Sunday, October 06, 2024

Tanzania: Masai evicted from their land on the altar of profit

Sunday 6 October 2024, by Paul Martial

The Tanzanian government’s policy, with the complicity of major Western NGOs, is to replace herders with tourists, who bring in more money. Joseph Oleshangay has embarked on a European tour to alert the authorities and NGOs to the situation of the Masai of Tanzania. A lawyer from this community of herders, he is committed, despite threats and pressure, to fighting the mass expulsions of the Masai from their ancestral lands, particularly in the Ngorongoro region.

The Tanzanian government’s policy, with the complicity of major Western NGOs, is to replace herders with tourists, who bring in more money. Joseph Oleshangay has embarked on a European tour to alert the authorities and NGOs to the situation of the Masai of Tanzania. A lawyer from this community of herders, he is committed, despite threats and pressure, to fighting the mass expulsions of the Masai from their ancestral lands, particularly in the Ngorongoro region.

Harassment policy

For several years now, the Tanzanian authorities have been trying hard to dislodge these pastoralists from their land. They blame their cattle for destroying the rich ecosystem of the Ngorongoro region, where the volcano Ol Doinyo Lengaï proudly stands. A region where you can find wild animals. The Masai’s cows pose a danger to lions, hyenas, rhinoceroses, zebras and others.

Acting under Government Notice (GN 673), the government deregistered 11 constituencies, 25 villages and nearly 96 hamlets, removing them from the electoral register and depriving community members of their right to vote. It also closed education services and medical clinics. As a result, measles is making a comeback due to a lack of vaccinations. At the same time, forest rangers requisitioned livestock, plunging many families into poverty. The aim is to evict 110,000 Masai from their land.

Profit versus ecology

This is not a question of ‘punitive ecology’ on the part of the Tanzanian government; its aim is profit by developing tourism in this region: luxury tourism and in particular the highly lucrative niche of trophy hunting. To this end, the Tanzanian government has granted the royal family of the United Arab Emirates the Loliondo lands for hunting wild animals. The Masai living on these lands have been expelled and some who have tried to return have been killed by the security forces. The government’s target for 2025 is five million visitors and six billion dollars in revenue, which should go straight into the pockets of the country’s select group of businessmen and politicians.

On the other hand, this policy is really endangering the ecological balance of the region by building the infrastructure needed to accommodate hundreds of thousands of people. As Joseph Oleshangay pointed out: ‘In 1976, there was one road right inside the crater. Today, there are 29! Cars drive around there all day and that stresses out the wild animals.

Green colonialism

Unfortunately, this policy is not unique to Tanzania. It is shared by many African countries and enjoys the support and guidance of major NGOs such as the WWF, the Nature Conservancy and even UNESCO. For Ngorongoro, for example, in 2019 the WWF was promoting the reduction of the number of Masai and cattle to ‘an acceptable minimum’, while UNESCO was advocating the transformation of Ngorongoro into a nature reserve with no population except for the maintenance of a few bomas (community enclosures for cattle)... for cultural tourism.

This policy of promoting nature reserves stems directly from colonial policies. At the time, the aim was to preserve virgin nature, reified as a kind of terrestrial Eden. Nothing has really changed, except that we now talk about bio-diversity. But the means remain the same: discrediting and even criminalising the agro-pastoral activities of the people who have lived there for centuries, with the aim of evicting them using the expertise supposedly possessed by the big Western NGOs.

The Masai have mobilised. They have blocked the flow of tourist vehicles, taken legal action and organised a massive demonstration attended by over 40,000 people. They point out that they are the guarantors of nature protection and not the Tanzanian government, which has authorised TotalEnergies to drill 419 wells in the Murchison Falls natural park.

National elections in Austria: 

A disaster for democracy 

the welfare state 

– and for the left


Thursday 3 October 2024, by EF, WH and PS


The right-wing extremist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) under Herbert Kickl received 29% of the vote and was elected by 1.4 million, almost twice as many voters as five years ago. This is the best result for the FPÖ since its founding in 1955; in 2019, it was 770,000. Compared to the last election for the National Council (the parliament of the Federal Republic of Austria), where did the voters come from? 76% voted for the FPÖ again, 443,000 came from the conservative party ÖVP and 258,000 from non-voters.

