Israel sending troops into Lebanon is 'invasion,' says UK lawmaker

'Its failure to defend international law and stand up to Israel is a moral disgrace,' says Jeremy Corbyn

Burak Bir |01.10.2024 - TRT/AA


LONDON

Jeremy Corbyn said Tuesday that the Israeli incursion into Lebanon is an "an invasion," as he criticized the UK for failing to defend international law.

"Israel's decision to send troops into Lebanon, a sovereign nation, is not a ‘limited ground operation.’ It is an invasion. Our government's hypocrisy is on full display," the Independent lawmaker wrote on X.

"Its failure to defend international law and stand up to Israel is a moral disgrace," said Corbyn, who is an MP with the Independent Alliance and former Labour Party leader.

Israel has launched massive airstrikes since Sept. 23 against what it calls Hezbollah targets across Lebanon that have killed more than 1,057 victims and injured north of 2,950, according to the Lebanese Health Ministry.

Several leaders of the Lebanese resistance group have been killed in the strikes, including the leader Hassan Nasrallah.

Hezbollah and Israel have been engaged in cross-border warfare since the start of Israel's onslaught against the Gaza Strip, which has killed nearly 41,600 victims, most of them women and children, following a cross-border attack by the Palestinian resistance group, Hamas, last October.

The international community has warned that Israeli attacks in Lebanon could escalate the Gaza conflict into a wider regional war.

THE RUSSIAN VIEW

Jimmy Carter as the Symbol of a Vanished Era

Roman Reinhardt
01.10.2024

https://valdaiclub.com/

© Sputnik/Vladimir Akimov

On October 1, the 39th US President Jimmy Carter celebrated his 100th birthday. In our opinion, this ex-president personifies a very interesting and, judging by some details, irretrievable bygone era. An era from which lessons can be learned. Especially if we look back at the turning point, the year 1979, writes Roman Reinhardt.

Then, forty-five years ago, a number of events occurred that determined the development of international relations along several important vectors. Carter, as the head of one of the two superpowers, was not just a participant in them, but a protagonist in the full sense. His actions and the steps he took have received and continue to receive different assessments, but amid the current conditions even a brief review of them seems important and timely, and provides the key, if not to a solution, then at least to a better understanding of current problems.

Despite the fact that foreign policy, as we know, is a continuation of domestic policy, we will not dwell on the analysis of the latter. We will leave the review of Carter's activities as governor of Georgia, his election campaign, education reform, energy policy and other things, right down to piquant details like the incident with the floating rabbit, to biographers and specialists in the relevant fields. We will focus on the image of Carter in world politics and on certain key events.

The first of these is the Camp David Accords of 1978. They served as the basis for the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in Washington on March 26, 1979. Yes, there were other figures present, perhaps even of the same calibre: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. However, it is unknown how history would have turned out and whether such a result would have been achieved without Carter. After all, politics is not only the art of the possible, but also often about cooperation with inevitability. And yet, it seems that Carter’s presence as a witness at the signing of the peace treaty, which became one of the pillars of regional security, sent an important signal to the world community. The role of the United States as a sponsor of the aforementioned treaty should not be underestimated either. Hawks do not often lay dove eggs, but this was probably one of those rare cases. However, it would have been difficult to do without an incubator. Given the current situation in the Middle East, the plot, it seems, is not only interesting in itself. At that time, the American administration proved in practice that it was capable of acting, albeit with certain limitations, as one of the guarantors of peace in that region, which is exceptionally difficult from all points of view. Thus, the assertion that the US is taking a chosen position a priori in the current escalation does not seem entirely convincing. Of course, the situation was different in many ways back then. And yet, its outcome demonstrates that Washington can act differently. There is a precedent.

The second was the signing of SALT II in Vienna on June 18, 1979:a formal ceremony that ended with Mr. Carter kissing Comrade Brezhnev. Six months later, the USSR sent a limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan, which is why the US Senate never ratified the treaty. This, however, did not prevent both parties from adhering to its main provisions. It is clear that reaching this agreement, as in the case of Egypt and Israel, was preceded by many years of painstaking work. Negotiations with the Soviet side were conducted by previous administrations starting in 1972. So, in a sense, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford also had a hand in this treaty. However, the final point, or rather, the personal signature, was put on it by Carter. Slowing down the nuclear race (its stop, then or now, let's be realistic, is only possible in mental constructs) is another topic that hasn’t lost its relevance. In turn, this precedent demonstrates the ability of the parties to adhere to the old principle of pacta sunt servanda, even despite the fact that the legal consolidation of the pact was not finalized. And it turns out that this is also possible.

Third, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China on January 1, 1979, and Deng Xiaoping's subsequent visit to the United States. Of course, this also had a "prequel" - Nixon's trip to China seven years earlier. Nevertheless, the institutionalisation of rapprochement occurred in the late 1970s. In addition to security issues, a bilateral agreement on scientific and technical cooperation and an agreement on cultural cooperation were signed during the Chinese statesman's visit. Thus, it can be considered the starting point for scientific diplomacy and cultural interaction between Washington and Beijing. This is also something to remember, given the current course of American politicians towards Chinese scientists, and not only. Just look at the increase in spending on military aid to Taiwan announced by President Biden.


