It’s possible that I shall make an ass of myself. But in that case one can always get out of it with a little dialectic. I have, of course, so worded my proposition as to be right either way (K.Marx, Letter to F.Engels on the Indian Mutiny)
Monday, August 19, 2024
Where is poverty highest in Europe?
The average poverty rate in Europe is 21% according to Eurostat, with the highest rates in Romania (32%), Bulgaria (30%), and Spain, and the lowest in Czechia (12%), Slovenia (13.7%), and Finland (15.8%). But the very lowest is in Russia (9.3%). / bne IntelliNews
In 2023, 94.6mn people in the EU (or just over 21% of the population) were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, reports Statista.
This means they lived in households facing at least one of three risks: income poverty, severe material and social deprivation, and/or living in a household with very low work intensity (where adults work less than 20% of their potential over the course of a year).
According to Eurostat data, this figure remained relatively stable compared to the previous year (95.3mn people in 2022, or 22% of the population).
As shown in the accompanying infographic, the share of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion varies significantly across EU countries. Last year, the EU countries with the highest rates were Romania (32%), Bulgaria (30%), Spain (26.5%), and Greece (26.1%). Meanwhile, the lowest rates were recorded in the Czech Republic (12%), Slovenia (13.7%), and Finland (15.8%).
For comparison, Russia recently announced that its fertility rate was “catastrophically low” at 1.4, well below the 2.1 rate needed to keep a population stable. However, Ukraine's birth rate has plummeted to 300-year low as country’s population collapses. These demographic problems have weighed on the poverty levels differently.
As reported by bne IntelliNews in its latest despair index – the addition of unemployment, inflation and poverty levels – Russia is currently enjoying one of the best despair index ratings in its modern history where poverty has fallen from 21.7% in 2020, according to Eurostat, to only 9.3% in 2023, Reuters reports – one of the lowest levels in Europe.
Poverty is hard to measure in Ukraine as few official statistics are being gathered thanks to the war, but Ukraine was already the poorest country in Europe before the war started. Just three months ago The World Bank estimated that around a third (29%, or roughly 9mn people) of the current population is living below the poverty line. According to The World Bank, an estimated 1.8mn more Ukrainians now live in poverty - since 2020; a situation that would be even worse had Ukraine not been the recipient of foreign aid to pay for pensions and salaries.
The Religious Composition of the World’s Migrants
Christians are the largest migrant group, but Jews are most likely to have migrated
Migration has grown steadily in recent decades. Today, more than 280 million people, or 3.6% of the world’s population, are international migrants – meaning they live outside their country of birth.
Christians made up an estimated 47% of all people living outside their country of birth as of 2020, the latest year for which global figures are available, according to a new Pew Research Center analysis of United Nations data and 270 censuses and surveys.
Muslims accounted for 29% of all living migrants, followed by Hindus (5%), Buddhists (4%) and Jews (1%).
The religiously unaffiliated – i.e., those who say they have no religion, or who identify as atheist or agnostic – represented 13% of all the people who have left their country of birth and are now living elsewhere.1
Over the past three decades, the total number – or stock – of people living as international migrants has increased by 83%, outpacing global population growth of 47%.
This report focuses on stocks rather than flows of migrants. We are counting all adults and children who now live outside their countries of birth, no matter when they left.
We are not trying to estimate how many move in a single year.
While the religious makeup of migration flows can change drastically from year to year – due to wars, economic crises and natural disasters – the total stock of migrants changes more slowly, reflecting patterns that have accumulated over time.
The religious makeup of all international migrants has remained relatively stable since 1990.
Our analysis finds:
Christians make up a much larger share of migrants (47%) than they do of the world’s population (30%). Mexico is the most common origin country for Christian migrants, and the United States is their most common destination.
Muslims account for a slightly larger share of migrants (29%) than of the world’s population (25%). Syria is the most common origin country for Muslim migrants, and Muslims often move to places in the Middle East-North Africa region, like Saudi Arabia.
People without a religionmake up a smaller percentage of migrants (13%) than of the global population (23%).2 China is the most common origin country for religiously unaffiliated migrants, and the U.S. is their most common destination.
Hindus are starkly underrepresented among international migrants (5%) compared with their share of the global population (15%). India is both the most common country of origin and the top destination for Hindu migrants.
Buddhists make up 4% of the world’s population and 4% of its international migrants. Myanmar (also called Burma) is the most common origin country for Buddhist migrants, while Thailand is their most common destination.
Jews form a much larger share of migrants (1%) than of the world’s population (0.2%). Israel is the most frequent origin country among Jewish migrants and also their top destination.
Of the major religious groups, Jews are by far the likeliest to have migrated. One-in-five Jews reside outside of their country of birth, compared with smaller shares of Christians (6%), Muslims (4%), Hindus (1%), Buddhists (4%) and the religiously unaffiliated (2%).