It was mainly workers who voted for the FPÖ , employees with apprenticeships and without A-levels, the 35 to 59 age group and almost equally women and men. The latter is new; women had previously been less likely to vote for the party. The party was less well received by older people, pensioners and people with A-levels or a university degree.

The main reasons for voting were dissatisfaction with the coronavirus policy, rising prices, particularly for housing and energy, deteriorations in the healthcare system, migration/refugees (this topic has recently been linked to terrorist attacks), but also the issues of war and Austrian neutrality.

The FPÖ has become significantly more radical under Herbert Kickl, its ‘federal party leader’ since June 2021, and publicly advocates conspiracy theories (about the coronavirus), recommended horse medicine instead of vaccinations, calls for the ‘remigration’ of refugees, wants to set up a reporting office for politicising teachers, and to deprive public broadcasting of funding by cancelling licence fees. He also played an important role in the regrouping of the far-right factions in the EU Parliament to provide Orbán with a forum and a parliamentary faction.

He represents a sharply neoliberal policy, veiled with folksy slogans for tax cuts like ‘more net from the gross,’ which would rob the social system of its financing. Similar to the AfD, he plays the ‘peace party,’ wants to lower energy prices by importing even more gas from Russia, and is very sympathetic to Putin’s war in Ukraine. Like many right-wing populists, he considers climate protection to be nonsense. Kickl likes to call himself the ‘People’s Chancellor’ and wants to ‘keep refugees in camps’ – deliberately provocative allusions to Nazi language. The Identitarians now appear to have established themselves as the ideological core of the FPÖ, with the party leader characterising them as a ‘desirable NGO’.

The success of the FPÖ is not explained by the special abilities of its leader Kickl, but primarily by the political vacuum and the rightward development of the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). Since December 2021, the ÖVP has been in a coalition with the Greens, with the chancellor coming from the ÖVP. The ÖVP is increasingly adopting topics and, to some extent, terminology from the far right. It wants to detain refugees in camps at the EU’s external borders, stirs up hatred against young climate activists and tries to criminalise them, while talking about ‘Autoland Austria’. So far, attempts at neoliberal ‘reforms’ and increased electronic surveillance have been blocked by the Green coalition partner.

The ÖVP is facing serious corruption allegations and a series of court cases involving its leading figures, both as a party and as individuals, from the time of its coalition with the FPÖ under Chancellor Sebastian Kurz (2017 to 2019). It also lost more than a quarter of its voters – to the FPÖ (and to the group of non-voters), of all people – due to its poor management of the coronavirus and inflation, the weakening of the (good) public health system, poor economic data and an uncredible political agenda.

The ÖVP chancellor surprised everyone on election night by stating that he did not want to enter into a (widely expected) coalition with the FPÖ under Herbert Kickl. It is not yet possible to say whether this is meant seriously or is just a tactical manoeuvre vis-à-vis the Social Democrats, in order to force them into serious concessions by engaging in mock negotiations with the FPÖ, only to suddenly form a coalition with the FPÖ after all (as was already the case under Chancellor Schüssel from 2000 to 2006).

The Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), led by the new, self-confident and combative reformist Andi Babler, stagnated at its worst election result in decades (21.1%) and was unable to benefit from the ÖVP’s losses. Although a third of the Green Party’s voters have left, the gain from this group just about made up for the losses to non-voters, but could not be used to strengthen the party. Babler was marginalised by the media as a political outlaw because of his – very moderate – reform proposals, while infighting and intrigue within the party have robbed the SPÖ’s election campaign of any momentum.

Groups to the left of the Social Democrats failed to clear the 4% hurdle. The Communist Party of Austria (KPÖ) tripled its result, achieving almost 115,700 votes or 2.4% (up 1.7%), but this is not enough to enter the National Council. The lists ‘Gaza’ (0.4%) and ‘Keine’ (0.6%) also failed.

