Thursday, April 04, 2024


Good news: Democracy won in Senegal. Here’s why it matters.

When so much of the world is backsliding on democratic norms, Senegal’s election reveals a trend toward democracy in Africa.
 Apr 4, 2024
Bassirou Diomaye Faye, Senegal’s youngest president, was sworn in on April 2, 2024.

Ellen Ioanes covers breaking and general assignment news as the weekend reporter at Vox. She previously worked at Business Insider covering the military and global conflicts.

2024 is the biggest global election year in history and the future of democracy is on every ballot. But amid an international backsliding in democratic norms, including in countries with a longer history of democracy like India, Senegal’s election last week was a major win for democracy. It’s also an indication that a new political class is coming of age in Africa, exemplified by Senegal’s new 44-year-old president, Bassirou Diomaye Faye.

The West African nation managed to pull off a free and fair election on March 24 despite significant obstacles, including efforts by former President Macky Sall to delay the elections and imprison or disqualify opposition candidates. Add those challenges to the fact that many neighboring countries in West Africa — most prominently Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, but other nations across the region too — have been repeatedly undermined by military coups since 2020.

Sall had been in power since 2012, serving two terms. He declined to seek a third term following years of speculation that he would do so despite a constitutional two-term limit. But he attempted to extend his term, announcing in February that elections (originally to be held that month) would be pushed off until the end of the year in defiance of the electoral schedule.

Sall’s allies in the National Assembly approved the measure, but only after security forces removed opposition politicians, who vociferously protested the delay. Senegalese society came out in droves to protest Sall’s attempted self-coup, and the Constitutional Council ruled in late February that Sall’s attempt to stay in power could not stand.

That itself was a win for democracy. Still, opposition candidates, including Faye, though legally able to run, remained imprisoned until just days before the election — while others were barred from running at all. The future of Senegal’s democracy seemed uncertain at best.

Cut to Tuesday, when Sall stepped down and handed power to Faye, a former tax examiner who won on a campaign of combating corruption, as well as greater sovereignty and economic opportunity for the Senegalese. And it was young voters who carried Faye to victory.

“What it tells us is that young people in the continent are becoming very assertive,” Joseph Sany, the vice president of the US Institute of Peace’s Africa Center, told Vox. “Very active in the party politics, right? Because they are the first victims when democracy does not deliver.”

The strength of Senegal’s democracy depends on several factors that go beyond any single politician, including relatively robust, independent democratic institutions like the courts and, perhaps surprisingly, the military. Those elements set it apart from other African nations presently under military rule.

“This election showed the resilience of the democracy in Senegal that resisted the shock of an unexpected postponement,” Adele Ravidà, Senegal country director at the lnternational Foundation for Electoral Systems, told Vox via email. “... after a couple of years of unprecedented episodes of violence [the Senegalese people] turned the page smoothly, allowing a peaceful transfer of power.”

And though Faye’s aims won’t be easy to achieve, his win can tell us not only about how Senegal managed to establish its young democracy, but also about the positive trend of democratic entrenchment and international cooperation in African nations, and the power of young Africans.
Senegal’s election is deeply important given challenges to democracy in Africa

In Senegal, Sall had been trying to erode democratic norms for months prior to his decision to postpone elections back in February, leading some observers to worry that Senegal’s democracy was in serious danger.

Sall “had taken the country through this whole odyssey whether he was going to go for a third term or not, which was very stressful,” Joseph Siegle, research director at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, said in a February interview with Vox. “It led to protest and death; there were some 50 people who died in the protests, there were more restrictions on free press and just a growing sense that he was testing and weakening the democratic institutions.”

There have been a series of coups in the Sahel — an African region roughly stretching from Senegal in the west to Sudan in the east — starting with Mali in August 2020. On the surface, it could look like these countries were dominoes falling, or that the coup phenomenon was somehow “contagious.” (A coup can be defined as a sudden and violent change in power by extralegal means.)

But coups remain a fairly rare phenomenon around the world, as the political scientists Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne demonstrate through their research. In a recent Voice of America piece, Powell and Thyne’s research showed that from 1950 through October 2023, there were 492 coup attempts globally, 245 of which were successful.

Poverty, polarization, corruption, weak institutions, a lack of safety and security, and high inequality are important factors that drive nondemocratic transitions of power, but they don’t, on their own, necessarily trigger coups.

Perhaps the biggest predictor of whether a coup will happen in any given country is precedent: Has there been a coup attempt before? Any sort of precedent, whether or not the attempt was successful, shows that it’s at least possible to try, and that other indicators for coup conditions are present.

“If you’ve had a coup attempt in the last three years, controlling for a bunch of different factors, there are various studies that point to your probability of having a coup in the current year to be something between 25 and 40 percent, which is really, really high when you think about how rare these events are otherwise,” Powell told Vox in an interview last September.

To think that coups are somehow contagious would both discount the complexity of why the phenomenon occurs, and ignore opposite trends of democratic entrenchment in Africa, particularly in Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone, Sany said.
What makes Senegal different?

Since it gained independence from France in 1960, Senegal has never had a coup — military or civilian. Increasingly strong and competitive democracy has been the norm for Senegal, and the country’s civil society went out in great force over the past three years of Sall’s term to enforce those norms.

“I think that it is really the victory of the democratic institutions — the government, but also civil society organization,” Sany said. “They were mobilized, from the unions, teacher unions, workers, NGOs. The civil society in Senegal is one of the most experienced, well-organized democratic institutions on the continent.” Senegalese civil society also pushed back against former President Abdoulaye Wade’s attempt to cling to power back in 2012, and the Senegalese people voted him out.

Though governmental institutions like the courts and the National Assembly do not have equal power to the presidency in Senegal, it’s important to note the Constitutional Council’s independence back in February when it ruled that Sall could not push back elections. (The council oversees some parts of the electoral process and adjudicates electoral and election policy disputes between the president and members of the National Assembly, among other duties.)

That decision clearly had the support of civil society, Sany said, but also international actors including the US, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and France, all of whom were united in reinforcing this decision — and pressuring Sall to reverse course.

Such pressure is much easier to apply to civilian politicians than military leaders, which leads to another critical characteristic of Senegal’s democracy: Its military is highly professionalized and has not been politicized in the way that the militaries of other nations like Mali and Sudan have, experts told Vox.

