Tuesday, November 05, 2024

 

Trump versus Harris: Is fascism coming to the United States?

Published 
Donald Trump supporter

First published at Socialist Project.

Leonard Cohen, poet laureate of Canada’s 1960s, offered a closing anthem to the twentieth century in his 1992 lament “ Democracy.” In an earlier year of revolt, 1968, Cohen had refused his country’s most prestigious literary prize, the Governor General’s Award. “The world is a callous place,” he reportedly said, “and he would take no gift from it.” He would later be the accepting recipient of many honours, including the Order of Canada.

Two decades later, confronted with the changing global landscape, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the crumbling Soviet Union, Cohen reflected on how and where democracy might be realized. Now a celebrated songwriter, Cohen looked to the United States, where his music was produced and marketed for world-wide audiences. He saw the “sorrow in the street” of working-class grievance; “the holy places where the races meet” that were never far removed from white supremacy; the gender difference scratched into human relationships expressed in “the homicidal bitchin’/that goes down in every kitchen/to determine who will serve and who will eat”; and the deserts created domestically and internationally by an America confident in its imperial dominance. Yet for all of this, 1992 seemed a bridge to a better future. “Democracy,” yet to be realized, “is coming to the U.S.A.” Cohen insisted. Amidst turmoil, tension, and recognition of revolt’s righteousness, Cohen was nonetheless hopeful.

So, too, were others, albeit of a different bent. Proclamations of “the end of history” came from ideologues of the right and postmodernists of the ostensible left. Capitalism, finally victorious over its century-and-a-half nemesis — actually existing, and undeniably deficient, socialism — promised boundless prosperity and expansive profits for those pulling the now unrivalled levers of possessive individualism. Windows of political and economic opportunity opened widely, offering a luxuriating vision of a new world order.

“Third Way”: Seemingly progressive populism

This was the moment of Democratic Party revival in the United States. Bill Clinton ushered in a new era of seemingly progressive populism, the slogan “It’s the economy, stupid” propelling the Arkansas Governor into the White House. It was the beginning of a “Third Way.” The polarizations of the past were supposedly swept aside as a politics of social amelioration and advance adjusted to market realities. The political project designated democratic, now tethered to an unbridled regime of accumulation, would ironically usher into being new imperatives of inequality, especially pronounced at the intersections of race and class. The new regime of accumulation, premised on the ideology of austerity’s attack approach to social provisioning of all kinds, dismantled entitlements associated with the “Great Society” rhetoric of the 1960s, gutting the welfare state and undermining programs associated with health care, housing, and a host of other post-World War II liberal reforms. A prison-industrial complex and profit-driven mass incarceration criminalized poverty. The war on the working class, proclaimed with such ferocity by Ronald Reagan’s breaking of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) 1981 strike, continued unabated.

History, of course, did not end. The Soviet Union imploded, to be sure, but it bounced back, proving something of a bête noire to its competitors in the capitalist west. The once-Soviet collectivized economy was pulverized by market imperatives; the apparatus of the state overtaken by ensconced apparatchiks. The result was a plundering of the primitive accumulation of the Revolution of 1917, a socialized economy looted to establish an unregulated, predatory market society orchestrated by oligarchs umbilically tied to an authoritarian state. This proved an irksome thorn in the side of hegemonic capital and its global agendas. China, following a course less drastic than the upheaval inside the Soviet Union, refused to succumb to the impulse of capitalist restoration that proved so destabilizing in the demise of the Soviet Union. As the People’s Republic kept a firm political grip on authority but opened the floodgates to enterprise and internationalization of trade and commerce, it surged economically. Planned economies, however compromised, remained a threat to capital’s quest for unimpeded dominance globally.

Moreover, as the 1990s progressed and transitioned into the twenty-first century, social democracy’s fading sun finally set. Faith in the infallibility of capitalist markets (now dubbed neoliberalism) decimated the politics of a moderate, parliamentary left and did little to resolve problems of wealth’s disproportionate distribution. In Britain, Tony Blair’s Labour Party gave up anything resembling the socialist ghost. The political economy of the new millennium wrote finis to the moderate, reform-oriented parties and programs of a left that had clearly lost its moorings.

The economic foundations of largesse on which democracy’s post-World War II promise rested precariously certainly wobbled. At times, they seemed to sink. The calendar of capitalist crisis took a quantitative leap forward. From 1945-71, the world’s capitalist economies suffered 38 economic recessions, downturns, and panics, but in the period 1973-97, this almanac of attack rose to 139. The regime of accumulation continued apace, concentrating wealth and power. In a crude capitalist variant of social Darwinism, periodic crises weeded out weaker, individual capitals. Businesses fell by the economic wayside. Authority and its material blessings continued to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. Democracy was apparently not forging ahead in the advanced capitalist nation states of the west, of which the US was first among un-equals. Instead, an economy increasingly recognized as unstable derailed it.

Financial crisis of 2007-10

This mercurial, downwardly spiraling materiality culminated in a 2007-10 financial meltdown. It rocked the global economy: revelations of reckless financial practices at the pinnacle of corporate power and within seemingly secure state-backed institutions exposed just how vulnerable the well-being of masses of people had become. Their safety net of owning a dwelling, an asset with seemingly never-ending rising value that had provided the one protection many working families retained against decades of deteriorating economic well-being, suddenly disappeared. A sub-prime mortgage meltdown collapsed the housing market, wiping out what constituted many working-class families’ only substantial equity. Decades of ceding capital a free reign left the majority of the privileged nations of the Global North vulnerable, the façade of well-being behind which their lives unfolded perilously unhinged.

The crisis of 2007-10 revealed this and more. It cracked the edifice of the European Union, and convinced many who proclaimed Karl Marx and the socialist project dead with the 1989 demise of the Soviet Union to rethink their optimism of the capitalist will. A much-needed dose of intellectual pessimism appeared necessary. Perhaps the acquisitive, accumulative drive of the profit system was not all that it was heralded to be.

This kind of thinking had to be marginalized and sidelined, however. Capitalism’s infinite capacity to overreach in pursuit of profit was somehow different than those many households crumbling in debt and despair. This latter group could be left to pick individual selves up by their solitary bootstraps; large economic interests, however, were judged too big to fail. The bailouts for capital exposed the big lie at the core of neoliberalism. Markets could not govern. Corporations needed to be rescued from themselves. Less than a decade later, a pandemic-initiated economic recession dealt neoliberalism’s cherished repudiation of Keynesianism a final blow: money needed to be pumped into the market to save the capitalist system from collapse.

The political fallout from these years of escalating capitalist crisis registered in democracy — never historically realized — coming under increasing attack. Far right parties and authoritarian political sensibilities gained ground rapidly. An ideology of globalism, seemingly hegemonic, gave to way to nationalisms of the most bellicose and xenophobic kinds. Much heralded advocates of free trade quieted under the ideological tsunami of protectionism. Capital’s intransigence and state legislation took their toll on unions and working-class remuneration. Immigrants were vilified; racism ran rampant in the mainstreaming of white supremacy. The politics of right-wing populism, authoritarianism, shameless buffoonery, hucksterism, and audacious corruption were normalized, exemplified in the rise of figures such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Marine Le Pen in France, Boris Johnson in the United Kingdom, and Donald J. Trump in the United States. Explicitly and proudly defiant fascist movements, while undoubtedly galvanizing minorities, were on the march in many capitalist nation states. They even secured significant footholds in the now increasingly unstable political settings of what had been, prior to the political earthquake of 1989, homelands of actually existing socialism, however compromised.

Democracy halted

Democracy, which Cohen thought on the march in 1992, seemed stopped in its tracks in the United States of the 2020s. Voter suppression gained a reinvigorated momentum. Riotous, threatening, and violent attempts to turn back electoral defeats of the political right sparked fears of insurrection and consolidated an undue faith in the rule of capitalist law that was itself destabilized by the robed authority of a now politically stacked and flagrantly unaccountable Supreme Court. A crescendo of conspiracy-driven theories and public demonstrations against attempts to ensure collective well-being, through combatting threatening public health crises with science-based campaigns of vaccination and the encouragement of socially responsible behavior, deformed political life. Many were fearful: it was not democracy coming to the U.S.A., but fascism.

Fear of fascism’s tightening grip on mainstream politics has paralleled, and is now associated with, the rise of Trump and his opportunistic right-wing populism. There are certainly grounds for being apprehensive. Trump, now described repeatedly as a fascist, has long defied easy categorization. Everyone from one-time Trump Chief-of-Staff, John Kelly, to high-ranking Generals and those Republican Administration officials fleeing the nightmare of the disorderly Make America Great Again White House, have jumped on this bandwagon of designation. It has become a rallying cry of the Democratic Party and its hopeful candidates for political office, high and low, an indication that the two-party system is showing signs of collapsing inward into a monolith. Liberal media outlets mass market the branding of Trump as a fascist. Many on the left echo this consensus: Trump, routinely likened to Hitler, is the new and ubiquitous face of American fascism, the lider maximo of a totalitarian movement.

