Wednesday, March 20, 2024

UK delivers final blow to UAE’s hopes of acquiring Telegraph

TORY MP's PROTECT TORY TELEGRAPH
Published March 20, 2024


LONDON: Britain said on Tuesday it would refer the UAE-led takeover of the Telegraph for a lengthy review, a move that will effectively kill the deal because a law banning foreign governments owning newspapers is due to come into force in coming months.

Abu Dhabi-backed RedBird IMI took control of the Telegraph titles and the Spectator magazine in December when it helped repay the Barclay family’s 1.2 billion pound ($1.5 billion) debt to Lloyds Bank, but the deal needs regulatory approval.

British lawmakers and journalists have vehemently opposed the UAE’s takeover of the Telegraph, which is nicknamed the “Torygraph” for its long-standing support for the right-leaning Conservative, or Tory Party. They say the acquisition of one of Britain’s most famous newspapers by a foreign state, particularly the UAE, would threaten press freedom.

In response, the government said last week it would legislate to stop foreign states from owning newspapers.

Media Secretary Lucy Frazer, who was examining the takeover’s compliance with competition and media ownership rules, said on Tuesday she was minded to refer it to a lengthy inquiry on the grounds of accurate news presentation and free expression.

Media regulator Ofcom had found that Abu Dhabi’s IMI may have an incentive to influence “the accurate presentation of news and free expression of opinion in the Daily Telegraph and the Sunday Telegraph newspapers”, she said.

The parties have until March 25 to make representations before she refers the deal to the Competition and Markets Authority.

The contest for ownership of the Telegraph Media Group is playing out against the backdrop of an unpopular Conservative Party, led by Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, that is set to lose the next election expected later this year, according to polls.

Published in Dawn, March 20th, 2024
A Guyanese case study on oil

Syed Rashid Husain 
March 18, 2024 


Guyana is the newest kid on the global energy bloc. The country’s growing oil assets, regarded by some as the find of the decade, are increasingly under the spotlight, giving rise to a new tug of war. As is always the case, attempts to grab the assets are on, both at the geopolitical and corporate levels.

Guyana’s offshore oil sector is booming, with over 11 billion barrels of oil equivalent resources discovered so far. Production is expected to reach roughly 620,000 barrels per day (bpd) once its Payara field reaches maximum capacity, and it could exceed 1.2 million bpd by 2028.

So far, 30 discoveries have been made, and many more are expected. With production anticipated to begin in Yellowtail in 2025 and Uaru in 2026, the country’s output could touch the 8m barrels equivalent per day, according to recent Standard & Poor’s Global estimates. However, the emerging resources are not without a curse.

Neighbouring Venezuela, boasting a large army with 337,000 personnel, is asserting ownership of the resource-rich Essequibo region of Guyana. Once supermajor Exxon made a swathe of high-quality oil discoveries in the waters off the Essequibo region, Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro’s sabre-rattling intensified.

Energy-deficient Pakistan could learn from Guyana in successfully exploiting its energy assets via active global player participation

Venezuela is now claiming its rights to a 61,000 square mile area of Guyana, comprising roughly two-thirds of the sovereign territory. A heated debate between the two countries has begun. Caracas is accusing Georgetown of awarding Exxon illegal drilling licenses. It says Guyana has no right to award such licenses. Venezuela has also objected to Exxon’s drilling campaign, claiming the supermajor was engaging in corrupt conduct with key opposition figure, Maria Corina Machado, to move ahead on the project.

Matthew Smith reported in his piece in Oilprice.com, “Recent evidence suggests heightened military activity along Guyana’s border, raising fears of a potential invasion. By the end of 2023, there were fears Venezuela would use its military to annex the contested region.” To many, this is reminiscent of the invasion of Kuwait by the forces of Saddam Hussain in 1990.

Later, however, the presidents of Venezuela and Guyana agreed to resolve the dispute peacefully. Yet despite the agreement, “evidence of heightened Venezuelan military activity along Guyana’s border has [re]emerged, sparking fears Caracas is preparing to seize the [resource-rich] Essequibo by force.”

In the meantime, a corporate battle is also ongoing. Currently, Exxon controls all production in Guyana, holding a 45 per cent share in a consortium that includes the Hess Corporation and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) as minority partners. Last October, Chevron Corp agreed to acquire Hess Corp for $53bn.

Analysts point out that Chevron’s bid to purchase Hess in October was primarily aimed at securing its 30pc stake in the Stabroek block off the coast of Guyana, currently one of the world’s fastest-growing oil developments and the biggest crude discovery in a decade.

Exxon is now claiming it has a right to first refusal of any sale of the Stabroek block off the coast of Guyana, containing at least 11bn barrels of oil. Late in February, ExxonMobil said it may pre-empt Chevron Corp’s acquisition of a 30pc stake in the giant Guyanese oil block. Many say the possible move by Exxon to pre-empt the Chevron-Hess deal could result in the breakup of Chevron’s $53bn deal to buy into the field.

Chevron stands adamant there’s “no possible scenario” where Exxon or CNOOC could buy the stake, adding that it remains fully committed to the Hess deal. Exxon and CNOOC’s right of first refusal is “not applicable” to its merger with Hess, Chevron said in an emailed statement sent to the media. “As described in the S-4, there is no possible scenario in which Exxon or CNOOC could acquire Hess’ interest in Guyana as a result of the Chevron-Hess transaction.”

However, Exxon is insisting that it has a duty to its shareholders to explore the right of first refusal over the change of ownership of the Hess stake.

In recent months, oil majors have struck a flurry of mega-deals to secure stakes in proven reserves without building new projects that would increase global supplies. Capitalising upon the sentiment, Guyana has been trying to attract more large oil producers to dilute Exxon’s dominance of the country’s energy output.

It recently held an offshore block auction that drew bids from TotalEnergies, Petronas and Qatar Energy. A battle royale between the oil giants is thus underway in Guyana.

The ongoing corporate dispute over Guyana’s Stabroek Block and the possibility of invasion of Guyana by Venezuela underscores “how important the emerging basin is to global crude markets”, Bloomberg underlined in a piece.

The evolving battleground of Guyana once again underlines oil and geopolitics are virtually inseparable.

For energy-deficient countries like Pakistan, Guyana presents a case study. The country has been successful in exploiting its energy assets through the active participation of global oil majors. Such projects require considerable investments and technological knowhow — oil majors’ posses both.

However, for oil majors to get involved in any such projects, political and economic stability in host countries remains a must. Consistency in policies is required and on a long-term basis.

