Sunday, November 17, 2024

 

To the International Anarchist Movement: Three Security Proposals

Three pictures, from left to right: Pigeons arranged in a circle, eating crumbs on a cobblestone floor in a city. / Pigeons sitting next to each other on a metal fence. A white sky is visible in the background. / Birds flying, seen from afar. A warm pink sky and soft blue mountains are visible in the background.

From No Trace Project

This text is addressed to the international anarchist movement, which we'll define as the sum of individuals fighting for anarchist ideas around the world. This movement is in conflict with its natural enemies — the State, fascist groups, and so on — and must protect itself if it is to survive in this conflict. In this text, we make three proposals for the international anarchist movement to consider in the coming years in order to allow anarchists to continue attacking while limiting their chances of getting caught.

1. Share knowledge internationally

Our enemies organize internationally through cooperation between police and intelligence agencies and new developments in science and technology — the increasing precision of DNA forensics and the proliferation of drones being just two examples. This means that a repressive technique used in one country may soon appear in another where it is not yet being used. It also means that an effective countermeasure used by anarchists in one country may be effective in another. We should therefore share knowledge of repressive techniques and countermeasures on an international level.

Ideally, any experience of repression or experimentation with countermeasures that might be of interest to other anarchists should be written up, translated into several languages, and made public. When anarchists are arrested and brought to trial, we can often obtain court documents that reveal how they were caught: we should exploit this and publish analyses of such documents, bearing in mind that information obtained in this way may be partial or distorted. We should experiment with new countermeasures and write and publish reports on these experiments (except in cases where the State might adapt and weaken the countermeasure by reading the report). We should try to collect information at the source: read police training manuals, steal police files, analyze data leaks from police servers.

A specific feature of the international anarchist movement is its decentralization. We see this not as a weakness but as a strength: in addition to preventing the hierarchies inherent in centralized organizations, it makes it harder for our enemies to target us because they cannot topple the whole movement by disrupting one part of it. However, this decentralization also makes it harder for us to share knowledge across borders. To overcome this, we see two options: developing informal bonds with other anarchists by meeting at international book fairs and other events, and using the Internet. We propose using the No Trace Project as an international platform to share the knowledge that is suited for sharing on the Internet, not as a replacement for informal bonds but as a useful supplement to spread information beyond existing informal networks.

2. Establish a security baseline

Anarchists who carry out direct actions should analyze the risks associated with their actions and take appropriate precautions: dress anonymously, be mindful of video surveillance and DNA traces, and so on. However, this is not enough. If only those who carry out actions take precautions, it is easier for our enemies to target these individuals. This is, firstly, because they stand out: if only a handful of comrades always leave their phones at home, for example, this could be an obvious starting point for an investigation with no other specific leads. And secondly, because our enemies can get information about them through their friends who do not carry out actions: if someone doesn't use social media but is mentioned on their friends' social media, for example, an investigation could query their friends' social media to get information about them. We should therefore establish a security baseline that everyone in anarchist networks agrees to follow, including those who have never carried out direct actions and have no intention of doing so.

We can't say what this baseline should be, as it will depend on each local context, but we can give some ideas. As a bare minimum, everyone should help hide information from our enemies by not speculating about who is involved in an action, not bragging about one's own participation in an action, not talking to the police, and encrypting any computer or phone used for conversations with other anarchists using a strong password. Discuss sensitive matters exclusively outdoors and without electronic devices, and don't make it obvious to your social environment who you are having sensitive conversations with (e.g. don't ask someone to “go for a walk” in front of people who aren't involved in the project being discussed). In addition, we think everyone should stop using social media (and definitely stop posting photos of other anarchists, even with their consent, because this helps the State map anarchist networks) and leave their phones at home at all times (not just during actions). Carrying your phone with you has security implications for everyone you interact with.

It can be difficult to convince people to follow such a security baseline, especially if they think they have no personal interest in following it. If someone is reluctant, we should remind them that it's not just their security that's at stake, but also the security of other anarchists around them who may be carrying out or planning to carry out direct actions. Everyone who wants actions to happen has an interest in making anarchist networks as difficult as possible for the authorities to repress.

3. Explore new horizons

Our enemies evolve over time as they refine their strategies and techniques. We should prepare not for the battles that already took place, but for those yet to come. We should therefore go beyond our current security practices, anticipate the evolution of our enemies, and develop new countermeasures.

Here are three issues we think the international anarchist movement should explore in the coming years.

