Feminist Approaches to International Relations: ‘Good Girls’ Only?

Dominika Remžová
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Dec 22 2024 •

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Feminist approaches to international politics have only been allowed into the discipline of International Relations as ‘good girls.’ Several scholars have made an argument along these lines, with Weber’s (1994) response to Keohane’s (1989) article on contributions by different feminist theories to the study of International Relations (IR) being one of the most cited positions on the issue. Keohane evaluates feminist standpoint as having the greatest potential for supplementing the mainstream (including, but not limited to, neorealist and neoliberal) IR in the short run (hence Weber’s categorisation of Keohane’s representation of this theory as a ‘good girl’), feminist empiricism as having a promise of supplementation in the long run (hence a ‘little girl’) and feminist post-modernism as having no such promise at all (hence a ‘bad girl’). Weber (1994:338) argues that Keohane ‘mutilates’ the feminist body of literature threatening to overflow the established boundaries of IR; the result being not just a partial representation, but a complete transformation, of the three theories. This can be seen in Keohane’s identification of standpoint feminism with his own project of neoliberal institutionalism, despite the former’s ontological and epistemological assumptions, as epitomised by Hartsock’s (1983) historical materialist strand of the theory, being contrary to the latter’s.

When it comes to my own position on the issue (i.e., the kind of feminist approaches that have been allowed into the discipline of IR), I see IR as consisting of multiple functionally and/or geographically defined sub-disciplines (hereafter referred to as ‘camps,’ a term coined by Sylvester in Zalewski 2008). Following from this multifaceted understanding of IR, I argue that both ‘good girls’ and ‘bad girls’ exist in IR (albeit my definition of these categories differs from Weber’s), with some ‘camps’ being dominated by ‘good girls’ (alongside other positivist approaches) and others by ‘bad girls’ (alongside other interpretivist, hereafter referred to as post-positivist, approaches).

I focus on the ‘camp’ of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), which I see as more representative of the scholarship and practice of IR (hereafter referred to as global IR) than other ‘camps.’ I use the term global IR as a descriptive term for the multitude of IR scholarships and practices in/from countries across the Global North and the Global South, which should not be confused with the normative project of ‘Global IR’ proposed by Acharya (2014). When it comes to feminism, I argue that the Foreign Policy Analysis and practice are dominated by ‘good girls’ in both the Global North and the Global South. Although this essay focuses on the ‘camp’ of FPA and feminist theories, the core/peripheral positions of ‘good girls’ and ‘bad girls’ within FPA can be seen as representative of all positivist and post-positivist approaches within not just the ‘camp’ itself but global IR.

In terms of structure, the main body of this essay consists of two sections. The first section focuses on IR scholarship, providing details about my own understanding of IR (including its ‘camps’ and theories) against the background of its disciplinary development. The second section focuses on the practice of IR in relation to the scholarship. Here, I use examples of (both explicit and implicit) feminist foreign policies (FFPs) to illustrate the predominance of ‘good girls’ in not just foreign policy scholarship but also practice.

‘Camps’ in International Relations



My understanding of IR has been informed by several developments that have occurred since the early debates between mainstream and feminist IR scholars (see the exchanges between Keohane 1989 and Weber 1994 or Tickner 1997 and Keohane 1998), which had tended to position all mainstream theories on the positivist end of the IR spectrum (conceptualised as materialist, universalist and problem-solving) and all feminist theories on the post-positivist end (conceptualised as idealist, particularistic and critical). One such development concerns the proliferation of post-colonial and decolonial approaches that have not only criticised the ethnocentric presuppositions within both mainstream and feminist theories, thus transcending the binary oppositions between the two but have expanded the boundaries of IR scholarship whilst becoming dominant in certain ‘camps’ of the discipline.

IR now consists of several ‘camps’ (including, but not limited to, International Political Economy, Foreign Policy Analysis, Security Studies, and Area Studies), all of which employ a variety of positivist and post-positivist theories, albeit some are more inclined to employ the former and others the latter. It may thus be more useful to think of IR theories as being at the core/periphery within individual ‘camps,’ although this is not to deny that positivist theories prevail across the ‘camps’ (i.e., in global IR). Indeed, my decision to focus on the ‘camp’ of FPA is due to its representativeness of global IR, which, despite the increasing proliferation of post-positivist theories within certain ‘camps’ (e.g., Area Studies), continues to be dominated by positivist approaches (and so does the ‘camp’ of FPA). In fact, the ‘camps’ that can be seen as dominated by post-positivist (including ‘bad girl’) theories, remain at the periphery of global IR (Kaczmarska and Ortmann 2021). Foreign policy practice, which is discussed in the second section of this essay, is further demonstrative of the continued power differentials (re. knowledge production and dissemination) between positivist and post-positivist approaches.

