LA REVUE GAUCHE - Left Comment

Saturday, May 18, 2024

GOP Farm Bill Decried as Pro-Corporate, Anti-Family 'Waste of Everyone's Time'

The head of MomsRising said that "it would be mean-spirited and shameful for Congress to cut the SNAP benefits moms and families rely on; and it also would be damaging to our economy."

People shop for food in a Brooklyn neighborhood in New York City on October 16, 2023.
(Photo: Spencer Platt/Getty Images)

JESSICA CORBETT

COMMON DREAMS
May 17, 2024

Echoing early May criticism of U.S. House Republicans' blueprint for the next Farm Bill, anti-hunger and green groups on Friday fiercely condemned the GOP's discussion draft text of the Farm, Food, and National Security Act of 2024.

Released by U.S. House Committee on Agriculture Chair Glenn "GT" Thompson (R-Pa.), the draft is competing with a Democratic proposal—Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee Chair Debbie Stabenow's (D-Mich.) Rural Prosperity and Food Security Act.

While Thomspon claimed that his bill "is the product of extensive feedback from stakeholders and all members of the House, and is responsive to the needs of farm country through the incorporation of hundreds of bipartisan policies," Rep. David Scott (D-Ga.), the panel's ranking member, said that the draft "confirms my worst fears."

"House Republicans plan to pay for the farm bill by taking food out of the mouths of America's hungry children, restricting farmers from receiving the climate-smart conservation funding they so desperately need, and barring the USDA from providing financial assistance to farmers in times of crisis," he warned, referring to the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

The economic impact of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) cuts alone "would be staggering," Scott emphasized. "A $27 billion reduction in food purchasing power would not only increase hunger, but it would also reduce demand for jobs in the agriculture, transportation, manufacturing, and grocery sectors."

Leaders at advocacy groups on Friday similarly slammed the Republican bill. Ty Jones Cox, vice president for food assistance at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, reiterated her previous condemnation of GOP attempts to cut the benefits of hungry families, saying that "this is unacceptable; Congress should reject it."

"Every SNAP participant would receive less to buy groceries in future years than they would under current law, putting a healthy diet out of reach for millions of people. This would be the largest cut to SNAP since 1996 if enacted and these cuts would grow even deeper over time," Jones Cox explained, debunking Thompson's description of the changes.

"And the cut to future SNAP benefits isn't the only harmful policy in this bill. For example, it would allow states to outsource SNAP administration to private contractors. But prior privatization efforts delayed benefits for people in need, worsened errors, and increased costs," she continued. "Congress should reject Chair Thompson's harmful proposal and instead work to pass a farm bill that truly protects and strengthens SNAP."

Kristin Rowe-Finkbeiner, executive director and CEO of MomsRising, argued that "at this time when skyrocketing food prices have increased hunger and food insecurity, forcing tens of millions of U.S. families to make impossible choices between food and other essentials, it would be mean-spirited and shameful for Congress to cut the SNAP benefits moms and families rely on; and it also would be damaging to our economy."

Describing the benefits, formerly called food stamps, as "the nation's first line of defense against hunger," Rowe-Finkbeiner highlighted that "more than 42 million people count on SNAP benefits each month and nearly four in five of them are children, seniors, people with disabilities, or veterans."

"In contrast, the bipartisan Senate Farm Bill—the Rural Prosperity and Food Security Act—aids farmers and treats hunger in America as the emergency it is," she noted. "It is a bold bill that would protect SNAP benefits and increase access to this essential program for groups that have long been excluded, reducing barriers to participation for older adults, military families, some college students, and others. It is an easy choice. Without question, the Senate Farm Bill is the version that should become law."

The GOP's efforts to restrict food assistance aren't limited to the United States, as Gina Cummings, Oxfam vice president for advocacy, alliances, and policy, pointed out Friday, declaring that "at a time when over 281 million people are suffering from acute hunger, any proposal to undercut crucial international food assistance programs is damaging."

As Cummings detailed:

The resilience-building programs housed in Food for Peace are vital to preparing frontline communities for future shocks that could impact their food security—whether it be from climate change, conflict, or economic downturns.

Oxfam has raised concerns about the American Farmers Feed the World Act, which is where many of the cuts to Food for Peace originate from—since its introduction last summer. The bill has proposed gutting funding for resilience-building activities that ensure communities can build up their local markets, withstand the next drought, flood, or conflict, and not go hungry. The House Farm Bill as it is currently written includes some of the most concerning provisions of the bill and would render these vital interventions inoperable, resulting in as many as 3 million fewer people being reached by these programs based on their current scale.

The House must reject the provisions of the American Farmers Feed the World Act included in the House Farm Bill draft as the bill goes for markup. The inclusion of such provisions is a threat to global food security and a shift towards a less-efficient model of international aid by the United States.

The AFL-CIO said on social media that it "strongly opposes" the Republican proposal, adding: "Families rely on Food for Peace—and also SNAP, SNAP's Thrifty Food Plan, and other federal nutrition and food security programs. We cannot support making harmful policy changes or funding cuts to any of them."