In terms of comparison and lessons, here, in our opinion, the important message is that the agenda should not be limited to any topic, even very sensitive ones. On the contrary, parallel and coordinated movement along other tracks (in particular, along scientific ones) at least does not hinder progress where the parties' positions diverge radically.


Moreover, this logic works not only in the case of China, although in its case it works especially well.



Of course, there were other achievements, and Carter's America also had its failures. To understand the scale and consequences of the latter, it is enough to name one country - Iran. The sanctions story, which continues to this day, began in 1979 after the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran by local students. Carter failed to cope with that crisis either by military or diplomatic means. The hostages were released under Ronald Reagan.

Relations with the USSR at that time were not cloudless. Let's remember, for example, the Il-62 incident in New York on August 24–27, 1979, which separated Bolshoi Theatre artists Alexander Godunov and Lyudmila Vlasova forever. During the denouement of this family drama, which unexpectedly acquired an international dimension, President Carter showed himself to be quite ambiguous. He simultaneously gave two orders: the first to the Attorney General to use the police in any expedient way, and the second to the US Permanent Representative to the UN, who acted as the main negotiator on the American side, to show restraint. As Joseph Brodsky, who also found himself embroiled in this story by the will of fate, noted, Carter's left hand cancelled what the right hand was doing... A certain indecisiveness was a characteristic of the hero of the day, and this duality of positions was observed more than once. The very fact that he appointed Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State and Zbigniew Brzezinski as National Security Advisor can be interpreted both as a brilliant political move and as a manifestation of inconsistency. Arguments in favour of the first: the principle of divide et impera, multiplied by someone else's experience of the balance of power in similar situations (take at least the Chicherin-Litvinov pair from the history of early Soviet diplomacy). In favour of the second - the actual transfer of the foreign policy reins to Brzezinski in 1980 after Vance resigned without finding an equivalent replacement. The next Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, did practically nothing during his six months in this position until Reagan came to power.

The Zbigniew Brzezinski I Knew: A Personal Tribute

Toby Trister Gati

Zbigniew Brzezinski’s life serves as an example of the contribution citizens can make to political life – and as an example of how to exit gracefully after a devastating electoral loss, writes Valdai Club expert Toby T. Gati.Opinions

However, the boycott of the Summer Olympics in Moscow, flirting with Soviet dissident émigrés, and finally, the end of the policy of détente are largely the work of the "American Talleyrand" of Polish descent, whose opinions Carter listened to throughout his entire presidential term. Strictly speaking, the so-called Carter Doctrine is more of a Brzezinski concept. The consequences of its adoption and application are described in great detail and clearly in the memoirs of our brilliant ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, who became the dean of the diplomatic corps in Washington on July 17, 1979. Its main result was the paralysis of political communication between the White House and the Kremlin; similar to what we are seeing now, but not in such a harsh vein.

This is by no means a complete and balance sheet of the eventful year 1979. The following year, 1980, marked the decline of Carter's political career. He was only 55 years old. The insightful editor of “The New American” Sergei Dovlatov, while far removed from politics, predicted the election results in the pages of his publication in the summer of 1980. He described Carter as pious, honest and noble, and his opponent Reagan as firm, principled and thrifty. To a large extent, the outcome of that presidential race was predictable. Now we are again in a similar phase of the electoral cycle, but with qualitatively different “input data.”

At one time, the author of this essay read a joke. Nixon, in a conversation with a foreign leader, formulated his foreign policy credo as follows: do to others what they can do to you. Henry Kissinger (who later also crossed the 100-year mark, and before that, like Carter, received the Nobel Peace Prize) allegedly added: and another ten percent. Judging by the actions and later statements of Carter (especially as ex-president), he himself was ready to take away this ten percent. Since then, the categorical imperatives in world politics have changed beyond recognition. At that time, they still adhered to an unspoken rule, close to the biblical maxim, that you should not do to Russia what you do not want it to do to you. Time will tell, whether there is enough wisdom in the Oval Office now, and even after the elections, if there can be a return to this understanding.

Tunisia reportedly jails presidential candidate Ayachi Zammel for 12 years

Zammel, who remains a candidate for October 6 race, sentenced in four cases related to voter endorsements, his lawyer says.

Ayachi Zammel [File: Screen grab/YouTube/@Ayachi_Zammel

Published On 1 Oct 2024

A candidate in Tunisia’s upcoming presidential election has been sentenced to 12 years in prison, according to his lawyer.

Ayachi Zammel, a former lawmaker who heads a small liberal party, was jailed in four cases related to voter endorsements, his legal representative, Abdessater Massoudi said on Tuesday.

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It is the third prison sentence imposed on Zammel in two weeks, according to the lawyer, who insisted that his client “remains a candidate in the election” which will take place on October 6.

Last Wednesday, the Criminal Chamber of the Jendouba Court of First Instance sentenced Zammel to six months for “deliberately using a fraudulent certificate,” according to Tunisia’s TAP news agency.