On 20 September, one week before the election, 13,000 people demonstrated in Vienna – a joint action of the climate strike movement with dozens of local ‘Defend Democracy’ initiatives from all over Austria. Compared to the ‘sea of lights’ in January 1993 with over 100,000 participants, it was unfortunately still far too few. This alliance is a tender plant, but it could mark the beginning of a resistance movement against the right-wing development if the cooperation is developed and social issues are also taken up. There is a threat of a massive weakening of the welfare state and democratic achievements.

30 September 2024

Venezuela after the presidential election: ‘This is not a left-wing government’

First published in German by Analyse und Kritik. Expanded translation from Venezuelan Voices.

Conflicts continue in Venezuela over the controversial results of the July 28 presidential elections. Incumbent President Nicolas Maduro was officially declared the winner by the National Electoral Council (CNE) with a 7 percent lead over his main opponent, Edmundo Gonzalez. Although the elections were characterized by a series of irregularities and to date no results have been published at the polling station level, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) has validated Maduro’s victory. In the days following the elections, protests took place in almost the entire country, in which 25 people were killed and many were injured. More than 2,000 people, including more than 100 minors, were arrested. In light of these events, anger is growing among the population, which has been suffering from an economic catastrophe for years. There have also been considerable mobilizations in popular barrios such as Petare and Catia, in Caracas, long considered strongholds of Chavismo. More and more leftists, including former Bolivarian activists, are forming new coalitions and campaigns against the government. In recent days, statements with a decidedly leftist perspective have been published, characterizing the government’s actions as state terrorism and dictatorial. The interview took place on August 30.

Michael Karrer: On July 29, thousands of people took to the streets in response to the results announced by the CNE. The reaction of the Maduro government, which had previously threatened “a bloodbath”, was ruthless. What is the particularity of the current mobilizations and the attitude of the government?

Atenea Jiménez: People didn’t only come out after the elections. Already the day before there were those who went to the electoral centers with mattresses to sleep there, with tables to play while spending the night. It was a popular initiative that had nothing to do with any of the candidacies. It seems that the people intuitively said: we are going to look out before the polling stations are opened and the possibility to vote is taken away from us. Also the demonstrations in the following days were basically a popular phenomenon. There was an unprecedented repression, including the persecution of electoral witnesses, polling center officials and leaders of opposition parties. But in addition to that, they have persecuted relatives of activists, even young people who post on social media a video or get a message (on their cell phones), and are detained for that, without having been actually involved in activism. Among the political prisoners there are approximately 100 minors, children and adolescents*, and this goes against the rights enshrined in the Constitution. In the face of this onslaught, various sectors of the country have said that this is outside the limits of democracy. What happened was a popular avalanche from the neighborhoods of Petare, Catia, in Caracas and other parts of the country, sectors that historically supported Chavez and Maduro. Of course, this also had an electoral expression. Evidently, people came out to defend democracy, to defend their vote and not to be deprived of the possibility of electing, which is what is at stake.

Simón Rodríguez: I would add that already in 2017 there were big popular protests and the phenomenon of the barrios mobilizing was seen, which has a great symbolic importance since they were the protagonists of the 1989 popular rebellion against the International Monetary Fund and President Carlos Andrés Pérez in Caracas. Symbolically, the Chavista Government always tried to appropriate that legacy, but especially in 2017 and notoriously now in 2024, the Government has become clearly again the executioner of the Venezuelan people. The electoral fraud has been so outrageous that the government hasn’t even published the detailed electoral results, as required by law.

Has the left in Venezuela definitively broken with the Maduro government?