In addition to calling out the GOP for trying to leave more people hungry, advocates denounced Republican efforts to gut climate-friendly requirements from the Inflation Reduction Act and enact the Ending Agricultural Trade Suppression (EATS) Act.

"The Farm Bill is a seminal opportunity to reform our food and agriculture sector away from factory farms and corporate greed," said Food & Water Watch managing director of policy and litigation Mitch Jones. "Instead, House Republicans want to double down."

"Some of leadership's more dangerous proposals would take us backwards on animal welfare, and climate-smart agriculture—both the EATS Act and support for factory farm biogas must be dead on arrival," he asserted. "It's time Congress put the culture wars aside and got back to work on a Farm Bill that puts consumers, farmers, and the environment above politicking and Big Ag handouts."

Brett Hartl, government affairs director at the Center for Biological Diversity, said that "weakening safeguards that protect people from pesticides, slashing protections for endangered species, and recklessly expanding industrial logging should have no place in the Farm Bill."

"It's unfortunate that chairman Thompson has put forward such a destructive farm bill to appease the most fringe members of Congress," Hartl added. "This bill can't pass the House and it's a waste of everyone's time."

In a joint statement released Friday after a meeting with House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-N.Y.) and Democrats on Thompson's panel, Scott and Statenow stressed that members of their party are "committed to passing a strong, bipartisan Farm Bill that strengthens the farm and family safety nets and invests in our rural communities."

"America's farmers, families, workers, and rural communities deserve the certainty of a five-year Farm Bill, and everyone knows it must be bipartisan to pass," the pair said, blasting divisive GOP proposals. "Democrats remain ready and willing to work with Republicans on a truly bipartisan Farm Bill to keep farmers farming, families fed, and rural communities strong."

EPS defends police actions during U of A encampment clearing

Story by Nicholas Frew

• CBC

Edmonton's police chief is defending the police's clearing of a pro-Palestinian encampment at the University of Alberta last weekend, saying that safety concerns, signs of entrenchment and local police intelligence were among the factors that led to the dismantling of the camp.

On Friay, the Edmonton Police Service (EPS) gave a detailed timeline of the encampment and the police response, starting from when the encampment was erected and ending with ongoing investigations that, officials said, could result in criminal charges.

"We hope we never have to do it. We hope people comply with the orders and they just leave," said police Chief Dale McFee during a news conference on Friday.

"I wish people would have just left peacefully when they were asked — not maybe the first or second time, but at least the third to the sixth time. It would have been a little easier for everybody."

The encampment was set up in the main quad of the U of A on May 9. Two days later, at the university's request, police cleared it.

The response, including the force used, has come under public scrutiny.

The Alberta government announced this week that it plans to ask the Alberta Serious Incident Response Team — which investigates incidents where police may have caused serious injury or death — to examine the U of A and University of Calgary encampment clearings.

Related video: Campus encampments: Freedom of expression or trespassing? (cbc.ca)
Duration 4:50 View on Watch

The Edmonton police commission is also asking for more information about EPS policies regarding protest management and wearing name tags.

"The choices police make in these complex public safety environments are not ones that we make haphazardly," said Deputy Chief Devin Laforce, of the EPS investigations bureau, at the news conference.

"These are based on significant expertise and reviews, and paying attention to similar events that occur in other major cities."

Demonstrators warned 6 times, police say

Demonstrators ignored six official trespass and eviction warnings, police said, and campus peace officers first informed organizers they could not stay overnight when the camp was built in the early morning of May 9

Signs were installed around the camp and peace officers told demonstrators they were trespassing several more times. The final eviction notice came Saturday morning while police were on scene.

The camp grew over those two days. The number of people fluctuated depending on the time of day, but police believe it peaked at 120 people and 40 tents on the evening of May 9.

University officials grew concerned, as encampment organizers made calls to action, such as "Protect our students," and requested various supplies, police said.

The assumed intent was that the encampment would try to entrench itself, garnering greater support so it could overrun U of A peace officers, Laforce said.

Devin Laforce, Edmonton deputy police chief, left, was one of the officers
who explained the chronology of events that led to an encampment at the Unversity of Alberta being dismantled. (David Bajer/CBC)© Provided by cbc.ca

"If the camp were to become very entrenched, then this would subsequently require a more dynamic and resource-heavy response, that could result in the potential of more people being hurt and certainly a greater threat to public safety," Laforce said.

On May 10, campus peace officers posted more trespass notices and organizers received several deliveries of wooden palettes — which Laforce described as "occupation supply," as they have been used to, among other things, fortify camps, build structures and fuel fires in other places.

University and EPS officials were in touch for several days before the U of A called in police to clear the camp, Laforce said.

The university tries to balance freedom of expression with community safety, but safety is "always foremost in our decision-making," as was the case when deciding to disperse the camp, a university spokesperson told CBC News in a statement Friday.

Police, aware of similar encampments at other Canadian university campuses, knew there were "escalating activities" at the U of A, Laforce said

Nour Salhi, centre, is a university student who has acted as a spokesperson for the pro-Palestinian encampment that erected at the University of Alberta on May 9, 2024. (Craig Ryan/CBC)© Provided by cbc.ca

Police said at the news conference that intelligence suggested that many students were afraid and intimidated, and that many people at the encampment were not students.