At the time, Massoudi told the Reuters news agency that it was “another unjust ruling and a farce that clearly aims to weaken him in the election race” and he pledged to defend Zammel’s right to take part in the vote.

On September 18, his lawyer said Zammel had been handed a 20-month prison term for falsifying the signatures he gathered to file the candidacy papers needed to run for president.

To appear on the ballot, candidates are required to present a list of signatures either from 10,000 registered voters, 10 parliamentarians or 40 local officials.

Zammel was arrested on September 2, just before an announcement by Tunisia’s electoral authority ISIE that he had made it onto the final list of candidates.

Power grab

The rulings underscore mounting tensions in the run-up to the vote.

Opposition and civil society groups have been voicing concerns about a potentially rigged election, designed to keep President Kais Saied in power.


ISIE rejected the bids of about 14 hopefuls for the election, leaving only Zammel and Zouhair Maghzaoui, of the left-wing nationalist People’s Movement, to challenge Saied.

The incumbent and frontrunner is seeking a second term. He initially took office in a 2019 election, but then orchestrated a sweeping power grab in 2021, shutting down parliament and ruling by decree. Several opposition figures have been jailed.

The treasurer of Zammel’s Azimoun party was arrested in August on similar charges to the leader.

Source: News Agencies

Deadly Marburg virus spreads in Rwanda, with no vaccine or treatment

Most of the affected are healthcare workers across six out of 30 districts in the country.

By Ignatius Ssuuna The Associated Press
Posted October 1, 2024 

A medical worker from the Infection Prevention and Control unit wearing full protective equipment prepares to enter an isolation tent housing a man being quarantined after coming into contact in Uganda with a carrier of the Marburg Virus, a hemorrhagic fever from the same family as Ebola, at the Kenyatta National Hospital in Nairobi, Kenya. 

AP Photo/Ben Curtis

Rwanda says eight people have died so far from the Ebola-like and highly contagious Marburg virus, just days after the country declared an outbreak of the deadly hemorrhagic fever that has no authorized vaccine or treatment.


Like Ebola, the Marburg virus originates in fruit bats and spreads between people through close contact with the bodily fluids of infected individuals or with surfaces, such as contaminated bed sheets. Without treatment, Marburg can be fatal in up to 88 per cent of people who fall ill with the disease.

Rwanda, a landlocked country in central Africa, declared an outbreak on Friday and a day later the first six deaths were reported.

So far 26 cases have been confirmed, and eight of the sickened people have died, Health Minister Sabin Nsanzimana said on Sunday night.

The public has been urged to avoid physical contact to help curb the spread. Some 300 people who came into contact with those confirmed to have the virus have also been identified, and an unspecified number of them have been put in isolation facilities.

Most of the affected are healthcare workers across six out of 30 districts in the country.

“Marburg is a rare disease,” Nsanzimana told journalists. “We are intensifying contact tracing and testing to help stop the spread.”

The minister said the source of the disease has not been determined yet. A person infected with the virus can take between three days and three weeks to show symptoms, he added.

Symptoms include fever, muscle pains, diarrhea, vomiting and, in some cases, death through extreme blood loss.

The World Health Organization was scaling up its support and will work with Rwandan authorities to help stop the spread, WHO’s Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said on Saturday on the social media platform X.

The U.S Embassy in Rwanda’s capital of Kigali has urged its staff to work remotely and avoid visiting offices.

Marburg outbreaks and individual cases have in the past been recorded in Tanzania, Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Congo, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda and Ghana, according to the WHO.

The rare virus was first identified in 1967 after it caused simultaneous outbreaks of disease in laboratories in Marburg, Germany, and Belgrade, Serbia. Seven people died who were exposed to the virus while conducting research on monkeys.

Separately, Rwanda has so far reported six cases of mpox, a disease caused by a virus related to smallpox but that typically causes milder symptoms. Mpox, previously known as monkeypox because it was first seen in research monkeys, has also affected several other African countries in what the WHO has called a global health emergency.

Rwanda launched an mpox vaccination campaign earlier this month, and more vaccines are expected to arrive in the country. Neighboring Congo has so far reported most of the cases of mpox, the epicenter of the emergency.

 

COMMENT: From Globalisation to “slowbalisation” as FDIs decline on trade and geopolitical woes

Geopolitical tension, rising trade barriers and the cooling of the global economy has seen Globalisation turn into 'slowbalisation', as FDI falls around the world. / bne IntelliNews

By bne IntelliNews September 30, 2024

Flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) are slowing worldwide in both in absolute terms and as a share of world GDP as the world’s economy cools thanks to the polycrisis. 

A number of factors are depressing international investment activity, says Oxford Economics in a paper on September 30, including changes in industrial organisation, rising trade and investment barriers, and a slump in M&A related to higher interest rates. Global FDI rose 13% per year on average from 1990-2016 but has declined since. 

“Even after netting out the distortionary impact of flows into and out of tax havens, we find that global FDI is now running at around 1% of GDP, around half the level seen in 2005-2016,” Oxford Economics said. 

