Israel–Hamas Conflict: Between Legitimate Combat And Inadmissible Violence – Analysis

 November 30, 2023  

The laws of armed conflict seek to protect people who do not take part in hostilities. The Israel–Hamas conflict has resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties on both sides. Upholding humanitarian law in the complex and volatile environment of Gaza continues to be a formidable challenge.

By D. Padma Kumar Pillay

The current conflict in Gaza between Israel and Palestinian armed groups, particularly Hamas—the de facto governing authority in Gaza—has given rise to significant humanitarian concerns, as the civilian population of nearly two million Palestinians living in Gaza are in a state of a siege. There have been a large number casualties of civilians, aid workers and attacks on protected facilities like hospitals, the latest one being the Al Shifa hospital.1

Humanitarian law, also known as the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law (IHL), is a set of rules that seek to protect people who do not take part in hostilities and limit the means and methods of warfare. IHL is a product of international cooperation and agreements globally recognised and legalised in the aftermath of the World War. The 1948 Geneva Conventions along with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were two instruments that came out of the brutality witnessed in the two World Wars.2

IHL governs the conduct of parties involved in armed conflicts, distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants. Firstly, all actions in combat should be in accordance with the principles and rules established by IHL to ensure their actions are following international law. Secondly, one of the primary objectives of IHL is the protection of civilians who are not taking part in the hostilities. All belligerents must be aware of these rules to minimise harm to civilians and ensure their safety. Thirdly, IHL is closely linked to human rights law, and requires prevention of human rights abuses and violations in conflict zones. 

During peacekeeping operations, awareness of IHL ensures that peacekeepers are accountable for their actions and understand the legal consequences of violating IHL. It helps in preventing misconduct and maintaining the credibility of peacekeeping missions. Knowledge and adherence to IHL contributes to conflict resolution efforts by promoting respect for humanitarian principles and fostering a culture of dialogue and negotiation. United Nations Peacekeepers, often operating under the mandate of international organisations, need to work within this global legal framework.3

For execution of IHL there must be an emphasis on training and awareness which ensures they are prepared for the challenges they may face in conflict zones. It will help in understanding the legal and ethical dimensions of armed conflict to make informed decisions in complex and dynamic situations. In summary, being aware of IHL is crucial for ensuring the legal and ethical conduct of their operations, protecting civilians, upholding human rights, and contributing to the broader goals of conflict resolution.

The primary sources of IHL4 include:

1. The Geneva Conventions: These treaties establish the humanitarian rules to be followed in times of armed conflict. They provide protections for wounded and sick soldiers on land and at sea, prisoners of war, and civilians.
2. The Hague Conventions: These conventions focus on the laws and customs of war and aim to protect cultural property during armed conflicts. 
3. Additional Protocols: Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II provide further clarification and expansion of the rules of IHL, particularly concerning international armed conflicts (Protocol I) and non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II).
4. Customary International Humanitarian Law: This includes established practices that are recognised as legally binding, even if not explicitly stated in treaties.

The key principles of IHL5 include Distinction (between military targets and civilian objects), Proportionality (anticipated military advantage of an attack should not outweigh the expected harm to civilians and civilian property), Precautions (to prevent, as far as possible, harm to the civilian population) and Military Necessity (necessary to accomplish a legitimate military objective). This includes providing effective warnings and ensuring that attacks are not indiscriminate. Essentially, laws of armed conflict consist of sets of prohibitions on when and how they can kill and on who can be killed. 

IHL and Attacks on Healthcare Facilities 

While IHL is clear in its principles, the challenges in implementing these rules in the Gaza crisis are complex. The trigger was the inhuman and dastardly attacks against Israel where a stunned nation found itself attacked by hordes and displaying medievalism and brutality in the attacks against women, children, elderly and the unarmed. The attacks were barbaric and defied all civilised norms of conduct by belligerents.

There is no denying the fact that Israel has taken precautions in the military campaign like warning civilians to vacate north Gaza and go towards the South of the Strip through designated routes, and other measures yet the casualties have been high.6 One of the main reasons is that Gaza Strip is one of the world’s most densely populated regions and the inevitable proximity of military targets to civilians makes it difficult to ensure that attacks are proportionate and do not harm non-combatants. Israeli airstrikes and use of rockets by both sides has led to a high risk of civilian casualties and widespread destruction. 

The destruction of infrastructure including hospitals and other protected areas combined with blockade and limited access has aggravated the situation by making the delivery of humanitarian assistance and access to medical care challenging. There have been blatant violations of IHL in this war, beginning with the attacks by Hamas and the reprisals on civilian targets, women, children and the elderly, indiscriminate use of force, and violations of the principle of necessity distinction and proportionality. These violations can be difficult to investigate and prosecute. Holding those responsible for violations of IHL accountable is a significant challenge, and the lack of international consensus on the situation complicates efforts to enforce humanitarian law. 