Many migrants have moved to escape religious persecution or to live among people who hold similar religious beliefs. Often people move and take their religion with them, contributing to gradual changes in their new country’s religious makeup. Sometimes, though, migrants shed the religion they grew up with and adopt their new host country’s majority religion, some other religion or no religion.3
While the migration patterns of religious groups differ, the groups in this analysis also have a lot in common. For example, migrants frequently go to countries where their religious identity is already prevalent: Many Muslims have moved to Saudi Arabia, while Jews have gravitated toward Israel. Christians and religiously unaffiliated migrants have the same top three destination countries: the U.S., Germany and Russia.
And, regardless of their religion, migrants often move from relatively poor or dangerous places to countries where they hope to find prosperity and safety.
These are among the key findings of a Pew Research Center analysis of international migrants around the world. The study is part of the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, which seeks to understand global religious change and its impact on societies.
This report relies on UN estimates of stocks of international migrants around the world for 1990, 2020 and every five-year interval between.
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic severely restricted travel, causing a precipitous drop in migration. But movement has picked up since, and there have been some sharp shifts in migration flow patterns. For example, emigration from Ukraine has surged due to its war with Russia.
Even though this report does not include very recent migration, we do not expect that recent events have had much impact on the religious composition of migrants overall. Even large flows of people leaving a country become part of much larger stocks of migrants who have already left, and the characteristics of these stocks tend to change very slowly.
This interactive table shows the estimated religious breakdown of immigrants to, and emigrants from, countries and regions of the world. Click the “Living in” button to see how many immigrants have moved into each country and remain there. Click the “Born in” button to see how many emigrants have moved away from each country and are living elsewhere.
You also can choose between counts and percentages (estimated number vs. % of all migrants). And you can toggle between decades to see how much change has occurred over time.
An additional 2% of global migrants belong to “other religions,” an umbrella category that includes Baha’is, Daoists (also spelled Taoists), Jains, Shintoists, Sikhs and adherents of many other religions. This report does not analyze those groups separately because in many countries, censuses and surveys do not provide sufficiently detailed data about them.↩
This report presents interim estimates of the overall population in each religious group (including migrants and nonmigrants) using data from three Pew Research Center studies: “The Future of World Religions” (projections of religious composition to the year 2020 published in 2015), “Modeling the Future of Religion in America” (2022) and “Measuring Religion in China” (2023). In the future, the Center will produce new estimates of the overall size of religious groups in 2020, based on data sources that have become available in recent years. Read the Methodology for details.↩
We have limited data on global patterns of religious switching after migration. Some studies have found evidence of considerable switching among migrants from China, who may join new religious communities as part of the process of integrating into their new home countries. Read, for example, Skirbekk, Vergard, Éric Caron Malenfant, Stuart Basten and Marcin Stonawski. 2012. “The religious composition of the Chinese diaspora, focusing on Canada.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion. Also refer to Yang, Fenggang. 1999. “Chinese Christians in America: Conversion, assimilation, and adhesive identities.”↩
IRAQ-KURDISTAN
10 Years Since ISIS Genocide, Kildani Moves Against Christian Officials in Nineveh
While Christians mark 10 years since the ISIS genocide in Nineveh, US-Sanctioned Rayan Al-Kildani and his Babylon Brigade are taking over, displacing Christian officials, and fostering corruption. Local leaders resisting his influence demand fair representation and protection of their community.
In the coming weeks, the Iraqi Federal Court is expected to rule on the illegal removal of the Nineveh Provincial Council on July 2 and replacement of 15 mayors and directors. If this action stands, it will remove the last independent Christian mayors outside of the Kurdistan Region and have a devastating impact on the historic Syriac, Assyrian, and Chaldean Christian cities of Bartella, Qaraqosh, Tel Kef, and the Yazidi homeland of Sinjar.
Before the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq that toppled Saddam Hussein, there were 1.5 million Christians in Iraq. US policy unfortunately increased sectarianism, which, in turn, hurt religious and ethnic minorities. By the time ISIS arrived, only 700,000 Christians remained, and under Islamic State rule Christians were subjected to “forced transfer, persecution, pillage, sexual violence and slavery, and other inhuman acts such as forced conversions and the intentional destruction of cultural heritage.” Now, reports suggest between 150,000 and 250,000 remain.
The Struggle for Qaraqosh
The largest Christian city in Iraq, Qaraqosh (Bakhdida) in the Al-Hamdaniya District, was captured by ISIS on August 6, 2014. Because the community was aware of the horrific crimes in Sinjar and Mosul, most of the 60,000 residents fled to Erbil in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). By the time Qaraqosh was liberated on October 19, 2016, with $135 million in damages, churches and homes destroyed, 40% of Christian residents had already emigrated abroad or had decided to stay in the KRI.
