), the clear winner of the November 2020 nationwide elections.
The State Administration Council-controlled Union Election Commission (UEC) announced that following the release of the amended Political Party Registration Law in late January, existing political parties had 60 days to re-register.
Forty parties, including the NLD, refused to do so. Fifty other existing parties, including the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), have registered for future polls. A further 13 new political parties have applied for registration.
The SAC has still not announced a date for its planned polls, after renewing the State of Emergency on February 1. The announcement may make it clearer who will and won’t contest, but everything else about the regime’s election plans is subject to speculation.
It is likely that the military leadership still hasn’t decided on when and how it can hold polls. A new system of proportional representation has been announced, but it is unlikely the military-captured electoral commission has the bureaucratic capacity to conduct anything resembling a credible election.
But SAC elections are not designed for credibility. They are being constructed to dupe the already deluded into some semblance of legitimacy for the military takeover.
Dissolving the NLD and 39 other parties, some of whom such as the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD), won significant numbers of seats in 2020, turns already discredited poll planning into violent pantomime.
The coup sparked widespread armed resistance to the military, has rendered large parts of Myanmar into conflict and humanitarian disaster zones, and shows no sign of abating; if anything, armed conflict and civilian suffering have been on the rise as the coup enters its third year.
These are not conditions conducive to election preparation, a point SAC leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing made in a speech to the annual Armed Force Day parade on March 27.
Myanmar’s military regime on Tuesday (March 28) took the major step of deregistering the National League for Democracy (NLD), the clear winner of the November 2020 nationwide elections.
The State Administration Council-controlled Union Election Commission (UEC) announced that following the release of the amended Political Party Registration Law in late January, existing political parties had 60 days to re-register.
Forty parties, including the NLD, refused to do so. Fifty other existing parties, including the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), have registered for future polls. A further 13 new political parties have applied for registration.
The SAC has still not announced a date for its planned polls, after renewing the State of Emergency on February 1. The announcement may make it clearer who will and won’t contest, but everything else about the regime’s election plans is subject to speculation.
It is likely that the military leadership still hasn’t decided on when and how it can hold polls. A new system of proportional representation has been announced, but it is unlikely the military-captured electoral commission has the bureaucratic capacity to conduct anything resembling a credible election.
But SAC elections are not designed for credibility. They are being constructed to dupe the already deluded into some semblance of legitimacy for the military takeover.
Dissolving the NLD and 39 other parties, some of whom such as the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD), won significant numbers of seats in 2020, turns already discredited poll planning into violent pantomime.
The coup sparked widespread armed resistance to the military, has rendered large parts of Myanmar into conflict and humanitarian disaster zones, and shows no sign of abating; if anything, armed conflict and civilian suffering have been on the rise as the coup enters its third year.
These are not conditions conducive to election preparation, a point SAC leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing made in a speech to the annual Armed Force Day parade on March 27.
Myanmar’s coup maker Senior General Min Aung Hlaing attends the 9th Moscow Conference on International Security in Moscow, Russia on June 23, 2021.
Photo: AFP via Anadolu Agency / Sefa Karacan
The NLD has been subjected to extreme violence since the coup, with hundreds of party members arrested and imprisoned under politically motivated charges of corruption. NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been imprisoned for 33 years on a number of spurious offenses.
Property of NLD party members has been seized and destroyed, and security forces have targeted party members for assassination. Several hundred USDP members have also been killed in targeted assassinations by resistance forces.
Of the 50 parties who had applied for new registration, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDP) is the one most closely aligned with the military. Many of them are smaller parties that will contest only in state and regions, not nationally.
The National Unity Party (NUP), which rose from the ashes of the vanquished Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) to contest the 1990 election, which it lost to the NLD, is running once again after a losing streak that included few votes and fewer parliamentary seats in 2010, 2015 and 2020.
Significant ethnic parties such as the Pa-O National Organization Party (PNO), the Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP) and the Mon Unity Party (MUP) have registered, but their involvement in future elections will likely suffer from diminished community support, as divisions widen between the subservience of geriatric leaders and angry youth resisting military rule.
One surprise re-registration was the Arakan National Party (ANP), the most popular political party in Rakhine state, likely still smarting from having many of its constituencies canceled by the NLD and military in 2020 due to widespread armed conflict.
However, registration does not automatically infer contesting. The ultimate decision for that will likely be decided by the Arakan Army (AA) leadership, who have extended their Arakan People’s Authority (APA) administration to large parts of Rakhine, and has the capacity to thwart any poll preparation.
Less surprising was the decision by the Arakan Front Party (AFP) of Aye Maung, a quixotic Rakhine ultra-nationalist who appears to have chosen to appease the SAC after being released from prison following the coup.
As if to presage the assembly of Quisling’s who will contest the elections, Ko Ko Gyi of the People’s Party (PP) attended Monday’s Armed Forces Day event in Naypyidaw: his party registered early in the 60-day period.
