Saturday, May 18, 2024

Capitalism Attacks Argentine Workers and You May Be Next

May 16, 2024

Source: Systemic Disorder


Protestors in Argentina. (Photo: Phoebe Moore)

As always when a representative of the right wing tells you he or she is campaigning to bring “freedom,” be afraid. Very afraid. For “freedom” in these cases means freedom for the richest financiers and industrialists to do whatever they want.

For them, “Freedom” is for capital, not for human beings without capital to invest. Today’s exhibit is the offensive against working people that is taking place in Argentina, where the new extreme right president, Javier Milei, is determined to see how far capitalist ideology can be pushed. So far, Argentines have pushed back but Milei, cheered on by domestic and international big business leaders, is nothing if not determined to ram through his austerity packages. And he has shown no inclination to allow mere democracy to stand in his way.

Nonetheless, there is no surprise here. President Milei ran on a program of extreme austerity, brandishing a chainsaw at his election rallies. Unfortunately, enough Argentines bought his siren songs, or were desperate enough to try anything given the country’s punishing inflation, to elect him, ending a one-term period in executive office by the ordinarily dominant Peronists. Alas, doing something new for the sake of doing something new, when it is aimed at you, rarely works. And here there is actually nothing new. President Milei simply promoted standard hard right ideology, albeit promoting it with unusual vigor. Snake oil is snake oil, as Argentine working people are already finding out.


People filled the streets of Buenos Aires and Argentina’s biggest cities to demand “memory, truth and justice” for the victims of state violence (photo by Izquierda Diario)

Still waiting for benefits to trickle down, aren’t you? For more than 40 years, the same tired propaganda has been peddled, and has been implemented in various countries, starting with Augusto Pinochet’s murderous military dictatorship in 1973, in Chile, and gaining speed with the election of Margaret Thatcher in Britain in 1979 and Ronald Reagan in the United States in 1980. “Neoliberalism” is the term that the world came to adopt for this vicious austerity. (The term references how the world outside of North America uses the word “liberal” to mean minimal government regulation to enable decisions to be made by market forces; this is termed “libertarianism” in North America. Capitalist “markets,” however, are nothing more than the aggregate interests of the biggest financiers and industrialists and are not the neutral arbiters loftily sitting in clouds even-handedly dispensing justice as conservative propagandists would have us believe.)

The ideology that undergirds austerity programs has a long history and has to be incessantly promoted, all the more so because traditional “laissez-faire” ideas had become discredited during the Great Depression, leading to post-World War II Keynesianism becoming entrenched. The need for capitalists to give concessions to save their system due to the mass revolts of the 1930s and the failure of fascism as a “solution” to capitalists’ difficulties in maintaining profits helped the temporary acceptance of (or resignation to) Keynesianism. Perhaps the most influential ideologue of laissez-faire/neoliberal economics is Friedrich Hayek, who went so far as to assert that solidarity, benevolence and a desire to work for the betterment of one’s community are “primitive instincts” and that human civilization consists of a long struggle against those ideals. “The discipline of the market” is the provider of civilization and progress, he wrote. His most prominent student, Milton Friedman, would supply the Pinochet dictatorship with its economic program, the first modern case of “shock therapy” being imposed with maximum force because there was no other way it could be implemented.

What Thatcherism had in store for Britons was demonstrated by her crushing of the miners’ strike and Reaganism in turn showed its teeth by crushing the air traffic controllers’ strike. Punishing austerity was to follow on both sides of the Atlantic as declining profits and increasingly stiffer and more globalized competition required pushing down wages and working conditions, reducing or eliminating regulations and outsourcing production to wherever labor was cheaper and regulations fewer. Making all this work required dropping barriers to trade, thus bringing on the age of so-called “free trade” agreements that put regulation outside political or democratic control, and cracking open countries outside the capitalist core of the Global North to expose those economies to plunder with legal defenses stripped away by unaccountable multinational organizations. Debt is used to enforce these prerogatives, with multinational lending organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund imposing draconian conditions on loans that are used to pay off earlier loans, sending Global South countries into deeper debt. The European Union is another neoliberal offensive, a supranational organization run by and for bankers that overrules democratically elected governments at the national level.

The Milei offensive in not new to Argentina

Argentina, although among the biggest countries outside the capitalist core, has suffered multiple rounds of neoliberal austerity. President Milei’s draconian attempts to maximize corporate profits are not new.

The fascistic military dictatorship of 1976 to 1983 laid waste to the Argentine economy while unleashing horrific human rights abuses. Upon seizing power, the military handed over economic policy to a well-connected industrialist, José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, who ruthlessly implemented a severe neoliberal program of shock therapy, backed by a savage campaign of torture, “disappearances” and killings waged by the military and two allied fascist groups. The CGT union federation was abolished, strikes outlawed, prices raised, wages tightly controlled and social programs cut. As a result, real wages fell by 50 percent within a year. Because of the collapse of internal consumption caused by this austerity, ten percent of Argentina’s workforce was laid off in 1976 alone. For the last five years of the military junta, 1978 to 1983, Argentina’s foreign debt increased to US$43 billion from $8 billion, while the share of wages in national income fell to 22 percent from 43 percent.

Upon the return of formal democracy, the debt did not go away. A civilian president, Carlos Menem, imposed an austerity program in the early 1990s in conjunction with selling off state enterprises at below-market prices. This fire sale yielded $23 billion, but the proceeds went to pay foreign debt mostly accumulated by the military dictatorship — after completing these sales, Argentina’s foreign debt had actually grown. The newly privatized companies then imposed massive layoffs and raised consumer prices. By 1997, about 85 percent of Argentines were unable to meet their basic needs with their income. In contrast, banks underwriting Argentine government bonds earned an estimated $1 billion in fees between 1991 and 2001, profiting from public debt. As one example, an investment bank that arranged a restructuring of Argentina’s debt, under which a brief pause in the payment schedule was granted in exchange for higher interest payments, increasing Argentina’s debt, racked up a fee of $100 million

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Argentines participating in the March 24, 2024, truth and justice demonstration in Buenos Aires draw parallels between the military dictatorship and Palestine (photo by 1985Idea)

It all finally imploded at the end of 2001, when the government froze bank accounts and the country experienced so much unrest that it had five presidents in two weeks. The last of these presidents, Néstor Kirchner, suspended debt payments. Had Argentina resumed scheduled payments in 2005, interest payment alone on the debt would have consumed 35 percent of total government spending. Kirchner announced that Argentina intended to pay only 25 percent of what was owed and any group that refused negotiations would get nothing; in the end, Argentina paid 30 percent to bondholders who agreed to talk.

Almost all of Argentina’s debtors accepted the 30 percent, seeing 30 percent as better than nothing. Many of Argentina’s creditors were not the financial institutions that originally made the loans; much of the debt had been sold to speculators. There were two notable holdouts, however — the hedge funds Elliott Capital Management and Aurelius Capital Management. These two speculators demanded full payment of the face value of the debt that they bought for pennies on the dollar. How to extract money out of a country where living conditions had already sunk to perilous lows? The head of Elliott Capital and its NML Capital affiliate impounded an Argentine Navy ship docked in Ghana, tracking the ship and waiting for it to reach the country that would be most favorable to its tactic of seizing an asset. This was no aberration; that speculator, Paul Singer, has a documented history of buying debt owed by poor Global South countries for pennies on the dollar and demanding to be paid full face value, no matter how dire that country’s condition.

The speculators on Argentine debt could use the tactic of impounding ships because a U.S. federal judge had issued a series of rulings declaring that Argentina must pay the full amount to the holdouts. Those rulings were not isolated instances of an out-of-control judge; the U.S. Supreme Court would later issue two rulings that fully backed the speculators. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 is supposed to bar lawsuits in U.S. courts against non-U.S. governments, but a 7-1 bipartisan majority of the Supreme Court decided that the law is malleable when not convenient. The Argentine bonds had been sold with a provision that New York law would be used to settle disputes related to them, which gave U.S. courts the excuse needed to extend U.S. law to Argentina. In essence, the high court ruled that financiers are more sovereign than a national government.