On July 18, 2019, the United States sanctioned Rayan Al-Kildani, the leader of the 50th Brigade militia, for human rights abuses, including intimidation, extortion, and harassment of women. With accusations of systemic looting and illegally seizing land, the US said, “The 50th Brigade was reportedly the primary impediment to the return of internally displaced persons to the Nineveh Plains.” Immediately upon the district’s liberation, Iranian-aligned militias began seizing lands, preventing many residents from returning.
The 50th Brigade is now known as the Babylon Brigade or Kataib Babiliyoun (KB). While they are supported by Iran and close to Iran’s Quds Force, they fall under the Government of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) or “Hashd al-Shaabi.” While Kildani claims it is a Christian group and calls himself “Rayan the Chaldean,” most members are Shia from Southern Iraq who have relocated to the Nineveh Plains to build Kildani’s political strength. The political arm is known as the Babylon Movement.
Unfortunately, the consequence of ignoring this deadline has cost Iraqis enormously, especially religious minorities.
After the fall of ISIS, Iranian-aligned militias filled the vacuum in the Nineveh Plains, particularly in disputed territories claimed by both the Governments of Iraq and Kurdistan, neither of which adequately invested in its governance or security. In fact, Article 140 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution lays out a process to resolve the disputed territories with a deadline of 2007. Unfortunately, the consequence of ignoring this deadline has cost Iraqis enormously, especially religious minorities.
Despite accusations of bribing and threatening voters, Rayan and his Iran-backed Babylon Movement won four of the five seats reserved for Christians in the 2021 Iraqi parliamentary election, exploiting loopholes in election laws. Kildani relied on support from Iranian-backed Shia groups to elect his candidates instead of giving Christians their promised voice in the parliament. During provincial elections in 2023, Kildani repeated his success by winning four seats reserved for Christians in the provincial elections in Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Nineveh. While initially Kildani lost the Basra seat to a church-backed candidate, he brought a legal case against him with accusations of being in the Baath party, leading to his elimination. Kildani’s candidate was his replacement.
In July 2023, it was reported that Kildani pressured the President of Iraq, Abdul Latif Rashid, to revoke a decree recognizing Cardinal Louis Sako as Patriarch of the Chaldean Catholic Church, the largest Christian denomination in Iraq (67%) and in full communion with the Roman Catholic Church. This led to Cardinal Sako withdrawing his headquarters from Baghdad and fleeing to Erbil. Kildani even faked a meeting with the Pope to try and gain legitimacy. While I was with Cardinal Sako days after he arrived in Erbil, he shared his fear for the future of the church in Iraq under such threats. Fortunately, in April 2024, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani reinstated the decree, with Cardinal Sako immediately returning the church headquarters to Baghdad. Resistance to Kildani
The Christian residents and leaders of Qaraqosh have refused to allow Kildani to take political control, although they endure regular harassment going through the militia checkpoints, especially women. On March 11, 2023, Kildani’s brother, Osama, who now commands the Babylon Brigade militia while Rayan focuses on the political movement, attempted to take over the base of the Christian Nineveh Plains Protection Units (NPU) in Qaraqosh, a force of 500 men organized for their protection.
Archbishop Younan Hanno and all the top Christian leaders, along with residents, marched towards the Babylon Brigade convoy to force the militia out of town. On August 5, the Council of Qaraqosh Archbishops, along with five Syriac, Assyrian, Chaldean political parties, held another protest against ongoing land theft, corrupt security forces, unfair elections for Christians, frustration with the demographic change, and anger at efforts to remove their political leadership and replace them with Kildani loyalists.
On September 26, a devastating fire broke out at a wedding reception in Qaraqosh, quickly igniting the entire building, killing 134 people, and injuring over 250, devastating the close-knit Syriac Catholic community. Just weeks after the fire, I was able to visit the reception hall and spend time sitting with families who were dealing with unimaginable grief. It seemed every family I met had lost at least one immediate family member, often a teenager, while also losing sisters, brothers, cousins, and parents.
Syriac Catholic Priest Father Adris Hanna, who spent time ministering to this community, wrote that “Exhaustion has taken its toll on the people, and thoughts of migration now loom large. The residents of Qaraqosh have faced persecution and expulsion, driven from their homeland due to their ethnicity and faith.” Many returned to rebuild after 2014, but even they are contemplating emigration due to constant threats.
With rumors that the wedding hall owner is affiliated with Kildani and angry with Kildani’s efforts to remove Christian officials, residents refused to let Kildani and his Babylon-affiliated Member of Parliament Duraid Jamil Eshoo to attend a mourning ceremony. Kildani threatened to attack a church if he was not allowed entry, and Duraid said, “If 100 died now, we’ll make them 200 next time, and we’ll break the bishop’s crosier on his head,” referring to Archbishop Hanno’s traditional staff. All of these comments were caught on video and shared with authorities. The power grab
On July 2, 2024, Kildani finally convinced (or coerced) a majority of the Nineveh Provincial Council to make the drastic decision to remove 15 government officials in Qaraqosh, Bartella, and Tel Kef, and the strategically important Yazidi homeland of Sinjar.