SR: This government represents a sector of the Venezuelan bourgeoisie, not only the military who run mafia businesses, mining and smuggling, who have a control derived from their position in the Venezuelan State, but also emerging capitalist sectors, what is popularly known as the bolibourgeoisie, which for two decades has amassed fortunes with the exchange arbitrage, that is, by receiving cheap petrodollars. This is the government that is repressing the people for, as Atenea says, simply defending their democratic rights. And the reason for this rupture has to do with the fact that it has been a government that has conducted the biggest economic counterrevolution ever seen in Latin America and one of the worst in the world, the deplorable milestone of having destroyed 80% of the Venezuelan economy without there having been a war or a natural catastrophe. And all this started long before the oil sanctions of 2019.

It is correct to speak of State terrorism in a context of forced disappearances and paramilitarism. It is important to locate the moment in which the regime acquires dictatorial characteristics. It seems clear to me that 2015 were the last elections held under more or less democratic conditions when the government lost 2/3 of the National Assembly (NA) as a result of a punishment vote, just like the punishment vote of 2024 against a corrupt government of billionaires that disguises itself as socialist. Upon losing these elections the government annulled the NA and since then we have a de facto government with constitutional guarantees suspended. So we have had nine years of that experience, although the criminalization of social protest begins much earlier and it is documented especially since 2007. At that time sectors of the bourgeois opposition complained that the government did not repress enough, that there was disorder in the country with peasants taking land, workers going on strikes not authorized by the government, etc., and that an iron fist was needed. The authorities began to use the accusation of agavillamiento against peasants, union leaders, students, workers, to criminalize the alleged intention of committing a crime, an alleged conspiracy involving several people. This diffuse crime was used to imprison hundreds of people during Chávez’s time.

And in those processes of persecution and repression that included the arbitrary imprisonment between 2009 and 2011 and then the assassination of the indigenous leader Sabino Romero in 2013, the imprisonment of the union leader Rubén González between 2009 and 2011, assassinations of union leaders such as Argenis Vázquez in the state of Sucre. Or revolutionary Trotskyist comrades in the state of Aragua like Richard Gallardo, Luis Hernandez and Carlos Requena, assassinated in 2008. All these repressive processes were contributing to the rupture of left-wing sectors.

AJ: Analyzing the political situation afterwards, I agree that in 2015 there was a rupture. But we who were in the popular movement, and even in the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), still thought that it was an impasse that was going to be resolved and we did not expect the authoritarian drift we have today. For the communal movement, the most important rupture occurred in 2017, when we were summoned to the National Constituent Assembly, in the midst of a political crisis that existed in the country. We met in several platforms to evaluate whether it was pertinent to participate. Finally, we decided to participate in a space of critical chavismo, which we called “chavismo bravío”, which would recover and promote the construction of a popular power and a form of government different from the one we have known so far.

We made our list of people who would be candidates. But after the elections, similarly to what’s happening now, a long time passed without the results being published. It was a mockery, because supposedly the CNE web page was not functioning and after it reappeared, all the people who supposedly won were from the PSUV or close to it. There was practically no one who won as constituent for the communal sector that came from that popular movement that preceded Chávez, people who built and continue building very interesting things. At that moment there was an important rupture and in some communes they debated not to participate in the following elections and to say that this is happening to us, we have just been robbed by the government itself. Although I must say that there are a large number of communes that still believe that the existing structures are an option.

At the time, many left-wing militants joined Hugo Chávez’s project when he proclaimed a 21st century socialism and found a platform for their own political agenda in grassroots organizations such as the Communal Councils and later the Communes. Was it a mistake for a large part of the left to join Chavismo? How do you see today this relationship between grassroots organization, government and State?

AJ: I come from the student movement that confronted neoliberalism in the IV Republic. The student, community, cultural and environmentalist movement was fighting in the streets for the vindication of democracy, free and public education and health care. When Chávez took the stage, almost all the popular and leftist movements saw that he was an option for a great coalition. Although at the beginning Chávez did not claim to be a leftist or a socialist, he came with a nationalist proposal which still meant a rupture with the existing, degraded, corrupt state of things.