EPS was unable to give reporters an estimate of how many at the camp were U of A students. Previous statements from university president Bill Flanagan suggest about one quarter were students.

People who attended the encampment have said many demonstrators were pegged as having no ties to the university, although they may have been faculty members or U of A alumni. They also said the encampment was respectful.

"Our encampment had no violent behaviour for them to police in the first place," Nour Salhi, a student who acted as a spokesperson for the encampment, told reporters Friday.

"We were praying together. We were sitting together, making art together. I don't understand how that is a policeable action."

Sweep took about 20 minutes: police

Police arrived at the U of A around 4:45 a.m. on May 11. Officers witnessed some demonstrators acting as sentries, cycling back to the camp to warn about incoming police, Laforce said.

At the camp, some demonstrators had formed a row by linking their arms together, he said.

At 4:55 a.m., campus peace officers read the final eviction notice, at which point about half the camp left.

Shortly after 5 a.m., officers performed a measured advance — a law enforcement tactic used throughout the continent, according to Insp. Lance Parker.

Police shouted, "Move," to demonstrators consistently while stepping forward in unison, he sai

People gather on the legislative grounds for a pro-Palestinian protest in Edmonton. The previously scheduled protest on May 11, 2024,
happened hours after police cleared an encampment at the University of Alberta that was in support of Gaza. (Emily Fitzpatrick/CBC)© Provided by cbc.ca

By 5:25 a.m., the encampment was fully cleared and no serious injuries were

reported, police said. Demonstrators, however, have said four students were injured, including one who was sent to hospital.

Police arrested three men, one of whom was previously known to EPS through other protests over the past several years. Police said they were charged with assault of a police officer and assault at an obstruction.

Two of the men were arrested during the initial clash after they resisted police and reached for officers' batons, police said.

"This clash with the protesters, all things considered, was incredibly minimal," Parker said.

Use of force

Videos taken by demonstrators last Saturday, which were posted to social media, showed some officers using batons and, at one point, gas started forming during the sweep.

Police showed video surveillance footage of the initial clash, when police used their batons, offering a different angle than the videos on social media. Parker suggested that, after police used their batons, the crowd became more docile, which allowed police to use less force from then on.

"Behaviour will always dictate actions from police," he said.

Parker reiterated that tear gas was not used. But officers fired 10 to 15 pepper balls — non-lethal ammunition filled with pepper spray, similar to a paintball — toward the ground to deter people from trying to break up arrests.

A muzzle blast containing pepper spray was also used, he said.

ID tags will not include officer names

Photos have circulated online of some of the police officers at the university last weekend, which, police say, has led to behaviour akin to bullying, harassment and intimidation such as doxxing — searching for and publishing private or identifying information of someone online.

Police are investigating 11 incidents in which people shared officer names, address information and social media posts from officers' relatives, Laforce said.

Some of the visuals that have circulated showed officers without name tags while wearing their chest guards — although some still had their regimental number.

Police Chief Dale McFee backed the actions officers took to clear the pro-Palestinian encampment at the University of Alberta on May 11, 2024. (David Bajer/CBC)© Provided by cbc.ca

McFee said that EPS should be changing its identification policy within two weeks.

The change will see officers wear ID tags that only feature their regimental number, he said, adding that it will be enough for EPS to know who attended a scene like the U of A last weekend, given the amount of visual evidence.

"We have to go to all ends to protect, obviously, our officers and their safety, but at the same time be accountable and transparent to the public, which we believe strongly that this will," McFee said.

University president out-of-country

While the encampment clearing occurred, university president Bill Flanagan was out of the country, a U of A spokesperson confirmed to CBC News.

Flanagan is on a previously scheduled work trip to Cortona, Italy, to mark the 25th anniversary of the university's satellite campus there, the spokesperson said.

"While there he is engaged with the situation back home and is attending important meetings virtually," the spokesperson said, adding that Flanagan is still working closely with senior leadership on campus.

University officials have met with members of its students' union and staff and alumni associations, and the school is trying to "move forward collaboratively and meaningfully" with them, the spokesperson said.

It is clear members of the U of A community are "hurt and in turmoil," they said, adding that further discussions will occur.

Extreme rights 2.0: A big global family

Steven Forti
2 May, 2024

First published at NACLA.

The victory of Javier Milei in Argentina’s presidential elections last November exploded a veritable atomic bomb, whose shockwaves reach far beyond the Latin American country. The paleolibertarian economist, known for his crude insults against “lefties,” immediately received congratulations from the members of what the Spanish philosopher and politician Clara Ramas has called the new Reactionary International. Although they have never brandished chainsaws at their rallies, for Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro, Viktor Orbán, Giorgia Meloni, José Antonio Kast, and Santiago Abascal, Milei is one of their own.

