Monday, July 31, 2023

Saudi metals deal to test Canada’s new foreign investor rules

Bloomberg News | July 28, 2023 | 

Voisey’s Bay nickel mine in labrador. (Image courtesy of Vale)

Canada’s vow to curb foreign investment in its critical minerals sector will face its first major test with Saudi Arabia’s deal to buy into some of the country’s largest nickel mines.


Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s government introduced new rules in October that added a layer of regulatory scrutiny to investments by foreign state-owned entities. Such deals will only be approved “on an exceptional basis” if they’re considered a “net benefit” to the country.

“The government will give enhanced scrutiny to this type of investment,” Canadian industry ministry spokesperson Sean Benmor said in a Friday statement. “The government takes very seriously its responsibility to protect national security and acts decisively when necessary.”

Vale SA announced Thursday that Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund and Saudi Arabian Mining Co. agreed to buy a joint 10% stake in the Brazilian mining company’s base metals unit. Vale operates Canada’s largest nickel mine, Voisey’s Bay in Labrador, and operations in Sudbury, Ontario.

Canada’s approval process would involve a national security review that can take 200 days or more and would then require sign off from Canadian lawmakers including the federal industry minister. Vale’s chief executive officer Eduardo Bartolomeo dismissed the potential for regulatory hiccups in a Friday interview, pointing to Canada’s recent restoration of diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia.

“We are the ones who run the show, they are passive partners,” he said in an interview. “Our principles will rule.”

(By Jacob Lorinc and Mariana Durao)

The mining world turns to Saudi cash for critical metal supply

Bloomberg News | July 30, 2023 | 

Bandar Ibrahim Alkhorayef, Saudi Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources.


A $2.6 billion deal announced last week has set the stage for a potentially landmark shift in the metal and mining investment landscape: the arrival of Saudi Arabia as a pivotal player.


The agreement with Vale SA gives the kingdom a 10% slice in one of the world’s crucial suppliers of nickel and copper — essential metals needed to decarbonize. It’s also held other talks, including with Barrick Gold Corp. about investing in a big Pakistan copper mine, according to people familiar with the matter. Speaking privately, executives at top miners said the value of Thursday’s deal made clear that the Saudis are ready to splash cash around.

The move comes as the question of who controls the commodities needed to both sustain and decarbonize the world’s economies has turned into a global flashpoint, jumping to the top of agendas in the US and Europe.

China has for years been the dominant buyer and a key source of funding, as it sought to secure supply for its rapid industrialization. But as tensions with the West have mounted, the mining industry is now facing increased pressure to look elsewhere.

Saudi Arabia is seeking to take minority stakes in global mining assets that will over time help provide access to supplies of strategic minerals. The country also is looking to build a metals-processing industry that could in turn make it more attractive for international miners to exploit its mineral deposits — a central pillar of Saudi efforts to diversify the economy away from oil.

The kingdom has invested heavily into industrial and financial assets and even turned the world of sport upside down by essentially buying the game of professional golf and piling into soccer. However, the Vale deal announced last week is its first major foray into mining. Manara Minerals, a new venture between the kingdom’s sovereign wealth fund and state mining company, will get a stake in Vale’s base metals business, giving Saudi Arabia an interest in mines from Indonesia to Canada producing copper, nickel and other industrial metals.

For western producers, the kingdom offers access to deep pools of capital, which are appealing as Chinese funds become less politically palatable, but also as some institutional investors have turned less comfortable with mining over environmental concerns.

Investors from the region — Qatar is already a major backer of Glencore Plc — are now likely to become one of the most important financiers for the capital hungry sector, according to serial mine builder Robert Friedland, who spent the last few years developing one of the world’s biggest copper operations, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with the help of Chinese funds.

“Now, probably, the largest supply of capital to the mining industry will come from the Middle East,” he said in an interview last month.

But Saudi Arabia offers something else beyond cold cash: political backing for companies looking to expand into the Muslim world as deposits in more traditional jurisdictions are depleted.

Canada’s Barrick has been in talks with the Public Investment Fund about a potential stake in its Reko Diq copper project in Pakistan, which is a relatively untouched frontier for the international mining industry, according to people familiar with the matter. Bringing the Saudis on board would not only ease Barrick’s funding burden, but also introduce a partner that has significant political influence in Pakistan, the people said.

Spokespeople for the PIF and Barrick did not comment.

Saudi Arabia’s deep pockets may also present some challenges for the biggest producers who are looking for deals of their own. Keen to get more exposure to copper and nickel, miners have started writing the biggest checks in more than a decade. BHP Group and Rio Tinto Group — the two largest — have just completed multi-billion dollar deals to grow in copper, while Glencore Plc tried to buy Teck Resources Ltd.

For years, the big producers have found themselves repeatedly outbid by Chinese companies when it comes to buying mines. China’s state-owned metal and mining companies have been willing to pay valuations that western firms simply couldn’t match. Saudi Arabia now seems willing to do the same, potentially putting some deals beyond the reach of the industry’s traditional buyers.

Executives at two of the biggest mining companies, which have spent years assessing base metal assets such as those owned by Vale, said privately that they were surprised by the price tag in last week’s deal, which valued the unit at $26 billion (RBC Capital Markets said it was worth about $21 billion.)

Still, unlike Chinese companies, Saudi Arabia is currently more interested in securing stakes — guaranteeing future supply of critical minerals — rather than buying outright and then operating the assets.

Saudi Arabia set down a marker earlier this year when it announced the new firm to invest in mining assets globally, with $3.2 billion for initial investments. The country holds an annual mining conference, which this year featured the CEO of the world’s biggest mining company, BHP’s Mike Henry, as well as the chairman of no. 2 producer Rio Tinto — a major step up from past speakers. CEOs from other top miners are expected to attend next year.

For mining companies looking for funds, the US and Canadian governments’ recent crackdown on Chinese investment in key metals companies has changed the investment landscape. That’s given an opening to Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia to fill the gap.

“Everything’s changed,” said Friedland.

“The American government has an ‘ABC’ policy: Anything But China. So the American government instead goes to rulers in the Middle East and says, “You should be giving the African people an alternative for financing mines in Africa. Recycle some of those petro-dollars.”

(By Thomas Biesheuvel and Jacob Lorinc, with assistance from Mariana Durao, Dinesh Nair, Archie Hunter and Matthew Martin)

Southern Copper getting more optimistic on stalled Peru mine

Bloomberg News | July 28, 2023 | 

Tia Maria mine. (Image courtesy of Southern Copper Corp.)

Southern Copper Corp. is growing more optimistic about being able to build a fiercely contested copper mine in the coastal mountains of Peru as sociopolitical tensions ease.


The company has been trying for years to convince local communities of the merits of the Tia Maria project. A 2019 decision to approve its license unleashed weeks of protests and former President Pedro Castillo singled it out as a non-starter. But the company says it’s been making progress with communities of late.


“Basically we are relatively much more optimistic than we were a year ago,” chief financial officer Raul Jacob told analysts on an earnings call Friday.

Developing the $1.4 billion project would be a major breakthrough in a country where the mining industry’s relations with isolated rural communities often sour. It’s part of Southern’s $15 billion pipeline of projects this decade.

