Ongoing Plans for a Fast Ferry Service Across Lake Ontario

Illustration courtesy Regent

PUBLISHED JUL 7, 2024 12:49 PM BY HARRY VALENTINE

 

 

The direct distance across water between Toronto, Canada and the St. Catharines – Niagara region is about half the overland distance by road or rail. As a result, there have been ongoing discussions about fast ferry service across the western region of Lake Ontario.

Introduction

The successful fast Lake Express ferry between Muskegon MI and Milwaukee WI is a direct route across Lake Michigan that is shorter than overland road or rail distance, bypassing traffic congestion on highways in Chicago. Its success prompted public sector investment into developing a fast ferry across Lake Ontario between Toronto, Ontario and Rochester NY. The inability of that service to generate sufficient revenue to cover operating costs resulted in its closure. There have been several earlier attempts at developing fast ferry service across the western region of Lake Ontario, between Toronto and St. Catharines.

Several earlier ferry boat services between Toronto and Niagara – St. Catharines region attracted summertime tourist traffic, despite having been in direct competition with passenger train and express intercity bus service that offered competitive travel duration at competitive travel prices, with greater departure frequency. Boat technology of the 1950s and 1960s could not offer the high speed of service required to compete with overland transport on this route, while short-haul airplane travel was prohibitively expensive. Recent developments in maritime technology offer the promise of fast ferry service across western Lake Ontario.

Courtesy Ontario Ministry of Transportation

Promising Early Technology

During the 1950s and 1960s, British inventor named Cockerill developed vehicles dubbed “hover-craft” that could float on a cushion of air while traveling above water, with ability to stop on land at a beach. Successful prototype testing resulted in the development of commercial hovercraft that carried passengers and freight across the English Channel between Dover, England and Calais, France as well as between mainland England and several offshore islands. Powered by turbine engines, the large hovercraft consumed substantial volumes of fuel. Outside of England, there was little interest in developing high-speed hovercraft commercial ferry services.

During late 1960s into 1970s, engineers at Boeing Aircraft Company adapted small-scale versions of airplane wing technology to operate under water, resulting in the development of high-speed hydrofoil boats that were introduced into fast ferry services at locations such as Hong Kong. Following the precedent from Boeing, many other companies have developed a variety of hydrofoil vehicles that includes hydrofoil surfboards and hydrofoil kayaks that are both capable of traveling smoothly above choppy water, at elevated speed. Large-scale versions of both hovercraft and hydrofoil craft have been considered for service between Toronto and St. Catharines.

Convergence of Technologies

The treatise entitled Competing for the Future by onetime University of Michigan professor of business Dr. C. K. Prahalad focuses on combining evolving technologies to develop competitive new products and services. Advanced development in battery technology can allow small commuter planes to fly between Toronto and Niagara – St. Catharines airport at a lower cost than gasoline-powered planes. Catamaran hydrofoil ferry boats that carry 30 passengers can be powered by outboard-mounted vertical-crankshaft V-12 engines of 600 horsepower that drive twin counter-rotating propellers, with loop-shaped propeller blades on boats offering greater efficiency when sailing at elevated speed.

Related developments in kite technology can fly an airborne kite-sail in powerful wind at high elevation above water, while pulling a boat at speed. Developments in ground effect wing technology allows winged boats to travel at very high speed with boat hull above the water surface. There is potential for high-speed ground effect planes, battery-electric planes, wind-powered vessels pulled by kite-sails and high-speed hydrofoil boats along with a multitude of hybrid variants of these technologies to travel at elevated speed between St. Catharines and Toronto., including close to and above the water surface.

Electric Propulsion

Ontario experiences an annual summer-time shortage of electric power generation, limiting summer time operation of electric vehicles such as battery-electric ferry services or battery-electric short-haul airplane services across western Lake Ontario. During winter, Ontario generates excess electric power that is sold at bargain basement prices during the overnight hours. During such time, it would be possible to recharge battery-electric transportation vehicles such as the Regent Craft ground effect plane. Between mid-June and mid-September, fast ferry technology powered by combustible liquid or compressed gaseous fuel or even wind could provide service between St. Catharines and Toronto.

Cavitation

Discussions about high-speed marine vessels needs to include mention of cavitation that occurs when propellers rotate at very high speed or when hydrofoils travel through water at very high speed. Cavitation results in water ‘boiling’ at low temperature, potentially damaging propellers that lose efficiency and propulsive thrust, also damaging hydrofoils that lose ‘lift’ and stall like an airplane wing, losing the ability to carry the vessel above water. When cavitation restricts the sailing speed of propeller driven hydrofoil vessels, ground effect technology is able to achieve greater speed while using aeronautical propulsion.