He failed to win a seat in 2020 and his PP attracted little support. He was one of several high-profile losers in that election who succumbed to the dark side of anti-Suu Kyi sentiment and entered the military’s orbit. Thet Thet Khaing’s People’s Pioneer Party (PPP) also registered, but she seems committed to serving the SAC as Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement.
Also present on Monday’s unconvincing demonstration of military might, and instrumental in rigging the future elections, were the gaggle of thugs who hoodwinked so many diplomats, journalists and military apologists over the years: Khin Yi, former national police chief and the head of the USDP, former admiral Soe Thane, and reportedly some of the leaders of smaller Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) who were in the capital this week for another round of farcical “peace talks.”
The NLD has been subjected to extreme violence since the coup, with hundreds of party members arrested and imprisoned under politically motivated charges of corruption. NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been imprisoned for 33 years on a number of spurious offenses.
Property of NLD party members has been seized and destroyed, and security forces have targeted party members for assassination. Several hundred USDP members have also been killed in targeted assassinations by resistance forces.
Of the 50 parties who had applied for new registration, the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDP) is the one most closely aligned with the military. Many of them are smaller parties that will contest only in state and regions, not nationally.
The National Unity Party (NUP), which rose from the ashes of the vanquished Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) to contest the 1990 election, which it lost to the NLD, is running once again after a losing streak that included few votes and fewer parliamentary seats in 2010, 2015 and 2020.
Significant ethnic parties such as the Pa-O National Organization Party (PNO), the Kachin State People’s Party (KSPP) and the Mon Unity Party (MUP) have registered, but their involvement in future elections will likely suffer from diminished community support, as divisions widen between the subservience of geriatric leaders and angry youth resisting military rule.
One surprise re-registration was the Arakan National Party (ANP), the most popular political party in Rakhine state, likely still smarting from having many of its constituencies canceled by the NLD and military in 2020 due to widespread armed conflict.
However, registration does not automatically infer contesting. The ultimate decision for that will likely be decided by the Arakan Army (AA) leadership, who have extended their Arakan People’s Authority (APA) administration to large parts of Rakhine, and has the capacity to thwart any poll preparation.
Less surprising was the decision by the Arakan Front Party (AFP) of Aye Maung, a quixotic Rakhine ultra-nationalist who appears to have chosen to appease the SAC after being released from prison following the coup.
As if to presage the assembly of Quisling’s who will contest the elections, Ko Ko Gyi of the People’s Party (PP) attended Monday’s Armed Forces Day event in Naypyidaw: his party registered early in the 60-day period.
He failed to win a seat in 2020 and his PP attracted little support. He was one of several high-profile losers in that election who succumbed to the dark side of anti-Suu Kyi sentiment and entered the military’s orbit. Thet Thet Khaing’s People’s Pioneer Party (PPP) also registered, but she seems committed to serving the SAC as Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement.
Also present on Monday’s unconvincing demonstration of military might, and instrumental in rigging the future elections, were the gaggle of thugs who hoodwinked so many diplomats, journalists and military apologists over the years: Khin Yi, former national police chief and the head of the USDP, former admiral Soe Thane, and reportedly some of the leaders of smaller Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) who were in the capital this week for another round of farcical “peace talks.”
A banner featuring Aung San Suu Kyi is displayed on February 15 as protesters demonstrating against the military coup surround police, who had blocked off the street leading to the headquarters of the National League for Democracy (NLD), in Yangon that day.
Photo: AFP / Ye Aung Thu
There is no doubt that the NLD made its share of enemies. Its political culture was deemed to be rigidly hierarchical, with blind fealty to the wintry monarch of Suu Kyi.
The National Unity Government (NUG), which rose partly from NLD members and anchors its legitimacy in the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH, or national assembly) is still grappling with the vestiges of this culture that frustrates the forging of consensus politics, coalition building, inclusivity and the urgent necessity of collective leadership with anti-SAC armed groups throughout the country.
But the deregistration of the NLD, SNLD and others is not the final step in the grotesque illegitimacy of the SAC’s elections plans. There is no possibility that any polls will provide a breakthrough for political reform. Only the most studiously gullible diplomat would fall for these elections designed to launder the atrocities of military rule, not reset democracy.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues.
There is no doubt that the NLD made its share of enemies. Its political culture was deemed to be rigidly hierarchical, with blind fealty to the wintry monarch of Suu Kyi.
The National Unity Government (NUG), which rose partly from NLD members and anchors its legitimacy in the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH, or national assembly) is still grappling with the vestiges of this culture that frustrates the forging of consensus politics, coalition building, inclusivity and the urgent necessity of collective leadership with anti-SAC armed groups throughout the country.
But the deregistration of the NLD, SNLD and others is not the final step in the grotesque illegitimacy of the SAC’s elections plans. There is no possibility that any polls will provide a breakthrough for political reform. Only the most studiously gullible diplomat would fall for these elections designed to launder the atrocities of military rule, not reset democracy.
David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian and human rights issues.
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