Standing up to finance capital

Nonetheless, the administrations of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández refused to kneel. Their left-wing populism has been overstated — they left capitalist relations untouched and at best merely tolerated the movement of recovered factories — but they did consistently put the interests of Argentine working people ahead of international financiers. That came to an end when a new right-wing president, Mauricio Macri, took office and fulfilled his campaign promises to put an end to the country’s sovereignty. As a reward, Buenos Aires was again allowed to borrow on international financial markets — so that it can borrow money for the sole purpose of paying billions of dollars to speculators. The Macri administration committed itself to paying $6.4 billion to the holdouts, which could only be paid off by more borrowing.

President Macri served only one term, with the Peronists regaining office. Now a hard right president is again in power. President Milei wasted no time implementing a program that is a dream for Argentine capitalists; his chainsaw is not an empty metaphor. Acting immediately — after all, “shock therapy” is also not just a metaphor — President Milei devalued the peso by 50 percent, reduced transportation and utility subsidies, lifted price controls and dissolved half of the government’s ministries. He also announced a new “protocol” to limit public protests and the creation of a “registry” under which activist organizations would be sent bills for the expenses of the state repressing their public protests. The purported purpose of this protocol is, you guessed it, to achieve “peace and order.”

This program, naturally, has drawn rapturous praise from business interests. Elon Musk, he of the mass firings, poor pay and notorious hostility to unions and regulations that protect employees, has endorsed President Milei, and “top Argentine CEOs” “heap praise” on him, Bloomberg reports. The president has in turn lavished praise on Margaret Thatcher, calling her “brilliant.”
Entre Rios province, Argentina (photo by Felipe Gonzalez)

Those who are at the receiving end of the Milei administration’s attacks, and those who represent them, have a decidedly different take. The General Secretary of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), Luc Triangle, said, “The IMF is celebrating the budget surplus in Argentina, but it’s indefensible to ignore the human cost of this economic shock therapy. Pensions have been slashed, thousands of public sector workers fired, public services are on the verge of collapse, unemployment is growing and food poverty spreading. These kinds of misguided, far-right economic measures deepen inequality and erode democratic foundations. It is no surprise that Milei also wants to bypass Congress and repress civil liberties — this is the anti-democratic ideology at the centre of his regime.”

What is it that the International Monetary Fund is celebrating? Inflation that had reached 160 percent in November, on the eve of President Milei’s inauguration, has steadily increased, reaching almost 290 percent in March. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the club of advanced capitalist countries and large Global South countries, predicts that Argentina’s inflation will be 251 percent for 2024 and that its economy will shrink 3.3 percent for 2024, easily the worst performance among G20 economies.

Democracy? What democracy?

The decrees mentioned above were only the beginning. Days into office, President Milei in December 2023 issued an 83-page “Necessity and Urgency Decree” intended to eliminate hundreds of regulations, erode labor rights and open the door to mass privatizations of state-owned enterprises. Both houses of Argentina’s National Congress must vote in their majorities to overturn the decrees, or they go into effect. The Senate voted it down but has not yet faced a vote in the Chamber of Deputies. In the interim, a court, hearing a challenge by the CGT trade union federation, voided some of the decree, suspending it until the Congress fully considers it. But there was still more to come.

Following up on his decree, President Milei a week later introduced an omnibus bill with the Orwellian name of “Foundations and Starting Points for the Freedom of the Argentine People,” a 351-page document that contains 664 articles. If passed, this bill would declare an “economic emergency” and delegate more than 1,000 powers from the legislative to the executive branch until December 31, 2025. This would enable the president to bypass Congress. Noting that President Milei said “the state is an enemy,” Professor Tom McDowell, writing in CounterPunch, summarized this offensive:


“Grounded in the same logic as neoliberalism’s conventional demand for freedom from the state, democratic institutions increasingly appear as impediments to the logic of the marketplace. … The anti-parliamentarism at the core of the neoliberal theoretical outlook has increasingly transformed into a populist program that mobilizes a general dissatisfaction with politicians against democratic institutions as such. Neoliberal politicians, such as Milei, use this reasoning to manufacture the conditions for the ongoing use of emergency powers and the concentration of authority in the executive branch.”


The Puerto Madero district of Buenos Aires. (Photo by Juan Ignacio Iglesias)

Following a one-day general strike in which 1.5 million people took to the streets, the omnibus bill was voted down in Congress. The fight was still not over, because the omnibus bill was trimmed and sent back to Congress, with the new version passed by the Chamber of Deputies on April 30. The Senate is debating the bill with a May 25 deadline to act; although the pro-Milei parties do not have a majority in the Senate, one of the left-wing parties that voted against it in the Chamber, Frente de Izquierda, does not have a Senate seat, leaving the outcome uncertain, according to the Buenos Aires Herald. The revised bill would still privatize nine state-owned enterprises, down from 41, implement “reforms” to pensions and labor law, make “maximizing profit obtained from exploiting natural resources” state policy and cut taxes for foreign companies.

The need to step up the fightback

Despite the militant action that stopped the December decree, opponents of the Milei administration on the Left decry a lack of resolve by mainstream labor organizations. Samuel Karlin, writing for Left Voice, writes that union bureaucracies and center-left parties are containing the ability of the working class to fight back. He writes:


“Months later the law is once again advancing due in large part to the refusal of the CGT — the country’s largest federation of trade unions — to mobilize workers against the attacks. The CGT — in addition to not holding assemblies or promoting the organization of the working class and a plan of struggle until the law falls — negotiates behind closed doors with the government, preventing the workers’ strength from being expressed against the adjustment and the law in the streets and workplaces. The CGT is more afraid of the mobilized workers than of the Milei government itself. Meanwhile, the centrist and center-left Peronists who lead the union bureaucracies and social movements have sought to negotiate the terms of the attacks rather than wage a fight against it.”

Nonetheless, militant pushback is happening, demonstrated by 800,000 students, educators and allies protesting cuts to public universities, including reductions in teacher pay and the closures of some schools. Mr. Karlin notes, “Milei is advancing U.S. imperialist penetration in Latin America and developing the Far Right movement internationally. As Israel becomes increasingly isolated due to its genocide of Palestinians, Milei has become one of the Zionist state’s fiercest allies. Milei wants to use Argentina as a laboratory for his far-right reaction, instead we should use it as a laboratory for fighting back the Far Right.”

Another dangerous initiative of the Milei administration is its denial of the massive crimes committed by the fascistic military regime of 1976 to 1983. The total of those murdered, “disappeared,” arrested, tortured and/or forced into exile likely is in the hundreds of thousands, with an estimated 30,000 killed. The administration’s ministers, including the president himself, either deny the toll the military regime took or attempt to justify it. Thus an annual demonstration in March against the military dictatorship drew large crowds, who had an increased sense of urgency.

What has the new government achieved? Argentina’s poverty rate has risen to 57 percent, the highest rate in two decades. The president openly celebrated firing 50,000 state workers, with plans to fire another 70,000, and the removal of 200,000 from social-benefit programs. In addition, reductions to pensions were the largest in 30 years. The previous hard-right president, Mauricio Macri, took out a $57 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund and the cuts demanded by the IMF in exchange led to austerity, a downward cycle that threatens to accelerate.

Regardless of what country we live in, we all have a stake in the Argentine people’s success in fighting off the Milei austerity package. Industrialists and financiers, and the public office holders who love them, are undoubtedly watching closely the events in Argentina. If a country with one of the most militant working classes can have extreme austerity imposed on them, similar offensives will soon be on the way elsewhere. Capitalists around the world understand well their common class interest. The working people of the world, the overwhelming majority of Earth’s population on whose backs the wealth of those elites is built, need to understand their common interest.


Pete Dolack is an activist, writer, poet, and photographer. He has been involved in various activist organizations, including Trade Justice New York Metro, National People’s Campaign, and New York Workers Against Fascism, among others. He has authored the books "It’s Not Over: Learning from the Socialist Experiment," which examines attempts to create societies outside of capitalism and explores their relevance to the present world while seeking a path to a better future and "What Do We Need Bosses For: Toward Economic Democracy," which analyzes past and present efforts to establish systems of economic democracy on a national or society-wide basis. He authored the book "It’s Not Over: Learning from the Socialist Experiment," which examines attempts to create societies outside of capitalism and explores their relevance to the present world while seeking a path to a better future.