Kildani’s pro-Iranian Babylon Movement controls 16 of the 29 members of the Nineveh Provincial Council, a huge surprise since this is a majority Arab area. He is part of the Nineveh Future Alliance, along with the Coordination Framework, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and those holding minority quota seats.
The Opposition Alliance comprises the United Nineveh Alliance (9 seats) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (4 seats). The opposition suspended its membership in the council, calling for the Council President to be removed, and filed a complaint with the federal court. The council’s decision brought stunning unity from five Christian political parties, saying the actions “exceeded the law and constitutional powers” and would have “serious negative consequences in society.” All changes are on hold until the court decides the case.
Kildani was also a leader in the alliance that took over the Kirkuk Provincial Council, voting on August 10 to replace the Governor and council speaker positions, leading to widespread news coverage and protests.
It’s important to note that Kildani is not a rogue player, but working closely with other Iranian-backed militia and political leaders such as former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, PMF leader Falih al-Fayyad, and Qais al-Khazali, who in June warned that if the US continues its support of Israel “then America should know that it will put all its interests in the region, particularly in Iraq, at risk and make them a target.”
In fact, it is difficult to find any negative articles about Kildani in local news any longer, showing his enormous power and the fear he instills.
Kildani immediately took credit for the council’s actions on Alawla TV saying, “but today we have restored rights to the people of Nineveh…” While there are dozens of articles about this vote, no local news covered Kildani’s involvement. In fact, it is difficult to find any negative articles about Kildani in local news any longer, showing his enormous power and the fear he instills. Protecting Iraq’s minorities
The Government of Iraq should challenge the Nineveh Provincial Council’s decision to replace officials with Kildani loyalists, giving him and Iranian-backed militias control of most of the Nineveh Plains. Harassment of religious and ethnic communities at checkpoints by Kildani’s Babylon Brigade or others should not be allowed or tolerated. Those that violate the law should be prosecuted.
Federal authorities must investigate and charge those like Kildani who engage in vote-buying and other election fraud.
Election rules must be changed to protect the political representation of Christians, Yazidis, and other religious and ethnic minorities in parliament so only minority community members can vote for their own representation. Federal authorities must investigate and charge those like Kildani who engage in vote-buying and other election fraud.
The US and the international community still have the political might to press for positive changes to protect these fragile religious minority communities, but they must act now.
The views represented in this piece are those of the author and do not express the official position of the Wilson Center.
About the Author
Nadine Maenza Global Fellow; President, International Religious Freedom Secretariat
The Wilson Center’s Middle East Program serves as a crucial resource for the policymaking community and beyond, providing analyses and research that helps inform US foreign policymaking, stimulates public debate, and expands knowledge about issues in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Read more
Why August 19, 2024's Super Blue Moon Is So Rare And When To See The Next One
Tonight’s full moon is not just a regular celestial event—it’s a rare combination of three fascinating phenomena: the Supermoon, the Blue Moon, and the Sturgeon Moon. Let’s break down what makes this August 19th full moon so special.
What Is A Supermoon?
A Supermoon happens when the moon is at its closest point to Earth, known as perigee, during its full moon phase. This means it looks bigger and brighter than usual. The term "Supermoon" was introduced by astrologer Richard Nolle in 1979. NASA explains that because the moon’s orbit around Earth is not a perfect circle, its distance from Earth varies. Supermoons occur three to four times a year, but they only make up about 25% of all full moons.
What About The Blue Moon?
The term "Blue Moon" has two meanings: monthly and seasonal. August's full moon is a seasonal Blue Moon, which is rare. Typically, there are three full moons in each astronomical season (from solstice to equinox or vice versa). When there are four, the third one is called a Blue Moon. The next seasonal Blue Moon won’t appear until May 2027.
Monthly Blue Moons, which happen roughly every 2-3 years, refer to the second full moon in a single calendar month. While Blue Moons are uncommon, a Supermoon that is also a Blue Moon is even rarer, with occurrences ranging from every 10 to 20 years. The next pairing of a Supermoon and Blue Moon will occur in January and March 2037.
The Sturgeon Moon
The name "Sturgeon Moon" comes from Native American tribes who used lunar names to track seasonal changes. August’s full moon was named after the large sturgeon fish found in the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain, which were most easily caught during this time of year. Other names for August’s full moon include the Black Cherries Moon, Corn Moon, and Mountain Shadows Moon. Unfortunately, sturgeon populations have declined due to overfishing and habitat loss.
Will The Moon Actually Appear Blue?
