A Misplaced Purity: Democracies and Crimes Against International Law

by Binoy Kampmark / May 22nd, 2024

The application for arrest warrants by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Karim A.A. Khan in the Israel-Hamas War gives us a chance to revisit a recurring theme in the commission of crimes in international humanitarian law.  Certain states, so this logic goes, either commit no crimes, or, if they do, have good reasons for doing so, be they self-defence against a monstrous enemy, or as part of a broader civilisational mission.

In this context, the application for warrants regarding Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Defence Minister, Yoav Gallant, merits particular interest.  Those regarding the Hamas trio of its leader Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Al-Masri, the commander-in-chief of Al-Qassam Brigades, and the organisation’s political bureau head Ismail Haniyeh, would have left most Western governments untroubled.

From Khan’s perspective, the warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant will focus on policies of starvation, the intentional causing of “great suffering, or serious injury to body or health”, including cruel treatment, wilful killing or murder, intentional attacks on the Palestinian population, including extermination, persecution and other inhumane acts falling within the Rome Statute “as crimes against humanity”.

The ICC prosecutor’s assessment follows the now increasingly common claim that Israel’s military effort, prosecuted in the cause of self-defence in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks by Hamas, is not what it claims to be.  Far from being paragons of proportionate warfare and humanitarian grace in war, Israel’s army and security forces are part of a program that has seen needless killing and suffering.  The crimes against humanity alleged “were committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack against the Palestinian civilian population pursuant to State policy.”

The reaction from the Israeli side was always expected.  Netanyahu accused the prosecutor of “creating a false symmetry between the democratically elected leaders of Israel and the terrorist chieftains”.  He rejected “with disgust the comparison of the prosecutor in The Hague between democratic Israel and the mass murderers of Hamas”.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog also found “any attempt to draw parallels between these atrocious terrorists and a democratically elected government of Israel – working to fulfil its duty to defend and protect its citizens in adherence to the principles of international law […] outrageous and cannot be accepted by anyone.”

Israel’s staunchest ally, sponsor and likewise self-declared democracy (it is, in fact, a republic created by those suspicious of that system of government), was also there to hold the fort against such legal efforts.  US President Joe Biden’s statement on the matter was short and brusque: “The ICC prosecutor’s application for arrest warrants against Israeli leaders is outrageous.  And let me be clear: whatever this prosecutor might imply, there is no equivalence – none – between Israel and Hamas.”

The democracy-as-purity theme, one used as a seeming exculpation of all conduct in war, surfaced in the May 21 exchange between Senator James Risch, the top Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.  Was the secretary, inquired Risch, amenable to supporting legislation to combat the ICC “sticking its nose in the business of countries that have an independent, legitimate, democratic judicial system”?  (No consideration was given to the sustained efforts by the Netanyahu government to erode judicial independence in passing legislation to curb the discretion of courts to strike down government decisions.)

The response from Blinken was agreeable to such an aim.  There was “no question we have to look at the appropriate steps to take to deal with, again, what is a profoundly wrong-headed decision.”  As things stand, a bill is already warming the lawmaking benches with a clear target.  Sponsored by Arkansas Republican Senator Tom Cotton, the Illegitimate Court Counteraction Act would obligate the President to block the entry of ICC officials to the US, revoke any current US visas such officials hold, and prohibit any property transactions taking place in the US.  To avoid such measures, the court must cease all cases against “protected persons of the United States and its allies”.

The Austrian Chancellor Karl Nehammer similarly saw the prosecutor’s efforts as a pairing of incongruous parties. “The fact however that the leader of the terrorist organisation Hamas whose declared goal is the extinction of the State of Israel is being mentioned at the same time as the democratically elected representatives of that very State is non-comprehensible.”

From the outset, such statements do two things.  The first is to conjure up a false distinction – that of equivalence – something absent in the prosecutor’s application.  The acts alleged are relevant to each specified party and are specific to them.  The second is a corollary: that democracies do not break international law and certainly not when it comes to war crimes and crimes against humanity, most notably when committed against a certain type of foe.  The more savage the enemy, the greater the latitude in excusing vengeful violence.  That remains, essentially, the cornerstone of Israel’s defence argument at the International Court of Justice.