Argentina: Unions hold second general strike over Milei’s austerity

May 16, 2024
GREEN LEFT Issue 

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protester with flare
Argentina's Senate is now debating an "omnibus" bill that contains 
some of Milei's neoliberal economic policies — including making privatisation
 easier. Photo: @CTAAutonoma/X

Argentina's primary trade union federation held another nationwide general strike on May 9, the second called since President Javier Milei, a far-right economist, took office in December and began pursuing sweeping austerity and deregulation.

The South American nation's unions organised the strike "in defense of democracy, labor rights, and the living wage," according to a statement from the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), the Argentine Workers' Central Union (CTA) and the Autonomous CTA.

"It is a day of resistance and demand," the groups said, blasting the Milei government's "brutal" attacks on labour rights, social security, public health, education, science, and "our cultural identity". The policies of austerity, say opponents, have disproportionately impacted working people and retirees.

The labour groups called out the government for promoting "dangerous policies for the privatisation of public enterprises" and pushing for "a phenomenal transfer of resources to the most concentrated and privileged sectors of the economy".

The CGT celebrated the 24-hour strike's success on May 10, declaring that "Argentina stopped" and sharing photos of sparsely populated roads, transit hubs, and other public spaces.

As the Buenos Aires Times reported: “In the nation's capital, streets were mostly empty, with very little public transport. Many schools and banks closed their doors while most shops were shuttered. Garbage was left uncollected.

“Rail and port terminals were closed, while the industrial action forced the cancellation of hundreds of flights, leaving airports semi-deserted. Some buses—from firms that did not take part in the strike—were running in the morning, although with few passengers. Cars were circulating, but traffic levels were similar to that seen on weekends.

“The port of Rosario, which exports 80% of the nation's agro-industrial production, was all but paralysed in the midst of its busiest season.”

A spokesperson for Milei, Manuel Adorni, claimed the nationwide action was "an attack on the pocket and against the will of the people" by those "who have curtailed the progress of Argentines over the last 25 years," the newspaper noted.

Meanwhile, union leaders stressed that the strike was the result of "a government that only benefits the rich at the expense of the people, gives away natural resources, and seeks to eliminate workers' rights," as CTA secretary general Hugo Yasky put it.

As the action wound down on March 9, Yasky described it as a "display of dignity of the Argentine people" that sent "a strong message" to Milei's government as well as the International Monetary Fund "that intends to govern us" and the country's senators.

Argentina's Senate is now debating an "omnibus" bill that contains some of Milei's neoliberal economic policies — including making privatisation easier — after the package was approved last week by the Chamber of Deputies, the lower congressional body.

Rubén Sobrero, general secretary of the Railway Union, signaled that more strikes could come if lawmakers continue to advance the president's policies, telling The Associated Press that "if there is no response within these 24 hours, we'll do another 36".

From Europe to North America, trade union groups around the world expressed solidarity with Thursday's strike.

"Milei's policies have not tackled the decadence of the elites that he decries, instead he has delivered daily misery for millions of working people. Plummeting living standards, contracting production, and the collapse of purchasing power means some people cannot even afford to eat," said International Trade Union Confederation general secretary Luc Triangle in a statement.

Triangle noted that "the government is targeting the rights of the most vulnerable sectors of the population and key trade union rights, such as collective bargaining, that support greater fairness and equality in society, while threatening those who protest with police repression and criminalisation."

"In this context, the work of the trade unions in Argentina is extraordinary. They have emerged as the main opposition to the government's dystopian agenda, uniting resistance and building a coalition in defense of workers' rights and broader democratic principles," he added. "The demands of the trade unions in Argentina for social justice, democracy, and equality are the demands of working people across the world. Their fight is our fight and that is why the global trade union movement stands with them."

[Reprinted from Common Dreams.]




Argentina at the rendezvous with its history

TUESDAY 14 MAY 2024, 
BY NICOLAS MENNA
INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT 


Since the coming to power of the ultra-neoliberal and reactionary government of President Javier Milei, the eyes of the global left have turned to Argentina to try to understand the phenomenon of the rise of the extreme right in Latin America and around the world. Much has already been written about its neoliberal, authoritarian, anti-popular and misogynistic nature, as well as about possible developments in the context of the struggle of the Argentine popular and progressive masses. This article attempts to take stock of the situation and identify ways to understand the balance of forces engaged in the class struggle in Argentina.

The 2001 crisis in the country ended with the affirmation, for about fifteen years of a so-called progressive project: the center-left national-popular sector of Peronism consolidated itself as the dominant force. More than a party, it is a conglomerate of groups, organizations and movements, all united under the umbrella of their adherence to the figure of Perón and his strategies of political construction. In one way or another, this is still the preferred form (or refuge?) of organization by the popular masses (including the proletariat) in Argentina.

This does not mean that the bourgeoisie, inextricably linked to imperialist interests, has agreed to move towards a development model based on investment and the strengthening of the internal market, as proposed by Presidents Kirchner (Nestor and Cristina). From 2012 onwards, faced with economic stagnation, these conservative sectors began to regain ground, until the victory in 2015 of Mauricio Macri’s neoliberal right, which led to a social regression without managing to impose itself in the long term. Macri was not re-elected in 2019, and was once again replaced by a Peronist government, that of Alberto Fernández, which failed to reverse the trend or emerge from economic crisis.

A SITUATION OF DEADLOCK

This situation is representative of the impasse in which Argentina has found itself for 75 years: neither of the two conflicting political projects has been able to fully impose itself against the other, whether it is the agro-export model defended by the right or that, more focused on the development of the domestic market, supported by centre-left Peronism. As Antonio Gramsci had noted, this polarisation and immobility of political forces has led to the exhaustion of both sectors and opened the way to a third actor, the ultra-neoliberal and authoritarian right of Javier Milei and the libertarians. Based on the elimination of state intervention in all areas except its repressive component, the libertarian project is not new.

It advocates:

A strong deregulation of the economy, through the elimination of all state controls. This includes the liberalisation of prices, including those of basic necessities.
A compulsory fiscal balance, accompanied by a significant reduction in the state’s participation in the fields of social security (pensions, health, education, scientific research), and a reduction in the number of workers within its structures.
The dollarization of the economy, with the elimination of the peso and the privatization of the Central Bank.
The removal of all export restrictions.
The privatization and fiscal austerity measures specific to the neoliberal state.

This project was first and foremost driven by Decree 70 (“Decree of Necessity and Urgency”). It corresponds to a radical version of the austerity program already championed by previous neoliberal governments, which has led some to refer to the Milei phenomenon as the “fourth neoliberal wave” in Argentina. This underlines its continuity with the dictatorship of 1976-1983 and the democratic governments of Menem and De la Rua (Justicialist Party – PJ – and Radical Civic Union – UCR, from 1989 to 2001) as well as that of Macri (Republican Proposal – PRO – from 2015 to 2019) that preceded it. The originality of this government, however, lies in its authoritarian dimension, i.e. its contempt for the fundamental norms of liberal democracy, established in Argentina after the dictatorship, and its decision to radically abandon any social welfare role attributed to the state. First of all, this has had an impact on the living conditions of the popular masses, through the dismantling of all support and development programs, but also on the endowments of the various provinces (autonomous regions), through the cessation of all economic transfers and collaboration with them, in order to guarantee the payment of the foreign debt and the profits of the multinationals.

The government’s first measures were introduced by Decree 70 and the “omnibus law”. [1] They have already caused enormous damage to the people: a 120% devaluation, inflation at 70% in three months, the elimination of social assistance programs, the opening of export markets, the halt of public investment in infrastructure as well as the closure of many public bodies. These measures have led to thousands of redundancies (150,000 in the construction sector alone, 15,000 in the civil service) and the closure of many companies, causing a snowball effect on economic activity. At the moment, the lack of management of the dengue epidemic that is wreaking havoc in the country accentuates the inability of the state to guarantee the protection of the population in terms of public health.