“In most of those countries, the military was designed for regime preservation, not for the preservation of the republic,” Sany said. Members of the Senegalese military are “extremely well-educated — the level of education is very high compared to other militaries in the region and then they have been exposed to national peacekeeping missions,” allowing the military to work with and learn from other professional forces. In a situation like that, the military is less likely to start a coup because they don’t see it as their job to have power.


Senegal also doesn’t face the same risk as other nations from Islamist insurgencies like ISIS-West Africa Province — possibly due to the proliferation of Sufi Islam and the nation’s identity as politically secular — though there is always a possibility that regional insurgencies could spill over its borders. In countries where terror attacks are common, it becomes easier for military personnel to convince civilians that the way to security is to have the military in charge — although increased violence in the region despite the presence of military governments disputes that.

Faye will still have his work cut out for him accomplishing the goals he campaigned on, including economic prosperity, transparency, food security, increased sovereignty, and the strengthening of democratic institutions. This will be important, especially for Senegal’s young people, who are at the forefront of another major trend.

Young Africans will play an increasingly key role in the coming decades, both on the continent and on the global stage; Africa’s youth population (people aged 15 to 24) will make up approximately 35 percent of the world’s youth population by 2050, and Africa’s population is expected to grow from 1.5 billion to 2.5 billion during that time. In Senegal, people aged 10 to 24 make up 32 percent of the population, according to the UN.

“These young people have connected to the rest of the world,” Sany said. “They see what’s happening. They are interested. They are smart. They are more educated.” And they have high expectations not only for their economic future but also for their civil rights and autonomy.

The reality of government is always different from the promise of campaigning, but Faye’s election is part of a promising trend of democratic entrenchment in Africa, exemplified by successful transitions of power in Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone over the past year. To be sure, those elections were not without challenges, but on the whole, they provide an important counterweight to democratic backsliding.

Senegalese people, especially the younger generation, have high expectations for what democracy can and should deliver for them. It’s up to Faye and his government to follow through.
GEMOLOGY
UN assembly adopts resolution backing ongoing efforts to eliminate 'blood diamonds' trade

By Rédaction Africanews
and AP Last updated: 1 hour ago

The UN general assembly adopted Wednesday (Apr. 03) a resolution on the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict and expressing concern regarding the unprecedented challenges faced by the Kimberley Process.

The representative of Russia, which produces nearly a third of the world's diamonds, deplored the challenges.

“Unfortunately, driven by the notion of their own exceptionalism, representatives of Western countries decided to sabotage a whole host of international cooperation on the global diamond sector to serve their own geopolitical interests. This is the third year in a row that the Kimberley Process has found itself under unprecedented pressure from a narrow group of countries unable to turn the process into yet another instrument to exert pressure on sovereign states.”

The Kimberley Process is a commitment to remove conflict diamonds from the global supply chain.

193 member nations adopted a resolution by consensus recognizing that the Kimberley Process, which certifies rough diamond exports, “contributes to the prevention of conflicts fueled by diamonds” and helps the Security Council implement sanctions on the trade in conflict diamonds.

82 governments have enshrined the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme into law. Today, 99,8 percent of the world’s diamonds come from conflict-free sources.

Before it came into existence, conflict diamonds accounted for as much as 15% of the global diamond market.

Zimbabwe and Tanzania were among 5 nations who tabled the draft adopted on Wednesday.

“The reason why we support this draft resolution is the fact that it aims to address the insecurity fueled by conflict diamonds. We are convinced that the relevant resolution is a necessary measure on the promoting states sovereignty, poverty eradication, conflict prevention and elimination of conflict demand from legitimate trade, which are the primary objective of the Kimberley Process,” Hussein Athuman Kattanga, the permanent representative of the Republic of Tanzania said.

For the first time ever, participants at the Kimberley Process plenary failed to produce a consensus communique, last November.

The key reason was a Ukrainian request, supported by the United States, Britain and others, to examine whether Russia’s diamond production is funding its war against Kyiv and the implications for the Kimberley Process which Russia and several others strongly opposed.

The Kimberley Process went into effect in 2003 in the aftermath of bloody civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone and Liberia where diamonds were used by armed groups to fund the conflicts.

South Africans call for UK to return diamonds set in crown jewels

By Rédaction Africanews
with Agencies Last updated: 04/05 - 


SOUTH AFRICA

calls are growing in South Africa for Britain's royal family to return the world's largest known clear-cut diamond. This diamond is currently set in the royal sceptre that King Charles III will hold during his coronation on Saturday.

History has it that the diamond, which weighs 530 carats, was discovered in South Africa in 1905 and presented to the British monarchy by the colonial government in the country, which was then under British rule.

In the midst of ongoing conversations about returning artwork and artifacts that were pillaged during colonial times, some South Africans are calling for the diamond to be brought back.

"The diamond needs to come to South Africa. It needs to be a sign of our pride, our heritage, and our culture," said Mothusi Kamanga, a lawyer and activist in Johannesburg who has promoted an online petition, which has gathered about 8,000 signatures, for the diamond to be returned, The Reuters reported.

"I think generally the African people are starting to realise that to decolonise is not just to let people have certain freedoms, but it's also to take back what has been expropriated from us."

Known as Cullinan I, the diamond in the sceptre was cut from the Cullinan diamond, a 3,100-carat stone that was mined near Pretoria.

A smaller diamond cut from the same stone, known as Cullinan II, is set in the Imperial State Crown which is worn by British monarchs on ceremonial occasions.

According to the Royal Collection Trust, which oversees the royal collection of the British royal family, the Cullinan diamond was presented to King Edward VII (the British monarch at the time) in 1907, two years after its discovery in a private mine in South Africa's old Transvaal province.

A replica of the whole Cullinan diamond, which is about the size of a man's fist, is displayed at the Cape Town Diamond Museum.
Far-Right Greek MPs of ‘Spartiates’ Party Charged With Electoral Fraud

ByTasos Kokkinidis
April 4, 2024
The far-right party Spartiates won 12 seats in the 2023 elections. 
Credit: Jebulon, CC1/Wikimedia Commons

Eleven far-right Greek MPs of the Spartiates (Spartans) party have been charged with electoral fraud for complicity in deceiving the electorate during the 2023 parliamentary elections.

The party gained significant traction in the national polls, following an endorsement on Twitter by Ilias Kasidiaris, a former neo-nazi Golden Dawn MP who had been convicted in the trial declaring Golden Dawn a criminal organization. Kasidiaris urged his supporters to vote for Spartans in the June 2023 election.