Geopolitics is also weighing on FDI decisions and Oxford Economics reports that greenfield FDI into China has been falling as tensions rise, diverting to other Asian economies such as Indonesia and Vietnam, where it has been rising; these countries are actively courting as wide a variety of foreign investors as possible to counterbalance China’s rising clout in the region. Many of the countries in the Global South have adopted a multivector foreign policy in an increasingly fractured world, although their relationship with China remains paramount. 

“The latest data for China, meanwhile, shows that FDI inflows have collapsed from over US$100bn per quarter in early 2022 to zero in mid-2024. China appears to be becoming uninvestable for new FDI investors, even if survey evidence suggests most existing investors are staying put,” says Oxford Economics. A global economic slowdown is also depressing FDI investments. 

The slump in global M&A levels – the second lowest since 1996 – and the stabilisation of global value chains are other important factors behind the weakening of FDI. The overall impact on growth is unclear, but middle-income emerging markets are likely to be hit hardest by these changes.

A persistent downtrend 

Global FDI flows surged between 1990 and 2016, peaking at around 2.5% of world GDP before the global financial crisis. However, since 2017, both the absolute level of FDI and its share of world GDP have significantly declined. The impact of ‘phantom’ FDI flows into tax havens, which do not represent productive investment, has lessened but cannot fully explain the current downward trend, says Oxford Economics. 

When tax havens are removed from the data, the downward trajectory remains. OECD data, which adjusts for flows into special purpose entities, also shows a strong decline, even when tax havens are excluded. Across different metrics, global FDI is running at about 1% of world GDP, roughly half of the 2005-2016 levels.

Greenfield investments provide some relief 

FDI is composed of multiple elements, including acquisitions, reinvestment of profits and the creation of new operations, with acquisitions typically being the largest component. 

“If we look only at announced greenfield investment projects, the FDI picture looks brighter. Announced greenfield FDI projects rose strongly in 2022-2023 from the depressed levels around the pandemic. The greenfield data also show a notable shift of investment away from China towards other Asian economies and the US,” says Oxford Economics. 

This shift may be an early indicator that US trade and industrial policies, such as the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act, are diverting FDI towards domestic manufacturing.

However, caution is needed when interpreting greenfield data, which captures planned rather than actual investment flows. In 2023, for instance, only $13.1bn out of $206bn in US greenfield FDI expenditures represented actual new firm expansions or establishments. Furthermore, the initial data for 2024 points to a potential slowdown in greenfield investment globally.

Barriers to investment 

The fall in global FDI can be partly attributed to rising barriers to trade and investment. Chinese FDI inflows have collapsed – dropping from over $100bn per quarter in early 2022 to nearly zero by mid-2024. 

“This collapse looks too dramatic to be just the result of slower GDP growth in China. Rather, it suggests that, even if survey evidence shows most (but not all) existing investors are staying put, China is increasingly seen as too risky a location for new FDI investors given the potential to fall foul of tariffs, investment restrictions and other US sanctions. The evaporation of FDI into sensitive sectors like semiconductors also points to a strong impact from US policy initiatives aimed at China,” Oxford Economics says. 

Geopolitical tensions and the proliferation of investment barriers are contributing to a fragmentation of FDI flows. The share of FDI between countries with distant geopolitical relationships fell to 15% in 2023, down from 23% in 2013, with a significant drop in manufacturing. This fragmentation could reduce long-term global GDP by as much as 2%, according to IMF estimates.

Global value chains and M&A slump 

The slowdown in FDI is also linked to changes in global value chains (GVCs). The increasing complexity of production processes has flattened, driven in part by protectionist policies, but also by technological advancements like robotics and supply chain digitalisation. The latter factors are less harmful to global growth, though they still contribute to a deceleration in cross-border investments.

At the same time, cross-border M&A activity has plummeted, falling from 0.8% of global GDP to just 0.4% over the past three years, reaching its second-lowest level since 1996. This decline is largely tied to rising global interest rates, which have deterred many forms of investment, including M&A.

Uneven impact on growth 

The relationship between FDI and growth is complex. While most studies suggest a positive link between FDI and GDP growth, the strength of this relationship varies depending on the type of economy. 

Middle-income emerging markets tend to benefit most, while advanced economies and low-income countries show weaker gains from FDI. Research suggests that a 1 percentage point increase in the FDI-to-GDP ratio can boost GDP growth by as little as 0.01 percentage points or as much as 0.2 points, with middle-income countries seeing the largest benefits.

The decline in FDI is symptomatic of the shift from rapid globalisation to “slowbalisation.” While not all factors contributing to the weakening of FDI are necessarily negative for growth, the broader trend of rising trade barriers and reduced cross-border investment flows is likely to weigh on global economic expansion, particularly for middle-income emerging economies, concludes Oxford Economics.