The arrival of Milei and his La Libertad Avanza party to the Casa Rosada is just the latest example of a process that has been developing over at least three decades and that has accelerated in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis. Currently, in addition to Argentina, the extreme right governs in four European countries (Italy, Hungary, Finland, and the Czech Republic), externally supports a conservative executive in Sweden, and could soon reach the government in the Netherlands, after the success of Geert Wilders in the November elections. As is known, the far right also ruled in Poland for two terms and in Brazil and the United States for one. In 2024, elections could propel far-right formations into governments in Portugal and Austria, not to mention the political earthquake that would come with electoral gains for the far right in the European Parliament elections in June and, above all, in the United States in November, with the possible return of Trump to the White House.

In short, as the Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde has pointed out, these political forces have become demarginalized. That is, on the one hand, they have become relevant political actors and accessed the government in various countries. On the other hand, their ideas have become normalized, shaping political agendas while being shared within conventional spaces. The radicalization of mainstream right-wing parties is reliable proof of this shift, as is the extreme right’s “conquest of the streets,” which has even included violence against political institutions or party headquarters in the United States, Brazil, and Spain.

In this early 21st century, a new spectre haunts the world. It is not the spectre of communism, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels explained in the mid-19th century, but the spectre of the extreme right. Although there are still no leading intellectuals nor a manifesto of a worldwide far-right party, this does not mean that it is not a globally organized, albeit heterogeneous, political force. On both sides of the Atlantic, recent events clearly show this is the case.

Fascist, populist, or radical right?

The rise of these political formations has led to a whole series of public and academic debates. The first is related to the definition of this phenomenon. It is often said that fascism has returned. In this regard, the thesis of eternal fascism or Ur-Fascism put forward by the Italian intellectual Umberto Eco has notably circulated in recent years. According to Eco, the creation of a “fascist nebula” requires the presence of only one of the 14 characteristics he detailed in his essay, among which are the cult of tradition, fear of the other, or the appeal to frustrated middle classes. Is this true? The question is not trivial, because the ability to define a political phenomenon is the first essential step to being able to understand and, by extension, combat it.

There is no doubt that these new extreme rights— or, as I will explain later, extreme rights 2.0—are the greatest threat to democratic values and the very survival of pluralist liberal democracies today. That does not mean it is correct to interpret them through the lens of fascism. As the Italian historian Emilio Gentile has pointed out, the thesis of eternal fascism is a consequence of the banalization of fascism. This banalization, on the one hand, has turned the concept into an insult, a synonym for “absolute evil.” On the other, it has led to a kind of ahistoriology “in which the historical past continually adapts to current desires, hopes, and fears.”

In short, what Gentile calls historical fascism was not only an ultranationalist, racist, and xenophobic political movement. Fascism, created in Europe after World War I, also had other core characteristics that we do not find in the extreme right today, such as its militia party organization, totalitarianism as a form of government, imperialism as a project of military expansion, regimenting of the population into large mass organizations, and self-presentation as a revolutionary rebirth and political religion. This does not mean that there are no elements of continuity between those experiences and current ones. However, fascism was a different creature. Today, neofascist and neo-Nazi groups still exist, but they are an ultra-minority.

Along with fascism, there is another obstacle that prevents us from defining and understanding the new extreme rights: populism. The debate on this topic has been endless over the last two decades. A consensus has not yet been reached on what populism is, beyond having become a kind of catch-all into which everything that does not fit within traditional political ideologies can fall. Some consider populism an ideology, albeit a thin one. Others, however, prefer to talk about it as a strategy or a political style. Given the absence of a defining doctrine, I believe that the second interpretation is more accurate. Add to this the fact that we are living in a time when populism permeates everything. If Milei, Gustavo Petro, and even French President Emmanuel Macron are populists, what good is this concept? Rather, this trend is the hallmark of our times, and it would be appropriate to talk, as Marc Lazar and Ilvo Diamanti have proposed, about “peoplecracy.” The extreme right uses the rhetorical and linguistic tools of populism, but populism in and of itself does not help us define and understand it.

That said, what concept should we use to define the political parties or movements led by Trump, Milei, Bolsonaro, Kast, Meloni, Le Pen, Orbán, or Abascal? Some speak of national populism and others opt for post-fascism, neither of which allow us, in the end, to move beyond the conceptual obstacles mentioned above. The term that has perhaps gotten the most traction is radical right. According to Mudde, unlike the extreme right, which rejects the very essence of democracy, the radical right accepts “the essence of democracy but opposes fundamental elements of liberal democracy, most notably minority rights, rule of law, and separation of powers.” In practice, the radical right accepts free, albeit not fair, elections— consider the case of Orbán’s Hungary in the last 12 years—and what ultimately is a simulacrum of democracy as we know it.

However, this proposal is problematic. On the one hand, is it correct to use the same adjective—radical— to define formations of the new extreme right and leftist forces such as Podemos, Syriza, the Broad Front of Chile, or La France Insoumise, as if there were some kind of symmetry? Personally, I think it is a mistake. The radical left criticizes existing liberal systems, focusing above all on the neoliberal model and economic issues, but it does not question the separation of powers, nor the democratic rights and gains guaranteed by these same systems. Rather, the radical left calls for an expansion and deepening of these rights, along with a reduction in inequalities.