Despite the name, the moon won’t turn blue tonight. When you see images of a blue moon, the blue color is usually added through filters or photo editing. Real blue moons are incredibly rare and usually result from specific atmospheric conditions, such as volcanic ash. The term "Blue Moon" has been in use since at least 1528, but naturally occurring blue moons are few and far between.
What’s Happening In The Night Sky?
If you’re keen on stargazing this month, here are some highlights:
August 19: Watch the full moon.
August 20: The moon will move past Saturn, rising in the east and traveling west throughout the night.
August 27: A crescent moon will join Mars and Jupiter before sunrise for a spectacular trio in the eastern sky.
All Month: The Lagoon Nebula is visible with binoculars or a telescope in the constellation Sagittarius, near "The Teapot" star pattern.
Enjoy tonight's full moon—whether you’re a seasoned stargazer or just curious about the cosmos, this August full moon is a celestial event not to be missed!
Antarctica’s Melting Ice Is Lifting the Land. Could It Slow Rising Seas?
As Antarctica’s ice melts, the land beneath it is rising due to the reduced weight on the bedrock. This unexpected uplift could potentially help reduce the impact of rising sea levels. Outlook International Desk Updated on: 19 August 2024 Representative image
Nature is full of surprises, and Antarctica is adding another intriguing twist to its tale. Recent research reveals that the land beneath the Antarctic Ice Sheet is rising, a phenomenon that could have significant implications for sea level rise. Understanding this process is crucial as we seek to anticipate and mitigate the impacts of climate change.
While the Earth may seem stable, the ground beneath our feet is in constant motion. Land can sink or rise due to various environmental factors. In Antarctica, as ice melts, the bedrock beneath is experiencing a noticeable uplift. This is because the weight of the ice pressing down on the land is reduced, allowing the bedrock to rise slowly.
Terry Wilson, a senior research scientist at the Byrd Polar and Climate Research Center at The Ohio State University, is leading a team investigating this phenomenon. Their focus is on how the rising land could interact with the melting ice and impact global sea levels.
Researchers at McGill University have developed a sophisticated model to explore these interactions. The model offers a glimmer of hope: if we succeed in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and slowing global warming, the uplift of the land could potentially reduce Antarctica’s contribution to sea level rise by up to 40%.
The rising land in Antarctica may offer some relief from rising sea levels. As the ice melts, the bedrock’s uplift could offset some of the expected increases in sea levels. This could significantly reduce the amount of sea level rise caused by melting ice if we manage to cut emissions.
Wilson explains, “Our measurements show that the solid earth beneath the Antarctic ice sheet is changing shape much faster than we previously thought. The uplift of the land is occurring over decades, not thousands of years.”
Risks Of Inaction
However, the benefits of land uplift are contingent on our actions to address climate change. If greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise unchecked, the ice will melt faster than the land can rise. This scenario would lead to an acceleration of sea level rise, potentially worsening predictions for coastal flooding and impacting millions of people living in low-lying areas.
Wilson warns, “If emissions are not reduced in time, the melting ice will outpace the land’s uplift, leading to greater sea level rise. This could significantly worsen predictions for sea level rise along populated coastlines.”
The study, which uses data from the Antarctic Network (ANET) of the Polar Earth Observing Network (POLENET) project, involves simulations to predict potential changes in Antarctica’s ice sheet and their effects on global sea levels until the year 2500. This research underscores the importance of taking immediate action to limit emissions and mitigate climate change impacts.
Wilson’s research emphasizes that individual and collective actions can influence the future health of our planet. With nearly 700 million people living in coastal regions, understanding and addressing sea level rise is crucial for protecting vulnerable communities.
Wilson concludes, “There’s a lot of uncertainty in every model and prediction, but improving our ability to make accurate predictions is essential. It’s the only way we can effectively address the changes our world is undergoing.”
This study highlights the urgent need for action on climate change. Whether through personal choices, supporting environmental policies, or advocating for systemic changes, every effort contributes to preserving our planet. As we face the challenges of a changing climate, every action, no matter how small, can make a difference in shaping a sustainable future.
Pakistan: Youtuber Aun Ali Khosa abducted by intelligence agencies released, says lawyer
Khosa was among the three other social media activists of jailed former prime minister Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) party who had recently been picked up allegedly by intelligence agencies
PTI Lahore Published 19.08.24, 06:03 PM
Aun Ali KhosaInstagram/ aunalikhosa
Pakistani YouTuber and comedian Aun Ali Khosa, who was allegedly abducted by intelligence agencies last week for singing a song critical of the Shehbaz Sharif government and its backers, has returned home in Punjab province, his lawyer said on Monday.
Khosa was among the three other social media activists of jailed former prime minister Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) party who had recently been picked up allegedly by intelligence agencies.
The other two people were Naeem Ahmad Yasin and Arsalan Akbar. Their families have declared them "missing persons".