When it comes to my categorisation of feminist IR theories, I see some as positivist on both ontological and epistemological fronts (e.g., feminist empiricism and liberal feminism), some as such only in terms of their ontologies (e.g., strands of standpoint and decolonial feminism) and others as post-positivist on both fronts (e.g., post-modern and post-colonial feminism). I refer to all feminist theories that adopt positivist ontologies as ‘good girls’ and those that adopt post-positivist ontologies as ‘bad girls,’ making the category of ‘little girls’ redundant. The distinction I keep is that between post-colonial and decolonial approaches. The former approaches define normative positions of the Global North that, based on a temporal divide between ‘colonial’ and ‘post-colonial,’ imply the end of colonisation, whereas the latter refers to normative projects of the Global South that aim to decolonise the ‘post-colonial’ and challenge the Western-centric knowledge production (Hiraide 2021). Decolonial theories thus not only criticise post-colonial theories for reproducing the existing power relations but are closer to the early anti-colonial approaches that aimed to decolonise the ‘colonial.’

Based on this distinction, decolonial feminism can be seen as a sub-type of feminist standpoint and post-colonial feminism as that of feminist post-modernism. This is supported by Mohanty (2003:511), a prominent scholar from the Global South (although Mohanty herself avoids the use of binary categories such as the Global North and the Global South), who bases her decolonial approach on the historical materialist strand of standpoint feminism. Moreover, in her criticism of liberal feminism (re. its ethnocentrism) and post-colonial feminism (re. its cultural relativism), Mohanty associates the former with modernism (Mohanty 1988) and the latter with post-modernism (Mohanty 2003). She sees both as hegemonic discourses uncritical of the neoliberal project of the Global North, which her anti-capitalist stance based on the standpoint of women from the Global South aims to challenge (Mohanty 2003:514).



In the next section I discuss the predominance of liberal and decolonial feminist (i.e., ‘good girl’) approaches over post-colonial (i.e., ‘bad girl’) approaches in foreign policy practices (as well as scholarships) of countries in both the Global North and the Global South. I argue that post-positivist (i.e., idealist) ontologies of the ‘bad girls’ prevail only in specific circles of foreign policy scholars in/from the Global North, with scholars and policymakers in/from the Global South seeming to prefer positivist (i.e., materialist) ontologies of the ‘good girls,’ albeit these are different from those preferred by policymakers in/from the Global North.

‘Good Girls’ in Foreign Policy Analysis and Practice

Not only has the ‘camp’ of FPA remained largely unaffected by the post-positivist turn in Social Sciences (including specific ‘camps’ of IR), but the foreign policy practice itself continues being based on positivist approaches (Achilleos-Sarll 2018:35). This can be seen in the prevalence of strategies such as gender mainstreaming, gender balancing and gender budgeting in the implementation of FFPs that have been adopted by an increasing number of countries across the world as part of their Women, Peace, and Security agendas. These strategies are based on adding sex (deemed synonymous with gender) as a variable into the mix of foreign policymaking. The goal is gender equality within the constraints of the existing (i.e., neoliberal) power structures, which makes such strategies representative of liberal feminist approaches that treat women as a homogenous category of analysis identifiable prior to any process of analysis (Mohanty 1988:65). This is epitomised by Swedish FFP based on ‘3Rs’ of rights, representation, and resources; Sweden being the first country in the world to adopt (and since abolish) an explicitly feminist foreign policy (Achilleos-Sarll 2018:41).

In an attempt to extend the Swedish formula to all marginalised groups, Germany has based its FFP on a ‘3R+D’ framework of rights, representation, resources, and diversity. The German formula was proposed by the party of the Greens as part of their 2021 election platform advocating for an explicitly ‘post-colonial and anti-racist’ foreign policy and subsequently adopted by the current government as part of its coalition agreement (Assad and Tausendfreund 2022). The potential for a post-positivist (i.e., ‘bad girl’) FFP that could transform the existing power structures, however, failed to materialise. Not only did the final FFP guidelines (FFO 2023a) downgrade the intersectional aspects of the proposed framework, privileging sex/gender over sexuality, race, class, and other social categories (Brechenmacher 2023), but the policy remained anchored within the neoliberal logic of the existing international order. This has effectively prevented any discussion (let alone transformation) of the structural causes behind the discriminatory conditions (e.g., sexism, heterosexism, racism, and classism) feminism is (in an emancipatory sense emphasised by Hartsock 1998) meant to tackle.

Feminism of the German FFP was thus conceptualised, in a Keohanean (1989) sense, as being in servitude to the overarching goals of neoliberalism, and nowhere is this more obvious than in Germany’s relations with China, which, contrary to the rhetoric of the foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, continues prioritising economic interests of German carmakers over the human rights of Uyghur women. Here, it is important to note that the final FFP guidelines were influenced not only by neoliberal but also neorealist assumptions about the increasingly competitive and violent international system (hence labelled as the ‘right kind’ of FFP by Tausendfreund 2021), which only reinforces the positivist nature of German FFP.

Whilst there are several differences between Western and non-Western IR, the ‘camp’ of Foreign Policy Analysis and practice is dominated by positivist theories across all regions of global IR. This can be explained by several factors, including (but not limited to) what Behera (2007) describes as ‘disciplinary gate-keeping practices’ of Western IR that hold a Gramscian hegemony over knowledge production and dissemination within global IR; the assumption being that Western IR is dominated by positivist theories. Although India has not adopted an explicitly feminist foreign policy, scholars have highlighted several tenets of Indian foreign policy that could be categorised as feminist. Here, the word ‘feminist’ is deemed synonymous with the word ‘anti-colonial,’ a development that Jain and Chacko (2009) trace back to the shared ideals (such as that of self-determination) between the Non-Aligned Movement and women’s movements. Besides anti-colonialism, these tenets were also framed by a Nehruvian vision of a sovereign Indian state based on a Westphalian model of a modern, liberal nation-state (Behera 2007:354), which further confirms their positivist nature.