Such arguments echo an old trope.  The two administrations of George W. Bush spilled much ink in justifying the torture, enforced disappearance and renditions of terror suspects to third countries during its declared Global War on Terror.  Lawyers in both the White House and Justice Department gave their professional blessing, adopting an expansive definition of executive power in defiance of international laws and protections.  Such sacred documents as the Geneva Conventions could be defied when facing Islamist terrorism.

Lurking beneath such justifications is the snobbery of exceptionalism, the conceit of power.  Civilised liberal democracies, when battling the forces of a named barbarism, are to be treated as special cases in the world of international humanitarian law.  The ICC prosecutor begs to differ.FacebookTwitter

RedditEmail

Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com. Read other articles by Binoy.

U$ Veterans For Peace Memorial Day Statement May 2024

Remember: All living things are victims of war

by Mike Ferner / May 23rd, 2024

Memorial Day is a day for remembering the victims of war.

Members of Veterans For Peace remember America’s war dead not just once a year, but every day of our lives, with the solemnity they deserve, not the crass commercialism Memorial Day has become.

We remember the war dead and the far greater number of wounded with missing limbs and the even greater number living with invisible, lifelong devils and injuries in their heads.

We remember the lost contributions they could have made to society that they literally bottled up or destroyed in the epidemic of suicide rampant among veterans.

We remember the domestic violence caused by their devils. We remember their children whose lives were more painful and less joyful than they could have been because of those devils. We remember the way the pain echoes through generations, refreshed by each new war. We remember how our communities and our nation are so much less than they should be because of this underserved burden.

We remember all those that our sociopathic, delusional leaders told us were “the enemy.” We remember the multitudes of women, children, the old and the sick they obscenely wrote off as “collateral damage.”

We remember our innumerable brothers and sisters of Mother Earth who were killed and wounded: the birds, the four-legged, our family in the seas, the trees and life-giving plants destroyed without thought, the crops and animals that sustain human life.

We remember the billions of people who go without clean water, education and health care because war has stolen the money.

This year we also remember the few winners in what Marine Corps General Smedley Butler called the racket of war, the elite who delight in telling their puppets in government to order up another one. And we remember the winners’ mantra, “Even losing wars make money.”

We remember all the losers of that racket, too; we remember each one. We do not remember some and ignore others. Nor do we glorify warriors or war because there is no glory in war. On Memorial Day we remember all the folly and all the costs of war.

We remember what Jeanette Rankin, the first woman in Congress, said as she voted against declaring war in 1917, “You can no more win a war than you can win an earthquake.”FacebookTwitter

RedditEmail

Mike Ferner is Special Projects Manager for Veterans for Peace. He can be reached at mike@veteransforpeace.org. Read other articles by Mike.

 

Belarus ratifies updates to nuclear power plant agreement with Russia

23 May 2024

The Belarus council of ministers has ratified protocol amendments which allow extension of the warranty period from those in the original 2011 intergovernmental agreement with Russia for the construction of the country's nuclear power plant.

The Belarusian nuclear power plant, built at Ostrovets (Image: Rosatom)

According to the official Belta news agency, the ratification is of the amendments which were agreed between the two countries in November 2023.

It says: "According to the protocol, the two-year warranty period for the operation of the equipment established by the agreement can be extended for a longer period. Certain equipment may have a longer warranty period. In addition, the agreement contains a provision that the procedure for setting the price of nuclear fuel and the terms of its supply are agreed upon by the Russian and Belarusian competent authorities."

The Belarus nuclear power plant has two VVER-1200 reactors and is located in Ostrovet in the Grodno region. A general contract for the construction was signed in 2011, with first concrete in November 2013. Construction of unit 2 began in May 2014. The first power unit was connected to the grid in November 2020, with the second unit put into commercial operation in November 2023. The amendment to the original agreement was part of measures to resolve issues relating to the project taking longer than original envisaged.

In January this year, Belarus and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding to deepen cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology, with a multipurpose nuclear research reactor one of the possible results.

Researched and written by World Nuclear News

 

Large-scale nuclear included in Australian cost report

22 May 2024

Large-scale nuclear has been included for the first time in national science agency CSIRO's annual GenCost report, which has included small modular reactors (SMRs) since its inception in 2018.

(Image: CSIRO)

GenCost is described by CSIRO as a leading economic report for business leaders and decision-makers planning reliable and affordable energy solutions to achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. Published in collaboration with the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), the report offers "accurate, policy and technology-neutral cost estimates for new electricity generation, storage, and hydrogen technologies, through to 2050."