Ground Effect Transport

Companies in the United States, Germany and Singapore offer wing-in-ground effect planes that travel at high speed, close to the water surface while consuming one third to one half of the energy required by an airplane. While these vehicles currently carry 8 to 12 passengers plus a pilot, Widget Works of Singapore, Tandem Wing of Germany, and Regent Craft in the USA all plan to build larger versions of their technology. The Regent Craft ground effect plane rides on hydrofoils prior to lift off as well as after having slowed for touch down.

At speed, the underside of wings of ground effect planes rapidly circulate air to generate powerful updrafts that flow upward from the water surface, directly below the wings that keep the ground-effect vessel above water between 5% and 40% of wingspan measurement. Optional tilt-rotor propellers promise to enhance vehicle operation in and near terminals as well as when encountering waves on the lake. The battery powered Regent Craft ground effect technology is capable of achieving 180-miles per hour while competing vehicles from other builders achieving speeds of 100-miles per hour.

Hybrid Technology

Combining ground effect wing technology with hovercraft technology would allow the vehicle to lift off from and touch down on an ice-covered area of lake while being able to travel at extreme speed above a water surface. Combining hovercraft technology with retractable/extendable hydrofoils would assure smoother travel at high speed above severely choppy water along with superior energy efficiency. Designers at Regent Craft have combined hydrofoil technology, seaplane technology and ground effect wing technology in their Viceroy Sea Glider vehicle. Any of these hybrid vehicle concepts could provide fast ferry service between St. Catharines and Toronto.

A kite-sail powered vessel would combine large-scale, racing-yacht type hydrofoils with an illuminated airborne sail-kite technology flying in powerful winds at 1,000 feet above Lake Ontario. On the approach to and departure from Toronto, a kite-sail powered vessel would need to drop the kite-sail elevation to deck height so as to assure safety for airplanes that arrive at and depart from Toronto Island Airport. The addition of onboard battery-electric technology would assist with low-speed vessel propulsion in restricted port areas, while also allowing for remote control of the airborne kite-sail from the bridge.

Recreational Water Craft

A large marina at St. Catharines and multiple marinas at Toronto provide summer parking for hundreds of small recreational boats, plus a small number of yachts. Recreational boat traffic increases dramatically offshore from Toronto and St. Catharines on sunny summer weekends during July and August, also on summer weekday afternoons. There is minimal recreational boat traffic in those regions from mid-September to mid-June of the following year, when vessels such as hybrid hovercraft and hydrofoil catamaran boats would operate fast ferry services across Lake Ontario between Toronto and St. Catharines, with minimal risk of collision with small boats.

While ground-effect vessels operate at an elevation of 5% of wingspan to achieve peak energy efficiency, re-adjusting wing settings increases flight elevation above water to sufficient elevation to pass above most recreational watercraft. Operation of ground effect vessels across western Lake Ontario would require designated seaplane runways at St. Catharines and at Toronto, to allow such vessels to touch down on a water surface while avoiding possible collision with recreational watercraft. The large number of recreational water craft on Lake Ontario strengthens the case to operate some form of ground effect vessel between Toronto and St. Catharines.

Government Regulation

An absence of economic regulation and market entry control might entice entrepreneurs to lease small high-speed ferry vessels that they would operate between St. Catharines and Toronto. The service would need to offer competitive travel prices combined with competitive travel duration. Entrepreneurs would need to evaluate service viability of a 30-seat high-speed ferry vessel. While fuel prices would deter some entrepreneurs, the option of using an airborne kite-sail flying high above Lake Ontario to achieve propulsion for a hydrofoil catamaran vessel, might encourage other entrepreneurs to offer service on days when wind speed is suitable.

Conclusions

The population of the Niagara – St. Catharines region is approaching 500,000 people while that of Metro Toronto is over 2 million, with trans-lake ferry distance being half the overland distance. There are likely multiple market niches for ferry service across western Lake Ontario, including using technology with extreme high-speed capability that could attract sufficient patronage to assure viability. The technology with the greatest probability of market success would be a hybrid vehicle such as ground effect hovercraft, tilt-rotor ground effect or gyro-rotor ground effect technology capable of operating all year, dealing with both open water and lake ice conditions.

Seasonal technology capable of providing competitive trans-lake service in ice-free lake conditions would include hydrofoil – hovercraft, catamaran – hydrofoil and ground effect technology using conventional hull, catamaran hull and/or hydrofoils. While federal transport regulatory officials would likely approve seasonal technology, achieving regulatory approval for year-round hybrid vehicle technology would likely encounter bureaucratic hurdles.