 

STOLYPIN: Putin's nuclear rhetoric hints at Ukrainian endgame

Putin has rattled his nuclear sabre very loudly, revising Russia’s nuclear doctrine to allow an attack on the US if Ukraine uses long-range missiles on Russian territory. Is an attack coming or is Putin just preparing the ground for some post-ceasefire future? / bne IntelliNews

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By Mark Galeotti director of consultancy Mayak Intelligence and honorary professor at UCL School of Slavonic & East European Studies September 29, 2024

Vladimir Putin is at it again, playing on Western nerves with talk of modifications to Russia's nuclear doctrine to open up more options for the use of nuclear weapons. Outside commentary is largely divided between regarding it as a serious threat and an act of intimidatory rhetoric, but there is also another dimension to this move, which suggests that Moscow is edging towards some sense of an endgame in Ukraine.

At the Security Council meeting of September 25, Putin announced that the Basic Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence, originally adopted in 2020, would be revised, following a period of consideration that began in June. In particular, he stated that close allies – presumably including Union State partner Belarus – would also come under the protection of Russia's nuclear umbrella and that the conditions for nuclear use would be expanded.

Whereas previously these were either a hostile first strike or a conventional attack which posed an existential threat to the state, Putin suggests now that a massive air and space attack including missiles and drones (which could, after all, carry nuclear warheads) would come under the definition of a potential first strike. Perhaps more interestingly, a serious attack by a state without nuclear weapons, yet with the participation or support of a nuclear state, could be considered a joint attack and face suitable retaliation. It is pretty clear that he has a US-backed Ukraine in mind.

Is this really a major shift? The first point to note is that the doctrine reflects the baseline thinking of the Russian state but that it is unlikely in itself to constrain Putin¡s actions. He would not launch or stop an attack just because his doctrine says so. To a considerable extent, this is likely just one more information operation. He knows perfectly well that the West takes notice when he talks nukes, and that some constituencies become alarmed and again start agitating for an end to the war, lest the hostilities spiral out of hand. Considering that at present Washington is still mulling the request to allow Kyiv to use its ATACMS missiles, as well as Anglo-French Storm Shadow/SCALP systems against targets deeper inside Russia, he may have felt this an opportune moment to stir the pot.

That said, he could have had the same political impact simply with a stray comment. He did not have to initiate a revision of the nuclear doctrine document, something which has consumed considerable effort within the Defence Ministry, General Staff and Security Council Secretariat. This is more than just another bit of sabre-rattling.

Is it that he fears some kind of nuclear attack on the Motherland, or that a US-backed Ukraine could mount some serious invasion of Russia on a vastly greater scale than the Kursk incursion? Unlikely. Indeed, if anything Putin has often been more cautious and conservative than the letter of law and doctrine would imply. Although four regions of Ukraine were formally annexed in September 2022, for example, Putin – for entirely self-interested political reasons, to be sure – has not sent conscripts to fight in the Donbas, even though that would be legal, albeit it deeply unpopular. 

Furthermore, this does nothing to bring closer the threat of the use of a non-strategic nuclear weapon (NSNW) either against Ukraine or as a demonstrative threat. There are serious practical considerations. All Russia's NSWS have sat in armouries for the past 25 years and would need to be reconditioned before being mated to their delivery system. There would also almost certainly need to be a test detonation before any use in anger, and given that even the hypersonic Kindzhal, once touted as impossible to intercept, has proven vulnerable to Patriot air defence systems, Moscow would presumably have to launch multiple missiles to get through. That is, of course, assuming there was a viable target. Ukraine does not mass its forces in such a way to provide a logical target, while striking a city would be considered a massive escalation and an unjustifiable war crime across the world.

Instead, insofar as this latest edit of the doctrine has any serious meaning in the context of the Ukraine war, it may be preparing the ground for some post-ceasefire future. Moscow will presumably try to freeze its control of around a fifth of Ukraine, drawing out any negotiations which would in any case be unlikely to reach some resolution. If left in control of the Donbas, Crimea and the Zaporizhzhian 'land bridge' to the peninsula, Putin would likely be quite happy to take that as a win, even while reserving the option of resuming hostilities at some point in the future if the correlation of forces looked favourable.

In the meantime, he would want to deter any attempt by Kyiv to take back the occupied territories. Garrisons, trenches and minefields are all very well, but the prospect that Moscow might consider an attack by a US-backed Ukraine as potential grounds for a nuclear response might make Kyiv hesitate but, rather more likely, will weigh on the minds of America's leaders, whoever they may be by then. The implications is that Moscow is seriously believing that a ceasefire may be on the horizon, whether because of US pressure or Ukrainian exhaustion. 

Sheinbaum takes the helm of a disoriented Mexico after AMLO’s populist era 

Economically, Mexico has also been left in a precarious position. The country’s fiscal deficit has doubled to 6% of GDP, with Pemex, the state-owned oil giant, holding nearly $100bn in debt. / Secretaría de Cultura de la Ciudad de México

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By Alek Buttermann October 1, 2024

Claudia Sheinbaum has made history as Mexico’s first female president, stepping into a role shaped by her mentor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), who founded the Morena party on a leftist platform in 2012. While her election in June marked a pivotal moment for gender equality in the country, the position comes with overwhelming challenges that her predecessor left unresolved. AMLO's ambitious social reforms and policies won him widespread popularity, but they also left the country facing major issues that Sheinbaum must now urgently address.