Not only did neither of the aforementioned countries (i.e., Sweden, Germany, and India) adopt a post-colonial FFP, but several scholars from the Global South have questioned the emancipatory potential (and thus desirability) of post-colonial FFPs as well as the intersectional approaches associated with them. On one hand, Mohanty (1988:79) criticises the totalising tendencies of liberal (equated with colonial) feminist approaches that emphasise commonality by creating a master narrative based on the image of Western women that subsumes images of ‘others,’ conceptualised in binary and hierarchical terms to the privileged referent, within it (i.e., an image of a marginalised non-Western woman as an ahistorical object becomes subsumed within that of a privileged Western woman as a subject of feminist counter-history). On the other hand, Mohanty (2003:520) also criticises post-colonial approaches, namely their emphasis on differences that prohibit any connections between cultures and thus a common basis for analysis. According to Mohanty (2003:522-523), the focus should not be on just describing the intersections of gender, sexuality, race, class, and other social categories, but on analysing ‘common differences’ (referred to as ‘relationality’ by Shohat 2001:1271) that can facilitate ‘feminist solidarity across borders’ (Mohanty 2003:503).

Further criticising the emancipatory limits of post-colonial intersectionality, Rivera Chávez (2022) refers to Mexico as the first country from the Global South to adopt an explicitly feminist foreign policy, when arguing that intersectionality has itself become a tool of neoliberal ideology that reproduces (rather than challenges) binary and hierarchical categories of difference. The suggestion is to reformulate FFPs in a decolonial (rather than post-colonial) manner (i.e., basing them on materialist ontologies as envisioned by Mohanty 2003:511), which further supports this essay’s argument about the ‘good girl’ nature of current FFPs. Some scholars, such as Narlikar (2022), go as far as advocating for what they term ‘inclusive’ (rather than feminist) foreign policies that would be neither ethnocentric nor culturally relativist, implying intersectionality based on decolonial (rather than liberal or post-colonial) approaches.

Concluding remarks

The purpose of this essay has been to answer what kind of feminist approaches have been allowed into the discipline of International Relations. Reconceptualising Weber’s categories of feminist approaches within a broad understanding of IR as a multifaced discipline consisting of several sub-disciplines (referred to as ‘camps’), this essay argues that both ‘good girls’ (reconceptualised as feminist approaches with positivist ontologies) and ‘bad girls’ (reconceptualised as feminist approaches with post-positivist ontologies) exist in IR, with some ‘camps’ dominated by the former and others by the latter. At the same time, the essay contends that both the scholarship and practice of IR as a whole (referred to as global IR) are dominated by ‘good girl’ (and other positivist) approaches, which has been demonstrated by the ‘camp’ of Foreign Policy Analysis selected due to its representativeness of global IR.

Particular attention has been paid to the criticism of post-colonial and post-modern (i.e., ‘bad girl’) feminist approaches, which have seen increasing proliferation within some ‘camps’ of IR scholarship in/from the Global North (e.g., Area Studies), by scholars in/from the Global South who seem to prefer decolonial and standpoint approaches, at least as far as foreign policies are concerned. Both decolonial and standpoint approaches have been reconceptualised (based on their materialist ontologies) as ‘good girls,’ which, added to the prevalence of liberal feminism (i.e., another ‘good girl’) in practice, supports the essay’s argument about the predominance of ‘good girls’ within but also outside the ‘camp’ of FPA.

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Further Reading on E-International Relations

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The Limits of the Scientific Method in International Relations

Constraints On Rape As a Weapon of War: A Feminist and Post-Colonial Revision

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Characters in Disney’s ‘Moana’ use the stars just like real Polynesian explorers. An astronomer explains how

By — Christopher Palma, The Conversation

Science Dec 22, 2024 2:22 PM EST


If you have visited an island like one of the Hawaiian Islands, Tahiti or Easter Island, also known as Rapa Nui, you may have noticed how small these land masses appear against the vast Pacific Ocean. If you’re on Hawaii, the nearest island to you is more than 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) away, and the coast of the continental United States is more than 2,000 miles (3,200 kilometers) away. To say these islands are secluded is an understatement.

For me, watching the movie “Moana” in 2016 was eye-opening. I knew that Polynesian people traveled between a number of Pacific islands, but seeing Moana set sail on a canoe made me realize exactly how small those boats are compared with what must have seemed like an endless ocean. Yet our fictional hero went on this journey anyway, like the countless real-life Polynesian voyagers upon which she is based.



Islands in Polynesia can be thousands of miles apart. Photo via NASA.

As an astronomer, I have been teaching college students and visitors to our planetarium how to find stars in our sky for more than 20 years. As part of teaching appreciation for the beauty of the sky and the stars, I want to help people understand that if you know the stars well, you can never get lost.