Drones

Aerial surveillance is rapidly becoming cheaper and more efficient. How should we react to the presence of police drones at riots, anarchist events, and so on? How can we detect or take down drones? Should we prepare for the risk of drones being used for routine aerial patrols, and if so, how?

Facial recognition technologies

In 2023, a journalist tracked down German left-wing militant Daniela Klette, who had been in clandestinity for decades, by using facial recognition technology to match a decades-old photo of her with a recent photo from Facebook taken during a dance class. What can we do against this threat? How can we prepare for the increasing integration of facial recognition technology into public video surveillance systems?

Lack of insight into police activity

Until a few years ago, radio scanners were used by anarchists to monitor police frequencies, for example to learn about nearby police activity while carrying out a direct action. In most contexts, this is now impossible because police communications are encrypted. Can we develop new techniques to functionally replace radio scanners or, more generally, to gain insight into police activity in a given area?

About the authors

We're the No Trace Project. For the past three years, we've been building tools to help anarchists understand the capabilities of their enemies, undermine surveillance efforts, and ultimately act without getting caught. We plan to continue in the years to come. We welcome feedback. You can visit our website at notrace.how, and contact us at notrace@autistici.org.

This text is available as a zine (in Letter and A4 dimensions).

Let's prepare ourselves, and may luck be on our side.

 

The ruptures of militant anarchism in Brazil

From Freedom News by O Amigo do Povo

“Where we come from and where we are going”: a reflection on Brazilian anarchism, then and now

~ from O Amigo do Povo ~

Brazilian anarchism lost influence over the masses with the decline and later, the end of revolutionary syndicalism in Brazil between the 1920s and 1930s. This syndicalism already had certain limitations when compared to the model of the historical AIT and its relationship with Mikhail Bakunin’s Alliance. The limitations can be summarised as purism, a-politicism and lack of understanding of the reality of Brazil, in addition to the centrality of anarchist organisation. What remained of anarchism in Brazil for more than half a century were small initiatives of propagandists, educationists and memorialists of anarcho-communist groups, composed of a mix of the old generation of anarchists in contact with young university students and punks, mostly from the petite bourgeoisie.

Between 1995 and 1996, through contacts between anarchist activists in Brazil and the Uruguayan Anarchist Federation (FAU), a new era emerged for anarchism in Brazil, culminating in the creation of the Libertarian Socialist Organization (OSL) in 1997 and, later, the Forum of Organised Anarchism in 2000. Despite the limitations and lack of theoretical and strategic unity of some local groups, it was in this context that Brazilian anarchism once again gained a small presence in the class struggle. Of note were the actions of the Gaucho Anarchist Federation (FAG) and, later, the Collective of Pro-organisation Anarchist of Goiás (COPOAG), with its work among waste pickers in the National Movement of Waste Pickers (MNCR), and the Libertarian Socialist Organization OSL-RJ (future UNIPA), with its urban occupations and secondary school movements in the outskirts.

Of the initiatives that stood out in the class struggle in the early 2000s, FAG’s activities lost traction among waste pickers and other social movements, adopting a shift towards post-structuralism. The Colective Anarchist Pro-organisation of Goiás, which was Bakuninist, ended in 2008. The only organisation that continued to advance, both in theory and in practice, was the group from Rio de Janeiro, which became the Popular Anarchist Union. At that time, the Popular Anarchist Union had already been debating the importance of building a revolutionary theory through Bakunin’s thought, criticising individualism and highlighting the importance of strategic action, as in the debate between CONLUTAS and INTERSINDICAL that existed within the Forum of Organised Anarchism. In this sense, the Popular Anarchist Union broke with Forum of Organised Anarchism and launched itself as a national organisation, criticising revisionism and eclecticism.

The Popular Anarchist Union, which was a local group in Rio de Janeiro until 2007, due to its more successful performance in the national context of degeneration of the left with the Worker’s Party governments, such as in the revolutionary bloc in Conlutas and in the promotion of a combative tendency in the student movement with the Class-Based and Combative Student Network, experienced relatively large quantitative and qualitative growth in the 2010s building centres in the Federal District, Ceará, Center South, Goiás, Mato Grosso, among others. Meanwhile the Forum of Organised Anarchism, which became the Brazilian Anarchist Coordination (CAB), despite its growth, changed little in terms of strategic unity and mass line, often acting as an auxiliary line of reformism or practicing welfare in social movements, resulting in less influence in the class struggle.