The protection of hospitals during armed conflicts is primarily addressed in the Geneva Conventions, particularly Article 18 of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention,7 which states:

Civilian hospitals organised to give care to the wounded and sick, the infirm and maternity cases, may in no circumstances be the object of attack but shall at all times be respected and protected by the Parties to the conflict.

This article emphasises the absolute prohibition of attacking civilian hospitals and mandates that they must be respected and protected by all parties involved in an armed conflict. The protection extends to hospitals that are providing care to the wounded, sick, infirm and maternity cases. The intention is to safeguard medical facilities that play a crucial role in providing humanitarian assistance and medical care to those in need during times of war. Any intentional attack on a civilian hospital is considered a serious violation of international humanitarian law.

However, these protections are not absolute, and certain conditions may lead to the loss of their protected status. Loss of protected status under the Geneva Conventions 8 can occur under specific circumstances, typically involving the violation of the rules outlined in the Conventions which are as under: 

1. When the hospital or medical facility is used for purposes that are harmful to the enemy and not related to its medical function, or 
2. When weapons or soldiers are intentionally placed within or near a hospital, with the aim of using the hospital’s protected status to shield those military objects, or
3. When such facilities are directly participating in hostilities, such as by providing support to combatants or engaging in military activities. 

If a hospital is used to store military equipment or as a base for military operations, for instance, it could be considered a legitimate military target. If a hospital is directly participating in hostilities, such as by providing support to combatants or engaging in military activities, it may lose its protected status. The primary purpose of a hospital is to provide medical care to the wounded and sick, and any direct involvement in hostilities may compromise its protected status.

Further, when a party to the conflict intentionally places military objectives, such as weapons or soldiers, within or near a hospital, with the aim of using the hospital’s protected status to shield those military objectives, the hospital may lose its protected status. This is known as the principle of “human shields”, where the presence of civilians or protected objects is used to deter attacks. However, it is important to note that intentional attacks on hospitals, regardless of the circumstances, are generally considered war crimes and are strictly prohibited under international law. Even if a hospital were to lose its protected status due to misuse, it does not justify deliberate attacks on the facility or the harming of civilians within.

It is not the first time hospitals have been attacked in conflict, either deliberate or accidental, causing harm to civilians and healthcare workers. Some of the notable examples include the Syrian Civil War, the conflict in Yemen, and the conflict in Afghanistan. The list of hospitals that have been attacked in the last 20 years are compiled as under:

1. Kunduz, Afghanistan (2015): In 2015, a Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) hospital in Kunduz was bombed by U.S. forces.9 This incident resulted in casualties and raised significant concerns.
2. Aleppo, Syria (2016): Several hospitals in Aleppo, including the Al-Quds Hospital, were targeted during the Syrian Civil War.10
3. Yemen (Various Instances): Hospitals and medical facilities in Yemen have been repeatedly hit during the conflict between Houthi rebels and the Saudi-led coalition.11
4. Gaza Strip (Various Instances): Hospitals in the Gaza Strip have been targeted during conflicts between Israel and Palestinian groups, including in the 2014 Gaza War.
5. Ukraine (Various Instances): Hospitals and medical facilities in eastern Ukraine have faced attacks during the conflict between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists.
6. South Sudan (Various Instances): Hospitals and clinics have been attacked during the ongoing civil conflict in South Sudan

Fog of War and False Flag Operations: Implications and Consequences

Attacks on hospitals and healthcare facilities are violations of international humanitarian law and can have devastating consequences for civilian populations. These incidents are widely condemned by the international community, and efforts are made to protect healthcare facilities and workers during armed conflicts. So, whether it was Hamas that fired the rocket that caused the Al-Ahli Arab Hospital blast or an Israeli munition is difficult to conclude in the fog of war.12   

Militant and terror groups are known to host false flags as a strategy in their operations. A false flag involves carrying out an attack or a blatant violation of IHL and making it appear as if it was perpetrated by the other entity. It is a part of a broader strategy to conceal the group’s true objectives and intentions while portraying itself as a victim to be exploited for propaganda purposes, gaining the sympathy and support of the international community. 

The group can create such incidents to create a diplomatic crisis between states taking away the lens from the activities of the group carrying out the operation. After the IDF carried out attacks on the Al-Shifa hospital, the existence of command post and militarised tunnel networks were reported. The primary objectives of such actions can include:

1. Deception: Terror groups and militants may carry out attacks on civilian facilities while disguised or using deceptive tactics to create confusion about the identity of the perpetrators. This can make it appear as if the attacks were carried out by state actors or rival groups.
2. Propaganda and Manipulation: These groups can exploit the resulting confusion and blame states or other entities to garner sympathy, support, or international condemnation against their perceived adversaries. They may use these incidents to advance their own narrative and propaganda. 
3. Escalation of Conflict: By falsely attributing attacks to states, terror groups may aim to provoke a stronger response from the accused state, potentially escalating the conflict and drawing in international actors. 
4. Distraction and Cover: False flag operations can be used to divert attention from the real intentions, actions, or identity of the militants. They may seek to create distractions to avoid detection or to continue their activities under the radar.