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

 

Norway Restricts Port Access for Russian Fishing Fleet

File image courtesy USC

PUBLISHED JUL 7, 2024 11:29 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

 

Norway has announced that it is aligning itself with the EU’s latest sanctions against Russia. The sanctions targeted key sectors of the Russian economy, especially shipment of Russia’s LNG through a shadow tanker fleet. Norway also added that it will also allow for profits generated from frozen Central Bank of Russia assets to be used in support of Ukraine.

But more sweeping changes is Norway introducing new restrictions for Russian fishing vessels at the three Norwegian ports partially exempt from the port ban. Currently, Norway has closed all its ports to Russian vessels, with the exception of Tromsø, Båtsfjord and Kirkenes ports, which are partially open to Russian fishing vessels. This meant that Russian fishing vessels could call at these three ports and be allowed to unload fish, change crew and resupply. In addition, the vessels had no restriction on how long they could stay at berth in the three ports.

However, this will change under the new restrictions introduced last week. Norwegian government said that the time Russian fishing vessels can dock in these three ports will be limited to a maximum of five working days, or seven days when including weekends and holidays. Further, a minimum of three days must pass since the previous stay in a port on mainland Norway. Russian fishing vessels will only be allowed to access specific terminals or quays in the three ports cleared to receive Russian vessels.

“With the exception of three ports partially open to Russian fishing vessels, inspection activity is already high. But the police and customs are now strengthening their inspection, and we are placing stricter requirements on Russian fishing vessels when staying in port,” said Emilie Enger Mehl, Minister of Justice and Emergency Preparedness.

In this regard, the government directed that the customs service must cooperate closely with the Norwegian State police by sharing information. The military must also continue to monitor all maritime activity and share information with other agencies.

The Norway-Russia fisheries agreement remains one of the few still existing cooperation areas between the two countries. The agreement ensures long-term management of the cod stock and other species in the Barents Sea.

 

Why Norway Should Lead the Fight on Ocean Plastic Pollution

File image courtesy Ocean Cleanup

PUBLISHED JUL 7, 2024 5:44 PM BY GEMINI NEWS

 

 

Plastic items from around the world are continuously washing ashore on Norwegian coastlines. This reflects a much larger systemic issue facing the nations of the world.

Scientists have long reported the consequences of plastic pollution and the urgent need for intervention, but global plastic production and consumption continue to rise.

This underscores the importance of Norway’s advocacy for a global agreement that guarantees stopping the flow of plastics into the environment.

But Norway also has a responsibility in generating plastic pollution.

In a study conducted with the Norwegian Air Research Institute (NILU), we attempted to map the Norwegian plastic cycle at high resolution – down to the product and polymer types.

Norway releases 15 000 tons of plastic to the environment each year

According to our recently published study in Environmental Science & Technology, around 758 kilotons (kt) of plastics enter the Norwegian market every year, while 632 kt is discarded as waste.

Almost the half of this waste is incinerated, and only 2.4% ends up in the environment.

Although 2.4% may seem insignificant, when translated into absolute masses, it equates to a substantial 15 kt, or 2.8 kg per capita.

On average, Norwegians consume 21% more plastics compared to Europeans and generate twice as much plastic pollution as the Swiss; this is equivalent to a staggering 1.5 billion plastic bottles that reach the environment each year.

Norway is pushing for a global agreement

Action against plastic pollution is finally gaining momentum as nations negotiate an internationally legally binding instrument for limiting plastic pollution.

By co-chairing the High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution together with Rwanda, Norway is setting the bar high.

But what can Norway do at home?

According to our study, there are two major pollution sources from the Norwegian economy:

• Consumer packaging: The biggest source of macroplastics.
• Tire wear rubber: Electric and hybrid vehicles have the worst performance.

Consumer packaging is the main “culprit”

Our study shows that the majority of macroplastics, items bigger than 5mm, mainly originate from consumer packaging, such as bottles and bags. Plastic packaging items are also among the most commonly found along Norwegian coastlines. 

Efforts to limit the release of these products (e.g., decreasing littering and dumping, and increasing road sweeping) are completely overshadowed by high consumption rates.

We simply use more than what we can collect.

It is therefore essential to reduce plastic consumption in these categories to curb this pollution source.

Tire wear particles: a big source of microplastics

We have identified tires as a significant contributor to microplastic pollution, with approximately six kilotonnes of tire wear rubber released annually.