The Sharif-led government and the establishment were facing scathing criticism on social media for "abducting" Aun Khosa for singing a parody song on soaring electricity bills.
Days before his abduction, Khosa had sung a song, "Bill Bill Pakistan", a parody of the famous Pakistani song "Dil Dil Pakistan" and released a video on social media criticising the high prices of electricity and extra taxes added to it.
Khosa also took on the worthlessness of the Pakistani passport and the cash-strapped country's loans. The comedian has a following of 137,000 on YouTube.
On Monday, Khosa's lawyer, Advocate Khadija Siddiqi, said on X: “Aun Ali Khosa has been released! He has reached home! Criticising the recurring cases of abductions, she said, “Over the last two months, we have fought all missing persons cases, including Aun's, at the Lahore High Court.” She said that the kidnappers have the same modus operandi; they come in the dark of the night at 2 or 3 am, break down the door, and there are about a dozen men with masks on their faces, carrying weapons.
They take away mobile phones and laptops, and if there’s a CCTV installed, they remove it. They harass the victim and take him away.
"Then, when the high court’s ruling comes, they return the victim to his house in the dark of the night," Siddiqui said, adding that the practice of abduction of citizens should come to an end.
"If someone has violated the law, bring them to court and prosecute them there," she said.
Earlier, the Lahore High Court (LHC) directed the Punjab police chief to recover Khosa by August 20 and to recover missing PTI activist Arsalan Akbar by August 28.
The PTI has expressed concern over the recent ‘forced disappearances’ of its political workers.
Two brothers of PTI former social media head Azhar Mashwani – Professors Mazhar-ul-Hassan and Zahoor-ul-Hassan – as well as party founder Khan's close aide Shahbaz Gill’s brother Ghulam Shabbir have been missing since June last.
Amnesty International has also demanded the Pakistan government to immediately disclose the whereabouts of missing persons and ensure an effective, independent, and impartial investigation into these disappearances."
The Lingering Economic Consequences of Sri Lanka’s Civil War
A lack of justice following Sri Lanka’s Civil War has compounded the economic crisis in the North-East.
By Devana Senanayake August 19, 2024 THE DIPLOMAT
Sri Lankan Tamil civil war survivors perform rituals in memory of their deceased family members on a small strip of land where civilians were trapped during the last stages of the war in Mullivaikkal, Sri Lanka, May 17, 2024.Credit: AP Photo/Eranga Jayawardena Subscribe for ads-free reading
This year marks 15 years since the end of the Civil War in Sri Lanka. The armed forces carried out an avalanche of atrocities during the conflict: they bombed No Fire Zones, shelled hospitals, fired on Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) combatants that surrendered, carried out enforced disappearances, and denied humanitarian aid such as food and medicine to civilians in camps. An International Crisis Group report in 2010 noted that the “the Sri Lankan option” set a precedent for the elimination of dissent. In fact, close parallels can be seen in Gaza today.
Fifteen years later, the Tamil people have not received a solution to the National Question, be it a political solution – such as the complete devolution of authority from a centralized state to the provincial councils, a solid accountability mechanism, or personalized reparations – or an economic solution.
Research has revealed a number of obstacles to economic development in the North-East: militarization, unsustainable infrastructure projects, a lack of viable livelihoods in the area, the lack of a macro-economic vision that prioritizes local people’s autonomy over land, and the absence of ports.
The diminished civic space and lack of economic development are closely connected. This can be seen in the state-sponsored colonization that has restricted people’s access to their land and resources, and militarized capitalism, that has acutely reinforced the military’s ability to act as a capitalist hand.
State-sponsored Colonization
“It is only the armed conflict that is over. The civil conflict is very much alive,” said Shanakiyan Rasamanickam, an MP and member of Illankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi (ITAK). “The oppression still exists and the land issues are the topmost issue.”
In Sri Lanka, the majority of land is under the state’s control. Land is distributed under various ordinances to farmers as annual or extended permits. Grants exist but they have specific stipulations. In the North-East, most citizens had access to private lands. Faced by violence from the armed forces, the Indian Peace Keeping Forces, and other paramilitary troops, many people had to leave their lands and in the process lost their deeds. At the end of the Civil War, the army released the majority of land but the state used various departments to reoccupy them.
The state has three primary motivations for this. First, the extensively centralized state is paranoid that the complete devolution of authority to the provincial councils could loosen their control over the land. Second, colonization shapes the ethnic makeup of an area. With land occupation, the number of Sinhala voters increases and there is a greater likelihood of a Sinhala representative elected into Parliament. Finally, when the state occupies land, they could use it to complete their political project, be it Sinhalization or neoliberalization.
“Land is power. The state needs to control land to implement its political project,” said Sandun Thudugala, a member of People’s Alliance for Right to Land. This can be seen in former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s allocation of land to the military and current President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s allocation of land for market liberalization (i.e. private investment).
