South Africa

Macua takes fight to rescue trapped illegal miners to ConCourt

03 January 2025 - 11:34

Shonisani Tshikalange  

Reporter 

A mineshaft in Stilfontein where hundreds of illegal miners are believed to be hiding underground after police cut off their food and water supplies. File photo.
Image: Reuters/Ihsaan Haffejee

Mining Affected Communities United in Action (Macua) has intensified efforts to save illegal miners trapped in an abandoned gold mine in Stilfontein after an unsuccessful legal bid at the Pretoria high court.

This is after a recent ruling by the court dismissed the group’s earlier bid to force the government to rescue and provide relief to the remaining miners at Stilfontein.

The organisation has turned to the Constitutional Court, seeking urgent intervention in the crisis. The application also calls for immediate humanitarian aid during rescue efforts and seeks to compel the government to expedite operations to bring the trapped miners to the surface.

“To provide the artisanal miners at shaft 11 of the Buffelsfontein gold mine with humanitarian aid, including sufficient food, water and medication, pending the finalisation of rescue services and continue to allow the community to assist with the provision of food, water and medication.”

Macua also wants police minister Senzo Mchunu to allow Lawyers for Human Rights access to any miner arrested or detained after surfacing from shafts 10 and 11 at the mine.

So far, more than 1,500 illegal miners have resurfaced in Stilfontein. Several have been helped by local community members using a rope, while the police's Operation Vala Umgodi, or “close the hole”, which is aimed at combating illegal mining, continues.

Stilfontein illegal miners resorting to cannibalism to survive: Macua

Illegal miners at the Buffelsfontein mine in Stilfontein, North West, are resorting to cannibalism to survive, according to a submission to the ...

News

4 days ago

According to a founding affidavit by Sabelo Mnguni, national administrator for Macua, at the centre of this case are the lives of hundreds to thousands of artisanal miners who have since about August 2024 been trapped underground under gruesome, undignified and life-threatening conditions.

Mnguni said the last communication received on December 24 2024 from one of the miners described the dire circumstances and claimed miners had resorted to eating human flesh.

He said the community and Macua have run out of the financial means to continue supplying humanitarian aid and to rescue the miners.

“With the financial means running out, it means the miners underground will return to the state they were in before the court order of [judge] Janse van Niewenhuizen was obtained, with no access to humanitarian aid, being food, water and medication, and no retrievals to the surface will take place.”

Mnguni said there was enough evidence before the high court showing the actions and inactions of the government in implementing Operation Vala Umgodi violated the constitutional rights of the miners.

He said the high court's judgment was procedurally and substantively flawed and Macua seeks urgent intervention to correct the “grave injustices”.

Mnguni said to date R118,973 has been raised on the crowdfunding website Back-A-Buddy to assist the miners. After the platform's 5% fee was deducted, the amount for disbursement stood at R113,024.

He confirmed the entire amount had already been disbursed. The contributions varied widely, with the largest single donation being R10,000 and the smallest R20. The average donation ranged between R100 and R500.

Fierce battles rage in northern Syria as Turkish-backed factions clash with SDF

2025-01-03 

Shafaq News/ Clashes continue in Northern Syria between Turkish-backed armed factions and the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The Turkish-allied "Syrian National Army" claimed to have gained new territory around the Tishrin Dam, while the SDF reported killing dozens of militants in the confrontations.

The Syrian National Army stated that it had captured the village of Sa’ideen and the Seriatel Hill near the Tishrin Dam on Friday. It also mentioned the deployment of significant military reinforcements to the frontlines south of Manbij.

On Thursday, SDF stated that they had "killed dozens of Turkish-backed militants and destroyed six of their military vehicles in the clashes. The attacks by Turkish-backed factions targeted several villages southeast of Manbij, as well as areas around the Tishrin Dam," adding that the attacks were supported by five Turkish drones, tanks, and modern armored vehicles.

According to media reports, "On Thursday, Turkish forces and their allied factions shelled the villages of Khidr Hassan and Sheikh Ali near Tal Tamr, and the village of Mushayrifa on the outskirts of Abu Rasin, near the Syrian-Turkish border."

Furthermore, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that "23 members of the Turkish-backed factions were killed, and around 18 others were injured in the fierce clashes with the SDF in northeastern Aleppo countryside on Thursday."

The Observatory also reported the death of four SDF fighters in the clashes around the town of Qabab Abu Qalqal, south of Manbij.

The SDF continues to control vast areas of northeastern Syria and parts of Deir ez-Zor province, particularly the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.

These areas have been under the self-administration established by the Kurds at the beginning of the conflict in Syria in 2011, following the withdrawal of government forces from a large portion of the territory.

Between 2016 and 2019, Turkiye conducted three military operations in northern Syria against the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), the backbone of the SDF, successfully gaining control over two extensive border regions inside Syria.

Moreover, the new Syrian administration leader, Ahmad Al-Shara, met with a delegation from the SDF on Monday for what was described as "positive" talks in their first meeting, as per media reports.

Syrian women protest Israeli occupation in Quneitra village

Residents of occupied area vow resistance, saying women, girls, children will stand together

Omer Koparan and Muhammet Nazim Tasci |03.01.2025 - TRT/AA



QUNEITRA, Syria

Women from Swaysa village and surrounding areas in Syria’s Quneitra province, which is under Israeli military occupation, are calling for an end to the Israeli aggression and the withdrawal of its forces from Syrian land.

In an interview with Anadolu, Resmiye al-Muhammed, a local resident, emphasized: “We do not want the Zionist occupation. This is our land, and we will not surrender it. Women, girls, and children will resist together.”

Quneitra, located in southwestern Syria, shares a border with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights.

Since the fall of Assad’s regime on Dec. 8, the Israeli military has escalated its attacks on Syrian territory, targeting military infrastructure while extending its control over the Golan Heights.