Pakistan is not meeting these prerequisites. Despite having the potential, it has been unable to exploit and grow its domestic energy asset base in recent decades. To some, it has been a lost decade in many senses.

Oil majors and multinationals are slowly opting out of Pakistan. To achieve a semblance of success in the energy sector, we need to reverse this trend. Pakistan, and especially the Ministry of Petroleum, has a lot to relearn.

Published in Dawn, The Business and Finance Weekly, March 18th, 2024Follow Dawn Business on Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram and Facebook for insights on business, finance and tech from Pakistan and across the world.
PAKISTAN

How long can govt hide behind ‘all is well on X’ mantra?
Work of content creators, fact-checkers suffering due to unannounced curbs on social media platforms.
DAWN
Published March 20, 2024


KARACHI: After being grilled by the courts over the unannounced curbs on social media platform X (formerly Twitter), government institutions seem to have adopted a fresh tactic: pretending as if nothing has happened.

“They’re taking us to be fools… The ban is not only unconstitutional and illegal, but it’s also shrouded in mystery,” says Abdul Moiz Jaferii, one of the petitioners challenging the disruption before the Sindh High Court, which is scheduled to be taken up by the court again today (Wednesday).

Recalling a recent hearing of his petition, Mr Jaferii related how an official from the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) tried to mislead the court by opening X on his phone and pretending as if everything was working normally.

“This seems to be their new strategy: pretend nothing is happening. They manipulate courts into believing there was never a loss of freedoms, branding it as mass paranoia.”

But when the judge in question, SHC Chief Justice Aqeel Ahmed Abbasi, asked the petitioners whether the PTA claim was accurate, they informed the court that the official was doubtlessly using a Virtual Private Network (VPN) to access the website, which remained inaccessible to the public at large.

Work of content creators, fact-checkers suffering due to unannounced curbs on social media platforms

‘Gaslighting the public’

“The majority of Pakistan sees it as obfuscation and gaslighting by the government. And the majority of Pakistan has had enough,” Mr Jaferii notes.

It has now been over a month since X was restricted in various parts of Pakistan. This unofficial ban followed accusations by former Rawalpindi commissioner Liaquat Chat­­tha against the chief election commissioner and chief justice, alleging their involvement in rigging the February 8 general elections.

Even the newly elected government has distanced itself from any responsibility, with newly-minted Information Minister Atta Tarar acknowledging that the social media website was indeed blocked but without any official notification.

When approached for a comment, the PTA asked DawnNewsEnglish to direct questions regarding X to the interior ministry. When pressed further, they attributed the instructions to the government.

But digital rights activists do not buy this argument. “Only the PTA has the legal authority to block websites under Section 37 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act,” insisted digital rights activist Farieha Aziz. “Any suggestion otherwise is legally incorrect.”

“The law clearly requires any curtailment of access to online content to be bound between very limited lines,” explains Mr Jaferii. “It needs to be something that affects the integrity of the state, something that attacks Islam and its glory, something that can cause riots and unrest.”

Beyond that, he added, there isn’t “any legal situation where the regulator can affect such a ban.”

Existing laws, such as Section 37 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, also outline due process for censorship. “They [PTA] have to send a notice to a website,” says Usama Khilji, another lawyer and digital rights activist. “There has to be an option of appeal, there has to be an explanation, and there has to be a public notice, but none of that is being implemented.”

In the case of X, there has been no notification from PTA or formal communication from the government.

This is obviously taking a toll on those who use social media for professional purposes.

Creators, journalists ‘at receiving end’

A 2023 report by the Overseas Investors Chamber of Commerce and Industry estimated that digital transformation could add a staggering $60 billion to Pakistan’s economy in the next seven to eight years.

“Social media apps are critical to many people’s employment and their jobs, especially content creators who depend on these platforms to produce and publish content,” says Sabah Bano Malik, a content creator.

She notes that when these apps are repeatedly taken down, it disrupts consistency for both the audience and the content creators. “It breaks the rhythm of posting and engagement, making it challenging for creators to maintain their audience’s interest and engagement,” she added.

“This inconsistency also affects content creators’ relationships with brands, impacting their ability to meet deadlines and deliver results.”

Another segment being affected is journalists. According to Amber Rahim Shamsi, who heads the IBA’s Centre for Excellence in Journalism and is one of the petitioners in the case before the Sindh High Court, the ban is actually interfering with the work of independent fact-checkers.

When you are fact-checking, one criteria to monitor is virality, says Ms Shamsi. Twitter being the most public domain — as opposed to Whatsapp, which is more of a private medium — it offers a good platform to track the spread of mis/disinformation across a social network, she says.

This can’t be done through VPN, she says, as they work erratically. Additionally, tracking mis/disinformation online involves comparing the spread of a particular piece of information across multiple platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram and, of course, X.

Therefore, the unannounced ban makes it harder to track and map the spread of misinformation, she says, essentially handicapping fact-checkers and allowing inaccurate information to proliferate in the absence of any independent checks and balances.

Nadir Guramani in Islamabad also contributed to this report; watch the full video on the DawnNews English YouTube channel


Published in Dawn, March 20th, 2024





PTI endorses Amnesty’s call for restoration of X


DAWN
Published March 19, 2024 

ISLAMABAD: Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) has fully endorsed Amnesty International’s demand for the immediate restoration of social media platform X, stating that Pakistan has become a laughing stock in the international community due to the unjustified blockage of social media and the chain of oppression against its own citizens.

A party spokesperson said that the government’s unjustified closure of the internet, especially social media websites on a daily basis, to conceal facts regarding the “mandate theft” in the general elections, has provided opportunities for the world to ridicule Pakistan.

According to the party’s media wing, he alleged that the Constitution was virtually suspended during the past 23 months and basic constitutional rights were openly being trampled upon.

“It is shameful that X has remained blocked in the country for over one month now. We fully endorse 28 civil society organisations’ demand for immediate removal of ban on the social media platform, allowing free flow of information as should be the case in a democratic country,” said the PTI spokesperson.

He went on to say that the murder of freedom of expression and the press had been the topmost priority of the “usurper and anti-constitutional” group.

He stated that all kinds of coercive and brutal tactics, ranging from enforced disappearances to blackmailing their families, had been used to target impartial journalists and social media workers.

He lamented that efforts were afoot to strangle the freedom of expression and the press to suppress critical, sane voices to establish control over the media.