(By James Attwood)
Ecuadorean votes could bar oil output in Amazon reserve, mining near Quito

Reuters | July 31, 2023 

View of El Panecillo in the center of Quito with the Cotopaxi in the background. Stock image.

Ecuadoreans will decide in two August referendums whether oil and mining projects in key regions of the country can continue, weighing Indigenous and environmental concerns against billions in potential lost income.


The South American country could lose about 12% of its 480,000-barrel-per-day (bpd) crude oil output if voters approve shuttering the 43-ITT block in the megadiverse Yasuni nature reserve in the Amazon, while a local referendum in Quito would bar mining in the Choco Andino forest, scuppering six gold concessions.

Environmental activists and communities near the sites say the bans are necessary to protect nature, fight climate change and, in the case of the Yasuni vote, safeguard some Indigenous Waorani people who are voluntarily isolated.

But oil and mining guilds say their industries are needed to shore up Ecuador’s battered economy and that bans would expose the areas to illegal mining and deforestation.

Outgoing President Guillermo Lasso, who moved ahead elections after lawmakers attempted to oust him, has failed to raise oil production or attract more mining investment as violence and social problems have worsened.

A “yes” vote in both referendums could complicate finances for his successor.

“We want to keep our territory safe and healthy. They say when they take crude they bring health, education, but we don’t see anything, there’s no development,” Ene Nenquimo, a national Waorani leader, told Reuters during a visit to Yasuni communities. “The government, from its desk, just sees trees. … But we live here.”

A single hectare (2.5 acres) of the Yasuni has 650 species of trees, more than the whole of North America, as well as hundreds of species of birds, mammals, reptiles and fish, according to the environment ministry.

Voters seem to be leaning toward yes votes in both referendums, said Santiago Pérez, head of pollster Clima Social, who has conducted surveys for his clients.

“I think as the population gets better informed and learns more about Yasuni and the Choco Andino that will favor the yes options,” he said.

State oil company Petroecuador says a “yes” on the Yasuni referendum would cost the country $13.8 billion in income over the next two decades.

Platforms in the ITT have up to 39 wells each to minimize the space they occupy, Petroecuador head Ramon Correa told journalists in mid-July.

“The park has had the best protection practices,” Correa said.

Two other Petroecuador blocks in the area would be unaffected by the vote.
Income versus environment

Former President Rafael Correa authorized the ITT fields after an unsuccessful effort to raise funds from the international community in exchange for barring development.

Despite improving technology and care, oil development in the Yasuni has hurt the environment and is threatening residents, including those who are voluntarily isolated, said Pedro Bermeo of advocacy group Yasunidos, which has been pushing for the referendum for a decade.

“They told us there wouldn’t be roads, that there wouldn’t be electricity generation, nor flares, and there is a huge impact,” Bermeo said.

Suspension of eventual full production in the ITT block would avoid the emission of 400 tonnes of carbon dioxide, says Yasunidos, though the group did not provide a time frame for the figure.

Petroecuador says there are no flares at the block, that it occupies 0.01% of the reserve’s 1 million hectares (2.5 million acres) and that roads are environmentally-friendly.

Meanwhile, opposition to mining is blocking some $1 billion in potential investment for the next two years, says Ecuador’s Chamber of Mining, though a major project by Australia’s SolGold is moving ahead.

Mining was Ecuador’s fourth-largest source of income last year, behind sales of oil, bananas and shrimp, bringing in $2.8 billion.

“It’s not moral that we stop an industry which could create many opportunities over untrue fears,” said Maria Eulalia Silva, the Chamber’s president, adding that barring legal production is unlikely to stop animal trafficking, illegal mining or illicit logging.

But residents say mining will threaten high altitude wetlands, water and animals like the spectacled bear.

“Mining will create water pollution, exploitation of the earth and destruction,” said Morelia Fuentes, a resident of a small agricultural community inside the forest. “We are fighting to have a healthy life.”

(By Alexandra Valencia, Tito Correa, Karen Toro and Julia Symmes Cobb; Editing by Marguerita Choy)
Bolivian Indigenous group declares local emergency to counteract gold mining cooperatives’ actions

Valentina Ruiz Leotaud | July 30, 2023 |

Illegal mining equipment in Bolivia’s Amazon.
 (Image by CPILAP, Facebook.)

The Indigenous Peoples of La Paz Central Group (CPILAP) issued a local state of emergency in the Bolivian department of La Paz following an attempt by gold mining cooperatives to modify the zoning of protected areas in the northern part of the province.


“We are in a state of emergency and all the communities are ready to join efforts and defend our rights, in the face of any outside incursion done either by force or by trying to deceptively manipulate our people to gain access to Madidi and Pilón Laja”, CPILAP’s president, Gonzalo Oliver Terrazas, said in a statement made public through social media.

Madidi is an almost 19,000 square-kilometre national park in the upper Amazon river basin. Ranging from the Andes Mountains to the rainforests of the Tuichi River, it is recognized as the world’s most biologically diverse national park. It is also part of one of the largest protected areas in the world together with the nearby protected areas of Manuripi-Heath and Apolobamba, and the Manu Biosphere Reserve.

Pilón Lajas, on the other hand, is a biosphere reserve and communal land that spans the departments of La Paz and Beni, in the northern part of the country.

This week, gold mining cooperatives threatened the Luis Arce administration with demonstrations if they don’t get an answer by August 21, 2023, related to their request to legally allow resource extraction in certain areas where such activities have been banned.

According to the Federation of Gold Mining Cooperatives of Bolivia, the sector has experienced massive growth and their demands should be tended to.

But in the view of Terrazas, the co-op’s announcement is “deceitful and manipulative,” and ignores the fact that any rezoning is the responsibility of the National Service for Protected Areas (Sernap) and must be carried out in full consensus with the Indigenous peoples who live in those territories.

The community leader, whose group represents 11 Indigenous organizations from seven First Nations, reminded authorities that on November 7, 2022, the government and CPILAP signed an agreement that nullified an attempt to rezone the protected areas in the northern La Paz department. Such an attempt was a deal signed between the Vice Ministry of the Environment, the National Service for Protected Areas, the Authority for the Inspection and Social Control of Forests and Land, and the Federation of Gold Mining Cooperatives of North La Paz.

The new agreement states that “the updating of the zoning of protected areas must be carried out with the participation of the Indigenous peoples and/or nations directly involved with the protected area, considering the sacred right to consultation under the sanction of nullity.”

The seven-point document also stipulates that when there is evidence of non-compliance with environmental regulations, “all illegal mining activities within protected areas, even if they are preconstituted, will be the subject of legal action to stop them and expel them from the protected areas.”
Chile’s Supreme Court awards $1.4 million to 31 of the 33 miners trapped in 2010
Valentina Ruiz Leotaud | July 30, 2023 

The 33 miners posing with President Sebastián Piñera and the First Lady Cecilia Morel in the Presidential Palace in October 2010.
 (Image by the Government of Chile, Flickr.)

Chile’s Supreme Court awarded $1.4 million to 31 of the 33 miners that were trapped for two months, back in 2010, 700 metres below the surface in the San José mine located in the northern Atacama region.


The ruling of the top tribunal’s third courtroom notes that the Chilean State “incurred in a lack of service” as two of its agencies, the National Geology and Mining Service, Sernageomin, and the Labour Directorate, failed to comply with their legal obligation of conducting proper precautionary inspections.