Capturing these particles is extremely challenging due to the nature of their emission.

Our study emphasizes rethinking mobility and transport choices as key to reducing this pollution source. Shared mobility options, such as public transport, are indeed part of the solution here.

Designing lighter vehicles and exploring alternative materials can also be effective to some extent.

Norway’s electric and hybrid vehicle fleet has rapidly expanded in recent years. While they produce lower carbon emissions, their heavier weight compared to conventional vehicles increases tire wear particle emissions.

Oceans choked by plastics

Why is plastic pollution so bad?

As a coastal nation, Norway’s land-based plastics can easily reach the ocean, given its high population concentration along fjords and long coastlines.

While the greatest percentage of plastic released to the environment ends up in the soil, nearly one-third ends up in the marine environment. It is important to note that a large part of what is deposited in soil will ultimately make its way to the ocean over time.

Marine plastic pollution has long been shown to cause irreversible impacts on ecosystems.

Animals often become entangled in or ingest plastic fragments. Fragments can act as a carrier of invasive species, and plastic debris has also shown the ability to interfere with the marine carbon cycle, further exacerbating climate change.

Plastic pollution is very toxic

To make matters worse, plastic products also contain a mixture of additive substances that are intentionally introduced during production to achieve specific properties.

Our study has demonstrated that high amounts of toxic additives, such as phthalate esters and organophosphate esters, are potentially released to the environment alongside plastics. Field studies (in Norwegian) have previously detected elevated levels of short-chain chlorinated paraffins in the livers of Norwegian herring gulls (Larus argentatus) after ingesting plastics. We estimated significant emissions of these substances from the Norwegian plastic economy.

The findings show that high additive amounts also enter recycling processes. This is problematic since plastic recycling can reintroduce these additives back to the economy.

In other words, recycled plastics can contain elevated levels of additives, which poses an additional risk to human health and the environment.

An urgent need for action

This research shows the importance of restraining plastic production and consumption and addressing the use of hazardous chemical additives.

Policies at home need to be imposed to limit the environmental consequences of the plastic economy.

This is urgent, and it has been urgent for a long time.

Reference: Marhoon, A., et al. Mapping Plastic and Plastic Additive Cycles in Coastal Countries: A Norwegian Case Study. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2024, 58, 19, 8336–8348 https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.3c09176

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

 

The Indispensable Ingredient for Victory: Defeating Sea Mines

An unmanned surface vehicle is craned aboard the Independence-variant littoral combat ship USS Canberra (LCS 30), as a part of the first embarkation of the Mine Countermeasures (MCM) mission package.`An unmanned surface vehicle is craned aboard the Indepe

PUBLISHED JUL 7, 2024 3:59 PM BY CIMSEC

 

 

[By Capt. George Galdorisi]

At no time since the end of World War II have so many nations fielded blue water navies that have roamed the globe. Navies from Australia, China, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have regional and worldwide commitments. Whether it is reinforcing or challenging rules-based order at sea, showing resolve to reassure allies and deter rivals, or exercising with other navies, these fleet also recognize that they must be prepared for high-end war at sea. Comparative naval advantage has returned as a critical unit of measure in great power competition.

But despite growing threats, navies have become accustomed to traversing the oceans and littorals with near impunity. This ability is now being increasingly jeopardized, and not necessarily by conventional high-end threats. For centuries, sea mines have presented an affordable and effective option in naval warfare. That threat is increasing today. The number of countries with mines, mining assets, mine manufacturing capabilities, and the intention to export mines has grown dramatically over the past several decades. More than fifty countries possess mines and mining capability. Of these, thirty countries have demonstrated an indigenous mine production capability and twenty have attempted to export these weapons. Additionally, non-state actors have used these cheap and plentiful weapons to hazard commercial vessels and disrupt commerce on the oceans.

When policymakers, military leaders, and analysts compare the qualities of various navies, they typically think in terms of numbers of ships, submarines, aircraft, and other conventional assets. However, considering the growing threat of sea mines worldwide, the capability to employ and defeat mines forms another core consideration in gauging the balance of naval advantage. Navies must consider how to field affordable and risk-worthy unmanned systems at scale to meet the mine threat.