On the other hand, as Beatriz Acha Ugarte notes: “Can we conceive of a non-pluralist democracy? Can we describe as democratic—albeit not in its ‘liberal version’—forces that, in their treatment of the ‘other’ (immigrant, foreigner), show their contempt for the democratic principle of equality?” By defending an ideology of exclusion incompatible even with the procedural version of democracy, and by calling into question the very existence of the rule of law, we should be cautious in considering these forces democratic.

Why do people vote for the far right?

The second debate has to do with the causes behind these political forces’ electoral advances. Why do people vote for them? In sum, three major causes have been identified, which are never exclusive, but rather must be considered alongside the peculiarities of each national context. First, the increase in inequalities, as well as the precariousness of work, weakening of the welfare state, and shrinking of the middle class, have pushed some voters who are dissatisfied with neoliberal economic recipes to choose the options on the ballot that criticize the existing order.

The second is what has been called cultural backlash—that is, the cultural reaction to liberal globalization. Our societies have gradually become multicultural, and in recent decades, many demands labeled post-materialist have become rights, from divorce to abortion to marriage equality. This shift has led, according to experts, to a reaction from sectors of the population who see their positions in society and even their identities threatened. They then vote for parties that reject immigration, criticize what they consider progressive excesses, and defend the traditional family.

Third, liberal democracies are experiencing a profound crisis. Our societies have become frayed—they are more liquid and atomized due to the prevailing neoliberal model and technological revolution, political parties no longer serve as an effective conduit between territories and institutions, unions face enormous difficulties in adapting to a fully post-Fordist reality, and citizen distrust continues to increase. In such atomized societies, where trust in institutions seems to have disappeared, it is not unreasonable to imagine that part of the electorate opts for parties that say they want to destroy everything or, at the very least, that oppose the establishment and criticize the functioning of democracies that they consider slow, ineffective, or disconnected from the will of the people.

To these three causes, we could add a fourth that has even more to do with the perceptions of the population. In a world that’s difficult to understand, demand for protection and security has increased. What will happen to my job in 10 years with artificial intelligence? What will happen in our neighborhoods if migrants from other continents keep arriving? What will come of the family model in which many of us have grown up if queer couples are allowed to adopt children or gender fluidity is accepted? What will come of our social relationships in times of virtual reality with projects like the Metaverse? In their own way, the extreme rights 2.0 know they need to offer security and protection to many people who live in fear of what the future may bring, giving simple answers to complex problems.

Understanding the extreme rights 2.0

To recap, there is considerable confusion about what to call these political formations and a series of causes to explain their electoral gains on both sides of the Atlantic. Some of these causes may outweigh others in a specific country, region, or municipality. We must, however, always take them all into account. Is Milei’s victory explained only by the economic crisis and increasing inequalities in Argentina? Without denying the importance of these factors, it would be wrong to relegate to a second or third place the high levels of citizen distrust towards traditional political parties and institutions, as well as the cultural reaction to the so-called “progressive consensus.”

It is often said that the European and Latin American contexts are not comparable. However, I do not believe we should keep the analyses and, consequently, the definitions of these phenomena separate. The fact that there are some differences or national peculiarities among the causes of the far rights’ electoral advances does not invalidate the possibility of conceiving of and using a concept on a global scale. On the contrary, it is useful to forge a macro-category that is elastic enough to include all these political formations. Based on these considerations, I have proposed the perhaps somewhat provocative concept of extreme rights 2.0.

With this concept, in the plural, I seek to highlight not only that the Trumps, Le Pens, Mileis, and Orbáns represent a phenomenon distinct from historical fascism, with radically new elements compared to the past, but also that new technologies have played a crucial role in the rise of these political formations. Likewise, I wish to highlight that, despite some divergences, they share much in common, in terms of both ideological basis and political and communications strategies. Last but not least, all of these figures not only know each other and maintain relationships with some frequency, but they also consider themselves part of the same global family.

Among their common ideological reference points are a marked nationalism, a deep criticism of multilateralism and the liberal order, anti-globalism, defense of conservative values, defense of law and order, criticism of multiculturalism and open societies, anti-progressivism, anti-intellectualism, and a formal distancing from past experiences of fascism, without rejecting so-called dog whistle politics— winks or references to authoritarian regimes of the past. In Europe and the United States, identitarianism, nativism, condemnation of immigration as an “invasion,” xenophobia, and more specifically Islamophobia, certainly play a crucial role. Within Latin America, there is no shortage of cases—consider Chile—where the extreme right also has clearly leveraged rhetoric rejecting immigration, mainly of Venezuelans. That said, those in Latin America who José Antonio Sanahuja and Camilo López Burian have proposed calling the neopatriotic right have most in common with the European far right.