According to the court, had such inspections been conducted, activities at the San José mine would not have been authorized.

On August 5, 2010, the San José gold and copper mine, a small deposit nestled among dusty, desert hills near the city of Copiapó, collapsed. The mine is owned by a company called San Esteban Primera.

No one knew whether the miners were alive or dead until they were able to convey a note to the surface in a probe sent down by authorities on August 22. “We are fine in the shelter, the 33 of us,” said the note, written in red ink.

Thirteen years after the accident, the Court issued the ruling in rejection of an appeal filed by the State Defense Council, which sought to reverse a ruling that ordered the treasury to compensate the rescued miners for moral damages. Thus, the men will receive about $48,000 each. The figure had been set in a resolution of the Santiago Court of Appeal in 2021.

Only two of the miners refused to take part in the legal action. The rest argued that proper monitoring and inspections from Sernageomin and the Labour Directorate would have prevented a number of safety and regulatory breaches by the company and, therefore, the incident that kept them underground for 69 days. The Supreme Court’s ruling, ultimately, upheld this argument.

In its final decision, the tribunal emphasized that Article 2, numeral 8 of Decree-Law No. 3,525, puts Sernageomin in charge of “guaranteeing that mining safety regulations are complied with and applying the respective sanctions to those who violate them; proposing the issuance of standards that tend to improve safety conditions in mining activities in accordance with technical and scientific developments; and requesting information about training programs and courses and sharing relevant information with those who work in extractive industries.”
Serabi Gold shares jump on deal with Brazil indigenous groups
Cecilia Jamasmie | July 31, 2023 |

Coringa mining camp. (Image courtesy of Serabi Gold.)

Shares in Serabi Gold (LON: SRB) (TSX: SBI) jumped in London on Monday after the Brazil-focused gold miner said it had inked an agreement with representatives of indigenous communities confirming their support for the long-term development of the Coringa project.


The stock climbed as much as 21% to 27.9p on the news and it was trading more than 13% higher to 26p towards the end of the trading day in.

“Whilst we still have to complete the indigenous studies and the formal consultation process, there is a willingness from all parties for this to be done as quickly as possible,” Chief Executive Mike Hodgson said.

Permitting a mine in Brazil – in particular for waste storage facilities – has become stricter over the past few years, following two major tailings dam collapses at iron ore mines in the country.

Serabi’s local subsidiary was hit in 2017 with a lawsuit from the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, seeking to revoke the operating licence granted by the state environmental agency. The suit was dismissed in April 2018 in a ruling that also denied any right to appeal the decision.

The federal prosecutor insisted in 2020 with new claims, which ended with the judge of the appeal determining that no further licenses or titles should be granted to Serabi in relation to its Coringa project.

The company did not give up, however, and continued advancing an agreement with the representatives of indigenous communities.

“I recognise that the past 18 months have generated some uncertainty regarding Coringa and Serabi’s ability to develop the project and realise its full potential,” CEO Mike Hodgson said in the statement.

“I hope that others share my view that this agreement significantly reduces this uncertainty and provides a strong platform for the company to move forward with confidence,” he added.

The signing communities have agreed not to take actions to suspend the development of the Coringa project in recognition of the long-term direct and indirect local economic benefits. They also agreed that the licences and titles granted to date for the project are valid.

Strategic asset


Coringa, located 200km (125 miles) away from Serabi’s Palito gold mining complex in the country’s north, is expected to double the company’s gold output once at full tilt.

Combined gold production from Palito sits currently at about 40,000 ounces per year. The Coringa project is forecast to yield an average of 38,000 ounces once in production.

The project is located in the Tapajos region, in the state of Para, which is reported to be the world’s third largest alluvial gold field.

Serabi Gold believes that the region is a major, under-explored mineral province as historical data shows that artisanal miners, called “garimpeiros,” have mined about 30 million ounces of gold mostly from alluvial and surface weathered bedrock deposits in the region since the 1970s.

The Violence of Our Imaginations: War, Women, Nation

This content was originally written for an undergraduate or Master's program. It is published as part of our mission to showcase peer-leading papers written by students during their studies. This work can be used for background reading and research, but should not be cited as an expert source or used in place of scholarly articles/books.

In 1971, multiple wars broke out in East Pakistan: a civil war between East and West Pakistan, with East Pakistan aiming to create a separate nation-state of Bangladesh, an internal war between the Bengali and Urdu-speaking populations of East Pakistan, and an international war between India and Pakistan. The war ended on 16th December 1971 with the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh. While these wars are well documented in history, one that has gone by relatively undocumented in formal history is the gender war that broke out against the women of East Pakistan (Saikia 3). In less than nine months, 200,000-400,000 women were raped, and tens of thousands were forcibly impregnated (Takai 193). After the war ended, the newly elected government of Bangladesh eulogised the women victims of rape by giving them the title of Birangona, i.e., brave women, and launched a rehabilitation programme for them (Saikia 64). While these are the statistics for one ethno-nationalist war, evidence for similar gendered wars being waged on women’s bodies can be found for almost all of them — what explains the pervasive nature of sexual violence during ethno-nationalist wars?

Through this paper, I aim to analyse the relationship between using motherhood as the dominant image through which women are symbolised in nationalist projects and the violence perpetrated against them during and in the aftermath of ethno-nationalist wars. I argue that the imagined position of women as reproducers of a nation and markers of its cultural boundaries leads to the violation of their bodily autonomy being interpreted as a transgression of the collective’s boundaries and hence, forms an essential motivation behind the wide-scale perpetration of sexual violence during ethno-nationalist wars. I move on to show that in the aftermath of war, the state recasts women into the same positions as mothers to further its nationalist agendas. To do so, it re-narrativises women’s experiences while simultaneously silencing the voices of individual women that pose a challenge to this narrative. This shapes a distinct form of epistemic violence against women in which they are stripped of their agency to share their own experiences. I study this relationship between the position of women in nationalist discourses and the violence against them through the case study of the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971.

Masculine Nation, Feminine Boundaries

Since the late eighteenth century, nation-states have formed the dominant mode of organising society. While the definition of a nation has been widely contested, the existing literature can be divided into two categories — first which seeks to define a nation in civic and political terms, and second, which seeks to define it in ethnic, religious and cultural terms. In the former imagination, a nation is defined as a group of territorially bound people governed by the same law and represented by the same legislature (Brubaker 7). In the latter, a nation is conceptualised as a group of people united by their shared history, descent, culture and language, coming together to organise themselves into governable units (Brubaker 12). In both definitions, nations are conceptualised as membership and territorial units.

Theorists of nations and nationalisms agree on another feature of nation-states – all nations are exclusionary by nature, and therefore, the imagination of the nationalist self is closely tied to that of the other. Benedict Anderson puts forth the argument that nations are imagined as “inherently limited” — even the most prominent nations have well-defined boundaries of both their territory and members, beyond which lie other nations and their members (Anderson 7). Boundaries are constructed to divide people into the categories of us and them and stretch them across generations. A variety of political, legal and cultural discourses are employed to build these boundaries of national groups — and it is in the representation and reproduction of such limitations that the role of women becomes visible in otherwise male-dominated nationalist projects.