A Centuries Old Challenge

Mine warfare is not new. Precursors to naval mines were first invented by innovators of Imperial China. The first plan for a sea mine in the West was drawn up by Ralph Rabbards, who presented his design to Queen Elizabeth I of England in 1574. Since the invention of the Bushnell Keg in 1776 (a watertight keg filled with gunpowder that was floated toward the enemy, detonated by a sparking mechanism if it struck a ship), mine warfare has been an important element of naval warfare.1 While the first attempt to deliver the Bushnell Keg from America’s first combat submarine, the Turtle, against a British warship in 1776 failed, subsequent attempts to employ these early mines were successful.2

Over 150 years ago, Admiral David Farragut became famous for “damning torpedoes” (which were actually mines) at the entrance to Mobile Bay during the Civil War.3 Indeed, in the early stages of the Civil War, Admiral Farragut wrote to Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles about the sea mine threat posed by the Confederacy, stating, “I have always deemed it unworthy of a chivalrous nation, but it does not do to give your enemy such a decided superiority over you.” Farragut’s warning was eerily prescient. 4

The use of sea mines and countermeasures to these weapons have figured significantly in every major war and nearly every regional conflict in which the United States has been involved since the Revolutionary War. Indeed, the naval mine has been a mainstay of modern warfare. The North Sea Mine Barrage, a large minefield laid by the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy between Scotland and Norway during World War I, inhibited the movement of the German U-boat fleet. During World War I more than one thousand merchant ships and warships were lost because of the 230,000 mines used.5 NATO navies continue to clear these mines to this day.6

Mines released by U.S. Navy submarines and dropped by U.S. Army Air Force B-29 bombers in the Western Pacific during World War II sank hundreds of Japanese warships, merchant ships, and smaller vessels. During World War II 2,665 ships were lost or damaged by 100,000 offensive mines.7

In Korea during the early 1950s, the Soviets provided North Korea with thousands of sea mines. These were used to defend key harbors and multiple U.S. warships struck mines. During the Vietnam War, over 300,000 American naval mines were used. In 1972 Haiphong Harbor was seeded with 11,000 destructor mines and was shut down completely for months, and it took years to clear out all the American mines.8

In the past several decades, rogue states have indiscriminately employed sea mines. Libya used mines to disrupt commerce in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait of Bab el Mandeb. In the 1980s Iran laid mines to hazard military and commercial traffic in the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, leading to the devastating mine strike against USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58). During Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991, the threat of mines precluded the effective use of the Navy and Marine Corps expeditionary task force off Kuwait and hazarded all U.S. and coalition forces operating in the Arabian Gulf. Indeed, Operation Desert Storm highlighted the importance of mine warfare with the heavy damage dealt to USS Princeton (CG 59) and USS Tripoli (LPH 10). The U.S. Navy has an abundant history of employing mines and striking them, but it remains unclear what the U.S. Navy’s mine strategy is for modern naval warfare.

Captain Bruce McEwen, commanding officer of amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LPH-10), inspects damage to the vessel inflicted by an Iraqi mine that the ship struck while serving as a mine clearing platform during Operation Desert Storm, February 18, 1991. (Photo via U.S. National Archives)

Today’s Ongoing Mine Challenge

Mine warfare remains a critical element of naval capability. In terms of availability, variety, affordability, ease of deployment, and potential impact on naval operations, mines are some of the most attractive weapons available.

Sea mines are hard to find, difficult to neutralize, and can present a deadly hazard to any vessel—especially those ships specifically designed to hunt them. They can also heavily shape behavior and weigh on the operational calculus of commanders, making them a source of potent psychological effects in the battlespace. 

Great power rivals are likely to employ mines in any conflict with the United States. Scott Truver highlighted the danger posed by China’s mine warfare capabilities, as well as those of other potentially hostile nations:

“The mine warfare experiences of America and other nations are not lost on the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Chinese naval analysts and historians understand the asymmetric potential for mine warfare to baffle the enemy, and thus achieve exceptional combat results.’ Mines provide what some have described as affordable security via asymmetric means.”9

Seth Cropsey echoed similar challenges and highlighted the mining capabilities China and Russia would bring to the fight. He focused primarily on the threat from China, noting:

“One of the top global mine threats comes from China. It has been estimated that Beijing has as many as 100,000 such weapons. Those range from the old-fashioned moored contact mine to include mines that have rocket-propelled weapons and target detection systems. In the event of a conflict with China, the United States is unlikely to approach warfare from the land. That leaves us with the seas as the place where conflict is most likely to play out.