Then Chávez, on the one hand, tried in principle to open those doors of participation, but from the beginning there was an internal class struggle between sectors of the bourgeoisie and between sectors of the military. Chávez was accompanied by sectors of the bourgeoisie, middle classes, peasants and popular classes. It was a carnival of political and ideological positions. In that first phase we advanced considerably, we had important victories, we were able to do things that had a value in terms of organization, in the recovery of many of the social, political and human rights of our population. But those contradictions that were there at the beginning began to worsen. For example, the military sectors were for a long time against the construction of a popular communal alternative economy. Every time they tried to move forward, these sectors imprisoned community members, peasants, invaded their lands, tried to manipulate the process so that the land would be awarded to other sectors. It was a permanent dispute and wear and tear. So much so that the communes and the popular movements had more contradictions with the sectors within the currents of Chavismo and the government than with the right-wing opposition in the country.

And then Maduro came and began to create movements tailored to his needs, structures at the community level that were authoritarian, vertical, decided by the party with a high bureaucratization and with a kind of voluntary officials that disputed with the commune, with the spokesperson elected in assembly, with the sectoral movements that have their banners of struggle, LGBTI, women and environmentalists. When we were going to advance our agenda towards direct democracy and the construction of our own companies, they put a brake on us. When it was proposed, instead of creating the Local Supply and Production Committees (CLAP), a totally vertical structure, we in the commune, the peasant movements and the producers of the country were proposing direct and collective social property enterprises of several communes to be able to produce, plan and distribute directly to the communities. There they put a brake on us, even public officials who at one time were activists of the Popular movement, were co-opted to become ministers and vice ministers and later emerged as political policemen of the Maduro government.

So this has led not only to the weakening of the movement, but also to the weakening of society, because the movements are organic expressions of society. The fact that in this opportunity the left did not have a candidate is the result of a policy of eliminating everything that could mean competition for Maduro.

SR: In my experience, for example, I began political work when the government was facing the threat of military coups, therefore it allowed many experiences of self-organization, it allowed the creation of new unions, it even allowed the operation of many community radio stations without legal authorization. I worked in a community radio station for several years, it was a very critical radio station. This was allowed to happen because it was seen almost as a necessary evil. It was necessary to let people organize and mobilize as a dike of containment against the coup. But as soon as this situation passed, the coup stage was overcome between 2002 and 2004, the government took the offensive.

The PSUV was created with the intention of having a corporate apparatus that would put an end to the autonomous processes of self-organization that the Venezuelan people had since the 80s. The Venezuelan revolutionary process was not initiated by Chavismo. What Chavismo has done is to co-opt it, repress it and finally destroy it. Chávez himself said that this was a party that was not going to tolerate union autonomy because it was a “counterrevolutionary poison” of the IV Republic that could not be tolerated. So he created a military corporate party with a total prohibition of organized tendencies, without public programmatic political debates, where all political disputes were turned into palace intrigues that resulted in purges, as for example the arrests of dozens of PSUV militants and officials every time a minister is accused of corruption, as has happened with Rafael Ramírez or Tarek El Aissami.

Communal councils and workers’ councils were also created and although many people saw them as their organizational instrument, the government always saw them as instances of control, that contradiction existed. People who saw the possibility of organizing through these mechanisms and a government that tried to liquidate any process of self-organization and struggle.

Both have emphasized the spontaneous character of the current protests. Do the Venezuelan lefts have any role in all this?

SR: The government has destroyed democratic life not only at the level of elections and the big parties, but also at the level of grassroots organizations, in such a way that the possibilities for the left are very reduced. At the moment it is very difficult to publicly call for political activities without exposing oneself to persecution. In addition, there is no union liberty: in the oil industry, where the independent left has a lot of strength, there have been no union elections since 2009 and the same has happened in the steel industry where the last ones were in 2011. However, it is a titanic and heroic task and deserving of the greatest sympathy and support that the left-wing opposition is doing in Venezuela, given the very harsh conditions of persecution that exist.