In primordialist theories, nations are often imagined as extensions of family and kinship relations. In such imaginations, the role of women is understood in the context of familial relations as mothers, daughters and sisters. They are seen to symbolise the family’s and, by extension of it, the nation’s honour and are shown as needing protection by their male counterparts. In non-primordialist theories, women have either been completely ignored or relegated strictly to the private realm. Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias argue that nationalist discourses construct the role of women in two crucial ways, first, as symbols of national culture and honour (Yuval-Davis 17). Second, by virtue of their ability to bear children, they are viewed as biological producers of the nation and transmitters of its culture (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 7). In doing so, nationalist discourses construct women as the “embodiments of the boundaries of ethnic and national groups” (Yuval-Davis 1, 18). The depiction of women as symbols of national and cultural honour and boundaries, combined with their exclusion from the active body which shapes the nationalist vision, pushes women towards an object rather than a subject position (ibid. 19). As the construction of women as biological producers and embodiments of ethnic boundaries of a nation is ideologically compatible with women’s position as mothers, it breaks down the public/private dichotomy within which women are typically situated. As a result, the imagination of women as nationalist mothers and embodiments of ethnic boundaries becomes acceptable and the dominant form of imagination and national mobilisation in both primordialist and non-primordialist theories of nations.

During the War

Through this section, I aim to analyse how the aforementioned imagination of women as markers and reproducers of the national collective’s boundaries in nationalist discourses shapes the violence perpetrated against them during ethno-nationalist wars. In particular, through the case of the Bangladesh Liberation War, I will focus on two forms of gendered violence perpetrated against women during ethno-nationalist wars — wartime rape and forced impregnation.

Wartime Rape

Ethno-nationalist conflicts, irrespective of their geographical location, root causes, scale and form, have one feature in common — the widespread use of rape against women of the communities involved in the conflict (Peltola 5). The scale and pervasiveness of this form of rape in wars is evident from the coining of the term wartime rape. Jonathan Gotschall defines wartime rape as “the distinct pattern of rape by soldiers at rates that are much increased over rates of rape that prevail in peacetime” (Gotschall 129). He argues that the perpetration of wartime rape differs from rape during peacetime on three fronts: scale, nature and motivation. The scale is at least 300%-400% more than in times of peace, women of all age groups are targeted, mutilation of body parts is common, and at least a part of the motivation is external to individual desire and sexual gratification. Therefore, it is crucial to understand its perpetration as a separate category, as a decisive tactic of war rather than as incidental to the conflict. Strategic rape theory does exactly this. The theory posits that rape is a tactic, a conscious and planned military policy that soldiers perpetrate in service of larger strategic objectives of the war (ibid. 131).

Once understood as a strategy of war, it is vital to ask what motivates the use of the strategy of rape as opposed to other strategies of mass victimisation of women of the enemy community (such as femicide)? Proponents of strategic rape theory, such as Davis Buss, argue that it is because “rape is a crime against a collectivity” (Buss 150). However, the question remains — what makes it possible for the rape of a woman to be interpreted as a crime against the entire collectivity when no other form of violence perpetrated against an individual is perceived as such? I argue that the public imagination of women as the embodiments of a nation’s borders and honour makes it possible for transgressions of their bodily autonomy to be seen as transgressions of the collective’s boundaries by both sides of the war. It allows for the rape of a woman to be interpreted as the victimisation of an entire community which inflicts irreparable harm to the community’s culture and honour. This forms an essential motivation behind its wide-scale perpetration during ethno-nationalist wars.

Several international treaties have defined rape as ‘a crime against honour’ rather than physical, emotional and psychological torture of the victim (“Practice Relating to”). ‘Whose honour?’ is a question that remains unanswered. The construction of women in nationalist discourses allows wartime rape to denote a crime against the honour of men and nations rather than individual women. As we observed earlier, nationalist discourses imagine women in familial roles of mothers, sisters and daughters and ascribe to men the duty of protecting the women and, consequently, the nation. Nitin Pai notes that this image of men as protectors was severely under attack during the Bangladesh War. The Pakistani Army conducted several “search and destroy” operations in the countryside — this involved the burning down of entire villages, which were viewed as aiding rebel fighters (Pai 4). While the men were killed, the women were victims of what Pai refers to as “hit-and-run rapes” — the raping of women in front of their sons, brothers and fathers, who were forced to helplessly watch the atrocities being perpetrated on the women they were ‘supposed to protect’ (ibid.). As the men failed to defend the ‘honour’ of the women, they were seen as having failed in their primary duty as men and citizens. Therefore, wartime rape is also viewed as an act of emasculating and humiliating the men of the enemy community/nation (Gottschall 131) – and this is what motivates its public nature, i.e. rape of women in front of their male family and community members.

In addition to weaponising nationalist tropes of women as embodiments of a nation’s boundaries, wartime rape also instrumentalises traditional patriarchal tropes of ‘female purity’ and ‘masculine protection’. As the woman has now had sexual relations with the enemy, she is shunned by society, and as the man has failed to protect the woman, he is seen to have failed in his primary duty towards his family and his nation. This destroys the family unit and leads to the breakdown of an entire community (Takai 400, Peltola 25). Therefore, the notion that the rape of individual women can be used to defile a whole nation severely increases women’s vulnerability to sexual violence during ethno-nationalist wars.

Forced Impregnation

An important consequence of wartime rape is forced impregnation. Usually viewed as incidental to wartime rape, I argue that, like wartime rape, forced impregnation is a decisive strategy in ethno-nationalist wars, and the motivation behind its perpetration lies in the imagination of women as biological reproducers of a nation. Closely tied to the dominant position of women as nationalist mothers in discourses of nationalism is the expectation of engaging in sexual relations within the national community and reproducing nationalist sons. However, in most patrilineal societies, the child inherits membership to any group — nation, ethnicity, religion — from the father rather than the mother. This allows for a man to violate not just the bodily autonomy of individual women but also the bloodline of the group as a whole.

Forced impregnation threatens the reproductive autonomy of a community in three ways. First, women’s bodies become sites of “forcibly transferring children of one group to another”, and their sexual violation is motivated to threaten the ethnic and genetic composition, i.e. the bloodline of the warring nation (Takai 400, Fisher 93). Second, victims of forced impregnation may be psychologically traumatised and unable to have other sexual and childbearing experiences with members of their own community (Fischer 93). Third, victims of forced impregnation, especially if they choose to raise the child themselves, may no longer be considered marriageable within society. All three of these factors attack women’s imagined positions as biological reproducers and cultural transmitters of the nation and threaten the survival and further reproduction of ‘ethnically pure’ community members. Due to its severe implications for the psychological, religious and ethnic identity of the group, authors such as Hyun-Kyung and MacKinnon argue rape with the motivation of impregnating the victims is genocidal in nature (Gotschall 132).