Garbage collector in Juazeiro, Bahia, 2007. Photo: Glauco Umbelino CC BY 2.0

In 2013, with the June uprising and the growth of its influence in several cities, the Popular Anarchist Union contributed to the call for the National Meeting of Popular, Student and Revolutionary Trade Union Organisations and the national reconstruction of Federation of Revolutionary Syndicalist Organisations of Brazil, becoming a reference for class-based tendencies in Brazil, mainly in the student movement with the Class-Based and Combative Student Network and in basic education with the Class Resistance Opposition group. There was a significant increase in the participation of Bakuninists in the class struggle, such as in the high school occupations of 2015 and in universities in 2016.

The Popular Anarchist Union, which established itself as the only bastion of revolutionary class-based anarchism in Brazil during the Worker’s Party governments (2003-2016), began to make its first mistakes after Dilma’s impeachment, by adhering to the coup narrative and, consequently, favouring the fight against the Worker’s Party “coup-mongering” and the defence of bourgeois democracy. This can be explained, in part, by the contradiction of its growth having occurred in intermediate sectors, such as the student movement of federal universities and the civil service. Meanwhile, the Brazilian Anarchist Coordination lost itself in social-democratic and identity-based narratives, having little influence in the class struggle.

After losing its way in the conceptual dispute with the reformists following Dilma’s impeachment, the only Bakuninist organisation in the world also failed to fully understand the changing context and the decline in struggles after 2016. Even in a new context of right-wing governments and a decline in struggles, it helped to convene the second National Meeting of Popular, Student and Revolutionary Trade Union Organisations, with a proposal de-contextualised from Western Europe by the anarcho-syndicalists of the International Confederation of Labor (CIT) with the creation of the SIGAs, parallel unions, breaking with the only model that was working: the class-based and disciplined tendencies. Thus, they created free unions aimed mainly at libertarians and doctrinaire revolutionaries, focusing only on agitation and propaganda, like the outdated models of the factory-gate unions of the 20th century.

The Popular Anarchist Union/ Federation of Revolutionary Syndicalist Organisations of Brazil continued to present errors in reading the context and promoting hasty and misguided structural changes, and as a result, several internal disagreements arose, mainly on issues such as the “Coup”, “Bolsonaro Out”, “identitarianism” and the “stay at home” policy. In this context, between 2021-2023, there were many ruptures in The Popular Anarchist Union/ Federation of Revolutionary Syndicalist Organisations of Brazil, some public, others not. In the Brazilian Anarchist Coordination, there were also disagreements on two main issues: the advancement of the national organisation with political and strategic unity and the criticism of liberalism/identitarianism, which culminated in a split, mainly of the southeastern organisations of the Brazilian Anarchist Coordination, which formed the new Libertarian Socialist Organization (OSL) in 2023.

With all these changes in the situation in recent years – right-wing governments, the pandemic and the return of the Lula government, even more bourgeois – splits were created that today divide militant anarchism in Brazil into four main lines: Brazilian Anarchist Coordination, Libertarian Socialist Organization, Popular Anarchist Union/ Federation of Revolutionary Syndicalist Organisations of Brazil and its dissidents, such as GLP/Jornal Amigo do Povo, Ofensiva Revolucionária, among others.

Our humble position, the result of these ruptures and more than 20 years of activism even though we are not an anarchist group today, but rather a group of class-based activists, is summarised in advancing where the historical Popular Anarchist Union (2003-2016) was unable to do so. We want to make a quantitative and qualitative leap not only with intermediate sectors, but mainly with strategic sectors and the marginal proletariat, continuing with disciplined activism and theoretical and strategic unity as a legacy of Bakunin and Makhno. We must go to the people and continue fighting for the social revolution.

Palestine: The Resistance

Saturday 16 November 2024, by Édouard Soulier




Since 7 October, Palestinians in Gaza have been subjected to the worst military onslaught in the history of the enclave, with an unprecedented outpouring of force and violence. At the same time, Israel has been on the offensive in the other occupied territories: the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and now the whole region. The aim of this offensive, in all its configurations, is to increase colonial control, in particular by evicting and destroying homes, but also by deliberately and systematically killing those who resist - the Israelis call this ‘mowing the lawn’.

When the media talk about this situation - and it’s not often - the Palestinians are often portrayed as extremely passive. It is true that on the surface the asymmetry of resources gives this impression. But Palestinian resistance is very much alive and kicking - armed resistance, peaceful resistance and legal resistance. However, one of the important aspects of Israeli colonisation is the fragmentation of Palestinian society: territorial fragmentation without geographical contiguity, administrative fragmentation and political fragmentation. This means that, de facto, each group of Palestinians does not have the same difficulties or the same opportunities for response and support.