The European extreme rights are not all exactly the same either. Neither were the fascisms of the interwar era, and this does not mean we cannot use a macro-category to talk about the regimes of Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco. Among these divergences today it is worth first mentioning their economic programs. There are forces, like Vox in Spain or Chega in Portugal, that are ultra-liberal, and those, like Le Pen in France, that defend so-called welfare chauvinism, without calling into question the neoliberal model. Second, when it comes to values, positions are much more ultra-conservative in the south and east of Europe compared to the extreme right of the Netherlands or Scandinavia, which are a bit more open on issues such as LGBTQIA+ rights and abortion. Finally, there are geopolitical differences since there are some Russophile parties and other Atlanticist parties.

At the same time, there are commonalities. One is exacerbated tacticism—that is, the ability to quickly change positions on crucial issues, without having any qualms about appearing incoherent, such as on the question of the European Union or measures to confront Covid-19—with the aim of setting the media agenda. Similarly, they share the ability to use new technologies and social media to make their messages go viral, gather citizen data, and further polarize society with culture wars. Another element, as the Argentine historian Pablo Stefanoni explains, is the willingness to present themselves as transgressors and rebels against a system supposedly dominated by a left that has established a progressive or politically correct dictatorship. The new far rights have not only made themselves more “presentable,” they are also trying to appropriate progressive and left-wing banners—think about the use of the concept of freedom or phenomena such as homonationalism or ecofascism—in a historical moment marked by what the French sociologist Philippe Corcuff has called ideological confusionism.

A big global family

To paraphrase the historian Ricardo Chueca, who studied the Spanish Falange during the Franco regime, each country gives life to the extreme right 2.0 that it needs. We can add that each extreme right is the offspring of the political cultures present in each national context. Thus, their peculiarities do not prevent them from being considered part of a large global family since, in addition, there are transnational networks that work to strengthen existing ties, develop a common agenda, and finance these political parties.

On the one hand, all these political leaders share personal relationships. They know each other, talk often, congratulate each other on social media, and meet and participate in gatherings organized by the other parties. In the European Union, the existence of the political groups Identity and Democracy (ID) and European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which bring together the continent’s far-right parties, offers space for the right to share ideas and experiences. It is true that the extreme right has not managed, neither in the past nor the present, to unify into a single group in the European Parliament, nor into a single community-wide party. But the parties both in the ID and in the ECR share a considerable understanding of the landscape and can reach compromises, as has been demonstrated by the manifesto in defense of a Christian Europe that the majority of these parties signed in July 2021.

On the other hand, global networks woven by foundations and conservative think tanks are gaining importance. One of these is the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), linked to the U.S. Republican Party, which has tentacles in Australia, Japan, Brazil, Mexico, and Hungary. Likewise, there is the Atlas Network, a promoter of free-market ideas based in DC, and the Edmund Burke Foundation, a conservative research institute founded in the Netherlands in 2019 and linked to ultra-conservative Israeli, U.S., and European sectors. One of its key figures is the Israeli philosopher Yoram Hazony, author of the 2018 book The Virtue of Nationalism and president of the Herzl Institute, a main animator of what is presented as “national conservatism.”

At the same time, many of these parties have created political training schools whose teachers often include members of the extreme right from other countries. Marion Maréchal Le Pen, niece of Marine Le Pen, created in France the Higher Institute of Sociology, Economics, and Politics, which, together with Vox, also opened a headquarters in Madrid. Among the many pro-government organizations created by Orbán in Hungary, it is worth mentioning the Mathias Corvinus Collegium, which currently has more than 20 locations in Hungary, Romania, and Brussels, and around 7,000 students. Among its guest speakers last year was former Fox News host Tucker Carlson. The director of the Collegium’s Center for European Studies is Rodrigo Ballester of Spain, who is linked to Vox and its think tank, the Disenso Foundation. Meanwhile, in Poland, the far-right Law and Justice party has promoted its university, the Collegium Intermarium, which is linked to the ultra-Catholic think tank Ordo Iuris. In addition, the ECR organizes courses for “future leaders” throughout Europe through its foundation, New Direction.

Connections are increasingly transatlantic. These connections are not only thanks to CPAC or the activism of Orbán’s Hungary, which organizes forums such as the Budapest Demographic Summit, but also because of the role that Vox, headed by Santiago Abascal, is playing in relation to Latin America. Through the Disenso Foundation, the party has developed the notion of Iberosphere, which promotes ties between right-wing parties on both sides of the Atlantic, in the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America. In 2020, Vox launched the Madrid Charter, a programmatic manifesto that made the Iberosphere concept official and enabled the creation of the Madrid Forum. This organization, which presents itself as a counterweight to the São Paulo Forum and the Puebla Group, has organized several meetings in the region, including in Bogotá in 2022 and Lima in 2023, in addition to the Iberosphere summits. In this way, Vox has strengthened relations with the Latin American far right, from Brazil to Chile, passing through Argentina, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, offering meeting spaces to share a common agenda. One of the main links has been Vox European Parliament member Hermann Tertsch, third vice chair of the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat), which shows once again the importance of the networks being woven from Brussels.