The Bangladesh War reflects the employment of such a strategy of forced impregnation. Press reports estimate that 200,000-400,000 women were raped during the war, resulting in 195,000 cases of forced impregnations (Mookherjee, “The Spectral Wound”, 143). The fact that these rapes and resulting impregnations were not incidental to the war but a strategy of it is reflected not just in the scale of violence but also in the discourse employed by its perpetrators. Nayanika Mookherjee notes that while speaking of sexual violence perpetrated during the war, her interviewees would recall the Pakistan Army men saying that even though Bangladesh might be able to secede from Pakistan, “we [they] would leave behind a Pakistani in the womb of every Bengali woman” (ibid. 180). She further states that during the war, Bengali men were seen as being “Indianised/Hinduised” and, therefore, as only being “nominally muslim” by the Pakistani state, and rape was seen as a way to “improve the genes of Bengali muslims”, populate the newly independent nation of Bangladesh with “a breed of pure muslims — Pakistanis” (Mookherjee, “Gendered Embodiments”, 39). Tautologically, its own continued existence is of primary significance to any community. As a result, little is more valuable to a collective than its reproductive ability and autonomy. The nationalist notions of women as biological reproducers of the collective, coupled with the patriarchal assertion that a child inherits their ethnicity from their father, creates a reality where forced impregnation of a woman is seen as threatening the nation’s continued existence. Therefore, forced impregnation is employed as a deliberate war strategy as it is seen to constitute one of the gravest threats an army can pose to its enemy community.

Hence, we observe that rape and forced impregnations are war strategies motivated by manipulating image of women as ‘biological reproducers’ and ‘cultural transmitters’ of a nation.

Aftermath of War

Having analysed how women’s imagined position in nationalist discourses shapes the violence against them during ethno-nationalist wars, I now turn towards exploring this relationship in the aftermath of war. The largescale perpetration of wartime rape had two implications: first, it victimised a significant proportion of the newly independent nation’s female population, and second, it bred the state’s anxiety towards the unborn war babies. As a result, the Bangladeshi state needed to reconcile the identity of women as rape victims and those carrying the enemy’s child with one compatible with its nationalist project. I argue that in order to achieve this reconciliation, the state recast them into the same role of nationalist mothers through a combination of discourse and policy, and in doing so, subjected them to diverse forms of violence. I will focus on epistemic violence in particular, which includes “persistent epistemic exclusion that hinders one’s contribution to knowledge production” (Dotson 1).

Nature, Nation, Mother

Throughout the Liberation War, the nation and nature were both feminised and represented through the figures of “respectable, self-sacrificing mothers” in songs, poems and plays (Mookherjee, “Gendered Embodiments” 45). Such an imagination of nature and nation as ‘motherland’, symbolised through women’s bodies, created a strong link between nature, nation and the symbolic depiction of women as mothers. This collective imagination and equation of nation-nature-mother made it possible for the wartime rape of women to be equated to the ravages of nature and the nation of Bangladesh, by the Pakistani Army, during the war. In the equation, the violence perpetrated on women to that performed on the nation’s land (imagined as a mother) by the same enemy alleviated the position of the raped woman to that of an aggrieved mother.

The gendered atrocities perpetrated during the war were re-narrativised through songs, poems and plays. In all sources studied by Mookherjee, wartime rapes depicted were those of cases of “hit-and-run rapes”, i.e. the rape of a woman in front of her male relatives, and they were symbolised through the ravaging of nature by the Pakistani Army (Mookherjee, “The Spectral Wound” 181). As men were forced to silently witness this atrocity perpetrated on their mothers/sisters/daughters, the re-tellings of war show them to be similarly mute spectators to the ravaging of nature and the nation. As a result, in both cases, they are shown to have failed in their ‘duties’ ‘as men’. This creates an image of relative trauma — the trauma of those being violated (women/nature) is depicted relationally to the ‘trauma’ faced by male witnesses of this violation. The dominant imagery was one of the mother (raped woman and mother nature) being wronged, in pain and calling for her (male) children to protect and avenge her (Mookherjee, “Gendered Embodiments”  42, 44). The focus is moved away from the victim towards the men, and it calls upon the men to avenge their mothers and motherland by participating in the war (while it continued) and then in the nation-building processes of the new Bangladesh. Therefore, by collapsing the image of rape of a woman to the ravaging of feminised nature and nation-aestheticised rape in the public imagination. This reconciled the pictures of the raped woman with a mother — an aggrieved mother calling upon her sons to avenge her, in this case — and she could, once again, be effectively employed as a national symbol encouraging the men to participate in the nationalist project.

This reconciliation and instrumentalisation of women’s experiences for the nationalist project was built on silencing individual women’s experiences. In interviews conducted by Mookherjee and Saikia, several women identified their perpetrators as family members, neighbours, and local and national leaders (Saikia 68, Mookherjee, “Remembering to Forget” 443). However, the instrumentalisation of women’s experience to encourage men to be a part of the nationalist project (by avenging the rapes of their mothers by inflicting harm on the Pakistanis) would not have been possible if the perpetrator had been identified as a local. Hence, the Bangladeshi government strategically claimed that all rapes were perpetrated by the ‘Pakistani enemy’ without providing space for survivors to voice their own experiences. In doing so, it transformed the victims of rape into an abstract number of bodies. Experiences identifying the perpetrator as a ‘local’ were systematically erased and forgotten to maintain a farce of ‘national unity’ and fuel sentiments against the ‘Pakistani enemy’. I discuss the different ways in which women’s individual experiences were silenced towards the end of this section.

Illegitimate and Legitimate Motherhoods

As observed in the earlier section, women forcibly impregnated during the war were seen as carrying the ‘enemy’s child’ and reproducing the enemy population in their home country. This posed a threat to the nationalist state, which cast this form of motherhood as “illegitimate” (Mookherjee, “Available Motherhood”, 350). The unborn war baby became a source of anxiety for the state, which sought to eliminate it by establishing control over women’s bodies and sexuality. This was done by setting up rehabilitation centres for victims of wartime rape. The centres facilitated four roles: abortion and international adoption of ‘war babies’ and marriage and financial sustenance of birangonas (Mookherjee, “Available Motherhood” 342, Saikia 67). Hastily, laws legalising abortion and international adoption were passed in 1971 and repealed as soon as the process was completed (ibid. 347, 349).

The state mandated an abortion programme through the rehabilitation centres, and women were compelled to accept the state’s intervention if they wanted to be included within the new Bangladesh and avail of the centre’s services (ibid.). Women too far into their pregnancy terms were mandated to give away their children for international adoption (Mookherjee,  “Available Motherhood”  342). Abortion and international adoption were seen as methods of not only getting rid of the “Pakistani children” from Bangladesh but also of  “cleansing” the women’s bodies by making them “unavailable” to the emotions of motherhood for an “illegitimate” child (ibid. 339, 348). Both Saikia and Mookherjee note several cases of forced abortions and adoptions — constituting yet another form of violence against women in the aftermath of ethno-nationalist wars. Once they were physically and physiologically expunged of the ‘war-babies’, the centres facilitated their reintegration into society and, specifically, their marriages to Bangladeshi men (ibid. 249). This ensured that the women were instituted within heterosexual marital alliances with men from the same community and could reproduce Bangladeshi children again. As a result, the birangonas were, once again, made available for a “legitimate” form of motherhood and could now occupy the position of nationalist mothers in people’s collective imagination.

All records of abortions and international adoptions, including details about the women on whom these procedures were performed/gave away their children for adoption, were burnt by centre workers to facilitate their “smooth assimilation” into society (Mookherjee, “The Spectral Wound” 151). As a result, there is no real-time documentation about the nature of these processes and women’s own consent (or lack thereof) to being a part of them. While on the one hand, the birangonas were once again cast in the roles of nationalist mothers in the public sphere, on the other hand, the experiences of individual women were systematically erased and appropriated (as being voluntary choices) by the state. Therefore, we observe that the state’s construction of an ideal of a birangonas as “cleansed, nationalist mothers” was built on and sustained by the systemic silencing of individual women’s experiences.