The Israeli forces have also intensified airstrikes and expanded their presence in Quneitra, with recent raids driving civilians from public buildings and resulting in three injuries during protests in Swaysa village.

‘Stop Israel from advancing further’

Betul Keryan, a resident of Swaysa, described the community’s resistance against the Israeli forces, saying: "Everyone came out to resist, and eventually, the Israeli forces withdrew."

Keryan, who called for the full withdrawal of Israeli troops from Quneitra, appealed to authorities and Arab nations for their support, stating: “We urge the authorities and Arab nations to support us.”

Selam Keryan, also from Swaysa, shared the fear her family experienced during the Israeli incursions. “My children were terrified by the sound of tanks. I did my best to comfort them,” she told Anadolu.

Keryan firmly stated her family’s rejection of Israel’s occupation, saying: “I call on the new Syrian administration to intervene and stop Israel from advancing further.”

She also recalled the hope she felt when Assad’s regime collapsed, saying: “We thought we could finally begin a new chapter of peace and security. But the Israeli army came and ruined everything.”

Assad, who ruled Syria for nearly 25 years, fled to Russia after anti-regime forces took control of Damascus on Dec. 8, bringing an end to the Baath Party’s reign, which had lasted since 1963.

The takeover occurred after Hayat Tahrir al-Sham fighters captured key cities in a swift offensive lasting less than two weeks. A new administration, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, has now assumed control.

Following the regime’s fall, Tel Aviv took control of the demilitarized zone in Syria's Quneitra province and declared the collapse of the 1974 Disengagement Agreement.


* Writing by Beril Canakci

TURKISH IMPERIALISM

Media Reports: Turkey To Establish New Military Bases In Syria

January 3, 2025
Special Dispatch No. 11765

Recent reports in the Arabic and Turkish media and social media claim that Turkey intends to establish new military bases in Syria as part of a defense agreement with the new Syrian government formed by Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) under the leadership of Ahmed Al-Sharaa (aka Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani).

Turkey has been the primary supporter of HTS, which has a jihadist background[1] and which launched the offensive that resulted in the downfall of Syria’s Bashar Al-Assad regime on December 8, 2024. With the fall of this regime and the decline in the status of its two biggest allies, Russia and Iran, in Syria, Turkey has seized the opportunity to try to significantly increase its influence in the country in the domain of defense (among other fields) – in an apparent attempt to turn Syria into a Turkish protectorate. Noteworthy in this context were statements by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in a January 2, 2025 press conference. He said that, "in this new era, if any majority or minority group in Syria feels distress or concern – whether it is the Alawites, the Yazidis, the Christians or others – Turkey is the shepherd and protector of these [groups] and of all others in Syria."[2] 

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is expected to visit Damascus soon as part of Turkish efforts to legitimize the new Syrian government and possibly to prepare the ground for the deployment of large Turkish forces in Syria. Ahead of his visit, Turkey reopened its embassy in Damascus for the first time in 12 years, and sent Turkish intelligence chief İbrahim Kalın and later Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to meet with Ahmed Al-Sharaa.[3]

HTS leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa (formerly Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani) welcomes Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Syria (Image: Shafaq.com, December 22, 2024).

This was the context of the recent Arab and Turkish reports on the plans to establish new Turkish military bases in various parts of Syria.

Below are details on some of these reports.

Reports: Turkey To Establish New Military Bases In Various Parts Of Syria

According to recent reports, Syria and Turkey are working on a defense agreement, as part of which Turkey will establish new military bases in Syria. These reports have yet to be confirmed by Turkey, which already maintains military bases in northern Syria, established before the fall of the Assad regime as part of understandings with Russia.[4]  Moreover, there is a great deal of discrepancy between the reports regarding the location and the nature of the new bases to be established by Turkey in the country.

A major figure who has reported on this issue is Syrian journalist Ibrahim Khalidi, editor of the Saudi Al-Majalla magazine. In a December  23, 2024 article, he wrote that Damascus and Ankara are drafting a mutual defense agreement that includes the establishment of two bases in Homs and Damascus and the deployment of an air defense system against Israeli attacks. "Such an agreement," he added, "will place the new Damascus regime in a strong negotiating position vis-à-vis the  [the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)  in their stronghold in the city of] Kamishli."[5]  

Another senior figure, Turkish journalist İbrahim Karagül, a former editor of the daily Yeni Şafak who is close to Turkish President Erdogan, wrote that "Syria is facing two major  dangers. The first is Israel's attacks and expansionist ambitions, and the second is the threat to Syria's territorial integrity posed by the YPG/PKK terror organization [i.e., the Kurdish People's Defense Units, which form the bulk of the SDF]. In coping with these two dangers, Turkey is the main element that defends [Syria] and guarantees [its security]."

On the matter of the Turkish military bases, he wrote: "Although the military cooperation agreement between Turkey and Syria has not yet taken definite shape, the talks are concerned with strategic issues such as rebuilding the Syrian armed forces, establishing military bases in the Damascus and Homs areas, defending Syrian airspace and establishing a base in the Tartus/Latakia region. These initiatives indicate the existence of serious plans to strengthen Turkey's security from the air and sea."  Karagül added that "Turkey is [also] likely to establish a military base – an airbase of naval base – in Lebanon," in light of the weakness of the state there and its willingness to cooperate with Turkey in various domains.[6]

Turkish journalist Sinan Burhan noted on a Turkish television channel that there are reports about an emerging military cooperation agreement with the new Syrian government, and about plans to establish a Turkish military base in Damascus and a naval base in Tartus.[7] 

The discrepancies between the reports on the Turkish military bases to be established in Syria was especially noticeable on social media. Some claimed that Turkey plans to establish as base in Palmyra in the Homs governorate, while others claimed that Turkey plans to deploy an air defense system in Quneitra, in the south of the country.[8]

Arab Daily: Turkey Plans To Deploy Extensive Military Forces In Syria

Amid reports about the planned visit by Turkish President Erdogan to Syria, the online daily Raialyoum.com stated on December 29 that the purpose of the visit is to facilitate the deployment of Turkish forces in the country "under the guise of" defense agreements. Turkish political sources told the daily that the nature of the preparations for the visit and the makeup of the delegation that will accompany Erdogan indicate that "Turkey plans to deploy extensive military and security forces within Syria, in several cities," in order to help strengthen the new Syrian government and also in order to fight the Kurdish armed presence in the country, namely the SDF.