A NEOLIBERAL AND AUTHORITARIAN ETHOS

We are clearly facing a government that is trying to definitively resolve Argentina’s historical impasse, breaking any capacity of the popular masses to resist. It is understandable, despite its poor results, that it still enjoys the favor of big business (national and international), the IMF and the United States, which are multiplying declarations of support. What is more difficult to understand is the support it still enjoys among the popular layers (about 53%, according to surveys). This could be explained by multiple factors:

The first is, without a doubt, the persistent economic crisis, which has continued to grow since 2012. The stagnation of the economy has increased precarious work; inflation has hit the popular classes hard, and the pandemic has only exacerbated shortages.
Another factor is the fact that the outgoing Peronist regime had shown an inability to solve the most pressing problems of the population. It had also shown a willingness to manage the system “as it is” (i.e. in its capitalist and neoliberal form), while integrating progressive elements, such as the fight against SGBV, which have however proved insufficient to improve the living conditions of a large majority of the population.
Finally, another factor is the inability of the left (governmental and “extra-parliamentary”) to adapt to the new realities and its failure to propose credible and desirable alternatives.

In this context, a small part of the popular sectors has lost its historical bearings, moving away from Peronism without approaching the left, and has therefore shifted to the libertarian project.

RESISTANCE

The inability of President Alberto Fernández and Sergio Massa, his Minister of Economy and candidate to succeed him, to manage economic and social problems, to control persistent inflation and to restore the purchasing power of the popular masses foreshadowed Massa’s defeat in the elections.

The popular reaction to the reactionary government of Javier Milei, on the other hand, was unpredictable (and in a way remains so). It is difficult to know what capacity the popular masses can develop to mobilize to thwart the government, especially since the government has resorted to repressive and intimidating measures to discourage resistance.

However, there are several positive signs that show a state of mobilization, if not general, at least of readiness for significant change. From the government’s first actions, protests emerged, thanks to the mobilizations of people affected by the reforms but also to the emergence of organizations such as neighborhood popular assemblies, a means of self-organization for the inhabitants of large cities, especially in Buenos Aires, as well as social movements in the suburbs or factory committees. In this perspective, the scale of popular mobilization has prevailed, surprising even its organizers, which could foreshadow a cycle of intense struggles in the months to come.

FIRST GENERAL STRIKE ON 24 JANUARY

After two mobilizations of unexpected magnitude on 20 and 27 December 2023, the unions broke their inertia and organised a first day of general strike on 24 January 2024. The aim was to pressure the National Assembly to reject the first “omnibus bill”, a package of measures aimed at granting broad powers to the executive to deregulate the economy and impose reforms by decree, without debate in parliament – where Milei’s government is clearly in the minority.

Although the strike was poorly supported, the mobilization was a remarkable success, bringing together more than a million demonstrators in the country and about 300,000 in the capital. Its intensity has created the necessary conditions to constrain the room for manoeuvre of the dialogue wing of the opposition and thus push the government to
back down and withdraw its project.

8 MARCH, DAY OF STRIKES AND FEMINIST REVOLT

In the face of a reactionary government that has not hesitated to make misogynistic and anti-feminist remarks and has even considered repealing the law on voluntary termination of pregnancy, the call for a global feminist strike on 8 March has taken on particular importance in Argentina. Feminist collectives denounced the attacks on organizations fighting against discrimination and racism and the elimination of programs to support female victims of sexual and gender-based violence.

The call, aimed at defending the gains made and fighting against the oppression of women workers, met with a massive echo. The mobilization was commensurate with the situation, with hundreds of thousands of women occupying the National Congress Square and surrounding streets, as well as numerous demonstrations throughout the country.

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN ACTION

From its first measures, the government cut off all aid to the poorest social sectors. This concerns the inhabitants of “villas miseria” (slums) and working-class suburban neighbourhoods, where the organisation of soup kitchens is crucial as a social support mechanism. In Argentina, the state guarantees access to food, while voluntary work is normally carried out by “social movements”: political, social and unemployed organizations, often very divided between those that claim to be Peronist, leftist or Christian.

The current situation has begun to force unity in the struggle. It had its baptism of fire on 18 March, a day marked by more than 500 street blockades and mobilizations to denounce the abandonment of the state in a context where more and more people are seeking help.

The movement was repressed by the police, who applied an unconstitutional “anti-blocking protocol”, denounced by the United Nations. Despite the repression, this day marked the significant entry of popular organizations into the protest against Milei’s government.

24 MARCH, MEMORY WITHOUT UNITY

March 24 is an important historical day for Argentine society, marking each year a mobilization against the dictatorship, for democracy, justice and human rights. This year’s event was particularly significant because, for the first time in Argentina’s 40 years of democracy, a government that claims the legacy of the dictatorship is in power and seeks to destroy the social consensus built by the historic struggle of human rights organizations and social organizations against state terrorism. It is also a day on which a democratic and inclusive model of society is defended, albeit vaguely.

As predicted, the protest was massive, mobilizing millions of people across the country. This year, Peronist unions, including the powerful CGT, which do not usually participate in the 24 March organization, also took part in the event.

This new configuration unfortunately prevented the construction of a unitary demonstration; As in previous years, it split in two with, on the one hand, some organisations of the extreme left such as the PTS having decided to march separately and, on the other side, the other political, social and trade union components.

GOVERNMENT DEFEATS CONCEAL PARTIAL VICTORY

Although the mobilization is beginning to be felt, pushing the Assembly to reject many anti-social measures, the government nevertheless retains the initiative thanks to various institutional tools: Decree 70, the most important, remains largely in force until its examination by the National Assembly. For the time being, the government, which had to deal with the Senate’s rejection of the order-in-council, has managed to delay its consideration. It has also bought time (and initiative) by presenting the opposition with a new draft agreement called the May Pact, which is beginning to be discussed (and approved in principle) by the provinces governed by Mauricio Macri’s PRO.

As long as Decree 70 continues to be implemented, even partially, Milei’s government retains the necessary tool to continue its project of dismantling the state and destroying the social gains won over a century of struggles. It is therefore continuing its offensive, without showing signs of weakening: 15,000 redundancies have already been announced among state employees with the promise of reaching 70,000, while new cuts in public spending and new anti-popular measures are looming.

THE CRISIS OF PERONISM

Alberto Fernández’s disastrous management and the accumulation of his political failures have led some observers to note the loss of support for Peronism among a part of the Argentine popular classes. If for the moment they remain orphans, they are already the object of a new hegemonic conflict. This situation of political vacuum is currently benefiting the far right, although this change is not yet definitive.

What is certain is the current state of great weakness of Peronism, which is expressed by its great difficulty in reacting, in a context of frontal attacks against the popular masses it claims to represent. Disoriented, “Pan-Peronism”, conceived as the aggregation of different Peronist currents, is now living in a state of crisis with no apparent way out, at least in the short term. As a result, it struggles to influence conflicts and is often overwhelmed by the autonomous action of social bases.

A NECESSARILY PARTIAL CONCLUSION

In this context of the crisis of Peronism, certain sectors of the far left are delighted to see the left take the lead in certain struggles, sometimes even as a driving force in them. This may be an overly optimistic but encouraging conclusion. If we also consider that the social movements are beginning to mobilize and gain courage, that within the unions (including the bureaucratic structures) the date of the next general strike is being discussed, and that this month students are starting to go back to school, these conditions still allow us to nourish a little optimism.

However, the left will have to travel a long way in building a favourable balance of forces: unifying the class against Milei will be its fundamental mission.

April 2024

Translated by International Viewpoint from Revue l’Anticapitaliste.

P.S.


If you like this article or have found it useful, please consider donating towards the work of International Viewpoint. Simply follow this link: Donate then enter an amount of your choice. One-off donations are very welcome. But regular donations by standing order are also vital to our continuing functioning. See the last paragraph of this article for our bank account details and take out a standing order. Thanks.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] The name given to the 660 provisions aimed at reforming the economy, commerce, culture and criminal law, proposed by Milei after his inauguration, reduced to 300 articles after reading by parliament.