The Golden Dawn strongman hailed the success of the Spartites by posting a photo from outside his cell celebrating and wearing a tee shirt with the logo of the party.

“Today is a day of triumph for the Greeks who have been fighting for the Fatherland and at the same time an unprecedented defeat of the power system. The state failed to ban the original request of hundreds of thousands of Greeks for a strong National opposition. The first step towards the establishment of a strong National faction in the country’s political life has already been taken,” Kasidiaris said.

The 11 MPs to face charges include Athanasios Halkias, Haralambos Katsivardas, Georgios Manousos, Alexandros Zerveas, Ioannis Dimitrokallis, Dionysios Valtgiannis, Georgios Aspiotis, Michalis Gavgiotakis, Ioannis Kontis, Petros Dimitriadis and Konstantinos Floros.

The charges do not include party leader Vassilis Stigas.

Kasidiaris was also charged with aiding Spartiates

Kasidiaris is also charged with morally instigating the deception of voters, as the prosecutor’s investigation revealed that he is the true leader of the Spartiates party, who secretly controlled events and was responsible for the party running in the elections and electing MPs to Parliament.

The charge is based on evidence showing that there was continuous contact between the Spartiates candidates and Kasidiaris while he was in prison and that he provided them with guidance and political support – which is forbidden under the law for him and other jailed members of Golden Dawn, which was ruled a criminal organization.

The investigation carried out by Supreme Court prosecutor, Georgia Adeilini, showed despite their official affiliation with the Spartiates party under the leadership of Stigas, it appears that they were receiving support and direct guidance from Kasidiaris.

The 11 lawmakers effectively “used the Spartiates party as a front for a new political entity under Kasidiaris, thereby aiding him in circumventing the electoral restrictions imposed by election legislation,” the prosecutor’s report said.

The probe was launched after Stigas appeared at the prosecutor’s office in September 2023 and alleged that members of his party were under the influence of “outside centers” and employing “Greek mafia and Don Corleone” practices. He later retracted his comments.

In the June 2023 elections, the Spartiates party secured 4.68 percent of the vote, electing 12 MPs. The party currently holds 11 seats as several MPs have come and gone amid disputes with Stigas.

The party considers that the traditions of Hellenism are missing from public life nowadays and describes itself as “the iron arm and the real bulwark that will stop the decline and the sell-out of Greece and the Greeks.”
The UK’s new definition of extremism is a dangerous anti-democratic move


Expert Comment~
Written bySamuel Sharp, Ján Michalko, Emilie Tant
https://odi.org/en

Pro Palestine supporters march through central London, October 2023. 
Image license:Brian Minkoff/Shutterstock

While governments across the world should be doing what they can to defend democracy, Communities Secretary Michael Gove’s move in the UK to redefine ‘extremism’ – as set out in the Defending democracy policing protocol – is a clear step in the wrong direction.

Certain groups will be blocked from government funding and meeting officials under the new definition, which risks reducing the space for dissenting views and the right to protest, and only government approved voices influencing decision-making.

At a time when the world is already facing a backlash to rights and shrinking civic space, experts from ODI outline why this political manoeuvre is dangerous and represents anything but ‘defending democracy’.

Our researchers reflect on the precedent the new definition sets for democracy today, and how it will impact women and minority groups the hardest.

Samuel Sharp: restricting civic space sets a worrying precedent for democracy

The struggles of global democracy in the last decade have been well documented. Most of this democratic erosion has not come in terms of electoral competition – a decline in incumbents removed from office through elections - but instead in more subtle challenges to the civil liberties and rights protections that enable democracy to function.

Restrictions on civic space and freedom of expression are a common tool. CIVICUS has documented that civil society face at least one of three repressive tactics (physical harassment and murder; negative discourses and labelling; and restrictive legislation) in 117 of 197 countries.

Through this lens, the UK Government’s imprecise attempt to redefine ‘extremism’, and how this definition could be used to stifle activism, is concerning. Particularly vague is a clause which classifies as extremist not just those that directly undermine fundamental rights or UK democracy, but also those that ‘intentionally create a permissive environment’ for doing so.

Liberal democracies face a genuine balancing act in regulating hate speech, protection from intimidation and freedom of expression. But, if in tension, protecting fundamental democratic rights to free speech and protest should be the priority. Opposition to the change has come from groups as diverse as the pro-hunting Countryside Alliance, National Secular Society, and the Palestine Solidarity Campaign, all concerned that their views could be classed as extremist. For many, the policing of protests on Gaza are a testing point of UK’s willingness to uphold such democratic values.

That Prime Minister Sunak sees the reform as an attempt to stop ‘mob rule replacing democratic rule’ is ironic. Limitations on civic space, even through seemingly marginal changes to definitions, can set a worrying precedent for democracy.
Ján Michalko and Emilie Tant: new definition could deepen distrust, especially among women and minority groups

Defending democracy does indeed require leadership from our politicians in power, especially as democracy is intended to support and defend individual freedoms and our collective well-being. But redefining extremism will not lead to much needed improvements in the public lives of women in the UK.

Women in society and in politics experience the consequences of intensifying intimidation, public misogyny, and anti-feminist discourse, but this is largely fuelled by patriarchal gender norms and broader socio-economic factors in society – rather than the types of political protest this definition seeks to target.

An ongoing curtailing of civil rights in the UK and recent treatment of women taking part in public protests, such as for Sarah Everard or Gaza, has already fostered distrust with the authorities, especially for women who remain socially and racially marginalised. A redefinition and expansion of the definition of extremism has the potential to further deepen this distrust with public institutions, as this protocol leaves it open to interpretation (by the reigning government) which and whose democratic rights are protected over others.

Without a clear definition of which rights should be protected under the scope of British democracy, women from religious, racial and ethnic minority backgrounds will increasingly feel less safe to take part in either formal or informal democratic processes. If we truly wanted to protect MPs, and British democratic processes, the government would instead address the norms and systemic issues that drive threats and intimidation against women in politics and in society at large.

Challenging the sexist, racist and anti-LGBTQI+ extremism that goes unregulated on social media and refusing to engage with culture wars to achieve political ends is a first step. In a time of anti-gender backlash and intense social polarisation, Gove’s definition does nothing to address the powerful actors actually targeting the rights and freedoms of women and gender minorities in society and in politics.