The decision to include large-scale nuclear in GenCost 2023-24 was prompted by increased stakeholder interest in nuclear following updated costings for SMRs in the 2023-24 consultation draft, the organisation said.

The report based its cost estimates for large-scale nuclear on South Korea’s nuclear programme, as the best representation of a continuous building programme consistent with other technologies in the report, and adjusting for differences between South Korean and Australian deployment costs. It calculated an expected capital cost of a large-scale nuclear plant in 2023 of AUD9217 per kW (USD6215 per kW) - but added that this capital cost could only be achieved if Australia were to commit to a continuous building programme and only after an initial higher cost unit is constructed.

With no local development pipleline for large-scale nuclear, and taking into account additional legal, safety and security requirements, and stakeholder evidence, the report estimated a development timeline of at least 15 years, with deployment from 2040 at the earliest.

The report found the estimated electricity cost range for large-scale nuclear under current capital costs and a continuous building programme to be AUD163 per MWh to AUD264 per MWh, which it said is expected to fall by 2040 to AUD141 per MWh to AUD232 per MWh.

New large‐scale nuclear costs are "significantly lower" than for SMRs - which have been significantly increased in the latest version of the report to reflect more recent data based on Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems' Carbon Free Power Project in the USA, which was cancelled in November 2023.

The report's comparison of levelised costs of electricity (Image: CSIRO)

The report found the levelised costs of electricity - the total unit costs a generator must recover over its economic life to meet all its costs including a return on investment - used to summarise the relative competitiveness of different generation options were lowest for variable renewables (solar photovoltaic and wind). "If we exclude high emission generation options, the next most competitive generation technologies are solar thermal, gas with carbon capture and storage, large-scale nuclear and coal with carbon capture and storage," it noted.

CSIRO Chief Energy Economist Paul Graham, lead author of the report, said GenCost is "flexible to adjusting assumptions, scope and methodology" in response to feedback received during the formal consultation period and throughout the year. “For example, our approach to the inclusion of large-scale nuclear technology provides a logical, transparent and policy-neutral method of costing a potential deployment scenario in Australia," he said.

GenCost 2023-24 can be downloaded here.

Researched and written by World Nuclear News

Nucleareurope calls for expansion of EU hydrogen output

H2 MADE WITH NUCLEAR POWER IS CALLED PINK HYDROGEN

22 May 2024

Nuclear trade body Nucleareurope has highlighted the benefits of European-based hydrogen production from nuclear energy in a new position paper.

(Image: Pixabay)

Nucleareurope noted a recent survey by McKinsey found that intensive gas buyers expect to reduce their gas demand in the future, largely by switching to hydrogen or synthetic gases produced via hydrogen.

"For the time being, the European Commission's focus is primarily on hydrogen produced exclusively from renewables, with a significant share of this hydrogen being imported from third countries, notably from the global south," the position paper says. "This will result in an important increase in energy demand due to transportation and losses while potentially exploiting countries where energy poverty is high and affecting Europe's energy sovereignty by creating a dependency on imported renewable hydrogen."

The European Commission's REPowerEU plan - adopted in May 2022 to rapidly reduce EU dependence on Russian fossil fuels - foresaw 10 million tonnes of domestic hydrogen production complemented with 6-10 million tonnes of imported hydrogen by 2030. However, following the communication in February this year on the 2040 climate targets, this plan has been downsized to 3 million tonnes, "perhaps to align it with the realistic forecasts of domestic production via renewables," Nucleareurope said.

"This is where other low-carbon energy sources, such as nuclear, could fill the gap and help meet the original ambitions, as the main target remains unchanged: net-zero by 2050," it added.

According to Nucleareurope, the main advantage of hydrogen production via nuclear is that the load factor of the installed electrolysers will be maximised with baseload production - possibility to reach 8000 hours per year with nuclear and improve the lifetime and payback of the installation.

One existing nuclear power plant with a capacity of 1000 MWe and a capacity factor of over 90%, coupled with 1000 MW of electrolysers, could produce about 0.16 million tonnes of low-carbon hydrogen per year, providing an uninterrupted supply to end-users, it noted. This output could increase further by up to 20% if coupled with high-temperature electrolysers capable of using nuclear steam.