The PTI spokesperson stated that the government of the “people-rejected” PDM-2 continued the series of violations of all fundamental and constitutional rights without any fear of accountability.

He made it clear that the closure of social networking websites by the authorities without any reason and justification was a violation of Article 19 of the Constitution and international laws. He said that PTI supported the statement of Amn­esty International and demanded immediate restoration of social media platform ‘X’.

Published in Dawn, March 19th, 2024


Pakistan interior minister urges new laws for online speech

Islamabad (AFP) – Pakistan's new interior minister said Tuesday the country needed better laws to regulate internet free speech, as disruption of social media platform X stretched into its fifth week.

Issued on: 19/03/2024

X has been rarely accessible in Pakistan since February 17 

Islamabad has declined to clearly say whether it is behind nationwide restrictions to the platform, formerly known as Twitter, which have left it rarely accessible since February 17.

Pakistan's polls earlier that month were marred by allegations of rigging, and the outages began after a senior government official made a public admission of vote tampering.

"We need to make better laws," Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi said when asked whether his ministry was responsible for the X shutdown.

"Expression is fine, but making false allegations against people is wrong -- it's happening and needs to be fixed."


"We must reassess our own laws and look into what is being misused," he told reporters in remarks broadcast on state TV.

X, Facebook, Instagram and TikTok were key planks in the election campaigning of jailed ex-prime minister and popular opposition leader Imran Khan.

The former cricket star was barred from running and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party was subject to a sweeping crackdown of arrests and censorship ahead of February 8 polls.

Most of their campaigning moved online, where it was shut down by numerous social media blackouts which Islamabad blamed on technical glitches.

Rigging claims were also fuelled by a nationwide mobile internet shutdown on polling day, which the caretaker government said was required for security reasons after twin bombings killed 28 a day earlier.

X remained unavailable to AFP reporters in Islamabad, Peshawar and Lahore on Tuesday afternoon -- but the site has been momentarily accessible at times over the past five weeks.

"The problem is there is no transparency by the government," said Sadaf Khan, an analyst for Pakistani campaign group Media Matters for Democracy.

"Twitter is being banned specifically because it has emerged as a platform where political disclosure takes place," she told AFP.

Information minister Attaullah Tarar has given mixed signals over disruption, telling one local media outlet it "is working" and another that it was "already banned" when the new government came to power.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif -- who secured the office through a shaky coalition after Khan's candidates defied expectations to secure more seats than any other party -- has frequently published statements on X.

On Monday, he used the platform to congratulate Russian President Vladimir Putin for his re-election in a poll slammed by independent observers and the West as the most corrupt in post-Soviet history.

© 2024 AFP

Unruly social media
DAWN
March 19, 2024 





“A free press can be good or bad, but, most certainly, without freedom a press will never be anything but bad” — Albert Camus

LAST Saturday, journalist Asad Toor finally got bail. It took nearly three weeks — three weeks in which his case went from court to court, all the way up to the Supreme Court in a manner of speaking. When he was first called in for questioning, his lawyers filed for pre-arrest bail but the judiciary didn’t think it necessary — he was arrested.

And then came the process which is called justice in Pakistan where the prosecution keeps simply asking for custody of the accused for ‘interrogation’, while his lawyers and family watch helplessly, waiting for the day the courts will be kind enough to send the former to jail (on judicial remand) so that bail becomes a possibility.

In Toor’s case, the FIA questioned him once before they called him back again for more questions, only to arrest him. The agency got five days to ‘interrogate’ him but then asked for more from the judge; and was given his custody for a few more days. After this, they still needed more time “to recover some things” from him, according to a story in Dawn. Fortunately, the judge had had enough and sent Toor to jail.

Meanwhile, his case was highlighted in the Supreme Court, when lawyer Salahuddin Ahmed mentioned the matter to the chief justice, who coincidentally was hearing a case about a physical attack on Toor some years ago. It so happens that the journalist whose attack we are discussing is behind bars, he told the CJ.

The judge had to ask for details and in the ensuing dialogue, the attorney general conceded that some of the charges against Toor in the FIR did not make sense. Those close to Toor were overjoyed; if the government’s representative was willing to comment publicly that the FIR seemed problematic, bail should not be a problem. As if logic ever had a role to play in Pakistan. The AG, having conceded, did no more; after all, if he began getting involved in the cases of all those wrongly incarcerated, who would pursue the more serious cases?

The mainstream press, from newspapers to channels, is no longer a challenge for the state.

For the rest, the runaround continues. A busy judge had so many cases to hear that it took him days to get around to hearing Toor’s case on Thursday. On that day, the investigating officer fell ill and was ‘hospitalised’; the hearing was put off till Monday. The presiding judge said he couldn’t hear the case before Monday — he was busy on Friday and didn’t work on Saturday, he told those who stood before him. The lawyers went back to the Islamabad High Court for the third time, where the IHC chief justice ordered the judge to make time. On Saturday the bail order was given; this time around, the FIA no longer had objections. By the evening, the journalist was home but still implicated in a case. The sword continues to dangle despite the AG’s concession about the FIR.

During the same period, Imran Riaz was also arrested in Lahore though his bail came through faster than Toor’s. This was a man who disappeared last summer for months and came back a shadow of his former self, leaving little doubt that he had been tortured during his incarceration. And yet, someone thought he should be picked up again. And that those around him should be grateful he was only arrested and not disappeared.

Both these cases happened as a new government was taking charge; the new information minister argued X, aka Twitter, was working when asked about the blocked social media app. Had anyone seen a notification blocking it, he asked. He is the information minister of a party which, along with other opposition members, had called on Toor when he came under attack last time. This time, few of those who had been keen on a photo-op with him during the PTI’s tenure, could spare the time to even raise a voice for him. After all, there was no Imran Khan in power and there was no political point-scoring to be done.

Both these arrests reveal the changing media landscape in Pakistan.

The mainstream press, from newspapers to channels, is no longer a challenge for the state. The Urdu-language news channels, with their greater reach, have been especially co-opted or subjugated to the point where their reporting and commentary has become palatable to the state. Of course, there are offending clips and remarks but these simply cause warnings to be issued, owners to be browbeaten and everyone to be kept on their toes.

Overall, though, there is little to object to in the stories that are being aired or broadcast. And why should there be when reporting has been reduced to simply producing which politician or leader said what; news bulletins are dominated by statements of prime ministers, the army chief, chief ministers, opposition leaders, followed by newsworthy stuff uttered by the likes of Faisal Vawda or Javed Latif? The rest of time is spent recounting events, such as which politician met whom and which government official held a meeting.