Methods
Under British rule, the state occupied land for tea plantations. These schemes displaced Sinhala peasants and confined them to the periphery of these areas. In the post-independence period, many politicians had to meet the demands of these constituencies and expanded colonization schemes into the Dry Zone. D. S. Senanayake, the first prime minister of Sri Lanka (then known as Ceylon), set up the Gal Oya project for rural development during 1948-1952. The project built a dam in the Gal Oya Basin and used it to cultivate paddy, chilies, and potatoes. The need for labor led to the violent displacement of Tamil and Muslim farmers to make space for Sinhala settlements. The Gal Oya riots in 1956 exploded as a result of these schemes.
Water diversification for Sinhala farmers was the primary aim of the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Program in the 1970s. In the next decades, Sinhala farmers did not have a base in the North-East, so the state continued the project. These development projects led to tensions in rural areas like Batticaloa’s Mayilathamaduva. Tamil cattle farmers were threatened by Sinhala paddy farmers and many times their livestocks were harmed or killed.
In the Civil War, the military occupied land for security reasons and maintained its establishments. No one could enter these areas except for military personnel. After the conflict ended, the military released most of the land, but certain lands such as Mullikullam in Manner are still occupied. The military also runs tourism sites such as the Thalsevana Holiday Resort and Restaurant in Valikamam. Some families were provided alternate lands, but other families continue to protest for their private land. Despite pressure from the international community, some of these lands have been reoccupied by other departments.
The Department of Archeology (DOA)’s main mandate is the restoration and preservation of Sinhala Buddhist culture, but they use this to colonize lands in the Tamil homeland. When the DOA identifies ruins (i.e. ancient stones or broken statues), they demarcate the land under their department. The entrance is closed and all productive activities are ceased. A Buddhist monk enters the area and a temple is built around him. He opens the space up to devotees, usually family members from the South, to clean the premises and cook. Once a number of families have been settled, the area becomes a Sinhala-Buddhist community. Kurunthurmalai temple is an example of a temple’s construction under the premise of archaeological restoration, despite the presence of a court order.
The DOA’s narrative only promotes Sinhala Buddhism. So only Sinhala people can enter these areas and pray. Tamil historians have pointed to the presence of Tamil Buddhists in the North but these nuanced identities are unable to fit into the state’s definition of a fixed Sinhala Buddhist identity. Land colonization by the DOA, as a result, upends and fractures the complexity of identity in the island.
Similarly, the Department of Wildlife Conservation (DWC) declares land to be under its authority for conservation purposes. Once land is allocated to the DWC, people cannot enter unless they have permission. Land allocated under the DWC in the Civil War naturally turned into forests. When the state mapped the area, they demarcated occupied private land as forest cover.
“We have certain places where the house is owned by a private individual and the toilet is owned by the DWC,” Sandun said. “Conservation is important but this is an arbitrary declaration of zones. We have asked for a proper mapping of the area for environmental conservation and private lands. This can help the release of lands to citizens.”
Despite their mandate for conservation, DWC-held land has also been used to set up cultivation projects. In 2015, the president claimed demilitarized land to be forest cover. The DWC set up elephant fences as borders, initiated reforestation projects, and the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) occupied these areas. In 2021, former Wildlife Conservation Minister Wimalaweera Dissanayake asked 600 CDF members to cultivate nut trees in the 300 acres allocated to each of them. Subsequently, the CDF members erected fences and claimed to be involved in a reforestation scheme, despite it being a cultivation scheme.
Another example is the occupation of the coastal belt. Coastal land in Sri Lanka is common land and in the past fishermen used this land to host their shelters, boats, and nets. After the tsunami in 2004, the state prevented construction in a 100 meter area that separated coast and land. When the Civil War ended in 2009, the state decided to allocate this land for tourism. In the Eastern Province, in particular, land has been sold to hotels.
The occupation of land by various state departments denies people access to the land, natural resources, and local infrastructure. Land that could potentially be used to stimulate the local economy is held by the state. The state is able to occupy, appropriate, and extract the lands for its benefit at the expense of the people it belongs to.
“If land is not prioritized, who are the beneficiaries of a political solution?” Rasamanickam asked.
The release of private land is just a start. There are a number of people that relocated from the plantations to the North and members of oppressed castes that never had land.
“There is a large section of society in the North that is landless. They never had land to start. This requires a much broader scheme for land alienation and land redistribution,” said Ahilan Kardirgamar, a lecturer at the University of Jaffna.
Militarized Capitalism
A study published in 2017 touched on the concept of militarized capitalism in the North-East. The idea is that militarization intersected with capitalism, in the form of apparel factories set up in former LTTE-occupied areas. The military helped these factories secure property, production sites, and a labor force in 2009. They also built infrastructure such as roads to increase connectivity. The factories set up training centers to indoctrinate the labor force into the rules of capitalism, namely technical skills, presentation and interpersonal skills. At this point, civilians still employed the labor force.