WATCH: Māori poet Tayi Tibble draws on guidance of Polynesian ancestors in ‘Rangikura’

U.S. Navy veterans learned the stars in their navigation courses, and European cultures used the stars to navigate, but the techniques of Polynesian wayfinding shown in Moana brought these ideas to a very wide audience.

The movie Moana gave me a new hook – pun not intended – for my planetarium shows and lessons on how to locate objects in the night sky. With “Moana 2” out now, I am excited to see even more astronomy on the big screen and to figure out how I can build new lessons using the ideas in the movie.
The North Star

Have you ever found the North Star, Polaris, in your sky? I try to spot it every time I am out observing, and I teach visitors at my shows to use the “pointer stars” in the bowl of the Big Dipper to find it. These two stars in the Big Dipper point you directly to Polaris.

If you are facing Polaris, then you know you are facing north. Polaris is special because it is almost directly above Earth’s North Pole, and so everyone north of the equator can see it year-round in exactly the same spot in their sky.

READ MORE: Native Hawaiians gain more authority over future of sacred mountain, astronomy site

It’s a key star for navigation because if you measure its height above your horizon, that tells you how far you are north of Earth’s equator. For the large number of people who live near 40 degrees north of the equator, you will see Polaris about 40 degrees above your horizon.

If you live in northern Canada, Polaris will appear higher in your sky, and if you live closer to the equator, Polaris will appear closer to the horizon. The other stars and constellations come and go with the seasons, though, so what you see opposite Polaris in the sky will change every month.

Look for the Big Dipper to find the North Star, Polaris.

You can use all of the stars to navigate, but to do that you need to know where to find them on every night of the year and at every hour of the night. So, navigating with stars other than Polaris is more complicated to learn.
Maui’s fishhook

At the end of June, around 11 p.m., a bright red star might catch your eye if you look directly opposite from Polaris. This is the star Antares, and it is the brightest star in the constellation Scorpius, the Scorpion.

If you are a “Moana” fan like me and the others in my family, though, you may know this group of stars by a different name – Maui’s fishhook.

WATCH: Samoan Islands: Shifting Tides

 

If you are in the Northern Hemisphere, Scorpius may not fully appear above your horizon, but if you are on a Polynesian island, you should see all of the constellation rising in the southeast, hitting its highest point in the sky when it is due south, and setting in the southwest.

Astronomers and navigators can measure latitude using the height of the stars, which Maui and Moana did in the movie using their hands as measuring tools.

The easiest way to do this is to figure out how high Polaris is above your horizon. If you can’t see it at all, you must be south of the equator, but if you see Polaris 5 degrees (the width of three fingers at arm’s length) or 10 degrees above your horizon (the width of your full fist held at arm’s length), then you are 5 degrees or 10 degrees north of the equator.

The other stars, like those in Maui’s fishhook, will appear to rise, set and hit their highest point at different locations in the sky depending on where you are on the Earth.

Polynesian navigators memorized where these stars would appear in the sky from the different islands they sailed between, and so by looking for those stars in the sky at night, they could determine which direction to sail and for how long to travel across the ocean.

WATCH: 360 video: Visiting the ‘island of seabirds,’ an uninhabited remote wildlife refuge in American Samoa

Today, most people just pull out their phones and use the built-in GPS as a guide. Ever since “Moana” was in theaters, I see a completely different reaction to my planetarium talks about using the stars for navigation. By accurately showing how Polynesian navigators used the stars to sail across the ocean, Moana helps even those of us who have never sailed at night to understand the methods of celestial navigation.

The first “Moana” movie came out when my son was 3 years old, and he took an instant liking to the songs, the story and the scenery. There are many jokes about parents who dread having to watch a child’s favorite over and over again, but in my case, I fell in love with the movie too.

Since then, I have wanted to thank the storytellers who made this movie for being so careful to show the astronomy of navigation correctly. I also appreciated that they showed how Polynesian voyagers used the stars and other clues, such as ocean currents, to sail across the huge Pacific Ocean and land safely on a very small island thousands of miles from their home.

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Common bacterium protects Brazilian city from dengue storm

ByDr. Tim Sandle
December 22, 2024
DIGITAL JOURNAL

Aedes aegypti, a common vector of dengue fever and yellow fever. Image by Muhammad Mahdi Karim. — GNU License, V1.2

With climate change acting as an accelerant fuelling dengue’s surge, new findings presented at the American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene (ASTMH) Annual Meeting provide evidence that releasing mosquitoes (Aedes aegypti) carrying a common bacterium of the family Wolbachia offers a tool to fend off intense outbreaks of the viral disease.

The study was conducted by researchers from the World Mosquito Program and it found that in 2024, as Brazil battled its largest dengue outbreak on record, there was only a small rise in Niterói, a city of half a million people close to Rio de Janeiro.

The study credits the fact that five years ago, a partnership between the World Mosquito Program and Brazil’s Ministry of Health blanketed three-quarters of Niterói with mosquitoes infected with Wolbachia, a naturally occurring bacteria that has been shown to inhibit a mosquito’s ability to transmit dengue and other viruses.

Deployments into the remaining areas were completed in May 2023.

According to lead researcher Katie Anders: “We already saw infections essentially flatline in Niterói after the Wolbachia deployment, and while there was a small increase in 2024, the caseload was still 90 percent lower than before the deployment — and nothing like what was happening in the rest of Brazil.”

