Whales were healthy before Orkney stranding - expert

By Katy Scott, BBC Scotland News

BBC
Work is continuing on the beach where the whales were stranded

A pod of 77 pilot whales that died after washing ashore in Orkney were healthy before they became stranded, according to initial findings.

The animals were found on the island of Sanday on Thursday following what could be the largest mass stranding in nearly 100 years.

Cetacean specialists - whose expertise is in aquatic mammals - have been examining tissue samples to establish the cause of the stranding.

Mariel ten Doeschate, from the Scottish Marine Animal Stranding Scheme, told BBC Scotland News that thorough post-mortems had so far been carried out on about 30 whales.

She said: "Just about everyone in the UK who is involved with whale strandings is here on Sanday.

"We've been taking samples to determine the health status of the whales before the stranding and according to our initial preliminary findings, they all seem to have been healthy.

"So it's unlikely there was a sick leader who they were trying to stay with and protect."

Members of the public are being asked to stay away from the area.


Major operation to find cause of mass whale pod stranding

Whole pod of 77 whales die in 'biggest mass stranding in decades'


Experts arrived on the island on Friday and it is thought the full investigation could take three or four days.

"We are working through a process of elimination to find the cause," said Ms ten Doeschate.

"But these strandings are rarely the cause of a single source, it’s usually a combination of factors.

"Some of the whales had fresh stomach content which suggests they were feeding nearby around the time they became stranded.

"The beach they were stranded on is a very sandy beach which is often difficult for the whales to detect due to how their acoustics work."


'Pushed or pulled'


Pilot whales are social creatures and live in a matriarch-style social structure, with the oldest female seen as having the authority in the pod.

Ms ten Doeschate said the animals were stranded close together which is a behavioural stress response and means that something could have frightened them - like a sound or a predator - and made them cluster.

The investigators have taken ear samples from six key whales to look for acoustic trauma.

The research associate said the investigation was a way of ensuring the whales had "not died in vain" as the findings could be used to help wild whales in the future.

She said the team was also investigating if there were any killer whales nearby at the time.

"We need to consider whether they were pulled into going near the land because they were maybe pursuing prey, or were they pushed because they were avoiding something?" she added.

The whales were discovered grouped together on the beach


The pod included male whales, measuring up to seven metres (22ft) long, as well as females, calves and juveniles.

The British Divers Marine Life Rescue (BDMLR) established that 12 of the animals at Tresness Beach on the island of Sanday were still alive when they came out of the water.

Emma Neave-Webb, from the BDMLR charity, said the animals were thought have been stranded "for quite some time".

She said animals were very closely packed together with alive animals next to dead animals.

The area was cut off by the high tide and the whales needed to be moved back into an upright position as quickly as possible if there was to be any chance of saving them.

But the soft sand meant the whales fell back over when the rescuers attempted to right them.

The decision was made to euthanise the animals after efforts to save them failed.

Ms Neave-Webb said that removing the whales was a "massive undertaking".

Orkney Islands Council confirmed discussions were taking place with community representatives on how best to dispose of the bodies, with the "likely option" being burial.

The stranding is thought to be the largest UK stranding since 1927 when 126 out of more than 130 false killer whales died in the Dornoch Firth, in the Highlands.

Last year an entire pod of 55 pilot whales died following a stranding on Lewis.

The Guyana-Venezuela dispute and UK involvement

HMS Trent

ANALYSIS
By J. Vitor Tossini
- July 14, 2024


In late 2023, tensions between Guyana and Venezuela resurged following the latter’s renewed claims and hostile rhetoric over the Essequibo region, also known as “Guayana Esequiba.”

This region represents roughly 74% of Guyanese territory and 16% of its population. In response, Guyana sought support for its territorial integrity from the United States, the United Kingdom, Brazil, and others.

A crisis was temporarily averted after backing from Washington, London, and neighboring states for de-escalation. For Britain, however, a hotspot in the only Commonwealth member in South America leaves the country in a difficult position.

This article is the opinion of the author and not necessarily that of the UK Defence Journal. If you would like to submit your own article on this topic or any other, please see our submission guidelines.

Although the United States holds a preeminent stance over the region, if inaction from London is the primary response to a close partner asking for political support, the signaling to others might be counterproductive to the ambitions of a true Global Britain.
Historical Context

British Presence in Guyana

The British presence in the region of present-day Guyana goes back to the 1740s when the Dutch allowed British immigrants into the area near the Demerara River. The promise of land ownership attracted plantation owners from Britain’s Lesser Antilles, and within two decades, the British represented most of the Europeans in the Dutch Demerara.

When the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-1784) broke out over disputes concerning Dutch trade with British enemies in the American War of Independence, Britain briefly occupied the territory but was expelled by French forces. France maintained control of the colony until 1784 when it was handed back to the Dutch, which continued with the policy of chartering Demerara to the Dutch West India Company until 1792. However, the political influence of the British landowners had already become significant, and by the mid-1780s, the colony’s internal affairs were managed mainly by British subjects.
United Colony of Demerara and Essequibo

After the end of Company rule in 1792, the Dutch created the United Colony of Demerara and Essequibo, which came under the direct control of the Dutch Government while a separate colony was maintained for the Berbice River settlement. During the French Revolutionary Wars, the French occupation of the Netherlands in 1795 contributed directly to the successful and bloodless 1796 British expedition to take both Dutch colonies. The Treaty of Amiens briefly returned the two colonies to the Dutch at the end of the Second Coalition War.

Uninterrupted British rule would commence in 1803 when Britain terminated its uneasy truce with France. Shortly after the British declaration of war in May 1803, a force was dispatched to capture the Dutch colonies for the third and final time. Through the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814, the United Netherlands formally transferred Essequibo, Demerara, and Berbice to the United Kingdom. Importantly, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814 did not stipulate the borders of the Dutch “settlements” ceded to the British, opening the way for future territorial disputes.

Emergence of Gran Colombia and British Guiana

The emergence of the independent Gran Colombia from the former Spanish territories of the Viceroyalty of New Granada led to contested claims as early as 1822, with complaints from Gran Colombia regarding the British colonization of claimed territories west of the Essequibo River. In 1831, Britain merged its colonies in the region, creating the colony of British Guiana.

A decade later, the first British attempt at delimitation of Guiana’s borders resulted in the Schomburgk Line, named after explorer and naturalist Robert Hermann Schomburgk, who was responsible for a botanical and geographical exploration of the territory in 1835. The Line set the overall tone of the territorial disputes with Venezuela – after the dissolution of Gran Colombia in 1839 – except for envisaging British Guiana reaching as far as the mouth of the Orinoco River. In 1850, although Britain and Venezuela agreed not to colonize the disputed territory, both countries refrained from defining the borders of the contested area.