Perhaps this is why it has been a long time since a news channel was taken off air. There is no ‘need’; though it was a tactic much in demand from Musharraf onwards. Unruly journalists can simply be sacked, a trend which began before the 2018 election and continues to date. But this hasn’t proved enough to silence them, and some of the peskier ones take to social media.

And it is here that the conflict is now playing out, where the worst of the state coercion is now at display. Arshad Sharif’s death is a case in point. Or Imran Riaz’s abduction. Or the day-long abduction of Matiullah Jan and other incidents during the PTI tenure. Intimidation and violence will continue as will efforts to block or limit the use of social media platforms. But if history is any guide, the voices will not be silenced.

The writer is a journalist.

Published in Dawn, March 19th, 2024



PAKISTAN

‘To remain silent is to die’: Asad Toor’s arrest, Peca and free speech

The FIA is blatantly disregarding the law by pressuring Toor to surrender his journalistic protections.
DAWN
March 11, 2024


“If I speak, they will kill me, to remain silent is to die”


Do we, as the people of Pakistan, connect with the vision defined by the framers of our Constitution? Does this vision reside within our reality, or is it merely an academic ideal — an impractical philosophy for leisurely Sunday contemplation?

It can be safely argued that the infamous Army Public School attack of December 16, 2014, laid the very foundation of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 (Peca). The severity and lethality of the attack, which left 149 people dead, amongst which 133 were children, had a massive impact on Pakistan’s anti-terror agenda.

An all-encompassing National Action Plan (NAP) was formulated, comprising 20 agenda items. Of these, agenda item number 11 (ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organisations through print and electronic media), and agenda item number 14 (measures against abuse of internet and social media for terrorism), may be characterised as catalysts behind the promulgation of Peca.

Given this historical background, evidently, the purpose of the said law was purely to prevent social media and digital space from being utilised by terrorist organisations and their symphyses, for promoting terrorism or other such activities falling within the definition of “terrorism”. At least, this was the narrative used by the state to silence the voice of those who preempted its misapplication and abuse, at the hands of the state.

Since its promulgation, Peca has claimed many victims, which include politicians, journalists, academics, activists, lawyers, political workers and members of the civil society. It did not spare anyone, not even those who professed their unvarying support and allegiance to it and defended its existence, without flinching.

On October 21, 2017, former prime minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif — whose government had passed the law — took to X (formerly Twitter) protesting the arrest of social media activists and calling on the state to respect the fundamental right of free speech and expression. The very law which stifled freedom of expression, supported and introduced in the parliament by his own government, was being criticised by him; such is the irony.

Yet another victim


Yet again, Peca has claimed another victim. A renowned journalist and vlogger, popular for expressing his opinion in the most uninhibited and unorthodox form, Asad Ali Toor, is in the captivity of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA).

It appears that Toor’s crime was so vile and unforgiving that the court did not even hesitate in granting a five-day physical remand to the FIA, which was subsequently extended for three days on March 3, and further extended for another two days on March 6. What crime you ask? The heinous crime of exercising his fundamental right, as guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, to freedom of speech and expression.

He had, through multiple vlogs, called into question the purported illegal transgressions of members belonging to government institutions, whose role is defined under the Constitution. He opined that the parameters envisaged in Article 245 of the Constitution should be vehemently observed and no actions or initiatives should be undertaken which would vitiate the mandate prescribed in the said Article.

Toor had also vehemently criticised the judgement passed by the Supreme Court, in which it had denied the PTI its election symbol, on the pretext that the judgment passed by courts was public property and could be subjected to criticism.

It is not that Toor was not participating in the inquiry, hence, warranting his arrest. Far from it, after being served with a notice, Toor appeared in person before the FIA’s Cyber Crime Wing, on Feb 23. He was interrogated for hours in connection to an inquiry relating to a “malicious” campaign against the judiciary.

On Feb 24, the journalist was served yet another notice, directing him to appear again on Feb 26, which Toor did. Some four hours later, his legal counsels were informed by an FIA official, carrying a letter in one hand and Toor’s car keys in another, that he had been formally arrested. The said letter was addressed to his legal counsel, Imaan Zainab Mazari, through which he requested that his 78-year-old mother be dropped at his relative’s house.

The next day, Toor was presented before the designated judicial magistrate, charged with the offence of Section 9 (glorification of an offence), 10 (cyber terrorism) and 24 (legal recognition of offences committed in relation to information system) of Peca. The first information report (FIR) dated Feb 26, which was presented in court along with an application for a 10-day physical remand, did not even remotely mention the inquiry proceedings or that Toor had been allegedly involved in any campaign against members of the superior judiciary.

The glaring omission to adequately and properly consider the presence of an alternative penalty to imprisonment, in the form of imposition of fine(s), as stipulated under sections 9, 10, 12 and 24 Peca, is basal to the court’s decision in granting a five-day physical remand, and its subsequent extensions, to the FIA.

Right to liberty

Toor’s current detainment, resulting in the blatant and unwarranted curtailment of his right to liberty, is not possibly compensable by the state. The right to liberty is cardinal and elementary to the principles of every democracy. It is for these reasons that the Islamabad High Court (IHC) has repeatedly granted bail in similar cases, whereas, the Peshawar High Court (PHC) has previously held that in cases where sections 9, 10, 12 or 24 of Peca are invoked, bail shall be granted to the accused as a matter of right.

Even otherwise, courts have been considerate of the fact that the requisite mens rea (criminal intent) of the accused, alleged to have committed such offences, is rarely ever discernible.

Moreover, the language incorporated and employed in the concerned provisions has been criticised for being vague and ambiguous, thus rendering the offences laid out more cumbersome to prove. Only a proper trial and arguments can lead to effective and fair adjudication of such allegations, not physical remand or absolute abdication of the accused’s fundamental right to liberty — not for five days, not for 10.

It is not surprising why when an offence under these provisions is alleged and the accused are consequently detained, it appears to be a culmination of arbitrary and whimsical abuse of the law which has time and again been manifested by authorities at their earliest temptation, whenever their conduct has been subjected to castigation by the public.

Perhaps, the most disturbing aspect of the decisions rendered by the court was the fact that the aforementioned application, in unequivocal terms, disclosed the very purpose for which the remand was being sought. The FIA is adamant about accessing Toor’s electronic devices and social media handles, i.e. access to his journalistic sources.