In order to support the deployment of domestic hydrogen production, Nucleareurope recommends that the EU focus on: encouraging a diversified approach to hydrogen production that recognises the potential of all net-zero technologies; emphasising the importance of energy sovereignty in the context of hydrogen production; developing policies to support the growth of domestic hydrogen industries, recognising their role in reindustrialisation and job creation; advocating for strategic investments in infrastructure that support domestic hydrogen production, storage and distribution; and allocating resources for research and development initiatives focused on improving the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of hydrogen production technologies, including nuclear-based methods.

"Domestic production of hydrogen can help solve some of the challenges which the EU is facing in terms of energy security, environmental sustainability, and economic competitiveness" said Nucleareurope Director General Yves Desbazeille. "Reimagining how hydrogen, a versatile and clean energy carrier, can play an important leading role in transforming the energy system is key in this respect."

Researched and written by World Nuclear News

 COLD WAR 2.0 HEATS UP

Russian Wargame Practicing Tactical Nukes Use Is Warning to West

May 22, 2024

Simon Saradzhyan

The Russian defense ministry has just launched a multi-phase exercise near Ukraine meant to prepare its forces for using non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). In addition to the obvious purpose of preparing Russian troops to use tactical nuclear weapons in battle, the multi-stage exercise is also meant to signal to the West that it should refrain from escalating assistance to Ukraine, as well as to warn the U.S. and its allies that Russia may liberalize its conditions for using nuclear weapons. Finally, the exercise may be evidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to retain Valery Gerasimov as head of the General Staff, at least for now.

That the Russian armed forces are planning a NSNW wargame became publicly known on May 6, when the country’s defense ministry (MoD) issued a statement disclosing that Putin—who is the commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces—had ordered an exercise in the Southern Military District (SMD) to have MoD units practice using tactical nuclear weapons. The wargame is supposed to prepare these units for what the ministry described as “unconditionally ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian state in response to provocative statements and threats of individual Western officials against the Russian Federation,” according to the statement.1 The defense agency’s rather curt announcement was followed by a longer statement from the country’s foreign ministry (MFA), which said that the planned wargame “should be considered in the context of recent bellicose statements by Western officials and sharply destabilizing actions taken by a number of NATO countries that are aimed at building forceful pressure on the Russian Federation and at creating additional threats to the security of our country in connection with the conflict in and around Ukraine.”  

Echoing the MoD, the MFA said in its May 6 statement that the exercise would be aimed at practicing using NSNWs for the purpose of ensuring “the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian state.” Thus, both Russia’s MoD and MFA implied within hours of each other that Russia could resort to nuclear strikes to protect its territorial integrity (Condition 1) and sovereignty (Condition 2), even though the publicly available versions of Russia’s strategic documents do not explicitly mention either of these two conditions. While not explicitly mentioned as conditions for use of nuclear weapons in those documents, Condition 1 and Condition 2 have been mentioned by Russian leaders, respectively, at least 10 times and two times, in the period from Feb. 22, 2022, to May 5, 2024. As I wrote on May 6, these references may indicate that the Russian leadership may be considering introducing them in the next editions of Russia’s military doctrine (which currently dates back to 2014) and/or in the Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence (which dates back to 2020). That the doctrinal language on nuclear weapons use may undergo this kind of liberalization is something that Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov implied in comments to Russian media on May 9. When asked in the same media opportunity if Russia could revise its nuclear doctrine to allow a preventive strike, Ryabkov said: "The environment itself is changing. This is why the correspondence between the basis documents in this sector and the need of ensuring our security is being constantly analyzed.” Speaking on the same day as Ryabkov, Putin chose not to discuss conditions for use of nuclear weapons, but he did comment on the NSNW wargame itself, claiming it was “nothing unusual.” Speaking with Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko beside him, Putin said on May 9 that the wargame will consist of three phases and that Belarus, which hosts some of Russian NSNWs, has been offered the opportunity to participate in the second phase.  