It was also reported that, during Erdogan's visit, plans and protocols are to be signed regarding the training of the Syrian security forces and air force, the reactivation of Syria's airports and sea ports,  and the oversight of Syrian airports, among other matters.[9]   

Turkish Concerns Regarding Kurdish And Israeli Operations In Syria

It seems that the Turkish military bases in Syria, if established, will serve inter alia as a base of operations against the SDF, which is supported by the U.S.-led international coalition for fighting ISIS. Turkey, as mentioned, views the SDF as an arm of the PKK terrorist organization and has repeatedly stressed that it has no place in Syria's future. For example, President Erdogan stated recently, at a December 25, 2024 party conference, that "the Kurdish fighters in Syria must lay down their weapons or else be buried in the soil of Syria along with their weapons."[10] This stance has sparked an ongoing dispute between Turkey and the U.S., which sees the SDF as its main partner in the fight against ISIS in Syria.[11]

The bases may also serve as a deterrent against Israel, which, after the fall of the Assad regime, destroyed most of Syria's military capabilities in a series of intensive strikes, took control of the Syrian side of Mount Hermon and also maintains a military presence in other areas of southern Syria.[12] Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said during his visit to Syria on December 22: "We cannot tolerate Israel exploiting the current situation to seize Syrian land... It must respect Syria's sovereignty and territorial integrity and not expose regional security to further risks."[13]

 

---

[1] Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham started out as a jihadist group called Jabhat Al-Nusrah, founded in 2012 after Ahmed Al-Sharaa (known at the time by his kunya Abu Muhammad Al-Joulani) was sent by ISIS founder Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to establish a branch of the Islamic State in Syria. In 2013, Al-Joulani swore allegiance to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri, and Jabhat Al-Nusrah became an official affiliate of Al-Qaeda. In 2016, Al-Joulani announced the severing of his ties with Al-Qaeda, and after merging with several other Islamist groups in Syria, Jabhat Al-Nusrah changed its name to Jabhat Fath Al-Sham. In 2017, after merging with a few more Syrian organizations, the group changed its name again, this time to Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS). HTS is listed as a terrorist organization in the U.S. and in several other countries.

[2] Aa.com.tr, January 3, 2025.

[3] Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), December 13, 2024; Aa.com.tr, December 22, 2024; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), December 26, 2024.

[4] As of mid-2024, Turkey maintained 126 military sites in Syria, most of them in the Aleppo and Idlib governorates (Jusoor.co, July 2, 2024).

[5] Majalla.com, December 23, 2024. The SDF is a mainly Kurdish force that has established an autonomy in northeastern Syria and is regarded by Turkey as an arm of the terrorist organization PKK.

[6]  Yenisafak.com, December 26, 2024.

[7] Zamanarabic.com, December 24, 2024.

[8] See e.g., x.com/Kalmuqdad, December 20, 2024; x.com/shafiee_ola, December 21, 2024; x.com/drhafezster, December 22, 2024; facebook.com/Haleb.Alshada, December 22, 2024. 

[9] Raialyoum.com, December 29, 2024.

[10] Alarabia.net, December 25, 2024.

[11] The U.S. and France are currently acting to stop mutual attacks by pro-Turkish Syrian armed factions and the SDF in northern Syria that broke out with the fall of the Assad regime, until the U.S. policy on this matter becomes clear with the start of Donald Trump's presidency on January 17, 2025 (Al-Akhbar, Lebanon, December 21, 2024; Al-Arab, London, December 23, 2024; Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, London, December 23, 2024).

[12] Syriahr.com, December 17, 2024; Al-Akhbar, Lebanon, December 28, 2024.

[13] Aa.com.tr, December 22, 2024.

US-Backed Syria Rebels Hope Trump Won't Withdraw Troops Just Yet

Published Jan 03, 2025 

NEWSWEEK

The head of a Syrian militia supported by the United States has told Newsweek his faction hoped U.S. troops would remain in the country, as uncertainties arise under a new Islamist leadership and the attempted resurgence of the Islamic State (ISIS).

The call from Colonel Salem Turki al-Anteri of the Syrian Free Army (SFA) comes as President-elect Donald Trump has signaled skepticism over the deployment of roughly 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria, as he prepares to take office later this month.

While a number of these forces are deployed alongside the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast, others are posted to the southwest desert garrison known as Al-Tanf, where the SFA operates.

"The Syrian Free Army values its partnership with the United States and the Coalition in the fight against ISIS," Anteri told Newsweek. "This support has been crucial in weakening ISIS and helping stabilize parts of Syria."

"We believe that having U.S. troops in the Al-Tanf area is still important to prevent ISIS and other extremist groups from coming back," he added. "The SFA is committed to fighting extremism and working toward a Syria that is free, safe, and stable for all Syrians."

Anteri acknowledged the situation in the country was complex but asserted that U.S. military presence continued to serve as an "extremely important" deterrent to ISIS staging a comeback.

Newsweek has reached out to Trump's transition team, the Syrian Interim Government and U.S. Central Command for comment.

U.S. infantrymen of the Georgia Army National Guard conduct an exercise alongside a member of the Syrian Free Army on October 31 near the Al-Tanf garrison in Syria. Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve/

U.S. Army/Staff Sergeant Mahsima Alkamooneh

Why It Matters

The steps pursued by the second Trump administration could have vast consequences for the balance of power surrounding Syria as local, regional and international stakeholders vie for influence in the country.