Journalistic protections

At this point, it must be highlighted that the Protection of Journalists and Media Professionals Act, 2021 (Protection Act), inspired by Article 19 of the Constitution and international law, was enacted by the Parliament, underscoring the state’s responsibility to safeguard freedom of expression.

This includes the right to seek, receive and impart information of all kinds, regardless of borders and the right to privacy and non-disclosure of sources. This legislation recognises the democratic imperative to foster a safe and independent environment for journalists, especially in light of targeted attacks on media professionals.

Furthermore, Section 4 (right to privacy and non-disclosure of sources) of the law explicitly protects journalists’ right to privacy and the confidentiality of their sources. Yet, the FIA is blatantly disregarding the law by pressuring Toor to surrender these protections.

Ironically, while the federal government was required to constitute an independent commission under section 12 (establishment of a commission for the protection of journalists and media professions) of the Protection Act — which was to be known as the Commission for the Protection of Journalist and Media Professionals (CPJMP) — for the purposes of ensuring the enforcement of the Protection Act, no such commission has been constituted so far. This omission is reflective of authorities’ hesitation to play an active role in enforcing journalistic protection.

The state compelling journalists like Toor to reveal their sources is not only an abuse of law and power in the domestic realm but also a grave violation of Pakistan’s international obligations towards journalists. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratified by Pakistan, confers the right to freedom of expression to citizens of member states which includes “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice”.

However, it is imperative to appreciate that journalistic protection is not absolute in nature. Article 19 (3) permits states to restrict this protection for the respect of the rights and reputation of others or for safeguarding national security, public order, public health or morals. Therefore, while international law recognises the importance of journalistic protection, it also hinders journalists from abusing this right by introducing a balance of proportionality.

Nonetheless, the UNHRC, in the Initial Report of Kuwait in 1999, disagreed with Kuwait’s assertion that freedom of speech and expression does not safeguard statements made against the head of the state, or the heads of other states. Rather, the committee concluded that compelling journalists to reveal their sources in order to evidence good faith behind a report is not only a violation of Article 19 of the ICCPR but also other provisions vis-à-vis respect to the presumption of innocence.

The committee, therefore, has crystallised that an invocation of the aforementioned grounds laid out in the law, in order to restrict journalistic protection, is not a trivial endeavour and is dealt with stringently.

Moreover, this was also endorsed by the Committee in Bodrožić v. Serbia and Montenegro where it stated that if the subject of a journalist’s report is a “prominent public and political figure” then a restriction on journalistic protection, on grounds of the reputation of officials, will be cumbersome to impose. In the bargain, Principle 30 of the Siracusa Principles has prohibited the invocation of national security as a ground for imposing limitations on Article 19 when “merely local or relatively isolated threats to law and order” are at play.

Stepping out of constitutional limits

Drawing from the aforementioned provisions, the UNHRC’s comments and international case law, it is evident that Toor expressing his opinion against powerful institutions and government officials does not mandate a restriction on his journalistic protection, in light of their public nature, and criticising them for stepping out of their constitutional limits does not compromise national security.

The same has also been endorsed by the European Court of Human Rights’ judgement, in Tillack v. Belgium, where it safeguarded a journalist’s journalistic protection when the police confiscated files and newsgathering materials possessed by the journalist with the aim of ascertaining their source for reporting on the activities of European Union officials.

The uninhibited treatment accorded to Toor is not mandated by law, but rather a product of personal offence taken on by those whom the journalist has bravely called out by exercising his rights.

Abusers of the aforementioned domestic and international law have been targeting journalists to silence the public; therefore, this contentious issue is not merely about journalists like Toor but about the Pakistani public at large.

The former chief justice of the IHC, Justice Athar Minallah, rightfully observed that “if liberty means anything at all, it means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear” which begs the question: Are Pakistanis actually free?

This piece is dedicated to all those brave journalists who are committed to their values and, unfortunately, face the real threat of persecution. It seems that Zahoor Hussain Zahoor is expressing what journalists might be feeling in the prevailing circumstances, particularly Asad Toor at this very moment.

He says: “On whose door shall I knock, carrying the corpse of thought, If I speak, they will kill me, to remain silent is to die. Silently swallowing my tears, I endured the ridicule of the world searching for my destination, I walk into the dark night, all alone Striving, I may not reach the end, but it will be closer, If I speak they will kill me, to remain silent is to die.”

سوچاں دی میت چا کے ، ہُن میں کیڑے گھر جاواں گا جے بولاں تے مار دِین گے ، نہ بولاں تے مر جاواں گا چپ چپیتے اتھرو پیتے ، مینے جگ دے پا کے پلے رات ہناری کلؔم کلے ، ٹُر یا جانڑاں منزل ولّے پاویں سارا پینڈا نہ سہی ، کُج نہ کٗج تے کر جاواں گا جے بولاں تے مار دیِن گے ، نہ بولاں تے مر جاواں گا ~ ظہور حسن ظہور





When Palestine writes its story of liberation, its people’s sacrifices and resilience will prove to be its biggest strength

While the 'world of light' has collectively agreed to forget the oppression it wrought on our lands, our 'world of darkness' has vowed to always remember.
PRISM/DAWN
Published March 20, 2024 

My mother was recently travelling from Abbottabad to visit me in Lahore. On the bus, she found herself seated next to an overwhelmed mother and her four children. Before she knew it, she was acting loco parentis to two of the children, who were glued to her for the entire ride.

My mother asked one of the daughters which city she preferred, Lahore or Abbottabad. The girl, unable to distinguish between the two, deflected by saying, “aap ko pata hai Pakistan ko Allah miyan ne apne haathon se banaya hai?” (Do you know God has created Pakistan from his own hands?)

Nowadays, it’s considered unfashionable to have such romantically religious notions of how your state came to be, but something about her deflection hit a chord. A nation knows itself and its future through the story its people tell. Whether it’s the story of rising from the ashes of a once dominant empire or that a nation was carved onto the map by the hands of God Himself — each tale carries weight.
Civilised, barbarian, or savage —19th century’s distorted worldview

In much of the dark world, our nations were born with congenital bloodstains on their cheeks.

In the 19th century, nations were either civilised, barbarian, or savages. All white states were naturally civilised unless they seriously transgressed (that is, became communist) at which point they regressed to being barbarians. Barbarians were semi-civilised and could be interacted with the aim that they would at some point be dragged into civilisation kicking and screaming.