Nearly two weeks after Putin’s comments, the Russian MoD announced on May 21 that the first game of the NSNW wargame had begun in the Southern Military District, which abuts Ukraine. The missile units of the Russian Ground Forces in the SMD are practicing how to first deliver nuclear warheads to their delivery vehicles (the Iskander surface-to-surface missiles), then to install them in these missiles and then deploy them to the areas they would be launched from, according to the MoD statement. Meanwhile, Russian Aerospace Force units are practicing installing nuclear warheads into Kinzhal air-to-surface missiles, which are carried by warplanes (e.g. MiG-31 interceptors, in contrast to some earlier Zapad (West) wargames, in which long-range Tupolev bombers simulated launches of air-to-surface nuclear missiles), with these planes subsequently conducting flights in designated patrol areas, according to the MoD statement.2

As stated above, in addition to the obvious purpose of training its troops to use NSNWs, the Russian leadership means to use this exercise to signal to the West that it should refrain from escalating assistance to Ukraine following France’s (and some other NATO members’) warnings that they may send troops to Ukraine, as well as Britain’s decision to allow Ukraine to use U.K.-supplied weapons for strikes inside Russia.3 The wargame also appears to serve as a broader warning to the West that, if the high-intensity militarized stand-off between West and Russia continues over Ukraine and other issues, Russia may liberalize its conditions for use of nuclear weapons in its doctrinal documents. Finally, the exercise may be evidence that Putin intends to stick to his post-reshuffle intention to keep chief of the General Staff and first deputy defense minister Valery Gerasimov in his posts, at least for now, in spite of replacing Sergei Shoigu with Anatoly Belousov as the country’s defense minister. The NSNW wargame is being conducted under the “leadership of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces,” according to the MoD’s May 21 statement. If that language means Gerasimov is commanding the current wargame, then that indicates Putin meant it when he said upon firing Shoigu earlier this month that he has no plans to oust Gerasimov as well. After all, Gerasimov probably would not have been picked by Putin to command such an important wargame if Putin meant to fire him soon.

Footnotes:

1. The same language then appeared in the MoD’s May 21 announcement that the exercise was beginning that day. “The ongoing exercise is aimed at maintaining the readiness of personnel and equipment of units for the combat use of non-strategic nuclear weapons to react as well as to unconditionally ensure the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Russian state in response to provocative statements and threats of individual Western officials against the Russian Federation.”
2. It should also be noted that the ongoing NSNW exercise is not the only major nuclear wargame that Russia might be holding this year. There is also one major annual wargame meant to train Russia’s strategic nuclear triad..
3. Putin’s press secretary Dmitry Peskov cited these statements by the U.K. and France among the reasons why Russia decided to hold the NSNW wargame. 

Simon Saradzhyan is the founding director of Russia Matters.

Opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. Photo by Mil.ru shared under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license.

China’s Rapid Nuclear Expansion Is Threatening U.S. Dominance in the Sector

By Haley Zaremba - May 22, 2024

• 
  
• China is quickly becoming the world's leading producer of nuclear energy, raising concerns for US competitiveness.
• 
  
• China's plans for floating nuclear plants in the disputed South China Sea create tension with neighboring countries.
• 
  
• China and Russia's joint project to build a nuclear reactor on the moon raises questions about safety and militarization.

China’s runaway nuclear energy expansion has competitors biting their fingernails. As nuclear energy regains traction around the world as a promising baseload power source for a decarbonized future, it’s also become more and more of a geopolitical battleground. As countries scramble to keep a strategic foothold in a rapidly changing energy landscape, becoming a nuclear energy powerhouse is suddenly important for world superpowers. And China seems to be winning this race. 

While the United States has been the biggest nuclear power generator in the world for decades, the American market has significantly slowed in recent years at the same time that Beijing has doubled down on deployment, adding a whopping 34 gigawatts of nuclear energy capacity over the last ten years. As a result, China is set to overtake the United States (and France) to become the world’s biggest producer of nuclear energy within the decade. 

China currently has 55 operating nuclear power reactors compared to the United States’ 94, but it already has 23 new reactors under construction and more on the way. In fact, it’s taken China just 10 years to add the same amount of nuclear capacity that the United States needed four decades to build. 

Beijing is able to approve new nuclear reactors at a much faster clip than the United States, at a blazing rate of ten new plant approvals per year. Chinese plants are also much less expensive to build, in part thanks to preferential loans with particularly favorable terms from state-owned banks. While the United States has recently taken pains to kick-start its own stalled nuclear energy sector, its newest power plant is so behind schedule and over budget that nuclear energy advocates are worried that it might derail the nation’s nuclear ambitions altogether. 