An admitted authoritarian, and a shameless, self-promotional huckster, Trump’s eclectic mix of free marketeering, tax cutting, pop-culture alluding, isolationist nationalism certainly embraces much that fascism’s fetid program feeds on. That Trump embraces and enables racist, misogynistic, rabidly anti-communist, anti-labour views, and offensively promotes the entitlements of the rich, goes without saying. For many, this defines fascism: it is all that a progressive, mindful citizenry deplores. Trump is certainly deplorable. He is more than willing to pander to fascists — and virtually any political charlatan willing to bend the knee in loyalist supplication to his emperorship. Whether he dons the dress of a full-fledged fascist is nonetheless more of an open question than many are willing to admit, even as his recent rhetoric takes on more and more of the trappings of a “Blood and Soil” program.

Trump: Lining his own pockets

Trump’s aspirations, however, do not seamlessly fit with a fascist agenda: they do not quite appear to be those of a Hitler or a Mussolini, since they are far more brazenly about lining his own pockets. It is difficult to imagine Hitler taking time out from building the Nazi state to market chintzy merchandise from trading cards to self-promotional medallions, flog overpriced Bibles and $100,000 watches, or help launch a crypto-currency endeavor. Fascists traditionally utilized economic policy to prepare for and ultimately to wage war. Trump would prefer to avoid open war at all costs, although he is as bellicose as the next Republican hawk, not averse to dropping bombs on Afghanistan or engaging in the clandestine killing of those he considers the “terroristic” international enemies of his rule of the United States. But he banks on a message of withdrawal from orthodox foreign policy positions premised on America being a military leader of the “free world colossus” resonating with his mass base. Fascists abhor Communists, but Trump, who rhetorically follows suit in vilifying Marxists and wasting no opportunity to name-call his political rivals revolutionary leftists (and totalitarian fascists, as well!), is also willing to exchange “love letters” with heads of ostensible People’s Republics like North Korea. To the extent that Trump has a program, then, it is surely insufficiently coherent and consistent to qualify as resolutely fascistic. It defies even elementary adherence to the standard tenets of fiscal conservatism, to which Mussolini, after an initial short period of defiance, soon conformed. To be sure, there is much of the cult of the leader operative within Trumpism, but then this has always been a component of right-wing populism. Trump’s leadership, however, is long on free-wheeling performativity, and short on the structured development of consistent, grounded, and organizationally stable authority that is surely a hallmark of fascism. Fascism, like all forms of bourgeois rule, is about many things. The one element that it cannot do without is decisive leadership. Trump is rhetorically bombastic to be sure, but he lacks constancy.

The point that needs stressing is perhaps not how Trump is bringing fascism to America, but rather that his brand of governance inevitably culminates in chaos and accelerates the tendency toward crisis that is already built into capitalism, accelerating as the profit system confronts its growing contradictions. What capital foments economically, Trump stokes politically. The result is unquestioningly repugnant and dangerous, constituting a political mish-mash, a pastiche that certainly contains overtures to fascism. There are similarities, for instance, between Hitler’s “Beer Hall Putsch” of 1923 and Trump’s incitement of a Washington mob on 6 January 2022. The fundamental difference irrevocably separating these events is also obvious: Trump was in power but could not carry through anything approximating a full-fledged insurrection (for all the hue and cry raised subsequently by the liberal media and progressives of all sorts), let alone an actual coup d’état. Can anyone seriously suggest that Hitler or Mussolini in power would ever have allowed their grip on political rule to be threatened by electoral niceties and, if it was, that they would have acted with the wacky hope of winning through recourse to bizarre reliance on unorthodox understandings of how to manipulate arcane constitutional practices? Would either of these fascist strongmen have exhibited the vacillating indecision displayed by Trump during a transition of power he clearly wanted to reverse?

Bonapartism

Trump certainly exploits the escalating crises that have become endemic under late capitalism. In this, he shares the ground fascists have always cultivated. He is less the archetypal fascist, however, than an example of what might be called twenty-first century bonapartism. This bonapartism was described in its mid-nineteenth-century origins by Marx:

“Driven by the contradictory demands of his situation and being at the same time, like a conjurer, under the necessity of keeping the public gaze fixed on himself, … by springing constant surprises, that is to say, under the necessity of executing a coup d’etat en miniature every day, … [he] throws the entire bourgeois economy into confusion, violates everything that seemed inviolable …, makes some tolerant of revolution, others desirous of revolution, and produces actual anarchy in the name of order, while at the same time stripping its halo from the entire state machine, profanes it and makes it at once loathsome and ridiculous.”

Appearing as the benefactors of “all classes,” Marx stressed that bonapartists “cannot give to one class without taking from another.” With respect to the working class, bonapartism in the nineteenth century bears a striking resemblance to its equivalent in the twenty-first: “Dissolution of the actual workers’ associations, but promises of miracles of association in the future.”1 This is Trump’s pledge to coal miners and service workers, with his simplified promise to restore the energy extractive industry and abolish taxes on tips.

There are, of course, different kinds of bonapartism. Their relations to fascism demand a certain nuanced assessment. As Leon Trotsky noted in 1934, however, bonapartists generally represent and appeal to “the strongest and firmest part of the exploiters.” This judgement surely goes a long way toward an explanation of Elon Musk’s conversion to Trumpism. The passage of bonapartism to fascism, in Trotsky’s view, was necessarily presaged by disorder and was “pregnant with infinitely more formidable disturbances and consequently also revolutionary possibilities.” The bourgeoisie, inevitably fragmented, seldom uniformly, relishes “the political victory of fascism.” But its disparate components can often coalesce to the point that they are more than willing to countenance a “strong power.” We are seeing this, in the current moment, in capital’s hedging of its bets on a potential Trump victory, as with Jeff Bezos moving to squelch an endorsement of Harris on the editorial page of the newspaper he owns, the influential Washington Post. Bonapartism and fascism can transition into one another, but Trotsky insisted it was necessary to distinguish the distinct forms that governing power might assume. Yet he was also adamant that these different methods of political management were hardly “logical incompatible categories” of bourgeois rule.

Many on the left have been prone to proclaim that with the arrival of Trump on the political scene, “Fascism is already here.” This kind of undiscerning labelling can be seen, in Trotsky’s words, as “an attempt to … make easier” the appeal of social democratic/liberal elements that the “lesser evil” of bourgeois democracy, however craven, should necessarily command the allegiance of the masses. With Trump about to assume power and vanquish democracy, establishing fascism, the liberal order and the crisis-ridden capitalism that is its economic counterpart — having given rise to the very bonapartist politics paving the way to fascism — must be shored up electorally and a program of class struggle deflected.2

This seems remarkably applicable to the current conjuncture in the United States. In the progressive stampede to block access to Trump’s second bid for the presidency, left-wing elements align themselves too easily with the Democratic Party, embracing a “lesser evil” that is then often elevated to unquestioned virtuousness. The credentials of this compromised politics turn relentlessly on defeating an incipient fascism. Problems with this political practice are legion.

The Biden/Harris Democratic Party

Many were willing to bloc with Joe Biden, for instance, despite abundant evidence demonstrating his obvious incapacities. Biden’s bumbling blunders and seeming senility cost him dearly, squandering credibility with a mass electorate, especially the young and the seemingly left wing. The answer was to parachute Kamala Harris into the 2024 Presidential campaign at the eleventh hour, ensuring that her opponents had little chance to mount an alternative opposition. Has there ever been a candidate for the American presidency who faced less in the way of interrogation from the left? Obama, perhaps, but even that assessment might be open to question.

As a United Auto Workers leader proclaims Harris “one of us,” she offers organized labour next to nothing, save for a continuation of the brokerage policies and practices of Biden’s tired and tottering regime. Biden’s approach to labour was of a piece with the Democratic Party’s complacent capacity to take for granted support from constituencies that have good reason to fear the governance of the Republican right. Outfitted with a union jacket on Labour Day, Biden proclaimed himself a backer of trade unions, talk and the fashion of the moment being cheap. His record, however, undressed the politics of representation exposing the bare-bodied economics of class allegiance. A contradictory, but unequal, dualism summed up the Biden administration’s labour practice: break a railway strike in 2022 and make a show of walking a picket line in 2023.

Harris, it is abundantly clear, will follow a similar class trajectory. She has now taken to proclaiming herself a proud capitalist. Small business and the ubiquitous if vaguely-defined “middle class,” loom large in her speeches, the working class far less so. Fuzzy promises to hold down the price of groceries will almost certainly falter and fail in the face of stiff capitalist opposition to the kind of deep regulatory incursions in the marketplace that would send the retail sector into coronary arrest. Raising the minimum wage, as she has convinced some she will do, is also likely to be another promise broken. For how can Harris claim, on the one hand, to stand for these reforms, at the same time as she is unable to answer persistent questions as to how she offers the electorate something different than the Biden years? Her hopeful coalition, uniting the likes of Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and the Democratic Socialists of America with elements of the Republican Party notable for their past crimes against humanity, such as Dick Cheney, constitutes nothing less than a regroupment of the center-right political mainstream. Formed on the bedrock of Trump’s capacity to imperil democracy, this realignment is notable for its exorcism of anything carrying the faintest scent of radical, left-wing sensibilities. It appears to be dragging much of the broad left along in its wake.