Anders adds: “The fact that Wolbachia has sustained itself in the mosquito population for years now and remained effective during a record year for dengue outbreaks shows that Wolbachia can provide long-term protection for communities against the increasingly frequent surges in dengue that we’re seeing globally.”

Anders explains that since Wolbachia has been rolled out across Niterói, dengue incidence has dropped to an average of 84 cases per 100,000 people per year, compared to an average rate of 913 cases per 100,000 people per year in the 10 years pre-Wolbachia.

The 1,736 dengue cases reported in Niterói from January to June 2024 represent a rate of 336 per 100,000 in 2024. This is compared to a rate of 3,121 nationwide and 1,816 in Rio de Janeiro state during the same period. Overall, in 2024, Brazil has recorded 9.6 million dengue cases — more than twice as many as in 2023 — and 5,300 dengue-related deaths.

Other trials spearheaded by the World Mosquito Program, including large-scale releases in urban areas of Colombia and Indonesia, have reported significant reductions in dengue. They also have shown that Wolbachia is safe for humans, animals and the surrounding environment. But Anders said the protective effect documented in Niterói stands out for occurring amid such an intense wave of disease.

Anders noted that the production facility in Brazil is a significant step because one the biggest barriers to using Wolbachia on a large scale is that it requires releasing a large number of infected mosquitoes to spread the bacteria into the local mosquito population.

 

Pictures from automatic camera provide first look at uncontacted Amazon community

By Stuff

8:56am Dec 23, 2024

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Pictures taken by an automatic camera have provided the world with the first look at an uncontacted Amazon community that is thought to be growing, despite pressure from agribusiness, miners, loggers and drug traffickers.

The pictures, taken in February, have been made public by Brazilian government agency the National Indigenous Peoples Foundation (Funai).

One picture shows a group of men from the community, referred to as the Massaco after the river that runs through the area where they live, collecting machetes and axes left behind by Funai agents.

READ MORE: Australia makes fewer and fewer coins. So what next for our Royal Mint?

This picture taken in February shows members of the isolated Amazon community, referred to as the Massaco people, collecting machetes and axes left behind by Brazilian government Funai agency. (Funai)

The cameras were placed at the spot where Funai leaves metal implements as gifts, with the aim of dissuading the community from venturing into logging camps or farms to get tools, The Guardian reported.

It was thought the number of people in the Massaco community has at least doubled since the early 1990s, to an estimated 200 to 250 people.

Previous indirect observation had revealed the Massaco hunted with three-metre long bows, and to move their villages around within the forest, depending on the season.

They discouraged outsiders by planting thousands of foot and tyre-piercing wooden spikes in the ground.

Massaco people deter visitors by leaving thousands of wooden spikes that can pierce feet and tyres in the ground. (Funai)

Population growth among isolated communities was a trend across the Amazon, after the implementing of government policies - started by Brazil in 1987 - of not initiating contact.

Video released earlier this year showed a rare glimpse of the world's largest uncontacted tribe emerging from the Peruvian Amazon.

One-third of Japanese companies keep workers employed until 70

Posted December. 23, 2024 

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It has been found that Japan, a country faced with a declining and aging population, currently sees around one-third of all businesses giving employment opportunities to workers of up to 70 by promoting re-hiring programs during their post-retirement years. Japanese workers are, by law, entitled to work by 65 at almost all companies.

As reported by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare in its status report on the employment of senior workers issued on Friday, as of June 1st this year, approximately 75,600 out of 237,052 businesses with 21 or more employees on the payroll provided job opportunities to those aged up to 70, up by 2.3 percent points from the previous year, making these companies account for 31.9 percent of the total corporate world. It was also found this year, consistent with last year’s results, that 99.9 percent of Japanese companies allow workers to stay on the payroll until the age of 65.

The ministry has confirmed that nearly all Japanese companies today re-employee their workers after they surpass the retirement age of 60; or remove or raise the retirement age system. Even with the legal retirement age still set at 60, businesses are required by law to choose one of these three options to keep their workers on the job until the age of 65 if they intend to continue to work.

What’s more, Japanese law stipulated back in 2020 that companies should fulfill their obligation to “try their best” to secure job opportunities for workers up to 70. Apart from abolishing or extensioning the pre-existing retirement age program, businesses have adopted various measures such as consignment contract programs or community service projects to provide continued employment for workers. The Nikkei Newspaper quoted an official from the health ministry saying that the government promises to support senior workers who are willing to remain in the workforce, considering the shrinking labor pool due to low birthrates and an aging population.

Meanwhile, some critics say that further action is needed, arguing that the legal retirement age should be raised from 65 to 70 to create a more conducive environment for older workers. As per data issued in September by the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, 36.25 million of the total population were 65 and above, making up 29.3 percent, higher than its Korean counterpart’s share of 19. 3 percent.