While the sharp rise in nuclear energy deployment in China is great news for the nation’s decarbonization potential – and therefore great news for the entire world’s ability to meet mid-century climate goals – China’s fast and furious approach has put a number of world leaders on edge. Policymakers in the United States have demonstrated concern that China’s rapidly increasing nuclear energy capacities could allow it to export nuclear reactors at a large scale, ultimately undermining U.S. foreign relations in the importing countries. This would not be a new trend, but a continuation of China’s already massive expansion of energy influence in emerging markets. 

Meanwhile, China’s plans to put floating nuclear power plants in the South China Sea have stirred up tensions with its Southeast Asian neighbors. China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines all have overlapping claims to parts of the sea, which China claims almost in its entirety despite a 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration which rejected Beijing’s claim as “having no legal basis.” In contempt of this ruling, China has continued to ‘reclaim’ land to build artificial islands in the Sea and now plans to send about 20 floating nuclear power plants to some of those islands. 

Experts have widely condemned these plans, warning that “China’s planned deployment of floating nuclear reactors to the disputed South China Sea may risk ramping up tensions with other claimants and undermining regional security.” Adding to these tensions, there is some legitimate concern that China will be using these plants to power military operations in the conflicted region, which would be in violation of international law. 

Indeed, China’s outsized nuclear ambitions cannot be hemmed in by its own borders, or even terrestrial bounds. Earlier this year, Moscow and Beijing announced joint plans to put a nuclear reactor on the moon within the next decade. Russian state media even claims that development of the plant is already underway and Russia and China are currently working on experimental and research facilities under the project.

By Haley Zaremba for Oilprice.com

Hot testing completed at first Zhangzhou unit

22 May 2024

Tests that simulate the temperatures and pressures which the reactor systems will be subjected to during normal operation have been completed at unit 1 of the Zhangzhou nuclear power plant in China's Fujian province. The unit is the first of three Hualong One (HPR1000) reactors under construction at the site.

Workers in the control room mark the completion of hot tests at Zhangzhou 1 (Image: CNNC)

Hot functional tests involve increasing the temperature of the reactor coolant system and carrying out comprehensive tests to ensure that coolant circuits and safety systems are operating as they should. Carried out before the loading of nuclear fuel, such testing simulates the thermal working conditions of the power plant and verifies that nuclear island and conventional equipment and systems meet design requirements.

China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) noted that during the hot testing of Zhangzhou 1, workers completed the full-load load test of the diesel generator, main system passivation, and 111 commissioning tests, as well as 73 regular operation tests.

Cold functional tests - which are carried out to confirm whether components and systems important to safety are properly installed and ready to operate in a cold condition - were completed at Zhangzhou 1 in early November last year. The main purpose of those tests - which marked the first time the reactor systems were operated together with the auxiliary systems - was to verify the leak-tightness of the primary circuit.

The Zhangzhou site (Image: CNNC)

China's Ministry of Ecology and Environment issued construction licences for Zhangzhou units 1 and 2 on 9 October 2019 to CNNC-Guodian Zhangzhou Energy Company, the owner of the Zhangzhou nuclear power project, which was created by CNNC (51%) and China Guodian Corporation (49%) in 2011. Construction of unit 1 began one week after the issuance of the construction licence, with that of unit 2 starting in September 2020.

"According to the plan, unit 1 will generate electricity within the year, which will drive the economic and social development of southern Fujian and serve as a new development engine for the region to achieve carbon peak and carbon neutrality goals," CNNC said. It noted that preparations are currently under way for cold functional tests at unit 2.

In September 2022, China's State Council approved the construction of two further Hualong One units as Phase II of the Zhangzhou plant. First concrete for the nuclear island of unit 3 was poured on 22 February this year. CNNC said first concrete for unit 4 is expected "within the year".

Control room commissioned at Chinese SMR

21 May 2024

The main control room of the ACP100 small modular reactor demonstration project at the Changjiang site on China's island province of Hainan, has officially been put into operation, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) announced.

The ACP100's main control room (Image: CNNC)

CNNC said that, with the establishment of part of the digital control system (DCS) network - the 'nerve centre' of nuclear power plant operation, the first on-site measurement signal was displayed on the main control screen.

The main control room of the ACP100 - referred to as the Linglong One - adopts a large wall-mounted monitoring screen for the first time, the company said, adding that this design greatly optimises the space of the main control room.