A group of “Historians for Harris,” 400+ strong and many of whom undoubtedly consider themselves leftists, have recently prefaced a statement with the following, quite incredible, view of United States history: “As American historians, we are deeply alarmed by the impending election. Since 1789, the nation has prospered under a Constitution dedicated to securing the general welfare, under a national government bound by the rule of law in which no one interest or person holds absolute power.” This, surely, is an understanding of the history of the United States that even Leonard Cohen, as contradictory as his lament for democracy in 1992 was, would have retreated from, even refused. Cohen could not have countenanced this — and the term is used advisedly — whitewashing of America’s quest for democracy, forged from so much strife and struggle: “From the war against disorder/From the sirens night and day/From the fires of the homeless/From the ashes of the gay/…From the brave, the bold, the battered/Heart of Chevrolet.”

It is mandatory to recognize that political/economic actions speak volumes over symbolic stands and public presentations of convenience. As war ravages Palestine, and Israel engages in mass destruction of Gaza, extending its assault into Iran and Lebanon, Harris holds firm to the American commitment to support the Israeli state. She offers the dead of the southern Levant her condolences. Israel receives arms and the military defense of its airspace. That support comes carte blanche. The United States administration urges restraint, concern for non-combatants, and apparently presses for a ceasefire, while Benjamin Netanyahu, facing allegations of war crimes by the International Criminal Court, is fêted in Washington. Upon his return to Israel, Netanyahu then thumbs his nose at Biden, Anthony Blinken, and Harris, and simply ups the ante in his aggressive crusade of mass destruction and obliteration. No matter how brazenly and disproportionately the Israeli war cabinet pursues vengeance against all Palestinian peoples for the October 2023 Hamas act of terrorism, those governing the United States refuse to stop the flow of arms to Netanyahu or to forcefully bring his genocidal campaign to a halt. The war-mongering reactionaries who prop up Netanyahu’s leadership, keep him out of prison, and appear hell-bent on taking settler colonialism to new heights of vindictive violent dispossession have a free reign. Domestically, Trump and the Republicans concoct wild stories about illegal immigrants, their responsibility for violent crime, and decry the rampant barbarism that inevitably results from an ostensibly “open border” policy. Harris responds by promising to use her prosecutorial experience — which is receiving almost no critical scrutiny — to get tough on transgressors and tighten up things at the southern international boundary.

To be sure, on abortion Harris has been firm. The dismantling of Roe v. Wade by the Supreme Court and the epidemic of state legislation outlawing abortion remains perhaps the singular issue on which Harris offers an unambiguous rejoinder to what is widely perceived as an attack on a fundamental human entitlement. Yet even on this decisive matter, where Biden was reluctant to mouth anything of substance, Harris tends to zero in on the extreme medical consequences of abortion bans and unwanted pregnancies resulting from rape, incestuous or otherwise. It is less common to hear Harris offer an unequivocal defense of the right to choose, a language from the past that has seemingly gone into hibernation in the current cold climate. Fascism’s coming is feared, and this structures political opposition in a particularly skewed way.

A politics of confused positionings proliferates, however much one side is undeniably preferable to another: the moralism of a progressive but programmatically deficient left runs headlong into the chaotic meanderings of a bonapartist right-wing populism, decried as fascism. This opposition, elevated to a clash of righteousness among reactionary right wingers and sanctimonious progressives, structures choice along a spectrum of evil/less evil. When the smoke and mirrors of our distorted politics in 2024 are eventually placed in the rear-view of a future, it is likely that fascism will not have come to America. What will have survived, to the detriment of a genuine democracy and the realization of social justice will be a strengthened bourgeois hegemony, in which a rhetoric of aspiration, hope, and freedom masks the barriers to a truly egalitarian order. The greater danger to the struggle for a better world will then perhaps be recognized to have been those ostentatiously dressed in the garb of the lesser evil.

Stopping fascism that some see coming to America is indeed both necessary and laudatory. But to do that we need to know what fascism is and what it is not. Decrying attempts to define it, opting instead to catalogue characteristics that can then be associated with Trump, is not an answer. Moreover, if the means to stop what some claim is fascism proves to be a strengthening of the decrepit and crisis-ridden capitalism and its politics of championing a democracy yet to be delivered is the only way to turn back the far right, we need to seriously search out other ways of doing this.

If we are to sail on, in Leonard Cohen’s words, “To the Shores of Need/Past the Reefs of Greed/Through the Squalls of Hate,” it will not be in the sinking ship of capital, even if captained by a head of state singing loudly the praises of freedom and democracy. Flying flags of antifascism was once a dangerous occupation, undertaken by those willing to risk their lives in the armed struggle against totalitarianism in Germany, Italy, and Spain. Now the antifascist banner too often sags under the weight of bourgeois conventionality and the smug complacency it trades in. Any ship of state powered by the crisis-ridden profit system that has historically, if pushed to the brink, spawned actual fascist movements and elevated them to ruling regimes, will sink us all. The cost of sailing forward in this lesser evil vessel is likely to prove a bit of a Faustian bargain, a pricey proposition for any left worthy of the name. 

Bryan D. Palmer is the author of James P. Cannon and the Emergence of Trotskyism in the United States, 1928-1938 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2021), Revolutionary Teamsters: The Minneapolis Truckers’ Strikes of 1934 (Chicago: Haymarket, 2014), co-author of Toronto’s Poor: A Rebellious History (Between The Lines, 2016), and a past editor of the journal, Labour/Le Travail. He is Professor Emeritus, Trent University, Peterborough, Ontario.

 

Socialists and progressives poised to make big gains in Puerto Rico’s upcoming election



First published at Reform & Revolution.

In recent years Puerto Rico was put into the spotlight by the devastation brought by hurricane Maria and the horrendously inadequate federal response, as well as the successful 2019 protests which ousted Ricky Rossello from the governor’s office. Today there are ongoing struggles against the privatization of the electric grid by LUMA and against ongoing gentrification on the island.

Maria Franzblau spoke recently with Jorge Lefevre and Manuel Rodríguez Banchs, activists in the Marxist formation Democracia Socialista, a section of the Fourth International. Democracia Socialista is active in the larger formation Movimiento Victoria Ciudadana (Citizen’s Victory Movement), which is contesting the upcoming elections on November 5.

What is the status of the working class struggle in Puerto Rico, and what role are socialists playing today?

Jorge Lefevre: In our analysis we are facing a new moment in Puerto Rican history that started in 2006, when our economic recession began. In more than 15 years, Puerto Rico has had only 5 years of positive economic growth, numbers that are usually only seen during war economies. There’s been a 20% contraction of the Puerto Rican economy and around 500,000 people have left the island, out of a population of 3.8 million in 2006.

However the political reaction to this economic crisis was not immediate. In the 2008 and 2012 elections the main political parties, the neoliberal parties, were still favored in political terms. The union movement was being heavily attacked during those years through very aggressive neoliberal policies.

It wasn’t until the 2016 general election that we started seeing a turning point in political terms. In the election for governor, the highest position in the Puerto Rican government, almost 20% of the vote did not go to the two main neoliberal parties, but were instead given to two independent candidates. These two candidates at the time weren’t necessarily anti-neoliberal or progressive, but it showed that the Puerto Rican population was looking for a change.

In 2016 the Financial Oversight and Management Board was approved in the US congress through a law called PROMESA, which translates to “The Promise”, or “Hope.” Puerto Rico was excluded from the bankruptcy law of the United States. The Puerto Rican government attempted creating its own bankruptcy law, but was quickly taken to the courts and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against it, stating it went against federal law. The US Congress response, with support of the Puerto Rican neoliberal parties, was the enactment of a law that created a mechanism for bankruptcy in Puerto Rico and also created a board to enforce it. The board would not be elected, and instead its members were chosen directly by the President of the U.S, by the US Senate, and by the House of Representatives. The board’s official name is the Financial Oversight and Management Board, but most people call it “La Junta.” The board actually controls the economy through the control of the Puerto Rican budget and its allocation. It has the capacity to overrule laws that are approved in the legislature, so there is now a more visible contradiction with the colonial relation between the US and Puerto Rico because there is this new political structure that really dictates how our public policy looks and that has enforced even more aggressive neoliberal policies. Privatization of the public corporations, budget cuts in health, budget cuts in the University Puerto Rico system.

We had a very large May Day strike in 2017 during a general University of Puerto Rico student strike. That was the biggest mobilization we had seen until the date, and it was in part also a mobilization against La Junta. 2017 was also the year of Hurricane Maria. Maria was not only a very traumatic moment in Puerto Rican history, but for working people’s struggles. It interrupted that movement that was built up during May Day because of all the new necessities we had to deal with to survive. The 2019 Summer, which ended up ousting an elected governor is another moment of incredible mobilizations, as there were almost continuous mobilizations for weeks. Some of these surpassed the 2017 May Day, particularly the manifestation on July 22, 2019.