The 61-year-old climate scientist and former Mexico City mayor, set to take office on October 1, inherits a nation plagued by rampant violence, an economy showing signs of strain, and a controversial judicial reform that has shaken investor confidence. While AMLO leaves office with an 80% approval rating, his tenure was not without flaws. His approach to security, which often involved avoiding direct confrontation with Mexico’s powerful drug cartels, has left regions like Sinaloa and Chiapas in a state of ongoing conflict. With over 30,000 murders recorded annually, Sheinbaum’s task of restoring safety will be daunting. Even if her appointment of former Mexico City police chief Omar García Harfuch as Security Minister may indicate a reinforced focus on intelligence and investigation, the extent of the country's cartel problem demands a far more comprehensive solution.

Economically, Mexico has also been left in a precarious position. The country’s fiscal deficit has doubled to 6% of GDP, with Pemex, the state-owned oil giant, holding nearly $100bn in debt. AMLO's decision to pour resources into Pemex, coupled with his refusal to implement fiscal reforms or raise taxes, has narrowed Sheinbaum's room for manoeuvre. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has reduced Mexico’s growth outlook to 2.2%, and the new president will face immense pressure to stabilise the economy while managing the burden of AMLO’s legacy, characterised by generous social benefits. Her government’s first budget, due in November, will be a critical moment for setting the tone of her economic policy.

One of the most controversial reforms Sheinbaum must deal with is the judicial overhaul pushed through by AMLO in his final months in office. This reform, which requires all judges to be elected by popular vote, has been widely criticised for undermining judicial independence and has contributed to the peso's significant decline since the election. Investors are waiting for Sheinbaum to clarify her stance on these thorny issues, and her approach will shape the country's economic future and international standing.

While Sheinbaum’s victory is a monumental event for Mexico, her presidency begins with high expectations and significant hurdles. As she steps out from AMLO’s cumbersome shadow, she must balance the promise of continuity with the need to address the deep-rooted problems left by her predecessor’s administration. Despite the pair being described as "politically close," observers point out stark differences in attitude between the reserved, US-educated academic and the outspoken populist leader who came to power in 2018, presiding over five turbulent years. Therefore, as the stage is set for a change of course, Sheinbaum's succession may look less seamless than many fear.

QUIET FIRE 

Jeep urges 194,000 plug-in hybrid SUV owners to stop charging and park outdoors due to fire risk

Associated Press
Mon, September 30, 2024 

A Jeep logo is displayed at the North American International Auto Show in Detroit, Jan. 14, 2019. (AP Photo/Paul Sancya, File)

DETROIT (AP) — Jeep is recalling more than 194,000 plug-in hybrid SUVs worldwide because they can catch fire with the ignition turned off.

In addition, Jeep is urging owners not to charge the SUVs and to park them outdoors and away from structures until they are repaired.

The recall covers the Wrangler four by e from the 2020 through 2024 model years, as well as the Grand Cherokee four by e from 2022 through 2024. Most of the recalled SUVs are in North America.


Stellantis, which makes Jeeps, said a remedy is near and affected customers will be notified when they can schedule service. The company says the risk of fire is reduced when the battery charge is depleted.

A routine review of customer data led to an investigation that found 13 fires with two injuries. Stellantis estimates that 5% of the SUVs have the problem.

Owners with questions should contact Jeep Customer Care at (800) 853-1403 or visit www.mopar.com.

Nearly 200K Jeep PHEVs Being Recalled Due to Battery Fire Risk

Emmet White
Tue, October 1, 2024

194K Jeep PHEVs Recalled Over Fire RiskALDO_FERRERO


Stellantis has been having a bit of a rough year in 2024 — and it doesn't look like it's getting better just yet. On Monday, the automaker announced that nearly 200000 plug-in hybrid Jeeps are being recalled due to a risk that the batteries could catch fire.


More specifically, 2020–2024 model year examples of the Jeep Wrangler 4xe and 2022–2024 model year versions of the Jeep Grand Cherokee 4xe subject to the recall. Models produced after November 16, 2023 are not affected, however.


The automotive conglomerate confirmed that 154032 U.S.-market vehicles are covered by the recall. Other markets affected include 14308 Jeeps in Canada, 673 in Mexico, and an additional 25502 4xes outside North America. Stellantis estimates that around five percent of the recalled models may be affected; the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, however, says it believes only one percent of U.S.-market models suffer from the problem.


Jeep

The potential problem: a combusting lithium-ion battery, to which at least 13 fires have been attributed. NHTSA filings explain that the issue stems from cells that are susceptible to separator damage. Stellantis has yet to find an official remedy, but the company says that a solution is imminent, and that owners should refrain from charging their vehicles in the meantime, because the risk of fire is significantly reduced when the battery is depleted. Owners are encouraged to park their 4xe models away from structures and other vehicles for now, too.

"Affected customers will be notified when they may schedule service," a release from Stellantis said. Affected owners can contact call customer care at 1-800-853-1403 or visit mopar.com/recalls for more information.

