The United Nations: Balancing high ideals and harsh realities
The United Nations has always been criticised for failing to live up to the high standards set by its founders in the UN Charter — whether in terms of preserving peace and stability, global socio-economic development, protecting human rights or handling refugee crises. However, criticism of the UN has perhaps never been as harsh as it is today, with two major conflicts — the war in Ukraine and the war in the Middle East — exposing the organisation’s perceived inability to address them. Israel recently declared UN Secretary-General António Guterres persona non grata. Following Guterres’ trip to the BRICS summit in Russia (22–24 October), the criticism intensified, with extreme suggestions in some circles to “outlaw” him globally, withdraw Western countries from the “useless” UN or even disband the organisation altogether.
Who is the United Nations?
When asked to visualise the UN, most people likely think of two iconic images: the 39-floor building on the East River and the UN Security Council Chamber, with its semi-circular meeting table. These two images, while simple, conceal a complex reality about the UN. Strictly speaking, the building on the East River does not house the entire UN; it primarily serves as the seat of the UN Secretariat. The Secretariat is a technical body that supports the functioning of various UN organs (many, but not all, of which are housed in the larger UN complex on the East River). These include the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council.
Many people outside the UN mistakenly imagine the Secretary-General as a “World President,” when, in fact, he is the head of the Secretariat. The Secretariat exists to implement the decisions taken by the UN’s decision-making bodies: the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Economic and Social Council. Its raison d'être is to carry out the directives of these main bodies — the “proper” United Nations, so to speak. The UN’s second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, emphasised that the competencies and action space of the Secretariat are defined by the member nations: “The United Nations is what member nations make it, but within the limits set by government action and government cooperation, much depends on what the Secretariat makes it. It has creative capacity. It can introduce new ideas. It can, in proper forms, take initiatives. It can put before member governments findings which will influence their actions.”
In Hammarskjöld’s words, the UN is what its member nations make of it. But how do member nations “make” the UN? Through the decisions of the main bodies already mentioned. The power of these decisions, however, differs immensely. While the decisions (resolutions) of the General Assembly carry significant moral weight, they are non-binding. Enforcement mechanisms, such as sanctions or the deployment of UN forces, can only be decided by the UN Security Council, whose decisions are binding on all UN members. This leads us to the second popular image of the United Nations: the UN Security Council Chamber.
The power and controversy of the veto
Unlike the General Assembly, where decisions are made by a simple majority vote (even if less than half of the total members vote), the decision-making process of the Security Council is built on a system of checks and balances, represented by the veto power of the five permanent members: China, Russia, France, Britain and the United States. The veto power means that no decision can be passed if any permanent member votes against it.
Viewed by many critics as the most undemocratic aspect of the UN, the veto power was considered by its key founders as the bedrock of the organisation. It emerged from negotiations during the formation of the UN at Dumbarton Oaks (1944) and Yalta (1945). The five permanent members of the Security Council ultimately agreed on the scope of the veto power during the Yalta Conference. Known as the Yalta formula, this agreement was essential for securing the participation of the major powers, as they sought both cooperation and protection of their sovereign rights. A key goal of the UN’s founding was to secure the involvement of the major powers — a lesson learned from the failure of the League of Nations. At the San Francisco conference, the Big Five made it clear that without the veto power, there would be no UN. The US was a strong supporter of this mechanism. US President Harry S. Truman wrote: “All our experts, civil and military, favoured it, and without such a veto no arrangement would have passed the Senate.”
Amid recent calls to strip Russia and China of their veto power at the UN, it is crucial to revisit the rationale behind this mechanism. It plays a crucial role in promoting compromise among the most powerful nations, preventing potentially destructive unilateral actions and encouraging dialogue. In the absence of the veto, it is argued that powerful states might resort to military means to resolve disputes rather than seeking peaceful or diplomatic solutions. The veto forces the permanent members of the Security Council to negotiate and find common ground, which, while imperfect, helps to de-escalate conflicts that might otherwise spiral into violence. This argument is often framed in terms of realpolitik, acknowledging that in a world of clashing national interests, the veto ensures no permanent member is compelled into decisions that threaten its core interests, thereby fostering cooperation.