Why is New Caledonia on fire? According to local women, the deadly riots are about more than voting rights

May 16, 2024
GREEN LEFT Issue 
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"Vote Yes" graffiti on a sign
Pro-independence leaders dispute the outcome of the 2021 independence referendum which, they argue, was forced on the territory by French authorities too soon after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Photo: Peter McCallum

New Caledonia’s capital city, Noumea, has endured widespread violent rioting over the past 48 hours. This crisis intensified rapidly, taking local authorities by surprise.

Peaceful protests had been occurring across the country in the preceding weeks as the French National Assembly in Paris deliberated on a constitutional amendment that would increase the territory’s electoral roll. As the date for the vote grew closer, however, protests became more obstructive and by Monday night had spiralled into uncontrolled violence.

Since then, countless public buildings, business locations and private dwellings have been subjected to arson. Blockades erected by protesters prevent movement around greater Noumea. Four people have died. Security reinforcements have been deployed, the city is under nightly curfew, and a state of emergency has been declared. Citizens in many areas of Noumea are now also establishing their own neighbourhood protection militias.

See also

The political dispute

At one level, the crisis is political, reflecting contention over a constitutional vote taken in Paris that will expand citizens’ voting rights. The change adds roughly 25,000 voters to the electoral role in New Caledonia by extending voting rights to French people who’ve lived on the island for ten years. This reform makes clear the political power that France continues to exercise over the territory.

The death toll has now increased to four.

The current changes have proven divisive because they undo provisions in the 1998 Noumea Accord, particularly the restriction of voting rights. The accord was designed to “rebalance” political inequalities so the interests of Indigenous Kanaks and the descendants of French settlers would be equally recognised. This helped to consolidate peace between these groups after a long period of conflict in the 1980s, known locally as “the evenements”.

A loyalist group of elected representatives in New Caledonia’s parliament reject the contemporary significance of “rebalancing” (in French “rééquilibrage”) with regard to the electoral status of Kanak people. They argue after three referendums on the question of New Caledonian independence, held between 2018 and 2021, all of which produced a majority no vote, the time for electoral reform is well overdue. This position is made clear by Nicolas Metzdorf. A key loyalist, he defined the constitutional amendment, which was passed by the National Assembly in Paris on Tuesday, as a vote for democracy and “universalism”.

Yet this view is roundly rejected by Kanak pro-independence leaders who say these amendments undermine the political status of Indigenous Kanak people, who constitute a minority of the voting population. These leaders also refuse to accept that the decolonisation agenda has been concluded, as loyalists assert.

Instead, they dispute the outcome of the final 2021 referendum which, they argue, was forced on the territory by French authorities too soon after the outbreak of the COVID pandemic. This disregarded the fact that Kanak communities bore disproportionate impacts of the pandemic and were unable able to fully mobilise before the vote. Demands that the referendum be delayed were rejected, and many Kanak people abstained as a result.

In this context, the disputed electoral reforms decided in Paris this week are seen by pro-independence camps as yet another political prescription imposed on Kanak people. A leading figure of one Indigenous Kanak women’s organisation described the vote to me as a solution that pushes “Kanak people into the gutter”, one that would have “us living on our knees”.

Beyond the politics

Many political commentators are likening the violence observed in recent days to the political violence of les événements of the 1980s, which exacted a heavy toll on the country. Yet this is disputed by local women leaders with whom I am in conversation, who have encouraged me to look beyond the central political factors in analysing this crisis.

Some female leaders reject the view this violence is simply an echo of past political grievances. They point to the highly visible wealth disparities in the country. These fuel resentment and the profound racial inequalities that deprive Kanak youths of opportunity and contribute to their alienation.

Women have also told me they’re concerned about the unpredictability of the current situation. In the 1980s, violent campaigns were coordinated by Kanak leaders, they tell me. They were organised. They were controlled.

In contrast, today it is the youth taking the lead and using violence because they feel they have no other choice. There is no coordination. They are acting through frustration and because they feel they have “no other means” to be recognised.

There’s also frustration with political leaders on all sides. Late on Wednesday, Kanak pro-independence political leaders held a press conference. They echoed their loyalist political opponents in condemning the violence and issuing calls for dialogue. The leaders made specific calls to the “youths” engaged in the violence to respect the importance of a political process and warned against a logic of vengeance.

The women civil society leaders I have been speaking to were frustrated by the weakness of this messaging. The women say political leaders on all sides have failed to address the realities faced by Kanak youths. They argue if dialogue remains simply focused on the political roots of the dispute, and only involves the same elites that have dominated the debate so far, little will be understood and little will be resolved.

Likewise, they lament the heaviness of the current “command and control” state security response. It contradicts the calls for dialogue and makes little room for civil society participation of any sort.

These approaches put a lid on grievances, but they do not resolve them. Women leaders observing the current situation are anguished and heartbroken for their country and its people. They say if the crisis is to be resolved sustainably, the solutions cannot be imposed and the words cannot be empty.

Instead, they call for the space to be heard and to contribute to a resolution. Until that time they live with anxiety and uncertainty, waiting for the fires to subside, and the smoke currently hanging over a wounded Noumea to clear.

[Reprinted from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Nicole George is Associate Professor in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland.]

 

Whistleblower David McBride sentenced, war criminals remain free

May 15, 202
GREEN LEFT Issue 
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David McBridge addressing a protest outside Labor's national conference in 2023 in Magan-djin/Brisbane. Photo: Alex Bainbridge

The jailing of Afghanistan war crimes whistleblower David McBride on May 14 has been condemned by truth-tellers across the globe.

McBride, a former Australian Defence Forces lawyer, served two tours in Afghanistan in 2011 and 2013, and complained internally about the behaviour of some Australian Special Air Service Regiment (SAS) members, but said he was not taken seriously.

Stella Assange, a friend, said on X that it is “scandalous” that McBride, who “shared documents evidencing impunity over ADF war crimes in Afghanistan” had been sentenced.

“The only person going to prison over the war crimes is the man who blew the whistle,” Assange said.

McBride’s leaked information was considered by the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) Afghanistan (Brereton) Inquiry, established by the Coalition government to investigate allegations of war crimes committed by the elite SAS in Afghanistan — Australia’s longest war.

The four-year inquiry by Paul Brereton, a New South Wales Court of Appeal judge and senior officer in the Australian Army Reserve, published its report in 2020. It included evidence of 23 incidents in which one or more civilians — or people who had been captured or injured — were unlawfully killed by special forces soldiers, or at their direction.

The report found a further two incidents that it said could be classified as the war crime of “cruel treatment”.

It made 36 referrals to the Australian Federal Police, only one of which has gone to court.

Meanwhile, McBride was charged with five national security offences, denied immunity from prosecution and jailed for 5 years and 8 months, with no parole for 2 years and 3 months.

The only alleged war criminal to appear before court is SAS veteran Oliver Schulz, whose crime was first publicised by the ABC’s Four Corners program on March 16, 2020.

He shot Afghan man Dad Mohammad during an ADF raid in Uruzgan Province, southern Afghanistan, in May 2012.

The ABC’s video footage of the incident helped bring the severity of the war crimes allegations in Afghanistan to the public.

abc_four_corners_2020_on_afghanistan_killing_.png

Still from the Four Corners' expose on Australian war crimes in Afghanistan.

Mohammad was married with two very young daughters. His family complained to the ADF, which investigated and cleared Shulz of wrong-doing. He completed multiple tours and was awarded the Commendation for Gallantry in Afghanistan.

Schulz has fared a lot better than McBride, whose evidence would have contributed to getting Shulz to face court.

Arrested in March last year, Shulz was granted relaxed bail conditions in February, since, according to the magistrate, the highly trained alleged war criminal presents no “heightened risk” and his lawyer argued he would be “at grave risk” of being attacked by “extremists” (in jail) opposed to the war in Afghanistan.

McBride has been charged with stealing public documents; not murder or war crimes.

McBride has always said he gave the ABC the documents as an act of public duty. He has spent five years waiting for sentencing, and now faces more than two years in jail.

Michael West has pointed out that McBride was not even allowed to argue his case in court, as the public interest defence was ruled out. He was therefore compelled to plead guilty.