Authors
Samuel Sharp
Senior Research Officer

Ján Michalko
Research Fellow


Emilie Tant
Strategic Communications and Policy Manager
How China hedges: deciphering Sinosure’s role in China’s overseas finance

Written byYunnan Chen, Andrew Herscowitz

ODI | ODI: Think change

04 April 2024
Haikou Xiuying Port Container Terminal. 
Image license:DreamArchitect/Shutterstock

The Belt and Road Forum in October 2023 marked a decade of China’s flagship initiative, revitalising the rhetoric of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) following years of negative PR. It was a political signal that President Xi Jinping’s initiative was not going away. The forum also signalled a shift in the next phase of BRI in terms of China’s overseas finance, in a much leaner and more targeted direction, but also with a much more conservative risk appetite. With respect to both past Chinese investments and the future trajectory of Chinese investments, one financial institution has been critical to China’s management of its overseas risk: Sinosure.


A recent ODI report, Hedging Belts, De-risking Road: Sinosure in China’s overseas finance and the evolving international response, shines a light on Sinosure, China’s other export credit agency (ECA), whose less-profiled role in overseas finance has to date been little understood.

This is the first instalment of the three-part series, 'China’s overseas finance in the era of competition', that explores the rise of – and responses to – China’s distinct model of overseas finance. It examines the critical role of Sinosure in de-risking overseas lending and enabling this overseas finance at scale, with updated figures on its financing trends. A second ODI Insight will dive into the international responses to China’s influence on export credit and development finance, looking at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) institutions and European actors. A final piece offers the perspective from the United States (US), underscoring policy implications for the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) in the context of intensifying bilateral competition.

What does Sinosure do?

Unlike the Export–Import Bank of China (Eximbank), the policy bank that has been the most active in low- and middle-income countries, Sinosure’s role is not that of a lender but a policy insurer. Analogous to the World Bank Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and many other export credit agencies, Sinosure specialises in guarantees and insurance covering political and commercial risk. Sinosure began largely with a trade-based mandate of promoting Chinese goods and services. But its role expanded dramatically following a major capital injection in 2011 from China’s sovereign wealth fund, to increasingly support not only the export of Chinese goods but also Chinese capital, via overseas investment and overseas lending.

In the promotion of the BRI, Sinosure has played a massive, critical role. According to its annual reports, by the end of 2022, Sinosure had provided over $1.3 trillion of insurance over projects in BRI countries. BRI-country activities in support of exports, financing and investment have constituted an estimated one-quarter of Sinosure’s total insurance activities over this period.

Insuring the BRI and overseas lending

Perhaps most intriguing has been Sinosure’s role in guaranteeing China’s overseas lending, which has been a key – and controversial – feature of China’s BRI. Sinosure doesn’t cover all lending, but it can cover significant portions of policy bank lending from China Eximbank and the China Development Bank (CDB; Figure 1), as well as commercial bank loans, taking on the higher-value projects of Eximbank’s portfolio and allowing Eximbank to expand its lending capacity and take on more risk. Meanwhile, for state-owned commercial banks, which have a lower risk tolerance in high-risk countries, Sinosure guarantees are seen as practically essential for them to be willing to finance.


Image credit:Figure 1: Sinosure’s insurance is eligible for most commercial loans from policy banks and state-owned commercial banks


This de-risking function has been instrumental in expanding the risk appetite of Chinese commercial lending, mobilising a significant layer of overseas financing. Sinosure has been critical in underwriting some of the largest infrastructure projects under BRI, including the Maputo–Katembe suspension bridge in Mozambique; the flagship standard gauge railways in Kenya and Ethiopia; and multiple projects under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), among many others. Estimates based on figures from AidData up to 2021 indicate that around $230 billion – at least 12% – of China’s overseas lending from 2000–2021 was enabled through Sinosure coverage.

Once bitten, twice shy

However, this function has also generated clear moral hazards in China’s overseas lending. Policy banks, commercial banks and Sinosure are mandated to support the promotion of Chinese goods, services and technologies. Much of this has been enabled by the small portfolio of medium- to long-term (MLT) insurance (Figure 2), which typically covers 95% of the project value. This means Sinosure bears nearly all the default risk, but with limited capacity to influence or refuse projects considered strategic. Meanwhile, Chinese state-owned enterprise contractors, who often help broker projects with host governments, bear little of the risk if governments default down the line.



A Flourish data visualization


Figure 2: Sinosure’s portfolio activities 2014–2022. Source: Sinosure annual reports 2019, 2021, 2022

Once burned, Sinosure learned. The squeeze in MLT coverage after 2018 (Figure 2) coincides with several restructurings in this period, where it made payouts on significant BRI project loans. The subsequent decrease in risk appetite mirrors the broader, well-noted decline in overseas lending, indicating that the shrinking in Sinosure’s risk appetite contributed to the broader pullback in lending from Chinese banks. Remarkably, other instruments such as overseas investment insurance and domestic trade credit insurance have not decreased; instead, the latter has grown to buffer Chinese exporters from the impacts of the US–China trade war.

But Sinosure’s appetite, and capacity, for risk has dropped. Recently, Sinosure has taken the step of cutting back its risk coverage provision in countries that have previously defaulted or are in arrears. Even in Pakistan, one of the biggest BRI partners, Sinosure has reduced its coverage capacity for the country from 95% to 70%, in response to Pakistan’s fiscal issues and payment delays. While not refusing new projects outright, this pullback essentially reflects a soft veto, forcing banks, contractors and project owners to either seek additional coverage elsewhere, or to share more of the financial risk. The next decade of the BRI 2.0 will not see the same exuberance of lending as the last – and creditors will be much stingier.

Sinosure in debt restructuring


Debt sustainability has also become a live issue that has pushed Sinosure into the limelight, as part of China’s participation in the G20 Common Framework. In theory, in the event of default, Sinosure has subrogation rights, giving it the legal authority to renegotiate across all Chinese creditors, and having the final approval over any restructured loans. But despite its cross-institutional role and vantage point across multiple Chinese creditors, Sinosure’s participation in debt restructurings has been curiously muted. Instead, it has taken a backseat to China Eximbank, which has acted as lead representative for all Chinese official creditors.

Even so, Sinosure has exerted influence over debt norms: in Zambia, Sinosure, with Eximbank, pushed back on the inclusion of Sinosure-guaranteed loans as ‘official’ loans despite their state-guarantee – breaking with the Paris Club norm for ECA-guaranteed debt. This likely comes from resistance to extending the eligible portfolio of debt for restructuring – Boston University GDP Center estimates an additional $4.1 billion of CDB loans for Zambia would have been then classified as ‘official’ debt for restructuring. But this choice has come with a trade-off; as Brad Setser and Theo Maret argue, Chinese commercial creditors are now disadvantaged relative to faster-moving bondholders in the process, further complicating the comparability-of-treatment issue, and deepening Zambia’s debt woes.