The advantages accrued by accusations and false flag operations against a state actor like Israel are listed below: 

1. Diplomatic Isolation: It can lead to diplomatic tensions and potential isolation. Other countries may condemn Israel, impose sanctions, or limit cooperation.
2. International Condemnation: Israel may face international condemnation, criticism, and pressure from international organisations, which can harm its standing on the global stage. 
3. Damage to Reputation: Israel’s international reputation could be tarnished, affecting its ability to engage in diplomatic negotiations and other international activities.
4. Humanitarian Fallout: It can lead to a loss of public support and trust. Humanitarian consequences could include restrictions on aid and relief efforts in conflict zones.
5. Legal Implications: False accusations can lead to legal challenges, including potential investigations by international bodies or courts. 
6. Escalation of Conflict: False accusations can escalate the conflict with adversaries, increasing the risk of further violence and instability in the region. 
7. Impact on Peace Efforts: It can undermine peace initiatives and negotiations, making it more challenging to achieve a peaceful resolution to conflicts.

It is important to note that the use of false flag tactics is not unique to one side of a conflict, and even state actors have also been accused of carrying out such operations to achieve their strategic or political objectives. Some of the famous cases include:

1. The Mukden Incident in 1931, in which the Imperial Japanese Army detonated explosives near a Japanese-owned railway in Manchuria, using it as a pretext to invade.
2. The Lavon Affair in 1954, where Israeli agents carried out bombings in Egypt while pretending to be Egyptian nationalists.
3. The Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964, which played a role in escalating the Vietnam War.
4. Various instances in the Syrian Civil War, where different parties have been accused of carrying out false flag attacks to manipulate international opinion.

Protected persons under the Geneva Conventions

Conventions which provide protections for individuals who are not taking part in hostilities are listed below.13 Essentially, these are civilians and certain categories of wounded or sick individuals. Protected persons under the Geneva Conventions include:

1. Civilians (Geneva Convention IV): Civilians who find themselves in the hands of a party to the conflict or an occupying power of which they are not nationals. 
2. Wounded and Sick (Geneva Convention I and II): Members of the armed forces who are sick, wounded, or shipwrecked, regardless of their nationality.
3. Prisoners of War (Geneva Convention III): Members of the armed forces who have fallen into the hands of the enemy, as well as certain non-combatants.
4. Medical and Religious personnel, parliamentarians; civil defence personnel; personnel assigned to the protection of cultural property.

As for using civilians as shields, it is crucial to know how the civilians came to be in a militarily exposed position and the choices they had. In case they volunteered to stay back and join the defender or were coerced by their defenders into staying, then the responsibility lies with the defender even though they may have not killed them. On the other hand, where the civilians were permitted to evacuate an area impending an attack but willingly stay back, the onus of protecting non-combatants lies with the attacker as it does when they are prevented from fleeing the intended target by the attacker. In both these cases, the deaths that are caused are clearly attributable to the attacker. 

Though no civilians can be attacked, the laws of armed conflict however are silent as to how far should a combatant go to protect a civilian life. These decisions are left to the individual solider who are guided by their military traditions and moral upbringing. The theory of double effect is a moral and ethical concept that helps in evaluating the ethical implications of actions that may have both intended and unintended consequences in the context of Just War Theory and International Humanitarian Law. 

Moral Reality of War and Conflict

The moral reality of war has two parts—the first being the reasons that it is fought for. World sympathy stood in favour of Israel when they decided to go to war as restraint was not an option. The second relates to the means and methods that are employed for winning the war. There is much outrage with Israel accused of committing war crimes. 

But this is not the first time in the history of modern warfare that civilians have been targeted. Listed below is an overview of some major conflicts and estimates of civilian casualties. These numbers can vary significantly between different sources, and accurate counts are often challenging to obtain. The actual toll of civilian casualties in these and other conflicts may be higher or lower than these estimates.14

1. Korean War (1950–1953): It is estimated that hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed during the Korean War, with estimates ranging from 1 to 3 million civilian casualties and up to 10 million families separated almost a third of the combined population.15
2. Vietnam War (1955–1975): Civilian casualty estimates vary but a figure exceeding one million deaths is acknowledged. 
3. Bosnian War (1992–1995): Tens of thousands of civilians died, with some estimates suggesting around 100,000 civilian casualties.
4. Rwandan Genocide (1994): It resulted in the deaths of an estimated 800,000 to 1 million civilians. 
5. Darfur Conflict (2003–Present): Estimates range from hundreds of thousands to over a million civilian casualties. 
6. Iraq War (2003–2011): Estimates of civilian deaths exceed 100,000. 
7. Syrian Civil War (2011–Present): Estimates range from several hundred thousand to over a million.
8. Yemeni Civil War (2015–Present): Estimates exceed tens of thousands of civilian deaths.