“What kind of justice is it where McBride is denied the opportunity to put his case in an open court of law, being forced rather to plead guilty to government charges but with no resort to the most basic legal right of pleading his case?” West asked.https://ssl.gstatic.com/ui/v1/icons/mail/images/cleardot.gif

“And what kind of justice is it that allows a whistleblower to be tried and convicted while the actual war crimes go unprosecuted, while dozens of incidents go entirely unpunished, untested in court?”


A Brutal Punishment: The Sentencing of David McBride


Sometimes, it’s best not to leave the issue of justice to the judges.  They do what they must: consult the statutes, test the rivers of power, and hope that their ruling will not be subject to appeal.  David McBride, the man who revealed that Australia’s special forces in Afghanistan had dimmed and muddied before exhaustion, committed atrocities and faced a compromised chain of command, was condemned on May 14 to a prison term of five years and eight months.

Without McBride’s feats, there would have been no Afghan Files published by the ABC.  The Brereton Inquiry, established to investigate alleged war crimes, would most likely have never been launched.  (That notable document subsequently identified 39 instances of alleged unlawful killings of Afghan civilians by members of the special forces.)

In an affidavit, McBride explained how he wished Australians to realise that “Afghan civilians were being murdered and that Australian military leaders were at the very least turning the other way and at worst tacitly approving this behaviour”.  Furthermore “soldiers were being improperly prosecuted as a smokescreen to cover [the leadership’s] inaction and failure to hold reprehensible conduct to account.”

For taking and disclosing 235 documents from defence offices mainly located in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the former military lawyer was charged with five national security offences.  He also found Australia’s whistleblowing laws feeble and fundamentally useless.  The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) provided no immunity from prosecution, a fact aided by grave warnings from the Australian government that vital evidence would be excluded from court deliberation on national security grounds.

Through the process, the Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus, could have intervened under Section 71 of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), vesting the top legal officer in the country with powers to drop prosecutions against individuals charged with “an indictable offence against the laws of the Commonwealth”.  Dreyfus refused, arguing that such powers were only exercised in “very unusual and exceptional circumstances”.

At trial, chief counsel Trish McDonald SC, representing the government, made the astonishing claim that McBride had an absolute duty to obey orders flowing from the oath sworn to the sovereign. No public interest test could modify such a duty, a claim that would have surprised anyone familiar with the Nuremberg War Crimes trials held in the aftermath of the Second World War. “A soldier does not serve the sovereign by promising to do whatever the soldier thinks is in the public interest, even if contrary to the laws made by parliament.” To justify such a specious argument, authorities from the 19th century were consulted: “There is nothing so dangerous to the civil establishment of the state as an undisciplined or reactionary army.”

ACT Justice David Mossop tended to agree, declaring that, “There is no aspect of duty that allows the accused to act in the public interest contrary to a lawful order”. A valiant effort was subsequently made by McBride’s counsel, Steven Odgers SC, to test the matter in the ACT Court of Appeal.  Chief Justice Lucy McCallum heard the following submission from Odgers: “His only real argument is that what he did was the right thing. There was an order: don’t disclose this stuff, but he bled, and did the right thing, to use his language, and the question is does the fact that he’s in breach of orders mean that he’s in breach of his duty, so that he’s got no defence?”  The answer from the Chief Justice was curt: Mossop’s ruling was “not obviously wrong.”

With few options, a guilty plea was entered to three charges.  Left at the mercy of Justice Mossop, the punitive sentence shocked many of McBride’s supporters.  The judge thought McBride of “good character” but possessed by a mania “with the correctness of his own opinions”.  He suffered from a “misguided self-belief” and “was unable to operate within the legal framework that his duty required him to do”.

The judge was cognisant of the Commonwealth’s concerns that disclosing such documents would damage Australia’s standing with “foreign partners”, making them less inclined to share information.  He also rebuked McBride for copying the documents and storing them insecurely, leaving them vulnerable to access from foreign powers.  For all that, none of the identifiable risks had eventuated, and the Australian Defence Force had “taken no steps” to investigate the matter.

This brutal flaying of McBride largely centres on clouding his personal reasons.  In a long tradition of mistreating whistleblowers, questions are asked as to why he decided to reveal the documents to the press.  Motivation has been muddled with effect and affect. The better question, asks Peter Greste, executive director of the Alliance for Journalists’ Freedom, is not examining the reasons for exposing such material but the revelations they disclose.  That, he argues, is where the public interest lies.  Unfortunately, in Australia, tests of public interest all too often morph into a weapon fashioned to fanatically defend government secrecy.

All that is left now is for McBride’s defence team to appeal on the crucial subject of duty, something so curiously rigid in Australian legal doctrine.  “We think it’s an issue of national importance, indeed international importance, that a western nation has such as a narrow definition of duty,” argued his defence lawyer, Mark Davis.

John Kiriakou, formerly of the Central Intelligence Agency, was the only figure to be convicted, not of torture inflicted by his colleagues during the clownishly named War on Terror, but of exposing its practice. McBride is the only one to be convicted in the context of alleged Australian war crimes in Afghanistan, not for their commission, but for furnishing documentation exposing them, including the connivance of a sullied leadership.  The world of whistleblowing abounds with its sick ironies.Facebook

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com. Read other articles by Binoy.
The World’s Forgotten War

As catastrophe unfolds in Sudan, most of the world continues to turn a blind eye

May 16, 2024
Source: Africa is a Country


Sudan, 2016. Image credit Anouk Delafortrie for the EU ECHO via Flickr 
CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 Deed.


“Don’t worry, Séra, the entire world is watching them, they won’t be able to do anything.”

“You think so?”

“Of course.”

In my heart of hearts, I knew I was wrong. The World Cup was about to begin in the United States. The planet was interested in nothing else. And in any case, whatever happened in Rwanda, it would always be the same old story of blacks beating up on each other.– The Book of Bones, Boubacar Boris Diop

Several months ago, amid the eruption of the war in Sudan, my grandfather, a British Sudanese national, found himself trapped in his house in a high-risk area next to Sudan’s military headquarters. Despite the British government’s efforts to dispatch dozens of soldiers to evacuate their personnel from the embassy right across the street from my grandfather’s house, they failed to include him in their evacuation plan. After our relentless pleas to include both my grandparents, the main query from the Foreign and Commonwealth Development Office (FCDO) we received was “Does he have dual citizenship?”

After a few days, my grandfather was tragically shot numerous times while my grandmother was left to starve to death, as both the Radical Support Forces (RSF) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) refused to cease fire. Upon my arrival at Heathrow Airport several days later, the first sight that greeted me was a banner advertising a pet scheme for animals that were trapped in the war in Ukraine. This stark contrast raised pressing questions: Why did the life of a pet in Ukraine seem to hold greater significance than that of a black British citizen?

Similarly, why was Suliman, another British citizen trapped in the war in Sudan, informed that only he and his kids could evacuate, and that they’d have to leave behind his heavily pregnant wife, as she was not a British national? The Ukrainian Family Scheme in the UK allowed spouses, fiancés, children, grandparents, grandchildren, siblings, aunts, uncles, cousins, nieces, and nephews of UK-based sponsors to access the UK for three years and freely work with no restrictions. The Canadian immigration pathway has taken in almost 100,000 more refugees from Ukraine than from Sudan, providing them with financial support, certification exemption, shorter processing time, and looser requirements for migration.

Beyond citizenship, we see many Sudanese activists tirelessly pleading for support by stating the concerning statistics of the Sudanese war—how it has produced the largest amount of displaced people globally while the country also suffers the world’s worst hunger crisis. Yet the United Nations has allocated only 5 percent of humanitarian funds for Sudan. The core question to ask here is: Why do certain lives hold more value in the world of humanitarianism than others?

It is no surprise that when the war in Ukraine broke out, the divide between whose life is considered important and whose isn’t became more evident. In one broadcast on Ukraine, NBC News correspondent Kelly Cobiella stated, “They are not refugees from Syria; these are refugees from Ukraine… They’re Christians. They’re white. They’re very similar.” Although this statement is problematic for numerous reasons, the main issue is the subliminal message it sends. First, the value of life when measured in humanitarian terms depends on one’s nationality, religion, and race. Second, the white man is perceived to be more civilized and less prone to the exposure of war and conflict, and this perception automatically creates a form of supremacy over people of color, who, presumably, attract instability. We begin to see that the body becomes an indication of humanitarian priority. Individuals who don’t fit the characteristics and features of a white man are perceived as “undeserving” of public sympathy and mourning.