This recall comes on the backs of a federal probe into mysterious fires that are plaguing certain Wranglers and Gladiators. Initial reports suggest that the fires are stemming from a shorting power steering pump connector. Hundreds of thousands of BMWs were also recalled recently over fire risks stemming from a shorting water pump connector.

How Adani Group’s airport deal will be a loss for Kenyans

The proposal to redevelop Jomo Kenyatta International Airport seeks to facilitate a tax holiday for the Indian conglomerate and increase costs.

Odongo Kodongo, The Conversation

01/10/24

Passengers wait for their flights during a strike by Kenya airports union workers to protest against a proposed deal for India's Adani Group to lease Jomo Kenyatta International Airport for 30 years, in Nairobi on September 11. | Reutes

The proposal submitted early this year by Indian conglomerate Adani Group to Kenya Airports Authority to develop and renovate parts of Jomo Kenyatta International Airport has recently been made public.

To facilitate informed public engagement with the proposal, as a project finance student, I thought it would be useful to provide an expert view on its key technical aspects.

Adani exploits a provision in Kenya’s Public Private Partnerships Act of 2021 that allows private companies to initiate project proposals and channel them to the government for consideration.

Briefly, Adani seeks to run Jomo Kenyatta International Airport via a 30-year build, operate and transfer arrangement. Under this arrangement, ownership of the airport remains with Kenya Airports Authority, known as the deal sponsor. The airport business is handled by Adani’s subsidiary, Airports Infrastructure Plc, called the special purpose vehicle.

Airports Infrastructure Plc, which was registered in Nairobi on August 31, 2024, is fully owned by the United Arab Emirates incorporated Global Airports Operator LLC.

Global Airports Operator is a subsidiary of Adani Airports Holdings Limited of India, which in turn is fully owned by Adani Group.

The proposal omits information on Adani Airports Holdings Limited’s extent of ownership of Global Airports Operator. This leaves room for speculation about Global Airports Operator’s beneficial owners.

The proposal shows that the project requires a cash outlay of $2.05 billion including capital expenditures, operating expenses and financing costs. This cost is spread over the project’s development period of about 25 years.

However, my examination identifies important flaws in the structure of the proposed deal.

Cash flows

The first flaw is that the Adani Group, the project operator, will have access to all of the airport’s cash flows. This should not be the case in a typical private public partnership deal like the one proposed.

In such deals, the project operator should only have access to cash flows generated by the new project – that is, the proposed new terminal building and runway and their associated infrastructure. It should not have access to cash flows from the existing assets and operations of the deal sponsor.

Secondly, the proposal shows that the proposed renovation of the existing terminal buildings will be financed from money generated from the airport’s existing operations. The renovations should therefore be undertaken by Kenyan Airports Authority and not included in Adani’s proposed deal. Including them in the deal would complicate cash flow separation and risk sharing.

To be sure, in instances where there are substantial risks associated with the new project’s capacity to generate cash flows, the project operator might require additional guarantees. In such cases, governments often provide guarantees limited to a small proportion of the required cash flows.

The third flaw is that Adani proposes that the government pay it for the developed assets when the partnership ends. This is wrong: the government must not buy assets that it already owns.

Return on investment

There are other provisions that require further scrutiny, as well.

The revenue sharing model proposes a fixed concession fee of US$47 million to the government in 2025. Thereafter, the government would receive a fixed fee plus a variable component calculated to ensure that Adani earns an 18% internal rate of return on its capital investment in the project. Internal rate of return is the average annual profit earned by a project in its lifetime.

For Adani to achieve this enviable outcome, the Kenyan Airports Authority would have to take a higher risk by accepting a concession fee that fluctuates with the project’s performance while Adani’s cash flows are predetermined by its desired profit.

This is neither fair nor equitable risk-sharing. As the project operator and major equity capital provider, Adani must take responsibility for the project’s performance by accepting greater fluctuation in its cash flows.

Affordability of services

Fees for aeronautical services (what airlines pay Adani for using the airport) for the first three years will be determined by the need for Adani’s 18% profit. This is problematic.

The internal rate of return is derived from cash inflows and outflows over the project’s lifetime.

Therefore, to determine user charges for an isolated period of the contract such that the internal rate of return remains fixed would push those fees to very high levels.

Indeed, Adani’s own calculations show that the proposed user charges would make the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport more expensive than the Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa. For some transport corridors, the Nairobi airport’s charges as a proportion of airfares are more than double Bole’s.

Passenger traffic

Adani’s project proposal is flawed when it comes to passenger traffic too.

First, the agreement assumes what it calls a “meteoric surge” in passenger numbers based on an assumed constant annual growth rate of 4.5%. This is too optimistic relative to the airport’s historical performance.

Second, Adani’s projections assume full capacity use over the 30-year period. Any financial modeller knows that full capacity is difficult to achieve.

Overall, because of the long period of projections and optimistic stance, Adani’s forecasting assumptions should be subjected to rigorous stress testing (sensitivity analysis). This has not been done.

Tax holidays

Carefully tucked away in the project’s feasibility report is an unheralded pitch to the government for a tax holiday if Adani wins the tender.