Beijing would likely concentrate on creating choke points in areas such as the archipelagos that separate East Asia from the Middle East and the South China Sea. That means that sea control and navigating around China’s anti-access and area denial capabilities will be crucial. It’s reasonable to expect that the Chinese would use mines there, and reasonable to expect that they would use mines if they decided to use force against Taiwan. Moving through those straits is crucial and being able to clear them of mines is equally important.”10

The danger of naval mines being employed short of major war is acute in the Middle East. In October 2020, a Maltese-flagged tanker was damaged by a mine while taking on crude oil the Yemeni port of Bir Ali. MV Syra reportedly suffered significant damage, resulting in an oil spill.11 Shortly after this event, in November 2020, a mine in the Red Sea exploded and damaged a Greek oil tanker.12 In December 2020, a Singapore-flagged tanker berthed at the Saudi Arabian port city of Jeddah was damaged by a mine, with Houthi militia from Yemen strongly linked to this attack.13 In January 2021, an oil tanker off the coast of Iraq discovered a mine attached to its hull.14 Regional navies, assisted by U.S. and U.K. navies, have stepped up mine countermeasures exercises in the Arabian Gulf.15 Most recently, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States conducted the Artemis Trident MCM Exercise in Arabian Gulf.16

As part of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russia mined the waters off the Crimean Peninsula. Some of those mines either broke loose or were cut loose and drifted into shipping lanes used by Ukrainian and NATO ships.17 Russia has continued to use sea mines extensively during the conflict in Ukraine. One of the most prominent examples involved Russian forces laying mines along the Dnieper River to the north of Kherson city to make it harder for the Ukrainians to cross.18

Other incidents have included Russian drifting mines that have been found along the coasts of Turkey and Romania, as well as elsewhere in the Black Sea. An Estonian cargo ship in the Black Sea was sunk by a Russian mine during this war.19 More recently, in February 2023, Turkish media claimed that a drifting sea mine exploded near Agva on the Black Sea coast.20

The ability of the U.S. Navy to deal with the growing threat of sea mines is not getting better, it is getting worse. The platforms that embody the U.S. Navy’s primary mine countermeasures (MCM) capability—the MH-53E AMCM aircraft and the Avenger-class minesweeper—are scheduled to retire in the next few years, which will leave the totality of the Navy’s MCM capability in the discrete number of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to be outfitted with the Mine Countermeasures mission package, which has suffered multiple delays during testing and development.

This is not the MCM capability needed by a global navy facing a pervasive mine threat. Nor is it a solution that eliminates the extreme danger to Sailors who are forced to work in a minefield to accomplish their mission, especially when the minefield is overlayed with the advanced anti-ship and anti-air capabilities of a great power adversary. Fortunately, technology has advanced to the point that with the proper commitment the Navy can conduct MCM remotely by leveraging unmanned systems and take the Sailor out of the minefield.

Leveraging Unmanned Technologies to Defeat Deadly Sea Mines

For all navies, there is only one way to completely take the Sailor out of the minefield and that is to leverage unmanned technologies to hunt and destroy mines from a distance. While this principle is readily acknowledged, it is not a lack of need that has impeded the Navy’s efforts, but rather technological maturity. In the past, unmanned vehicle technologies were not mature enough to take on the complex task of mine hunting. But today, they are now capable enough. These capabilities are no longer based on concepts or early prototypes. Rather, every necessary component has been in the water and tested in operational environments. 

The following proposal is based on three subcomponent candidates that can deliver a single-sortie, autonomous mine countermeasures solution with autonomous target recognition. This design can also flexibly accommodate various towed sonars and remotely operated vehicles (ROVs).

The MARTAC Devil Ray T38 is intended as the autonomous platform for the package, and will host a communications and data transmission hub, in addition to above-water and underwater sensors.

The ThayerMahan Sea Scout Subsea Imaging System is specifically designed for missions such as mine hunting. The Sea Scout system is based on the in-production COTS Kraken Robotics Katfish-180 tow-body mounted synthetic aperture sonar. The system is designed to search for mine-like objects and is integrated by ThayerMahan’s remote operations and communications system.

The Pluto Gigas is an existing, standalone, third generation ROV with several systems deployed globally and with over 3,000 mines destroyed. The Pluto Gigas deploys an acoustically armed and detonated countermine charge that is low-cost both in production and in logistics and sustainment. Several charges can be loaded onto the T38 to enable single-sortie field clearance.

These three components can combine to deliver an effective mine hunting solution. The driving principle of this solution is to incorporate mature hardware that will minimize risk to the host platform during execution of the MCM mission. To that end, the weight and outside dimensions of the mission package are within a few inches of the dimensions of a common 11-meter RHIB. Launch and recovery should be easily accomplished using standard naval small craft handling procedures for the host vessel.

While this MCM solution is component agnostic, the leading commercial-off-the-shelf candidates for the initial solution were chosen based on their technical maturity, as well as their current use by various navies. Leveraging these commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) systems will enable this MCM solution to move forward at an accelerated pace to speedily deliver a fleet capability in the near term.