Gold Reserves and Renewed Claims

During the next 26 years, the dispute remained dormant until gold reserves were discovered in 1876 and quickly explored by British-backed settlers. Venezuela renewed its original claims up to the Essequibo River. Britain’s response was a counterclaim covering the Schomburgk Line and all of the Cuyuni Basin, although the claims over the latter were essentially political. In late 1886, the British Government adopted the Line as the provisional western border of British Guiana, which led to Venezuela breaking diplomatic relations and seeking American support.

The United States did little for years until Venezuela hired William L. Scruggs as a lobbyist in Washington. Shortly after, tensions erupted in the form of the Venezuelan Crisis of 1895. Initially, London refused to subject the entire disputed territory to calls for arbitration. However, Scruggs’ influence in Washington and argumentation that Britain had violated the Monroe Doctrine led to American solid support for arbitration of the disputed territory.

Arbitration and Controversy

The 1899 Arbitration

By December 1895, the crisis had shifted from disagreements between London and Washington to a presidential address to Congress, which was seen as a threat to the British if they did not accept arbitration. In Britain, the matter’s relevance for the United States only began to be recognized after December. In January, the British Government accepted arbitration in principle and removed previous demands, including that any arbitration should use the Schomburgk Line as the basis for future negotiations.

Despite conceding to the proposal, the British managed to convince their American counterparts about several points, including the number of members of the future Panel of Arbitration. The British case rested on the argument that before the independence of Venezuela, Spain had not taken “effective possession” of the territory in question and that the Dutch had several arrangements and alliances with local Native Americans, which in practice gave the Dutch a sphere of influence that was transferred to Britain in the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1814.

However, the British argumentation received little support among the sitting American members of the Tribunal of Arbitration. Meanwhile, Britain and Venezuela formalized the procedures and signed the Treaty of Washington, agreeing to respect the decision of the Tribunal as the “perfect, and final settlement” to the dispute.

The Tribunal’s Decision

The Tribunal’s decision was disclosed in October 1899, awarding Venezuela only slightly more than 10% of the disputed territory and granting Britain the remaining area. Most of the Schomburgk Line remained as the border, with the main alterations being changes near the mouth of the Orinoco River, granted to Venezuela.

The Tribunal of Arbitration gave no reasoning for its decision. Although perceived as a national defeat, the Venezuelan Government accepted the ruling. A commission surveyed the new border, and both parties accepted the verdict in 1905.
Renewed Disputes and the Geneva Agreement

Mallet-Prevost Memorandum

The dispute would arise again more than half a century after the 1899 Arbitration decision. In 1949, the Mallet-Prevost memorandum was posthumously published. Its author, Severo Mallet-Prevost, official secretary of the American and Venezuelan delegations during the 1899 Arbitral Award, stated that the favorable ruling towards Britain resulted from a deal between the British and Russian governments. The deal supposedly involved the Russian representative of the five-member arbitration panel, Friedrich Martens, granting the British a 3 to 2 majority; as the British side had two sitting members, the Venezuelan-American had another two, and Friedrich Martens was the independent fifth member.

Mallet-Prevost explained in his memorandum that the US-Venezuela judges were forced to choose between a “consensus deal” that would grant Venezuela some relevant stretches of land while agreeing with British possession of the remaining area or face a 3 to 2 decision that would be even more favorable to Britain. Mallet-Prevost’s memorandum reinforced the suspicions in Venezuela that the 1899 Arbitral Tribunal had been unjustifiably one-sided. The South American country promptly revived its claims over the then-British Guiana. In the mid-1950s, Venezuela, under a military dictatorship, initiated plans to invade and annex Essequibo, but the dictator – Marcos Pérez Jiménez – was overthrown, and democracy was restored before the invasion commenced.

Bringing the Matter to the United Nations

In 1962, based on the Mallet-Prevost memorandum, Venezuela brought the matter to the United Nations, arguing that the 1899 decision was null and void. Although Venezuela could not provide additional documents to prove its case, the UK agreed to engage in new conversations, mainly due to ongoing plans to disengage from British Guiana. In November 1963, representatives of Venezuela, the UK, and British Guiana met in London.

The result was a communiqué declaring that all parties should work to “Find satisfactory solutions for a practical settlement of the controversy which has arisen as a result of the Venezuelan contention that the 1899 award is null and void”. A high-profile meeting occurred in the following month with similar results. The British and Guianese agreed to “find satisfactory solutions” to the alleged nullity of the 1899 decision, which means finding evidence that corroborates the Venezuelan calls for nullity.

The Geneva Agreement

Following these meetings, negotiations started for what would be known as the 1966 Geneva Agreement between the United Kingdom – on behalf of British Guiana, independent in May 1966 – and Venezuela. Signed in February 1966, Article I reiterated the aim to search for “satisfactory solutions for a practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom, which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void.”

Simply put, the core aim of the Agreement remained the same as the communiqué signed almost three years before. However, in the Agreement, there were no concessions over the sovereignty of the disputed territory, and all parties agreed to make no further claims or enlarge existing claims. They also established a four-year period for the resolution of the dispute. Notably, through Article VIII, Britain tied itself to the question of still being a part of the Agreement even after the independence of British Guiana, with lingering expectations from Guyana as an independent nation. In this regard, as Dr. Odeen Ishmael, former Guyanese ambassador, stated: “Great Britain has never handed over its rights as a party to the Guyana government, and must, therefore, play an active role in resisting any claim by Venezuela to Guyana’s territory”.

Geneva Agreement Violations and the Port of Spain Protocol

Lastly, the Geneva Agreement states that if the parties fail to find a solution to the case through a Mixed Commission, they shall refer the decision to the “appropriate international organ upon which they both agree or, failing agreement on this point, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations”.

It is worth mentioning that this would influence the 2020 decision of the Secretary-General to send the matter to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Four months after the independence of Guyana, Venezuela performed the first violation of the Geneva Agreement when it invaded the Guyanese part of Ankoko Island, quickly building facilities to support a military garrison on the occupied territory. After the expiration of the Mixed Commission in 1970, Venezuela and Guyana agreed on a protocol to the Geneva Agreement.

In short, the 1970 Port of Spain Protocol was a 12-year moratorium on the border dispute, a temporary suspension on Venezuela’s claims over the Essequibo, that would allow the two sides to foster cooperation and partnership without the shadow of territorial disagreements. The Protocol was signed by representatives of three parties of the Geneva Agreement, meaning that Britain remained involved in the question. Nevertheless, adverse reactions in Venezuela resulted in the Port of Spain Protocol not being renewed when its deadline expired. Shortly after the Protocol’s expiration in 1983, Venezuela declared interest in reopening bilateral talks with Guyana without the involvement of third parties.

A counter-proposal accompanied the Guyanese rejection, which involved taking the case to the United Nations General Assembly, the Security Council, or the International Court of Justice. Venezuela repudiated the proposals, and the dispute remained unchanged until four years later. In that year, both countries accepted the Good Offices method of settling international disputes, in which a third party, with the consent of the disputing states, serves as a neutral mediator between the governments to aid them in achieving a solution. Since 1989, the intermediary has been a representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Recent Developments and Renewed Tensions

Oil Discoveries and Increasing Tensions

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the issue continued under the auspices of a representative of the Secretary-General. Signs that the contention had been thawing out in the last decade could be seen when Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez visited Georgetown in 2004, declaring the dispute to be finished. The situation would start changing in 2006 after Venezuela altered its flag to include an eighth star symbolizing the Essequibo region.