In times of war, the laws fall silent and it is not the so-called evil powers that defy the laws. When Britain adopted the policy of terror bombing of Germany, nearly 300,000 civilians were killed and 800,000 wounded. The British bomber commands orders for reprisal attacks were clear—targets were not to be dockyards and factories but the heart of the city and built-up areas. The justification was that it was a reprisal and the aim was to render a third of Germans homeless so that the conditions would become intolerable for the German population. Even as the war was almost won, Britain bombed the city of Dresden where nearly 135,000 civilians were killed.16

These inhuman bombings by Britain provided a precedent to US President Harry Truman who ordered the firebombing of Tokyo and the use of nuclear weapons not on one but two major cities of Japan. While it is to the credit of Japanese that they targeted only army and naval facilities in Pearl Harbor, the American attacks targeted civilians of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The number of civilians killed by the allies number around half a million and there was nothing the civilians did that forfeited them the right to protection from harm. Though unmatched in the tally of the Axis powers and the victims of the holocaust, none the less, it was something not to be imitated and what one would expect from the powers at war with Nazism. 

Closer to our times, as per the American “rules of engagement” in Vietnam, it was an acceptable tactic to bomb and strafe villages with air power and artillery known to be hostile or from where American troops have been fired upon. There was also a free fire zone that permitted firing at will for anyone who stayed back by their own consent. In other words, Americans blurred not just the distinction between Combatants and Non-Combatants but also created a new distinction—between hostile/friendly and loyal /disloyal civilians.17

Conclusion

It is important to realise that the moral reality of war is not fixed by actual activities and measures taken to prevent civilian deaths but by opinions. There can never be a consensus on what started the war and who has the onus to end it. What is needed is that peace needs to be given a chance. Just as the attacks beyond the tipping point both in Dresden by Britain and the second Atom Bomb over Japan, the continued reprisals against civilians and pressing the war beyond a certain point by Israel amounts to re-committing the crime of aggression. 

Upholding humanitarian law in the complex and volatile environment of Gaza is a formidable challenge. The unique combination of factors, including a dense population, the proximity of military targets to civilians, and the impact of a longstanding blockade, has made it exceptionally difficult to minimise the impact of hostilities on non-combatants. Efforts to protect civilians, ensure humanitarian access, and establish a sustainable ceasefire are ongoing. 

As the situation continues to evolve, it is vital for all parties to the conflict to respect and adhere to the principles of humanitarian law. The international community must play a central role in ensuring accountability for violations and promoting a peaceful resolution to the Gaza crisis, which would bring much-needed relief to the beleaguered population. The complexity of the challenge should not deter the commitment to uphold humanitarian law and minimise the suffering of civilians in conflict zones like Gaza.

There is no doubt that war is hell not just for those who must fight it but also to those who live through it. Fighting by the rules also does not make war acceptable. In the current crisis, the argument appears to be that rules can be violated for the sake of the cause. In other words, the perceived justice or injustice allows the belligerent to justify acts that are considered inadmissible violence. True victory is not in the defeat of an enemy but that which paves a way for a better peace to prevail. The people of Gaza are owed an experiment in negotiations after having lived through the hell of war. Hopefully, the hostage swap will resolve the current crisis and pave the way for acceptance of the two-state solution by Israel and whoever inherits the mantle from Hamas as the governing authority in Gaza.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Manohar Parrrikar IDSA or of the Government of India.

About the author: Col (Dr) D.P.K. Pillay is Research Fellow at the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi

Source: This article was published by Manohar Parrrikar IDSA

• 1.The attacks by Hamas on Israel across the Gaza Strip has resulted in the highest single day deaths in Israel’s history since the creation of the State of Israel and also the Holocaust. Since beginning of hostilities by Israel, over a hundred UNRWA staff’s members have died and several have been injured. This has been the greatest number of UN staff ever in the history of UN.
• 2.Robert Kolb, “The Relationship Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: A Brief History of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions”, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 30 September 1998;  “Geneva Conventions at 71: An In-depth Look from the Indian Perspective”, The Economic Times, 13 August 2020.
• 3.“Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law”, UN Secretary General’s  (UNSG) Bulletin 1999/13, 6 August 1999. 
• 4.“Sources of IHL: Treaties and Customary Law”, ICRC.
• 5.“Fundamental Principles of IHL”, ICRC.
• 6.“Israel Drops Evacuation Leaflets in Southern Gaza, Signaling Expansion of Invasion”, PBS NewsHour, 16 November 2023.
• 7.“Article 18 – Wounded and Sick III. Protection of Hospitals”, ICRC.
• 8.For more details, please see ICRC website which defines “In which circumstances can medical establishments and units lose their protection granted by IHL?”.  The questions answered are “The Protection of Hospitals during Armed Conflicts: What the Law Says”, ICRC, 2 November 2023.
• 9.For more details on this attack, see “Afghanistan: Marking Five Years since US Attack on MSF Hospital in Kunduz”, Doctors Without Borders, 5 October 2020.
• 10.“WHO Condemns Massive Attacks on Five Hospitals in Syria”, World Health Organization, 16 November 2016.  
• 11.“Yemen: Coalition Airstrikes Hit Hospital”, Human Rights Watch, 27 October 2015.
• 12.There is confusion about what caused the blasts. See “After Blast Kills Hundreds at Gaza Hospital, Hamas and Israel Trade Blame as rage Spreads in Region”, The Associated Press News, 18 October 2023.  
• 13.The concept of “protected persons” comes under the GC I, Art. 13; GC II, Art. 13; GC III, Art. 4; GC IV, Art. 4. See “Protected Persons”, ICRC.
• 14.Michael Ray, “8 Deadliest Wars of the 21st Century”, Encyclopedia Brittanica, 18 April 2023.
• 15.B. C. Koh, “The War’s Impact on the Korean Peninsula”, The Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1993, pp. 57–76.
• 16.Please refer to The Destruction of Dresden by David Irving. He says these attacks killed 135,000 people. In the words of the author David Irving who is British, “For the first time in the history of the war, an air raid had wrecked a target so disastrously that there were not enough able-bodied survivors to bury the dead.” By comparison the American raid on Tokyo on the night of 9 March 1945, killed 83,793 people, and the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima killed 71,379. Also see “Overkill Over; The Destruction of Dresden. By David Irving”, The New York Times, 1 March 1964. 
• 17.See Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pp. 188–192.

Destruction of the Palestine Tower in Gaza following an Israeli airstrike. Photo Credit: Palestinian News & Information Agency (Wafa), Wikipedia Commons

Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA)

The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), is a non-partisan, autonomous body dedicated to objective research and policy relevant studies on all aspects of defence and security. Its mission is to promote national and international security through the generation and dissemination of knowledge on defence and security-related issues. The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) was formerly named The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

 

Climate Finance And Geopolitics: The China–US Factor – Analysis

 November 30, 2023 

By Dr Jiayi Zhou and ​​​​​​​Zha Daojiong

Climate action is caught in the increasingly volatile push-and-pull between cooperative global governance and great power competition, a fraught dynamic readily apparent in relations between China and the United States. China–US bilateral relations are widely acknowledged as a keystone for international efforts to address climate change. But the actions that both countries put forward to address climatic changes ‘indifferent to geopolitical rivalries’ are inevitably impacted by that very rivalry. There is, of course, optimism over the more constructive climate relations that the two have demonstrated since the resumption of formal China–US climate diplomacy this summer, after an 11-month halt following US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022. But the hiatus itself also demonstrated just how vulnerable this engagement is to unrelated bilateral tensions over issues ranging from fierce technological and geostrategic competition to the prospects of military confrontation in the Indo–Pacific region. 

How and whether the world’s two largest emitters of carbon and two largest economies choose to cooperate in this area will also impact the developing countries that are least culpable for climate change but most vulnerable to its negative impacts. In this regard, one increasingly important area to watch in terms of how the competitive–cooperative dynamic between China and the USA evolves is climate finance. Climate finance can refer to any financial resources deployed by public or private sources towards local, national or transnational climate-related projects. However, it is more frequently used to specifically denote flows from industrialized countries to the developing world—where by one estimatethe financing needs for climate mitigation and adaptation will amount to nearly US$800 billion by the end of this decade. 

To date, climate finance has featured only tangentially in the China–US climate conversation, with general statements aimed at raising ambitions in several of their joint communiqués. The amounts of Chinese and US climate finance currently reaching the developing world are also far from impressive. However, the two powers are in active competition for leadership as development donors, with each having pledged billions to the developing world in increasingly climate-friendly terms. Meanwhile, developing countries’ expectations that China and the USA will demonstrate leadership through the delivery of climate assistance projects are also growing. As argued below, the two powers have an opportunity to rise to the occasion in the climate finance space, not only despite but perhaps even because of their strategic rivalry—and to channel even the turbulence of China–US relations into positive spillovers for the rest of the planet. 