What we have today is a diversity of leftist sectors that oppose Maduro. Some claim to continue the Chávez legacy, others do not. We think that Chávez, to a certain extent, prepared the conditions for the current disaster, both economically and politically. But the positive thing is that from the more traditional sectors such as the Communist Party, the sectors of Chavista opposition, Marxist sectors that have been exercising a left-wing opposition since the Chávez years, in general we coincide beyond strategic and programmatic differences in opposing a fierce capitalist dictatorship. And spaces such as the Encounter in Defense of the Rights of the People have arisen expressing these diverse currents.

AJ: I believe that a good part of the people who voted against Maduro on July 28 have also voted against a way of doing politics on the left. Therefore, we are also in a process of self-criticism. The Venezuelan people in their diverse expressions have been ahead of the left, of course, ahead also of the right. The lefts have to accompany what the Venezuelan people have already started, because they have been behind our people. Our people went out to the streets alone, they are in jail enduring the violence.

Let us say that the elements where the lefts are pushing forward are in the strengthening and defense of democracy, of sovereignty and the defense of the Constitution. On the issue of human rights, there are people, lawyers, NGOs, different movements that are supporting the victims and the families. These are the three elements that are being pursued and where the popular and leftist movement is proposing different activities, taking into account the risks that exist, which are very many. For example, we have just called for a cacerolazo on the 28th of August with a coalition of the left.

You both live abroad at the moment, but you are still part of leftist platforms and organizations in Venezuela. How can you support the leftist forces at the international level?

SR: First of all, to show solidarity with the thousands of people who are currently political prisoners in Venezuela, simply for having defended their democratic rights. And repudiate the repression, the electoral fraud of the dictator Maduro, to be very clear that what there is in Venezuela is not a leftist government. It’s quite simple to do so, given that in general the leftists in the world do not advocate that in their country there should be a minimum wage of $4 a month, or that people of the LGBT community should be criminalized. Neither do they argue that the government should have an ultraconservative, religious discourse, nor do they argue that society should be militarized or that neighboring countries should be invaded, as Maduro is advocating against Guyana.

From the outside, I think that our role as socialists and revolutionaries is to deepen these discussions in order to arouse solidarity, because unfortunately these discussions are mostly absent. I would like to highlight two positive examples: there was a statement by a sector of the French New Popular Front that declared itself in solidarity with the Venezuelan people and also the parliament member of the Socialist Left of Argentina, Mónica Schlotthauer, who proposed a resolution in the Argentine Congress rejecting the dictatorship’s fraud and repression. Although its value is symbolic, these statements are very important, because they help to remove the false leftist mask that this government uses. It’s very important that leftist activism in Europe and other countries listens to the Venezuelan left and stop repeating pseudo anti-imperialist slogans to justify a totally reactionary regime.

AJ: Support the issue of human rights, divulge what is happening with the young people who are imprisoned, the children who are today in Venezuelan jails. To deepen, to push and also to take a stand against the Maduro government and its authoritarian drift so that together, in solidarity, we defend democracy and defend the sovereignty and self-determination of our people, who have wanted to exercise it through the vote and have not been able to do so.

In terms of the international left, I take up again what President Boric of Chile said: it’s important for the lefts of the world to build a democratic left that moves further and further away from authoritarianism, that deepens the popular and social processes in the demands of the peoples. It’s therefore necessary for the world to know what is really happening and for large international coalitions to be formed.

Atenea Jiménez is a sociologist and founder of the community network Red Nacional de Comuner@s in Venezuela and of the Universidad Campesina de Venezuela Argimiro Gabaldón. She is currently active in a network (as yet unnamed) that brings together a wide range of leftist movements in Venezuela and whose central concern is the defense of the Constitution. Within this framework, international solidarity committees will also be organized in the future.

Simón Rodríguez is co-founder of the Socialism and Liberty Party (PSL) in Venezuela, a Marxist party of a Trotskyist tradition that participated in elections between 2012 and 2015, prior to the annulment of its legal status by the authorities. PSL leaders played an important role in the founding of the National Union of Workers (UNETE) and in the workers’ opposition in the United Federation of Oil Workers (FUTPV).

Michael Karrer is a literary and cultural critic specializing in Latin America.