De-risking the next decade of the BRI

One thing is clear: the second decade of the BRI will not replicate the first. Sinosure guarantees have been a huge part of the BRI in the last decade, and a significant instrument in enabling Chinese banks in overseas lending. This era is over, and Sinosure’s diminished appetite and capacity for risk – and China’s own domestic economic headwinds – are likely to squeeze the capacity of banks and investors going forward.

Even with tightened constraints, Sinosure’s scale remains massive. Plans to overhaul MIGA’s provision of guarantees pledges to triple issuances to $20 billion by 2030 – compare this to Sinosure’s $70 billion of overseas investment insurance in 2022 alone (Figure 2). If the World Bank seeks to compete, it will need to seriously raise its ambitions in scale.

One big shift will be the sector focus. As China scales up clean energy development at home to meet its carbon neutrality and energy transition goals, it will be its clean tech sectors – renewables rather than railways – that ‘go out’ in the years to come. Sinosure, whose new motto of ‘small yet smart’ (echoing the official BRI motto of ‘small and beautiful’) is quickly ramping up its insurance of green and renewable projects and supporting green finance, as well as new expanding in the medical and health fields.

This is likely to be the new frontier of competition, as our next blog will discuss. The rise and scale of China’s official lending and guarantees have put huge pressure on the existing norms and frameworks that govern aid and industrial competition. This great power competition will have potentially unanticipated consequences for OECD rules themselves, as new reforms seek to level the playing field.


Many thanks to Frederique Dahan and Mark Miller for their feedback and comments, and to Zoe Zongyuan Liu for her inputs.
Iraq Kurdistan region suspends entry visas for Syrians

April 3, 2024 

A man holds Syrian passports as he waits at a border crossing 
 [JOSEPH EID/AFP via Getty Images]

Iraq’s northern Kurdistan region has suspended the issuing of entry visas for Syrian citizens, in a decision that has sparked fears of potential humanitarian consequences for Syrians seeking shelter in the region.


According to the news outlet, Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed, unnamed security sources in the city of Erbil revealed to it that the autonomous region’s authorities have decided to implement measures to curb the entry of Syrians into Iraqi Kurdistan, such as prohibiting work and tourism visas for young adults aged between 18 to 40.

Prior to Erbil’s decision, the Kurdistan region enabled Syrians to obtain visas for a fee of up to $170, which allowed one month’s residency and the chance to extend it for another month, with Syrians having been able to gain residency for an entire year. It was only the Kurdistan region which recognised that residency, however, with federal Iraqi authorities having the power to arrest Syrians who left that northern region for other areas in Iraq.

This latest decision by Iraqi Kurdish authorities was reportedly finally taken at the behest of Iraq’s federal government, which aims to regulate foreign labour and particularly the influx of undocumented Syrians to cities within Iraq for work.

It comes months after Syria’s regime cancelled entry visas or security clearance for Iraqis intending to visit Syria, with Iraq, in turn, suspending visa issuance for Syrians two months ago.

Rather than merely being part of Baghdad’s efforts to regulate foreign labour within Iraq, though, there are concerns that it could cause humanitarian impediments for Syrians by restricting their ability to enter Iraqi Kurdistan to seek refuge and work.

According to Aso Hawramani, an activist from the autonomous northern region, the move is “inhumane” as it neglects the plight of Syrians seeking medical treatment and protection under the United Nations in the region.

There is also the issue of potentially forcefully deporting Syrians in Iraqi Kurdistan – numbering hundreds of thousands – against their will and legitimate needs, with a survey by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) having revealed that over 92 per cent of Syrians in the region not wanting to return to Syria due to fears regarding safety and the lack of livelihood.

The decision may also be the result of Iraq’s talks with Turkiye over the region’s security situation, with Baghdad last month agreeing to Ankara’s demands to ban the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist group. The suspension of entry visas for Syrians, therefore, could potentially be an effort to crack down on the entry of suspected Kurdish militants entering the region from north-east Syria, an area controlled by Kurdish militias allegedly linked to the PKK.


OPINION...

Unlike Iran and Turkiye, Iraq and Syria are vulnerable to Kurdish separatism





People gather to protest against the preparations to evacuate the main headquarters building of the Kirkuk Joint Operations Command of the army and transfer it to the KDP in Kirkuk, Iraq on August 31, 2023 [Ali Makram Ghareeb/Anadolu Agency]


by Omar Ahmed
3umr27md
September 14, 2023 

Among the myriad of the Middle East’s post-colonial, post-independence issues, the Kurdish question stands as a perennial one. This is closer to home for the four states which straddle the historic geographic region of Kurdistan, in particular fragile states, Iraq and Syria (ranked 27th and 5th place, respectively on the Fragile States Index), in addition to Iran and Turkiye.

Kurdistan’s geographical overlap with modern nation-states has fuelled Kurdish aspirations for self-determination, as they find themselves divided by borders, often facing varying degrees of discrimination and marginalisation. The Kurds have long sought to establish an independent Kurdish state, transcending the borders that divide their homeland. Naturally, this is at odds with the national interests of the “occupying” states.

Unlike regional powers, Turkiye and Iran, who routinely take proactive measures in safeguarding their territorial integrity against the spectre of Kurdish separatism, the two neighbouring Arab states find themselves grappling with this threat. In both countries, there have been recent ethnic clashes reigniting long-standing security concerns.

Late last month, in the northern flashpoint Iraqi city of Kirkuk, Arab and Turkmen tribal members staged a sit-in protest against Prime Minister, Muhammad Shia Al-Sudani’s order late last month to hand over the Joint Operations Command building to the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). This demonstration was met by a counter-protest from the Kurdish community, resulting in violent clashes involving the security forces, leaving three protestors dead and several wounded.

Prior to the Iraqi army take-over of the oil-rich city from Peshmerga forces in 2017, it had served as the party’s headquarters after the Kurdish militia seized the multi-ethnic city when Iraqi forced withdrew in the face of the Daesh threat.

READ: Syria: Kurdish-led forces clash with pro-Turkiye militants


The Kurds, who suffered under the past Arabization policies under Saddam Hussein, want the strategically important city to be part of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan region of Iraq, with long-term aspirations for full independence.