Any prevailing doubts about Chávez’s actual position on the dispute were lifted in 2011 when Guyana submitted an application to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to extend its continental shelf by a further 280 kilometers (150 nautical miles). Considering the dispute essentially over, Guyana made its application, knowing that the Commission only analyzes cases of areas that are not subject to territorial disputes. Ending pretenses that an accommodation to the case was closed, Venezuela sent an objection to the Commission stating that the Guyanese application had areas subject to an ongoing unsettled international sovereignty dispute.

The following decade would witness renewed tensions, particularly from the Venezuelan side, fostered by growing prospecting for oil in Guyanese territory. In 2013, a vessel conducting exploration for oil on behalf of the Guyanese Government was detained by Venezuela, triggering a minor diplomatic crisis. Three years later, Guyana granted a license to drill for oil in an area offshore the Essequibo to the American multinational ExxonMobil. Within a few months, it was clear that Guyana and its Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) had promising oil reserves. Despite protests from Caracas and the inclusion of the disputed maritime zone as part of a Venezuelan marine protection area, Georgetown authorized further drillings. Significant discoveries started to happen in 2017.
ICJ Involvement and Economic Transformation

Meanwhile, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, António Guterres, argued that the dispute had not seen “significant progress” in decades. The Secretary-General also stated that he intended to hand the case to the International Court of Justice if there was no explicit objection from both sides. In 2018, Guterres handed the case to the ICJ – with Guyana’s support – on whether the 1899 Arbitration was valid and stated that the Good Offices practices were insufficient to reach an agreement.

While the ICJ analyzed the question, crude oil production started in 2019. Within four years, the offshore area of the Essequibo – known as the Stabroek block – propelled Guyana to become one of the largest crude oil producers, only behind the United States and Brazil in the Americas and ahead of Norway and China. As the US Energy Information Administration stated: “Since starting production in 2019, Guyana has increased its crude oil production to 645,000 barrels per day (b/d) as of early 2024, all from the Stabroek block.” Guyana’s crude oil production grew rapidly, with an annual 98,000 b/d increase on average between 2020 and 2023.

Consequently, the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) experienced unparalleled growth, with a 49% increase in 2020. By 2022, the GDP grew an additional 62.3%, making Guyana, by some metrics, the fastest-growing country in the world. In 2024, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expected Guyana to remain the fastest-growing country worldwide, with growth above 30% due to its oil and gas boom. Guyana has witnessed a quick and sharp economic transformation, with significant improvements to its Human Development Index and the purchasing power of its population.

Renewed Hostilities

Within this context of a golden age for the economy of Guyana reappeared the belligerent and sabre-rattling posture of a Venezuela engulfed by economic and political problems. Between the submission of the case to the ICJ in early 2018 and the Court’s ruling that it had jurisdiction to determine the territorial dispute in early 2023, the whole process was criticized by Venezuela, which abstained from partaking in the proceedings of the ICJ, including hearings and submission of argumentation. On 18 October, reports of an increased Venezuelan military presence near the contested border prompted Guyana to question its neighbor through diplomatic channels.

The 2023 crisis would only erupt on 23 October 2023 – roughly one month after Guyana granted new offshore drilling licenses – with the Venezuelan Government increasing the hostility of its rhetoric with the proposal of a referendum to oppose “by all means” Guyana’s use of the Economic Exclusive Zone off Essequibo and give Venezuelan citizenship to the population of Essequibo, dated to occur on 3 December 2023. Shortly after, on 31 October, Guyana submitted a request to the International Court of Justice requesting a position on Venezuela’s behavior. Two days before the referendum, the Court ruled that Venezuela should take no actions to alter the status quo while the Court analyzed the case.

In the weeks before the referendum, Guyana sought support from its traditional partners, mainly the United States, Britain, and neighboring states. As the vote in Venezuela approached, Guyana gathered support for its territorial integrity from Brazil, Britain, the United States, the Caribbean Community, the Commonwealth of Nations, and others. Additionally, Guyana’s Prime Minister Mark Anthony Phillips accused Venezuela of “considerably expanding its military forces” near the border and gathered support from Brazil, the United States, and the Secretary General of the Organization of American States.

On 14 November 2023, an initiative by the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States successfully held a meeting with the leaders of Guyana and Venezuela and officials from the United Nations. Both sides agreed not to resort to the use of force or escalate tensions while stating that they decided to settle the issue in accordance with international law. However, the same statement declared that Venezuela does not recognize the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the dispute.

Despite diplomatic moves to ease tensions, the referendum occurred on 3 December. Soon after, the Venezuelan Government declared that 95% of voters supported the questions in the ballot, claiming it had a renewed mandate to incorporate the Essequibo region. International analysts questioned the referendum’s validity, pointing out the likelihood of Caracas falsifying the results.

The turnout was also meagre for Venezuela. Within a week, the Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro, stated that he had already initiated proceedings to incorporate the region, but the whole process could take a few years. It is worth noting that the referendum and other attempts to change the status quo violated the 1966 Geneva Agreement.

Three days after the referendum, the Brazilian Army reported that it had detected an increase in Venezuelan troops near the border with Guyana and that the Brazilian Government had been taking actions to increase the number of its forces near the Brazilian border with Venezuela and Guyana. Shortly after, Brazil issued a statement renewing its support for Guyana’s territorial integrity and a peaceful solution to the dispute. At this stage, Brazil feared being dragged into a conflict if Venezuela used the more accessible land routes to Guyana by crossing Brazilian territory.

In practice, this meant that Maduro lost sympathy from the only major country in South America that he hoped to stay – at least – neutral and desired to court to his side. The Brazilian Government was also worried that Venezuela’s behavior would lead to the establishment of foreign military bases in Guyana. Hence its unequivocal support for peaceful solutions, de-escalation, and the efforts to act as an intermediary between the two parties.

International Responses

British and American Involvement

Four days after the vote, the United States announced that it would dispatch military forces to participate in joint operations with their Guyanese counterparts to improve cooperation in security measures. On 18 December, Britain was the first Group of Seven (G7) country to dispatch a minister to Guyana since the renewed tensions in October. The Minister for the Americas, Caribbean, and Overseas Territories, David Rutley, declared he was there “to offer the UK’s unequivocal backing to our Guyanese friends” and that “the border issue has been settled for over 120 years.”

The Minister also stated that “the UK will continue to work with partners in the region, as well as through international bodies, to ensure the territorial integrity of Guyana is upheld.” The visit was the second of the Minister for the Americas to Guyana in 2023. As part of efforts to improve bilateral trade between Britain and Guyana, Rutley was present in March 2023 when the British Chamber of Commerce was officially launched in the country.