이청아 기자 clearlee@donga.com

Romanian liberals orchestrated Georgescu campaign funding, investigation reveals 

Russian interference saw far right and pro-Russian outsider Calin Georgescu storm to a shock first round victory in Romania’s presidential election. Except it wasn’t Russia. It was Romania’s incumbent liberal party PNL that was trying to do its main rival in, in a election ruse that badly bac / bne IntelliNews

By Denis Cenusa in Berlin December 22, 2024

Russia was accused of interfering in Romania’s November 24 presidential election that saw far-right and pro-Russian outsider Calin Georgescu storm to a shock first round victory. But an investigation by the tax authorities has exonerated the Kremlin and revealed the highly effective TikTok campaign was funded by the liberal, pro-EU National Liberal Party (PNL) in an effort to knock out a rival in a plan that badly backfired.

Evidence revealed by the National Agency for Fiscal Administration (ANAF), Romania’s tax agency, called into question claims that Russian-induced algorithmic manipulations on the TikTok platform would have brought far-right candidate Georgescu to first place in the second round.

Russia has been accused of hijacking the electoral process, although no concrete evidence has been produced, and that was enough for the Romanian Constitutional Court to take the unprecedented step of annulling the presidential election. The first annulment of elections in Romania in modern history has set a serious political precedent and sent shockwaves through the EU as it potentially undermines Romania’s democratic credentials.

On the one hand, the 9.4mn first round votes, of which almost 805,000 were from people in the diaspora, were annulled. The argument that accompanied this decision was that Georgescu's victory in the first round, with 2.1mn votes, was not authentic due to Russian interference through the TikTok campaign. To some extent, the constant reference to the Russian hybrid war in neighbouring Moldova led to a resumption of the argument that Russia could actually be behind Georgescu's "meteoric" rise. Moreover, Georgescu was an open supporter of Russian President Vladimir Putin's governing style and he had called repeatedly for an end to support for Ukraine. These comments were used by various NGOs and media outlets in Romania and abroad to label him as a "Russian asset".

However, the more obvious explanation for Georgescu's unexpected electoral success, given the lack of evidence of Russian interference, is his support was a protest vote against the establishment parties.

The ANAF investigation revealed that Georgescu’s TikTok campaign was carried out by another actor: the PNL via the offices of a Romanian PR firm, Kensington Communication.

The cancellation of the elections has put Romania in a delicate position vis-à-vis the EU and Nato. Both organisations had to react to information provided by Bucharest about Russian interference involving TikTok's algorithms. The platform is increasingly seen as harmful for the West. The European Commission has already launched an investigation against TikTok on suspicions of malign electoral influence. The two main risks attributed to TikTok are the "recommender system", which can be manipulated by creating inauthentic behaviour among users, and political campaigns that can go unnoticed by the platform's "advertising policy". According to the "retention order" under the Digital Services Act of the EU, issued by Brussels in early December, TikTok is obliged to collect valuable data on electoral processes and civic discourses related to elections in EU states held until March 2025.

“Russian” or “non-Russian” manipulation

The ANAF discovered that the campaign promoting Georgescu was actually funded by the PNL and carried out by Kensington Communication.

Initially, the PR company’s message was dedicated to promoting European values ​​and against extremist candidates under the hashtag #echilibrusiseriozitate. The company was funded by the PNL but presented itself as a civic public awareness activity. In fact, before the presidential elections the company targeted far-right presidential candidates, including George Simion of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), because they promoted the pro-EU vote. The hashtag #echilibrusiseriozitate, used for political purposes to create an unfavourable environment for non-liberal presidential candidates on TikTok, was replaced by #echilibrusiverticalitate on the FameUP platform. The new hashtag was eventually used by users who were supporters of Georgescu, as noted by the Romanian intelligence services (CSAT). 130 influencers involved by PNL and Kensington Communication to indirectly promote voting for pro-Western candidates ended up spreading the message that benefited Georgescu, reaching 2.4mn views.

The ANAF revelations revealed that TikTok has been used by liberal forces with the aim of mobilising voters to vote for a pro-EU candidate. Despite this, with PNL money, the campaign catapulted Georgescu into the political stratosphere of Romanian politics. According to Kensington Communication's claims, someone manipulated the hashtag and used it to Georgescu's advantage. The new situation fuels the argument of far-right political forces who accuse establishment parties, including the PNL, of using institutional leverage on courts and electoral bodies to prevent the change of political power through elections. Georgescu called on the Romanian General Prosecutor to take action and accuses the PNL of alleged election manipulation on TikTok.

The implications of the Romanian precedent

The Romanian precedent has raised serious concerns in the West about the possibility that TikTok could pervert the election result. However, the twist that the ANAF uncovered the involvement of the PNL party, which had manipulated Romania’s electoral behaviour on TikTok, completely changed the conversation. The fact that Romanian security institutions have failed to prove Russian involvement, but instead showed that a domestic player, the PNL, was actually behind the attempt to manipulate votes, jeopardises Romania’s political stability. The credibility of the Constitutional Court, reputedly a neutral actor, has also been shredded after it cancelled the elections on little more than hearsay.

Romanian far-right parties, including their symbolic representative in the anti-establishment Georgescu, have received a major boost and intend to take the case to court and retaliate against state institutions on the basis of the ANAF revelations. They are hoping to take advantage of the fiasco to win political advantage and more votes in the inevitable rerun of the presidential elections, which could also be followed by early legislative elections, if the newly elected parliament does not form a new stable government.