According to historian Achille Mbembe, the West is presented as the “birthplace of reason, universal life and truth of humanity” thus making it seem like the most “civilized region in the world.” It is vital to take into consideration that the index of Eurocentric humanitarianism holds various hierarchies with different levels of importance. Based on that hierarchy, the black life and the Muslim life are at the bottom.

The underlying issue of institutional racism, especially within humanitarian agencies, has not suddenly emerged in the 21st century; rather, it goes back to the formation of these institutions, during a time of prevalent coloniality. In historical terms, the rapid expansion of NGOs in Africa was affected by the fall of European colonial rule. Colonial powers expected to maintain close relations with and a presence in their former colonies in a way that did not make plain that another colonial invasion was taking place. Their rapid expansion focused on aid and development by replicating their linguistic, religious, and socioeconomic structures in Africa.

The humanitarian interventionists prioritized groups to be assisted, broke neutrality, and advocated Western military intervention for humanitarian purposes. British NGOs, such as Oxfam, would even be reluctant to work on Francophone states, particularly in West Africa, as they perceived these states to be France’s territory of influence. The Human Rights Watch was originally created to monitor the former Soviet Union. The founding father of the Red Cross, Henri Dunant, was celebrated for aiding soldiers in the battle of Solferino and treating men equally regardless of what side they represented, creating the phrase “tutti fratelli,” which translates to “all brothers.” What European history fails to convey, however, is that Dunant had built his empire on colonial resources and was there to pursue his business interest in colonial Algeria.

Granted, humanitarian agencies have reformed since their early years. Nonetheless, the influences of coloniality in many of these agencies remain prevalent.

There are a number of explanations for why humanitarian agencies have not been able to meet the desperate need for help during the Sudanese war. First, in a global context in which numerous crises are breaking out at once, European donors’ interests were redirected to conflicts that were more “relatable,” and thus held more value from a Eurocentric perspective. A white population being oppressed by Russia, the West’s largest rival, creates a “reason” in the Western imagination and thus attracts empathy. Empathy is commonly the construction of reason and interest in the world of realpolitik, consequently affecting humanitarian incentives. In the realm of hegemonic fights for power, the Ukrainian war also supports the West’s agenda of distorting Russia’s image and amplifying the humanitarian persona that the West attempts to convey to the world.

Second, where realpolitik is put aside and effective humanitarian interventions are considered, prioritization of who receives aid is influenced by the historical structural racism that exists within these institutions. In other words, in a hierarchy of humanitarian emergencies, the black man’s needs, regardless of how critical they may be in comparison to the other emergencies, are always put last. In a year of calamities, from the exodus of Armenians to the continued attacks on Ukraine, Sudan’s conflict was given less importance.

The Norwegian Refugee Council publishes reports on the topmost neglected displacement crises in the world, in order to shine a light on global sufferings that rarely make headlines, receive less aid, and are not the focus of international diplomatic efforts. In 2022—notably before the Sudanese war—the top 10 countries were all African, and Sudan was number four. In the same year, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway had all redirected aid set to go to other countries and to Ukraine. This therefore slashed UN funds going to various countries in Africa and canceled ongoing pledges of much-needed relief.

Beyond institutional humanitarianism, Sudan currently faces two dilemmas that deprive it of attaining the same solidarity that current violent escalations, such as the one in Palestine, are receiving from the general public. The implications of identity have contributed to much of Sudan’s internal conflict. Sudan is not Arab enough to the Arab world and is not African enough to the African world. Arabization has placed it in a dilemma where it forcefully attempts to integrate itself into an Arabian identity that does not accept its blackness.

Similar to Du Bois’s philosophies of double consciousness, the average Sudanese is programmed to look at himself and his blackness through the eyes of others—through the historical gaze of Arab and European imperialism. The illusion of the self creates a divide within the African identity, subsequently classifying Sudan as non-African in the traditional sense.

This in-between identity consequently affects whom Sudan receives solidarity and support from. Discussions on the Sudanese war started trending globally after two incidents. The first was when diplomats and citizens of Western states were trapped in Sudan and pleaded for support from their governments. The second was after the recent tensions in Palestine escalated, increasing global activism and influencing individuals to explore other regions experiencing similar oppression—the slogan that the Palestinian conflict raised is “our struggles are interconnected.”

The issue with both scenarios is that it took other conflicts on other identities to surface for the loss of Sudanese life to be acknowledged. I would like to note that this comparison is made not to prioritize one cause over another—any form of human calamity deserves full solidarity. However, selective humanitarianism defeats the purpose of humanism, which is that any loss of innocent life is a loss to all of humanity regardless of where or to whom it happens.

An activist from Iran, who has chosen to remain anonymous, writes in one of her statements that contemporary “activism is deeply enrooted in individualism and performative activism” and that “selective attention” was given to other trending causes while “neglecting” Sudan “as our perceptions are influenced by our conditioning.” Our conditioning is based on whom we resonate with more or who looks more like us. The Sudanese may speak and follow the same cultural or religious beliefs as many Arabs, but they don’t carry the same physical features. In psychology, this is referred to as own-race bias, which involves a tendency to resonate with, favor, and recognize one’s race more than other races. The tendency to downgrade a darker-skinned man is prevalent even within Sudan, where there is a mix of Afro-Arabs. Arabian features in Sudan are associated with the ruling ethnic group and its historical domination of the “enslavable” minorities.

In the Middle East and North Africa, an Arabian man with a different complexion often will feel superior and degrade black life and its struggles. Black men are called an abd—a racial slur that translates to “slave.” These derogatory attitudes contribute to the perception among Arabs that Sudanese life is less important. In a world of emerging conflicts in Syria and Palestine or natural disasters in Morocco, the story of a Sudanese black child losing his life to a deadly war will always come last.

As such, the politics of identity, and where Sudan belongs, fragments the opportunity of attaining full solidarity from a similar “race” or Arab identity that the people of Sudan have forcefully tried to resonate with—an identity that does not fully accept or stand in solidarity with the black man from Sudan at times of need, thus creating a solidarity imbalance.

The loss of black life has been normalized in public perception. One commentator on X explains his experience trying to raise public discussions on what was happening in Sudan within a multinational space. He writes that the most common response he receives from the majority of international “activists” when he questions why there is little global solidarity with Sudan compared to other tragedies is that the conflict in Sudan is “just a civil war.”

The lack of public awareness is partially a result of the difficulty of obtaining data, due to limited mobility and internet access within Sudan. However, this ignorance of the geopolitical war between the RSF (weaponized by the United Arab Emirates and Europe to stop refugees from entering Europe through Sudanese borders) and Sudanese Armed Forces (supported by Egyptian military Islamicists for military domination in the region) is primarily due to the lack of interest in and normalization of the loss of black life, and the presumption that Muslim and black bodies are accustomed to violence and that conflict within their regions is to be expected.

Foucault explains that the body is a “political field”—in this context, the reaction to the body’s struggle is destined by the current systemic notions of power. Due to imperial influences, the subconscious mind is programmed to associate violence, poverty, and instability with black and Muslim bodies, reducing the power of this violence. Black and Muslim bodies are marked and characterized with “deadly consequences,” normalizing their struggle.

In her work on “grievability,” Judith Butler argues that some lives are more grievable and hold more value than others. Ungrievable lives, in her definition, are lives that can’t be lost or destroyed, because they as they already inhabit a lost and destroyed zone. They are perceived ontologically, from the very beginning, as already lost and destroyed—meaning that when these lives are destroyed in war, nothing is destroyed. The Sudanese identity, which blends “blackness” and “Muslimness,” is a recipe for disaster in the world of global solidarity that rejects either one of the two identities or both.

Former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Anan states that his biggest regret was failing to prevent the genocide in Rwanda. Rwandan activists and humanitarian workers, like those in Sudan, raised warnings of catastrophe prior to the genocide. Humanitarian agencies and the global community turned a blind eye, consequently making it one of the world’s greatest humanitarian failures.