Forced Silences

Once “reintegrated into the society”, mostly through marriage alliances, women were also systematically dissuaded from sharing their war or rehabilitation centres experiences. This silencing happened by subjecting those who sought to accept the title of birangona to khota — khota is a Bengali word that refers to scorn that was directed at such women through everyday normative discourses in Bangladesh (Mookherjee, “Remembering to Forget” 434, 435, 438). It did not take long for the term birangona to be twisted into the slur barangona meaning “penetrated”, which is used to denote prostitutes (Saikia 66). Women received compensation when they shared their experiences with news agencies, academics or lawyers (Mookherjee, “Remembering to Forget”, 438). In the state’s rehabilitation programme, women who claimed the status of birangona, either received money and land to sustain themselves or were married off to a Bangladeshi man who was “rewarded” with money for their willingness to “accept and transform” the birangona (Saika 67). As the monetary exchange was involved in all these cases, women who claimed the status of birangona were labelled as barangonas in everyday discourses and were again shunned through the violence of khota. Furthermore, a “true” survivor was constructed to be one who would attempt to conceal their experience of rape, be ashamed of it and refuse to acknowledge or speak about it publicly (Mookherjee, “Remembering to Forget”, 440). Therefore, women who claimed the status of birangona were disbelieved by the locals and seen as opportunistic (ibid.). This meant that in addition to the realm of material evidence, individual women’s experiences were also systematically erased from the realm of discourse.

Through this section, I have shown that in order to recast women into the imagination of nationalist mothers, and symbols of nationalist mobilisation and continuation, the state strips women of their agency and systemically silences and erases their individual experiences. This deliberate strategy to silence the women in order to fit their experiences into a nationally acceptable mould shapes a distinct form of epistemic violence against them in the aftermath of war — one that appropriates and misrepresents women’s experiences and in doing so, denies them the epistemic space for their experience to be acknowledged as history and be a part of the “knowledge” about the war.

Conclusion

Through this paper, I have analysed the relationship between forms of violence perpetrated against women during and in the aftermath of ethno-nationalist wars and their position in nationalist discourses. I have argued that women’s imagined position as reproducers of a nation and markers of its cultural boundaries leads to the violation of their bodily autonomy being interpreted as a transgression of the collective’s boundaries, and in doing so, forms an essential motivation behind the wide-scale perpetration of sexual violence during ethno-nationalist wars. I have then proceeded to analyse this relationship in the aftermath of war and argued that the state subjects women to a distinct form of epistemic violence in efforts to recast them in positions of nationalist mothers. Therefore, throughout the paper, we have observed how the imagination of women in nationalist discourses constitutes them as political signs, as symbols of national honour and boundaries, which shapes the violence against them both during and in the aftermath of war. In doing so, it creates a reality wherein women’s bodies become sites on which wars are waged, and power gets inscribed.

Works Cited:

Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso, 2016.

Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Harvard University Press, 1996.

Buss, David M., and Neil M. Malamuth. Sex, Power, Conflict Evolutionary and Feminist Perspectives. Oxford University Press, 1996.

Dotson, Kristie. “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression.” Social Epistemology, vol. 28, no. 2, 2014, pp. 115–138., doi:10.1080/02691728.2013.782585.

Fisher, Siobhan K. Occupation of the Womb: Forced Impregnation as Genocidewww.jstor.org/stable/1372967.

Gottschall, Jonathan. “Explaining Wartime Rape.” The Journal of Sex Research, vol. 41, no. 2, 2004, doi:10.1080/00224490409552221.

Mookherjee, Nayanika. Available Motherhood: Legal Technologies, `State of … 2007, DOI:10.1177/0907568207079213.

Mookherjee, Nayanika. “Gendered Embodiments: Mapping the Body-Politic of the Raped Woman and the Nation in Bangladesh – Nayanika Mookherjee, 2008.” SAGE Journals, 2008, https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.fr.9400388.

Mookherjee, Nayanika. ‘Remembering to Forget’: Public Secrecy and Memory of … Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute, 2006, DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9655.2006.00299.x

Mookherjee, Nayanika. The Spectral Wound: Sexual Violence, Public Memories, and the Bangladesh War of 1971. Duke University Press, 2015.

Pai, Nitin. The 1971 East Pakistan Genocide – A Realist Perspectivewww.genocidebangladesh.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/eastpakistangenocide1971-realistperspective1.pdf.

Peltola, Larissa, “Rape and Sexual Violence Used as a Weapon of War and Genocide” (2018). CMC Senior Theses. 1965. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1965

“Practice Relating to Rule 93. Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence.” Customary IHL – Practice Relating to Rule 93. Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violenceihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule93.

Saikia, Yasmin. Women, War, and the Making of Bangladesh: Remembering 1971. Duke University Press, 2011.

Takai, Alexandra. Rape and Forced Pregnancy as Genocide before the Bangladesh Tribunalsites.temple.edu/ticlj/files/2017/02/25.2.Takai-TICLJ.pdf.

Yuval-Davis, Nira, and Floya Anthias. Woman-Nation-State. Macmillan, 1989.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. Gender and Nation: Sage Publications. Sage Publications, 1997.

Further Reading on E-International Relations

‘Reproductive Slavery to Please Western Rich’: Russian Propaganda Alleges Ukraine Conspiracy

Russia’s “firehose of falsehood” claims that Ukrainian President Zelensky’s government benefits from the war through an elaborate human trafficking operation.


by Pete Shmigel | July 31, 2023
Photo: Ukrinform

Russian propaganda’s “firehose of falsehood” is alleging that the full-scale war is part of a human trafficking conspiracy by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s government.

“A living commodity – human trafficking in Ukraine is becoming rampant” is the headline of an article posted on Readovka’s Telegram channel (and then widely shared on other pro-Kremlin or ultra-nationalist Telegram channels).

With minimum regard for logic or coherence, and near total disregard for factuality, Readovka lays out a conspiracy with the following elements in what they refer to as “country 404”:

1. Intentionally creating conditions of “total poverty” in Ukraine by “destroying any social guarantees”;

2. Putting Ukrainian citizens into the position of vulnerability;

3. “Profitably selling Ukrainians to the Western master” for menial work abroad or as soldiers in Western countries’ effort to destroy Russia;

4. Putting Ukrainian women into “reproductive slavery to please the Western rich.”

The Russian online news outlet Readovka was founded in 2011 in Smolensk, as a public page on VKontakte, Russia’s version of Facebook.

By April 2022, it hit the mark of one million subscribers on Telegram and is considered one of the five most cited media in Russia – attesting to the state of journalism today in a country where the distinctions between fact and fantasy have disappeared in Vladimir Putin’s post-truth surreality.

MORE ON THIS TOPIC
Kryvyi Rih Missile Attack: Four Dead and 43 Injured in Russian Strike on Zelensky's Hometown


Russian forces launched two missiles at Kryvyi Rih. According to officials, people are still trapped under the rubble and a 10-year-old child is among the dead.