To all this activity we must add the networks created in Christian fundamentalist orbits, which have been very active since at least the late 1990s. One of the best-known examples is the World Congress of Families, an organization founded between the United States and Russia in 1997 that now has branches throughout the globe. Among its participants is HazteOír, an organization founded in 2001 by Spanish lawyer Ignacio Arsuaga, who went on in 2013 to launch the international lobby group CitizenGo. Likewise, the Political Network for Values, headed by José Antonio Kast, has been organizing transatlantic meetings for a decade. Among its leading members is Jaime Mayor Oreja, former minister in the Spanish government under the Popular Party’s José María Aznar and founder of the “cultural platform” One of Us, a Catholic think tank that defends the prohibition of abortion, euthanasia, gay marriage, and “gender ideology.” This brief overview offers just a small sample of a very well-organized and dense network.

Electoral autocracies

Taking all this into account, it is difficult not to consider these political formations as part of the same political family. They defend largely the same ideas, promote similar policies, and share the same forums internationally. They also have the same objectives. First, they seek to shift the public debate to the far right—that is, to move the Overton window, making acceptable rhetoric and narratives that up until a few years ago were unacceptable. Second, they seek to radicalize the traditional right either by conquering them from within or by forcing them to become allies. Third, they seek to come to power to establish an illiberal democracy following the Orbán model. Today’s Hungary is not a full democracy, but a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy,” as the European Parliament defined it in September 2022.

And Hungary is a model. It is no coincidence that Orbán traveled to Buenos Aires on December 10 for Milei’s inauguration and met with the new Argentine president. Likewise, far-right European, U.S., and Latin American politicians have often traveled to Budapest to learn how to hollow out democracy from within. When they fail to do so, they call the elections fraudulent and promote violent actions against institutions, as we saw in Washington in January 2021 and, two years later, in Brasília. The extreme rights 2.0 are not historical fascism, but they are, without a doubt, the greatest existing threat to democratic values.

Just look at the policies approved by Milei after his inauguration. In the first weeks of his administration, he introduced measures aimed at deregulating the economy, along with brutal cuts to social assistance, indiscriminate attacks on civil rights, and the criminalization of unions and protests to the point of eliminating freedom of assembly and demonstration. In this context, it is not unreasonable to draw a parallel between the Decree of Necessity and Urgency signed by Milei to implement his “shock therapy,” and especially his proposed omnibus “Law of bases and starting points for the freedom of Argentines,” and the “Enabling Law” approved by the German parliament in March 1933. In practice, the overturning of Congress that Milei seeks to impose in his omnibus bill would mean the end of the separation of powers and the rule of law itself. In other words, the death of democracy—exactly what happened in Germany with Hitler’s arrival to power.

Steven Forti is a professor of Contemporary History at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. Among other works, he is the author of Extrema derecha 2.0 (2021) and editor of Mitos y cuentos de la extrema derecha (2023). He is a member of the editorial boards of Spagna Contemporanea, CTXT, and Política & Prosa.

When Afghanistan was red!

Imran Kamyana
8 May, 2024

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First published at International Socialism Project.

There are turning points in the evolution of societies that determine their direction for quite long periods of time. In this regard, many past events become crucial to understand the current situation and create a perspective for the future. There is always a need to discuss such happenings time and again so that their lessons can be passed on to the new generations. As is correctly said, without the past there is no future.

The Saur (Spring) Revolution of 1978 is one such event, which played a key role in shaping the current situation not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan but also in the entire South Asian region in general. Without knowing, understanding and evaluating it, it becomes almost impossible to devise a revolutionary plan of action in this part of the world.

It is a tragedy that most of the revolutionaries outside this region are not even aware of this historical event, while there is a lot of ambiguity regarding it in the political left even here. While Stalinism, with its typical methods of intrigue and sabotage, always tried to distort the character of this revolution, the imperialists spared no effort to erase it from the pages of history altogether.

In official writings and textbooks, the civil war in Afghanistan began on December 24, 1979, when Russian (Soviet) troops entered the country. However, an entire period before that, up to April 1978, has been obliterated from the pages of history. Few people are aware of the fact that the so-called jihad in Afghanistan (basically the CIA’s Operation Cyclone) was initiated by US imperialism in June 1979, about six months before the entry of Russian troops. Its main objective was to overthrow the revolutionary government of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), which came to power under the leadership of Noor Muhammad Tarakai on April 27-28, 1978 after overthrowing the reactionary and unpopular dictatorship of Sardar Dawood Khan.

The formation of the PDPA government through a revolutionary takeover, mainly orchestrated by the party sympathizers within the military but with popular support, was an event in the region that set alarm bells ringing in the imperialist centers from Islamabad to Riyadh and from Brussels to Washington.

After coming to power, the revolutionary regime courageously and boldly undertook the historic task of bringing Afghanistan out of centuries of darkness, backwardness and ignorance. Abolition of extremely exploitative, usurious loans that kept poor peasants living in humiliation and poverty for generations; distribution of feudal landlords’ lands among poor farmers (land reforms); abolition of reactionary norms, traditions and laws that treated women worse than animals; separation of the state from religion; emergency literacy programs; plans for free provision of healthcare and education; fair distribution of water; initiation of industrialization—these were some of the radical measures that gravely threatened the interests of the local ruling classes and global imperialism.