Although again we see difficulties in mobilizations for the workers’ movement, we also know that another breaking point could again create great mobilizations. That is the context of our political organization and of our attempts at creating an important revolutionary, socialist organization in Puerto Rico. We struggle for this not just through Democracia Socialista (DS), but through our creation and participation in the Movimiento Victoria Ciudadana (in English the “Citizens’ Victory Movement”) which is a broader anti-neoliberal political party that participates in Puerto Rican elections.

In 2020, this change in political terms continued. Movimiento Victoria Ciudadana won 13.95% in the gubernatorial elections. The Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP), which in past elections was not able to garner the 3% needed to maintain its affiliation as a political party recognized by the state, experienced incredible growth and also arrived at 13.58%. The main neoliberal political parties respectively won 33.24% and 31.75%. It was the first time in recent Puerto Rican history where if you add the progressive vote, it would have been around 28%, just five points short of the candidate who won.

Manuel Rodríguez Banchs: For more context, Puerto Rico has been a colony of the United States since 1898, and the colonial structure has been changed three times. The first colonial structure was the military government immediately after the occupation. After that there was a “tutelage” government with some local participation through the Jones Act.

Then in 1952 the current “status” began with the creation of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, in Spanish called Estado Libre Asociado, which is literally translated into “Free Associated State”. That status gained support and certain legitimacy because there was economic growth during the postwar boom throughout the capitalist economies. There were also democratic advances, as Puerto Rico adopted its own constitution and limited local autonomy in government was granted. I believe that has changed since the adoption of PROMESA, where as mentioned before, the Junta put in place by PROMESA took away from the local government all powers over the budget. And it has gone further than that: la Junta opposed and challenged in court a modest labor reform that was enacted earlier this term.

I think we’re facing a new structure or moment of the colonial relationship with the United States which we see as an opportunity to push for further advances for the working class. The role we’re playing now is to contribute to the working class struggle in articulating or framing what we call transitional demands, which can further the radicalization of broader sectors of the working class. We are in a defensive position from the class struggle perspective. But after over 40 years of neoliberal policies which have been pushed further by the Junta, combined with all the other factors mentioned by Jorge, people are being pushed to the limit. More people are rejecting those policies, and correctly identifying those policies with the two political parties that have ruled Puerto Rico for the past 50 or more years. That’s where I think the new organization of the political system of Puerto Rico is taking place. For example I think that all the anger, the mobilizations and the struggle of 2019 reflected electorally in favor of both Victoria Ciudadana and PIP. For this new cycle Victoria Ciudadana made an alliance with PIP, and I think there’s a strong chance of increasing the members of both parties in the house and the senate, of winning the race for mayor of San Juan and probably other municipalities as well. There’s also a possibility for the Alianza to win the gubernatorial election.

What is the political role of La Junta and how do the neoliberal parties relate to its oversight?

Jorge Leferve: In 2016 when the law was finally approved in the U.S. congress, the Puerto Rican population mostly favored the creation of this board. The idea was: “we’re tired of Puerto Rican politicians, we need something outside of them managing our economy”. That was even expressed by 4 out of the 6 candidates for governor in 2016, which made the election a competition of which of these four would work better with the board. Only the Partido del Pueblo Trabajador (Working People’s Party), which was an earlier electoral political party that Democracia Socialista was part of, along with the Independence Party, were against the board from the beginning.

Quickly after the creation of the board it was very evident that it was as bad as the left expressed. It was a board created to make the bond holders get the best possible deal out of a possible bankruptcy in Puerto Rico, and the way they control public policy is mostly through the Puerto Rican budget, because they have to approve the Puerto Rican budget, and they are very meticulous about how it gets approved. What I mean to say is that, for example, it’s not only that, the public university system would get $500 million, but that the Junta decides how those $500 million get used, and that is their main mechanism. PROMESA also created its own bankruptcy court under Lauda Taylor Swain, the district judge, which is where the legal disputes are seen.

In theory, there could be a large political contradiction if Puerto Rico’s legislature approves laws that the Junta does not approve of. That does not happen much because the majority of the votes are in the hands of the two main neoliberal parties, but conflicts have still happened. For example, a labor law that was approved with slightly better working conditions with regards to vacation days and paid sick days was later overturned in Laura Taylor Swain’s District Court. The Junta had appealed the law and said it went against the Puerto Rican fiscal plan, which is the broad plan the Junta approved which the budget and the public policy should follow.

But it is also true that sometimes the neoliberal parties will often not implement measures because they think the Junta would not approve it. For example the University of Puerto Rico (UPR) system has received some of the worst budget cuts under the control of the Junta. In Puerto Rico, like in many Latin American countries, the main university system is the public system and it’s older than the private system. There are 11 campuses of the UPR system around the island, and not only is the UPR system historically a place of student movements and some union activism, but from the very start of the 21st century it has been one of the main if not the main site of struggle against neoliberal policies. Students were involved in island-wide strikes in 2010, in 2017, and even in 2021, that last one being a very political strike because it was against a new bondholder plan that the Junta was negotiating. Because the UPR is such a place of resistance, they usually have imposed budget cuts of around half of what it should receive under the university laws that are supposed to be in place but that are not being respected. Neoliberal politicians would tell you, when asked why they don’t comply with this university law that states what the UPR budget should be, that the Junta doesn’t approve it, so they don’t even try. There has not been an attempt to defy these budget cuts by these neoliberal parties because they don’t think the Junta will approve them.

Our vision, the MVC’s vision and the PIP’s vision, is that the legislature could be a place of struggle. Even though it is a colonial legislature because we live in a colonial government, we believe that a legislature with a majority of Alianza representatives, for example, could create a struggle against the Junta, and it would be not only an economic struggle but also a political and colonial struggle, because the Junta’s power is colonial power. La Junta is right now the most blatant representative of the colonial powers in Puerto Rico.

Manuel Rodríguez Banchs: Also the board ideologically is aligned with the far-right here in Puerto Rico, in terms of separating economic decisions from elected bodies. The rationale behind it is that such a structure like the unelected board is immune from the electoral process. So they cannot be voted out, even if they push bad legislation. And that is true to a certain point, but the board is not immune to mobilizations and we have seen good examples of that.

The retirees were one of the targets of the Junta when it started to restructure the debt of Puerto Rico. The first proposed plan for the adjustment of the pensions was really aggressive, and the retirees were successful in getting a better deal through mass mobilizations. So when there are mobilizations against La Junta’s decisions or recommendations, they have to think twice. Another example was the truck drivers in Puerto Rico. The Junta and the owners of transportation companies were pushing to eliminate the rates regulated by the state to carry goods around. The truck drivers called for a strike, and they also got a better deal and the regulations stood in place. That shows we can confront La Junta through mobilizations and through legislation.

The budget of La Junta is approved by the legislature, and one of the proposals that both Victoria Ciudana and PIP (now la Alianza) are pushing for is to not approve the budget for the Junta, to stop the deviation of funds to La Junta through the legislature. We know that’s gonna be challenged in court, and probably we’re gonna be facing an adverse judgment, and there is a possibility of imprisonment for elected officials who defy those judgments, for contempt of court, and that has to be part of the strategy. We need to tell the United States government that what is going on in Puerto Rico is unacceptable, and we could be in a better position if we combine the defiance of unfair court decisions and the legislative work with mass mobilizations.

What lessons can be drawn from the struggle around the electric grid, including the issue of increased power outages and the larger issue of privatization?

Jorge Lefevre: In Puerto Rico, part of the industrialization project around the 40’s and 50’s involved nationalizing all of the private electrical companies and then expanding the access to electricity around the island. Before the public corporation was created only the cities like San Juan and Ponce had electricity and in a very limited way. The electrification of the island is something that occurred when this public corporation was created, and there was no corner of the island left without access to electricity. And there are a lot of stories and anecdotes about this process (the first place that would put electrical posts with the use of helicopters, for example, was Puerto Rico). So we’re talking about a very important public corporation, a monopoly, the only electrical company that distributes energy.

The plan to privatize this public corporation started in the 90’s, so this has been a long process. First, they started privatizing in a very limited way the generation of electricity, and then finally the privatization that has happened in these last few years that involved concessions of the generation and distribution of electricity as a whole. It is important to say one of the things included in the PROMESA Act was that the Financial Oversight and Management Board should promote structural reforms, and the only structural reform that they have promoted is the privatization of this public corporation. First through the privatization of the distribution of the electrical energy, and later through the privatization of the generation of electrical energy.

Usually privatization is promoted as a type of negotiation in which the private sector contributes some money, some support, and receives a public service transformed into a commodity. In this first contract, LUMA received everything, it is a $1.5 billion contract for 15 years, and it will probably be more than that, because every year LUMA has asked for more money than what it is supposed to receive.

But another important thing is that one of the historic unions in Puerto Rico working class struggle was the union in the electrical public corporation, la UTIER (Unión de Trabajadores de la Industria Eléctrica y de Riego), so privatization was also a mechanism of destroying a key workers union.