  • *

    Most children detained after the electoral were released in the following weeks, 86 according to some sources, some having suffered torture. This was achieved through popular pressure and denunciation; however, at least 30 remain in Venezuelan prisons. The campaign for their release continues.

Postcard from a Venezuelan feminist in Caracas


Published 
A youth raises his middle finger while riding public transportation in Caracas, Venezuela on September 7, 2023 © Maxwell Briceño.

First published at Ojalá.

In the months since the July 28 elections in Venezuela, international media outlets have put out polarized coverage with a near exclusive focus on state politics. The ins and outs of daily life and the pulse of the streets in the South American country have been pushed into the shadows.

To shake things up a little, we decided to call Ariadna Mogollón, a filmmaker and researcher from Caracas who returned to her hometown almost a year ago after six years in Mexico. Mogollón has long been connected to feminist organizing in Caracas, as well as to the Bolivarian Revolution. She has held various roles within of government offices, especially in the culture sector, including at television channels, and for the mayor and governor.

“I consider myself very Caraqueña,” she said, with her characteristic laugh. When Mogollón agreed to sit down with Ojalá, she made it clear that she speaks from the vantage of the capital city. “Caracas is one thing, another is the reality in the interior of the country, in terms of infrastructure, basic services and mobility, and that’s a reality I’m less familiar with,” she said.

She insists the crisis in Venezuela be understood without losing sight of the fact that the whole world is in crisis. “I think at the global level there are two distinct realities, the daily reality of people going about their lives, and political reality,” she said. She emphasizes that the genocide perpetrated by Israel in Palestine is an event that structures and demonstrates the extent of the crisis at the global level. The narrative of crisis and dictatorship in Venezuela contrasts, according to the filmmaker, with communal attempts to sustain shared ways of life, as well as with the daily lives of residents.

I spoke with Mogollón on September 23 via video call; our conversation has been translated, shortened and lightly edited for clarity.

How would you describe the current situation in Venezuela, two months after the elections?

After the elections there was a lot of tension, daily life was disrupted, but Caraqueños are used that, even when there are no political surprises.

In Caracas today there is public transportation, gasoline, and food. The school year is about to start, children are getting ready to go to school, their families are buying school uniforms. People are going to the beach, to the supermarket, they’re out jogging, going for walks, playing sports, going to bars, partying, and dancing salsa.

This is a city that’s constantly on the move. I think the people of Caracas are in a moment where what we want is to have a normal life. We want kids to go to school, we want public transportation to work, we want to be able to fill up with gas. That’s the spirit I feel in the city now.

This return to normality in daily life obviously doesn’t mean there are no social and economic problems, but it’s clear the country is recovering economically. Venezuela is not the same country it was in 2017, or 2018, when there was nothing to eat, when there was a very intense economic crisis due to the blockade imposed by the United States.

There has been an economic recovery, but its a recovery that has been costly, that has deepened class divisions.

When your economic situation declines, but there is a health system that works and there is a functional education system, when at least those two rights are guaranteed, that’s one thing. But right now, in Caracas, both of these things have collapsed. In Venezuela, under the governments of Hugo Chavez, the health and education systems were strengthened, but with the blockade both systems crumbled. Their recovery has taken time and, from my perspective, has led to a deepening of class divisions.

Then there is the issue of salaries, the minimum wage is $3.50 a month, nobody can support themselves with that. This of course has had an impact on the economic life of families. A teacher, for example, has to look for other sources of income. Teaching has never really been a way to live well in this country, but the current salary is extremely low.

While the government gives monthly bonuses as a palliative measure, they do not make up for the lack of benefits, vacations, and so forth. Falling wages has been another cause of deepening of class differences.

How would you characterize the political tensions that exist, and how they’re experienced in everyday life?

I think part of the population has basically decided to say “I don't care, I'm not going to talk about politics.” I also think there’s good part of the population that does not identify with either the government or the opposition.