A number of Russian opposition and some Western publications classify Readovka as a pro-Kremlin or ultra-nationalist resource. However, its owner denies this, stating that Readovka “remains in line with independent journalism.”

With regard to the human trafficking conspiracy, Readovka stated: “The current Kyiv authorities have made great efforts to plunge their own citizens into total poverty. In pursuit of a “European future,” the incompetent managers from Bankova [Street – a synecdoche for Ukraine’s Presidential Administration] have hung a credit yoke of unprecedented severity around the country’s neck, almost completely destroying any social guarantees.”

Prior to the Covid-19 epidemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s economy was steadily growing, according to the World Bank. Its export levels had reached record highs.

As of January 2023, retirees in Russia received an average pension of approximately 19.3 thousand Russian rubles, or $236, per month.

Readovka then continued: “The Kyiv regime needs people only in order to profitably sell them to the Western master. Thus, Ukraine agreed to become a ‘ram’ against Russia, leaving the lives of its own soldiers at the disposal of ‘respectable people’ from Brussels, London and Washington.”

The Readovka rant further noted that “the Kyiv government left the population not so many alternatives: to be kidnapped from the streets of their native city and forcibly mobilized into the army, or to become a participant in another scheme of the shadow economy, whether it is the sale of people [into menial work] or reproductive slavery to please the Western rich.”

The Ukrainian military has long relied on volunteers. While Ukrainian has a draft for military registration, it has no forcible conscription for active duty.

“In today’s conditions, in an independent life, a person’s life costs very little, so there is absolutely no reason to be surprised at the growth of the real slave trade on Ukraine’s territory. Considering that Ukraine has no future, the negative slave-owning tendencies will only grow in the future,” Readovka concluded.

Independent polling – such as it is – in Russia continues to show popular support for Russia’s war on Ukraine at between 60 percent to 75 percent.

A recent analysis by the RAND Corporation about the design and operation of Russian propaganda called it a “firehose of falsehood.”

“We characterize the contemporary Russian model for propaganda as ‘the firehose of falsehood’ because of two of its distinctive features: high numbers of channels and messages, and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions… Russian propaganda entertains, confuses and overwhelms the audience,” RAND’s analysts wrote.


Pete Shmigel is an Australian writer. With a background in politics, business, sustainability, the military and mental health, he has been published by the major newspapers in Australia. He helped initiate Lifeline Ukraine.
It’s not just Ukraine. Russia occupies territory in other countries in emerging Europe

July 31, 2023
Marek Grzegorczyk

Opposition in Georgia to cultural and economic ties with Russia has served to remind a global audience that Moscow occupies not just part of Ukraine, but also Georgia and Moldova.

There was much anger in Georgia on July 27 when a Russian cruise liner, the Astoria Grande, docked at the port and seaside resort of Batumi. The vast majority of Georgia’s population, unlike its government, opposes cultural and economic exchanges with Russia while Moscow continues to occupy around 20 per cent of Georgia’s internationally-recognised territory.


Russia’s Odesa attacks recall Serb destruction of Dubrovnik

The ship, which had departed from Sochi in Russia on a circular cruise of the Black Sea which also included stops at Trabzon and Istanbul, was forced leave Batumi by protesters just hours after docking. Some of the Astoria Grande’s passengers had provocatively declared for Georgian television news channels that they had supported Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia.

One went so far as to suggest that Russia had “liberated” Abkhazia, a breakaway region of Georgia on the Black Sea coast, which lies between Sochi and Batumi.

There were further protests against the cruise liner and its passengers when it once again docked in Batumi on July 31, with demonstrators hurling bottles and eggs at buses taking the ship’s passengers on a tour of the city.

For many people outside of Georgia, the protests were a reminder that Russia has not only invaded Ukraine and occupied large parts of its territory: it has in recent memory also occupied two regions of Georgia as well as a slither of land in eastern Moldova. But where are these territories? And how (and why) did Russia occupy them in the first place?
 
Abkhazia


A region of northwestern Georgia, Abkhazia has maintained de facto independence since the end of a civil war in 1993 in which Russia supplied material and logistical support to Abkhazian separatists.

Its government is financially dependent on Russia, which continues to have a military presence in the region and is one of a handful of states that recognises the territory’s independence, first declared in 1993.

Before the 1992-3 war, Georgians made up nearly half of Abkhazia’s population, while less than one-fifth of the population was Abkhaz. As the war progressed, confronted with hundreds of thousands of ethnic Georgians who were unwilling to leave their homes, the Abkhaz separatists implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing to expel the ethnic Georgian population. Around 250,000 Georgians were forcibly removed from their homes: the vast majority have not returned.

Several thousand Russian troops are permanently stationed in the territory, and the Russian state remains influential in Abkhazia’s security apparatus; the territory’s State Security Service (SGB) includes a representative of the Russian government in its leadership.

According to Freedom House, corruption is believed to be extensive and is tolerated by the government, despite promises to combat it. In recent years, Russian officials have voiced concern about the large-scale embezzlement of funds provided by Moscow, but efforts to investigate and punish such malfeasance have been largely ineffective.

More than 70 per cent of Abkhazia’s residents hold Russian passports.
 
South Ossetia

South Ossetia, in northern Georgia, engaged in an armed struggle for secession from 1989 to 1992. As in Abhkazia, the separatists were backed by Russia both politically and militarily.

The conflict remained largely frozen, with South Ossetia de facto independent from Tbilisi, until 2004, when Georgia’s then-president Mikheil Saakashvili vowed to reincorporate all of the country’s separatist territories. In the coastal region of Adjara, which since the early 1990s had been the personal fiefdom of the staunchly pro-Russian Aslan Abashidze, this was achieved peacefully: Abashidze fled into exile (in Moscow) and Adjara—which includes Batumi—now enjoys a great deal of autonomy and is one of the Georgia’s most prosperous regions.

Later in 2004 fighting broke out between Georgian forces and Ossetian separatists around the town of Tskhinvali, but Saakashvili did not force the issue again until 2008, when increased Russian military activity in the region led to new skirmishes.

In August 2008, Saakashvili ordered a full-scale military offensive which initially took control of significant parts of South Ossetia. Russian then declared war on Georgia, claiming some of its “peacekeepers” in the region had been killed. A brief, full-scale ware ensued, in which hundreds were killed and Georgia was heavily defeated: its forces withdrew from South Ossetia (including from areas they had held prior to 2008), and for a brief period Russia occupied the Georgian towns including Gori and Zugdidi.

It was after a ceasefire ended the war on August 26 that Russia recognised the independence of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Many ethnic Georgians were forced to flee the region following the 2008 war. The territory today remains under Russian occupation and almost entirely dependent on Moscow, which exerts a decisive influence over its politics and governance.

Local media and civil society are largely controlled or monitored by the authorities, and the judiciary is subject to political influence and manipulation.

It was reported last year that South Ossetia has sent troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine.

Transnistria

The conflict between the government of the newly-independent Republic of Moldova and the “Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic”, known colloquially as Transnistria, formed by the Russian minority living in a slither of land on the left bank of the Dniester river began in the autumn of 1991.

Unlike the rest of Moldova, Transnistria was never part of Romania (it was incorporated into the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic by the Soviet Union in the 1940s in an attempt to “Russify” the republic).