Trump vowed to "stop wars" after winning a second term of presidency in November 2024, signaling a desire to oversee a more peaceful tenure than his predecessor, President Joe Biden.

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After declaring victory over ISIS in 2019, Trump intensified calls for a U.S. military withdrawal from Syria. He reduced the U.S. presence in formerly SDF-held areas in northern Syria, allowing both Syrian troops and rebels backed by Turkey to advance.

Now, the former Al-Qaeda offshoot of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is in de facto control of Damascus and large parts of the country.


While Trump openly asserted that the U.S. "should have nothing to do" with the Syrian conflict in early December, the SFA and SDF, two top U.S. partners on the ground, now face tough questions over how to deal with HTS and its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani.

At the same time, the U.S.' top regional ally, Israel, has staged its own incursion into southwestern Syria, seizing more territory in the disputed Golan Heights region.

The threat of an ISIS resurgence looms as the militants seek to capitalize on Syria's disarray and claim more ambitious attacks abroad, most recently being linked to a deadly car ramming in New Orleans. The outgoing administration has stepped up strikes against ISIS in Syria in recent weeks.

Syrian Free Army commander Colonel Salem Turki al-Anteri poses for this undated photo provided by his faction. He told Newsweek having U.S. troops in the Al-Tanf area is important to prevent ISIS. Syrian Free Army

What to Know

The SFA, not to be confused with the former rebel coalition known as the Free Syrian Army, is one of many opposition groups to emerge throughout Syria's civil war, that first erupted in March 2011.

The conflict pit rebels and jihadis against the government, led by President Bashar al-Assad and backed by Iran and Russia, until its downfall on December 8 at the hands of an 11-day insurgent offensive, led by the former Al-Qaeda offshoot of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Originally known as Jaysh Maghawir al-Thawra, or the Revolutionary Commando Army, the SFA teamed up with a U.S.-led coalition to fight ISIS in the 55-kilometer deconfliction zone established around Al-Tanf in 2016.

While the SFA did not directly participate in the successful rebel campaign spearheaded by HTS to oust Assad last month, the group took advantage of the disorder to seize more land, inclding the ancient city of Palmyra.

Now, Anteri stated that the group would focus on accelerating humanitarian efforts, such as providing aid to the Rukban refugee camp, located near the border between Jordan and Syria.

"We are happy with the fall of the regime," Anteri said. "We can now provide aid and support to disparate populations like the Rukban, and plan on spreading relief and aid efforts towards Palmyra."

"While we were not directly involved in the fall of the Assad regime, we played a critical role in protecting and providing for the people of Rukban," Anteri said. "These have been incredibly difficult years for the people of Syria, but through our sustained efforts, many individuals are finally able to return to their homes."

While Assad was in power, the Syrian government and its allies accused the U.S. and its partners of deliberately neglecting the population of Rukban and using the Al-Tanf deconfliction zone to shelter militants.

With Assad having fled to Moscow, the SFA must today figure out how to work with HTS, which the U.S. considers to be a terrorist organization due to its prior allegiance to Al-Qaeda.

Sharaa rescinded ties with Al-Qaeda in 2016, three years after he cut ties with ISIS, but critics, including Vice President-elect JD Vance, have expressed skepticism over the militant leader's promises for nationwide reforms.

Anteri also pointed out that the SFA's outlook differed from that of HTS.

"It's important to clarify that the Syrian Free Army is separate from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and has always had different goals and values," Anteri said. "We have worked with our Coalition partners to support humanitarian efforts, protect civilians, and fight extremism."

When it comes to Sharaa's transitional government, Anteri stated that the SFA is "open to working with any political group that is committed to peace and stability in Syria.

"However, this must align with the values of freedom, human rights, and the rule of law. We know the situation is complicated, but we believe that dialogue and cooperation are the key to building a Syria free from violence and extremism," Anteri added.

The other major U.S. partner in Syria, the SDF, has voiced even greater doubts about HTS, its jihadi background as well as its alliance with the Syrian National Army, a rebel coalition supported by Turkey, which views the SDF as an offshoot of the insurgent Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

Anteri said that the SFA has allied with Ankara in the past but also saw the SDF as a potential partner in the quest to find unity in war-torn Syria.

HTS chief and de facto leader of Syria Abu Mohammed al-Golani, who now goes by his real name Ahmed al-Sharaa on December 30. U.S.-backed Syrian rebels want U.S troops to keep ISIS down. Ali Haj Suleiman/Getty Images

What People Are Saying

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump addressing the situation in Syria during a December 16 press conference: "I don't think that I want to have our soldiers killed, but I don't think that will happen now anyway because the one side has been decimated ... Nobody knows what the final outcome going to be in the region ... I believe it's Turkey. I think Turkey is very smart. [Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan]'s a very smart guy, and he's very tough."

Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova discussing the presence of U.S. troops in Syria during a December 18 press briefing: "The Russian side regularly reminds the global community about the dangers of an IS resurgence. Events in the Middle East highlight the destructive impact of Washington's policies and those of its allies, who have been illegally present in Syria since 2014 under the guise of fighting terrorism, while undermining Syria's sovereignty, including through the illegal presence of U.S. troops in the Trans-Euphrates region and Al-Tanf."

Colonel Salem Turki al-Anteri of the Syrian Free Army (SFA) told Newsweek: "While we understand that there are many factors involved in military decisions, we believe the continued presence of U.S. forces in Syria is extremely important in order to stop extremist groups from returning."

What Comes Next

Much of how the conflict in Syria plays out this year may rest on Sharaa's capability to balance local factions and internal clashes.

So far, Sharaa has proven pragmatic in engaging with other rebel groups, the SDF and even some former Assad officials.