They also had the potential to appeal to the workers, oppressed nations and exploited masses in general around the world. All this could have awakened more rebellions elsewhere by becoming a point of reference.

On the other hand, the Soviet bureaucracy was also worried about the establishment of an independent and relatively healthy revolutionary government in its neighbor. Contrary to the popular belief, the revolution took place without the intentions and prior knowledge of the Soviet bureaucracy, or else they would not have let it happen. So, the Stalinists in Moscow also wanted to mold the new revolutionary government according to their own designs and bring the whole process under their control.

Few people are aware of the irony that the Russian troops, after entering Afghanistan, fired the first shot at Hafizullah Amin, the head of the revolutionary government at the time. Earlier, Tarakai, the leader of the revolution, was mysteriously found dead in the presidential palace. He is also believed to have been killed by the KGB.

In this way, the Soviet bureaucracy installed Babrak Karmal (who belonged to the PDPA’s opposition faction “Parcham”, which was closer to the Soviets) to power. The arrival of Soviet troops paved the way for a more open and aggressive intervention by the CIA through the Pakistani and Saudi states. These very jihadist groups that were raised with imperialist support and funding fought each other after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1988 and the fall of the Najibullah’s government in 1992, turning Afghanistan into ruins.

In the meantime, to fund these jihadists, the CIA laid an entire network of drug production and distribution in the region, which continues to operate to this day. The enormous black money generated through this business is still the driving force behind state and non-state terrorism and fundamentalism in the region.

The Taliban also emerged from these jihadists later in the mid-1990s, primarily with the backing of the Pakistani state, but also with an understanding with the Americans. Their love and hate relationship with the imperialism have resulted in the current chaotic and disastrous situation in Afghanistan.

Throughout the 1980s, thousands of “madrassahs” (religious seminaries) were established all over Pakistan, especially in the areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa bordering Afghanistan, in order to provide children and youth of the poor families as foot soldiers for this counter-revolutionary imperialist war in Afghanistan. The syllabus for these seminaries was designed and printed by the CIA in the US, and basic math in these books was explained by numbers of guns, bullets, grenades, and the communist soldiers killed! Similar was the case with grammar, and alphabets were taught as “A for Allah,” “J for Jihad,” etc. (more on this here and here). Interestingly, the literal meaning of Taliban is “students”, referring to the pupils at these seminaries—which, turning into another profitable enterprise, continue to expand in size and numbers to this day, while serving as the factories of religious extremism, fundamentalism and bigotry.

However, while there was an invasion of the enemies from all directions, the Saur Revolution also suffered from many internal contradictions. In particular, the conflict between the “Khalq” and “Parcham” factions within the party caused irreparable damage to the revolutionary cause.

But there is one more thing to be taken into account here: unlike the US puppet government of Dr. Ashraf Ghani, which did not last even a few weeks against the Taliban without the direct support of its handlers, Dr. Najibullah’s government continued to fight and resist the jihadists for four full years after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. It shows that, unlike the former, the latter—which was a continuation of the PDPA government, albeit in a deformed manner—had the support of a much larger section of the Afghan population. During this time, the soldiers of the Afghan Revolutionary Army, including a large number of women, inscribed many chapters of unprecedented courage and sacrifice against the arch-reactionary and counter-revolutionary proxy groups.

The Battle of Jalalabad can be taken as a reference point of this heroic struggle in defense of the revolution. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the refusal of Boris Yeltsin’s government to supply fuel and weapons became the main reason for the fall of the Najibullah’s government. The darkness that engulfed Afghanistan still continues to torment the Afghan masses with lives of the women particularly becoming a living hell.

The counter-revolution in Afghanistan also casts its shadows not only on the neighboring countries but in many ways all over the world (the forces like ISIS can fairly be considered the byproducts of the process initiated by imperialism in Afghanistan). Yet these sufferings, atrocities and miseries are not the destiny of Afghan workers and youth. The Saur Revolution of 1978, despite all its weaknesses and mistakes, is a ray of hope even in these dark times, and proves that even in the most backward regions and in the most difficult situations, this system of oppression and exploitation can be challenged and overthrown.

The new generation of Afghans will have to take lessons from this brief yet glorious episode of their history, and march forward with the red banner of revolutionary socialism in unity with their class brethren and sisters throughout the region and beyond for a revolutionary emancipation from imperialism, fundamentalism, and capitalism.

Imran Kamyana is the International Secretary of Pakistan Trade Union Defence Campaign (PTUDC).

THE ORIGINAL

Leon Trotsky, 1938

The Transitional Program: The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International

This is the founding document of the Fourth International, published in September of 1938. It was previously drafted by Trotsky and discussed widely by sections of the Trotskyist movement.

Assessing the historical lessons of the betrayal of the working class by both the Second and Third Internationals, Trotsky outlines the principles upon which to build a new proletarian leadership for the struggles against world imperialism and Stalinism. The strategic task of the upcoming period—“the overcoming of the contradiction between the maturity of the objective revolutionary conditions and the immaturity of the proletariat and its vanguard”—is linked to the program of transitional demands that embodied the experience of the revolutionary movement to this point.