Palestinian civil society

Palestinians have not stood idly by. On the international stage, this resistance has led to important symbolic victories: condemnation of plausible genocide and condemnation of the occupation and apartheid by the International Court of Justice, recognition of the Palestinian state with observer status at the UN General Assembly.

In particular, this presence enabled sanctions against Israel to be included in the most recent resolution of this assembly. Palestinian civil society is also represented by the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign based in Ramallah, which continues the fight to delegitimize the state of Israel, its colonisation and its apartheid. At once political, ideological and economic, this campaign has scored a number of victories: AXA divestment, PUMA withdrawal and a number of event boycotts.

Organised from Palestine, the BDS campaign is the simplest point of entry for people wishing to support Palestinians outside Palestine. The leadership of the BDS campaign recommends pushing harder, particularly on banks such as BNP, because it considers that the Israeli economy is on the brink of collapse and that massive disinvestment by the banks could push it further into the abyss.

The Palestinian Authority

The Palestinian Authority (PA) has found itself in an even more uncomfortable situation than in previous years, when the slaughter and oblivion of the Palestinians was carried out with little fanfare. Regularly - and quite rightly - accused of treason and of being suppletives of the Israeli army, the PA essentially controls a few towns in the West Bank and obviously the policy of resistance in international institutions. The PA is in a delicate position because it cannot continue its direct support for the offensive on Jenin, Tulkarem and so on and at the same time leave control to the radical elements. The fact that the PA is not negotiating the release of Marwan Barghouti is linked to the fact that he would de facto take over its leadership and purges would take place in the upper echelons.

The PA has a great deal at stake in staying in office. There are two million people in the West Bank and 250,000 people working for the PA, half of them in the security forces. Most of them are in zone A - Ramallah, Jericho and so on which are relatively unscathed for the moment. Even areas close to Ramallah such as Huwara are being targeted by settlers. The Israeli offensive is concentrated mainly on the poor refugee camps where there are autonomous armed groups. On the ground, apart from the usual protests, the PA has mainly acted as police force against armed groups in the West Bank, most of which come from these refugee camps. It therefore seems difficult at this stage to consider the PA as part of the resistance. [1]

On the West Bank

However, Israel has begun an unprecedented offensive in the West Bank, no doubt judging that at this stage Western support has been secured and that increasing the land seizures can be included in the ‘Gaza balance’, i.e. as part of the general offensive against ‘terrorism’ and Hamas. For the moment, the settlers and the Israeli army are still doing the easy thing, killing demonstrators and children and destroying buildings. But organised Palestinian military resistance is more significant and, as already indicated, even the Palestinian Authority is finding it very difficult to control the will of groups around Islamic Jihad or Hamas and even from within its own ranks, such as the Al Aqsa Martyrs or other more radical groups such as the Lion’s Den.

The emergence of new Palestinian armed groups is not a recent phenomenon. Such groups were formed during the first and second Intifadas, or during any period of escalating oppression or restriction of Palestinian rights under Israeli occupation.

A new generation of Palestinian armed groups with diverse strategies, tactics and objectives has emerged since 2021, particularly in the occupied West Bank, in response to repressive Israeli policies, increased violent raids, continued settlement and the absence of a political path. [2]

Gaza

Gaza has always been a hotbed of resistance. The withdrawal of the settlements in 2005 was mainly due to the prohibitive cost of monitoring and protecting them - and also in order to focus on the West Bank. It is also the place where the Palestinian Authority had the least influence and disappeared completely after the inter-group wars of 2007 following Fatah’s desire to overturn the election result.

Since the blockade of Gaza, the main political party organising life there is Hamas, which also has a military wing. On several occasions, Gazans have organised protests against colonisation and the separation wall. Several demonstrations took place last year. But since October, the resistance has been mainly military. Fighters from several armed groups continue to intervene against the Israeli forces. The main forces are the armed groups of Hamas (Al Qassam), Islamic Jihad (Al Quds), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and also Fatah (Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade).