He's also expressed enthusiasm for better ties with the U.S., Turkey and Arab nations, while also opening the door for maintaining relations with Assad's top military backers, Russia and Iran, and avoiding a direct confrontation with Israel.

As for the fate of U.S. troops in Syria, Trump has avoided offering any decisive responses.

Of the two U.S. partners on the ground, however, the SDF appears to be in a more precarious position than the SFA due to Trump's stated desire to deal with Turkey, but the leverage of both groups may ultimately be linked to the next administration's Syria policy.

SDF refutes claims by the ‘Syrian Network for Human Rights’

SDF said that disinformation spread by the “Syrian Network for Human Rights” seeks to obscure the crimes committed by Turkish-backed mercenaries.


ANF
NEWS DESK
Thursday, 2 January 2025

The Media Center of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) released a statement refuting misleading information published by the so-called ‘Syrian Network for Human Rights’.

“The so-called “Syrian Network for Human Rights,” operating out by Turkey, has falsely claimed that three members of one family were killed in the village of Al-Qashla, southeast of Manbij, and attributed the crime to our forces. This systematic disinformation seeks to obscure the crimes committed by Turkish-backed mercenaries who were in control of the village at the time of the crime,” said the SDF statement, which further included the following:

“Ten days ago, and after our forces entered Al-Qashla and cleared it of the so-called “Al-Amshat” and “Al-Hamzat” mercenary groups, we discovered the bodies of three civilians—Muhammad Al-Khalil Al-Ayyoub, his wife, and their son, Suleiman.

Investigations revealed that these individuals were executed by Turkish-backed mercenaries after resisting attempts to loot their home and property. This is just one of many atrocities committed by Turkish-backed groups in Manbij in recent days, which have included looting, robbery, kidnapping, and even raping. These crimes have been documented and published with residents providing video evidence.

The disinformation spread by the so-called “Syrian Network for Human Rights” enables the actual perpetrators to evade accountability. This biased reporting has ignored hundreds of crimes committed by Turkish-backed mercenary groups in Afrin, Manbij, and other areas, allowing these atrocities to continue unchecked. Such bias undermines victims’ rights to justice and accountability, perpetuating a cycle of violence and impunity.”

Kurdistan: A double-edged sword for Turkey


In a rapidly changing political environment, the fate of Kurdistan is now shaping the future of the Middle East. Turkey’s century-long repression of the Kurds, argues Loqman Radpey, is now posing a critical dilemma: either embrace de jure recognition of Kurdistan and Kurdish rights, or risk escalating tensions and instability

Superficial gestures, entrenched repression

Evolving dynamics in the New Middle East put Turkey and Iran in a precarious position regarding the Kurds. Historically, both states have remained staunch in their denial of Kurdish rights and identity. But they must now adjust to a regional landscape in which the Kurdistan problem is no longer confined within their borders.

In the past, both countries have occasionally signalled outreach to Kurds. Yet these gestures were superficial, overshadowed by ongoing repression and political exclusion, notably Turkey’s removal of elected Kurdish mayors in the Bakûr (north) region of Kurdistan.

For Turkey in particular, how to deal with Kurdistan is no longer a domestic issue, but a crossroads decision that could define the country’s future role in the wider region. Turkey faces a choice: engage with the Kurds and their rights with genuine and substantive constitutional reforms, or continue its stance of denial. Each path comes with profound consequences.

Constitutional barriers to Kurdish rights

If Turkey truly wants to address the Kurdistan question, it must first make sweeping constitutional changes. In particular, it must change provisions in its constitution that define Turkey as being exclusively ‘Turkish’.

Turkishness is enshrined in the constitutional preamble, and reinforced by Articles 3, 9, and 70. Article 3, which declares the Turkish language supreme, is constitutionally non-amendable. Article 4 bars any discussion of amending core identity-based provisions. Articles 9 and 70, meanwhile, reserve juridical authority and public service for ‘every Turk’. All this reinforces the primacy of Turkish identity in public and civic life, effectively excluding Kurdish (or any other) identity.


For Turkey to recognise Kurdish identity meaningfully, it must change provisions in its constitution that define Turkey as being exclusively ‘Turkish’

Constitutional reform would need to eliminate these ethnocentric policies, redefining Turkey’s national identity. For Turkey to recognise Kurdish identity meaningfully, these articles would need an overhaul that affirms the Kurdish people as a distinct nation within the state. Such changes would require the Turkish state to discard long-held principles of ethnic homogeneity. This would mean acknowledging Kurdish culture, language, and political rights as an integral part of Turkey’s social fabric. It would not be a simple act of legislative revision, but a cultural shift. Indeed, it would mark a major re-education of Turkish society, and a revision of the century-long erasure of Kurdish history.

Systemic state-sponsored ethnocentrism

Any such shift would face fierce opposition, especially from deeply rooted nationalist factions. Decades of state-sponsored ethnocentrism have created a pervasive mindset that denies Kurdish history and aspirations. Changing this is unlikely in the short term, because the Turkish state has shaped the country’s collective memory through education, media, and official history.

Turkey’s refusal to recognise the Armenian genocide also suggests it will resist confronting its poor treatment of the Kurds. Convincing Turkish society — particularly its nationalist core — to accept such a dramatic transformation would be a formidable challenge. Many Turks would perceive such change as a betrayal of Turkey’s founding principles.


Decades of state-sponsored ethnocentrism have created a pervasive mindset that denies Kurdish history and aspirations

The second option for Turkey is to continue its policy of denial. For decades, even the term ‘Kurd’ was banned from the public lexicon. Kurdish people were instead referred to euphemistically as ‘Mountain Turks’. Only after the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq in 2003 did Turkey acknowledge any Kurdish entity, and even then, it was acknowledged only outside its borders: ‘Kurdistan is in Northern Iraq, Go there!’