The separatists were supported by elements of the Russian (previously Soviet) 14th Army, which had long recruited its forces from the region. Fighting intensified in March 1992 and continued throughout the spring and early summer of 1992 until a ceasefire was declared in July 1992. It has largely held since then.

Since achieving de facto independence, internal politics in Transnistria has been dominated by a pro-Russian orientation reflecting Russian support for secession (although Russia does not recognise the territory’s independence).

Minority Rights, which monitors the rights of indigenous people around the world, says that this has been reflected in measures to reduce the public role played by the Romanian language (which Transnistria’s authorities call Moldavian) in the region.

This trend has also included discrimination against ethnic Romanians, including expropriation of land, intimidation of Romanian language teachers, and promotion of the Cyrillic rather than Latin script for the Romanian language

Transnistria’s government and economy are heavily dependent on subsidies from Russia, which maintains a military presence and peacekeeping mission in the territory. Political competition is limited, and the dominant party is aligned with powerful local business interests. Impartiality and pluralism of opinion in media is very limited, and authorities closely control civil society activity.

GEORGIA
Return of cruise ship carrying Russian  passengers sparks new protests in Batumi


July 31, 2023
Source: Meduza

The Georgian coastal city of Batumi saw renewed protests Monday morning against the arrival of the cruise liner Astoria Grande, which was carrying nearly 800 Russian tourists.

According to Georgian media, police tightened security and put up metal barriers at the port. Clashes reportedly broke out between officers and protesters, with multiple people getting arrested.

Blogger Nikolai Levshits said that activists blocked the Astoria Grande’s passengers from exiting the ship and obstructed the path of the bus that was supposed to pick the tourists up from the pier. Protesters reportedly threw bottles and eggs at the vehicle.

The protest was the second one against the Astoria Grande in less than a week. On July 27, demonstrators met cruise passengers with signs featuring messages like “Russia is an occupier” and “Go back to your fucking country,” causing the ship to leave earlier than scheduled.

According to Russian state media, the ship will no longer stop in Batumi in the future
 

‘They’re coming here and telling us we’re the occupiers’ A protest against Russian tourists in a Georgian coastal city ended with their cruise ship leaving ahead of schedule

July 28, 2023
Source: Meduza


On the morning of July 27, the cruise liner Astoria Grande arrived in the Georgian resort town of Batumi. The ship was carrying more than 800 people, most of whom were tourists from Russia.

That evening, when the ship was slated to depart, local protesters gathered at the city’s port. The demonstrators spoke out against Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s strengthening relationship with Georgia, and expressed outrage at the responses some of the passengers gave journalists when asked about Russia’s occupation of parts of Georgia.

“Russia’s not an occupier. What, you think we occupied you? We liberated Abkhazia from you. They asked us for help, so we went in with tanks. I’ve been to Abkhazia, and I saw how all the buildings have broken windows,” said one Russian woman, according to the outlet Novosti Gruzia. “We’re the Soviet Union. We’re a single country,” another Russian passenger reportedly said.

Protesters held signs with messages like “Russian warship, go fuck yourself,” “Abkhazia is Georgia,” “Russia is an occupier,” and “Go back to your fucking country.” Additionally, they carried photos of Abkhazia and the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and played the Georgian national anthem, according to the outlet Batumelebi.

“It’s currently 2023, and we know what they did back in 2008,” another protester reportedly told the BBC. “Now they’re doing to Ukraine what they did to us twice in the past. And today there are Georgian heroes fighting and dying in Ukraine! And they’re coming here on vacation and telling us that we’re the occupiers!”

The ship departed the Batumi port earlier than planned, about an hour after the protests began.

Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili voiced support for the protesters. “I’m proud of our people, who peacefully protested against Russia’s newest provocation: a stop by a Russian cruise liner at the port of Batumi in Georgia at the same time that Putin is blocking grain shipments and preventing free navigation in the Black Sea. The security of the Black Sea is vitally important for Georgia, Ukraine, and the European Union,” she wrote on Twitter.



According to the Georgian TV channel Formula, a separate protest against the Russian tourists took place outside the country’s parliament building in Tbilisi around the same time.

Georgian journalists began reporting on the Astoria Grande’s scheduled stop in Batumi several days before it occurred. According to the country’s Maritime Transport Agency, the ship sails under the flag of Palau and is operated by the Turkish cruise company Miray Cruises International. The agency emphasized that the ship’s stop in Batumi was of a commercial nature, that the ship itself is registered in the Seychelles Islands, and that it does not fall under any international sanctions, according to the outlet Ekho Kavkaza.


ISIL claims responsibility for Pakistan terrorist attack


TEHRAN, Jul. 31 (MNA) –The ISIL terrorist group on Monday claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing at a Jamiat Ulema Islam-Fazl (JUI-F) convention in Pakistan’s northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province on Sunday.


The terrorist group claimed its responsibility for yesterday's deadly terrorist attack through a statement posted on its Telegram account.

The death toll from the deadly explosion in Bajaur, Pakistan rose to 54, with almost half of the victims children, police said on Monday.

A senior official with the counter-terrorism department said that 23 victims were under the age of 18.

Anwar ul Haq, deputy commissioner for the district, confirmed the toll.

SKH/ISN1402050905718

ISIS claims responsibility for Pakistan's political rally suicide bombing that killed over 50

Islamabad, Pakistan 
Edited By: Heena Sharma
Updated: Jul 31, 2023,


Visuals after bombing Photograph:(Reuters)

Islamic State (ISIS) group on Monday claimed responsibility for the suicide bombing at a political rally in Pakistan's northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province the previous day that killed over 50 and injured hundreds more, reported Al Arabiya media portal.

The group said this through a statement posted on its Telegram account.

A devastating explosion occurred during a political event organised by the fundamentalist Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) party on Sunday on the outskirts of Khar, situated in Pakistan's northwest Bajur district, adjacent to the Afghanistan border.

According to AFP quoting Shaukat Abbas, a high-ranking official from the counter-terrorism department, the number of casualties has now risen to 54. He said, among the victims, 23 were under the age of 18.

Viral video captures tragic moment


A video of the horrifying explosion circulating widely on social media captured the moment the suicide bomber detonated the explosive device while innocent attendees stood unsuspectingly nearby.

The video footage reveals followers attentively listening to speeches on the main stage just moments before the sudden explosion. Chaos erupts as the blast goes off, causing panic among the crowd. People at the far end of the tent are seen running for their lives amid the pandemonium.

JUI-F leader mourns

Following the devastating blast, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the leader of the JUI-F party, expressed his "deep sorrow and regret" in a statement issued by his press office. He extended his condolences to the affected families and urged the government to provide the best medical treatment to the injured.

Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif also "strongly condemned" the heinous act of violence and pledged a thorough investigation to bring the perpetrators to justic

In response to the incident, Sharif's office has requested a report from Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government.

Previous bombings


The bombing that occurred on Sunday marked one of the four most severe attacks in northwestern Pakistan since 2014. Back in 2014, a devastating Taliban attack on an army-run school in Peshawar claimed the lives of 147 individuals, with the majority being schoolchildren.

In January, a mosque bombing in Peshawar resulted in the loss of 74 lives. Then, in February, a horrific bombing at a mosque inside a high-security compound housing Peshawar police headquarters caused the death of over 100 people, predominantly policemen.