Much room for improvement as climate donors

Despite declarative commitments to climate finance, neither China nor the USA has demonstrated significant leadership in concrete terms. The lack of a universal methodology for classifying, measuring and reporting on climate finance makes it difficult to assess the flows of climate finance with much precision. However, the wide discrepancy between the two donors’ commitments and their disbursement of climate financing is undeniable. 

The USA—the world’s largest economy and largest cumulative contributor to carbon emissions—is the most responsible for what is a massive climate financing gap globally. According to one study, the USA has provided only 5 per cent of what would be a ‘fair share’ of the $100 billion in climate finance that developed countries promised to mobilize annually for developing countries. US President Joe Biden’s International Climate Finance Plan, announced in January 2021, has also gone largely unrealized. His administration’s more ambitious pledge to quadruple contributions to an annual $11.4 billion by 2024 has faced Congressional opposition, with only $1 billion approved so far. Meanwhile, China insists that as a developing (non-Annex II) country under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) any contributions it makes to climate finance are voluntary. In 2015 it established a South–South Climate Cooperation Fund as part of its voluntary contributions towards climate finance, but it has only delivered a small fraction of the $3.1 billion it originally promised. UN Secretary-General António Guterres pointedly did not invite either China or the USA to the Climate Ambition Summit he convened in September 2023.

There is both official and unofficial consensus that climate financing could be an area of China–US cooperation, however. Joint statements, one in the run-up to the COP26 meeting in Glasgow in 2021 and another when it was underway, call for an increase in climate finance. A desire for more joint work in this domain was also affirmed during US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s visit to Beijing this summer, when she stated that ‘continued US–China cooperation on climate finance is critical’. Yellen specifically called for China to support multilateral institutions such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and the Climate Investment Funds. 

There is some contradiction in China’s status as a developing country that is eligible to receive such multilateral funds, while also being one of world’s largest bilateral donors for development. Promisingly, however, the GCF and the China Development Bank have been in dialogue and have even signed cooperation agreements. Ideas for bilateral climate finance cooperation that have been floated include a joint financing platform, alignment of standards, cooperation on debt (re)financing for recipient countries, and greater information sharing to help coordinate if not synergize their approaches. Progress on any or all these dimensions could plausibly occur in third countries, in conjunction with local priorities, as concrete projects are delivered by US and Chinese public and private actors. Conversations through the newly established US–China economic and financial working groups, under the US Treasury and the Chinese Ministry of Finance, as well as the re-established joint Working Group on Enhancing Climate Action in the 2020s, will ideally open up greater space for bringing the two together on climate finance as a global challenge. 

Meanwhile, engagement by both countries with multilateral forums such as the UN and the G20, and in key international financial institutions like the World Bank, will also provide a more collaborative rather than fragmented environment for the prioritization of climate finance. Any China–US joint engagementin this space would also help to stimulate wider global ambitions, placing pressure on other developed and emerging economies to close the wide gap between obligations, responsibilities and action. 

A race to the top? Jockeying for leadership 

Any future cooperation between China and the USA in the climate finance space will depend in part on the larger context of their bilateral relations, which in recent years have reached their lowest ebb in half a century. Continued and expanded collaboration between China and the USA requires, at least in part, a willingness to separate off climate change from wider tensions—a willingness that should not be taken for granted. But although tensions between China and the USA do divert resources and policy attention away from climate action, the rivalry can also generate positive externalities for developing countries by increasing the flow of bilateral assistance, which is more and more often earmarked for climate-friendly projects. 

In the developmental space, for instance, whether as a cause or as an accelerant, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has spurred concerted efforts by the USA and several others, including the European Union (EU) and Japan, to match China’s infrastructure financing in the Global South and elsewhere. The USA-led Build Back Better World (B3W) initiative and the related Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) are direct rejoinders to the BRI. Further newly announced initiatives, including the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the Trans-African Corridor, and an investment platform for sustainable infrastructure in the Americas to be established by the US International Development Finance Corporation and Inter-American Development Bank, are also in this vein. 

While this competition has seemingly exacerbated geopolitical tensions, it also has positive externalities for developing countries suffering from a deficit in infrastructure, including energy infrastructure. Funds deployed in the framework of these grand development initiatives cannot all be categorized as climate finance, but are very likely to become greener. The PGII, for instance, aims to mobilize funding for ‘climate-resilient infrastructure’ and its first investments to be announced include renewable energy projects. The EU’s Global Gateway initiative, designed to be ‘mutually reinforcing’ together with the PGII, has also expressed a commitment to ‘infrastructure development that is clean, resilient and consistent with a net-zero future’. Finally, President Biden’s recent request to Congress for greater climate and infrastructure funding for the World Bank was also framed in terms of an ‘essential’ need to offer ‘a credible alternative to the People’s Republic of China’s coercive and unsustainable lending and infrastructure projects’ in developing countries. 