This denialist stance allowed Turkey to externalise the Kurdistan issue. By relegating it to another state’s territory, Turkey could continue its domestic policy of repression.

A shifting Middle East

Turkey’s strategy of denial, however, is becoming less tenable as regional dynamics shift. The political landscape in the Middle East has evolved significantly. Kurdish forces (Peshmerga, YPJ, and YPG) are gaining recognition and influence, particularly in the Başûr (south) and Rojava (west) regions of Kurdistan, in Iraq and Syria, respectively. Kurdish entities now play essential roles in combatting extremism and terrorism, advocating for democratic governance, and securing regional stability. As Kurds attract international support, and Kurdish aspirations for self-determination gain visibility, Turkey’s continued refusal to recognise even minimal Kurdish autonomy, if not outright independence, could result in diplomatic isolation.


Turkey’s continued refusal to recognise even minimal Kurdish autonomy risks diplomatic isolation

The Turkish Republic was established on principles of ethno-nationalism, built by suppressing diverse national identities, including the Kurds, Armenians, and Greeks. Turks envisaged a monolithic republic grounded in the singular identity of a ‘Turkish Nation’ (as in the original text of the preamble to the Turkish Constitution). However, a century of repression has only amplified Kurdish demands for recognition. It has turned what was once a suppressed movement into a substantial regional force.

Kurdistan: Turkey at a crossroads

Kurdistan has become a litmus test for Turkey’s adaptability. Continuing to deny Kurdish legitimacy may provide short-term security, but it risks long-term isolation and unrest. Iran also has a history of Kurdish repression and denial in the Rojhilat (east) region of Kurdistan. Iran’s internal fragile dynamics, numerous nationalities and ongoing domestic unrest add yet more layers of complexity.

The architects of modern Turkey and Iran are unlikely to have predicted that Kurdistan would threaten to destabilise the very states they sought to consolidate. Now, whichever way those involved turn, the double-edged sword of Kurdistan could strike deeply.

This article presents the views of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the ECPR or the Editors of The Loop.

Author

Loqman Radpey

PhD in International Law, University of Edinburgh

Loqman is a Middle East Forum fellow.

Since 2013, he has focused extensively on the Kurdistan case and the international legal and political dimensions of the right to self-determination for peoples and nations.

Loqman has made contributions to ASIL Insights, Oxford University Politics Blog, EJIL:Talk, Oxford Human Rights Hub, Opinio Juris, and various press outlets, including ABC News, The National, Times of Israel, Die Zeit, and The Jerusalem Post.

Personal website

@LoqmanRadpey

Loqman's book Towards an Independent Kurdistan: Self-Determination in International Law (Routledge, 2023) offers a Middle Eastern perspective on the right of self-determination.

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Turkiye Researcher Ok: Resolving the Kurdish question will unlock avenues for economic development

Researcher and writer Sinan Ok said that one of the main reasons for the economic crisis is the transfer of the country's resources to security expenditures.


ANF
NEWS DESK
Friday, 3 January 2025, 

Researcher and writer Sinan Ok, known for his recent work in economics and dismissed from his position at the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK) in 2016 over alleged “links to an illegal organization,” spoke to ANF about the economy, the minimum wage, and the talks surrounding the solution to the Kurdish question.

What would you say are the root causes of Turkey’s economic crisis?

One of the primary drivers of Turkey’s economic crisis is the diversion of national resources from public services to security expenditures. The Kurdish question, in particular, is a critical factor that directly impacts the economy. This issue, which is present since the times of the Ottoman Empire and later the Turkish Republic, has stymied economic growth and hindered the development of society by putting substantial budgets into security and diplomatic efforts. Since the 1990s, the internationalization of the Kurdish question meant it has shifted from a domestic challenge into a central element of Turkey’s foreign policy.

How has the Kurdish question shaped Turkey’s domestic politics?

The Kurdish question has profoundly influenced not only Turkey’s domestic policies but also its foreign policy priorities. In nearly all of Turkey’s major diplomatic issues, from NATO membership to EU candidacy, the Kurdish question has played a pivotal role. In the early years, the problem was dismissed under narratives denying the existence of Kurds. However, by the 1990s, Kurds began to assert themselves as active participants in this narrative. Although the peace process marked a significant turning point, the resurgence of security-centric policies after 2015 and the termination of the peace process have greatly escalated Turkey’s economic and political costs.

How has the AKP’s approach to the Kurdish question evolved?

When the AKP first came to power, Turkey’s economic situation was dire. However, during the early 2000s, steps toward a resolution of the Kurdish issue were initiated, and the issue gained greater visibility in domestic politics. During that period, the AKP secured both domestic and international support by signaling a willingness to address the Kurdish question through reforms. Yet after 2015, the peace process was abandoned, and the government reverted to a security-focused approach. Since then, the AKP has leveraged the Kurdish question as both a tool for legitimizing its domestic authority and as a justification for asserting Turkey’s national security priorities on the international stage.

What do the economic data and minimum wage trends reveal about Turkey’s post-2016 trajectory?

Post-2016, Turkey’s economic crisis has deepened, and the purchasing power of the minimum wage has dropped significantly. For example, while the minimum wage exceeded $500 between 2012 and 2014, it had fallen to $347 by 2022. This decline is largely attributed to the financial burdens of Turkey’s foreign policy, particularly its military interventions in Syria. The depreciation of the minimum wage against the dollar reflects broader trends of economic uncertainty at home and diplomatic instability abroad. While the minimum wage has been adjusted to hover around $500 in 2024, its sustainability will depend on interest rate adjustments and broader economic policy shifts.

How do you view the connection between the peace process and the economic crisis?