Shortly after the visit of the British Minister for the Americas and the United States announcement of joint exercises with Guyana, on 24 December, the British Government stated that a Royal Navy vessel would be deployed to the country as part of joint operations with Guyana’s defense forces.

The vessel in question was the Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) HMS Trent, deployed to the Caribbean to assume patrol duties from her sister ship, HMS Medway, while her maintenance in Gibraltar was underway. Venezuela’s reaction included declarations about Britain bringing instability to the region and ordering a “defensive” military exercise near the border, with roughly 6,000 personnel involved. Despite the Venezuelan rhetoric and attempts at military displays of force, HMS Trent conducted her duties with her Guyanese counterparts without disturbance.

Continued Military Buildup and Diplomatic Efforts

Although Venezuela and Guyana continued to hold meetings – with Brazilian mediation – into 2024, reports of a military buildup on the Venezuelan side of the border permeated most discussions after the referendum. In early April 2024, Maduro signed into law the creation of a Venezuelan province in what is the Essequibo, weakening ongoing diplomatic efforts to minimize tensions.

By mid-2024, Venezuela continued to expand its military infrastructure near the border with Guyana. Meanwhile, the United States has pledged to assist Guyana in acquiring new military equipment, including aircraft, helicopters, drones, and radar technology. In June, in another display of growing American commitment and interest, Under Secretary Jenkins visited Guyana to discuss issues concerning, among other things, “international security.” Similarly, numerous Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) officers have visited the country since December 2023.

Positions of Key International Players

The dispute also questioned the position of Venezuela’s main diplomatic and economic partners, particularly China. For China, the dispute could potentially disrupt its expanding investments in Guyana’s oil fields, with Chinese oil companies having a 25% stake in the Starbroek oil block, only behind the American ExxonMobil (45% stake) and Hess (30%). Venezuela’s position as a supplier of crude oil and buyer of Chinese security and military assets further complicates China’s stance.

Thus, between 2023 and 2024, China has attempted to follow a middle ground, aiming to keep both sides pleased. The Russian position is relatively simple when compared to the Chinese. Russia’s stance can be described as mimicking Venezuelan arguments and claims, offering tacit support for Maduro’s ambitions.

The British-Guyanese Connection

Economic and Political Ties

The shared history of Britain and Guyana contributes to the view in Georgetown that London remains a relevant partner. Despite the relative decline of the British economic influence in South America and the Caribbean, Britain is still a relevant partner with strong economic ties with some regional countries, particularly Commonwealth members. Guyana is one of these regional partners, traditionally having Britain as one of its largest trading partners.

According to the British Department of Business and Trade, between 2013 and 2022, the total bilateral trade with Britain accounted for roughly 8.7% of Guyanese trade on average and has been on the rise since the discovery of oil. By 2023, crude oil represented more than 95% of British imports from the South American nation. British exports to Guyana were marked by “road vehicles other than cars” (34%), “general industrial machinery” (17.3%) and “specialized machinery” (16.9%).

British exports to the country in the first quarter of 2023 grew by 96.5% compared to 2022. In 2023, total trade of goods and services reached £1.8 billion, a rise of 50% compared to 2022, with almost £950 million of trade surplus for Britain. Between 2016 and 2023, trade expanded fifteenfold. Thus, the tendency is one of increased Anglo-Guyanese trade as Guyana expands its oil production capacity and the demand for machinery and know-how to manage its growing economy. Although a relatively small economy, Guyana has the potential to become a reliable source of crude oil imports for Britain, easing the pressure on the vital sea lanes in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, strengthening bilateral relations – economically and politically – will demand a renewed policy for the region.

Strategic Considerations

As Maduro marches on with his jingoistic rhetoric, Britain’s interests in Guyana are caught within a moment of rising stakes. The only Commonwealth member in South America with significant potential as a reliable economic partner has already called Britain for support in its question to maintain its territorial integrity. Besides seeing Britain as an important economic and political partner, possibly helping the country to advance into the era of the “oil boom,” Guyana also recognizes Britain as tied to the border question due to the

British not relinquishing their position as one of the parties of the Geneva Agreement. Moreover, Britain’s support means that Guyana has more than one major country on its side, while Venezuela is emboldened mainly by Russia. For Britain, the question of Guyana and the Essequibo is one of recognizing that – even if Venezuelan aggression might be a distant concept – British support remains highly relevant to the dispute, and providing useful support to Guyana’s territorial integrity is mutually beneficial, allowing the British economic presence in the country to grow and contributing to Guyana itself benefiting from its natural resources with political stability.

Conclusion

The dispute over the Essequibo might be overlooked, but it is still an opportunity to prove that Britain is truly “global” and willing to reinforce links with old partners. In addition, the case of Guyana reinforces the view that the international arena of the 2020s is quickly becoming increasingly more competitive and unstable than it was in the 1990s or 2000s. Nevertheless, despite rhetoric acknowledging the changes, British defence and foreign policy struggled to break free from the mindset of the 1990s. As the sources of instability that threaten or challenge British global interests multiply, the Government in London must understand that ensuring national security and defending British interests are tasks that ultimately demand investment and cannot be run cheaply.

This is particularly the case about topics not entangled by a formal British network of alliances and security pacts. Even when considering interests supported by alliances, a prepared Britain will have a loud voice in a crowded room of allies to help decide how to achieve shared objectives. When considering the British position and interests internationally, the Essequibo dispute might initially appear secondary at best. However, an underlying issue remains: similar crises are likely to erupt elsewhere, and when British interests are involved, the UK’s peer competitors will take notice of the British stance and actions.


J. Vitor Tossini
Vitor is a doctoral student of International Relations at the Sao Paulo State University. He also explores British imperial and military history, and its legacies to the modern world.

Fatal hoist/scaffold collapse

Three people are dead and nine injured after a scaffold and transport platform/hoist collapsed in the Swiss town of Lausanne on Friday.

 15.07.2024

The scene on Friday

The incident occurred in Prilly, a suburb on the north west side of Lausanne, on a 19 storey building fully covered with façade scaffold for a major refurbishment. A Geda transport platform/materials hoist was also installed. The initial findings have suggested that platform installation may have been at fault and pulled the whole corner section of the scaffold down with it. A Manitou telehandler was also buried under the fallen scaffold debris.

The police have confirmed that three people working on the site have died while another four are seriously injured, and a further five received more minor injuries.

We will update this item as we discover more information.

THE EMPIRE DEVOLVES

Manufacturing jobs in England fall while devolved nations see growth

Alan Jones, PA Industrial Correspondent
Sun, 14 July 2024 


The devolved nations of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have seen big growth in the number of manufacturing jobs in the last year, in contrast to most English regions, according to new research.

A survey by Make UK and BDO showed that, in the year to March, the number of manufacturing jobs in Wales increased by 13,000, in Scotland by 10,000 and in Northern Ireland by 2,000.