The Kirkuk crisis has also caught the attention of Turkiye, which has its own history of counter-insurgency against Kurdish separatists. On 3 September, Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan expressed Ankara’s concerns over the development during a joint presser with his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, in Tehran.

Fidan also called on the Iraqi authorities to put an end to the increasing presence of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militant group in Kirkuk. The PKK is a designated terrorist organisation by Turkiye, the US and EU. In August, during his first visit to Iraq since taking office, the Turkish diplomat also called on Baghdad to label the PKK as such.

In Syria, ethnic tensions in the eastern part of the country have also been escalating as of late, with reports that the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), an affiliate of the PKK, has been stepping up attacks on the outskirts of Deir Ez-Zor against Arab residents, forcing hundreds of them to flee their villages. Earlier this week, clashes between the SDF and local Arab tribes erupted, with the latter resisting against offensives by the Kurdish militia aimed at taking control of several towns in the governorate.

Speaking earlier this month on the two issues of the ethnic-related unrest in Iraq and Syria, Turkish President, Recept Tayyip Erdogan, said regarding the latter: “we have repeatedly warned the US that it should not cooperate with the separatist terrorist organisation, and if it continues to act this way, both its own interests and the region will suffer in the future.”

Both the US and its ally, Israel, have, at various times, seen value in aligning with Kurdish groups to advance their interests in the Middle East. This strategic manipulation has led to heightened suspicions in both Iran and Turkiye.

The US, in particular, has a history of supporting Kurdish militias in Iraq and Syria. In recent years, as part of efforts to combat Daesh, this partnership was instrumental in leading to the entity’s territorial defeat, yet it also led to friction with Arab tribes and communities who claimed discrimination and theft of natural resources under Kurdish rule.

READ: Turkiye: foreign minister calls on Iraq to end PKK presence in Kirkuk

Iran, as a natural regional hegemon in the region, has its own set of concerns regarding Kurdish separatism. The Iranian Kurds primarily reside in the country’s western provinces, where they have faced periods of unrest and calls for greater autonomy. Iran’s fear of Kurdish separatism is not unfounded, given the historical precedent of Kurdish uprisings, the latest of which was sparked by the death in police custody last year of Kurdish-Iranian woman Maha Amini.

Notably, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) has given the Iraqi government an ultimatum by 19 September to disarm “terror groups” in the Kurdistan region, under the threat of a resumption of targeted strikes.

Last September, the IRGC carried out over 70 ballistic missile strikes against hostile targets. Earlier that year in March, IRGC also allegedly carried out missile attacks against a covert Israeli Mossad compound in Erbil.

Baghdad appears to take the threat from Tehran seriously as, on Tuesday, Iraqi Foreign Minister, Fuad Hussein, announced that steps had been taken to remove Iranian-Kurdish militants away from the border.




Given their shared concerns over Kurdish separatism, Iran and Turkiye have, on occasion, engaged in joint operations against Kurdish groups in Iraq.

Previous Turkish-Iranian operations have targeted the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), an Iranian offshoot of the PKK based in the border region of Iraq and Iran.

These actions stem from the fact that neither Ankara nor Tehran want “to see Syria and Iraq once again become powerful countries, but they also have no interest in seeing the Kurds take advantage of this fragility to build autonomous local governments, or even independent ones in the long term.”

Complicating matters, both regional rivals have sought to undermine one another’s influence, vis-à-vis the Kurds in Iraq, as Turkiye supports the KDP while Iran supports the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Both countries are also competing for influence in Kirkuk, with Iran said to be gaining the upper hand, “thanks to factors such as the fight against the Islamic State and Tehran’s ties with the PMU and the Shiite section of the Turkmen community.”

The historical intersection of Kurdistan with the aforementioned states, combined with the Kurds’ position as the largest ethnic group lacking a nation-state, fosters a volatile situation that external actors will look to manipulate. Turkiye and Iran maintain a strict stance against Kurdish separatism within their own territories, often resorting to actions that may compromise the sovereignty of their neighbours. In contrast, Iraq and Syria, as relatively weak states, lack the capacity to adopt such an approach and, consequently, bear the ongoing consequences of unchecked Kurdish separatism within their borders.
Attacks on Kurds or use of proxies: Middle East awaits Iran’s response - analysis

People in the Middle East are concerned about Iran’s vow to attack Israel in the wake of an airstrike in Damascus.

ISRAEL ATTACKS CONSULATE IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

 JERUSALEM POST
APRIL 4, 2024
(L-R) Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu(photo credit: REUTERS)


In the days after an airstrike in Damascus led Iran to vow to “punish” Israel, many people in the region are wondering what may come next. While it’s possible Iran may seek to use ballistic missiles to target Israel – the way it targeted Al-Asad Airbase in Iraq in 2020 after the US killed IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani – people in the region fear other types of escalation.

Iran has often preferred to escalate attacks in other countries, using proxies in past years, whenever there are tensions with Israel, the US, or other countries. For instance, Tehran prodded the Houthis in Yemen in the past to attack Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Tehran often prefers to get others to do its dirty work, although that’s not always the case. In addition to the 2020 attack on Al-Asad Airbase, where US forces were present, Iran also directly attacked Saudi Arabia in the September 2019 attack on the Abqaiq energy facility. In that attack, Iran used drones and cruise missiles.

Iran’s capabilities in this respect are well known. It has a large number of long-range ballistic missiles. In January, Iran carried out attacks on Pakistan and Syria using rockets. Tehran claimed it used a long-range missile attack on ISIS in northwest Syria. It used its Kheibar Shekan ballistic missiles. The attack was a “message” for the US and Israel, according to Iranian media at the time.
Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei views an Iranian drone during his visit last week to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace Force. (credit: Office of the Iranian Supreme Leader/WANA via REUTERS)

Typical Iranian response: show off capabilities

This is the typical type of Iranian response: showing off capabilities or striking at others. Iran also bases its missiles and drones in other countries. For instance, in late 2020, Iran moved its Shahed 136 drones to Yemen, according to reports. They were spotted in aerial photos in early 2021, according to Newsweek.

The same drones were then exported to Russia for use against Ukraine. The drones have a range of about 2,000 km. They carry a warhead and fly a one-way kamikaze mission. Iran moved drone and missile technology to Yemen over the last decade. This enabled the Houthis to strike at Riyadh and more recently to attack ships in the Red Sea.