Support for Georgescu is likely to surge, as he was already riding on the back of a protest vote against the incumbents before the current scandal broke. The attempt to manipulate the vote by the PNL will only undermine the incumbent's position further and mobilise more protest votes in Romania and in the diaspora. At the same time, the argument that Russia interfered has been seriously damaged and partially neutralised. This represents a small victory for Russia in its information war inside and outside Romania. Finally, this case also has the potential to discredit legitimate concerns about Russia’s hybrid interference in the EU and Nato member states.

Albanian prime minister says TikTok ban was not a ‘rushed reaction to a single incident’

A view of the TikTok app logo, in Tokyo, Japan

 (AP Photo/Kiichiro Sato, 

By Llazar Semini - Associated Press - Sunday, December 22, 2024

TIRANA, Albania — Albania’s prime minister said Sunday the ban on TikTok his government announced a day earlier was “not a rushed reaction to a single incident.”

Prime Minister Edi Rama said Saturday the government will shut down TikTok for one year, accusing the popular video service of inciting violence and bullying, especially among children.

Authorities have held 1,300 meetings with teachers and parents since the November stabbing death of a teenager by another teen after a quarrel that started on social media apps. Ninety percent of them approve of the ban on TikTok.

“The ban on TikTok for one year in Albania is not a rushed reaction to a single incident, but a carefully considered decision made in consultation with parent communities in schools across the country,” said Rama.

Following Tirana’s decision, TikTok asked for “urgent clarity from the Albanian government” in the case of the stabbed teenager. The company said it had “found no evidence that the perpetrator or victim had TikTok accounts, and multiple reports have in fact confirmed videos leading up to this incident were being posted on another platform, not TikTok.”


“To claim that the killing of the teenage boy has no connection to TikTok because the conflict didn’t originate on the platform demonstrates a failure to grasp both the seriousness of the threat TikTok poses to children and youth today and the rationale behind our decision to take responsibility for addressing this threat,” said Rama.

“Albania may be too small to demand that TikTok protect children and youth from the frightening pitfalls of its algorithm,” he said, blaming TikTok for “the reproduction of the unending hell of the language of hatred, violence, bullying and so on.”

Albanian children comprise the largest group of TikTok users in the country, according to domestic researchers.

Many youngsters in Albania did not approve of the ban.

“We disclose our daily life and entertain ourselves, that is, we exploit it during our free time,” said Samuel Sulmani, an 18-year-old in the town of Rreshen, 75 kilometers (47 miles) north of the capital Tirana, on Sunday. “We do not agree with that because that’s a deprivation for us.”

But Albanian parents have been increasingly concerned following reports of children taking knives and other objects to school to use in quarrels or cases of bullying promoted by stories they see on TikTok.

“Our decision couldn’t be clearer: Either TikTok protects the children of Albania, or Albania will protect its children from TikTok,” said Rama.

 

Germany ignored multiple warnings by Saudi Arabia before Magdeburg attack

German authorities ignored multiple warnings before Magdeburg attack by ex-Muslim Saudi-born citizen. / bne IntelliNews

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By bnm Gulf bureau December 22, 2024

German authorities dismissed multiple warnings about the suspect in the December 20 deadly Christmas market attack in Magdeburg, including formal alerts from Saudi Arabia and reports of explicit threats.

The suspect, identified as Taleb al-Abdulmohsen, had been the subject of three separate Saudi security warnings and an Interpol arrest request that German officials rejected as politically motivated, Der Spiegel reported.

Al-Abdulmohsen, who worked as a psychiatrist at a German state hospital, drove his vehicle into crowds at the market, killing five people and injuring more than 200, authorities said.

The Saudi national had been granted asylum in Germany in 2016 after claiming persecution in his home country, despite subsequent warnings about his activities, according to police sources familiar with the matter.

German security services received specific alerts in 2023 through the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees about threats allegedly made by the suspect on social media, the sources said.

"The warnings were dismissed as expressions of free speech," one senior security official told Reuters, speaking on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the investigation.

Saudi Arabia's foreign ministry condemned the attack and expressed solidarity with Germany whilst noting that it had previously sought the suspect's extradition.

Social media reports also note that several Saudi citizens contacted German authorities beforehand; however, several calls went unanswered. 

The incident has raised questions about Germany's handling of security intelligence regarding asylum seekers. Opposition politicians have called for an urgent review of protocols for assessing threats.

Chancellor Olaf Scholz faced jeers from onlookers during a visit to the attack site on Saturday, as public anger mounted over the authorities' failure to act on the warnings.

German media outlets have been criticised for initially providing limited information about the suspect's background and for missing security alerts.

Germany faces criticism for failing to prevent Christmas market attack while suspect is held in pre-trial detention

Yevheniia Khoroshun | V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National U. School of Law, UA

DECEMBER 22, 2024 

German police revealed Saturday that the suspect in Friday’s Christmas market attack in the city of Magdeburg is currently in pre-trial custody on charges of murder, attempted murder, and grievous bodily harm — as German politicians from opposing political camps condemned the coalition government for “ignoring warnings” about the attack.

On Friday evening, a man drove a car into a crowd of visitors at the Christmas market, killing five people and injuring more than 200. Among the dead are four women and a nine-year-old boy. The suspect is identified as Taleb al-Abdulmohsen, a 50-year-old man from Saudi Arabia, who lived in Germany for more than 10 years and worked as a doctor in Bernburg. He is said to have acted alone for reasons that are still under investigation.