Every English region saw a fall in manufacturing jobs in the same period, with the East of England being the only region showing a slight rise, the study found.

The report said there was a total fall of 34,000 manufacturing jobs over the year.

It added that pressure on finding skilled people is still “severe” as 64,000 vacancies remain in the manufacturing sector.

Make UK urged the new Government to make tackling skill shortages and reforming the technical education system, the centrepiece of its forthcoming industrial strategy.

Verity Davidge, director of policy at Make UK, said: “The new Government has made a welcome bold statement of its intent to tackle the UK’s anaemic growth at national and regional level.

“It should now back this with a radical, cross-government, long-term industrial strategy which has measures to tackle the UK’s acute skills crisis at its heart.”

Richard Austin, head of manufacturing at BDO, said: “Over the last few years, manufacturers across the regions and nations have faced multiple external shocks and changing policy priorities.

“There is now an exciting opportunity for the sector to work with the new Government on the development of a new long-term industrial strategy.

“This could help address longstanding skills shortages, boost infrastructure, improve productivity and unlock vital investment to help drive economic growth and prosperity.”

Kuwait announces 'giant' oil discovery

14 July 2024 - 

BY JAIDAA TAHA AND MUHAMMAD AL GEBALY

 Picture: 123RF/Warawoot Nanta

Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) said on Sunday it had made a “giant” oil discovery in the Al-Nokhatha field east of the Kuwaiti island of Failaka, with oil reserves estimated at 3.2-billion barrels.

KPC's CEO Sheikh Nawaf Saud Nasir Al-Sabah said in a video posted by the company on X that the new discovery's reserves were equivalent to the country's entire production in three years.

The initial estimated area of the newly discovered oil well is about 96 square km, KPC said in its statement.

It added that the preliminary estimates of the hydrocarbon reserves present at the well were estimated at about 2.1-billion barrels of light oil, and 5.1-trillion standard cubic feet of gas, which correspond to 3.2-billion barrels of oil equivalent.

Reuters

Kuwait Announces "Giant" New Oilfield Discovery in Persian Gulf

Courtesy KOC

PUBLISHED JUL 15, 2024 3:00 PM BY THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE

 

On Sunday, Kuwait's national oil company announced the discovery of a "giant" oil find, large enough that its reserves equal three years of the energy-rich nation's entire annual production. 

The discovery sits just off the island of Failaka in the Persian Gulf, next to the northeastern edge of the Kuwaiti exclusive economic zone. It contains about 3.2 billion barrels of oil equivalent, including 2.1 billion barrels of light oil and 5.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 

The find is located in Kuwait's Al-Nokhatha field, and in a statement, Kuwait Oil Company said that the discovery suggests "huge potential" for additional oil and gas finds within the complex. It will help sustain Kuwait's production at a reliable level for years to come, the KOC said, and create more local employment opportunities (and bidding opportunities for contractors).  

Kuwait is a small emirate of four million people, but its rich oil and gas fields make it the fifth-largest producer in OPEC with output of about 2.5 million barrels a day, according to Bloomberg. The majority of its exports are in the form of refined products, reflecting a push to add value in the midstream sector. It has the newest and largest refinery in the Middle East, Al Zour, which is designed for high output of low-sulfur fuel oil for the shipping industry. The largest share of its exports go to Asia, and China is its largest trading partner. 

SOUTH AFRICA


Six firefighters killed in runaway Midlands bush fire

Raging veld fires must be declared a disaster area, says KZN Cogta MEC

14 July 2024 - 17:57
Gill Gifford

Senior journalist
TIMES LIVE

An aeromedical chopper lands to rescue firefighters in critical condition at the scene of a raging bush fire in the Boston area outside Howick in the KZN Midlands.
Image: Midlands EMS

A raging veld fire in the Boston area just outside Howick in the KwaZulu-Natal Midlands has left six firefighters dead.

Just after 3pm on Sunday, uMngeni mayor Chris Pappas said three female firefighters had died, another five firefighters had been rushed to nearby hospitals. One of them was airlifted to hospital with severe burns. All five admitted fighters were in critical condition.

Midlands EMS spokesperson Roland Robertson said three other firefighters died in hospital, bringing the death toll to six.

Robertson said crews were dispatched to the Boston Road area where paramedics found multiple victims still on fire and several deceased.

He said the crews worked to stabilise several people on the scene while the veld fire continued to rage and firefighting aircraft attempted to douse the flames.

A decision was made to call in additional backup, including an aeromedical helicopter from Netcare 911 with extra equipment, to assist on the scene.

He said three firefighters were placed on ventilators on the scene, with one being airlifted to the hospital. Two other patients were also in critical condition, requiring urgent advanced life support treatment.

Pappas said it appeared to have been a runaway grass fire and that Sappi, Working on Fire, local land owners and uMgungundlovu Fire had also all responded.

Provincial co-operative governance and traditional affairs MEC Rev Thulasizwe Buthelezi said he was deeply saddened by the “tragic loss of three workers who were fighting a fire in a plantation near Mpophomeni, Boston, under the uMngeni local municipality”.

“These brave individuals lost their lives while battling the blaze. We are heartbroken by the loss of these courageous workers who were fighting to protect others from harm. We extend our heartfelt condolences to the families affected by this tragic event and wish a speedy recovery to those injured,” Buthelezi said.

The incident occurred in an area characterised by difficult terrain, complicating the efforts of the fire and emergency services that were deployed to the scene. This tragedy brings the total number of lives lost recently due to runaway fires in the province to 13.

Buthelezi earlier on Sunday visited wildfire-damaged areas in the Zululand district, where he met farmers severely affected by the wildfires that have destroyed more than 13,000 hectares of grazing land. He handed over bales as relief for the affected farmers.

The provincial government is working round the clock to assist affected communities and mitigate the impact of these devastating fires. He called for the parts of the province affected by the fires to be declared disaster areas, emphasising the urgent need for additional support and resources to manage the crisis and aid recovery efforts.

TimesLIVE

 Myanmar ethnic armies, junta agree 4-day ceasefire in Shan state: alliance

An alliance of ethnic armies say they will cease fighting the junta between July 14 and 18.



Since late last month, the Three Brotherhood Alliance renewed an offensive against junta troops along the road to China's Yunnan province. / Photo: Reuters Archive

An alliance of Myanmar ethnic minority armed groups said it had agreed a four-day ceasefire with the junta in northern Shan state following clashes in which its fighters seized territory from the military along a strategic highway to China.

The area has been rocked by fighting since late last month, when the so-called Three Brotherhood Alliance renewed an offensive against junta troops along the road to China's Yunnan province.

The clashes shredded a previous Beijing-brokered truce that in January halted an earlier push by the alliance –– made up of the Arakan Army (AA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).

"We... showed cooperation with China by agreeing a four-day ceasefire in northern Shan" from 14-18 July, Major-General Tar Bhone Kyaw of the TNLA said on Sunday.