Tehran also has moved drones and missiles to Iraq. Beginning around 2018, Iranian ballistic missiles were said to have moved to Iraqi areas and were secured by Iranian-backed militias. Iran did this once ISIS was defeated in Anbar province.

Then, Tehran helped build the Imam Ali base near Albukamal, Syria, on the Iraqi border. This enabled Iran to warehouse munitions and move weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Tehran likely was at least in part behind the decision by Hezbollah in 2019 to try to post a unit, using what was described in media as “killer drones,” near the Golan.

Iran also moved drones to the T-4 base in Syria, and in 2018, it targeted Israel with one of these drones. In the 2021 conflict with Hamas in Gaza, Tehran prodded a militia in Iraq to target Israel with drones. The IDF used F-35s to intercept two Iranian drones in March 2021.

While Iran has been moving drones and missiles to proxies in the region over the last decade, it has also increasingly targeted other groups when it wants to “respond” to Israel. For instance, Rudaw media in Erbil reported in mid-January: “Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps claimed responsibility for a massive ballistic-missile attack on the Kurdistan Region’s capital of Erbil that killed at least four civilians, claiming to have hit ‘spy headquarters’ of anti-Iran groups in the Region.”

IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency said in “response to the recent terrorist crimes of the enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the spy headquarters and gatherings of anti-Iran groups in parts of the region were targeted by IRGC ballistic missiles in the middle of the night,” the report said.

Five ballistic missiles were fired at Erbil, the capital of the autonomous Kurdistan Region in Iraq. At least four civilians were killed and 17 wounded as the missiles struck, Rudaw reported, adding that Kurdish businessman Peshraw Dizayee was dead.

In March 2022, Iran targeted another businessman in the Kurdistan Region. It attacked a mansion owned by Baz Karim Barzinji, CEO of the Iraqi Kurdish oil company KAR Group. The IRGC said it had fired 12 missiles at his house.

Iran’s tendency to lash out at Kurds is now leading to concerns in the region. The Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq is close to US bases and hosts US forces. In addition, the US backs the Syrian Democratic Forces in Syria, a group that includes Kurdish anti-ISIS fighters. As such, Iran often targets these two Kurdish areas because it is easier to target them since they are closer to Iran and closer to Tehran’s proxies in Syria and Iraq.

Iran has a history of using proxies to attack others so that after the attack, Tehran can claim it has no responsibility for the attack.

Today, as the region awaits Iran’s claims that it will “punish” Israel, many countries and groups are wondering if they will be on the receiving end of the Iranian response, whether directly or by proxy.
4 April is International Landmine Awareness Day

4 APRIL 2024


On 8 December 2005, the UN General Assembly declared that 4 April of each year shall be observed as the International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action. This initiative continues to be supported by countries, organisations, and communities around the world.

This year, the theme is “Protecting Lives. Building Peace.” — reminds us of the need to safeguard those at particular risk, including people living with disabilities, women, children and other vulnerable groups. This is a particularly poignant theme in the South Caucasus where the problem of landmines is acute, and the region is now identified as among the ones with the highest contamination of landmines in the world.

In his message on the occasion of this year’s International Landmine Awareness Day, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said:

“Even after the fighting ends, these deadly devices can contaminate communities for decades to come, posing a daily and deadly danger to women, men and children alike, and blocking vital humanitarian and development assistance.”

In his message, the UN Secretary-General urged Member States to ratify and fully implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

"I also call on Member States to support the United Nations Mine Action Strategy, and ratify and fully implement the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. Country by country, community by community, let’s rid the world of these weapons, once and for all", Guterres added.

LINKS Europe Statement on International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action 2024

In a statement from its offices in The Hague, LINKS Europe Foundation, said that on a daily basis, people are becoming victims of landmines in different parts of the South Caucasus. International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action provides us with an opportunity to focus on this problem and ensure that it does not simply become just another daily inconvenience. We regret that as yet the international community has failed to recognise the enormity of the problem, and to respond accordingly.
Source: LINKS Europe Foundation and the United Nations.


Cambodia reiterates commitment toward mine-free world

Cambodian Prime Minister Samdech Moha Borvor Thipadei Hun Manet on April 4 reaffirmed Cambodia's commitment to a world free of landmines and called for collective action to achieve this goal.

VNA Thursday, April 04, 2024
Cambodian Prime Minister Samdech Moha Borvor Thipadei Hun Manet 
(Photo: AKP/VNA)


Phnom Penh (VNA) - Cambodian Prime Minister Samdech Moha Borvor Thipadei Hun Manet on April 4 reaffirmed Cambodia's commitment to a world free of landmines and called for collective action to achieve this goal.

“We reaffirm our commitment to achieving a mine-free world, overcoming the challenges posed by landmines and turning our vision into reality to ensure that the next generation can live in safety and dignity and be free from the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war,” said the premier in a message released on his social media networks this morning on the occasion of the International Mine Awareness Day as quoted by the country’s Ministry of Information.

According to the ministry, as Cambodia is the Chair of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (Ottawa Treaty) in 2024, the PM called on the international community to continue to work together to highlight the efforts to eliminate this hidden killer, as well as emphasise the importance of mine action to promote peace, security and sustainable development around the world.

International Mine Awareness Day, observed this year under the theme of "Protecting Life, Building Peace," is aimed to underscore the importance of raising awareness on the threat posed by landmines and explosive remnants of war to innocent people worldwide.

Cambodia became a party to the Ottawa Treaty in 2000. It was elected by the 164 member states to chair and host the 5th Review Conference of the Mine Ban Convention – the Siem Reap-Angkor Summit on a Mine-Free World – in Siem Reap province in late November this year./.
Despite gains in Brazil, forest destruction still 'stubbornly' high: report

Agence France-Presse
April 4, 2024

This photo taken on September 22, 2017 gives an aerial view of deforestation in the western Amazon region of Brazil CARL DE SOUZA AFP/File

The world lost 10 football fields of old-growth tropical forest every minute in 2023 and despite uplifting progress in the Amazon, the picture elsewhere is less rosy, researchers said on Thursday.

Tropical forests absorb carbon and are a vital ally in the fight against climate change, but they are also the most ravaged by deforestation.

High rates of tropical forest loss remain "stubbornly consistent" despite nations pledging in recent years to protect these critical environments, said researchers from the World Resources Institute (WRI) and the University of Maryland.

Around 3.7 million hectares of primary tropical forest -- an area almost the size of Switzerland -- was lost last year, they said.