You could say there were two important unions in the beginning of the 21st century, the Federación de Maestros y Maestras de Puerto RIco (Teachers Federation), and the UTIER. The Teacher’s Federation was decertified after the 2008 teacher’s strike, and now the UTIER has been heavily weakened, first because neoliberal policies would not create any more jobs in this sector, and later because most of the employees of LUMA do not come from the ranks of the UTIER. They stayed in the government, displaced to different parts of the government. The Utier went from having 6,000 to 8,000 members 10 to 15 years ago to 120 members today.

The members of UTIER were asked whether or not they wanted to enter LUMA, but the conditions to enter LUMA was that they would have to quit their positions as government employees, so older members could lose what they had achieved with regards to their retirement and pensions. Also, the union made a campaign for the workers to not enter LUMA. It was a strategy that was an attempt to make the LUMA contract just not operational. A large amount of UTIER workers did not enter LUMA, most were relocated within the government, others retired, and that meant LUMA employees were either new employees or probably UTIER members that had not assured their retirement plans or other benefits. There is now a union, IBEW, that represents LUMA workers.

With regards to daily life, the privatization has had nine rate raises in a period of three years, and something that was not common at all in Puerto Rico, constant blackouts. One of the arguments in favor of privatization was that electrical costs were too expensive and privatization would keep electrical prices cheap. The exact opposite has happened, and the Junta has been very quiet about this.

What is the history of Democracia Socialista, and what role has it played in the recent struggles in Puerto Rico? How does it relate to Movimiento Victoria Ciudadana?

Manuel Rodríguez Banchs: Democracia Socialista was founded in 2014. Although there’s a red thread, a hilo rojo as we call it. I believe a good number of the founding members of Democracia Socialista came from what was initially the Taller de Formación Política (The Political Education Workshop), that in 2008 joined other revolutionary organizations and founded Movimiento al Socialismo, MAS. I think one of the biggest contributions of MAS was the founding of the PPT, which participated in the elections of 2012 and 2016.

The group of people that came from el Taller, together with other new members from MAS, founded the fourth international tendency within MAS. El Taller was the section of the Fourth International in Puerto Rico. Then, our tendency within MAS was recognized as the section. In 2014 MAS was dissolved, and those members of the fourth international tendency within MAS founded Democracia Socialista.

Even though we were founded in 2014, we did not go out publicly as Democracia Socialista until 2020 for different reasons. Most of them had to do with the construction of the broader party and the tasks we assumed within the construction first of the PPT, and, later, of Victoria Ciudadana.

We played an important role in the process of creating Victoria Ciudadana. After the elections in 2016, where two independent candidates received huge support in the elections, politics really started changing rapidly in Puerto Rico. One of those independent candidates, Alexandra Lúgaro, started organizing events along with Manuel Natal. Manuel Natal, who is also one of the leaders of Victoria Ciudadana, and current candidate for mayor of San Juan, resigned from the Partido Popular Democrático, the Popular Democratic Party, after the 2016 elections. The PPD is one of the two parties that has governed Puerto Rico for the past 50 years. Natal was a representative, a member of the house of representatives at-large of the PPD. He resigned to the PPD but kept his seat at the house. Alexandra Lúgaro and Manuel Natal started to organize a political alternative for the elections of 2020. At the same time, there were several groups of mostly left and militants of different organizations and social movements that were discussing the possibility of creating an alternative for the elections of 2020. There were 3 or 4 concurrent efforts, all discussing and evaluating what could be done for the elections of 2020.

We were participating in most of these efforts. Our members together with labor leaders were instrumental in the integration of those different efforts that eventually joined to create Movimiento Victoria Ciudadana. We also had an important participation in the adoption of what is called the Agenda Urgente, or Urgent Agenda, the minimum program that was launched by this effort of Victoria Ciudadana. The Agenda Urgente was further developed into a political program that was presented for the elections of 2020. We also participated in this process. Now we have one member of the organization who is a senator in Puerto Rico for Victoria Ciudadana, and for these upcoming elections we have 10 members who are running for different positions as candidates of Victoria Ciudadana and La Alianza.

Our members participate in the different struggles in Puerto Rico and internationally. DS cadres participate in the environmental movement, in the women’s movement, in the labor movement, in the LGBTTQi+ struggles, in the student movement, and so on. Leaders of the organization are also leaders in these struggles. Militants of Democracia Socialista are also members of labor unions, and we have members in the leadership of at least two important unions. Even though the labor movement and the student and youth movements are relatively weak right now, compared to other periods, we have a strong presence, as well as in the women’s movement.

What are the other political parties in Puerto Rico and how are they approaching this upcoming election?

Jorge Lefevre: Clarification first, for our U.S. comrades: although we are a U.S. colony, our parties are not structured around the Democratic Party or the Republican Party of the United States. In theory they exist in Puerto Rico, but their only activities are when the Republican Party and the Democratic Party primaries happen, and they are also held here although we do not have the opportunity to vote in the Presidential Elections. We’ve had independent political parties from before the U.S. intervention in Puerto Rico, and ever since then.

Right now there are two main neoliberal parties, historic neoliberal parties. The PPD is basically the party that created a contemporary Puerto Rico, with all of its contradictions included, so we’re talking about the party that was somewhat part of the industrialization projects of the 40’s and 50’s and the architect of the Commonwealth, which now the majority of population knows was just the rearrangement of the colonial agreement in Puerto Rico. Because of this history, with regards to the colonial question, the PPD has favored either status-quo or a new type of commonwealth status. The other neoliberal party is the Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP, New Progressive Party), which was founded by industrial capitalists at the time. It articulated itself around statehood.

These modern neoliberal parties, which adopted neoliberalism in the 80’s and 90’s, mainly articulated their support around status issues, either in favor of the status quo or in favor of annexation. These are the two political parties that have governed for the last 60 years. The other historical party, which is older than the PNP, is the PIP, a pro-independence party, which was founded after a split in the PPD once it started opposing the independence of Puerto Rico. And it has had its ups and downs, related to environmental struggles, to worker struggles, to women’s struggles… It did not have a lot of success in the 21st century with regards to electoral politics until 2020, when, like we said, it arrived at almost 14%.

Like we’ve said, there’s a new political movement, anti-neoliberal, progressive, which is Movimiento Victoria Ciudadana, founded in 2019. It participated for the first time in 2020.

But, also in 2019, another party was created, Proyecto Dignidad (Dignity Project), which is a conservative neoliberal fundamentalist political party. It received 7% of the vote in 2020, to the surprise of most of the Puerto Rican population, although in Democracia Socialista, because we see this conservative turn as part of a general international trend of neoliberal conservative fundamentalist parties, we never underestimated it. It was able to vote in a senator and a representative, so it has representation in the legislature. It has been effective also in growing its base.

So like we’ve seen in other countries, we see a polarization of Puerto Rican politics also expressed in the elections, through the creation of La Alianza, which grouped the two main progressive anti-neoliberal parties, but also through the creation of a Proyecto Dignidad, which has been relatively successful also at recruiting some figures from the historical neoliberal parties. Particularly, its candidate for governor is an important mayor of a town in Puerto Rico, formerly running as a PNP.

It is difficult to see what will happen with Dignidad in the 2024 elections, but our analysis is that, if Puerto Rican corporate interest continue to see that the PPD and PNP are in a irreversible crisis, then they could very easily start supporting Dignidad, and start growing into a major force in a matter of nothing, very quickly. We see also that there are new corporate institutions or institutions that promote corporate interests, there is a super PAC created called “Democracy is Prosperity” which has a nice name, but that is a market fundamentalist superPAC. There’s also a known think tank, the Institute for Economic Freedom, and their political programs are even closer to Dignidad’s political program than to the main neoliberal parties. So we are seeing a new shaping of the new right in Puerto Rico with some of the old figures, but many new figures involved.

What is the significance of La Alianza, the alliance between MVC and the PIP? And what is the situation regarding the legal challenges to La Alianza?

Manuel Rodríguez Banchs: In the 2020 elections, Victoria Ciudadana and PIP, together received close to 28% of the votes. In the election, as mentioned by Jorge, the winning party received only 33% of the votes. It’s important to mention that in 2020 people called for Victoria Ciudadana and PIP to join for the elections. This took place really close to the elections. After the elections, when we analyzed the results, there were many places where the votes for the candidate for Victoria Ciudadana and the candidate for Partido Independentista combined were much more than what the elected candidate got. In numerical terms, the combination of both parties could mean important seats in the legislature and in some municipalities as well.

The other aspect that allowed la Alianza to materialize is that the programmatic proposals of both parties are similar in very important areas. Regarding the decolonization of Puerto Rico, the big difference between the parties is that the Partido Independentista promotes independence. And that was the way the political parties organized in Puerto Rico for a long time, around the relationship with the United States: there is also a pro statehood party and a pro status quo party.

Victoria Ciudadana emphasizes the decolonization process and organizes around other issues. We learned from the experience of the labor unions, which organize workers who favor different alternatives of non colonial non territorial status. Members of MVC support different alternatives of status, however they agree on decolonization as part of our right to self determination. There is agreement on a democratic process: a status convention with representatives of all the alternatives.