The new agreement did not cover the neighbouring Mandalay region, where members of the alliance and other opponents of the military have been battling junta troops in recent weeks, Tar Bhone Kyaw said.

A junta spokesman could not be reached for comment.

China is reportedly a major ally and arms supplier to the junta, but analysts say it also maintains ties with armed ethnic groups in Myanmar that hold territory near its border.

Beijing's top leaders are gathering on Monday for the Communist Party's secretive Third Plenum –– a key political meeting.


Towns captured

In the latest fighting, the TNLA claimed to have captured two towns along the highway that runs from Myanmar's second city Mandalay to China's Yunnan province.

One of the towns, Naungcho, is around 50 kilometres (30 miles) down the highway from the former British hill station of Pyin Oo Lwin, home to the military's elite officer training academy.

Clashes have also rocked the town of Lashio, home to the military's northeastern command.

Dozens of civilians have been killed or wounded in the recent fighting, according to the junta and local rescue groups.

Neither the junta nor the ethnic alliance have released figures on their own casualties.

Myanmar's borderlands are home to myriad ethnic armed groups who have battled the military since independence from Britain in 1948 for autonomy and control of lucrative resources.

Some have given shelter and training to newer "People's Defence Forces" (PDFs) that have sprung up to battle the military after it ousted Aung San Suu Kyi's government in 2021.

In recent days, PDF fighters have battled junta forces in Madaya township, around an hour north of Mandalay.

Amid the renewed fighting earlier this month, top junta general Soe Win travelled to China to discuss security cooperation along the border.

ICC Member States: Coordinate To Protect Witnesses With Evidence Of Atrocities, Refer Myanmar To Chief Prosecutor

Monday, 15 July 2024, 
Press Release: Fortify Rights

(BANGKOK, July 11, 2024)—Member States of the International Criminal Court (ICC) should ensure appropriate protection for witnesses from Myanmar who have evidence that would contribute to accountability for ongoing potential war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, said Fortify Rights today. Fortify Rights obtained ten secretly recorded videos showing Myanmar military junta soldiers severely torturing detainees at an interrogation facility in Mandalay Region, and the defector-whistleblower who filmed the incidents is in need of protection.

The videos expose numerous incidents of severe torture of detainees by Myanmar junta personnel, including fatal beatings as well as electrocutions. In one video, junta personnel use a long implement to severely beat a man who is naked on the floor with his hands bound behind his back. In another video, soldiers allegedly beat two detainees to death.

“These torture videos are the type of evidence needed for justice and accountability, but the key witness who filmed them requires protection to ensure the usefulness of this valuable evidence,” said Chit Seng, Human Rights Associate at Fortify Rights. “Collecting and preserving evidence of atrocities in Myanmar is more crucial now than ever, but without urgent witness protection, significant amounts of evidence will be lost. These videos add to the mounting evidence of the junta’s flagrant violations of international law and should compel the international community to hold the Myanmar junta accountable, including by referring the situation to the ICC.” 

To preserve the integrity of the video evidence and future prosecutions and for the security of the witness, Fortify Rights is not at liberty to release the videos at the moment but is preserving them as future evidence in potential war crimes cases.

The witness in question has communicated with the Independent International Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM), which was created to collect and preserve evidence of international crimes in Myanmar but has no mandate to protect witnesses, creating a gap in efforts to ensure accountability.

In March 2023, Fortify Rights received ten videos from a 35-year-old former private in the Myanmar Air Force who secretly recorded fellow Myanmar military soldiers torturing detainees in an interrogation center in Mandalay Region in October and November 2021. The private defected from the military and fled the country, bringing the videos with him. Fortify Rights interviewed the defector, who served as a security officer at the interrogation facility, and a civilian whom the military detained at the facility and later released. Fortify Rights remains in direct communication with the military whistleblower as well as the former detainee.

The videos, the exact location of the interrogation facility, and the names of five military soldiers—including Army, Air Force, and military intelligence, known as Sa Ya Pa in Burmese language, personnel holding the ranks of major, captain, corporal, and warrant officer—who ordered, committed, and oversaw the torture are on file with Fortify Rights. These men should be investigated and prosecuted for their role in the junta’s widespread and systematic use of torture as an attack against the civilian population or crimes against humanity under international law, said Fortify Rights, which is ready to share the evidence with relevant prosecutorial authorities.

Fortify Rights analyzed the ten videos that range from 20 seconds to four-and-a-half minutes in length and show six different incidents of torture and abuse, including severe and fatal beatings of detainees with heavy whips and other implements, non-fatal electrocutions of detainees, kicking of detainees, threats of sexual violence, and forcing detainees to perform humiliating acts. Altogether, the videos depict the interrogation and torture of approximately 48 detainees, including two women. All the videos were recorded in an outdoor courtyard within the military facility’s compound; in half the videos, the torture took place during the night between approximately 11 p.m. and 2 a.m.

Speaking about the videos he recorded, the 35-year-old military defector told Fortify Rights:

I took ten videos. … [A]ccording to the law, during the interrogation, only intelligence officers are allowed to [interrogate] the detainees. But [at the facility], everyone [all military personnel] was doing the torture, everyone was kicking and hitting [the detainees]. … When you witness these things almost every day, after a while, I didn't feel good inside. I felt sad, and it was devastating for me to see the military torturing people every single day. At some point, I decided that I wanted to do something. So, I started recording videos to keep as evidence for the victims who were tortured. I want to do what I can for the victims.

One video that runs for one minute and 19 seconds shows two men lying next to each other on the ground. One of the detainees’ hands is bound, and he is lying in the fetal position as three plain-clothed soldiers beat him repeatedly with sticks and a whip. The other detainee is lying face-up and does not appear to move during the entire video, indicating that he may be unconscious or dead. A fellow officer told the defector that the detainees died from the torture in the interrogation facility the day after the video was filmed.

“I have seen people die in front of me,” the defector told Fortify Rights. “As you can see in the video, [two people were beaten to death.] ... I took this video secretly from behind the tree. They were interrogated and beaten up repeatedly during interrogation. ... They died in the morning.”

In the video, the three soldiers hit the bound man with implements at least 20 times, and the detainee can be heard saying, “Please help me. I am telling the truth.” A man in a black tank top with dark shorts hits the detainee with an approximately three-foot-long stick. “Does it hurt?” another soldier in a white tank top with a thin cane asks. “Yes, it hurts,” the civilian cries.

Following this exchange, in a span of 26 seconds, a soldier in a red t-shirt and longyi [a traditional cloth worn by men] strikes the detained man 11 times with a whip while taunting: “What’s wrong? Huh? I have been waiting for guys like you.” The detainee cries out in pain as the soldier with the thin cane hits the civilian again while shouting: “Are you a man or a woman? Are you a man? Are you a man? Huh?! Are you a man? … If you say you’re a man, don’t make a single sound!”

The video ends with the military officer with the long stick hitting the detainee, who cries out, “It hurts a lot.”