Over time, the intersection of capitalism and militarization coalesced into one form: militarized capitalism. In Mullaitivu alone, there are a number of military-run businesses (i.e. farms, hotels, and factories), recruitment of civilians into the military-run Civil Security Department (CSD) and interference by the military in the private sector. People are stuck in a cycle of control, dependence, and debt. As a result, the military, as a hand of capitalism, has a monopoly over the local economy and local political activity.
“The local people cannot access their land, natural resources, and markets. They are denied opportunities,” Sandun said. “Smallholder businesses and SMEs are supposed to compete. This is not a fair or equal competition. This bodes badly for the entire economy. It provides control of the economy to a limited group of people.
“Look at Myanmar and Pakistan. The authority of the military has been built through economic exercises. In those countries, the military controls the economy,” he continued.
The structural dependence of local livelihoods on the military means that they are instrumentalized for political purposes. CSD employees were used to campaign for former President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s re-election in 2015. Workers had been told to protest the transfer of the CSD to civilian authorities in 2017.
Impact
With the end of the Civil War, repression became normalized in Sri Lanka’s North-East. In 2017, the district of Mullaitivu had 60,000 troops – 25 percent of the approximately 243,000 active military personnel in the entire country. For every two citizens, there was one soldier.
In 2024, over a decade since the war ended, Tamil people are haunted by surveillance, harassment, and intimidation. Women, in particular, have not received justice for the sexual violence they experienced in 2009. They encounter armed men in mundane situations: as they purchase food, enter schools, and access resources. Female-headed households are particularly culpable to violence. Those who protest have received visits from armed men at late hours, sources have disclosed.
Research from 2020 mapped out diminished civic space for minorities across Sri Lanka. While this space briefly opened up in the 2022 protests in the South, activists have encountered a climate of repression in events that remember Tamil people, such as the Mullivaikkal remembrance event in 2023 in Borella Cemetery and 2024 in Wellawatte Beach. Similarly, protests for Palestine are accompanied by a police force and water cannons.
“Tamils in the North-East have fought for the right to commemorate for many years prior, facing severe repression from the state. While commemoration events marking the Tamil Genocide Remembrance Day and Maaveerar Naal happen, the participants and organizers continue to face harassment from the state,” said Mario Arulthas, a Ph.D. candidate at SOAS, University of London. “The people organizing Tamil remembrance events in Colombo only started in recent years and are in a space that the state is not used to and therefore faced some backlash. Tamils have shown that these spaces, while contested, must be fought for.”
The deprivation of economic and civic rights has left the North-East vulnerable to external shocks. Sri Lanka’s poverty rate increased from 4 to 7 million during 2019-2023. While the economic crisis hit the entire island, the impact is compounded in the Tamil homeland. Research from 2019 revealed that multidimensional poverty had declined from 2007-2013, but existed in pockets in the North-East. In 2023, a UNDP report identified 55.7 percent of the country to be multidimensionally vulnerable, mostly from areas in the North, North-Central, and Eastern provinces. Many people have been forced into debt to secure basic necessities such as food and medicine. Reports by the World Food Program and U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization in 2023 exposed the acute food insecurity in districts in the North-East.
Tamil Vote
The Tamil people’s choice is crucial for the upcoming presidential election because no party is likely to secure a majority in the first round. Data from 2019 revealed that the North-East has exceptional voter turnout. These votes helped Sajith Premadasa and his party become a contender in the 2019 presidential election. The upcoming election is a three-horse race run by three candidates. As the Sinhala vote is likely to be split into three, the minority Tamil votes are essential for a party to secure a victory.
Tamil nationalist parties have announced a number of options: a boycott of the elections, support for a candidate in the South, or a common candidate for the Tamil vote. While some feel that the common candidate is an opportune moment to further Tamil demands, others are critical of it.
“The common candidate is a distraction. The Tamil nationalist parties have distorted the entire project. They remain on this one-track, polarizing ethnic project but this does not help the Tamil people,” Kardirgamar observed.
In a local paper, leader of ITAK, M. A. Sumanthiran said that presidential elections are not the time to make statements about Tamil demands.
“No party or a candidate is likely to receive 50 percent in the first count. So the president is likely to focus on the second preference. He could rely on SLPP members for the Southern votes and CWC for the Hill Country Tamil votes,” said Shreen Saroor, an activist and member of the Women’s Action Network.
“The Cabinet recently issued a statement about burial rites and an apology for forced cremation done during the pandemic, probably for the Muslim votes. It is also speculated that the president and the Tamil common candidate have a deal to further split the Tamil votes.”
Despite the importance of the Tamil vote, apart from lip service about the provincial councils, none of the candidates has proposed a radical solution to either the national question or the economic crisis. In the North-East, they manifest as one crisis.