Regarding health, we both support public health through a public universal healthcare system. In education we both support public education and the University of Puerto Rico, and in so many other areas we have similar programmatic proposals.

The other thing I must mention is, as Jorge mentioned, the potential growth of the far-right with Proyecto Dignidad, and the accelerated decomposition of the two traditional neoliberal parties presented us with an opportunity to build an alliance between these two progressive parties. Otherwise we would compete against each other and we would do better than 2020, but not enough to increase our chances, as can be done through an alliance.

In Puerto Rico, alliances were part of the political system until recently, until 2011, where alliances were prohibited by law. Both parties, MVC and PIP, challenged that prohibition in court. What was proposed was a fusion ballot, which is very common in the United States, that is that a candidate can run for the same position for different parties. That was the proposal. We were proposing to have Juan Dalmau from the PIP as candidate for governor in the two columns.

That prohibition was sustained by the courts, so we had to find a creative way, even though not allowed by law, to put in place the alliance that was approved by the members of both parties. So we ended up supporting different candidates in different ballots. We are doing the same, but risking our franchises, our electoral franchises. In order to be able to maintain the electoral franchise, there are several requisites that you have to comply with. One of them is having a candidate for governor, a candidate for resident commissioner, one at-large for the House of Representatives and one for the senate. We are now proposing Juan Dalmau for governor, and Ana Irma Rivera Lassén, currently a senator of Victoria Ciudadana, for the Resident Commissioner, which is a non-voting member of the House of Representatives in the U.S. congress. There are 8 senatorial districts, where we are presenting one candidate of each party for each one of those districts. For the House of Representatives we made a similar distribution, and we’ve made an agreement in four municipalities to either support Victoria Ciudadana’s candidate, such as Manuel Natal in San Juan, or the PIP’s candidate such as Jason Domenech in Caguas, another important town in Puerto Rico.

The Alianza is being presented as a change regarding the way the political and electoral process was organized, which used to be around the relationship with the United States once the colonial status is changed. Now it’s more around social issues. There’s a clear divide between left and right proposals.

Even though it’s difficult, I think a victory of the Alianza is within the possibilities for this next election cycle. I think the PPD is behind La Alianza, and we are putting up a fight with the New Progressive Party, which is the party of big business and the party of the current governor and the resident commissioner, who is going to run for governor. One factor to consider is that the current governor of the PNP lost his primary election against Jennifer Gonzalez, who is a Trump supporter Republican, currently holding the seat of resident commissioner. That also represents a different scenario and from our perspective, more opportunities for la Alianza.

There are possibilities of increasing the presence in the legislature through the arrangements, for the senate, and for the house in the districts, even though we’re facing a huge challenge. The candidates for Victoria Ciudadana for the senate and the house at-large were disqualified by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico in a case brought by both members of the PNP and PPD parties, and they are now running, with the support of Victoria CIudadana, as write-in candidates.

Thinking about the day after the elections at the very least Victoria Ciudadana would have more members in the house of representatives, more members in the senate, would win the city of San Juan, and that would be a huge advance for us. We have been thinking about what the government of the Alianza might look like, also. We know that if the Alianza wins, it’s going to face not only the opposition of the other political parties, but also the opposition and the sabotage of the corporate interests, like Jorge mentioned, or, in more traditional terms, the bourgeoisie. We should be thinking about ways of maintaining the government while facing the sabotage of the other parties and the bourgeoisie. We need to organize workers, we need to be able to mobilize the population in order for the Alianza to be successful in pushing forward the proposals it is presenting. These proposals are going to be resisted not only by the opposition and the bourgeoisie, but also by the fiscal control board and by the federal government.

What is the status of the current election campaign, the main issues, and the response from voters?

Jorge Lefevre: I would say that contrary to the previous elections, the main neoliberal parties have made an attempt to make no issue an important issue in the elections, other than whether Victoria Ciudadana has a communist agenda, or whether we follow or do not follow correctly the electoral laws. It has been mostly noise around the political issues. We know it’s a conscious effort. We have our candidates often saying in the media “we would prefer to talk about economic issues, social issues, instead of all of this political gossip”. But that has mostly been what we have been seeing for at least a year.

Part of these distractions also have to do with the lawfare against the Alianza. Manuel mentioned the case that disqualified our candidates at-large, both of which were incumbents, but there was also a lawfare offensive against Mariana Nogales, who is currently in the House of Representatives and also one of the people who was disqualified. Because there is no progressive newspaper, because there is no progressive news outlet in the television, because there are very few spaces for our parties to participate in the media, there has been a lot of fog around what should be the actual issues coming up in November 2024.

We have continued to raise our program: in favor of economic reconstruction, in favor of LGBT rights, in favor of rescuing public corporations, public instrumentalities, public agencies, in favor of life, in favor of health, in favor of women’s rights, in favor of LGBT rights. But contrary to the 2016 elections, where the Financial Oversight Board was a central issue, the central issue right now have been the controversies between the Victoria Ciudadana and the Alianza. That and LUMA, which has also been a central issue.

Manuel Rodríguez Banchs: There’s a red scare campaign basically pushed forward, as Jorge said, and we are proposing la Alianza as the democratic alternative to the far-right threat in Puerto Rico. To stop the far-right, the only viable alternative is la Alianza. Also, with regards to the elections in the United States, where we do not participate but that have a huge effect in Puerto Rico, we also think that the government of la Alianza would be the most effective. In either case if Donald Trump wins the election, and we have a government of Jennifer Gonzalez in Puerto Rico, she will be servile to Donald Trump as she has been in the past. And a government of la Alianza would definitely mitigate the impact of a Trump administration through direct confrontation and mass mobilizations.

The same is true if Harris wins the election of the United States, I think la Alianza will be the alternative to hold accountable the Democratic Party. There are many promises and proposals in the Biden/Harris program involving Puerto Rico, none of which have been met. There were proposals to get rid of La Junta, to return powers to the Puerto Rican government, to push for economic measures for the population, and those specific commitments were not complied with. Whatever happens in the United States election la Alianza would be the best government to protect the people of Puerto Rico.

The issue of Puerto Rico status is hotly contested on the island and in the diaspora between independence, statehood, and free association with the U.S. This election there will be a non-binding referendum on the status of Puerto Rico. How does Democracia Socialistas relate to this debate?

Manuel Rodríguez Banchs: I first want to say that Democracia Socialista is a pro-independence organization with an internationalist perspective. We believe that the people of Puerto Rico have an inalienable right to self-determination and independence, in a Leninist orientation if you will. But we are also conscious that the majority of the workers and the people in Puerto Rico are not pro-independence; even though those numbers have risen in recent years, the support for independence is not majoritarian. That’s why when we engage in the construction of mass organizations, of political parties, we have a structure in which the issue of the colonial relationship is dealt with through a demand for decolonization. We have focused on a process, on the procedural aspect of how that can be materialized. The proposal is to call for a constitutional convention where delegates of each of the alternatives would be elected, and that convention would have as a central task the development of the status proposals, write them down, and negotiate with congress those alternatives. There would be several steps within the proposal we are managing, but once the alternatives are drafted in the convention they should be submitted to the population for approval of those definitions in referendums.

At the same time, there have to be negotiations with Congress in order for the result of the process to be binding, and for them to express approval or disapproval of the alternatives, other than independence, and what the terms of those alternatives would be. Then, those alternatives would need to be submitted for general approval or rejection. There would be rounds; if none of the proposals gets a majority of the votes, the two that received the most votes would go to the second round.

The experience of organizing around issues and not around a specific status alternative has been possible, and that we learned from the labor unions. They organize workers who favor different tendencies, they have the ability to get together and push for more common demands. That’s the model we try to replicate in the electoral process and we have been successful.

This new referendum that is going to happen on the same day of the elections has several problems. The first one is that it was called for by the governor without legislative action. And that has been challenged by the PIP to no avail. But other than the formalities, I think the main reason for calling another referendum for the elections is for the new progressive party to be able to mobilize electors. Otherwise, a huge sector of their sympathizers would not mobilize, so they are using the pro-statehood movement and the plebiscite as an excuse to mobilize the pro-statehood electorate towards the PNP. That didn’t go well for them in 2020. They did the same thing, but those who voted for statehood in the plebiscite were 51%, while only 33% voted for their candidate for governor. So that also tells us that a lot of pro-statehood supporters are not exclusive members of the PNP, and would probably vote for la Alianza. That’s part of the votes we had in 2020.

Jorge Lefevre: Along with the red scare, one of the scares that corporate interests arebemoaning in the press is that the Alianza is a pro-independence alliance. Again, it’s a way of trying to get people that are in favor of statehood to not vote for Alianza, and maybe to vote again for the PNP, or maybe even for Proyecto Dignidad. But like Manuel said, we’ve seen that these attempts of trying to mobilize the pro-statehood sector to favor the PNP have not been successful. In the last 30-something years, we have had plebiscites in 1993, 1998, and then some that are very close in time: 2012, 2017, and 2020. Both the 2012 and the 2020 plebiscites were on election day. People that favor statehood see this as another gimmick by the pro-statehood party, and one thing that the people are seeing is that the PNP isn’t really advancing statehood. It says it does, it might have an anti-colonial rhetoric, but it is just another colonial force, another colonial party, heavily neoliberal, heavily anti-popular.