The 35-year-old defector confirmed that the men involved in beating the two detainees “were from the intelligence, special branch police, and security personnel from army and air force.” He said: “I don’t know [their names] because I took this [video] secretly.”

In a three-minute 56-second video filmed at night, a bound, naked man, who is blindfolded with a blue surgical mask and black cloth, is lying face down on the concrete ground while three soldiers interrogate and beat him 65 times with a large wooden stick. The bound man has visible bruises in the middle of his naked back that look purple or black and splotches of discoloration on his left upper thigh and buttock.

One soldier asks the bound civilian if he transferred 500,000 Myanmar Kyat [approximately US$150 to US$200] to a resistance group operating against the Myanmar military in the area. The bound man answers that he only transferred 10,000 Myanmar Kyat [approximately US$3 to US$4]. The soldiers threaten the man’s family for the rest of the video.

“Go and put the gun on his father and call me once you are there,” the interrogator ordered junior soldiers. Speaking to the man being tortured, he adds, “If you don’t tell the truth, your parents will be shot dead. We will set an example of what happens with the families who support [resistance groups].”

The video ends with the detainee repeatedly crying out, “Please, I beg. I apologize. Please don’t do it.”

In two further videos, also filmed at night, show a group of up to eight plain-clothed soldiers surrounding six bound detainees, who are kneeling or lying face down on the ground. The soldiers beat them with a whip and thin canes and electrocute them with what appears to be a hand-held taser. The sound of the detainees being shocked and cries of pain are audible in the video. The soldiers are heard questioning the detainees about payments made to resistance fighters.

Another 15-second video similarly shows interrogators in military uniforms electrocuting detainees. Filmed during the daytime, a uniformed army major and two plain-clothed soldiers are seen encircling two kneeling detainees, who are blindfolded and wearing surgical masks with their hands tied behind their backs. The major proceeds to shock one of the men continuously for eight seconds with a handheld electric taser while interrogating him. The man’s body spasms uncontrollably for the duration of the treatment, and he sobs and begs that he didn’t do anything.

In another one-minute video, two soldiers, one in green camouflage pants and army green singlet and another in plain clothes, interrogate two blindfolded men, whose hands are tied behind their backs, accusing them of being involved with armed resistance fighters. The first detainee is writhing on the ground as one soldier whips the detainee with a black whip while saying: “So now, these hurt you? Huh? How about when my drivers were hurt?” Another soldier interrogating a second kneeling detainee says: “You… decide to blow up this car with a landmine? So, does that give you some satisfaction?” The video ends with the soldier whipping the first detainee while the detainee is squatting on the floor with folded hands, groaning in pain. The video ends with one of the soldiers saying: “So now, you think your life is good?... No, right? It’s not good now.”

Fortify Rights interviewed a 61-year-old civilian who spent 45 days detained in the same interrogation facility where the defector was stationed and at the same time when the defector recorded the videos. He stated:

I was detained on October 10, 2021. … The village administrator and two soldiers ambushed me in [redacted] town and detained me. … They took me back to the village first. I was beaten up once I arrived at the village. … They hit me with the butt of the guns. It was about three hours that they were interrogating me. … [T]hey blindfolded me and tied my hands behind my back. I couldn’t see who was beating me. … They accused me of supporting the [resistance fighters] by donating money.

The 61-year-old man recalled being taken to the military interrogation center afterward in a car, still blindfolded and bound. He said: “I arrived at the interrogation center around 2:30 p.m., but they wouldn’t remove my blindfold until I was settled in the room around 9 p.m.”

The man described how the soldiers confined him and others in a metal shipping container for ten days, saying:

[T]he ten days that they put us in the container box, I felt like I was in hell. There were 15 of us thrown in there. To paint a picture for you, a container box that is usually attached to a truck was just placed on the ground, and there was nothing made up inside to accommodate us. We had to scream out to the guard if we wanted to go outside for bathroom breaks or to breathe. But it depended on the guards, and we all had to be brought out together. The sun's heat would seep through the metal walls, and it was excruciating inside. We had to stay there day and night. Sometimes, if we wanted to pee, we had to pee into water bottles inside that container.

Sharing what he saw while detained at the interrogation facility, he said:

What I witnessed at the military interrogation center rattled me a lot because I had never ever experienced anything like this before. I saw the soldiers torturing a person they accused of being a [resistance fighter]. What I mean by “torture” was that I saw them asking the person if he was thirsty, and they would force one detainee to pee into another detainee’s mouth.

He went on to describe how he heard other detainees being tortured, saying:

There were small holes in our holding rooms, so we would peep out of them to see what was happening. Most of the interrogation happened at night. One of the worst things I witnessed was the day they brought in youths, who were accused of being [resistance fighters]. The screams were a lot. I could hear the youths denying [the accusations], but [the soldiers] wouldn't stop hitting them. I saw each person taking turns to hit [the youths] whenever they passed by or when they felt like it. At some point, I saw the soldiers putting tires on the youths’ necks, and if they happened to lean forward, the soldiers put a knife in front of their bodies and had the knife pierce them every time the youths happened to lean forward from having the weight of the tires on their necks.

The former detainee also witnessed how the facility commander at the time, holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, threatened to rape a young woman. He said:

[T]he interrogation facility commander came and asked me to follow him. He was drunk at that time. I was taken to a room where a father, a mother, and a young daughter were detained. … He threatened to rape the young girl in front of her family and me. We all had to beg him not to do it, and we also begged the guards around not to do this to the girl and also to the parents.

Describing the commander of the detention center, the 61-year-old torture survivor said:

I don’t know the [commander]’s name. He was about five feet eight inches with tan skin and a round face. I think he was 50 years old. I don’t know his rank, but he referred to himself as the interrogation facility commander, and we had to call him “A Ba” [or “respected elder” in Burmese language], and other [soldiers] only called him “A Ba.”

The military defector also described the commander, saying:

He is really a bad man. … He drinks a lot. Whenever he was drunk, he would bring out all the detainees and do whatever he wanted with them. The video I am about to show is when he put a bottle on top of a detainee’s head, and he was about to shoot the bottle. The part when he fired is not recorded. I didn't dare to record, but at least I managed to record him threatening and aiming at the bottle on top of the detainee’s head.

In the video, the commander is heard saying to the civilian: "I am just going to shoot the bottle. I won't shoot your head. Just shooting the bottle." The civilian in the video looks visibly terrified as he balances the bottle on his head with his left hand and puts his right hand over his heart.

The defector clarified that the commander did not fire his gun during this incident; however, in another video taken during the same incident, the commander is seen kicking a woman in the face after she is unable to answer a question asked by the commander. At one point, he returns to the woman, holds her head, and hits the left side of her head while shouting: “I didn’t want to [kick you]. Do you hear me? I said, ‘Do you hear me?’ I am angry!”

The defector also told Fortify Rights how the commander threatened two women detainees with sexual abuse, saying “…he would use a taser on their genital area. It gave me goosebumps when I heard [this threat].”