Savages were non-white and beyond the pale, they were no more than human, infantilised, and unrepresented in the community of states. These groups were challenged after the First World War when the devastation wrought by European infighting led the rest of the world to question the so-called superiority of the white world. But instead of changing the rules, everyone just wanted in.

Japan tried to join the League of Nations, asserting its distinction from other perceived ‘barbarians’, claiming to be far better than its neighbour, China, at the very least. Its plea was rejected. Arthur Balfour, who represented Britain at the conference, said that “it was true in a certain sense that all men of a particular nation were created equal; but not that a man in Central Africa was created equal to a European.”

The West was given powers of ‘tutelage’ after World War I over territories that were considered to not be ‘able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’ and so required help from ‘advanced nations who because of their resources, their experience, or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility’.

How they achieved this advancement and how they acquired these resources and experience was left unsaid but one thing was clear: the architects had decided the world’s blueprints and we were in the outhouse with the promise of being allowed inside if we behaved.

The paradox of independence

Of course, we didn’t behave. From the early 20th century onwards, empires fell like dominos as new states emerged onto the international plane. But none of them were as polarising as the Algerian war against its ‘parent’ state, France.

Similar to the conversations taking place about Palestine and Hamas today, philosophers debated the necessity of armed violence in overthrowing a coloniser using brute force to maintain its hold. While the French state tortured and executed people, rebels planted bombs and killed innocents.

Frantz Fanon argued that the anti-colonial revolution must be violent, not only because it was effective, but also because it helped the colonised “shake off the paralysis of oppression and forge a new shared identity”.

The Algerian novelist and philosopher Albert Camus disagreed. When accepting his Nobel Prize for Literature in 1957, he emphasised that the struggle for independence is a plea for peace: “People are now planting bombs in the tramways of Algiers. My mother might be on one of those tramways. If that is justice, then I prefer my mother.”

While Camus was choosing his mother, these new states were figuring out how to be many people but one nation within borders they hadn’t chosen. Our territorial integrity, so hard won, was to be jealously guarded for anyone wanting to break it up. And in many instances, like Bangladesh, we tried to preserve it by recreating the oppression we had just fought.

Meanwhile, the mills of international politics kept churning and the West was working to ensure that it maintained its domination through an economic empire. Our former colonisers became ‘sugar daddies’ getting us hooked on aid, trapping us in debt cycles, and pillorying us with talk of human rights. We were left working to create justice in a sieve.

Commitment to statehood

But at least we were free, politically if not economically, in part if not entirely; we were nations. States are legal fictions, but without them, we are exiled spirits in conquered countries searching for a home. When Israel casts its struggle as that between the ‘children of light and the children of darkness, between humanity and the law of a jungle’ it echoes archaic notions of savage, uncivilised nations.

Mahmoud Darwish wrote in one of his poems that Palestinians live in a ‘country of words’, with no state and no army. But the wealth of the nation they create will be based on the limitless deposits of its peoples’ sacrifice; their resilience will be its crude oil, for “few states on earth can claim the degree and intensity of allegiance which the people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip manifest, day after bloody day, to the State of Palestine”.

Someone once said a nation was a group of people who have agreed to collectively remember and forget the same things. While the ‘world of light’ has collectively agreed to forget the oppression it wrought on our lands, our ‘world of darkness’ has vowed to always remember.

In decolonising our states, and in creating our nations, we remade the entire world. And we called our land our home.

Perhaps the most important story to tell ourselves about our homelands — whether we freed ourselves from violence or not, with the help of God or not — is to never, ever recall the moment we became independent with indifference. And if we do falter at some point, let the children of Palestine serve as a reminder of the cost of freedom today.

Ayesha Malik is an international lawyer and is Deputy Director at the Research Society of International Law where she runs the Conflict Law Centre.



Clans step in to protect Gaza aid

Reuters Published March 20, 2024 

Palestinians gather to receive free food on Tuesday, even as Gaza residents face alarming levels of hunger during the month of Ramazan.—Reuters


CAIRO: Armed and masked men from an array of clans and factions have started providing security to aid convoys in Gaza, Palestinian officials and sources in the Hamas group say.

Video footage obtained by Reuters showed a convoy of trucks entering Gaza City with foreign aid overnight, watched by several men armed with AK-47 assault rifles and others wielding sticks.

With Israeli forces sworn to eliminating Hamas since its deadly Oct 7 raid on Israel, it has become highly risky for anyone linked to the group to emerge into the open to provide security for aid deliveries to desperate civilians.

So numerous clans, civil society groups and factions — including Fatah — have stepped in to help provide security for the aid convoys, according to the Palestinian officials and Hamas sources.

With public order strained, safe distribution of supplies becomes increasingly hard to guarantee

They did not identify the clans and factions, but said Hamas’ ability to rally such groups behind it over security showed it retains influence, and that efforts by Israel to build its own administrative system to keep order in Gaza were being resisted.

“Israel’s plan to find some clans to collaborate with its pilot projects of finding an alternative to Hamas didn’t succeed but it also showed that Palestinian resistance factions are the only ones who can run the show, in one way or another,” said a Palestinian official who asked not to be named.

An Israeli military spokesperson declined comment, saying specific rules of engagement in an active war zone could not be publicly discussed.

Israel’s offensive in Gaza has killed over 30,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health officials, and reduced much of the enclave to rubble.

Hamas, which has run Gaza since 2007, has built its popularity on social services, education programmes and charities it offers impoverished Gazans.

With public order strained and civil police having concerns about providing security for fear of being targeted by the Israeli military, the safe distribution of supplies has become increasingly hard to guarantee.

Juliette Touma, spokesperson for the UN refugee agency UNRWA, had no information about masked men securing convoys.

Jamie McGoldrick, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for the Occupied Palestinian Territory, said the United Nations was not working with clans. “We’ve been trying to get the Blue Police (Palestinian civil police) back on track again. There have been a number of incidents where the blue police have been targeted by Israel, because they regard them as part of the Hamas infrastructure,” he said.

“And so we are trying to find the best way suitable to have delivery of assistance into the north and other parts of Gaza Strip. That is a combination of using community groups, etc. And where we can use the police in a discreet manner as well.”

Gaza has large traditional family clans, affiliated with political factions, including Hamas and Fatah, which dominates the Palestinian Authority in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

Some clan leaders have said they cannot take the place of UN relief agencies helping Palestinian refugees, or be a substitute for local authorities.