An illustrative example of the UN Security Council veto preventing escalation between superpowers is the Korean War (1950–1953). During this conflict, the Soviet Union’s absence from the Security Council (protesting the exclusion of the People’s Republic of China) allowed the Council to pass a resolution authorising military intervention in Korea. Had the Soviet Union been present and exercised its veto, the UN might not have endorsed intervention, potentially averting or altering the course of the war. This absence underscored the deterrent value of the veto during the Cold War, as it highlighted the possibility of escalation without superpower agreement.
As I explored in a previous article, the veto can also be seen as a tool for cost minimisation. By using the veto, permanent members minimise the economic and political costs associated with military interventions or conflicts that could arise from being forced into unfavourable decisions. This cost-saving aspect is often overlooked in broader discussions of the veto’s role, but remains central to understanding its continued relevance in international diplomacy.
Moreover, the founders (who were all men) considered the veto mechanism a cementing factor, essential for the UN’s continued existence. They believed it would prevent the breakdown of the United Nations itself if binding action were imposed against any of the permanent members. Given the disproportionate influence these powers hold globally, any attempt to bypass their interests could lead to their withdrawal from the institution altogether, potentially weakening or even dissolving the UN’s authority.
The toughest job in the world
The UN has undeniably failed to stop the war in Ukraine or the conflict in the Middle East. But can this be blamed on the Secretary-General? Without consensus in the Security Council, the Secretary-General has limited options. Furthermore, he must maintain a delicate balance in his relationships with the permanent members, who effectively hold the power to appoint him. It is also not unknown for the permanent members to treat the Secretary-General harshly when they perceive that person as overstepping their bounds, as was the case with Kofi Annan, who was severely rebuked by the US for questioning the international legitimacy of NATO's bombing of Serbia in 1999.
Contrary to popular belief that the toughest job in the world is that of the US President, the role of the UN Secretary-General is arguably even more challenging. He is under constant pressure to navigate and act upon many, often conflicting, interests. The Secretary-General’s responses to the Ukraine and Middle East conflicts underscore the difficult balance he must maintain as the UN’s top diplomat. While he has condemned the breach of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, he has refrained from explicitly criticising Russia, much as he has avoided directly censuring Israel in the Middle East conflict. His recent statement on the escalating violence in the Middle East illustrates this delicate position: “I condemn the broadening of the Middle East conflict, with escalation after escalation. This must stop. We absolutely need a ceasefire.” As the Secretary-General, his role is to encourage peace without alienating key actors on either side.
His restraint highlights the inherent limitations of his position; direct condemnation risks undermining his capacity as a neutral mediator, which is essential for maintaining diplomatic channels. The fact that he has now been declared persona non grata by Israel creates a cognitive dissonance for Western left liberals who support both Ukraine and Palestine: they are now in the impossible position of calling to ostracise someone for his stance on Ukraine, who has simultaneously been ostracised by Israel for his stance on Palestine — positions they otherwise support. Each statement he makes must consider the need to maintain open dialogue with all parties involved, weighing carefully the fine line between advocating for peace and risking accusations of bias from conflicting sides.
Another dilemma arose recently with his decision to attend the BRICS summit in Russia. Declining the invitation from President Vladimir Putin might have earned him praise from Ukraine and its allies, but at the cost of alienating a bloc of countries that represents roughly half of the world’s population and about 30% of global GDP. When choosing between BRICS and the G7, which accounts for 10% of the population and 43% of global GDP, what should he prioritise? Given how diverse and contradictory the UN’s membership is, it is nearly impossible for the Secretary-General to meet all expectations. The job demands not only diplomacy but also an ability to manage inevitable criticism from all sides.
I can personally attest to this challenge, having met three very different Secretaries-General — Annan, Ban Ki-moon and Guterres — each with distinct personalities, yet facing the same pressure and constraints. Their agency was severely curtailed by the Security Council, and their forays into issues lacking consensus consistently drew criticism from different, sometimes diametrically opposed, sides. Of course, those Secretaries-General who explored the limits of their freedom less often had quieter tenures.