As an example, the last two times that there has been a federal increase in wages for exempt employees, the Partido Nuevo Progresista, the supposedly pro-statehood party, has intervened to exempt Puerto Rico from that pay increase. So on one hand they speak of equality, on the other hand they favor policies that continue impoverishing the Puerto Rican population.

The current candidate for governor of PNP, Jenniffer Gonzalez, said in 2016 that she would be the last resident commissioner in Puerto Rico’s history because she would bring statehood in that four year term. She again was elected to that position in 2020, and now she’s running for governor. So there has been a lot of rhetoric, aggressive rhetoric by the PNP, but there has been an increasing independence of pro-statehood voters in these last elections that have either voted differently (we know that there was a large amount of people, for example, who voted for Juan Dalmau, the candidate for governor in 2020 for the PIP, but that voted for Jenniffer Gonzalez as Resident Commissioner, or in favor of Statehood in the plebiscite).

And there is also a growing force which we haven’t mentioned, and that is electoral abstention. Puerto Rico has historically had a high percentage of people who are eligible to vote participating in elections. That has decreased very rapidly during the epoch of the economic crisis starting in 2006, and beating apathy is one thing that the Alianza also has to do in order to think of a possible victory. Apathy is then another enemy, not as greedy or as dangerous as corporate interest or the fundamentalist party, but definitely something we have to combat. Because of this economic crisis being so extended, we’re talking about 15 years again, with only 5 years of positive growth, most of the population has lost hope. And that is one of the things that both in our program but also in our slogans, candidates of Victoria Ciudadana, of PIP, and of La Alianza are trying to bring back to the political terrain, hope that we can triumph and we can transform this society into one much more just, equal, and democratic.

How can socialists in DSA fight U.S. imperialism’s grip on Puerto Rico and on Latin America more generally, and how can we assist?

Jorge Lefevre: I think because of what I said earlier about there not being important progressive news outlets, one way DSA can help not only Victoria Ciudadana and the Alianza but also progressive politics in Puerto Rico in general is helping us get people in the United States to know what’s going on in the political Puerto Rican political agenda, in the worker’s movement, because our news outlets aren’t going to give a lot of time to these issues. I think it’s also important for DSA members to get in contact with the various organizations of the Puerto Rican diaspora who are active in many of these issues, in Chicago, in New York, in different parts of the country where there are Puerto Rican populations. But I think it would also be very helpful if we could strengthen ties with DSA and be able to talk to many of our comrades about many of these issues.

Manuel Rodríguez Banchs: We in Puerto Rico need to organize and mobilize to tax corporate profits; for job programs, urban reconstruction, expanded social services, universal health insurance and free higher public education; for renewable energy, student debt cancellation and relief for indebted families; for reduced military spending in favor of social spending; to organize workers and revitalize the labor movement; to end all forms of racist, sexist, homophobic or xenophobic discrimination as much as you do. We count on you to build and expand these transitional demands. And we ask that you include Puerto Rico’s needs for economic reconstruction, debt cancellation and self-determination in your demands and proposals.

We need to work together for justice for working people in Puerto Rico, in the United States and in Latin America.

How Telecom Customer Service Reps Got Better Connected Via Their Union

November 4, 2024
Source: Labor Notes



American politicians love to pose as defenders of factory workers threatened by globalization, corporate restructuring, and overseas outsourcing. But their campaign spiels rarely mention other jobs at risk, for the same reasons, in white-collar workplaces that now employ more workers than all domestic manufacturers of steel, autos, airplanes, and other machinery combined.

Among them are the nearly 4 million employees of 40,000 call centers based in the U.S., part of a labor force that rapidly expanded in the last 40 years due to changes in the way people buy products and get service and support.

As a result, writes Debbie Goldman in her valuable new book Disconnected: Call Center Workers Fight for Good Jobs in the Digital Age, “Call centers became the primary vehicle through which businesses (and many public agencies) interact with customers, clients, and citizens.” They now employ 17 million people in a global industry that offers employers the opportunities to move work from higher labor cost countries to ones with lower-wage scales and “electronic sweatshop” conditions.

Goldman is a former research director for the Communications Workers. During her three decades at union headquarters, she helped CWA customer services reps negotiate with AT&T and Bell Atlantic (now Verizon).

As she recounts in Disconnected, she also helped nurture a network of rank-and-file activists who gathered annually to discuss workplace problems and solutions involving telecom’s fastest growing occupational group.
ALTERNATIVE VISION

Collectively, they developed and tried to promote an alternative vision for customer service jobs, pushing for an “environment that valued their judgment, experience, and professional skills.” This would require drastic changes in working conditions in call center work, which is characterized by computer-paced work, remote monitoring by supervisors, sales pressure, and scripted interaction with customers. All these pressures make for a stressful work environment leading to illness, absence, and high turnover, even in unionized workplaces.

The mostly female customer service reps initially faced some pushback in a union where predominantly male technicians had more sway. The author describes the mobilization by service rep-led locals to pressure the national union to fight on their behalf, and to build effective cross-border campaigns in solidarity with call center workers abroad.

Shrinking union density in telecom was a bigger problem for CWA members, regardless of their job. AT&T, a regulated monopoly, once employed 700,000 union members. But it was broken up in 1984, leading to the rapid growth of aggressive anti-union competitors.

As the author notes, union representation declined in telecom from 60 percent to 22 percent from 1980 to 2005. Now it’s down to 10 percent, despite vigorous CWA organizing efforts. The 110,000 CWA members who remain in telecom work work in a mix of technical, sales, and service rep jobs at AT&T, Verizon, Frontier, and CenturyLink/Qwest.

Seventeen thousand of them at AT&T, including call center staff in nine southeastern states, approved a new contract this month after a four-week walkout, the longest telecom strike in the region’s history. Another 8,500 AT&T workers in California and Nevada also ratified a new agreement after rejecting the company’s previous offer.

Disconnected includes a detailed case study of a three-week strike nearly 25 years ago, by 85,000 Verizon workers from Maine to Virginia. It focused on job security protections, organizing rights at the company’s fast-growing wireless subsidiary, and winning what the author calls “a path breaking stress-relief package for customer service reps.” Thanks to extensive membership mobilization, call center workers secured new contract language that “curbed the most abusive speed up, management surveillance, mandatory overtime, and contracting out of their work.”

However Goldman writes that fundamental decisions about work organization, and new automated systems, remained under management control. What CWA hoped would be an organizing rights breakthrough at largely non-union Verizon Wireless (VZW) was soon nullified. After the 2000 strike, VZW closed all the wireless call centers covered by its new card-check and neutrality deal with CWA, and shifted that work elsewhere in the country.
CHALLENGING ORGANIZING ENVIRONMENT

A quarter century later, only a handful of Verizon Wireless techs and retail store workers have bargaining rights, despite valiant ongoing efforts to recruit more of them, along with call center reps and VZW’s even harder to reach “home-based associates.”

The organizing environment is even more challenging for T-Mobile Workers United, a CWA-backed network of call center workers, techs, and salespeople at T-Mobile US and MetroPCS. For comparison, during one 2005-6, twenty thousand new CWA members were recruited at Cingular, the wireless carrier now known as AT&T Mobility.

That’s because the union was able to use its bargaining leverage with the parent company to win a card check and neutrality agreement to avoid contested NLRB elections. Call center managers were barred from interfering with committee-building and card-signing, which enabled call center workers in places like Jackson, Mississippi to self-organize, free of the usual union busting campaigns.

Some of CWA’s subsequent call center campaigns have also been centered in southern states but outside of telecom. In 2014, after a 19-year struggle, CWA helped passenger service workers at American Airlines organize a unit that included nearly 15,000 workers, following American’s merger with US Airways, whose customer service agents were union.

A similar protracted struggle is now underway at Maximus, a federal contractor, which employs 10,000 customer service staff to assist recipients of Medicare and Affordable Care Act coverage. In a workforce predominantly composed of Black and Latina women, many employed in right-to-work states, there have been six strikes in the last two years over low pay, heavy workloads, lack of job security, and affordable healthcare. Their “long, bruising fight” has been aided by nearby CWA locals with telecom call center members. The campaign also draws on the lessons of past skirmishes with federal call center contractors, like AT&T.
‘THEIR QUALITY OR OURS?’

Overall, Goldman’s account of CWA’s late 20th century search for firms willing to create a union-friendly “workplace of the future” for service reps is a cautionary tale. Under Morton Bahr, who served as national president for 20 years until his retirement in 2005, the union was one of the AFL-CIO affiliates most eager to experiment with “labor-management partnerships” as a supposedly helpful addition to collective bargaining.

But as early as 1989, Goldman notes, a dissenting AT&T local president in New York City named Laura Unger refused to participate in “quality of work-life” (QWL) programs. Unger warned that the goal of QWL training was to get workers “to internalize the goals of management,” under the guise of empowering them. In her view, such joint programs were part of an anti-union strategy that would lead to union members acting “against their own self-interest as workers.”