The peace process offered significant opportunities for economic growth. For example, during the 2012–2014 period, the minimum wage remained above $500, reflecting the positive economic impact of this initiative. However, the cessation of the peace process and the resurgence of security-focused policies after 2016 ushered in a period of profound economic crisis. This shift diminished public purchasing power and stifled the country’s long-term economic potential. Resolving the Kurdish question is not only essential for fostering peace within society, but also for unlocking avenues for economic development. If Turkey can genuinely address this issue and the realities of the Kurdish people, the Kurdish language, and Kurdistan, it could break free from its political and economic stagnation.

What solutions do you propose for Turkey’s future?

To overcome its economic crises and achieve long-term stability, Turkey must resolve the Kurdish question through peaceful means. This is not merely an ethnic matter but a cornerstone of the country’s democratization process. Recognizing the existence of Kurds, the Kurdish language, and Kurdistan would have transformative effects on Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies alike. Such a resolution, grounded in justice, equality, and human rights, would pave the way for broader transformation in society. Turkey’s entrenched democratic and legal crises can only be addressed through this approach. Ultimately, an honorable resolution would not only address the Kurdish question but also serve as a pathway to prosperity for the entire nation.

What is your opinion on the role of Abdullah Öcalan?

Abdullah Öcalan has long been recognized as a key figure in the resolution process. Both domestic and international actors seem to acknowledge the critical role he could play in addressing this issue. However, the matter is not solely about one individual’s role. It also involves designing a comprehensive peace process that engages society as a whole. Should Turkey genuinely commit to resolving this issue, economic and democratic reforms could offer a brighter future for all segments of the population.

KURDISH RESISTANCE

KCK Bayik: An alternative to the Turkish government is possible with a right approach to the Kurdish question

The Kurdish question is Turkey’s biggest challenge. "If solved, it will give Turkey great momentum, but if it is not, it will turn into an even bigger burden for the country," said Cemil Bayik.


ANF
BEHDINAN
Friday, 3 January 2025

In the fourth part of this interview with ANF, Cemil Bayik, co-chair of the KCK Executive Council, said that the Kurdish question is Turkey’s biggest challenge. "If solved, - he added - it will give Turkey great momentum, but if it is not, it will turn into an even bigger burden for the country."

The first part of this interview can be read here, the second here, and the third here.

While, on the one hand, the genocidal policies against the Kurds are continued with full intensity, on the other hand, there are statements by Devlet Bahceli on the Kurdish question. What point has politics in Turkey reached with regard to the Kurdish question? Is there any change in the approach to the issue on the part of the ruling parties and the opposition, especially the CHP?

The Kurdish question is Turkey’s biggest problem. If it is solved, it will give Turkey a great momentum, but if it is not, it will turn into an even bigger shackle for the country. So far the Kurdish question is a big shackle because there has been no will on the part of the state to create a solution. Denial and extermination have been the only methods used by it. It is obvious that this has only deepened the problem and aggravated the shackles on Turkey’s feet. Although they are aware of this, they still insist on continuing the genocide against the Kurds. This shows the existence of a deeply rooted mentality. And this goes hand in hand with a circle of people in the state who can only hold on to their position and power because of the lack of solution to the Kurdish question.

There is no doubt that the political dimension bears the main responsibility for the Kurdish question becoming so deep and remaining unsolved. The politics in Turkey does not have an attitude that solves problems, develops methods, and creates development. A state-centered, rather than society-centered, understanding of politics has persisted, and the nationalist, monist nation state ideology has made Turkish politics reactionary and inefficient. There is a political reality in Turkey that consists of a refusal to see and deal with problems like the Kurdish question in all their depth and with all their dimensions. Looking from the past to the present, one can easily see that there has not been much change in Turkish politics, but there has been a certain change in Turkish society. Despite all the fascist special war that is being waged against it, there has been a change in Turkish society. Our struggle in particular and our paradigm have a significant impact on it. Again, despite all the disinformation and perception operations, the developments in Rojava are also affecting Turkish society. The contribution of democratic politics should also be mentioned in this respect. Society is ahead of politics in Turkey. This is a serious paradox.

There is no change in the government’s approach. On the contrary, the AKP-MHP government is trying to deepen the politics of genocide and finalize it. The most concrete indicator of this is the government’s approach to Rojava. In view of these facts, it would be extremely wrong to perceive Devlet Bahceli’s statements as a change in political approach. At the moment, we are in a period in which special war is predominant. The approach of the state and the government to Rêber Apo [Abdullah Öcalan] and the Kurdish question has not gone beyond the concept of special war. The state and the government have not developed a new approach to the Kurdish question.

It is crucial for opposition politics to approach the Kurdish question correctly. If politics is to be done in Turkey, if there is to be an alternative to the government, this is only possible by approaching the Kurdish question correctly and defending the democratic solution of it. If the opposition in Turkey cannot develop an alternative politics to the government’s politics, it is because it does not approach the Kurdish question correctly. If alternative politics is to defend and fight for at least minimum democratic principles, the way to do this in Turkey is to approach the Kurdish question correctly and defend its democratic solution. Recently, it is seen that some opposition parties have developed more positive approaches than in the past; while this is positive, there is still no holistic, determined, and solution-oriented approach. In general, the political parties have not overcome their pragmatic approach to the Kurds and the Kurdish question. Nationalist, monist mentality has a prevailing impact on politics. This prevents the correct approach to the Kurdish question and the development of its democratic solution.

There is a struggle by democratic politics for Turkish politics to get out of the influence of the nationalist, monist, and statist mentality and to adopt an approach that takes into account social reality. This has had, to a certain extent, a positive influence, especially on the opposition parties. In the past, as the HDP and now as the DEM Party, both the political struggle waged and the political strategy pursued have an impact on the opposition parties in Turkey. The method implemented in the municipal elections under the name of urban consensus has yielded positive results. These approaches developed by democratic politics positively affect the style and politics of opposition parties.