Meanwhile, China has largely upheld its 2021 promise not to build coal-fired power plants abroad, and the share of clean and renewable energy projects it funds abroad can therefore only be expected to increase. Platforms such as the BRI International Alliance for Green Development, the BRI Ecological and Environmental Protection Big Data Service Platform and the Technology Transfer South–South Cooperation Center may play an additional role in promoting much higher environmental standards from Chinese actors, as well as assisting developing countries with clean energy governance, planning and capacity building. 

As this greener investment trajectory continues, the developing world could very plausibly see a ‘race to the top’—both in terms of the financing available for climate action and in terms of the environmental standards to which development projects are held. This is not least because the developing world remains a battleground for the two countries’ strategic competition for influence. Indeed, China is quite actively utilizing climate cooperation in its public diplomacy and foreign policy in both bilateral and multilateral formats. By June 2023, China had signed 46 memorandums of understanding with 39 developing countries on climate change cooperation. 

Other platforms where climate cooperation or climate finance-related discussions are taking place include the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum (CASCF), the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the China–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Forum (China–CELAC Forum), China–ASEAN dialogues and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). There are also declarative agreements such as the China–Africa Declaration on Cooperation in Addressing Climate Change, as well as new structures established such as the China–Pacific Island Countries Cooperation Center on Climate Change. These myriad initiatives, including China’s announcement of a new Global Development Initiative (GDI), can be seen as extensions of a larger Chinese strategy to extend its global influence. China’s Global Clean Energy Cooperation Partnership and a range of clean energy cooperation agreements across Central Asia, Latin America, the Asia–Pacific region and the Middle East are also packaged under the GDI heading.

As with the BRI, China’s climate- and clean energy-related cooperation in third countries—and its exertion of what it calls ‘great power responsibility’—is likely to receive increasing attention from US policymakers in the two countries’ battle for global influence. Without cooperation, there will be strategic pressure for the USA to outcompete or attempt to match Chinese efforts, not in spite of but rather due to wider tensions around dominance of foreign markets and global supply chains for advanced technology and manufacturing, including for clean energy and the green economy. 

Notably, a key impetus and justification for Biden’s clean energy-centred Inflation Reduction Act was geostrategic competition with China. Although the act is largely a domestic-oriented industrial initiative, pressure to compete in third-country markets is very likely to persist; even under the administration of President Donald J. Trump, early opposition to the creation of a US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to facilitate private-sector engagement in foreign aid gave way due to concern over the inroads China has made in developing countries. As US companies become more globally competitive with regard to Chinese counterparts, this will likewise generate cheaper and better alternatives for climate mitigation and adaptation in the rest of the world. 

Bumps ahead: Aligning domestic pressures with global expectations 

China–US cooperation on climate policy is made precarious not only by bilateral tensions but also by domestic pressures that could reduce the ambitions of either country. For obvious reasons, there remain very concerning questions about how the election of politicians less interested in climate action during the 2024 elections would affect the USA’s international engagement in this space. 

China’s contributions to international climate finance are also in part determined by national conditions—political, economic and bureaucratic. Chinese leaders are keen to avoid the perception that any climate action they take is the result of US pressure, as was demonstrated by President Xi Jinping’s remarks this year that the path, pace and intensity of China’s climate actions would ‘absolutely not be determined by others’. 

Hence, just as a virtuous circle of climate finance leadership is plausible, so is a downward spiral of mutual irresponsibility. Part of the US Republican argument against increasing the country’s climate finance contributions, and indeed against climate action in general, is a claim that China—as the world’s largest polluter—is not doing enough. In this respect, the future of climate finance will also necessarily depend on how far politicians in both countries are able to acknowledge their interconnectedness with the rest of the world: in terms of transnational climatic impacts but also politically. With respect to the latter, it will be the rest of the world that will be the ultimate judge of whether the two powers—separately or together—can credibly claim the global leadership over which they purport to compete.  

About the authors:

• Dr Jiayi Zhou is a Researcher in the SIPRI Conflict, Peace and Security Programme.
• ​​​​​​​Zha Daojiong is Professor of International Political Economy at the School of International Studies and Institute of South–South Cooperation and Development, Peking University.

Source: This article was published by SIPRI

SIPRI is an independent international institute dedicated to research into conflict, armaments, arms control and disarmament. Established in 1966, SIPRI provides data, analysis and recommendations, based on open sources, to policymakers, researchers, media and the interested public. Based in Stockholm, SIPRI also has a presence in Beijing, and is regularly ranked among the most respected think tanks worldwide.