The control room's wall-mounted monitoring screen (Image: CNNC)

The DCS system for the ACP100 adopts two domestically-developed platforms: the Dragon Scale platform (safety level) and Dragon Fin platform (non-safety level). The Dragon Scale platform can realise reactor safety control under various working conditions and ensure the safe operation of the nuclear power plant. Meanwhile, the Dragon Fin platform is responsible for operation and management and is an important guarantee for the efficient and economical operation of the nuclear power plant. Between them, the two platforms control hundreds of systems within the nuclear power plants, nearly 10,000 equipment operations and various operating conditions.

The first cabinet of the DCS system was moved into place on 10 April, followed by installation and debugging work.

CNNC announced in July 2019 the launch of a project to construct an ACP100 reactor at Changjiang. The site is already home to two operating CNP600 pressurised water reactors (PWRs), while the construction of the two Hualong One units began in March and December 2021. Both those units are due to enter commercial operation by the end of 2026.

First concrete for the ACP100 was poured on 13 July 2021, with a planned total construction period of 58 months. Equipment installation work commenced in December 2022 and the main internal structure of the reactor building was completed in March 2023.

Under development since 2010, the 125 MWe ACP100 integrated PWR's preliminary design was completed in 2014. In 2016, the design became the first SMR to pass a safety review by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Once completed, the Changjiang ACP100 reactor will be capable of producing 1 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity annually, enough to meet the needs of 526,000 households. The reactor is designed for electricity production, heating, steam production or seawater desalination.

The project at Changjiang involves a joint venture of three main companies: CNNC subsidiary China National Nuclear Power as owner and operator; the Nuclear Power Institute of China as the reactor designer; and China Nuclear Power Engineering Group being responsible for plant construction.

Karachi 2: Final sign-off for first Hualong One export

21 May 2024

Representatives from China and Pakistan formally signed the final acceptance certificate for Karachi unit 2, just over three years after the 1100 MWe unit started up.

The event to mark the final acceptance of Karachi 2 was attended by representatives from the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Karachi K-2/K-3 Nuclear Power Plant and China Zhongyuan (Image: CNNC)

Karachi 2 was declared in commercial operation in May 2021. Since then, various performance indicators have been gradually optimised, and operating performance and WANO indicators have been continuously improved, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) said. The unit has generated a total of nearly 23 billion kWh, reducing coal consumption by 7.176 million tonnes and carbon dioxide emissions by 18.768 million tonnes per year.

Experience gained from the design, construction, commissioning and operation of the unit will be used to improve new projects, including preparations for the construction of Chashma unit 5 - for which a ground-breaking ceremony was held last year - the company added.

CNNC said that its Zhongyuan Operations and Maintenance subsidiary has been working towards finalising acceptance items and equipment warranty documents during the unit guarantee period. It said it has "successfully closed" more than 99.9% of the main contract guaranteed task projects and "effectively promoted the improvement of the operational stability" of many key items of equipment.

A joint working group was set up in February to "proactively and comprehensively" understand any concerns raised by Pakistan during the final acceptance phase of the unit. Zhongyuan Operations and Maintenance worked closely with the Pakistani owners to ensure the rapid resolution of concerns with frequent meetings to study related issues and discuss solutions, which significantly reduced the number of final acceptance items, CNNC said.

Karachi units 2 and 3 are the first exports of CNNC's 1100 MWe Hualong One pressurised water reactor. Construction of unit 2 began in 2015 and unit 3 the following year. Karachi 2 achieved first criticality in February 2021 and was connected to the grid the following month after the completion of commissioning tests. Unit 3 achieved first criticality in February 2022 and entered commercial operation in April that year. The site, in the province of Sindh, was also home to Pakistan's first nuclear power reactor, Karachi 1 - a small Canadian pressurised heavy water reactor which shut down in 2021 after 50 years of operation.

In August 2023, Pakistan's Executive Committee of the National Economic Council formally approved a project to build Chashma unit 5, a Hualong One reactor, at Mianwali in Punjab, on a site that is already home to four operating Chinese-supplied CNP-300 pressurised water reactors. China has agreed to invest some USD4.8 billion in the Chashma 5 project.

China Zhongyuan Engineering Corporation is CNNC's general contractor for Karachi 2 and 3.

Researched and written by World Nuclear News