The CHP came out as the leading party in the last election. Especially from this position, it should take the most responsibility for solving the problems of the country. Turkish society has put forward its expectations in favor of the CHP. If the CHP acts on the basis of this responsibility, it will receive even more support from society. Considering the fact that the existence of the Kurdish question is the basis of all problems in Turkey, the future of the CHP, whether it will be an alternative government or not, will be determined by its approach to the Kurdish question. If it is mistakenly assumed that any problem in Turkey can be solved while denying and ignoring the existence of the Kurdish question and without taking the democratic solution of the Kurdish question as a basis, it will not be possible for the CHP or any other opposition party to make any progress. The future of the CHP will be determined by its approach to the Kurdish question. As far as we follow it, the new leadership of the CHP has a positive approach to the solution of the Kurdish question. There is a difference in approach compared to the past. What is important is that this is transformed into a democratic program.

Following the conclusion of the municipal elections, the government put into effect the trustee policy. The arrest of elected co-mayors and the trustee policy has now also spread to municipalities governed by the CHP. How should this trustee policy be understood? What can the struggle against it and the underlying mentality look like?

There is much debate about what the appointment of trustees means, but the important aspect is to have an attitude against it and to develop a struggle against it. Trusteeship does not only consist of usurping municipalities, it is the will of the people that is being usurped. In the current system in Turkey, the will of the people is not accepted; to the state, it does not exist. Therefore, it is neither democratic nor legitimate. With the appointment of trustees to municipalities by the state, the dismissal of elected officials, their arrest, and imprisonment, democracy has been completely shelved. This practice is the work of the AKP-MHP government. With the AKP-MHP government, there is not even a trace of representative democracy, which is called bourgeois democracy. The fact that the appointment of trustees is now also developed against CHP municipalities reveals the understanding of the government and shows that the government wants to adjust the CHP by intimidating and threatening. It wants the CHP to turn away from its relationship with the DEM Party. The AKP-MHP government is aware that an opposition that engages with the Kurds and the democratic forces in Turkey is an alternative to itself and is afraid of this. It is trying to prevent this with its practice of appointing trustees.

But for sure, the practice of appointing trustees is a fruitless practice. It is a sign of bankrupt politics. In the municipal elections on March 31, the people gave the necessary answer to the trustees and the ones that push forward the mentality behind all of this. In the words of the people, the trustees were sent away. However, the state and the government have not given up, they insist on Kurdish genocide. This is the main reason why they have started to reappoint the trustees that were sent away by the people. Everyone who opposes the trustee practice must approach the Kurdish question in a holistic, determined, and courageous manner. Overcoming the monist, authoritarian, and reactionary mentality in Turkey and the development of democratization is only possible by embracing the democratic solution of the Kurdish question. As long as this is avoided, the monist, authoritarian, and reactionary mentality will gradually envelop and suffocate the entire society and politics of Turkey. The appointment of trustees to CHP municipalities reveals this reality.

With the appointment of trustees, the AKP-MHP government is also trying to take revenge for the outcome of the municipal elections. It is clearly punishing the people. The society of Turkey, especially the Kurdish people, is aware of this reality and reacts strongly against it. The society is very disturbed by the practice of appointing trustees and this approach of the AKP-MHP government. It is also trying to reflect this discomfort. However, this discomfort in society needs to be organized and put into action. The example of Wan (tr. Van) shows that when this happens, the government is forced to take a step back. In this respect, there must be a strong sense of responsibility, and an according attitude is needed to be developed.

In addition to the genocidal attacks on the political dimension, the extensive special warfare on Kurdish society, particularly targeting women and youth, continues. However, despite this, Kurdish society, pioneered by women and the youth, takes to the streets. In 2024, what kind of concept did the AKP-MHP fascist government implement against the peoples of Kurdistan? What approach and resistance should the Kurdish people develop against this?

The so-called ‘collapse plan’ that was set into action by the Turkish government envisioned the massacre of the Kurdish people. It was aimed to realize genocide by destroying all the resistance centers of society. In order for this plan to succeed, on the one hand, annihilation attacks were carried out against the movement and the guerrillas, and on the other hand, the law was totally pushed aside, and the Kurdish people were attacked with violence that surpassed everything that had been before. Intense physical violence was developed. Society was intimidated by trustee appointments, detentions, arrests, oppression, torture, executions, and all kinds of other threats.

Also, the attacks on the nature of Kurdistan should be considered within the scope of this physical violence. There is a reckless attack on the nature of Kurdistan, and this attack is within the scope of Kurdish genocide. The geography of Kurdistan is not only plundered but also made uninhabitable and dehumanized. Society was wanted to rot from within through psychological special warfare. Drugs, prostitution, spying, and all kinds of degradation methods were developed within this framework. Women and young people in particular were the main targets of this, and thereby the decay of society was aimed at. Disinformation and perception-building activities were intensified on the public. Paramilitary structures, collaborator agents, mafia, JITEM-derived counter-organizations, special military, police organizations, the national intelligence service, and many more structures that would put this special psychological warfare into practice, with an intensity exceeding the one in the 90s, were moved to Kurdistan. With all these physical and psychological attacks, the Kurdish people were tried to be forced on their knees. But this policy didn’t succeed, and the state did not get the result it expected. The Kurdish people did not give up their stance of struggle, patriotism, and freedom. Let alone falling back from these, it has raised the struggle even higher. With the global freedom campaign for the physical freedom of Rêber Apo and the democratic solution to the Kurdish question, it has made its struggle more known to the whole world and received more support from the peoples and women of the world. However, one must always be aware of the fact that the enemy has not given up on his efforts to destroy us and continues to increase its physical and psychological special warfare attacks. And one must be aware that psychological and special warfare are much more destructive than any physical attack. That is why the enemy pushes it so much. Knowing this, it is necessary to develop more awareness and organizational work against the enemy’s special war policies.