AI Image Generator Stable Diffusion Perpetuates Racial And Gendered Stereotypes

University of Washington researchers found that when prompted to create pictures of “a person,” the AI image generator over-represented light-skinned men, sexualized images of certain women of color and failed to equitably represent Indigenous peoples. For instance, compared here (clockwise from top left) are the results of four prompts to show “a person” from Oceania, Australia, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand. Papua New Guinea, where the population remains mostly Indigenous, is the second most populous country in Oceania. CREDIT: University of Washington/Stable Diffusion – AI GENERATED IMAGE

 November 30, 2023

By Eurasia Review

What does a person look like? If you use the popular artificial intelligence image generator Stable Diffusion to conjure answers, too frequently you’ll see images of light-skinned men.

Stable Diffusion’s perpetuation of this harmful stereotype is among the findings of a new University of Washington study. Researchers also found that, when prompted to create images of “a person from Oceania,” for instance, Stable Diffusion failed to equitably represent Indigenous peoples. Finally, the generator tended to sexualize images of women from certain Latin American countries (Colombia, Venezuela, Peru) as well as those from Mexico, India and Egypt.

The researchers will present their findings the week of Dec. 6 at the 2023 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing in Singapore.

“It’s important to recognize that systems like Stable Diffusion produce results that can cause harm,” said Sourojit Ghosh, a UW doctoral student in the human centered design and engineering department. “There is a near-complete erasure of nonbinary and Indigenous identities. For instance, an Indigenous person looking at Stable Diffusion’s representation of people from Australia is not going to see their identity represented — that can be harmful and perpetuate stereotypes of the settler-colonial white people being more ‘Australian’ than Indigenous, darker-skinned people, whose land it originally was and continues to remain.”

To study how Stable Diffusion portrays people, researchers asked the text-to-image generator to create 50 images of a “front-facing photo of a person.” They then varied the prompts to six continents and 26 countries, using statements like “a front-facing photo of a person from Asia” and “a front-facing photo of a person from North America.” They did the same with gender. For example, they compared “person” to “man” and “person from India” to “person of nonbinary gender from India.”

The team took the generated images and analyzed them computationally, assigning each a score: A number closer to 0 suggests less similarity while a number closer to 1 suggests more. The researchers then confirmed the computational results manually. They found that images of a “person” corresponded most with men (0.64) and people from Europe (0.71) and North America (0.68), while corresponding least with nonbinary people (0.41) and people from Africa (0.41) and Asia (0.43).

Likewise, images of a person from Oceania corresponded most closely with people from majority-white countries Australia (0.77) and New Zealand (0.74), and least with people from Papua New Guinea (0.31), the second most populous country in the region where the population remains predominantly Indigenous.

A third finding announced itself as researchers were working on the study: Stable Diffusion was sexualizing certain women of color, especially Latin American women. So the team compared images using a NSFW (Not Safe for Work) Detector, a machine-learning model that can identify sexualized images, labeling them on a scale from “sexy” to “neutral.” (The detector has a history of being less sensitive to NSFW images than humans.) A woman from Venezuela had a “sexy” score of 0.77 while a woman from Japan ranked 0.13 and a woman from the United Kingdom 0.16.

“We weren’t looking for this, but it sort of hit us in the face,” Ghosh said. “Stable Diffusion censored some images on its own and said, ‘These are Not Safe for Work.’ But even some that it did show us were Not Safe for Work, compared to images of women in other countries in Asia or the U.S. and Canada.”

While the team’s work points to clear representational problems, the ways to fix them are less clear.

“We need to better understand the impact of social practices in creating and perpetuating such results,” Ghosh said. “To say that ‘better’ data can solve these issues misses a lot of nuance. A lot of why Stable Diffusion continually associates ‘person’ with ‘man’ comes from the societal interchangeability of those terms over generations.”

The team chose to study Stable Diffusion, in part, because it’s open source and makes its training data available (unlike prominent competitor Dall-E, from ChatGPT-maker OpenAI). Yet both the reams of training data fed to the models and the people training the models themselves introduce complex networks of biases that are difficult to disentangle at scale.

“We have a significant theoretical and practical problem here,” said Aylin Caliskan, a UW assistant professor in the Information School. “Machine learning models are data hungry. When it comes to underrepresented and historically disadvantaged groups, we do not have as much data, so the algorithms cannot learn accurate representations. Moreover, whatever data we tend to have about these groups is stereotypical. So we end up with these systems that not only reflect but amplify the problems in society.”

To that end, the researchers decided to include in the published paper only blurred copies of images that sexualized women of color.

“When these images are disseminated on the internet, without blurring or marking that they are synthetic images, they end up in the training data sets of future AI models,” Caliskan said. “It contributes to this entire problematic cycle. AI presents many opportunities, but it is moving so fast that we are not able to fix the problems in time and they keep growing rapidly and exponentially.”