The Need to Take Action Today to Address the MCM Challenge 

Because ships and Sailors operate daily in harm’s way, the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps—and by extension other allied navies—would be well-served to accelerate their efforts to deal with deadly sea mines. The essential components for such a system exist today, and a robust COTS MCM solution can reach fruition in the near-term.

While programs of record are developing next-generation technology, navies should invest in parallel-path solutions that leverage mature subsystems that are ready to provide capability today. It is time to put a speedy solution in the hands of Sailors.

To achieve victory, navies must get to the fight in the face of anti-access area denial capabilities of adversaries. Given the low cost, ease of deployment, and increasing proliferation of naval mines, the ability to find and clear these deadly mines makes for a major pacing challenge for navies. Developing and fielding mine countermeasures capabilities, overlooked for too long, should be a first order priority for navies today.

Captain George Galdorisi is a career naval aviator and national security professional. His 30-year career as a naval aviator culminated in 14 years of consecutive service as executive officer, commanding officer, commodore, and chief of staff. He enjoys writing, especially speculative fiction about the future of warfare. He is the author of 18 books, including four consecutive New York Times bestsellers. His latest book, published by the U.S. Naval Institute, is Algorithms of Armageddon: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Future Wars.

This article appears courtesy of CIMSEC and may be found in its original form here. 

References

[1] Tyler Rogoway, “The Revolutionary War Gave Birth to the Age of Naval Mine Warfare,” The War Zone, July 4, 2016, accessed at: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/4256/the-revolutionary-war-gave-birth-to-the-age-of-naval-mine-warfare.

[2] Christopher Hevey and Anthony Pollman, “Reimagine Offensive Mining, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2021.

[3] Farragut’s boldness is especially striking because in 1862 a Confederate mine sank USS Cairo in the Yazoo River.

[4] U.S. Navy Fact File, “U.S. Navy Mines,” accessed at: https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167942/us-navy-mines/.

[5] See, for example, Paul Ahn, “A Tale of Two Straits,” U.S. Naval Institute Naval History Magazine, December 2020 for a concise history of naval mine warfare.

[6] “NATO Forces Clear Mines off Port of Dieppe,” The Maritime Executive, April 9, 2020, accessed at: https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/royal-navy-clears-mines-off-port-of-dieppe.

[7] US Navy Fact File, “US Navy Mines,” accessed at https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=1200&ct=2).

[8] “Surface Forces: Mines Revisited,” Strategy Page, March 13, 2020, accessed at: https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsurf/articles/20200313.aspx

[9] Scott Truver, “Taking Mines Seriously: Mine Warfare in China’s Near Seas,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2012, accessed at:

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1429&context=nwc-review.

[10] Yasmin Tadjdeh, “Navy Invests in New Mine Warfare Technology,” National Defense Magazine (online), April 6, 2020, accessed at: https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2020/4/6/navy-invests-in-new-mine-warfare-technology.

[11] Edward Lundquist, “Tanker Loading Crude Damaged by Floating Mine in Yemen,” Seapower, October 9, 2020, accessed at: https://seapowermagazine.org/tanker-loading-crude-damaged-by-floating-mine-in-yemen/.

[12] Ryan White, “Greek-Operated Tanker Damaged by Mine at Saudi Terminal,” Naval News, November 25, 2020, accessed at: https://navalnews.net/greek-operated-tanker-damaged-by-mine-at-saudi-terminal/.

[13] Sam Chambers, “Hafnia Tanker at Jeddah Becomes Latest Mine Victim,” Splash 247.com, December 14, 2020, accessed at: https://splash247.com/hafnia-tanker-at-jeddah-becomes-latest-mine-victim/.

[14] “Oil Tanker Near Iraq Finds Mine on Hull as Gulf Risks Mount,” Newsmax, January 4, 2021, accessed at: https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/cos-exe-gen-gov/2021/01/01/id/1003892/.

[15] “Saudi, UK, U.S. Naval Forces Conduct Mine Countermeasures Training,” Defense-Aerospace, November 29, 2020, accessed at: https://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/214552/saudi%2C-uk%2C-u.s.-naval-forces-conduct-mine-countermeasures-training.html.

[16] Naval News Staff, “U.S. France and UK Complete Artemis Trident MCM Exercise in Gulf,” Naval News, April 13, 2023.

[17] “Weapons: Naval Mines in The Black Sea,” Strategy Page, February 2, 2023, accessed at: https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htweap/articles/20230202.aspx.