UN failures and successes
There are many examples of the UN falling short of its members’ expectations, particularly in the Global South. One notable example is the structural adjustment programs implemented by the World Bank and IMF in developing countries during the 1980s–90s. It is now widely recognised that these programs did more harm than good and may well be responsible for the “ lost decade of growth” in Africa during the ’80s and turning it into a “ hopeless continent” in the ’90s. Indeed, the image of the UN building on the East River conceals another truth: the World Bank and IMF, both headquartered in Washington, DC, are specialised agencies under the UN Charter and part of the broader UN system.
Other prominent failures of the UN are also well-known: it failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (despite desperate pleas from the Force Commander, Canadian General Roméo Dallaire), the massacre of civilians in Srebrenica in 1995, and the genocide in Darfur starting in 2003. Because of the immense suffering these failures caused, they are seared into public consciousness. Less known to the public, however, is the routine work done by various UN agencies, often behind the scenes, that saves countless lives by providing access to medical care, food, improved agricultural practices and initiatives that foster job creation and socio-economic equality.
A notable example is the work of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which has provided a lifeline for over 70 years to thousands of Palestinians across the region. Though heavily criticised in Israel, UNRWA has made substantial contributions to healthcare, education, and job creation for Palestinians in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza. While the organisation has faced serious challenges, including instances where terrorists have managed to infiltrate it, this should not define its overall mission. Such incidents are tragic but do not mean that UNRWA itself is inherently aligned with terrorism, as is sometimes claimed by the Israeli government. Instead, its impact on the welfare and stability of Palestinian communities remains significant and invaluable.
The iconic UN building also obscures the vast and varied UN system, which consists of more than 30 affiliated organisations, programs, funds and specialised agencies, each with its own membership, leadership and budget processes. Many of these entities are globally recognised for their significant contributions to humanitarian and development efforts over the decades, such as the World Food Programme, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, UN Women and the UN Development Programme, among others. Several UN agencies, including the International Labour Organization (ILO), UNICEF and the World Food Programme, have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The UN Peacekeeping Forces, which have been deployed in various global hotspots since 1947, also received the prize, as did the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was honoured twice, in 1954 and 1981.
The last bridge: Preserving dialogue in a divided world
Despite its flaws and criticisms, the United Nations remains the only organisation where every country in the world is represented. This gives the UN a unique status as a platform for discussion, collaboration, and compromise — not only among like-minded actors, as is often the case with organisations like the European Union or NATO, but also among adversaries and even open enemies. The UN serves as a space where nations with deep-seated conflicts, such as the United States and Iran, can engage under the same roof. The very existence of this forum offers an invaluable opportunity for dialogue and diplomacy, even when prospects for agreement seem remote. It provides an essential buffer that prevents the breakdown of communication between hostile states, reducing the risk of conflict escalation. This unique role, where adversaries can at least discuss their differences rather than resort to force, remains one of the UN’s most critical contributions to international peace and security.
In this context, I disagree with recent proposals, such as those by Dominique Lazanski, which argue for disbanding the UN as an outdated, top-down institution, and replacing it with a decentralised “system of federations,” as suggested by Friedrich Hayek. These proposals, aiming to create federations of countries or territories united by common interests such as trade or security, risk dangerously mirroring “friendshoring” and fostering geopolitical fragmentation. Such a system would create echo chambers — alliances that lack space for dissenting perspectives and promote division rather than global cooperation. This approach contrasts starkly with the UN’s core objective: fostering an inclusive platform where nations, despite their differences, work toward peaceful reconciliation and stability, rather than reinforcing opposing alliances.
Finally, when reflecting on the UN’s successes and failures, it is essential to return to its original mandate: to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” While the founders knew that preventing all future conflicts was unrealistic, their primary concern was to avert another world war on the scale of those they had experienced. By that measure, the UN has not yet failed — at least, not so far.