These armed groups regularly intervene against the forces on the ground. This can be seen in videos of fighters in which targets are indicated by red triangles. These armed groups claim success against several thousand vehicles - tanks, bulldozers and troop carriers. Official figures indicate that since the start of ground operations in Gaza on 27 October 2023, 346 Israeli soldiers have been killed and more than 2,300 wounded. [Swords of Iron: IDF Casualties. www.gov.il ]] [Given the frequency of the attacks documented by the videos, it would appear that this figure is greatly underestimated - probably by ignoring the losses of the mercenary groups deployed in the area. [3]

In addition, despite the destruction and control of several areas in Gaza, dozens of rockets were fired towards the north (Ashkelon) and towards the Naqab (Beer Sheva). More than a military result, these rocket attacks clearly demonstrate the poor control exercised by the Israeli army over the armed groups. Clearly, it is easier to destroy buildings and fire on refugee camps. However, the Israeli army is continuing its propaganda about human shields to justify its massacres, such as that at the Nuseirat refugee camp, where the bombing to kill one of the Hamas leaders resulted in 90 deaths. As usual, every accusation is a confession: there is no proof of the use of human shields by Hamas and other groups, although this has been extremely well documented on the Israeli side. In any case, such proof would be pointless to establish, given the massive and indiscriminate nature of the Israeli bombardments.

What prospects?

The main demands are for a ceasefire. The truth is that the main resistance factions in Gaza (Hamas and Islamic Jihad) have declared that they will accept any arrangement to govern the Gaza Strip after the end of the war, provided that this arrangement is Palestinian and not imposed by Israel. [4]

The Palestinian Authority has also agreed to play a role in the management of the Gaza Strip, provided that political unity is re-established with the West Bank. The Israeli government is the only one to have rejected all the proposals for the ‘day after’ and has not even specified a clear plan for that day, because it rejects the very existence of Hamas and any role for the Palestinian Authority, and refuses to include any political solution that guarantees even a fraction of the Palestinians’ national rights.

Hamas and the other resistance factions have called for an end to the aggression against Gaza from day one, but they have always come up against Israel’s refusal and inflexibility. As we have seen, Israel’s desire to eradicate Hamas is nothing more than propaganda. For even if Hamas were to disappear, new armed Palestinian groups would continue to emerge to fight against the Israeli occupation, with an emerging consensus among rights groups who regard the Israeli regime as apartheid. Moreover, the violence necessary for a military operation to dismantle or weaken Hamas could prove self-destructive, spawning new forms of armed resistance and the creation of new Palestinian groups.

Indeed, Israel’s approach to solving its security problems does not include a political solution, without which no military solution can produce lasting results. And at least in Gaza, the armed groups are paradoxically the force that is most preventing the massacres. [5]

Palestinian resistance and resilience demonstrate the impasse in Israel’s military tactics. The ongoing war of colonisation has more to do with a headlong rush than with a political solution. By setting fire to everything, Israel hopes that, in time, its territorial gains in Gaza, Jerusalem, the West Bank and, why not, Lebanon, will become ‘permanent’. As far as Gaza is concerned, total annihilation is probably not possible (even though the Israeli leaders obviously want it); Israel would be content with a permanent field of tents paid for by the UN, surrounded by barbed wire, corridors and buffer zones. This is why the negotiations for a cessation of hostilities must at the very least include withdrawal from Gaza in its entirety.

Having said that, armed resistance will not be enough to secure withdrawal without movement from the outside, whether it be boycott campaigns or direct pressure via mobilisation (the two are not mutually exclusive). ‘For non-violence to work, your opponent must have a conscience. The United States has none”, said Stokely Carmichael. The same goes for Israel.

L’Anticapitaliste

P.S.

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Footnotes

[1Emad Moussa, ‘Israel-PA security coordination: Protection for whom?’ New Arab, 14 October 2021.

[2Jessica Buxbaum, ‘Amid Gaza’s devastation, Israel wages another war in the West Bank’, New Arab, 02 November 2023; Sally Ibrahim, ‘A new generation of Palestinians is emerging to resist Israel’, New Arab, 6 October 2022; Mat Nashed, ‘How Israel’s raids on Jenin only fuel Palestinian resistance’, Al Jazeera, 2 June 2024 and Mariam Barghouti, ‘How growing Israeli violence in the West Bank is fuelling Palestinian resistance’, New Arab, 12 August 2024.

[3‘Palestinian resistance movements fight back against Israeli occupation in Gaza’, Daily News Egypt, 22 May 2024.

[4Dario Sabagh, ‘Why dismantling Hamas won’t end Palestinian armed resistance’, New Arab, 18 October 2023.

[5Sébastian Seibt, ‘Israeli army in urgent need of troops amid rising casualties in Gaza’, France24, 19 June 2024.




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