There is an important figure that is rarely discussed, which is voting abstention [which reached almost 40 percent] in this last electoral process. Everybody talks about the votes obtained by Edmundo González, about the votes obtained by Nicolás Maduro, but nobody talks about abstention. There are many who are saying “I don’t feel represented, I don’t agree with what is being proposed, and I am not going to vote.”

I believe that there is generalized exhaustion due to polarization, and because we can’t talk about national politics. When these conversations do take place, many times there is no actual discussion, rather they become violent. From my perspective, this has meant that the deepest political debates increasingly take place internally, in spaces considered safe, instead of in public. In terms of daily, material life, we are fed up with political tension, and the feeling that all of this is going to come up again at the dinner table at Christmas with our families.

In my own experience, the process of violence occurs on the part of the opposition after one positions oneself politically. When someone says—or when I have said—“I support the government of Hugo Chavez,” if there is someone from the opposition there, the response is violence no matter which context we’re in: a bar, a political event, a feminist meeting, a university gathering.

This is an interesting moment, because there are spaces opening up for discussion and critical analysis of national politics. These are smaller spaces, like study groups, but they are spaces for dialogue, for political analysis, for political reflection from a leftist point of view, and that is very valuable.

And what can you tell us about the feminist movement?

Because of the political situation, ever since the Chavez government there has been a division in the feminist movement: there are right-wing feminists and left-wing feminists.

From my point of view, what we have now is a kind of feminism that is praxis oriented and focussed on issues of reproductive rights, on the distribution of contraception, and sexual education. These are very practical and tangible things that are needed in Venezuelan communities. Venezuela has one of the highest teenage pregnancy rates in South America and abortion is legal only if it is to save the woman's life. Maybe we can explore this more in another conversation.

During the Chávez administration, the Ministry of Women was created, which is today called the Ministry for Women and Gender Equality. At one time this ministry focused on building a mass movement and providing small scale credit for women's enterprises in popular settings, which is totally necessary. It is essential that women have access to micro-credits to develop their businesses, this is a key state policy, but that is all there is to it. There is no educational work, there is no work toward transformation, of thought or reflection from a feminist point of view.

What is your understanding of how communes are trying to sustain life and their organizing right now? And for those who don't know, what are communes, and how do they work?

The communes have a political outlook, they’re not middle class neighborhood organizations that are like “let's fix up the building, let's make sure we have water, let's get the elevator working and spruce things up.”

The communes are a project of community political organization; everything in the commune is approached from a political point of view. In the communes its understood that everything, from health, to pedagogical processes to art, sport, infrastructure, mobility, and leisure, are linked to political organizing. When one visits a commune this is immediately evident.

A week before the elections, we visited a commune in 23 de Enero called Comuna El Panal. They have a factory that produces pet food for residents of the community and they are starting a project to produce pork and tilapia.

In another area there is a sports complex with basketball courts and they are about to open a pool so children can receive swimming lessons. They have a whole plan for remodeling the homes in the commune as well as a communal laundry system that also produces cleaning products.

Within the commune there is university training, and young people can obtain a university degree, there’s also a communal radio.

All this responds to a political project in which historically excluded populations are guaranteed access to sports, education, health, recreation; access to things that are in fact basic needs.

This communal project would disappear if the right wing was to win. The first thing the right wing would do if it came to power is destroy the communes, which is also where the core vote in support of the government are located. There is a political project in the commune, and that is what is in dispute with the right.

From your perspective, what is next for Venezuela?

I think the tension in realpolitik will continue, it is clear to me that the government [of Maduro] will continue, and that tensions with the United States and the European Union are going to continue. I don’t think that the United States can return to the logic of an absolute blockade. If Trump wins, this could change and it is possible that we return to a total blockade. Let's hope not.

On the other hand, I don’t think a social uprising is imminent in Venezuela. What people want is to live a normal, ordinary life; and that normal, ordinary life, for a good part of the population in this country, is tied to the continuation of the communal project.

Raquel Gutierrez Aguilar has participated in various experiences of struggle on this continent, works to encourage reflection and the production of anti-patriarchal weavings for the commons. She’s Ojalá’s opinions editor.