Fortify Rights has documented how the Myanmar military is responsible for committing ongoing atrocity crimes, including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. For example, the joint report “Nowhere is Safe,” published by Fortify Rights and Yale Law School in 2022, documented various acts, including acts of torture, committed by the Myanmar military following the February 2021 coup. The report found that such acts were carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed at a civilian population and amounted to crimes against humanity.

The ten videos obtained by Fortify Rights provide further evidence of torture and crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar military, which should be investigated, said Fortify Rights.

In March 2024, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, addressed the U.N. Human Rights Council, expressing deep shock at the continued “systemic use of torture against political detainees in police stations, military interrogation centers, and prisons.”

The Convention against Torture or Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) defines torture as the intentional infliction of "severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental," for a specific purpose, such as punishment, intimidation, or coercion, “or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind." Although Myanmar is not a party to CAT, the convention provides authoritative guidance on the act of torture and other forms of ill-treatment under international human rights law. Under CAT, torture is committed “when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”

When carried out as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed at a civilian population, torture may constitute a crime against humanity under Article 7(1)(f) of the Rome Statute.

Although the ICC is investigating crimes committed against the ethnic Rohingya community in Myanmar and the state of Myanmar is currently on trial for the Rohingya genocide at the International Court of Justice, there are no criminal investigations by prosecutors into the military junta’s more recent post-coup crimes.

Member states of the ICC should urgently refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC Prosecutor under Article 14 of the Rome Statute, and the Prosecutor should immediately investigate torture and other ongoing mass atrocity crimes in the country, said Fortify Rights today.

Article 14 of the Rome Statute empowers ICC member states to request the Prosecutor to investigate international crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. While Myanmar is not an ICC member state, the National Unity Government—the body representing Myanmar’s democratically-elected leaders—lodged a 12(3) declaration with the Court’s registrar on July 17, 2021, accepting the jurisdiction of the Court for international crimes committed on Myanmar territory since July 1, 2002 and into the future.

On March 14, 2024, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Tom Andrews, called on ICC member states to refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC prosecutor.

At the time of writing, no ICC member state has referred Myanmar to the ICC Prosecutor.

The ICC has a witness protection program for various types of witnesses, including “insider witnesses,” which could include military defectors. However, the ICC’s witness protection can only be activated in relation to an ongoing investigation by the Office of the Prosecutor, and the ICC is not investigating atrocity crimes in Myanmar in relation to the military coup and subsequent attacks on civilians nationwide. For this reason, ICC member states should urgently coordinate to ensure protection for high-value witnesses from Myanmar and should urgently refer the situation in Myanmar to the ICC Prosecutor, said Fortify Rights.

“No one has been prosecuted anywhere in the world for the horrible atrocities unfolding in Myanmar. The Myanmar junta will not get serious about ending its attacks against civilians until the international community ends this lethal inaction,” said Chit Seng. “The junta has shown again and again that it will continue to persecute and abuse those who oppose its dictatorship. The international community and the ICC must act immediately to investigate these violations and create an environment where individuals with evidence on such crimes feel safe to share information and are actually protected.”

© Scoop Media

New players emerge in fighting in Myanmar's northeast, as powerful ethnic militias intervene

Recently renewed combat in northeastern Myanmar between troops of the military government and ethnic minority militias has in the past few days become more complicated, as two minority groups not previously involved in the fighting stepped into the fray

ByGRANT PECK Associated Press
July 14, 2024, 


BANGKOK -- Recently renewed combat in northeastern Myanmar between troops of the military government and ethnic minority militias has in the past few days become more complicated, as two minority groups not previously involved in the fighting stepped into the fray, claiming to act as a third force for stability.

The intervention of the powerful fighting forces of the United Wa State Army and the Shan State Army-North highlights tensions among the various ethnic minority guerrilla groups who have been fighting for decades for greater autonomy from Myanmar’s central government.

While many of the groups have alliances with the pro-democracy resistance forces that arose to fight military rule after the army ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021, they prioritize their own goals, which include control over territory.

The focus of every group is now on Lashio, which is about 210 kilometers (130 miles) northeast of Mandalay, the country’s second-largest city and headquarters of the northeastern military command of Myanmar’s ruling generals.

Two ethnic armed groups, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or MNDAA, last week had been advancing on Lashio, the biggest city in northern Shan state. The TNLA represents the Ta’ang or Palaung ethnic minority, and the MNDAA is a military force of the Kokang minority, who are ethnic Chinese.

The two groups had been part of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which last October had launched a surprise offensive that succeeded in seizing large tracts of territory along the border with China. The current fighting that began last month had marked an end to a Chinese-brokered cease-fire that nominally stopped fighting between the army and the alliance.

But the United Wa State Army and the Shan State Army-North, who were not involved in the October offensive, late last week moved their own soldiers to the Lashio area, apparently impeding the offensive by the TNLA and MNDAA.

The United Wa State Army announced it had sent about 2,000 troops on Thursday into Tangyan, a township bordering Lashio, which had been under attack by the TNLA. Tangyan is believed to be home to a large number of ethnic Wa.

The Wa military is the biggest and strongest ethnic armed organization in Myanmar, with an army of approximately 30,000 well-equipped soldiers and sophisticated weaponry including heavy artillery and helicopters from China, with which it maintains close relations

Nyi Rang, a liaison officer for the group, told The Associated Press in a message on Friday that the move was meant to prevent the armed conflict from spreading to the town. He said the Wa group had negotiated with the military government at the request of residents before deploying its troops.

The Shan State Army-North sent more than 1,000 troops on Friday and Saturday into the nearby township of Mongyai, where the MNDAA has been fighting the Myanmar military, The Shan consider Mongyai to be in their sphere of influence, which should not be taken over by another group.

The group issued a statement through its affiliate media on Facebook stating that it had sent troops for the stability of the region and the security of the people.

“It is the region we had dominated,” Col. Sai Su, the group’s spokesperson, was quoted in the report as saying. “That’s why we did that to prevent the town from falling into the hands of the other organizations and to keep it under the administration of the Shan State Army. People also requested us to protect them.”

Two Mongyai residents, speaking on condition of anonymity because of security concerns, told the AP on Sunday that their area was calm after the Shan troops were deployed. One said Wa troops were also stationed nearby.

All the ethnic armed groups involved in the situation in Shan state maintain close relations with China. It's widely believed that last October's offensive had Beijing’s tacit approval because of its growing dissatisfaction with the military government's seeming indifference to the burgeoning drug trade along its border and the proliferation of centers in Myanmar at which cyberscams are run, with workers trafficked from China and elsewhere in the region.

Beijing has made clear it strongly backed a crackdown on scammers. Tens of thousands of employees of scam operations were repatriated to China, while the MNDAA, which assisted that effort, was allowed to retake a major border city it had once controlled.

However, China's overriding interest in the area is maintaining stability, which is endangered by the new fighting. so it is likely to back efforts such as the Wa and the Shan are carrying out to restrain the TNLA and MNDAA.