Holger Münch, head of Germany’s Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), told news outlet ZDF on Saturday evening that the department had previously received a warning from Saudi Arabia about the man in 2023, but “the case was ambiguous.” Bernd Baumann, the parliamentary head of the far-right political party Alternative for Germany (AfD), demanded an urgent special parliamentary session be called to discuss internal security issues

Amid tensions over the attack, more than 2,100 far-right protesters took to the streets of Magdeburg on Saturday night, some of whom voiced calls for the mass deportation of immigrants. Occasional minor disturbances involving physical contact occurred during protests, according to the police report.

Additionally, the AfD is going to hold a funeral procession and public memorial service on Monday for the victims.

Israeli women mobilise against ultra-Orthodox military exemptions


By AFP
December 23, 2024


Israeli security personnel in Jerusalem disperse ultra-Orthodox Jewish protesters opposed to conscription, on October 31, 2024 - Copyright AFP/File Ted ALJIBE

Delphine MATTHIEUSSENT

Exhausted by more than 14 months of war, the wives and mothers of Israeli soldiers are uniting in protest against exemptions from conscription for ultra-Orthodox men.

For several Saturday evenings, the bridge over a key highway that runs between Bnei Brak, an ultra-Orthodox suburb of Tel Aviv, and Givat Shmuel, a bastion of religious Zionists whose sons and husbands proudly serve in the army, has been the scene of a tense standoff.

Ultra-Orthodox residents passed by, some running, as protesters holding Israeli flags and banners shouted through megaphones demanding “conscription for all”.

The military has asked for extra manpower in light of the war in Gaza and connected conflicts, while the Supreme Court ruled in June that the state must draft ultra-Orthodox Jewish men into military service.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition government includes members of two ultra-Orthodox parties, and he has feared that ending the exemption could break up his coalition.

The coalition is moving ahead with legislation that would protect the exemption for the vast majority of Haredim (the Hebrew name for ultra-Orthodox Jews, meaning “God-fearing”) from military service.

Political and religious ultra-Orthodox leaders, whose decisions are often binding on their followers, continue to strongly oppose service in the military. They say that prayer and religious study protects the country as much as combat.

– ‘Help from our brothers’ –

Military service is mandatory in Israel, but under agreements forged at Israel’s creation, when the Haredim were only a very small community, those who devote themselves to the study of sacred Jewish texts can avoid conscription.

The ultra-Orthodox account for 14 percent of Israel’s Jewish population, according to the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI), representing about 1.3 million people. About 66,000 of those of conscription age are exempted, according to the army.

Michal Vilian, a 60-year-old resident of Givat Shmuel, has been participating in weekly demonstrations organised since last month by “Partners for Bearing the Burden”, a religious women’s collective.

All four of her sons and her son-in-law have been called up as reservists, almost without leave since the war began, and been deployed to Gaza, Lebanon and, more recently, Syria.

“We are here to ask for help from our brothers who live just across the bridge, to tell them to lend a hand, a shoulder, and to share the burden”, said the doctor, sporting the turban worn by religious Zionist women.

Religious Zionist Jews are allied with the ultra-Orthodox factions in Netanyahu’s coalition, and their political leaders have been willing to compromise on the issue of Haredim exemptions.

Even for them, though, the burden of the war has become too heavy.

Since October 7, 2023, 818 soldiers have been killed, including during the Hamas attack on Israel as well as in the Gaza ground operation, the Israeli offensive in southern Lebanon and operations in the occupied West Bank.

With a disproportionately high number of combat deaths due to their above average participation in the military, they share the anger of the majority of Israelis on this issue, said Amotz Asa-El, a researcher at the Shalom Hartman Institute.

That anger was now “overflowing,” he said.

– ‘Not the Torah’ –

The exemption is “perceived by the vast majority of the rest of the population as being at their expense in the most physical, existential sense of the term,” he added.

At its peak, just days after Hamas’s attack, up to 300,000 reservists were mobilised in the ranks of the army. This number has now dropped to 100,000, or around one percent of the total Israeli population, according to figures from the Reservists’ Wives Forum.

One of the founders of the Forum, Rotem Avidar Tzalik, a 34-year-old lawyer, said she has been living in a “parallel reality” for more than a year, with her husband, a member of a special unit, called up for more than 200 days.

A mother of three young children, she said the weight of mobilisation had become unbearable for families because of the economic and psychological difficulties it caused.

In the Israeli parliament, where she advocates for the rights of reservists’ families, her approach to the issue of ultra-Orthodox conscription is pragmatic, emphasizing that it is only one aspect of broader changes needed.

She points out, however, that any increase in their conscription, “even by just a thousand,” beyond the few thousand who already serve, would have a “huge impact” for reservists by allowing them to reduce the burden.

Shvut Raanan, a 31-year-old lawyer, also an active member of the Forum, said the Haredim’s arguments did not stand up to scrutiny.

“It has never worked that way in religious history… it is clear that this is not the Torah,” said the mother of four young children, citing various Jewish religious figures who called for Jewish people to fight.