Published in Dawn, March 20th, 2024

PAKISTAN

Customers versus clients

Umair Javed 
DAWN
March 18, 2024 




WHILE service delivery in Pakistan has rarely been carried out with the explicit intention of pro-poor redistribution, no domain exemplifies this trend more than urban development. If, periodically, there is at least some effort to improve public-sector health and education and make them more accessible to the poor, rarely do we see any such effort on important urban issues such as transport, clean drinking water, sanitation, solid waste management, and housing.

If anything, urban development in Pakistan is characterised by the exact opposite, ie, redistribution towards the well-off. Nothing captures this better than seven decades of housing policy. For the first few decades after statehood, much of the government’s focus in this sector was towards developing suburban land and allotting it to high- and mid-ranking state employees at low prices.

The expansion of Lahore, for example, from the 1950s to the 1990s through schemes such as Gulberg, Samanabad, Garden Town, Allama Iqbal Town, and Johar Town is characterised exactly by this distinct ‘socialism for the well-off’ phenomenon.

Since the 1990s, the state’s urban policy has fallen in line with trends of neoliberalisation elsewhere and encouraged private sector or military-run development of a type which almost exclusively caters to upper and middle-income households. Now, households with sufficient savings can invest in properties, ride speculative bubbles to make further profits, and ultimately buy plots of land when they wish to build a house.


There is something dystopic about the fact that two children born a few hundred metres apart can have drastically different biological development.

What happens to families who don’t have that initial capital to enter the private-sector housing market? Given Pakistan’s current income levels, such households naturally constitute the overwhelming majority. They are, instead, compelled to turn to alternatives, such as informal or unregularised settlements, or the housing stock, ie, homestead, of former villages that have been engulfed by expanding cities.

These settlements, and their contrast with schemes and societies developed by the private sector or the military, offer the clearest evidence of entrenched inequality in urban Pakistan. In particular, I want to focus on two inter-linked aspects of this inequality that signal a worsening trend. The first is inequality in the provision of services. And the second, and relatedly, is inequality in the form and type of citizenship that is being cultivated in Pakistani cities.

The first type of inequality, that of services, is visible to anyone who has ever stepped into an informal or ex-village settlement. Above the ground, solid waste management services rarely keep up with actual demand, green public spaces are non-existent, and road and street infrastructure often lie in poor condition.

And yet, an even bigger problem lies underneath. As excellent, recent work in low-income settlements of Lahore by Action Research Collective (ARC) shows, piped drinking water contamination is extremely widespread. Faecal matter contaminates drinking water due to a mixing with sewage lines, leading to a range of health complications.

A recent health camp carried out by ARC in a former village settlement in Lahore showed that children growing up in communities with poor water and sanitation services face serious issues of stunting and other related developmental ailments. This is backed up through research from other areas of the country by Ghazala Mansuri and others, who conclusively show that Pakistan’s stunting issue is a water and sanitation crisis, rather than one of nutrition alone.

There is, then, something truly dystopic about the fact that two children born a few hundred metres apart (such as in DHA and the homestead of a village whose agricultural land DHA is built on) can have such drastically different biological development, let alone life opportunities.

Inequality in provision of services brings us to a second type of inequality, which is that of citizenship. Since the 1990s, Pakistani cities have seen the emergence of two parallel models of urban citizenship, even though all residents are, legally speaking, citizens of the same country.

The first model of urban citizenship is what we call citizenship of customers or consumers. This type is found in planned schemes catering to high- and middle-income households. Here, delivery of basic services such as water, sanitation, and trash management, is administered through a logic of customer service. Residents of planned schemes are seen as customers. They pay some amount on a regular basis, through service fees and property taxes, and get something in return. If there is service failure of some sort, customers of these schemes can call up a helpline and shout at some low-level government or private functionary.

Hidden in this exchange are usually hefty government subsidies for richer households. These exist in the form of almost-free access to groundwater, trunk sewage infrastructure laid by the government, and car-friendly road infrastructure (flyovers, ring roads, underpasses) that connects these schemes to city centres.

The second model of urban citizenship is citizenship through patronage. This type is found in settlements of the poor, whether they are informal, unregularised, or urban villages. Here, delivery of basic services is under the logic of the election cycle. Communities reach out to local brokers, who then plead with agents and frontmen of provincial and national representatives to pave a broken road, or install street lights, or reline an open sewer.

Such interventions are carried out through discretionary grants and funds, which are occasionally released. Many issues get ignored because there is no interest, or no votes to be garnered, or no funds immediately available. Any work carried out, even something as small as replacing a street light bulb, is accompanied by pomp and ceremony. Signs are put up so that the poor know who to thank and who to remember when the next election comes.

This is the general pattern in which Pakistani cities are growing: neoliberal policies of urban development and the indifference of the state are creating privileged customers on one hand, and underserved clients of patronage on the other.

The writer teaches sociology at Lums.
X: @umairjav


Published in Dawn, March 18th, 2024
PAKISTAN

Kafkaesque set-up

Dr Niaz Murtaza 
DAWN
March 19, 2024




THE emerging contours of our new set-up depict a murky labyrinth hiding the conflicting pulls of the elite interests of multiple power centres, none of them aligned with the public interest. Given these deep cracks, can the byzantine set-up last and deliver?

A structure’s strength reflects that of its base. This set-up’s weak base is rigged polls. Over it, a huge ivory tower has been built by the actual powers to house willing elites to project a strength they lack. Each faction has conflicting interests that increase the set-up’s instability. The interests of the establishment — the proverbial elephant in the room — include pulling us back from doom’s edge, where its past actions got us, while retaining its political and economic sway, with other elites footing the costs of reform.

Then there is the PML-N, the ‘lion’ and main ruler, which is actually a façade for the new hybrid dispensation and its weakest cog, given its dubious mandate, infighting and 20th-century mindset. Its aims are to protect its empire and that of allied Punjab elites. But it sees the wrath of the masses and wants to drop them enough crumbs to win next time.

By foxily avoiding the cabinet, the PPP wants to hunt with the hounds and run with the hares. It will hug the set-up when it does well, but oppose it when it doesn’t. Its aims are to protect its own empire and allied Sindh and Balochistan elites and seeing Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, the crown prince, enthroned soon. The fox alone can topple the lion at the centre but only if the establishment agrees. The smaller parties need crumbs too.

Internal conflict and poor capacity can stymie performance.