Adani argues that, if granted, a tax holiday would lower the charges to airlines. In my view, this is the proposed project’s deal breaker.

Kenyan policy does allow for tax holidays of various kinds to incentivise capital formation and investments in critical but unattractive sectors. It’s doubtful that the airport business fits this description and therefore merits such an incentive.

Further, the evidence shows that such tax incentives hardly offer meaningful economic growth benefits to African countries. More importantly, an analysis of the proposed tax holiday’s effect on cash flows should be provided to aid its assessment. Adani omits such an analysis.

The land question

A component of Adani’s strategy involves developing and operating facilities, such as offices and convention centres. This is subject to confirmation of land availability. Adani does not propose to buy the land. Rather, it appears that Kenya Airports Authority would have to provide the land.

This begs several clarifications.

If the Kenya Airports Authority owns the land, the opportunity cost of the land utilisation by Adani needs to be incorporated in the cost-benefit analysis.

If the Kenya Airports Authority has to buy the land, the question becomes that of the source of the purchase money and whether land acquisition would be the best use of that money by an authority seeking to outsource tasks, such as renovations, due to cash flow constraints.
Final thoughts

The Public Private Partnerships Act requires a justification when an open tender approach is not used for a proposed project. That this has not been done is worrying, given that the consultant hired by the government to advise on this transaction recommended open tendering.

Adani’s argued benefits of its privately initiated proposal – quicker turnaround time, customisation, and risk mitigation – are not convincing. Such benefits are better realised through an open tender, which provides additional benefits such as competitive pricing and transparency.

Adani labelled its proposal “private and confidential”. It is reasonable to expect that it signed a non-disclosure agreement with Kenya Airports Authority to protect its submission from leaking to potential competitors. The proposal has now been released and its content is open knowledge.

If the government were to stop processing Adani’s proposal and open the tender to all interested investors, Adani might seek legal redress since its competitors would easily design their bids to beat its own. Any unbiased court will find that the “breach of confidentiality” violates Adani’s rights.

Adani will win the suit.

One way or the other, circumstances now make Adani the winner and Kenyans the loser in this fiasco.

Odongo Kodongo is Associate professor, Finance, University of the Witwatersrand.

This article was first published on The Conversation.

Also read:

Modi leads, Adani follows: Is India’s diplomacy in lockstep with a private group’s global expansion?

USA: RSF condemns the agrochemical industry’s shameful practice of profiling and slandering environmental journalists

Organisation:  RSF_en

Following the release of the investigative report “Bonus Eventus Files” on September 27 by several international media outlets, Reporters Without Borders (RSF) condemns the collection and misuse of environmental journalists’ personal information to fuel slander campaigns orchestrated by the agrochemical industry. RSF calls on the authorities to swiftly open a judicial inquiry into these scandalous practices, carried out by an American company.

“They tried to discredit me by spreading lies about my work and putting pressure on my editors. This had real consequences on my career, even leading to the cancellation of conferences where I had been invited to speak,” American investigative journalist Carey Gillam told RSF. Gillam, who has written numerous articles and books on the agrochemical industry, particularly for The Guardian and The New York Times, has been the target of false accusations. She is among the media professionals victimised by the private platform Bonus Eventus, which seeks to influence the public debate on pesticides and genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

As revealed on 27 September by the investigative media outlet Lighthouse Reports, in collaboration with several international news organisations such as Le Monde and The Guardian, the platform has compiled and disseminated the personal and professional information of over 3,000 journalists, scientists, activists, and organisations working on pesticide-related issues, along with malicious rumours intended to damage their reputations.

“The practice of profiling and spreading rumours that could harm journalists’ integrity should never be allowed to flourish in a democratic state. A thorough investigation must be conducted to bring to justice all those involved in these outrageous violations of privacy and the reputation of environmental journalists. These manipulation techniques aimed at influencing the public debate are a direct attack on the public's right to reliable and independent information.

Arthur Grimonpont, Head of RSF's Global Challenges Desk

Discrediting science and independent journalism

The Bonus Eventus network is managed by the PR firm v-Fluence, led by a former communications director at the agrochemical company Monsanto. Its members include executives from agrochemical firms — such as Bayer-Monsanto, Syngenta, and BASF — as well as U.S. government officials. The platform curates and disseminates content (comments, blog posts, interviews) aimed at downplaying the health and environmental impacts of the agrochemical industry, but primarily seeks to cast doubt on studies and news articles that expose damaging truths about the industry, mainly by discrediting their authors. Environmental journalists who have highlighted the dangers of pesticides are particularly targeted.

Lighthouse Reports is also being surveilled and accused of alleged conflicts of interest. The outlet told RSF that these accusations are being used to discredit their investigative work.

Stéphane Foucart, a journalist for Le Monde whose articles are frequently targeted, explained that the information circulated by this platform is used to undermine solid scientific studies and their journalistic coverage. He pointed to a recently published study linking pesticides to increased infant mortality rates. “These attacks are then widely amplified on social media to erode public trust in recognized scientific work,” he told RSF.