"Impressive" declines in Brazil and Colombia were "largely counteracted by increases" in tropical forest lost elsewhere, said Mikaela Weisse from WRI, a nonprofit research organization.

"The world took two steps forward, two steps back when it comes to this past year's forest loss," said Weisse, director of WRI's Global Forest Watch, which uses satellite imagery to aid its analysis.
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They focused on tropical forests because of their particular vulnerability to deforestation and capacity to store carbon, and considered various causes of destruction including farming, logging and fires.

- Amazon gains -

The 2023 figures represent a nine percent decline in forest loss compared to 2022 but in general, rates have barely wavered from the highs of recent years, researchers said.


They said the amount of forest lost in 2023 represented the equivalent of 2.4 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions -- nearly half of US annual emissions from fossil fuels.

Aside from soaking up huge quantities of carbon, tropical forests protect soil, host the majority of the world's plant and animal species, and filter air and water.

But there was good news from Brazil, which lost 36 percent less primary forest than the year prior -- its lowest level since 2015.


This "dramatic" decline was most pronounced in the Amazon, a rainforest so vast that it stores the equivalent of around 20 years of emissions of carbon dioxide.

Researchers said this coincided with the first year of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who vowed to defend the Amazon and restore forest protections after former leader Jair Bolsonaro revoked environmental safeguards.

There were disparities across the country, however, with a very clear improvement in the Amazon but a deterioration in the Cerrado, the heartland of Brazil's agriculture industry.


In Colombia, where President Gustavo Petro has been trying to negotiate peace with armed groups, there was a roughly 50 percent decline in forest lost in a year.

Forest conservation was an "explicit goal" of these peace talks, Weisse said.

- Off track -


"The 2023 data shows that countries can cut rates of forest loss when they muster the political will to do so. But we also know that progress can be reversed when political winds change," said Rod Taylor, global director of forests at WRI.

By contrast, forest losses hit a record high for a third year running in Bolivia, in part due to the conversion of land for its growing soy industry.

Agriculture also played a major role in sharp increases in forest destruction in Laos -- where land is under pressure due to investments and demand from China -- and Nicaragua, researchers said.


The Democratic Republic of Congo -- home to the enormous Congo Basin, which absorbs more carbon than it releases -- lost more than half a million hectares of primary forest for another year in a row.

Outside the tropics, wildfires caused immense losses of forest, particularly in Canada which experienced record-breaking blazes.

Taylor said this was the second year of full annual data on forest loss since more than 140 countries agreed at the COP26 climate summit to halt and reverse deforestation by 2030.


But deforestation in 2023 was almost 2 million hectares above the level needed to meet this target by the end of the decade, said Taylor.

"Are we on track to halt deforestation by 2030? The short answer? No... we are far off track and trending in the wrong direction," he said
KCK Ecology Committee: 4 April is a call for environmental struggle

Öcalan is conducting the greatest struggle against the powers of capitalist modernity, said the KCK Ecology Committee.





ÖCALAN'S BIRTHDAY
ANF
BEHDINAN
Thursday, 4 April 2024

The KCK Ecology Committee issued a statement to mark Abdullah Öcalan's 75th birthday and called for "an ecological struggle."

The statement said: "We celebrate the 75th birthday of Rêber Apo [Abdullah Öcalan], who offered the peoples of Kurdistan and the world the opportunity to participate in this gallant struggle and paved the way for a new, free and ecological life.

Rêber Apo, who turned the fate of the Kurdish people around, has redefined the past half-century with the struggle for freedom which he spearheaded in the leadership of the PKK. In his 75 years of life, he fitted a struggle which, otherwise, would have only developed in decades. With his thought and philosophy – all of which are dedicated to freedom – he continues to effect millions of people. The most concrete example of this can be seen in today’s situation of the Kurdish people."

The statement added: "With the guidance of Rêber Apo, the people of Kurdistan rose from their ashes and recreated themselves. With the conspiracy and solitary confinement imposed on Rêber Apo, the objective of the forces behind the international conspiracy and the fascist AKP-MHP administration is to prevent his thoughts from reaching the people. Yet, Rêber Apo took every opportunity, despite the brutal conditions of the Imrali island-prison, to deepen and share his knowledge. The prison writings he prepared and the paradigm he established during the 25-year Imrali period appeals not only to Kurds; they are of global significance. He disabled the conspiratorial forces from achieving their aim; he has fulfilled his duties and responsibilities, and done much more than what one could imagine. He was appointed by the people themselves as a leader, to which he responded with extraordinary hard work and a great struggle. He formulated a new paradigm of democracy, ecology and women’s freedom and presented it to the entire human race.

Rêber Apo is conducting the greatest struggle against the powers of capitalist modernity, who continue to threaten the future of humanity every day via exploitation and immoral practices."

The statement continued: "In the face of the ecological catastrophe brought about by capitalist forces and the estrangement between humanity and the natural world, Rêber Apo chooses to celebrate his birthday by planting trees as a way to meet and connect with the land. In this way, he criticizes and shows an alternative to the consumerist lifestyle fostered by capitalist modernity. Rêber Apo refuses to monopolize any of his accomplishments; instead, he credits humanity, the Kurdish people, and the independence cause.

Only by accepting the ecological paradigm can the new life that Rêber Apo envisioned - a restoration to social ecology - be realized. As a result, April 4 should be celebrated by preserving the land, the water, and the trees that are under constant threat from capitalist modernity, as well as by fostering ecological solidarity while creating new parks, gardens, and habitats for the members of our planet. The “tree of life” tradition, as the tradition which is practiced in Kurdistan and many other regions of the world called, must be implemented more popularly. Taking steps to meet the soil and planting a tree, is the most meaningful way to celebrate April 4."

The statement underlined that "under the principles developed by Rêber Apo, we share a distinctive heritage of struggle, ideology, perspective, and organization that holds the prospect of a new and alternative ecological movement. Thus, in the paradigm he offered as a remedy, Rêber Apo emphasized the importance of connecting the women’s liberation movement to the ecological revolution. He described all the work carried out in the name of ecology, as the work of legends. He also stated that the 21st century is the century of women. Thus, the twenty-first century – which we approach with the objective of bringing about a women’s revolution – should also be a century in which the ecological revolution gains the support it deserves. We call on all parts of society to develop the ecological struggle, to establish Rêber Apo’s paradigm for an ecological and free life; for a life which is friend to nature and where the most beautiful values meet under the ideology of Jin, Jîyan, Azadî."