There are groups outside the Leaning Tower of Pisa pushing to join the party inside or topple it. The PTI, the main one, represents populist middle-class fantasies and assorted elite interests. The cornered tigers want to rejoin the real powers while evicting the lion, or topple the tower if rebuffed. There are religious lobbies (the Jamaat-i-Islami, the JUI and TLP) with nuisance street power. The banned TTP and Baloch militants aim to topple it outright. Many global actors and events can harm it too, for example, India, Afghanistan, Middle East wars and Sino-US tiffs.

The set-up can defeat all these threats only if it performs very well. Unfortunately, internal conflicts and poor capacities can stymie this task.

The prime minister is better at supervising local projects than leading federal policy work. He may not have control over the three key posts: finance, interior and foreign. The interior ironman is a newbie, said to have been picked by the establishment — apparently, to clamp down on the PTI, militants and progressives. Dar lacks the experience or finesse for his job and will toe Nawaz Sharif’s line, not the prime minister’s, but will be checkmated by picks like Jilani. The finance guru has no loyalty to PML-N and his selection, too, is supposed to have been influenced by non-political elements.

For many, Muhammad Aurangzeb is the new saviour we want to transform our economy. Economic progress needs macroeconomic stability, productivity/ growth, equity and sustainability. The last two will barely hit the agenda. But can he even deliver stability and growth? Ensuring stability requires solid macroeconomic credentials and public and IMF experience (like Shamshad Akhtar’s), which he lacks. He may outshine Dar, but experimenting with inexperience with a very shaky economy is risky.

We only chase macroeconomic stability once we are in the midst of a full-blown crisis via IMF’s austerity menu. But durable stability comes by creatively ex­­panding exports, industry and in­­v­estments. This re­-

quires able pers­ons in commerce, industry, investment, IT, etc, with dynamic glo­­bal experience that the incumbents badly lack. Aurangzeb has good credentials in these business areas. Can he alone transform our non-dynamic economy?

One can answer this hard query about the future via a simpler one about the past. Like Pakistan, its banks non-dynamically make money by investing in safe public debt. Did he put his bank on a new, dynamic investment path? No. Can he do that then for a much bigger, complex and politicised economy?

With productivity and growth ruled out by poor cabinet appointments, we will again chase stability via IMF’s menu. This will harm elite interests and more so the masses. Each faction will try to avoid the cost of inevitable reform as per its power and guile, possibly leading to conflict. So, this tower may implode in a few years. The PML-N can avoid all that by having able hands in a dozen key economic and social ministries to ensure productivity and equity before it’s too late.

The writer is a political economist with a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley.

murtazaniaz@yahoo.com
X: @NiazMurtaza2

Published in Dawn, March 19th, 2024
Blood carbon


DAWN
March 19, 2024 




AMID the pressing need to confront climate change, the emergence of carbon markets has gained prominence. In these markets, industries acquire the privilege of emitting carbon dioxide by committing to safeguarding forests or implementing other offsets. Although widely seen as a potent tool for conservation, apprehensions persist regarding its potential adverse effects on local communities, particularly in developing nations where mangroves face clearance for profitable endeavours such as fish and shrimp aquaculture or real estate development.

The term ‘blood carbon’ describes the dark side of these carbon trading schemes. The aggressive land acquisition strategies employed by certain entities have raised concerns about the unjust eviction of indigenous communities from their ancestral lands. The Ogiek people’s plight in Kenya serves as a stark reminder of the human cost associated with these carbon credit initiatives.

For example, in the pursuit of carbon credits, a UAE-based firm has been criticised for embarking on an extensive land acquisition initiative for mangrove plantation and conservation. This programme spans multiple African nations, including Kenya, Zimbabwe, Liberia, Zambia, and Tanzania, and has drawn the attention of environmentalists and human rights activists, raising concerns about potential displacement of indigenous people.


There is a call for a paradigm shift in carbon credit systems.

The characterisation of current events as a contemporary form of colonialism has stimulated ethical deliberations on the prioritisation of carbon sequestration initiatives over the well-being of vulnerable communities. A striking illustration of this concern unfolds with the ongoing predicament of the Ogiek people in Kenya’s Mau Forest. Kenyan President William Ruto, justifying their coerced displacement, presents it as a climate-driven measure to safeguard the forests from what he deems “illegal settlers”. This justification has triggered profound ethical debates regarding the potential adverse impact of carbon sequestration efforts on marginalised communities, with some activists drawing parallels with a modern form of colonial exploitation.

The Ogiek, acknowledged as the traditional custodians of the Mau Forest, have endured violent evictions and land seizures spanning decades. Despite legal triumphs, including a 2017 ruling by the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights affirming their land rights, the Kenyan government has drawn criticism for persistently flouting these judgements.

The situation faced by the Ogiek is not isolated; it mirrors the struggles of numerous first nation communities globally. These communities find themselves fighting not only for their lands but also against the exploitative mechanisms of carbon credit trading. The term ‘blood carbon’ aptly captures the injustice and human rights violations associated with these schemes.

In Pakistan, for the first time Sindh Forest Department has entered into a carbon credit agreement, selling 3.1 million credits valued at $40m to the Delta Blue Carbon company. The 60:40 partnership prompts questions about transparency and inclusiveness, especially considering that a significant portion of the population in the mangroves of the Indus deltaic districts lives below the poverty line. The fate of these communities remains uncertain, echoing the concerns raised by the Ogiek people in Kenya. Similarly, questions arise as to whether there was a proper tendering process, encouraging competition and giving enough leverage to local stakeholders.

Recent research underscores the critical role that mangroves play in sequestering carbon dioxide. Daniel Donato from the US Department of Ag­­­riculture’s Forest Service reveals that mangroves sto­re aro­und three to four times more carbon per hect­are than rainforests in temperate or tropical zones. However, the ra­­pid loss of these ecosystems, estimated at a third to half globally in the last 50 years, releases substantial quantities of greenhouse gases, equivalent to up to 10 per cent of the global toll from deforestation.

In light of these challenges, there is a call for a paradigm shift in carbon credit systems. Rather than trading carbon as a financial commodity on global markets, the focus should be on rewarding indigenous communities and land managers for their ecosystem services.

The story of ‘blood carbon’ highlights the need for a more equitable and just approach to climate change mitigation. Instead of evicting traditional landowners like the Ogiek, the world should recognise and compensate them for the invaluable services they provide in combating climate change. It’s time to move away from the exploitative carbon credit system and embrace a model that prioritises environmental justice and community well-being.

The writer is an expert on climate change and development and founder of the Clifton Urban Forest.

mlohar@gmail.com
X: @masoodlohar

Published in Dawn, March 19th, 2024