[18] Gerrard Kaonga, “Russia Mines River as Soldiers Prepare Kherson Retreat: Kyiv,” Newsweek, October 25, 2002.

[19] Scott Savitz, “The Drifting Menace,” Real Clear Defense, (undated), accessed at: https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/11/16/the_drifting_menace_865111.html.

[20] Tayfun Ozberk, “Sea Mine Explodes on Turkey’s Black Sea Coast,” Naval News, February 14, 2023.

The opinions expressed herein are the author's and not necessarily those of The Maritime Executive.

 

Tanker Runs Aground in Cayman Islands

Sea Elephant (image courtesy Cayman Islands Government)

PUBLISHED JUL 7, 2024 8:28 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

On Saturday, a 50,000 dwt product tanker went aground on coral heads in the Cayman Islands, prompting an emergency response from the local government. 

The Greek-operated tanker Sea Elephant was approaching Cayman Brac to deliver a cargo of diesel fuel when she ran aground near Cayman Brac Port, the receiving pier for fuel imports. The grounding caused damage to the double-bottom tanker's hull and "to the sea floor," according to Cayman authorities. The local Cayman Compass reports that Sea Elephant contacted coral heads on a shallow bar near the terminal. 

No pollution or injuries were reported. The vessel was safely refloated, according to local media, and its AIS status shows that it is now moored at the pier. It is still under close monitoring as a precautionary measure.

Multiple local agencies are investigating the circumstances of the grounding and the impact on the coral. In a statement, the Caymans government said that it would be providing more information as the investigation unfolds. 

Sea Elephant is a 2019-built product tanker flagged in Liberia. It has a clean port state control inspection record and a single owner since delivery. 

It is the second time this year that the Cayman Islands has avoided a potentially serious casualty. 

On the evening of April 2, the Liberian-registered container ship SC Montana reported that the ship’s main engine was offline and that it was drifting toward the western end of Little Cayman, the smallest of the nation's three islands. The vessel still had auxiliary power but could not bring its main engine back online. 

Two good samaritan vessels intervened and brought the episode to a safe conclusion. The freighter Lefkes arrived on scene and successfully took the SC Montana under tow - a rarely-attempted evolution for two full-size merchant ships - and repositioned the ship to a safer location until a tug from Grand Cayman could arrive and take over. 

Iranian Frigate Capsizes at the Pier

Via Iranian social media

PUBLISHED JUL 7, 2024 10:56 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

Over the weekend, the Iranian Navy suffered a serious casualty in port at Bandar Abbas. The frigate IRIS Sahand capsized at her berth, and she was photographed resting more than 90 degrees listed over to port, halfway submerged. 

State-owned news outlet IRNA has confirmed the capsizing. In a brief statement, the agency said that the Sahand "lost its balance due to water ingress" while she was under repair alongside the wharf. Several people were reportedly injured and taken to the hospital. IRNA added that "the vessel is being returned to balance quickly." 

The Iran Shipbuilding & Offshore Industries Complex (ISOICO) claimed Sunday that it could be possible that Sahand will be repairable. Saltwater immersion is notoriously destructive to electronic systems, like the controls, weapons and automation systems found aboard a modern warship. When the Norwegian frigate Helge Ingstad partially sank in 2018, she was recovered in one piece - but was scrapped due to the high cost of removing and replacing all of her saltwater-damaged mission systems. 

Sahand was a Moudge-class frigate built in 2018. At the time, she was a symbol of Iran's push to develop a fully indigenous naval industrial base and circumvent American sanctions. The vessel was capable of 30 knots, and could carry a combination of surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles. She was reportedly equipped with far more weaponry than the first-in-class vessel, Jamaran, while retaining the same hull shape. 

While unconfirmed, open-source intelligence discussions suggest that weight growth from recent weapon upgrades above the main deck could have reduced the vessel's stability. The vessel made a long voyage to St. Petersburg for Russia's annual naval parade in 2021, accompanied by a tanker; no difficulties were reported at the time. However, after her return to Iran, she was reportedly fitted with four more antiship missile launchers and five more SAM launchers on deck, along with new radar systems.

Sister ship IRIS Damavand sank in the Caspian in January 2018 after hitting a breakwater at the port of Bandar-e Anzali. 

The original IRIS Sahand (ex name Faramarz, F-74) was a British Alvand-class frigate, and it also sank. Sahand (F-74) was targeted by the U.S. Navy in retaliation for the mine damage to the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts in April 1988. A series of Harpoon missile salvos destroyed Sahand (F-74), and after a magazine detonation, the frigate went down with the loss of 45 crewmembers.