Anti-QWL sentiment gained further traction among 60,000 NYNEX (now Verizon) workers who struck, successfully, against contract concessions that same year. After the four-month CWA-IBEW work stoppage, management unleashed a blizzard of warm and fuzzy schemes for “Process Improvement,” “Self-Managing Teams,” and “Making Things Better”—all under the rubric of a “Vision Quest” for “Quality.”

NYNEX locals began to develop a different post-strike agenda. Local officers and stewards received Labor Notes-assisted training about the pitfalls of quality circles. This union education was conducted under the wing of Jan Pierce, a CWA regional vice president, whose political differences with Bahr led to his defeat a few years later by a CWA headquarters-backed candidate.

While influenced by the Labor Notes critiques of QWL, one upstate NY telecom local, issued its own policy statement, entitled “Their Quality and Ours.” This document opposed joint programs that would bypass the union and “require conformity to company-determined objectives, divide workers into competing groups internally and statewide, undermine workplace conditions, and erode the independence of the union.”

To counter this threat, NYNEX locals developed a coordinated campaign to get the Public Service Commission in New York to impose new quality standards on the company’s landline service (then more widely used and regulated). The goal was to pressuremanagement to hire more techs and service reps, under conditions that would allow them to serve customers better.

Call center shut-downs, driven by Covid four years ago, added a new wrinkle to the struggle for workplace improvements when customer calls were re-directed to service reps working from home. For many CWA at AT&T and Verizon, this eliminated the need for long commutes, leading to more family time, reduced absenteeism, and greater job satisfaction.

So last year, customer service reps made their voices heard again in a lively CWA presidential campaign debate about whether they should still have the flexibility to work from home or be herded back into traditional workplaces with less desirable conditions.

There’s no better back story to that recent tug-of-war than Disconnected, with its well-researched account of call center work and its continuing discontents.

Steve Early was a CWA international rep and organizer in the Northeast between 1980 and 2007. He was involved in organizing, bargaining, and strike activity by call center workers at AT&T and Verizon. He remains active in the union as a NewsGuild/CWA member. He can be reached at Lsupport@aol.com
Claudia Sheinbaum Stares Down Mexico’s Highest Court

Mexican judges have threatened to throw their own president in jail for implementing constitutional reforms that subject them to direct elections. The effort is destined to fail, but the confrontation could set the tone for lawfare campaigns across the region.

November 4, 2024
Source: Jacobin


Claudia Sheinbaum | Image credit: ASAMBLEA INFORMATIVA EN TORREÓN, COAHUILA

Since taking office on October 1 as Mexico’s first woman president, Claudia Sheinbaum has had — to put it mildly — an eventful month.

She has made three trips to Acapulco to coordinate recovery efforts in the aftermath of Hurricane John. She has overseen the passage of key constitutional amendments, including measures to restore the passenger train network (privatized and eliminated in the ’90s), return the energy sector to public control, and authorize the federal housing authority, INFONAVIT, to build much-needed social housing. She has launched new programs to lower the pension age for women, provide home-to-home health care for senior citizens, provide day care for the children of maquiladora and field workers, and ban the sale of junk food in schools. And she has faced her own gruesome welcome wagon of violence, including the beheading of the mayor of the city of Chilpancingo, Guerrero, a pair of car bombings in the state of Guanajuato, and the killing of six migrants in Chiapas after the military opened fire on the truck carrying them, an incident currently under investigation.

But among all of these, the affair really putting her young administration to the test was set off before she took office: the judicial reform amendment, ratified on September 15, which provides for the direct popular election of federal judges.
Judges Run Amok

The judicial reform will roll out in two stages: half of the federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court, will be chosen in a special election in June 2025, and the other half at the time of the midterm elections in 2027. Current justices will have the option of participating in the elections or retiring from their posts.

The Mexican public has repeatedly demonstrated its utter fatigue with justices living high on the hog while leaving everyone else to pick up the pieces of a dysfunctional, profoundly unjust, and highly partisan justice system. At the same time that they stuff the bureaucracy with family members (according to a report by the chief justice of the Supreme Court herself, Norma Piña, the nepotism rate in the judicial bureaucracy in 2022 was a staggering one in two), judges routinely protect high-profile elites while leaving some 87,000 prisoners languishing for years without trials or sentences.

It is to be recalled that Morena ran on the judicial reform during this year’s presidential campaign, asking the public for the qualified majority of two-thirds necessary to pass it and other reforms over the opposition’s objections. Voters obliged. And in a series of polls taken shortly before ratification, support for the direct election of judges ranged from 68 to 75 percent.

Not surprisingly, this enthusiasm is not shared by the judiciary itself. Its guerrilla war against the reform began during the legislative process, when judges attempted to halt congressional debate by means of injunction or, failing that, prevent it from being sent to state legislatures for their consideration. While the idea that the judiciary can intervene to stop a legislature from doing its job is risible on its face — equivalent to Congress dictating to the courts what cases they can and cannot hear — it is further compounded by the fact that Article 61 of Mexico’s law governing the use of said injunctions (the Ley de Amparo), passed by today’s aggrieved opposition when it was in power in 2013, makes abundantly clear that they cannot be used against constitutional amendments.

This did not stop the judiciary, however, from trying again. Once the amendment was officially a done deal, a judge and conservative activist from Veracruz with a series of disciplinary problems ordered it to be stripped from the books within twenty-four hours; if not, she would refer the case to prosecutors, who, she warned, could move to jail the president for up to nine years for contempt. Coolly, Sheinbaum pointed out in her morning press conference on October 24 that it was illegal for the judge to remove something that had already been added to the Official Federal Register and that, by so ordering, it was the judge who had effectively placed herself in contempt.

Then it was the Supreme Court’s turn to get in on the act. Throughout October, it decided to accept a series of petitions submitted by opposition legislators and political parties to stop the reform. That was error number one, as political parties in Mexico do not have the standing to seek injunctions on constitutional matters; as for the justices themselves, the conflict of interest of purporting to rule on a measure that directly affected them was blatantly obvious to all concerned. Undeterred by such niceties, the court’s conservative majority plowed ahead, and, on October 28, Justice Juan Luis Alcántara Carrancá — who hosted a now infamous dinner between Chief Justice Piña and opposition political leaders before the election — presented a draft of his ruling. In language eerily reminiscent of the Bush v. Gore decision of 2000, which infamously limited itself “to the present circumstances,” Alcantára’s text took great pains to present itself as “exceptional” (nine times) and “an exceptionality” (five times). While accepting the settled precedent that a constitutional amendment cannot be unconstitutional, it goes on to contend that the offending parts of the Constitution are not constitutional-level text at all but downgradable to simple “federal electoral law” and thus susceptible to being overturned. In a subsequent interview on Radio Fórmula, former Supreme Court justice José Ramón Cossío (whose Instituto Para el Fortalecimiento del Estado de Derecho NGO is backed by the US soft-interventionist arm USAID) breathlessly threatened that anyone who disobeyed the ruling, be it the president or every last legislator, could be declared “in rebellion,” thrown out of office, and put on trial.
Keeping Her Powder Dry

All of this sounds far more lurid than it actually is. Backed by an enormous popular mandate, Claudia Sheinbaum is not going anywhere, nor are MORENA legislators or anyone else — except for the judges who of their own volition decide not to participate in next year’s election. Indeed, the Federal Electoral Tribunal has already given the green light for said election, and planning is already underway. Eight of the Supreme Court justices — the same eight who are attempting to place themselves “exceptionally” above the Constitution — have already handed in their resignations as of next year in order to benefit from the generous retirement package provided by the reform.

There is, indeed, more than a whiff of desperation around this vulgar little coup, what in Spanish is called patadas de ahogado, the flailing of a drowning person. This is very likely the reason why, in the face of calls from the Morena base to impeach the offending judges (which its qualified majority permits), President Sheinbaum has preferred to adopt a wait-and-see attitude, making a consistent case against the plotting in her morning press conferences but keeping her powder dry lest it be needed ahead.

But the episode does raise a larger — and largely unresolved — question that has plagued left-leaning governments throughout Latin America: how to defang well-funded lawfare campaigns that clothe themselves in legalese to subvert popular democracy, and how to handle a judiciary that violates the law in the name of defending it, converting itself in the process into a renegade political actor.

The strategy of what Andrés Manuel López Obrador called the “Supreme Conservative Power” is clearly to put Sheinbaum’s administration in an early bind: either knuckle under and accept its wayward ruling or be seen as disobeying the highest court of the land, thus reinforcing the authoritarian image of Morena’s popular government carefully cultivated by the national and international press over the last six years.

With a vote on Alcántara’s proposal scheduled for as soon as this week, it will soon become clear to what extent the justices, on their way out the door, are willing to burn down the house. How Sheinbaum responds will set the tone not only for her administration but for a generation to come.

Kurt Hackbarth is a writer, playwright, freelance journalist, the cofounder of the independent media project “MexElects" and host of Soberanía: The Mexican Politics Podcast.