We are now effortlessly watching history repeat itself. The Sudanese war is on the verge of becoming the next Rwanda. Sudan is in dire need of solidarity and external pressure to increase the chances of holding both General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, accountable for the numerous felonies they’ve carried out over the years.

Furthermore, Sudan is a victim of Western and Arab imperialism, the former of which is not spoken of enough. Imperialistic presence in Sudan can be overthrown only by the people. There needs to be international pressure on regional players that contribute to the war by supplying arms to the Rapid Support Force, strengthening their forces on the ground. As we are learning from Palestinian activism, international pressure requires a bottom-up approach. Civilians around the world need to place pressure on their governments to use bilateral relations to prevent Sudan’s geopolitical war from further exacerbating.

Humanitarian agencies are essential during world calamities. Abolishing the systemic racism that exists within humanitarian institutions that promote Western nuisance, favoritism, and hidden political motives is the only way to break imperialistic cycles of exploitation within the humanitarian arena. As Tammam Aloudat, a humanitarian responder, explains in an interview on the podcast Rethinking Humanitarianism, as of now, humanitarian agencies are commonly “driven not by the demand of people” but by those funding it. We must create a deeper understanding of history and its influences on solidarity and humanitarianism in Africa to overcome these hindrances.

Brazilian philosopher Paulo Freire elucidates that we should not deal with people as objects but as subjects. I take that in the humanitarian sense and urge NGOs not to “serve” the people experiencing calamities but to work with them. To work with the Sudanese society, the Sudanese emergency rooms, youth volunteers, and civilian-led humanitarian responders in order to truly assist those in need. This could be done by introducing mutual aid systems within humanitarian organizations. Mutual aid systems are how many volunteers have managed to successfully evacuate Sudanese families or provide them with medical care. How can NGOs institutionalize mutual aid by closely working with civil societies during the war in Sudan to respond to the crisis more effectively? Rest assured that this movement I am urging for is not one that is intended to end humanitarian involvement. Rather, it is a movement for inclusivity that can overcome imperialistic influences to respond to global crises more functionally.

It is a movement that truly stands in the name of humanity.



Azhar Sholgami is currently a PhD student at Cornell University with experience in the developmental and humanitarian sector at the UN in Sudan.
The United States Assembles the Squad Against China

May 17, 2024

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In early April 2024, the navies of four countries—Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States—held a maritime exercise in the South China Sea. Australia’s Warramunga, Japan’s Akebono, the Philippines’ Antonio Luna, and the United States’ Mobile worked together in these waters to strengthen their joint abilities and—as they said in a joint statement—to “uphold the right to freedom of navigation and overflight and respect for maritime rights under international law.” A few weeks later, between April 22 and May 8, ships from the Philippines and the United States operated alongside Australian and French naval troops for Exercise Balikatan 2024.

For this Balikatan (“shoulder-to-shoulder”), over 16,000 troops participated in an area of the South China Sea that is outside the territorial waters of the Philippines. Alongside the navies of these nations, the Coast Guard of the Philippines took part in Exercise Balikatan. This is significant because it is the boats of the Coast Guard that most often encounter Chinese ships in these international waters, part of which are disputed between China and the Philippines. Although the official documents of these exercises do not mention China by name, they are certainly designed as part of the increasing military activity driven by the United States along China’s maritime border.

During the Balikatan exercise, the navy vessels from the Philippines and the United States jointly attacked and sank the decommissioned Philippine Navy BRP Lake Caliraya. The ship—which was made in China—had been donated to the navy by the Philippine National Oil Company in 2014. The fact that it was the only ship in the Philippines’ navy that was made in China did not go unnoticed within China. Colonel Francel Margareth Padilla-Taborlupa, a spokesperson of the armed forces of the Philippines, said that this was “purely coincidental.”

During Balikatan, the defense ministers of the four main nations met in Honolulu, Hawaii to discuss the political implications of these military exercises off the coast of China. Australia’s Richard Marles, Japan’s Kihara Minoru, the Philippines’ Gilberto Teodoro, and the United States’ Lloyd Austin met for their second meeting to discuss their collaboration in the region that they call the Indo-Pacific. It was at the edges of this meeting that the public relations teams of these ministers began to float the term “Squad” to refer to these four countries. While they did not formally announce the creation of a new bloc in East Asia, this new nickname intends to provide a de facto announcement of its existence.

From the Quad to the Squad

In 2007, the leaders of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States met in Manila (Philippines) to establish the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) while their militaries conducted Exercise Malabar in the Philippines Sea. The Quad did not initially include the Philippines, whose President at the time—Gloria Arroyo—was trying to improve relations between her country and China. The Quad did not develop because Australia’s Prime Minister Kevin Rudd was unhappy with Washington’s growing belligerence towards Beijing. The Quad revived in 2017, once more in Manila, with a more forthright agenda to work against China’s Belt and Road ambitions in the region (which U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson called “predatory economics”).

Over the course of the past two years, the United States has been frustrated with India’s discomfort with the kind of pressure campaign that the U.S. has been mounting against China and Russia. India refused to stop buying discounted Russian energy, which was a pragmatic decision during an election period (although India’s purchase of Russian energy has declined over time). When asked if India will consider being a NATO+ member, India’s foreign minister S. Jaishankar said that India does not share the “NATO mentality.” India’s reluctance to join in the full-throated New Cold War against China annoyed the U.S. government, which therefore decided to set aside the Quad and assemble the Squad with the more pliant and eager government of Philippines president Bongbong Marcos. It is important to note, however, that in April India delivered a batch of supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles to the Philippines (sold for $375 million and produced by a joint venture between arms manufacturers in India and Russia). That these missiles might be part of the new pressure campaign against China is not something buried in the fine print of the deal.

Provocations

Since its “pivot to Asia,” the United States has sought to provoke China. The U.S. trade war that began in 2018 largely fizzled out due to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its attempt to build the advanced production lines to circumvent U.S. trade restrictions (for instance, when the U.S. tried to prevent China from importing semiconductor chips, the Chinese developed their own manufacturing capacity). The U.S. attempt to make Taiwan into the frontline of its pressure campaign has not borne fruit either. The inauguration of Taiwan’s new president Lai Ching-te on May 20 brings to the helm a man who is not interested in pushing for Taiwan’s independence; only 6 percent of Taiwan’s population favors unification with China or independence, with the rest of the population satisfied with the status quo. Unable to create the necessary provocation over Taiwan, the United States has moved its gunsights to the Philippines.

While the Philippines and China dispute the status of several islands in the waters between them, these disagreements are not sufficient to drive either country to war. In April 2024, former president of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte recalled that when he was president (2016-2022), “there was no quarrel. We can return to normalcy. I hope that we can stop the ruckus over there because the Americans are the ones pushing the Philippine government to go out there and find a quarrel and eventually maybe start a war.” In March, President Marcos said that he is “not poking the bear” and does not want to “provoke” China. However, the formation of the Squad two months later does indicate that the Philippines has now replaced Taiwan as the frontline state for U.S. provocations against China.

China’s vice chair of its Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia, warned against “gunboat muscles.” “Reality has shown,” he said, “that those who make deliberate provocations, stoke tensions, or support one side against another for selfish gains will ultimately only hurt themselves.”

This article was produced by Globetrotter. Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor, and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is an editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest books are Struggle Makes Us Human: Learning from Movements for Socialism and (with Noam Chomsky) The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of U.S. Power.



Vijay Prashad is an Indian historian, editor, and journalist. He is a writing fellow and chief correspondent at Globetrotter. He is an editor of LeftWord Books and the director of Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research. He is a senior non-resident fellow at Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China. He has written more than 20 books, including The Darker Nations and The Poorer Nations. His latest books are Struggle Makes Us Human: Learning from Movements for Socialism and (with Noam Chomsky) The Withdrawal: Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and the Fragility of U.S. Power. Tings Chak is the art director and a researcher at Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research and lead author of the study “Serve the People: The Eradication of Extreme Poverty in China.” She is also a member of Dongsheng, an international collective of researchers interested in Chinese politics and society.